S/PV.1276 Security Council

As I am taking my place for the first time in the Security Council as representative of the Republic of Mali, and as, by virtue of the alphabetical rotation of the Presidency, the signal honour of presiding over the work of this important body falls to me, I am the more conscious of my debt of gratitude to my illustrious predecessors. 2, This feeling applies partieularly to my immediate predecessor, Mr. El-Farra, the representative of Jordan, whose faultless conduct of the consultations and debates during the past month has’set an example that I shall endeavour to emulate,

Mr. President, I should like first to thank you warmly for your very kind words. While I have relinquished my duties as President, I now find myself assuming one of the more pleasant prerogatives that go with the office, that of extending our welcome to a new colleague. 4. It is my pleasure to extend a warm welcome to Mr. Moussa LBo Keita of Mali, who is presently occupying the Chair as President of the Security Council for the month of April. This is Mr. Keita’s first meeting as the representative of a Council member, but we all know that he is not new to the activities of the United Nations. Indeed, he attended Pf6siderk M. Moussa L8o KEITA (Mali), Prksents: Les repr&entants des Etats suivants: Argentine, Bulgarie, Chine, Etats-Unis d’Am&ique, France, Japon, Jordanie, Mali, Nighria, Nouvelle- Zblande, Cuganda, Pays-Bas, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et dWlande du Nord, Union des Republiques sooialistes sovietiques et Uruguay. Ordre du jour provisoire (S/Agenda/l276) 1. Adoption de llordre du jour, 2. Question concernant la situation en Rhod&sie du Sud: lettres, en date des 2 et 30 aotlt 1963, adress&es au President du Conseil de si?curit& au nom des reprbsentants de 32 Etats Membres (S/5382 et S/5409) : Lettre, en date dy 7 avril 1966, adress6e au President du Conseil de s6curite par le reprbsentant permanent adjoint du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord aupres de 1’Organisation des Nations Unies (S/7235). Remerciements au Prgsident sortant 1. Le PRESIDENT: Siegeant pour la premiere fOiS au Conseil de &cur& comme representant de la Republique du Mali et compte tenu du fait que, selon le roulement de la presidence par ordre alphabetique, llinsigne honneur de pri?sider les travaux de cet organe important m’$choit, je ressens d’autant plus la dette de gratitude que jlai a l%gard de mes illustres prgdecesseurs. 2. J’hprouve ce sentiment tout parti&li&rement envers mon prbdQesseur immhdiat, M. El-Farra, repr&entant de la Jordanie, qui, par la fagon irr6PrOchable dont il a conduit les consultations etles d&bats au tours du mois 6~0~18, a 6% un exemple que je m’efforcerai d’imiter. 3. M. EL-FARRA (Jordanie) [traduit de Itanglais]: ~ Monsieur le President, je tiens tout d’abord a vous remercier de tout cceur de vos trbs aimables paroles. Au moment oh je cesse d%tre pr&ident, ilm’incombe d’exercer une des plus ag&ables prbrogatives de ce paste, cells d’accueillir un nouveau collegue. 4. Je suis heureux de souhaiter une chaleureuse bienvenue a M. Moussa Li?o Keita, representant du Mali, qui preside le Conseil de &uritb pour le mois d’avril. Aujourdlhui, M. Keita participe, pour la premiere fois, a une sbance du Conseil, en tant que repr6sentant d’un Etat membre de cet organe, mais nous savons tous que les activitbs de 1’Organisation 5, In extending our warm, welcome to Mr. Keita, I should like to assure him of our full CO-Operation. I believe I would be expressing the feelings of all of us around this table in wishing our President the best of luck.

I sincerely thank the representative of Jordan for his kind words about me. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia: Letters doted 2 and 30 August 1963 addressed to the President of the Security Council on behalf of the representatives of thirty-two Member States (S/5382 and S/5409): Letter dated 7 April 1966 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Counci I (S/7235)

The President has received requests from the representatives of Sierra Leone and Algeria [S/7239 and S/7242] to take part without the right to vote in the consideration of the question just inscribed on the Council’s agenda. 8. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the Council’s consent, to invite these two representatives to take places at the Council table and to take part in the Council’s discussions without the right to vote. At the invitation of the President, Mr. G, B. 0. Collier (Sierra Leone) and Mr. T. Bouattoura (AlgerSa) took places at the Council table.

Before beginning the debate I should like to draw the Council’s attention to the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom [S/7’?36/Rev.l]. I now call onthefirst speaker on the list, the representative of the United Kingdom, 10. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): Mr. President, in welcoming you to this Council, I should first of all read the application for an emergency meeting of this Council which was submitted at 10 o’clock on Thursday morning, 7 April. I read the text: “You will be aware of the concern felt by my Government over the arrival in Beira of an oil tanker which may result in substantial supplies of oil reaching Southern Rhodesia in contravention of the oil embargo imposed by Her Majesty’s Govern- 5. En adressant a M. Keita nos chaleureux souhaits de bienvenue, je tiens a l’assurer de notre entiere .cooperation. Je suis s&r que je me fais l’interprete des sentiments de tous les membres reunis autour de cette table en souhaitant le plus grand succes B notre president. 6. Le PRESIDENT: Je remercie trbs sincerement le representant de la Jordanie pour les aimables parole’ qu’il vient de prononcer a mon endroit. Adoption de I’ordre du jour L’ordre du jour est adopt& Question concernant la situation en Rhodksie du Sud: lettres, en date des 2 et 30 aoOt 1963, adress&es au PrCsident du Conseil de &curit& au nom des reprksentants de 32 Etats Membres (S/5382 et S/5409): Lettre, en date du 7 avril 1966, adressbe au President du Conseil de s&t-it6 par le reprdsentont permanent adjoint du Royaume-Uni de Gronde-Bretagne et d’lrlande du Nord aup& de I’Organisation des Nations Unies (S/7235) 7. Le PRESIDENT: Le President du Conseil de s8Curite a recu des representants du Sierra Leone et de l’Alg&rie des demandes [S/7239 et S/7242] en vue de participer sans droit de vote & l’examen de la qUeStiOn qui vient d’&re inscrite & notre ordre du jour. 8. Conformement B la pratique habituelle, je me propose, avec l’assentiment du Conseil, d’inviter ces deux representants a prendre place a la table du Conseil afin de participer, sans droit de’vote, B notre discussion. Snr l’invitation du Prksident, M. G. B. 0. Collier (Sierra Leone) et M. T. Bouattoura (Alg&-ie) prennent place E? la table du Conseil. 9. Le PRESIDENT: Avant de commencer le d&bat, je voudrais attirer l’attention des membres du Conseil sur le projet de r&olution presentb par le Royaume- Uni [S/7236/Rev.l]. Je donne maintenant la parole au premier orateur inscrit, le representant du Royaume-Uni. 10. Lord CARADON (Royaume-Uni) [traduit de l’anglais]: Monsieur le President, en vous souhaitant la bienvenue au Conseil, je dois avant tout donner lecture de la demande de convocation d’urgence d’une r&union du Conseil, qui a 8tG dgposbe le jeudi 7 avril, & 10 heures du matin, et dont voici le texte: “Vous n’ignorez pas les preoccupations que cause a mon gouvernement l’arrivge d’un pgtrolier a Beira, fait qui risque d’avoir pour con&quenee l’entrbe en Rhodesie du Sud de quantites importantes de p&role, en violation de l’embargo sur “You may also be aware that the approach of a second tanker to Beira also believed to be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia makes the situation one of extreme urgency and I should, therefore, be grateful if you would arrange for the emergency meeting to be held at 4.00 p.m. this afternoon” -the letter was dated 7 April 1966--“and would inscribe the United Kingdom as the first speaker” [S/7235]. 11. Let me also read an extract from a further communication which I sent to you, Sir, yesterday morning, I shall not read the whole document; it has been distributed. In that letter I drew attention to the fact that Article 28 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that “the Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously”. The letter continued: 11; Permettee-moi ggalement de lire un passage d’une autre lettre que je VOW ai adres&e hier matin. Je ne vous la lirai pas en entier; elle a gt6 distribuee. Dans cette lettre, jlai attire llattention sur le fait que l’brticle 28 de la Charte des Nations Unies dispose que “le Conseil de &curit& est organis de maniere a pouvoir exercer ses fonctions en permanence”. Voici la suite de ma Lettre: “A grave and most serious precedent for the proper functioning of the Security Council in emergency situations is created if the President of the Council fails to fulfil the duties imposed upon him by the provisional rules of procedure with respect to the convening of a meeting of the Council. “In the light of these considerations, I must express my profound dissatisfaction at the failure to convene a meeting of the Council yesterday in spite of the formal and urgent request which I had transmitted to you, having in mind particularly that a majority of the members of the Council were agreeable to such a meeting being held. I must also express my regret that no formal explanation has been afforded to me for this refusal to accede to a request fully justified by the provisional rules of procedure. In the circumstances, I am bound to insist that a meeting of the Council be convened without further delay to consider the situation referred to in my letter of 7 April” [S/7238]. 12. On Thursday, 7 April, a draft resolution[S/72361 was submitted by my delegation and circulated, and yesterday I submitted a revised draft resolution [S/7236/Rev.l]. 12. Le jeudi 7 avril, ma d&li?gation a prgsenti! un projet de r&olution [S/7236] et, hier, jlai p&en% un projet de &solution revise [S/7236/Rev.l]. f The speakes then read out the drafY resolution.] 13. There was only one change between the draft resolution submitted on Thursday and that submitted yesterday. In the fourth operative paragraph of the revised draft resolution we have omitted the last two lines which read in the original draft: I’. . , andin particular on the Greek Government to divert the tanker Manuela from proceeding to the Port of Beira”. It remains of the greatest importance and urgency to ensure that neither the tanker Manuela nor any other tanker believed to be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia should proceed to Beira, but the earlier wording of operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution is 13, Ce projet de r.&oIution n’apporte qu’une modification 8. celui que nous avions p&sent6 jeudi. Au paragraphe 4 du dispositif du projet de r&.olution revise, nous avons omis les deux dernieres lignes libel&es comme suit dans le projet de resolution initial: )I, , . et prie en particulier le Gouvernement grec de d&outer le pbtrolier Manuela pour &?iter qu’il ne se rende dans le port de Beira”. 11 demeure ext&mement important et urgent de s’assurer que ni le pbtrolier Manuela ni aucun autre pi?trolier dont art a lieu de croire qu’ils transportent du pgtrole destin& a la Rhod&ie n’arrivent B Beira, Mais le “Vous &es peut-&re ‘aussi inform6 du fait qulun deuxieme phtrolier, qui transporterait Ggalement du petrole destine a la Rhod&ie, approche deBeira, ce qui donne un caract&re d’extreme urgence & la situation. Je vous saurais done gr6 de bien vouloir faire le n&essaire pour convoquer le Conseil de &curitg d’urgence B 16 heures oet apr&s-midi” - la lettre est datbe du 7 avril 1966 - “et d’inscrire le repr&entant du Royaume-Uni comme premier orateur” [S/7235J. IfUn pr&gdent grave et des plus serieux pour le bon exercice des fonctions du Conseil de s&urit& face. a des situations d’urgence se trouve cr@ si le Prgsident du Conseil ne slacquitte pas des devoirs que le Reglement intbrieur provisoire lui impose en ce qui concerne la convocationdu Conseil. “Eu Sgard B ce qui p&c&de, je dois dire que je dbplore profondgment que le Conseil de s&urit6 n’ait pas 6th reuni hier malgre la demande expresse et urgente que je vous avais adressge, &ant don&, en particulier, que la majoriti: des membres du Conseil Btait en faveur d’une telle &union, Je dois aussi dire que je regrette qu’aucune explication expresse ne m’ait Bte donnee quant a ce refus de donner suite k une demande que le RBglement interieur provisoire justifie pleinement. Dans ces conditions, je suis tenu de demander instamment que le Conseil soit r6uni sans autre di?lai pour examiner la situation Bvoquee dans ma lettre du 7 avril” [S/7238]. [L’orateur donne iectwe du projet de re’solution.] 14. I do not propose to raise how the serious situation which arose on Thursday and again yesterday when the application for an emergency meeting of the Council was not accepted, The constitutional issue is so important that I respectfully suggest that we need more time to reflect upon it and then to ensure that we adopt the best course for the future in the interests of the United Nations, We need to ensure that we sustain the tradition of the Council-a tradition of which we should all wish jealously to preserve-that we are constantly prepared to meet at the shortest possible notice to deliberate together with a due sense of urgency and, when necessary, to act with confidence and with speed, We remain gravely concerned about that, but I trust that none of my colleagues on this Council will doubt that my delegation made the request for an emergency meeting because it was and IS essential to deal with a matter of great importanceand to deal with it at once. 15. Let me go on to assure you that this question of Rhodesian San&ions is not a new issue which I wish to raise in this Council. If it were a new issue I should certainly have given longer notice and discussed the whole question with my colleagues in advance. This is no new issue, It is one which has long exercised all delegations at the United Nations. No subject of all those which we have oonsidered in recent years has attracted greater attention. No subject has been more frequently debated. No subject has aroused more concern or more anxiety, not only in Africa but here in this Council and in the General Assembly. I fully share and respect that concern and that anxiety. Of no subject is this Council more aware, particularly as we have all read and heard the most recent news. I am not raising a new subject, but what I am doing is to report a serious challenge to the authority of the United Nations on a question on which both this Council and the Assembly have pronounced within recent months. What ,I am ‘doing is to seek your authority to respond to that ,challenge with vigorous and forthright action. 