S/PV.1273 Security Council

At the end of its last meeting, the Council decided to postpone its decision concerning the adoption of the agenda until this afternoon. Before the Council proceeds to the vote, I shall call on the representative of Jordan who wishes to supplement the statement he made yesterday.

I should first like to express my delegation’s appreciation and thanks to the representatives on the Security Council for their patience and for not opposing my proposal to delay the voting until today. 3. My delegation strongly supports all efforts aimed at attaining peace and bona fide justice in Viet-Nam on the basis of the Geneva Agreements, whether such efforts are initiated within the United Nations or outside it, My delegation sincerely believes that the mere adoption of the agenda on Viet-Nam does not in any way prejudice the substance of, or the principles involved in, the issue. It has been Jordan’s consistent stand that the Security Council, whinh is the primary organ for maintaining peace and se urity, should avail itself of the opportunity to debate and examine an issue of such great concern an’. gravity as the Viet- Namese question. Perhaps suck. a debate or examination will serve only as a pr ;liminary step to a final course of action. The Char’ar of the United Nations was Jordan’s sole argurrdnt in insisting that the Security Council should be seized of the Dominican Republic case when tbj question of the Dominican Prhr’dent: M. Akira MATSUI (Japan). Pr&ents: Les rep&sentants des Etats suivants: Argentine, Bulgarie, Chine, Etats-Unis d’Am&ique, France; Japon, Jordanie, Mali, Nighria, Nouvelle- Z Blande , Ouganda, Pays-Bas, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord, Union des Rhpubliques socialistes sovi&iques et Uruguay. Ordre du jour provisoire (S/Agenda/l273) 1. Adoption de l’ordre du jour. 2. Lettre, en date du 31 janvier 1966, adressee au President du Conseil de s&uritb par le rep&- sentant permanent des Etats-Unis d’Am&ique aupr’es de I’Organisation des Nations Unies (S/7105). Adoption de I’ordre du jour 1. Le PRESIDENT: A la fin denotrederniere sbance, le Conseil a d&id6 de reporter B cet apr&s-midi sa decision a propos de l’adoption de l’ordre du jour. Avant de passer au vote, je donne la parole au repr& sentant de la Jordanie qui d&sire complbter les observations qu’il a pr6sent8es hier. 2. M. SADI (Jordanie) [traduit de l’anglais]: Je voudrais tout d’abcrd remercier les membres du Conseil, au nom de ma dhlbgation, d’avoir bien voulu accepter de dtffi?rer le vote jusqu% aujourd’hui, comme je l’avais proposb. 3. Ma dhlbgation appuie fermement tous les efforts visant ;2 assurer la paix et une justice vgritable au Viet-Nam, sur la base des Accords de Gen&ve, que ces efforts soient entrepris dans le cadre de l’Organisation des Nations Unies ou ailleurs. Ma dglhgation croit sincerement que la simple inscription a l’ordre du jour de la question du Viet-Nam ne saurait pr8- juger, en aucune facon, le fond du probl??me ni les principes en cause, La Jordanie a toujours estimi! que le Conseil de sScuriti:, qui a la responsabiliti! principale du maintien de la paix et de la s$curitb, devait saisir l’occasion d’examiner et de mettre en discussion un problBme d’une importance et d’une graviti! aussi exceptionnelles que celui du Viet-Nam. Peut-Btre ces debats et cet examen ne feront-ils que p&parer la decision finale. Lorsque la Jordanie a demandi! que le Conseil de si?curiti! se saisisse de la question de la situation en RBpublique Domini- US with an opportunity to resolve the issues of fact which are the roots of the case. Perhaps, as was pointed out by some representatives here in the Council, there are sufficient reasons to warrant the belief that a discussion of the Viet-Namese question here in the United Nations would be useless. However, for the sake of objectivity, my delegation contends that it is perhaps equally valid to state that there are sufficient reasons to warrant the belief that any such debate would not be harmful, an! this is good enough for my delegation, My delegation, therefore, will support the adoption of the agenda on Vi&-Nam. 5. Mr, FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation considers it necessary to reaffirm most vigorously its objection to the convening of the Security Council to discuss the question of Viet-Nam and declares that it is opposed to the inclusion of this question in the Council’s agenda, We would remind the members of the Council that the Geneva Agreements of 1954U must be strictly observed; it is within the framework of these Agreements that the question of Viet-Nam must be settled, with the participation of all parties concerned. 