16. I trust that by this Council’s answer to the challenge we shall not further procrastinate when positive action is required. We must show that we do not allow wider preoccupations to preclude or delay practical decisions immediately required. 14. Je n’ai pas l’intention de soulever maintenant la question de la grave situation qui s’est cr&e jeudi et, de nouveau, bier; lorsqu’il n’a pas E?tb fait droit B la demande de convocation d’urgence d’une seance du Conseil. Cette question d’ordre constitutionnel est d’une telle importance que, a mon humble avis, nous devrons y r%lechir plus longuement et veiller ensuite B adopter la meilleure ligne de conduite pour llavenir, dans 1%&&t m&e de l’ONU+ I1 est nbcessaire que nous maintenions la tradition. du Conseil, tradition que nous devrions, tous chercher 3. p&server jalousement, selon laquelle nous sommes constamment prbts a nous reunir dans les plus brefs dhlais, en vue de dhliberer, dfiment conscients de llurgence de la question soulevee, et, le cas Bchbant, d’agir avec assurance et rapidite. Nous continuons d’btre sbrieusement preoccupes a ce sujet, mais je suis stir qu’aucun de mes collegues ici prbsent ne doute que ma delegation n’ait demandi! cette reunion d’urgence parce qu’il Btait et parce qu’il est indispensable dlexaminer cette question extrgmement importante et de llexaminer immhdiatement. 15. Je tiens 8. assurer le Conseil que la question des sanctions centre la Rhodesie n’est pas une nouvelle question que je d&ire soulever ici, S’il s%tait agi d’une nouvelle question, jfaurais oertainement don& un prQavis plus long et j’en aurais discutb & l’avance avec mes collegues. 11 ne slagit pas d’une nouvelle question, 11 slagit d’une question qui a depuis longtemps retenu l’attention de toutes les d&:lbgations 8. l’organisation des Nations Unies. Parmi les questions que nous avons examinees ici au tours des dernieres an&es, aucune nta retenu davantage l’attention, aucune n’a fait ltobjet de plus frkquentes discussions, aucune nla cause plus de prSoccupation ni plus d%nqui&ude, non seulement en Afrique, mais egalement au Conseil de &urit$ et B l’Assembl$e g&i$rale. Je partage et je respecte pleinement cette pr&occupation et cette inquietude. I1 n’est aucune ‘question dont le Conseil de seourite soit plus conscient, surtdut aprBs les toutes dernieres nouvelles. Non, je ne souleve pas une nouvelle question; oe que je voudrais, c’est signaler un grave defi a l’autorit6 de 1’ONU au sujet d’une question sur laquelle le Conseil de sdcurit& et l’Assembl&e g&&ale se sont prononces au oours des derniers mois. Ce que je voudrais, c’est btre autorise par vous a relever ce defi gnergiquement et immddiatement. 16. Je suis s5r que la rbponse du Conseil de &curlt& a ce d&fi nous permettra d16viter tout nouveau retard quand une action decisive s’impose. Nous devons montrer que nous sommes resolus a ne pas laisser des preoccupations d’ordre plus general contrarieroU retarder des d6cisions concretes qui s’imposent dans 1’ immbdiat . 18. Now let me remind the Council of the simple facts which justify my calls for this meeting. 19. On 20 November 1965, in resolution 217 (1965), the Council called for an oil embargo against Rhodesia. My Government has taken action in response to that call, But as we meet here today an oil tanker, called the Joanna V, with a full cargo of oil, rides at anchor in the port of Beira. Another tanker, also with a full cargo of oil, called the Manuela, has recently been close to Beira-and. I have a message about that ship to which I shall presently refer. The Manuela could still put in to Beira very soon, But it is not merely a matter of one or two ships. Other tankers may follow, and will surely do so unless we act now. If the oil carried by such ships is pumped through the pipeline to the refinery at.Umtali, which has been closed since last December, then the normal system of supply of petroleum products to Rhodesia will start again. If the oil from these tankers, and others to follow, ‘reaches Rhodesia, the oil embargo for which this Council calledwill be severely prejudiced, the illegal regime in Salisbury will be encouraged, the purposes so clearly stated and so widely accepted here in the United Nations will be most seriously frustrated, 20. I come therefore to this Council to seek your help and your authority to stop this happening. Our aim is not to criticize or condemn anyone, but to call on everyone concerned to rally to the support of our common purpose, If you give that help and authority, I believe that even at this late hour it can be done. 21. Without that authority, the United Kingdom Government has to face defiance of the UnitedNations with its hands tied. The Royal Navy undoubtedly had the physical power to prevent the Joanna V, for instance, from entering Beira. But in this matter my Government has been anxious that at all times its actions should be lawful actions and that it should not risk acting in breach of the law of nations. -One of the very purposes of the action we are, at considerable sacrifice to ourselves, taking against the illegal regime -in Southern Rhodesia is to assert the rule of law and principles of the United Nations Charter. I therefore ask the Council now, by adopting the draft 18. Je rappellerai maintenant les simples faits qui m’ont ameni! a demander la convocation de cette seanoe du Conseil. 19. Le 20 novembre 1965, par sa r6solution 217 (1965)) le Conseil de s&curite a demand& qulun embargo soit impose sur les envois de petrole destinks &la RhodBsic. Mon gouvernement a pris des mesures afin de rGpondre B cette demande. Mais, en ce moment meme, alors que nous nous r&missions ici, un petrolierportant le nom de Joanna V est mouill6 dans le port de Beira, ses soutes pleines. Un autre pgtrolier, le Manuela, transportant lui aussi une pleine cargaison de p&ole, se trouvait rbcemment dans les parages de Beira - j ‘ai reou B son sujet un message sur lequel je reviendrai tout B l’heure. On court encore le risque de voir le Manuela arriver B Beira sous peu. Mais 11 ne s’agit pas seulement dlun ou de deux navires; il se peut que dlautres petroliers suivent, et oe sera certkinement le cas si nous n’intervenons pas immi?diatement. Si le p&role transport6 par ces navires eat pomp& dans le pipe-line pour btre transport6 a la raffinerie d’Umtali - rest&e fermee depuis di?cembre dernier -? la,Rhod&sie sera de nouveau normalement approvissonnee en produits pgtroliers. Si le petrole de oes navires’ et de eeux qui suivront arrive en Rhodesie, l’embargo que le Conseil de s$curiti! a demand& sera gravement compromis, le rggime illegal de Salisbury sera encourage et les objectifs si clairement definis et accept& par tant dIEtats Membres seront trahis. 20. Je viens done devant le Conseil pour VouS demander votre aide et votre caution pour mettre un terme B cette situation. Notre but n’est pas de critiquer ni de condamner quiconque, mais de demander a tous les interesa& d’appuyer notre cause commune. Si vous nous donnez cette aide et cette caution, je orois que m&me a cette heure tardive il est encore possible d’agfr. 21.. Sans cette autorisation, le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni a les mains liees pour rhpondre au dbfi lance! aux Nations Unies. Sans aucun doute, la marine rovale avait matbriellement le pouvoir d’en@cher le” Joanna V, par exemple, d’entrer & Beira. Mais dans cette affaire, mon gouvernement a tenu B rester constamment dans la ligalitg et ti ne pas risquer d’agir en violation du droit des nations. L’un des buts essentiels des mesures que nous prenons au prix dlun sacrifice personnel consid&rable centre le regime illbgal de la Rhod&ie du Sud eat d’affirmer la suprhmatie du droit et des principes de la Charte des Nations Unies. Je demande done maintenant au 22. There may well be some who wish to raise other and wider issues. We are in constant consultation with Commonwealth Governments about them. The Commonwealth Prime Ministers took decisions on the action required at the Lagos Conference in January 1966. We are continuously considering the practical questions at issue in the Commonwealth Committee on sanctions against Rhodesia which held another meeting in London this week. We ourselves raised the whole question of the illegal declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia in November last year when my Foreign Secretary came to New York to report and consult with this Council. 23. We are not yet at the end of the road on which we have set out. Certainly not. But we must proceed step by step, Each step must be on’ sound ground. Each step must show the risks involved to those who give comfort to the illegal regime. Each step must demonstrate our determination to bring the rebellion to an end. We must at every step be sure that we have the means and the power to carry through what we undertake. We call for a most important step forward today. 24. If we were to allow debate on wider problems to prevent us from this immediate action, we should be failing to do what is today urgently required. This is the test. It is the test whether we wish to see ships arriving at Beira with oil for ‘Rhodesia, and the oil then pumped from Beira to Rhodesia. None of us does, So let us stop it. Let, us stop it now. If we do so, we shall sustain the authority of the United Nations. We shall give encouragement to all,those in Africa and elsewhere who look to us for leadership. We shall give proof and we shall give warning of our determination, 25. If, through doubt or indecision, or through a refusal to limit our debate and our aotionto the immediate problem, we fail today, we shall rightly be oondemned. I put it to the Council that we must not fail. This is an opportunity we must not, we surely cannot, miss, 22. 11 se peut fort bien que certains veuillent soulever d’autres questions dlune portee plus g&&ale. Nous sommes en consultation con&ante avec les gouvernements du Commonwealth a ce sujet. A la Conference, de Lagos, en janvier 1966, les Premiers Ministres du Commonwealth ont pris des decisions sur les mesures B prendre. Nous etudions sans cesse les problemes concrets en cause au Comiti! du Commonwealth sur les sanctions centre la RhodBsie, qui a tenu une autre reunion a Londrescette semaine. Nous avons nous-memes soulevi: la question de la d&laration illegale d’independance de la Rhodbsie du Sud en novembre dernier, lorsque le Seorbtaire d’Etat aux affaires etrangeres de mon pays est venu a New York pour faire rapport au Couseil et procbder a des consultations avec ses membres. 23. Nous ne sommes pas encore au bout de la route que nous nous sommes trac6e. Certainement pas. Mais nous devons avanoer pas a pas. NOUS devons avancer sur un sol ferme. Chaque pas doit montrer B ceux qui encouragent le regime illegal, quels risque= leur attitude implique. Chaque pas doit prouver que nous sommes r&olus & mettre fin a la r8bellion. A ohaque pas nous devons btre siIrs que nous avons les moyens et llautoritb necessaires pour mener a bien ce que nous entreprenons. Nous demandons qu’un pas en avant t&s important soit fait aujourdlhui. 24. Si nous permettions qulun debat ait lieu sur des problemes plus gbnbraux pour nous empgcher de prendre cette mesure immediate, nous ne ferions pas ce que la situation actuelle exige aujourd’hui de faqon urgente. ‘Clest la la Pierre de touche de nos intentions: voulons-nous voir des bateaux arriver a Beira aved du p&role pour la RhodBsie, et le phtrdle pomp6 ensuite de Beira en Rhodesie? Aucun de nous ne le veut. Mettons-done fin 21 cette situation. Mettons-y fin tout de suite. En agissant ainsi, nous fortifierons lrautoriti? des Nations Unies. NOUS enoouragerons tous ceux qui, en Afrique et ailleurs, comptent sur nous pour les guider. Nous donnerons un exemple probant de notre resolution. 25, Si notre indetermination, notre indbcision ou notre refus de limiter le debat et l’action au probl?me immi?diat causent aujourd’hui notre Bchec, on aura raison de nous blamer. Je declare devant le Conseil que nous ne devons pas echouer. Clestl&une occasion que nous ne devons pas, que nous ne pouvcns pas laisser passer. 27. If that purpose were frustrated, the grave responsibility, the responsibility for assistinga major breach in the oil embargo and for giving encouragement to the illegal regime in Rhodesia, would clearly be on those who delayed and prevented the action which we are ready and anxious to take. It would indeed be an extraordinary state of affairs if this Council refused to help to give effect to its own previous decision. 27. Si nous ne parvenions pas a atteindre ce but, une lourde responsabilit6, la responsabilit6 de s%tre fait le complice d’une s&ieuse violation del’embargo sur le petrole et d’avoir encourage le regime ill&gal de Rhodgsie incomberait clairement 2L ceux qui auront retard& et contrarii! les mesures que nous sommes p&s a prendre le plus vite possible. 11 paratirait vraiment extraordinaire que le Conseil refuse son aide lorsqu’il slagit de donner effet a une d&ision qu’il a lui-m&me prise pri?c$demment. 