6. The Viet-Nam problem can be settled only on the basis of strict compliance with those Agreements, the adoption of the just and well-founded programme of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the National Front for the Liberation of SouthViet-Nam concerning conditions for a political settlement and the participation in the solution of the problem of the National Liberation Front, the only genuine representative of the people of South Viet-Nam. 7. In this connexion, we should like to draw the Council’s attention to the message dated 24 January 1966 from Ho Chi Minh, the President of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, in which he points out that in 1954 the United States of America made a solemn promise in Geneva to refrain from violating the Geneva Agreements by the threat or use of force and it is the ‘violation of that undertaking by the United ‘States and its unleashing of aggressive war in Viet-Nam that has resulted in such tragic consequences, In his message, President Ho Chi Minh goes on to say: “The United States of America maintains that it is respecting the Geneva Agreements. One of the basic provisions of those Agreements, however, prohibits the introduction of foreign troops into Viet- Nam. If the United States is really respecting the u Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indo-China, signed on 20 July 1954 at the Geneva Conference on the Problem of Restoring Peace in Indo-China; see Further Documents relating to the discussion of Indo-China at the Geneva Conference, Cmd. 9239 (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, August 1954). 5. M. FEDORENKO (Union des Republiques socialistes soviirtiques) [traduit du russe]: LYJnion sovi&- tique estime necessaire de rQit&rer avec la plus grande energie ses objections centre la convocation du Conseil de sbcuritb aux fins d’examen de la question du Viet-Nam et se prononce centre l’inscription de cette question & l’ordre du jour du Conseil de &curit& Nous nous permettons de rappeler aux membres du Conseil la n$cessitg d’observer’ rigoureusement les Accords de Genbve de 1954g, car c’est dans le cadre de ces accords que le probl’eme vietnamien doit Btre r&olu, avec la participation de toutes les parties intGres&es. 6. Le rbglement du problBme vietnamien n’est passible que si l’on applique scrupuleusement ces accords, que si l’on accepte le programme juste et pertinent de la Rhpublique democratique du Viet-Nam et du Front national de lib&ration du Viet-Nam du Sud concernant les conditions d’un rbglement politique, que si le Front national de lib&ation, seul rep&- sentant authentique de la population du Viet-Nam du Sud est associi: &. la solution de ce problbme. 7. Nous voudrions appeler a cet Qgard l’attention des membres du Conseil de &curitd sur un message du Prgsident de la RBpublique dhmocratique du Viet- Nam, Ho Chi Minh, date du 24 janvier 1966, oh il souligne qulen 1954 les Etats-Unis se sent solennellement engages a Gen&ve B s’abstenir de toute violation des Accords de Genijve par la menace ou par l’emploi de la force, et que c’est pr&is&ment la violation de cet engagement par les Etats-Unis et le d$clenchement par ce pays d’une guerre d’agression au Viet-Nam qui ont conduit a des con&?quences tragiques. Le pr&ident Ho Chi Minh dgclare dans son message: “Les Etats-Unis d’Ambrique affirment qu’ils respectent les Accords de Genbve. Mais l’une des principales clauses de ces accords interdit l’introduction de troupes gtrangbres au Viet-Nam. Si les Etats-Unis d’hmhrique entendent respecter vrai- L/ Accords sur la cessation des hostilir6s en Indochine, sign&s le 20 juillet 1954 B la Confkence de Geneve sur le probleme du rktablissement de la paix en Indochlne; voir La Documentation fran$aise, Notes et Etudes documentaires, No 1.909 du 18 aodt 1954. 8. Thus, it is obvious that the diversionary manoeuvre which the United States is at present attempting to carry out in the Security Council by seeking to bring the question of Viet-Nam before the Council is aimed primarily at concealing the fact that the United States is violating the Geneva Agreements, evading its obligation to fulfil those Agreements and, ultimately, undermining the only possible basis for a peaceful settlement of the Viet-Nam problem-the basis which is to be found in the Agreements. 9. That is how the matter stands today, and those members of the Security Council who are in favour of a truly peaceful settlement of the Vfet-Nam problem must, of cource, carefully consider the great responsibility that is theirs in this connexion. 