28. Finally, I wish to stress the urgency of the action we call for. The urgency was emphasized in our application for this meeting. It is emphasized in the draft resolution which I have submitted. It is urgently necessary to stop the pumping of oil from Beira and the delivery of oil to Beira. I ask that this Council should accept the draft resolution which we have submitted and thus achieve that immediate purpose in which I believe we can all be agreed. 28. Enfin, je tiens a insister sur llurgence de l’action que nous demandons. Cette urgence, notre demande de r&union du Conseil la soulignait deja. Elle est soulignee dans le projet de resolution que jlai pr& sent5. 11 importe d’arreter de toute urgence le pompage du p&role de Beira et les livraisons de p&role a Beira. Je demande au Conseil d’accepter le projet de &solution que nous avons p&sent& et d’atteindre ainsi l’objectif immhdiat sur lequel je crois que nous pouvons tous Btre d’accord. 29. Pour en terminer avec la question de l’urgence, nous avons cherchi: une confirmation de derni&re heure de la situation en ce qui concerne le pgtrolier Manuela. Hier, on nous informait que le pbtrolier Manuela pourrait faire route vers le sud, ce qui l’am&erait en Afrique du Sud. Mais un message emanant d’un avion de la marine royale nous informe qu% environ 10 heures T.U., ce matin, le pgtrolier Manuela allait cap au nord et $tait a environ une journge de Beira. 29, Finally, on the question of urgency, we havebeen seeking confirmation, at the latest possible moment, of the situation with regard to the tanker Manuela, There were reports yesterday that thetanker Manuela might be on a southward course which would take it to South Africa. But the report which has come forward as confirmation this morning from Royal Naval aircraft is that the Manuela is now reported to have turned north-reported, that is, at about 1000 hours GMT this morning. And she is on a course now which could take her to Beira in about twenty-four hours. 30. We, Mr. President, as you know, have been anxious from the time when we made our first application on Thursday that this ship might go to Beira carrying its oil for delivery to Rhodesia. We studied the situation very carefully, and both the ships and the aircraft of the Royal Navy have been keeping a close and constant watch. 30. Comme vous le savez, d&s le moment o’u nous avons demand& pour la premiilre fois, jeudi, la convocation du Conseil, nous avons craint que ce bateau ne se rende B Beira avec sa cargaison de pbtrole pour la Rhodbsie. Nous avons btudih la situation avec le plus grand soin, et avions et navires de la marine royale ont exercB une surveillance gtroite et constante. 31, L’urgence de notre premibre demande &ait moti&e par les d&placements du bateau et aussi par ll$ventuel pompage du p$trole du Joanna V jusqu’a la Rhodbsie. Cette urgence apparaft clairement aujourdlhui. Par bonheur, il n’est peut-8tre pas trop tard pour agir. Mais le temps presse, et je demande instamment au Conseil, une fois, naturellement, qu’il aura entendu le point de vue de tous 68s membres et de ceux qui sont Venus aujourd’hui se joindre a nos dglib&ations, de parvenir a temps aune decision, et non quand il sera trop tard. 31. The urgency of our application, when we made it originally, arose from the movements of the ship and alSO from the possibility of pumping oil from the Joanna V to Rhodesia. That urgency is clear today. By good fortune, it may still be possible to take action in time. But the time is very short, and I shall certainly ask this Council, after having heard, of course, the Views of all the members and those who have come to deliberate with us today, that we should reach our decision in time and not too late.

The delegation of the United Kingdom called for this meeting of the Security Council for the urgent consideration of developments in connexion with violations of the 32. M. QUARLES VAN UFFORD (Pays-Bas) [traduit de l’anglais]: La dGl8gation du Royaume-Uni a demandg la convoaation du Conseil de &curiti! pour examiner d’urgence Ies &$nements resultant de vio- 33. After the Security Council, on 12 and 20 November 1965, adopted two resolutions 216 (3965)and 217 (1965) calling upon all States to refrain from rendering any assistance to the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia and to break all economic relations, at the same time placing an embargo on oil and petroleum products, it was confidently hoped that these measures would bring about the end of the rcSgime of Mr. Smith. 34. The Government of the Netherlands gave effect to the contents-of these resolutions since it was convinced that nothing less than full implementation of the Council’s resolution 21’7 (1965) would bring about the elimination of the authority of the minority regime. So far, the response of nearly sixty Member Governments to the appeal of the Council has been positive and clear, Nevertheless, indications exist that the economic measures decided upon by the Council are being circumvented in a number of cases. It should therefore be the primary duty of the Council at this stage to block any effort and prohibit any action that tends to render ineffective the previous decisions of the Council. 35. At this moment we are dealing with a likely infringement of the Councilts decisions. Attempts are being made to su’pply the illegal authorities in Salisbury with oil and petroleum products in defiance of the proscription formulated by the Security Council. It is our duty to thwart, in an immediate and effective manner, these culpable actions. The effectiveness of our action in this particular case will dependupon the swiftness with which we can reach a decision. Our immediate aim should be to halt the delivery of any shipment of oil through Beira,‘and particularly those that may still be effected this very day. We should not, at this stage, encumber either our debate or a resolution with matters that will confuse the issue which confronts us now. 36, The statement by the representative of the 36. La declaration du representant du Royaume-Uni United Kingdom and the explanation which he gave in et l’explication qu’il a don&e en presentant un prOjet presenting a draft resolution have convinced my delede &solution ont convaincu encore davantage ma gation even more of the urgency of the present d&gation que la situation actuelle pr&sente un caraocircumstances. t&se d’extrbme urgence. 37. The oil embargo instituted by the Security Council is being disregarded and this serious infraction is strengthening in more ways than one the regime whose elimination we are seeking. Therefore the Council can do no’better at this moment than to take the only effective measure for halting any shipment of oil to Rhodesia, and that is to confer upon the Government of the United Kingdom the mandatory 33. AprBs l’adoption par le Conseil de securite lea 12 et .20 novembre 1965, des resolutions 216 (1965) et 217 (1965) demandant a tous ?es Etats de s’abstenir de fournir toute assistance au ritgime illegal de la Rhodesie du Sud, de rompre avec lui toutes leurs relations economiques, et d’imposer un embargo sur le p&role et les produits phtroliers, on pouvait esp& rer que ces mesures entrai’neraient la fin du regime de M. Smith. 34. Le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas a don& suite B la teneur de ces r&olutions, car il Btait convaincu que seule l’application intbgrale de la r&solution 217 (1965) pourrait arriver B mettre un terme &l’autorid du regime minoritaire. Jusqu’ici, pres de 60 gouvernements dIEtats Membres ont rgpondu B l’appel du Conseil de fapon positive et non equivoque. Nbanmoins, certafnes indications nous montrent que les mesures Bconomiques d&id&es par le Conseil ont 6th tour&es dans un certain nombre de cas. Le Conseil a done avant tout le devoir, au point oh nous sommes, d’enrayer toute tentative et d’empecher toute action qUi tendraient B rendre inefficaces les r&solutions ant& rieures du Conseil. 35. En ce moment, nous traitons dlune violationprobable des d&isions du Conseil. Des tentatives sont faites pour fournir aux autorites i&gales de Salisbury du pgtrole et des produits petroliers au mepris da llinterdiction formulee par le Conseil de s&u&+ 11 est de notre devoir de dgjouer, d’une manfare immhdiate et efficaoe, ces agissements coupables. L’efficaoite de notre action, dans ce cas particulier, dbpendra de la rapiditi? avec laquelle nous pourrona parvenir a une decision. Notre but imm&diat doit &re d’arr&er toutes livraisons de p&role par leport de Beira, et en particulier celles qui risquer-t d’btre faites aujourd’hui meme. Nous ne devons pas, b ce stade, nous embarrasser dans no8 discussions OU nos r&olutions de questions qui compliqueraiant inutilement le probleme qui se pose maintenantanoua. 37. L’embargo sur le p&role dhoid8 par le ConSail de &curiti% n’est pas respect& et cette grave infraation fortifie a maints Bgards le rkgime que nOuS cherchons B dliminer. C’est pourquoi le Conseil na saurait rien faire de mieux en l’occurrence que da prendre la seule mesure efficace pour arrbter tout envoi de &role en Rhodhsie, ,en confbrant au Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni le pouvoir et l’autorit8 qu’il 38, Mr. KIRONDE (Uganda): I do not wish to delay the deliberations of the Council by spending too much time on the procedural aspects of the discussion, which have already been brought up by two previous speakers. I wish to say only that aspersions have been cast on the wisdom of the President in not calling a meeting of the Council at the time it was requested by the United Kingdom. 39. The United Kingdom, in fact, in support of the stand it has taken, has referred to Article 28 of the Charter and to rule 2 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council. I should like to dispose of these two very briefly. 40. I think that Article 28 has been misinterpreted. The word “continuously” there, which I presume is the operative word, does not really mean “continuously” in the usual sense. The Security Council does not sit or function without stop: it does stop from time to time, until it is called upon to reconvene by the President. 41. As regards rule 2 of the provisional rules of procedure, there it is laid down that the President shall call a meeting of the Security Council when it is requested. It is obvious here that the President has absolute discretion as regards the timing of the meeting. The President has a responsibility not only to the majority of members of the Security Council but, indeed, to all members of the Council: he has to consult with them. That is, in fact, precisely what the President was doing: he was carryingonconsultations. 42. This matter of Rhodesia is of extremely important significance to the African States. To us, this is perhaps one of the biggest problems we have to tackle at present. We have to consult our respective Governments ; and our respective Governments are not available just around the corner, but they are far, far away. My own Government, for example, is some 10,000 miles from here, So I think the President, in his discretion, was very wise to give us an opportunity to consult our respective Governments and not to call a meeting until now. 43. I said, Mr. President, that I did not wish overly to delay you with the procedural aspects of the question, and I hope my explanation has been sufficient. 44. NOW, as regards the draft resolution, the African members of the Security Council, acting in close collaboration with the other African Members of the United Nations here, have produced amendments [S/72431 to the United Kingdom draft resolution. Wowever, before I introduce and explain the amendments which have been proposed by the African States, I should like to make it abundantly clear that we do not in any way intend to go against the draft resolution which has been produced by the United Kingdom. The 38. M. KIRONDE (Ouganda) [traduit de l’anglais]: Je ne voudrais pas retarder les dgliberations du Conseil en m’etendant longuement sur la question de proc6dure deja ‘Bvoqui?e par deux orateurs. Je me bornerai a d6clarer qu’on a mis en doute la sagesse du Pr&ident qui n’a pas convoqui! le Conseil au moment qui avait et6 fixi: par le repr6sentant du Royaume-Uni dans sa demande. 39. Le Royaume-Uni, Pour appuyer sa position, s’est &f&i? B l’tlrticle 28 de la Charte et a Ifarticle 2 du Reglement int$rieur provisoire du Conseil de securite, et je voudrais, en quelques mots, faire justice de ces arguments. 40. Je pense que l’drticle 28 a &it ma1 interprgte. Dans cet article, les mots “en permanence”, qui, je suppose, sont les mots-clefs, ne doivent pas ijtre pris au sens strict du terme. Le Conseil de s&curite ne siege pas de fagonpermanente. 11 s’arr&e de temps a autre et ne se r&nit que sur convocation de son President. 41. L’article 2 du reglement intbrieur provisoire dispose que le Prhsident r&nit le Conseil de securit6 B la demande de tout membre du Conseil. 11 ressort de cet article que le President a toute latitude pour fixer le moment ,de la &union. 11 est responsable non seulement devant la majorit des membres du Conseil, mais devant chacun d’eux. 11 doit les consulter. C’est prbcis4ment ce qu’il a fait: il a pro&d8 a des consultations. 42, La question de la Rhodgsie a une importance extreme pour les Etats africains. Pour eux, c’est peut-&.re l’un des problbmes les plus graves auxquels ils aient a faire face a l’heure actuelle. Nous devons consulter nos gouvernements respectifs; et ceux-ci ne sont pas tout p&s, mais loin, t&s loin. Le mien, par exemple, est B 10 000 miles d’ici. Aussi je pense que le Pr6sident a fait preuve,d’une grande sagesse en se pr6valant de son pouvois discretionnaixe pour ne pas fixer de reunion du Conseil avant aujourd’hui, afin de nous donner la possibilith de consulter no8 gouvesnements respectifs. 43. J’ai dit que je ne voulais pas retarder indament les travaux du Conseil en mlappesantissant sur une question de proc$dure et j’espere que mon explication est suffisante. 