10. The Soviet delegation is gratified to note that the truly realistic and peace-loving position of the Soviet Union with regard to the solution of the Viet- Nam problem has met with wide support among the members of the Security Council. We are pleased to see that it is supported by a permanent member of the Security Council-France-and by a number of other delegations, including those of Bulgaria, Mali and, to a certain extent, Uganda and Nigeria, It has been stressed in the Council that the settlement of the question must be based on the Geneva Agreements and that it must be achieved with the participation of all interested parties, including the National Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam. In this connexion, I should like to quote from a message setting forth the position of the National Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam. 11. The National Liberation Front today published a statement in connexion with the request by the United States Government for the situation in Viet-Nam to be discussed in the Council. In its statement, the National Liberation Front declares that the Security Council has no right to take any decision concerning the problems of the South Viet-Namese people and that all resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council on the question of Viet- Nam will be null and void as far as the National Liberation Front is concerned. The statement, transmitted by the Viet-Namese information agency, stresses that the only just decision for the restoration of peace in South Viet-Nam is the withdrawal from South Viet-Nam of all troops of the United States and its satellites, and the dismantling of all United States military bases there, so that the 8. 11 va saris dire qu’en s’efforgant de saisir le Conseil de &cur-it6 de la question du Viet-Nam les Etats-Unis dlAm6rique tentent aujourd’hui au Conseil une manceuvre de diversion par laquelle ils cherchent avant tout B dissimuler le fait qu’ils violent les Accords de Geni3ve et a se d6rober a leur obligation d’appliquer ces accords, a saper en definitive la seule base possible en vue d’un reglement pacifique du psobleme vietnamien - celle que constituent ces accords. 9. Voilh comment la question se presente aujourd’hui, et il est clair que ceux des membres du Conseil de securite qui se prononcent pour un r’eglement veritablement pacifique du probleme vietnamien doivent soigneusement peser toute la responsabilit6 qui leur incombe B cet Bgard. 10. La delegation sovietique se plaft b constater que la position vraiment realiste et pacifique adoptee par 1YJnion sovietique touchant la solution du prob&me vietnamien a bbn6fici6 d’un large soutien de la part des membres du Conseil de s$curitB. Nous notons avec satisfaction que cette position a repu l’appui de la France, membre permanent du Conseil de securite, ainsi que d’autres representants, notamment oeux de la Bulgarie et du Mali et, dans une certaine mesure, ceux de 1’Ouganda et du Nigeria. On a souligni: au tours des d6bats du Conseil la neoessit6 de resoudre le probleme sur la base des Accords de Geneve, la necessite d’associer au reglement du probleme vietnamien toutes les parties interessees, y compris le Front national de liberation du Viet-Nam du Sud. Je voudrais h cet 6gard titer une depbche concernant la position du Front national de liberation du Viet-Nam du Sud. 11. Le Front national de liberation a publie aujourd’hui une declaration B propos de la pretention du Gouvernement americain de faire examiner la situation au Viet-Nam par le Conseil de securite. Dans cette declaration, le Front national de libbration note que le Conseil de securiti: n’a pas le droit de prendre des d&cisions sur des questions interessant le peuple du Viet-Nam du Sud et que toutes les r&solutions du Conseil de securiti! concernant la question du Viet-Nam seront nulles et non avenues pour le Front national de libgration. Cette declaration, qui a et6 diffusbe par l’agence vietnamienne d’information souligne egalement que la seule solution juste en vue du r6tablissement de la paix au Viet-Nam c’est le retrait du Viet-Nam du Sud de toutes les forces armees des Etats-Unis et de leurs satellites, la suppression de toutes les bases militaires am& 13. Could there be a more revealing picture of the United States that this new-found American “angel of peace” which its ominous load of bombs under its wings? The so-called pause in the bombing of North Viet-Nam by the United States was nothing but a bluff for purposes of propaganda, 14. The facts and the activities of the United States, which is carrying out aggressive military actions in Viet-Nam, show more clearly than words that the United States not only does not want a truly peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam, but is now