44. Pour ce qui est du projet de r&olution, les membres africains du Conseil de sBcurit6, agissant en Btroite collaboration avec les autres Membres africains de 1tOrganisation des Nations Unies a New York, ont pr6parB des amendements [S/7243] au projet de r&solution du Royaume-Uni. Toutefois, avant de les soumettre au Conseil et de les expliquer, je tiens B pr6ciser clairement que nous n’avons aucunement Ifintention de nous opposer au projet de resolution present.6 par le Royaume-Uni. Les Etats africains 45. The representative of the United Kingdom has referred to what took place at the last Commonwealth meeting in Lagos. It is very good indeed that he should have referred to it; but he should also have mentioned the fact that the African States that were represented there did not agree that sanctions alonewouldproduce the desired political end; and they were assuredby no less a personage than the Prime Minister of Britain himself that, if the African States were to agree to the use of sanctions, the Ian Smith regime would be toppled, not in months but in just a matter of weeks. We all know how long it has been since those words were spoken: it is getting on to several months, and the end is nowhere in sight. 46. Thus, I think the time has come for Britain to look in new and unfamiIiar and, perhaps, unpopular directions, and that is precisely the reasonwe thought we should strengthen the hand of Britain by introducing the amendments which, Mr. President, are now before you. We feel that it is not enough just to paper over the cracks in the wall: one should go deeper; one should go to the root cause of the trouble. And we feel the root cause of the trouble is not at Befra; that is only a symptom of the disease which has been eating away at this part of Southern Africa. The root cause of the trouble is in Salisbury. We feel that since Britain has been so ingratiating as at long last to agree to move from the application of Chapter VI of the Charter to the application of Chapter VII, it might as well go the whole hog, If it wants to be generous, it should be really generous and should now agree to the use of force to topple the minority regime in Southern Rhodesia, In fact, if it were to do that, there would be no need for it to ask us for authority to fight against Portugal or against any other Power which might be anxious to violate the embargo. 47. There is another point to which I should like to draw your attention. Why is it that Britainis interested only in the two tankers? I understand that they have more oil to pour into the pipeline than the oil which has been pouring into Southern Rhodesia via South Africa by rail and by road; but why is there no mention whatsoever of the vast quantities of oil which have daily been pouring in from South Africa? Is it because Britain is not aware that this has been happening? How has Southern. Rhodesia been obtaining its oil hitherto? ‘uo the British aircraft only patrol the seas and not the border between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia? We should like to have a reply to this. 48. We have been told that his is anextremely urgent meeting win 4 should have been held at a time set by the I nest ntative of the United Kingdom. This, 45. Le representant du Royaume-Uni a fait &at ds la derniere reunion du Commonwealth B Lagos. I1 a tr‘es bien fait, mais il aurait do egalement ajouter que les Etats africains qui y &aient represent& eStiIn&rent que le seul recours a des sanctions s’av& rerait inefficace pour atteindre ltobjectif politique recherchb; et qu’ils recurent l’assurance du Premier Mini&e du Royaume-Uni lui-mbme, que s’ils acceptaient l’application de sanctions le regime dYanSmith serait renverse non pas en quelques mois, mais en quelques semaines, Nous savons tous combien de temps s’est ecoule depuis ces d&larations: la situation dure ainsi depuis plusieurs mois, et nous n’en voyons toujours pas la fin. 46. Le moment est done venu, me semble-t-il, pour la Grande-Bretagne, de s’orienter vers des voies nouvelles, inhabituelles et peut-8tre impopulaires. C ‘est pourquoi il nous a paru de notre devoir de renforcer sa position en presentant les amendements dont vous ‘&es saisis. Nous ne pensons pas que des palliatifs soient suffisants; il faut faire davantage; il faut aller a la racine du mal; or, la racine du ma1 n ‘est pas B Beira, simple symptbme de la maladie qui ronge cette partie de 1’Afrique meridionale, C’eSt B Salisbury que se trouve la racine meme du mal. Puisque la Grande-Bretagne a finalement consenti a passer de llapplication du Chapitre VI de la Charte a l’application du Chapitre VII, elle pourrait aller jusqu’au bout, Si elle veut btre genereuse, qu’elle le soit reellement et accepte maintenant que l’on emploie la force pour renverser le regime minoritaire de la Rhodesie du Sud. En fait, si elle devait agir en Cs sens, elle n’aurait pas besoin de nous demander llautorisation de combattre le Portugal ou toute autre puissance qui serait tentde d’enfreindre l’embargo. 47. I1 est un autre point sur lequel je voudrais attirer llattention, Comment sefait-il que la Grande-Bretagne ne stint&ease qu% ces deux petroliers? Je CrOiS comprendre qu’ils transportent plus de pbtrole L eux seuls que n’en recoit la Rhodesie du Sud d’Afrique du Sud par voie ferree et par route; mais, pOurWi ne pas faire &tat des enormes quantitgs de petrols qui arrivent quotidiennement d’Afrique du Sud? Est-ne parce que la Grande-Bretagne n’en a pas connaiasance? Comment la Rhodbsie du Sud s’est-elle aPprovision&e en p&role jusqu% present? Les avions britanniques patrouillent-ils seulement les mers, n& gligeant la front&e qui &pare 1’Afrique du Snd de la Rhod$sie du Sud? Nous aimerions que l’on rhponde B ces questions. 48. On nous a dit que la presente &union etait extr&mement urgente et qu’elle aurait da avoir lieu au moment fixit par le representant du Royaume-Unl. 49. I should like to refer to some of the important clauses in the draft amendments [S/7243] which have been submitted by Mali, Nigeria and Uganda. 50. We would suggest that, after the first paragraph of the preamble, two new paragraphs should be added the first would read as follows: “Noting that economic measures have failed to produce the desired political results”. I need hardly say anything in support of that; I am quite sure that, although it is an addition to what Britain proposed earlier on, Britain would welcome it. It is a statement of fact, Britain should agree with us that the Ian Smith regime still grows from strength to strength-unless Britain is prepared to indicate to us to what extent Ian Smith has been so harmed as to be thrown out of power through what has gone on before. It is a fact that economic sanctions have not produced the desired political results. I think that it is possible to destroy Southern Rhodesia economically and still retain Ian Smith ‘in power, Many countries which do not enjoy the sort of standards of living which are enjoyed in southern Africa have been known to continue to exist, and it is possible for a man with the sort of insane delusion under which Ian Smith labours to continue in power and to have a modicum of followers for quite a long time after Rhodesia has been destroyed economically, So it is not enough to tackle this problem merely by imposing more and more economic sanctions. We are not saying that we should not go ahead; we are saying that we should, together with the imposition of sanctions, go against Ian Smith himself. 51. The second paragraph reads: “Deeply concerned at the reports that oil has been reaching Southern Rhodesia”. We have not specified South Africa, but I am quite sure that the United Kingdom has received reports, which we too have received, about the oil which has been reaching Rhodesia. I think that the omission on the part of the United Kingdom is reprehensible and most regrettable. It should have been included in the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom. 52. The third amendment concerns operative paragraph 1 and proposes the deletion of the words “the resulting situationt’ and the insertion of the words “the sitiation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia”. The explanation there is that the resulting situation is concerned only with Ihe two tankers. But the two tankers do not go to the core of the problem; it is the situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia which is the source of alarm, We also propose that after the word “peacett the words “and security” should be 49. Je voudrais maintenant en ve.nir aux parties les plus importantes du projet d’amendements prhsenti: par le Mali, le Nigbria et 1’Ouganda [S/7243]. 50. Nous proposons qu’apr8s le premier alin6a du prgambule, on ajoute deux autres alinhas. Lepremier se lirait comme suit: “Notant que les mesures &conomiques n’ont pas don& les r&ultats politiques souhait&“, Je ne crois pas avoir a m’expliquer sur ce point: je suis sQr que la Grande-Br,etagne acceptera volontiers cet amendement bien qu’il s’ajoute a ce qu’elle a propose? pr&&demment. 11 stagit d’un simple enon& des faits. La Grande-Bretagne doit convenir avec nous que le r6gime d’Ian Smith se consolide de jour en jour - ou alors qu’elle nous montre que les sanctions prises jusqutici ont a tel point &bran16 le rhgime d’Ian Smith qu’il ne sten relBvera pas. 11 est de fait que les sanctions bconomiques n’ont pas eu les rSsultats politiques escompt6s. A mon avis, on peut trbs bien ruiner Bconomiquement la Rhod6sie du Sud sans chasser pour autant Ian Smith du pouvoir. De nombreux pays qui n’ont pas atteint le niveau de dhveloppement de 1’Afrique australe continuent nganmoins a exister, et un homme qui slabuse aussi follement que Ian Smith peut fort bien se maintenir au pouvoir avec une minorit de partisans longtemps apr&s la ruine Bconomique de la RhodBsie. Multiplier lea sanctions bconomiques ne r6soud pas le problBme. Cela ne veut pas dire qulil faille rester inactif, mais que tout en imposant des sanctions, il faut s’en prendre B Ian Smith lui-m8me. 51. Voici le texte clu deuxieme ali&a propos8: f1Profond6ment pr6occup6 d’apprendre que du pdtrole est pirvenu en Rhod6sie du Sud”. Nous n’avons pas mention& nommgment 1lAfrique du Sud, mais je ne doute pas que le Royaume-Uni ait appris, comme nous-mQmes, que du p6trole arrivait en Rhod6sie. J’estime que cette omission de la part du Royaume-Uni est &p&hensible et des plus regrettables. Ce fait aurait dQ &re mentionn6 dans le projet de r&solution p&sent6 par le Royaume-Uni. 52, Le troisiBme amendement concerne le paragraphe 1 du dispositif et propose de remplacer les mots “la situation en r8sultanttt par les mots “la situation existant en Rhod6sie du Sud”. La raison en est que “la situation en r&sultantlt ne vise que les deux pktroliers. Or, ce n’est. pas lh le fond du problbme, et c’est la situation existant en Rhodi?sie du Sud qui est ?L l’origine de notre vive inqui6tude. Nous proposons ggalement qu’aprbs le mot rrpaixtI onajoute les mots “et B la s$curit61r. Cette modification ne de- “Calls upon the Government bf South Africa to take all measures necessary to prevent the supply of oil to Southern Rhodesia”, South Africa, either deliberately or by mistake, has been excluded, and we feel that South Africa owes a duty to this Council to take all measures necessary to prevent the supply of oil to Southern Rhodesia. Nobody is saying that South Africa has been supplying oil. If it has been doing so, then thk cap fits: if not, all we are asking South Africa is that it should take all measures necessary to prevent the supply of oil to Southern Rhodesia, This is not too much to ask. 54. Then, we are asking for the complete deletion of operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution, and the substitution of the following paragraph: “Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to prevent by all means, including the use of force, the transportation into Southern Rhodesia of oil or other merchandise, and empowers the United Kingdom to take measures necessary for the immediate implementation of this provision.” I think this again is a definite improvement upon what the United Kingddm has submitted in its operative paragraph 5. The United Kingdom hadrestricted itself entirely to the two tankers-now one, I believe. We are calling upon the United Kingdom to prevent by whatever means, including the use of force, any transportation of oil-whether it is being brought there by the Greeks, by the Portuguese, by the South Africans, or by any Power whatsoever. We do not see that there is any reason whatsoever why this should be rejected, 55. We go further, It is not enough just to restrict the flow of oil. This is not supposed to be just an embargo on oil. The Security Council passed a resolution which is also concerned with general sanctions. Therefore, we are asking Britain to take measures to prevent the flow of oil and the transportation of any other merchandise into Rhodesia. It cannot be said that by asking for the,se innocuous provisions we are delaying the consideration of the big issues before us here, We are, in fact, just trying to impl’ove on the performance of the British. 56. Tht?n, we are requesting the addition of two extra paragraphs. These are in complete conformity with Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter. Since Britain has agreed to invoke into operation Chapter VII, we do not see that it should complain if we spell out into greater clarity what we feel should be contained in the draft resolution, These two paragraphs read as follows: ~~Cn11s upon all States to apply measures for the complete ,interruption of economic relations and of “Prie le Gouvernement sud-africain de prendre tou=es mesures n&essaires pour empbcher l’approvisionnement en p&role de la Rhodgsie du Sud”. L’Afrique du Sud, dhlib&r&ment ou par erreur, n’avait pas i% mentionnhe, et nous estimons que ce pays a le devoir de prendre toutes les mesures n&essaires pour empecher l’approvisionnement en p&role de la Rhodesie du Sud. Personne ne dit que 1’Afrique du Sud a fourni du pi%role; si elle le fait, cette phrase est d’autant plus justifihe; sinon nous nous bornons % lui demander de prendre les mesures n&cessaires pour emp&her la fourniture de p&role & la Rho&sie du Sud. Ce n’est pas 18 trop demander. 