attempting, by staging. a propaganda farce in the Security Council, to obtain some kind of justification-a blank check as it were-for the further expansion of its aggressive war in Viet-Nam. But these expectations are vain. 15. In the present situation we consider it necessary to express the hope that the members of the Security Council will not be led along hy those who, speculating on the desire of the peoples for peace, are in fact trying to secure some sort of prior dispensation for continuing and extending the aggressive war in Viet-Nam, and that they will not become involved in the diplomatic machinations of Washington, which are actually nothing more than a masking man&uvre in the plans of the Pentagon. 16. The continuing roar of United States bombs which are exploding in Viet-Nam at this very moment, while the Security Council is meeting, the Press reports of the marauding raids carried out by the air pirates who are dropping their lethal loads on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and the disclosure by very highly-placed persons in the United States of plans for escalating the war in Viet-Nam all testify to the fact that the demagogic ‘United States declarations are calculated to deceive, in order to involve the Security Council ati exploit it for the purpose of concealing the expanding United States aggression in Viet-Nam. 1%‘. That is the true state of affairs. The members of the Security Council will, of couxce, reach the appropriate conclusions and will reject the bid that is being made by the United States in the attempt to use the authority of the United Nations as a cover. 13. Comment, dans ces conditions, les EtatS-UniS pourraient-ils mieux se dbmasquer eux-memes qu’en nous offrant l’image, si j’ose dire, de cet ange aIn& ricain frais $moulu porteur d’une sinistre CargaiSOn de bombes sous ses ailes? Quant & lap&endue pause observ&e par les Etats-Unis d’Am&ique dans 1eS bombardements du Viet-Nam ‘du Nord, elle n’est rien d’autre qu’un bluff servant des fins de propagande. 14. Les faits et gestes des Etats-Unis, qui intensifient les operations militaires offensives au Viet- Nam, montrent plus gloquemment que toutes les paroles que les Etats-Unis, loin de souhaiter un vgritable rhglement pacifique au Viet-Nam, cherchent maintenant, en montant une farce a des fins de propagande au Conseil de s&zurit& % se faire di?livrer une sorte de justification, de chbque en blanc pour i%endre encore leur guerre d’agression au Viet- Nam. Mais ce sont l& de vaines esphrances! 15. Dans les ciroonstances prbsentes nous crayons devoir former le voeu que les membres du Consiil de s$curith ne suivront pas ceux qui, spi%ulant sur le desir de paix des peuples, tentent en fait de s’assurer d’avance de l’impunitit pour prolonger et 6tendre la guerre dlagression au Viet-Nam, nous espijroris que les membres du Conseil ne se laisseront pas entratier dans les machinations diplomatiques de Washington qui ne sont en rbaliti: qu’une manceuvre de oouverture dans les plans du Pentagone. 16. Le fracas des bombes am&icainesqui continuent d’exploser au Viet-Nam en ce moment mQme, pendant que le Conseil de sbcurit& est ici r&ni, les di$pkhes de presse sur les raids de brigandage des pirates de l’air qui lachent leurs cargaisons m&rtri&res sur le territoire de la Republique dbmocratique du Viet- Nam et les pronostics de hautes personnalites am& ricaines au sujet de plans visant B intensifier la guerre au Viet-Nam montrent que la demagogic des dgclarations ambricaines est desti&e & tromper l’opinion publique, que l’on cherche B entrafher le Conseil dans cette affaire et a se servir de lui afin de dissimuler l’agression amitricaine qui s’intensifie au Viet-Nam. 17. Telle est la vbritable situation. Les membres du Conseil ne manqueront pas de ditgager les conclusions qui s’imposent et de rejeter les sollicitations des Ecats-Unis qui cherchent a se couvrir de l’autorite de I’Organisation des Nations Unies. 19. I would merely at the moment content myself with saying that I reject completely his statement that the United States has violated the Geneva Agreements, I should like to remind everyone that at the time the Geneva Agreements were adopted the United States did’make a statement, which the representative of the Soviet Union read only in part. The part that he omitted reading was: n.. .it [the United States] would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid Agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security. I’ y 20. The facts with reference to who is responsible for the violation of the Geneva Agreements can be reviewed in detail, and I shall be glad to review them at the appropriate time. It suffices to say now that this has been the subject of impartial investigation. The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam, in its Special Report to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo- China, dated 2 June 1962, had this to say about the subject: “It follows that the using of one Zone for the organization or the carrying out of any hostile activites in the other Zone, violations by members of the Armed Porces of one Party of the territory of the other Party, or the commission by any element under the control of one Party of any act dixected against the other Party, would be contrary to the fundamental provisions of the Agreement which enjoin mutual respect for the territories assigned to the two Parties. “(2) Having examined the complaints and the supporting material sent by the South Viet-Namese Mission, the Committee has come to the conclusion that in specific instances there is evidence to show that armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions and other supplies have been sent from the Zone in the North to the Zone in the South with the object of supporting, organizing and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, directed against the Armed Forces and Administration of the Zone in the South. These acts are in violation of Articles 10, 19, 24 and 2’7 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet- Nam. “(3) In examining the complaints and the supporting material, in particular documentary material sent by the South Viet-Namese Mission, the Committee has come to the further conclusion that there is evidence to show that the PAVN”--Regular Forces of North Viet-Nam-@has allowed the Zone in the North to be used for inciting, encouraging and supporting hostile activities in the Zone in the South, aimed at the overthrow of the Administration in the South. g See Further Documents relating to the discussion of Indc-China at the Geneva Conference, Cmd. 9239 (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, August 1954), p, 7. 19. Pour l’instant, je me bornerai B dgclarer que je regrette entibrement ses assertions selon lesquelles les Etats-Unis ont violin! les Accords de Genbve. Je tiens B rappeler a tous que lors de l’adoption des Accords de Geneve, les Etats-Unis oat fait une declaration dont le representant de 1YJnion soviE?- tique n’a mentiontie qu’une partie. Le passage qu’il a omis est le suivant: “. . . ils [les Etats-Unis] envisageraient to&e reprise de l’agression en violation des Accords susmentionn&s avec la plus grande graviti! et comme de nature a menacer &rieusement la paix et la &curitG internationalesg./.” 20. On peut passer les faits en revue pour savoir qui est responsable de la violation des Accords de Geneve, et je serai heureux de le faire au moment opportun. Pour l’instant, je me bornerai a dire que cette question a fait l’objet dlenqu&es impartiales. La Commission internationale de surveillance et de contr8le au Viet-Nam, dans son rapport special aux Copri?sidents de la Conference de Gen&ve sur l’Indochine, date du 2 juin 1962, S’eSt f3XpTimee Comme suit: “11 s’ensuit que l’utilisation d’une zone pour l’organisation ou l’exbcution de toute entreprise hostile dans llautre zone, les violations par les forces armees de l’une des parties du territoire de l’autre, la perpktration par tout elgment sous contrale de llune des parties de tout acte dirige centre l’autre partie, seraient contraires aux dispositions fondamentales de l’dccord qui enjoint aux deux parties le respect mutuel des territoires qui leur sont assign&. ‘12) Ayant examine les plaintes et les preuves aff& rentes envoyGes par la Mission sud-vietnamienne, le Comite est arrivk a la conclusion que, dans des cas sp&ifiques, on a la preuve que du personnel arm& et non armb, des armes, des munitions et d’autres fournitures ont 6% envoy% de la zone Nord dans la zone Sud dans le but de soutenir, d’organiser et dlentreprendre des a&vi& hostiles, y compris les attaques armees dirigSes centre les forces armees et Itadministration de la zone Sud. Ces actes sont en violation des articles 10, 19, 24 et 27 de l’dccord sur la cessation des hostilites au Viet-Nam. “3) En examinant les plaintes et les preuves afferentes, en particulier les documents envoy&s par la Mission sud-vietnamienne, le Cornit% est arrivi? a la nouvelle conclusion que l’on peut faire la preuve que 1’APVN” - les forces rbguli&res du Viet-Nam du Nord - “a permis B la zone Nord d%tre utilisee pour inciter, encourager et soutehir les activit6s hostiles dans la zone Sud. L’utilisation de la zone Nord pour de telles acti- ?!/ Voir La Documentation fransalse, Notes et Etudes documentaires, No 1.901 du 30 juillet 1954, p. 6.