54. Ensuiie, nous demandons de supprimer complhtement le paragraphe 5 du dispositif du projet de &solution, et de le remplacer par le paragraphe suivant: “Prie le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord d’emp8cher par tous les mdyens, y comprispar laforce, l’acheminement vers la Rhod6sie du Sud de p&role ou autres produits, et habilite le Royaume-Uni & prendre les mesures n&cessaires pour.assurer la misc en ceuvre immgdiate de cette disposition”. Je pense que ce nouveau libel16 du paragraphe 5 du dispositif constitue une nette amelioration par rapport B celui proposb par le Royaume-Uni. Le Royaume- Uni stbtait born& a mettre en cause deux, puis un seul pi?;trolier. Or, nous demandons au Royaume-Uni d’emp&her par tous les moyens, y compris par la force, tout acheminement de phtrole vers la RhodGsie du Sud, que ce soit par les Grecs, les Portugais, lss Sud-Africains ou par quelque puissance que ce sOit, Nous ne voyons auoune raison de rejeter cette proposition. 55. Nous allons plus loin. I1 ne suffit pas de limiter la fourniture de p&role. L’embargo ne vise pas simplement le p&role. Le Conseil de seouritb a adopt& une &solution qui envisage Bgalement des sanctions g&&ales. Par con&quent, nous demandons a la Grande-Bretagne de prendre des mesures pour emp&cher ltacheminement de p&role et de toutss autres marchandises vers la Rhodksie. Nul ne pourra dire qu’en demandant l’adoption de cette disposition inoffensive nous retardons lfexamen des grandes questions dont nous sommes saisis. Nous essayons simplement d’apporter des am&iorations au texte britannique. 56. Nous demandons ensuite que l’onajoute deuxnouveaux paragraphes. Ceux-ci sont pleinement cOnfOrmes aux Articles 41 et 42 de la Charte, PuiSqUe la Grande-Bretagne a accept6 dtinvoquer le Chapitre VII, nous ne voyons pas qu’elle ait lieu de se plaindre si nous prgcisons plus clairement ce qui, B notre sen5, doit figurer dans le projet de r&solution. CeS deux paragraphes se lisent comme suit: “Prie tous les Etats de prendre des mesures en vue de l’interruption compl&te des relations i%OnO- 57. I trust that the first of these two paragraphs will be welcomed by the United Kingdom. I suspect, however, that Britain may demur on the second because it has been so anxious to assure Ian Smith and his regime that it would never use force against them. 57. Je suis certain que le premier de ces paragraphes sera bien accueilli par le Royaume-Uni. Toutefois, je trains que la Grande-Bretagne ne sloppose au deuxieme du fait qu’elle a toujours eu le souci d’assurer Ian Smith et son r6gime qu’elle ne recourrait pas B la force centre eux. 58. This is one of those bones of contention on which we can never see eye to eye with Britain. Britain has been using force throughout its imperial history. Britain used force against the United States at one time. Britain used force in India. Britain has been using force against Jagan, against Kenyatta. Where is the dividing line? When does the United Kingdom use force and when does it not use force? Ian Smith Comes to attend a conference in London and tells Britain to its face that he is going to declare Rhodesia.independent unilaterally, Britain sees him off at the ‘plane. Britain tells him, “You can now go to Rhodesia and do the worst.” Under other circumstances, such a leader would have been clapped into gaol immediately. Now, Britain keeps on reiterating that she does not intend to use force. 58. C’est la une de nos pommes de discorde avec la Grande-Bretagne. Celle-ci a fait usage de la force tout au long de son histoire imperiale. Elle lla utilisee jadis centre les Etats-Unis. Elle l’a utilisee centre 1’Inde. Elle l’a utilisbe centre Jagan, centre Kenyatta. Oh est alors la ligne de demarcation? Quand le Royaume-Uni emploie-t-i1 la force et quand refuse-t-i1 d’y recourir? Ian Smith va assister b une conference B Londres et declare en face B la Grande-Bretagne qu’il va proclamer unilatitralement l’independance de la Fthodi%ie. Un representant de la Grande-Bretagne ltaccompagne jusqu% llavion et lui dit: llVous pouvez m&tenant rentrer en Rhodgsie et faire le pire.” En dlautres circonstances, un tel dirigeant aurait 3.6 aussitBt jeti! en prison. Or, en l’occurrence, la Grande-Bretagne r&Pete qu’elle n’a pas l’intention de recourir B la force. 59. Nous estimons que cette disposition est t&s importante et qu’elle doit figurer dans le projet de r&solution. Nous ne voyons meme pas comment nous pourrions progresser si nous nous contentons de nous attaquer aux symptames sans toucher B la racine du mal. La racine du mal, comme je llai dit pr&demment, n’est ni .a Beira, ni ailleurs, mais bien a Salisbury, 11 faut que des mesures soient prises immediatement afin de mettre un terme par la force au regime minoritaire des colons - et le problbme que nous avons B regler sera r&solu imm8diatement. 59. We feel that this is a most important provision which should be part and parcel of this draft resolution. We do not see how we can ever move any further if we are just going to treat the symptoms, leaving the root cause of the disease untouched. The root cause of the disease, as I said earlier, is not in Beira, is not anywhere else: it is right in Salisbury. Steps should be taken immediately to use force to bring down the settler minority regime-and that would see an end to the immediate problem now before us.

Mr. President, I wish to join my colleagues who have preceded me in welcoming you to your first meeting in the Security Council, Having also been President of the Council myself in the first meeting which I attended, when I was charged with convening a meeting of the Council too promptly, I am aware of the complexity of the task before you as a servant of the Council, with such long and established traditions of, contribution in the interests of peace, I welcome you as a colleague and as the President of the Council and extend to you the best wishes of my delegation and offer you full co-operation in what is always a very onerous task. 60. M. GOLDBERG (Etats-Unis d’Amerique) [traduit de l’anglais]: Monsieur le President, j’aimerais m’associer aux vceux deja exprimes par mes collegues et vous souhaiter la bienvenue au Conseil de &curite, oh vous siegez pour la premiere fois, Ayant moim&me presidb le Conseil lors de la premiere reunion B laquelle j’assistais et ayant itt& accuse d’avoir convoque le Conseil trop rapidement, je me rends compte de la complexite de votre t&he en tant que serviteur d’un conseil, ayant une tradition longue et bien etablie de contribution aux inter&s de la paix. Je vous souhaite la bienvenue en tant que coll&gue et en tant que Pr$sident du Conseil et je vous adresse les meilleurs vceux de ma delegation et vous assure de notre entiere cooperation dans l’accomplissement d’une i&he toujours lourde de sesponsabilites. 61. Je partage egalement, Monsieur le P&sident, les sentiments que vous avez exprim& au nom de tous les membres du Conseil au sujet de notre col- 61. I also associate myself. Mr. President, with the views you have expressed on behalf of all of the members of the Council concerning our colleague, Mr. 63. Several members of the Council have already adverted to the important constitutional and procedural issues which have been raised with regard to the manner in which this meeting of the Council has been set, This is not the appropriate time for us to debate this issue. We have a matter of urgency before us, upon which we should act, and act promptly. But I believe it will be necessary for the Council to consider the matters more fully in some form in the future, and we, on that later occasion, when time permits, will communicate our detailed views on this very important subject. This Council is calledurgently by the United Kingdom to address itself to an immediate and pressing problem, the possibility that oil may at any time be delivered to Southern Rhodesia from tankers calling at the Portuguese port of Beira. The general views of my Government on the settlement of the Southern Rhodesian question have been expressed several times before the General Assembly and the Council, and they are too well known to require a detailed statement from me at this time. I shall content myself with saying that in Southern Rhodesia, as elsewhere, my Government is committed to the objectives of democratic Government and self-determination-self-determination by and for all the people of Southern Rhodesia, not by and for the few. 64. It is a matter of concern, I am sure, to all of us in the Council that the steps upon which we agreed last November in pursuit of this common goal have not as yet had their full effect, and we meet again this morning to consider a further urgent measure which will contribute to the achievement of this goal. 65. From the outset, I wish to make it clear that my Government shares the view, on which I do not find any disagreement in this Council, that the problem of Southern Rhodesia is a responsibility of the British Government, not that this Council and the International Organization do not have an appropriate role to play in dealing with this problem. 66. The world has quite properly looked to Britain, the constitutional authority, to resolve this very difficult question. Britain has never hesitated to acknowledge its responsibility publicly and to the members of this Council, and in coming here when it did originally and when it does so today, it seems to me, as a believer in this International Organization, that Great Britain should be congratulated and not condemned for manifesting its recognition of its obligations under the Charter and its respect for the decent opinions of mankind. The good faith of Great Britain is doubted in some circles. I can only say, for myself and for my Government, that we believe that Britain is entirely committed to bringing an end to the Smith regime, and we are convinced that this 63. Plusieurs membres du Conseil ont deja 8voqu8 les importantes questions de prockdure touchant la maniere dont cette reunion du Conseil a et8 convoquBe. Ce n’est pas le moment opportun pour discuter ce probleme. Nous sommes saisis d’une question pressante et nous devons agir et agir vite. Mais je suis convaincu qulun jour le Conseil devra examiner plus & fond ces questions; nous aurons alors tout loisir d’exposer en d&ail notre position. Le Royaume-Uni a demand& que le Conseil soit convoqub d’urgence pour s’occuper du probleme pressant d’Bventuelles livraisons de p&role a la Rhodesie du Sud par des petroliers mouillant dans le port portugais de Beira. Mon gouvernement a exposi: a maintes reprises son opinion g&&ale sur le reglement de la situation en Bhodesie du Sud devant 1’Assemblee gen&ale et devant le Conseil et elle est trop connue pour que je la reprenne en detail maintenant. Je me contenterai de dire qu’en Rhodksie du Sud, comme ailleurs, mon gouvernement reste fiddle aux objectifs que sont lf&ablissement dlun gouvernement democratique et 17autodbtermination par et pour le peuple de la Rhodhsie du Sud dans son ensemble et non par et pour une minorit& 64. Je suis convaincu que tous les membres du Conseil sont preoccupes par le fait que les mesures sur lesquelles nous nous etions mis d’accord en novembre dernier pour parvenir B cet objectif commun n’ont pas encore pleinement abouti, et ce matin nous nous &unissons a nouveau pour examiner une mesure d’urgence supplementaire susceptible d’aider a atteindre ce but. 65. Je voudrais tout de suite bien preciser que mon gouvernement s’associe a l’opinion qui n’evoque aucun &saccord en ce conseil, scion laquelle le probleme de la Rhodhsie du Sud releve de la responsabilittj du Gouvernement britannique, ce qui ne veut pas dire que le Conseil et l’organisation internationale n’aient pas un r81e important B jouer dans le reglement de ce probleme. 66. Le monde slest, B juste titre, tour& vers la Grande-Bretagne, autorite constitutionnelle, pour ri?- soudre cette question 8pineuse. La Grande-Bretagne n’a jamais h&site B admettre ses responsabilit8s aussi bien publiquement que devant les membres de ce conseil, et du fait qu’elle s’est adresshe a nous d&s le dgbut, et s’adresse encore & nous aujourd’hul, il me semble, en tant que fervent partisan de cette organisation internationale, que la Grande-Bretagne devrait dtre f8licit6e et non bldmge pour avoir demontrd qu’elle reconnaissait ses obligations aux termes de la Charte et pour avoir prouve son respect des opinions honorables de l’humanit8. Dans certains milieux, on doute de la bonne foi de la Grande- Bretagne. Je ne puis que declarer en mon nom per- 67, It is fitting that Britain should expect and obtain from all of us the fullest co-operation in support of its efforts. It was, infact, inasearch for such support that the United Kingdom brought the problem of the Southern Rhodesian rebellion to the attention of the Security Council last November. Now Britain has returned to this Council to receive additional backing for new and very firm steps. 68, I should like to say to this Council that what the United Kingdom is asking for in terms of substance is not by any means inconsequential. On the contrary, it is one of the gravest and most far-reaching proposals that has been made to this Council. What is involved is not a question of two tankers, if I may say so with all due regard to all who have spoken. Paragraph 5 of the draft resolution tendered by the United Kingdom: “calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to prevent by the use of force if necessary the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Southern Rhodesia”. 69. The question of intercepting vessels on the high seas, the question of arresting and detaining them, is a matter that has a long history in the field of international law. Indeed, if we refer to history, my own country once went to war with Great Britain on the question of arresting and detaining vessels on the high seas. We are asked in the Security Council, and it should be a matter of deep consideration and concern for all of us, to put our sanction upon what will be a rule of international law-that when this Council acts vessels on the high seas can be arrested and detained in the interest of the international law which we will be making here today, if we adopt the draft resolution as I hope we will do. It is not an easy decision for my Government to give its support to a resolution of this character, both in the light of our history and traditions and in the light of all the farreaching implications that such a step as we are asked to take may envisage. 70. Indeed, for a major trading oountry such as the United States to put teeth into a programme of denial such as the one called for by the Security Council last November involved an impressive array of steps on our part which called into play very important decisions. When I last spoke to the Council on this subject (1265th meeting) I mentioned some of the measures that we had taken and I said that the United States would consider urgently what else remained to be done in order to apply an effective, across-theboard programme of trade sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. I am sure the members of the Council would be interested in hearing what this involved for the United States in terms of taking such action. First, we refused recognition of the Smith regime. Second, we immediately instituted a comprehensive embargo on the shipment of all arms and military equipment tc Southern Rhodesia. Third, we suspended action on applications for United States Government loans and 67. 11 est normal que la Grande-Bretagne s’attende a obtenir et obtienne de nous tous appui et coop& ration dans ses efforts. En fait, c’est pour obtenir cet appui que le Royaume-Uni a port6 a l’attention du Conseil de sbcuriti! en novembre dernier le prob&me de la rebellion sud-rhodgsienne. Aujourd’hui, il revient devant nous pour obtenir un appui supplementaire visant de nouvelles mesures trbs bnergiques . 68. Je voudrais faire remarquer au Conseil que la question de fond posee par le Royaume-Uni n’est pas sans importance. Au contraire, sa proposition est l’une des plus importantes dont nous ayons jamais bti: saisis, Ce ne sont pas seulement deux petroliers qui sont en cause, soit dit sans vouloir offenser ceux qui ont dgja pris la parole. Au paragraphe 5 du projet de resolution, le Conseil “prie le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord d’empecher, au besoin par laforce, l’arrivbe B Beira de navires dont on a lieu de croire qulils transportent du phtrole destini: B la Rhod6sie du Sud”. 69. L’interception de navires en haute mer, leur saisie et leur detention est une question fort ancienne du droit international. Si nous nous reportons ‘a l’histoire, mon propre pays est entri? jadis en guerre avec la Grande-Bretagne a propos prbcisement de la question de saisie et de la dhtention de navires en haute mer. On nous demande de sanctionner, au Conseil de securite, ce qui deviendra une regle de droit international; et ctest 1% une d6cision qui appelle une s& rieuse reflexion de la part de chacun. En effet, lorsque le Conseil en aura ainsi d&id&, des navires se trouvant en haute mer pourront &tre saisis et dktenus en vertu du droft international que nous aurons etabli, si nous adoptons, comme je l’espbre, le projet de resolution. Ce n’est pas une decision facile a prendre pour mon gouvernement que d’accorder son appui a une r&solution de cette nature, tant en raison de notre histoire et de nos traditions que des consequences incalculables que peut impliquer une telle mesure. 70. Pour une puissance commerciale de l’importance des Etats-Unis, llapplication rigoureuse d’un programme d’interdiction tel que celui qu’a demand6 le Conseil de securitg en novembre dernier, a exige de notre part un nombre important de mesures appelant des decisions dlune importance capitale. La derniere fois que jlai pris la parole B ce sujet devant le Conseil [1265Bme seance], jlai cite quelques-unes des mesures que nous avions prises et j’ai dit que les Etats-Unis etudieraient de toute urgence ce qu’il restait a faire pour mettre en o3uvre un programme de sanctions commerciales efficaces et g&&sales centre la Rhodbsie du Sud. Se suis convaincu que Ies membres du Conseil apprendront avec inti?&t ce qulune telle action impliquait pour les Etats-Unis. En premier lieu, nous avons refusg de reconnaitre Ie rGgime Smith; en deuxieme lieu, nous avons imm& diatement impcsi: un embargo total sur les exp& ditions d’armes ou d’itquipement militaire en Rhod&sie 71. In addition to these direct measures, we have joined the United Kingdom and other countries in establishing an air-lift of petroleum products to Zambia in order to aid that land-locked nation in maintaining its economy-a consideration which must never escape the minds of this Council. United States aircraft are being used in this operation delivering vital cargo to Elisabethville at a total rate of 1 million gallons per month. 71. Outre ces mesures directes, nous nous sommes associ& au Royaume-Uni et B d’autres pays pour htablir un pont a6rien pour les produits pGtroliers destin6s B la Zambie afin de soutenir 1’Gconomie de ce pays sans littoral. ‘C’est l?~ une considhration q”e le Conseil ne doit pas perdre de vue. Des avions appartenant aux Etats-Unis sont utili&s pour cette op&ation destin6e a approvisionner Elisabethville au rythme d’un million de gallons par mois. 73. I mention these costs not to use figures, but to emphasize that these are costs which we accept gladly in support of the principles of legality, democracy and self-determination in Africa, and we are gladthat we have been able to make this contribution because we deem the problem of Rhodesia to be a problem for all the world. We recognize, of course, the special concern of Africa in this problem, but we share that concern. 73. Si je parle des co&s ce n’est pas pour titer des chiffres, mais pour souligner que ce sont des depenses que nous consentons volontiers pour d& fendre les principes de 16galite, de democratic et dlautodistermination en Afrique. Nous sommes heureux d’avoir pu fournir cette contribution parce que nous considerons que le probleme que pose la Rhod&ie est un probleme d’interbt mondial. Nous reconnaissons certes que ce probl’eme preoccupe tout particulierement l!Afrique, mais nous partageons sapr8occupation. 74. I think this is the proper occasion strongly to urge other countries which have not as yet moved to tighten the ring around the Smith regime to do SO without delay, As for us, we continue to support the United Kingdom firmly as it discharges its responsibilities in this effort. 74. Je crois qu’il convient aujourd’hui de demander instarnment aux autres pays qui n’ont pas encore pris de mesures pour resserrer 1’Btau sur le regime de Smith de le faire sans plus attendre. En ce qui nous concerne, nous continuons d’accorder notre ferme appui au Royaume-Uni dans l’accomplissement de ses obligations. 75. Today we deal with a particular problem. The United Kingdom has brought to the attention of this Council the greatest current danger to our common effort: the risk of a serious breach in the programme of oil sanctions as a result of the arrival and the potential arrival of tankers at Portuguese ports with cargoes apparently destined for Southern Rhodesia. The United States fully concurs in the British proposal that the Council act vigorously and promptly to meet this danger. This draft resolution is indeed designed to meet firmly and clearly the immediate danger before us by calling on the Portuguese Government, and on any Government whose vessels may be involved, to prevent the movement of oil into Rhodesia through Beira; and, in case this is not sufficient, it calls on the United Kingdom Government to prevent such movement by force if necessary. 75. Aujourd’hui, nous sommes saisis d’un probleme particulier. Le Royaume-Uni a appeli! l’attention du Conseil sur la plus grave menace B notre effort commun: le risque d’une violation grave dans l’application du programme de sanctions petrolibres, risque engendre par l’arrivhe ou l’eventuelle arrivee dans des ports portugais, de petroliers transportant des cargaisons apparemment destinees a la Rhod&sie du Sud. Les Etats-Unis sont entibrement d’accord avec la proposition britannique demandant au Conseil d’agir avec vigueur et promptitude pour parer h ce danger. Le projet de r&solution vise justement B parer avec fermete et rapidit au danger immediat en priant le Gouvernement portugais, et tout autre gouvernement dont les navires pourraient i%re encause, d’empbcher les expi?ditions de p&role destine B la Rhodesie du Sud via Beira et au cas oti cela ne serait pas efficace, il demande au Royaume-Uni d’empgcher ces exp& ditions par la force, si besoin est. 76. All of us are realistic. We hope that these additional measures will be effective. But we must and do recognize the absolute necessity for moving in concert, step by step, as far as we can, unitedly to meet this problem. This Council as before, remains 76. Nous avons tous le sens des r&alit&s. Nous esp8- rons que ces mesures suppldmentaires seront efficaces. Mais il nous faut admettre la n&essiti! absolue d’agir de concert, pas a pas, et dans toute la mesure du possible, de prhsenter un front uni devant ce 77. It has always been my conviction that we should proceed practically, to do what we can agree upon quickly and urgently, and then we should go on to consider other measures upon whichcertain members of the Council may have doubts and reservations, and see whether we can arrive at agreement upon such other measures. But we should never, in my opinion, fail to act quickly and urgently on those matters we all desire and upon which we can all agree quickly, in the interests of the common goal. Perhaps, in saying so, I reflect a personal philosophy. As we sat here I sent for a speech I made when I was appointed Secretary of Labor of the United States, when there were also many unfinished problems in my own country. I quoted then-it was not an original idea of mine-a great democratic Spanish philosopher as an illustration of my own philosophy, Salvador de Madariaga, who said this: “Our eyes must be idealistic, and our feet realistic; we must walk in the right direction, but we must walk step by step. Our tasks are to define what is desirable, to define what is possible at any time, within the scheme of what is desirable, to carry out what is possible in the spirit of what is desirable. 78. The draft resolution we have befare us reflects no disagreement in this Council. I am sure we all want to stop these ships, and I am sure we all want to empower the British Government to stop them as quickly and as effectively as can be done. 79. The resolution 217 (1965) we passed l&November reflected the Council’s determination to condemn the rebellion and to bring it to an end. It was paralleled by General Assembly action reflecting similar overwhelming sentiment, Implementing actions have been announced since then by an impressive majority of United Nations Member nations; and, despite the fact that the ultimate end has not been achieved, we ought to take pride and satisfaction in what the great body of world opinion has done in response to an appeal by this Council. In fact, in my short experience here, few issues coming before this body have ever produced such a unanimity of response, a clear indication that we have the same goal, and dramatic evidence that, as we affirmed last November, the nations of the world will not remain idle while a minority violates the principles which the world community holds sacred. And, surely, we can and we should agree, today, on the specific question before us-agree that we should take action to prevent these oil shipments. Time, as we have been told, is of the essence, and we ought to act in the spirit that time is of the essence, 77. J’ai toujours &e convaincu que nous devons agir avec pragmatisme, mettre rapidement B exbcution les mesures sur lesquelles nous pouvons nous meltre d’accord pour passer ensuite a l’examen des autfes mesures sur lesquelles certains de nos membres auraient des doutes ou des r&erves et voir si nova pouvons arriver a un accord. Mais, a mon avis, noua ne devrions en aucun cas manquer dlagir avec 1%~ gence et la rapiditb neoessaires ?X propos des questions que nous avons B 0Oeur et sur lesquelles nous pouvons tous nous mettre dlaccord rapidement pour servir une cause commune. Ce nlest peut-5tre 18 que I+%- pression d’une philosophie personnelle. Pendant que nous siegeons, jlai envoyi: chercher le texte du dlstours que jlai prononce lorsque jlai 6th nornIl ministre du travail des Etats-Unis, a un moment 03 de nombreux problBmes restaient encore sans solution dans mon pays. Pour illustrer ma psopre philosophic, jlavais alors cite - l’idee n’btait pas de moi - un grand philosophe democrate espagnol, Salvador de Madariaga, selon lequel: ltNous devons &re idealistes mais avoir les pied5 sur terre, nous devons marcher dans la bonne voie, mais a pas compt&. Notre devoir est de d&finir ce qui est souhaitable, ce qui est possible ?I ua moment quelconque, dans le cadre de ce qui est souhaitable, et d’accomplir ce qui est possible dans l’esprit de ce qui est souhaitable.” 78. Le projet de resolution dont nous sommes snisis ne suscite aucun d&accord au Conseil. Je srlia convaincu que nous voulons tous arr&er ces navirea et donner pouvoir au Gouvernement britannique delea arr&ter avec toute la rapiditi: et l’efficacit8possib1ea. 79. La resolution 217 (1965) adopt&e en novembre dernier traduisait la volonte du Conseil de condamner la rebellion et d’y mettre fin. L’Assembl&e gbn&rnla a pris une decision parallele, attestant une entibre communaute de vues. Depuis lors, des mesures da mise en ceuvre ont 8th annoncees par une majorit; impressionnante des Membres de 1’ONU et, bien qua notre but ultime n’ait pas encore &tB atteint, uo?is devrions Btre fiers et satisfaits de ce que cet organe important de l’opinion publique mondiale a acconlph en reponse B llappel lance par le Conseil. En failit, si j’en crois ma courte expbrience aux NationsUnies, peu de questions port&es devant cet organe ont jantiis provoqui? une reaction aussi unanime, ce qui indique clairement que nous poursuivons un but commun et demontre de facon spectaculaire, comme nous 1Q~na affirmi: en novembre dernier, que les nations dU monde n’accepteront pas de rester passives tandia qu’une minorite viole les principes que la cornmunauti: mondiale tient pour sac&. 