In connexion with the statement by the United States representative, we deem it necessary to reaffirm the position which we set forth just now and to state that it is the United States of America that bears the full weight of responsibility for the violation of the Geneva Agreemerits, 23. The attempt by the United States representative to whitewash the United States aggress& and in some way to justify himself in the Council merely confirms ohce again the fact that it is precisely the United States that is flouting the Geneva Agreements in the most flagrant manner. 24. It is common knowledge that there axe on the territory of South Viet-Nam hosts of United States armed forces which are attempting to crush the people of South Viet-Nam who have risen up in defence of their sovereignty and independence, that there are in South Viet-Nam interventionists and invaders who have come from the United States of America, and that the armed intervention by the United States is, of cdurse, a challenge to the. entire world. There can be no justification whatever fox this disgraceful attempt that is being made by the aggressive forces of the United States to repress a people which has risen up in a struggle for liberation. 25. Washington has torn off its mask of peacemaker by resuming its bombings of the sovereign State of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. 26. No further proof of United States aggression is needed. The guilt is clear and the United States alone is responsible. No attempts by Washington to use the authority of the United Nations as a cover will succeed. Such attempts are doomed to failure, as is the entire ?/See Cmnd. 1755 (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Cffice. June 1962), pp. 6 and 7. 22. M. FEDORENKO (Union des RGpubliques socialistes sovi$tiques) [traduit du russe]: A propos de l’intervention du reprbsentant des Etats-Unis, nous crayons devoir rbit&er la position que nous venons de d6finir et d&zlarer que ce sont les Etats-Unis qui portent l’entibre responsabilit6 de la violation des Accords de Gen&ve. 23. En cherchant ?I blanchir llagression americaine et, en quelque sorte, a la justifier, le reprgsentant des Etats-Unis d’Am8rique n’a fait que confixmex une fois de plus, que ce sont justement les Etats-Unis qui violent de la maniijre laplus flagrante les Accords de Genkve. 24. Chacun sait que toute une armada amgricaine se trouve sur le sol vietnamien oh elle tente d%craser le peuple du Viet-Nam, soulevi? pour la defense de sa souverainetg et de son indgpendance, quY1 y a pr&is&ment au Viet-Nam du Sud des interventionnistes et des occupants Venus des Etats-Unis d’Ami?- rique et que l’intervention arm&e des Eta&-Unis est en dgfinitive un d6fi lancit au monde entier. Rien ne peut justifier cette tentative x&oltante des forces d’agression des Etats-Unis d’Am&ique pour venir B bout d’un peuple soulev6 dans un combat libhrateur. 25. Washington a jetb le masque du pacificateux en reprenant lea bombardements de la RBpublique d8- mocratique du Viet-Nam, Etat souverain. 26. 11 n’est pas besoin dlautres preuves de l’agression amhricaine. La culpabiliti: est flagrante, et les seuls responsables sent les Etats-Unis d’Am&ique, Toutes les tentatives de Washington pour se couvrir de l’autoriti? de llOrganisation des Nations Unies ne u Voir La Documentation fraqaise, Articles et Documenrs, No 0.1300 du 9 sctobre 1963. p. 2. A wte was taken by show of hands. In favour: Argentina, China, Japan, Jordan, Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay. Against: Bulgaria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Abstaining: France, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda, The agenda was adopted by 9 votes to 2, with 4 abstentions, Letter dated 31 January 1966 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7105)

Before proceeding to the next item on the agenda, I should like to suggest to the Council that members hold informal and private consultations with a view to determining the most effective and appropriate way of conducting our debate in the future and that, for this purpose, this afternoon’s meeting should be adjourned until the exact date and time can be arranged for the next meeting. I should like to know the Council’s views on this suggestion. If I hear no objection, it will be so decided, It was so decided. The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m. ll est proc&dtS au vote $ main levee. vote& pour: Argentine, Chine, Etats-Unis d’Am6- rique, Japon, Jordanie, Nouvelle-Z$lande, Pays-Bas, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord, Uruguay. Votent centre: Bulgarie, Union des Rgpubliques socialistes sovi&iques. S’abstiennent: France, Mali, NigBria, Ouganda. Par 9 voix co&e 2, avec 4 abstentions, I ‘ordre du jour est adopt& Lettre, en date du 31 janvier 1966, adressee au President du Conseii de s&uritB par le reprbsentant permanent des Etats-Unis d’Am&ique auprk de I’Organisation des Nations Unies (S/7105) 28. Le PRESIDENT: Avant de passer auxdiscussions sur ce point, je voudrais suggerer au Conseil que des consultations officieuses et privges aient lieu en vue de d6gager les moyens les plus efficaces et lea plus appropribs pouY le ddroulement de no6 d$bats & l’avenir et qu% oette fin, la seance de cet aprbs-midi soit ajourni5e jusqu% ce que la date et llheure exactes puissent Btre communiq&es. Je VOUdrais consulter le Conseil 5% ce propos. Si je n’entends pas d’objection B l’encontre de cette suggestion, il en sera ainsi d&id& ll en est ainsi d&id& La s&nce est levde ri 16 h 30. HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva. COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES Les publications des Nations Unies sont en vente dans les librairies et les agences dbpositaires du monde entier. Informer-vous aupres de votre librairie ou adressez-vous &: Nations Unies, Section des ventes, New York ou GenBve. COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS Las publicaciones de Ias Naciones Unidas est6n en venta en librerias y casas distribuidoras en todas partes del mundo. Consulte a su librero o dirijase a: Naciones Unidas, Seccibn de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra. Litho in U.N. Price: $U.S. 0.50 (or equivalent in other currencies) 12190~November 19674,000