11 est en sotre pouvoir et de notre devoir de nous mettre d’acconi aujourd’hui sur la question precise dont nous SOmfws saisis, de nous mettre d’accord sur la n&ceaaite d’agir pour empecher ces livraisons de p$tmle. Le temps, a-t-on dit, est le facteur essentiel, et noua devons agir en consgquence. 81. Mr. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet So&&& R+ publics) [translated from Russian]: Mr. President, as this is the first time that I am speaking in the Council under your Presidency, I would like toconvey to you the Soviet delegation’s warm wishes. I am firmly convinced that your great experience and profound knowledge will help the Security Council successfully to examine the questions before it this month. 82, I must express my surprise at the statements which have been made here by some delegations, particularly the delegations of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Netherlands, about the procedure followed in convening this meeting of the Council, since they seem to my delegation to have absolutely no factual or, what is more, legal foundation. The Soviet delegation would like to emphasize most strongly its conviction that you, Mr. President, acted absolutely correctly and effectively, in full conformity with the rules of procedure and in observance-of all the necessary standards. The Soviet delegationtherefore rejects any attempts to cast any shadow over the actions of the President of the Security Council, the universally respected representative of the African country of Mali. 83. It is well known that in accordance with rule 2 of the provisional rules of procedure, the President shall call a meeting of the Security Council at the request of any member of the Security Council. Following firmly established practice, the President usually consults all members of the Council about the time of the meeting and takes a decision on that question, with due regard for all the circumstances and without any undue delay. You, Mr. President, did in fact comply with all this. 84. We know very well that there was no question at all of rejecting the United Kingdom representative’s request to convene a meeting of the Council. On the contrary, the President did hold consultations, as I can testify, because such consultations were held also with the Soviet delegation. As a number of members of the Council have informed me, similar consultations were held with them too. In the course of these consultations, delegations’ views on the exact date and time of the meeting differed, and I must say that many years of experience of the work of the United Nations shows that for various workingreasons such differences of opinion, depending on the views of particular delegations, arise in the course of the President’s consultations almost every time that the Council is to be convened. The President naturally had to weigh all the circumstances, since it was obvious that differing views had been expressed on this question-not on the question of convening a meeting as such, because no one objected to a meeting of the Council being convened, but on the question of the day and exact hour for beginning the Council’s 81. M. MOROZOV (Union des R&publiques socialistes sovi&iques) [traduit du russe] : Prenant la parole pour la premiBre fois sous votre pr&sidence, je voudrais, Monsieur le Prhsident, vous transmettre les fhlicitations cordiales de la d616gation sovi&tique. Je suis intimement convaincu que votre grande expbrience et vos connaissances 6tendues contribueront au suc&s des travaux que le Conseil consacrera B llexamen des questions dont il sera saisi au tours de ce mois. 82. Certaines d&ggations, notamment celles du Royaume-Uni, des Etats-Unis et des Pays-Bas ont 6voqu6 ici les conditions dans lesquelles le Conseil a et6 ri?uni. Je suis btonn6, pour ma part, des d&larations qui ont &ii: faites ici a ce sujet parce qu’elles paraissent B ma d@gation ditnu6es de tout fondement mat6riel et, a plus forte raison, juridique. La d&6- gation sovi&ique est convaincue - et elle tient a insister avec force sur ce point - que vous avez agi, Monsieur le President, en pleine conformit du rhglement inthrieur, que vous avez respecti! toutes les r&gles applicables en la mati’ere, c’est-&-dire que vous avez agi en toute justice et diligence. Voila pourquoi la d616gation sovi&ique s’$li?ve centre toute tentative faite pour jeter le discrddit sur les ddcisions du Pr$sident du Conseil de &curit&, le representant du Mali, qui jouit de l’estime g6nbrale. 83. Comme on le sait, conform6ment B l’article 2 du RBglement int6rieur provisoire, le Pr6sident r&nit le Conseil de sbcurit6 B la demande de tout membre du Conseil de s8curit6. Selonune pratique bien htablie, en rbgle g$,nbrale, le Prbsident consulte au pr6alable tous les membres du Conseil sur la date de la ri?union et prend une d6cision B ce sujet en tenant compte de toutes les circonstances pertinentes, sans d&lai injustifib. Or, Monsieur le Prgsident, vous avez respect6 tous ces points de notre pxoc6dure. 84. Comme chacun sait, il n’a 6th nullementquestion de ne pas acc6der a la demande du reprhsentant du Royaume-Uni tendant B r6unir le Conseil de skcurit6. Bien au contraire - et je puis t6moigner B ce sujet puisque la dhlbgation sovietique a 6th consult6e et que plusieurs membres m’ont config que le President les avait consult& eux-aussi -, le Prhsident a proc6d6 aux consultations d’usage, Des divergences de vues ont divisi! alors les d616gations quant h la date et llheure prkcise de la reunion du Conseil, Je dois dire que ma longue expgrience de 1’ONU m’a appris que de telles divergences surgissent, pour des raisons diverses, suivant l’attitude adopt&e par les diverses d&l&gations, pratiquement ;2 chaque demande de convocation du Conseil au tours des consultations prhalables auxquelles pro&de le Pr6sident du Conseil, Comme il Qtait evident que les divergences portaient non sur la question de la r&union du Conseil de si?curit&, mais sur la date et l’heure pr6cise de la seance du Conseil, le Prbsident se devait de peser toutes les circonstances &ant don& que le Prhsident poss&de en fin de compte - et je tiens a souligner cela - lepou- 85. That has been the practice in the past and that is the practice which we followed in this case. Obviously, we must also follow the same practice in the future. If I may be allowed,’ I shall not deal further with this question, so as to end this discussion of a subject wholly unrelated in substance to the question before us. 86. Thus the Council has met once again to examine the question of Southern Rhodesia. As is known, the critical situation in Southern Rhodesia has recently been discussed in the Security Council, the General Assembly and, the Committee of Twenty-Pour,U The Security Council has repeatedly given careful and extensive consideration to the situation which has been created because of the racist Smith r8glme’s usurpation of power in Southern Rhodesia. As indicated by the agenda which the Council adopted today, and as we all remember very well, this question was placed before the Security Council on the initiative of the African countries. These countries were the first, and legitimately, to be uneasy about the situation in Southern Rhodesia, since this situation threatens not only the cause of peace in Africa, but also international peace and security. 87. Among the recent important stages in the consideration of the question of Southern Rhodesia in the United Nations, I should like to refer to the 401st meeting on 6 April 19663 of the Committee of Twenty-Four, whose Chairman is present here as one of those invited to take iart in the discussion of this question. At the suggestion of the Afro-Asian countries, the Committee at that meeting approved a statement by the Chairman according to which the Secretary-General was invited to take steps to convene the Security Council and the Council to adopt the steps needed as a result of the failure of the United Kingdom Government to take appropriate and effective action to liquidate the racist Smith r8gime. 88. I consider it important to recall this $a& at the very beginning, in order to make it quite obvious that, although there was no formal request to convene a meeting of the Council up to the time the United Kingdom delegation sent its lette?r$ this is of no significance from the point of view of the substance of the matter. It does not mean that the African States do not continue to feel the most legitimate concern at the serious situation and the continuing crisis in Southern Rhodesia, In accordance with the agenda and the most recent discussi& of this question in the Committee of Twenty-Four to which I have referred, we may regard the Council as havingbefore i,/ Special Committee on the Situation wlth regard to the Implementation of the Declaration CIII the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. & See document A/AC.109/S.R.401. 85. Telle a eti: la pro&dure que le President a suivie dans ce cas et telle est la pro&lure a suivra. Je n’insisterai pas davantage sur oette question pour ne pas me lancer dans une digression sur des quaations qui n’ont rien 21 voir avec le fond du prabl&ne dont nous sommes saisis. 86. Ainsi, nous voila de nouveau reunis pour examiner la question de la Rhodbsie du Sud. Comma on le sait, la situation critique existant en Rhodesie du Sud a 8th recemment examin&e tant .par le Consell de securite que par l’Assemb%e g&n&ale, saris parler du Comite des Vingt-Quatreg. Le Conseil da securite a deja etudii? 3. plusieurs’ reprises, de faGon t&s approfondie et sous tous ses aspects, la situation qui s’est c&Be B la suite de l’usurpation du pouvoir en RhodQsie du Sud par le regime raciste de Smith, Comme l’indique l’ordre du jour de notre s&ance dlaujourd’hui, que nous venons d’adopter, et comme tous s’en souviendront parfaitement, le Conseil de securite a 6th saisi de la question SUP l’initiative des pays africains. Ces pays ont i?tkles premiers B s’inquieter a fort juste titre de la situation en Rhodesie du Sud qui menace non seulement la paix en Afrique, mais aussi la paix et la sbcurit& internationales. 87. De toutes les importantes seances que les organes de 1lONU ont consacrees a l’examen de la question de la Rhodesie du Sud, je voudrais me r6f6rer plus particulierement B la 401bme sbance que le Comit$ des Vingt-Quatre - dont le President a btk invite a assister aujourd’hui 2t nos travaux - a tenue le 6 avail 19663. Sur la proposition des pays afmasiatiques, le Comite a approuviI! une declaration du Prgsident en vertu de laquelle le Secretaire g&nbrai etait invite a prier le President du Conseil de COWJquer le Conseil de securite afin que ce dernier prenne les decisions qui s’imposent &ant don& que le Sonvernement du Royaume-Uni n’avait paspris les mesures &cessaires pour liquider le r6gime raCiSte d’Ian Smith, 88. J’estime qu’il est important de rappeler &a le debut cette circonstance. On verra ainsi que, et la demande de convocation du Conseil de &Writ& n’avait pas encore et& officiellement presentee au moment oh la delegation du Royaume-Uni a SOUmig sa propre lettre, cela ne change rien au fond de l’affaire. Cela ne signifie nullement que les pw africains ne continuent pas de se preoOCuper fort lbgitimement de la situation grave de Rhodesie du Sud, de la crise qui dure. Nous pouvons danc Consid&rer que, conformement a l’ordre du jour et Conformbment a la discussion qui s’est dbroulee au Gomite des Vingt-Quatre, le Conseil de &Write exami% II/ Comiti apkial chargit d%tudier la situation en ce qti COllcerm l’application de la ticlaration sup l’octroi de l’indipandance aUX PaYe et aux peuples colofiaux. y VOir document A/AC.109/SR.401. 89. The Soviet Union’s position on the question of the situation in Southern Rhodesia has often been set out in detail, both in the Security Council and in United Nations bodies which have recently been concerned with this problem. I feel it necessaryto recall and emphasize that the Soviet Union, on the basis of its position of principle of unfailing support for peoples struggling for their liberation from colonial domination, has been and is in favour of respect for the sacred right of every people to decide its own fate and freely to choose the path of its development. 90. That is why-as the Soviet Government has stated in documents dealing with the question of Southern Rhodesia-the Soviet Union has resolutely and consistently supported, and supports, the struggle of the Zimbabwe people for freedom and genuine independence and is ready to give appropriate help and support to any actions by the African countries aimed at securing this right. 91. As is well known, the Soviet Government has decisively condemned the racist Smith regime which usurped power in Southern Rhodesia. The Soviet Government regarded this criminal act by the white racists as an open challenge by colonialism to the Zimbabwe people, as well as to the peoples of Africa and the whole world. 92. Xn this case again, the colonialists have disregarded the will of the peoples as expressed in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. They have disregarded the numerous decisions of the United Nations. 93. As we have frequently pointed out, the plans of the racists in Southern Rhodesia could not have been realized without extensive agreement among the colonialists. I repeat, these plans could not have been realized without extensive agreement among the colonialists. This was precisely what enabled the racist rdgime in Salisbury to gain economic and military strength. 94, The foundations for the present regime, in which a clique of racists exeroises colonial domination over millions of Africans, were laid as far back as 1961, when the so-called Constitution, prepared by none other than the United Kingdom Government, came into force. Afterwards, as we all know, the United Kingdom armed the Southern Rhcxiesian racists and helped to strengthen their position,by encouraging the colonial alliance between Southern Rhodesia, the mist regime in South Africa and the Portuguese Colonialists. As a result, Southern Rhodesia has been turned into a police State, a bastion of racism, and a oountry of prisons, concentration camps and terror for the African population. 95. The Soviet Union supports the decision of the Organization of African Unity that the ruling circles 89. La position de 1YJnion sovietique sur la situation en Rhodesie du Sud a et& exposge 3 plusieurs reprises, tant au Conseil que dans Les autres organes de 1’ONU qui s’en sont occupi?s dernierkment. Jlestime devoir rappeler et souligner en meme temps que, forte de sa position de principe qui consiste B apporter un appui indhfectible aux peuples qui luttent pour se liberer de la domination coloniale, 1Wnion sovietique a constamment demand& que soit respect8 le droit sac& de chaque peuple de decider de son propre avenir et de choisir librement les voies de son dhveloppement. 90. C’est pourquoi, oomme l’a annonce le Gouvernement sovibtique dans les documents consacri?s 8. la question de la Rhodesie du Sud, 1’Union sovidtique n’a jamais cessi: d’appuyer de toutes ses forces la lutte du peuple du Zimbabwe pour la literti? et une inciependance viiritable, et elle est p&e %. apporter toute l’aide et toute l’assistance necessaires aux mesures que les pays africains pourront prendre pour faire respecter ce droit. 91. Comme on le sait, le Gouvernement sovietique a categoriquement condamni? le rggime raoiste de Smith qui a usurpi: le pouvoir en Rhodesie du Sud. I1 a declare que cet acte criminel des racistes blancs constitue un defi ouvert du colonialisme au peuple du Zimbabwe, aux peuples d’Afrique et au monde entier. 92, Ici encore, les colonialistes n’ont tenu aucun compte de la volonte des peuples exprimee dans la Declaration sur l’octroi de l’indgpendance aux pays et aux peuples coloniaux. 11s n’ont tenu aucun compte des nombreuses resolutions adoptees par l’organisation des Nations Unies. 93. Cornme nous ltavons deja fait remarquer B differentes reprises, les racistes de Rhodesie du Sud n’auraient pas pu mettre en oeuvre leurs sombres desseins sans une large collusion des colonialistes. 11s n’auraient pas pu ri?aliser leurs sombres desseins, je le &p&e, sans une large collusion des colonialistes. C’est bien ce qui a permis au regime raciste de Salisbury de slimplanter solidement tant sur le plan Bconomique que sur le plan militaixe. 94. Des 1961, avec llentr&e en vigueur de la soidisant constitution qui legalisait l’ordre raciste &abo&e par nul autre que le Royaume-Uni, on a jet6 les fondements du rbgime actuel de domination coloniale de la clique raciste sur des millions d’Africains. Ensuite, le Royaume-Uni a armi:, comme on le sait, les racistes de la Rhod&ie du Sud, il les a aid& a renforcer leurs positions et les a encourages B conolure une alliance coloniale avec le regime raciste d’Afrique du Sud et les colonialistes portugais. C’est ainsi que la Rhod&ie du Sud s’est transformse en un Etat policier, en un bastion du racisme, en une terre de prisons et de camps de concentration, en un centre de terreur pour la population africaine. 95. LfUnion sovi&ique appuie les decisions de l’Organisation de ltuniti: africaine selon lesquelles les 96. Today, when this question has been many +imeS considered in the United Nations, under the roof of this building, in various rooms and at various times, there is scarcely anyone who doubts that these crimes against the African people in Southern Rhodesia could not have been carried out without the blessing of the Governments and other members of the military NAT@ bloc, without the approval of the representatives of those member Governments of the military NATO block who have already had an opportunity to speak at this meeting of the Security Council. 97. I shall revert later to the observations made during these recent statements, as we consider it necessary to comment on them. 98. In this connexion, we should like to recall again that the Soviet Government has declared its complete solidarity with the Zimbabwe people and reaffirmed its readiness to co-operate with African countries in giving them every possible assistance in their just struggle to gain genuine national independence. 99. The Soviet Union not only voted for the Security Clouncil’s decision 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, but has made every effort to see that it is strictly carried out. As is well known, this decision of the Council provides for a number of important measures against the Southern Rhodesian racists. 100. The Security Council called for measures, in particular from the United Kingdom Government, which would prove effective-and I quote--“in eliminating the authority of the usurpers and in bringing the minority regime in Southern Rhodesia to an immediate end”-1 repeat, Itan immediate end”. The Security Council called upon the Government of the United Kingdom: “to take immediate measures in order to allow the people of Southern Rhodesia to determine their own future consistent with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514. (XV)“, in other words, in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Thus, as the representative of Uganda quite rightly pointed out in his brilliant statement at today’s meeting, the Council’s resolution provided for concrete measures which must be taken immediately. 101. The Council’s resolution also referred to other measures which would contribute to the speediest possible liquidation of the authority of the usurpers in Southern Rhodesia. It contained an appeal to all States to refrain from any action which would assist and encourage the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia. In particular, the Security Council called upon all States to desist from providing the racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia with arms, equipment and military material, and to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products. 96. Aujourd’hui, apri?s les nombreuses discussions que divess organes ont consacr&es B la question sous ce toit meme, B diffbrents moments, personne ne doutera que les crimes commis centre la population africaine de la Rhod&ie du Sud aient pu btre per@- tr& sans la b&n&diction des gouvernements membres du bloc militaire de l’OTAN, sans celle notamment des reprgsentants de ces gouvernements qui ont d$jb eu le temps de prendre la parole & cette seance du Conseil. 97. Je reviendrai un peu plus tard sur les observations qui ont 6th presentges dans ces dernihes interventions et au sujet desquelles nous estimons devoir exposer notre point de vue. 98. A ce propos, nous tenons B rappeler que le Gouvernement sovii%ique a proclam son entiBre solidaritl! avec le peuple du Zimbabwe et qu’il a affirm6 de nouveau qu’il est p&t & coophrer avec les pays africains pour lui apporter toute l’aide possible dans la lutte legitime qu’il m&ne pour conquhrir une indhpendanee nationale authentique. 99. L’Union sovi$tique non seulement a votb en faveur de la &solution 217 (1965) du Conseil de &curit~, en date du 20 novembre 1965, mais a cherch&$ la faire appliquer strictement. Cette r&3olution, on le sait, pr&oit une sbrie de mesures importantes centre les racistes de Rhodgsie du Sud. 100. Le Conseil de &curit& a notamment pri& le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni de prendre des mesures llpour aneantir l’autoriti! des usurpaeeurs et pour mettre fin immgdiatement, je repbte, immk diatement au r$gime minoritaire en Rhodhsie du Sud”. Le Conseil de sgcuriti: a pri$ le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni “de prendre des mesures immgdiates pour permettre au peuple de Rhodgsie du Sud de d$cider de son propre avenir conformGment aux objectifs de la resolution 1514 (XV) de l’Assembl$e g%- rale”, c’est-&-dire conformement a la D&laration sur l’octroi de l’independance aux pays et auxpeuples coloniaux. Ainsi done - e(; le reprhsentant de 1’Ouganda l’a t&s justement fait remarquer dans sa brillante intervention aujourd’hui au Conseil -, larksolution du Conseil de s&curiti! pr&voyait des mesures concretes qulil fallait absolument mettre en CeUVre imm8diatement. 101. Elle proposait 6galement d’autres mesures quj devaient contribuer & chasser au plus vite du pOUVOir les usurpateurs en Rhodgsie du Sud. Elle ConMail un appel B tous les gouvernements les invitant b s’abstenir de toute action qui aiderait et encour;Lgerait le rhgime illBga1 de la Rhodgsie du Sud, Le Conseil de &curiti! invitait notamment tous les Etats 3 ne pas fournir d’armes, d’hquipement et de materiel militaire au regime de la minorit$ raciste de Rho&- sie du Sud et a s’efforcer de rompre toutes les retations &conomiques avec la Rhodhsie du Sud, notamment en imposant un embargo sur le p&ole et les produits petroliers. 103. The decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly were supported by the overwhelming majority of States Members of the UnitedNations. 104, If my information is correct, the UnitedNations Secretariat had, by 18 March, received reports on concrete steps taken against the Smith regime from at least fifty-eight countries. Letters are still being received regarding measures taken by States to implement those decisions, including the termination of oil supplies to the Smith regimeandthe breaking of relations with it, 105. The Soviet Union, for its part, consistently adhering to the principles of solidarity with people struggling against the colonial yoke, declared its readiness to implement these Security Council decisions in a letter addressed 5 January 1966 to the Secretary-General (S/7068). The USSR does not recognize the criminal Smith clique’s rhgime. It goes without saying that it has not provided and is not providing it with any arms, equipment or military material and does not maintain any economic relations with it. The Soviet Union has also informed the Secretary-General that it has suspended postal communications and telecommunication with the Salisbury regime. 106. However, not all States Members of the United Nations are consistently carrying out the decisions taken here, which are directed at liquidating the Smith regime and taking measures to ensure that power in Southern Rhodesia should be transferred to organs representing the majority of the population of that country. First and foremost, the United Kingdom has not ensured that these decisions are carried out, although it bears the basic responsibility for the situation in Southern Rhodesia, which continues to be a threat to international peace and security, 107. It is not difficult to show that the Council’s most important requests are precisely the ones which are not being fulfilled. The request that the minority regime in Southern Rhodesia should be brought to an immediate end and that measures should be taken to allow the people of Southern Rhodesia to determine their own future has not been fulfilled. Have any measures been taken to revoke the racist Constitution of 1961? We look in vain even for indications of when the United Kingdom Government intends to implement that decision of the Council. 103. Les resolutions du Conseil de sbouritg et de l’Assembl6e gbn6rale ont Btg appuy$es par ltt%rasante majorit des Etats Membres de l’organisation des Nations Unies. 104. Au 18 mars, le Secretariat de 1’ONU avait regu de 58 pays au moins - si mes renseignements sont exacts - des rgponses sur les mesures concr&es qu’ils avaient prises centre ‘le r6gime de Smith, Le Secretariat continue de recevoir des lettres sur les mesures prises par les gouvernements en application de cette r&solution, et notamment sur llarrbt des livraisons de p&role et sur la rupture des relations avec le regime Smith, 105. Pour ce qui est de 1’Union sovi&tique, toujours fid’ele aux principes de solidarit6 avec les peuples en lutte centre le joug colonial, elle s’est d&large pr&e, dans une Iettre adressee le 5 janvier 1966 au SecrGtaire g&n&al [S/7068] a mettre en application les dgcisions du Conseil de &curit& L’Union sovi& tique ne reconnafe pas le r&gime de la clique criminelle de Smith. 11 va sans dire qu’elle ne lui a livre ni ne lui livre aucun armement, bquipement ou materiel militaire, ni n’entretient avec lui aucune relation &onomique. LWnion sovi&ique a Ggalement fait savoir au Secrhtaire g&n&al qu’elle avait interrompu les relations postales et les &litcommunications avec le rhgime de Salisbury, 106. I1 s’en faut toutefois que tousles Etats Membres de 1’Organisation des Nations Unies exhcutent de fagon suivie les dbcisions prises par le Conseil en vue d’amener la chute du rGgime de Smith et adoptent les mesures necessaires pour que le pouvoir en Rhodeaie du Sud passe aux organes repr&sentatifs de la majorit de la population de ce pays. Le premier B ne pas executer ces dhcisions a i%le Royaume-Uni qui Porte la responsabilite principale du maintien d’une situation en Rhodhsie du Sud qui constitue une menace B la paix et 3 la s$curiti: internationales. 107. 11 est facile de prouver que ce sont justement les dispositions les plus importantes de la r&olution du Conseil qui n’ont pas 6th ex&ut&es. On n’a rien fait pour mettre fin immbdiatement au r$gime minoritaire en Rhodgsie du Sud ni pris aucune mesure pour permettre au peuple de Rhod&ie du Sud de d$- cider de son propre avenir. A-t-on pris des mesures pour abroger la Constitution raciste de 1961? On chercherait en vain quelque indication sur la date B laquelle le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni aurait l’intention d’appliquer cette decision du Conseil. 109. The Security Council has so far not even been informed as to how an&when it is proposed to carry out the Council’s deeisibns, which are binding on the United Kingdom in accordance with the Charter, and, in particular, the resolution 217 (1965) adopted on 20 November 1965, In order to conceal these facts somehow, a great hubbub has been made in recent days-and has already been made at this. meetingover the alleged fact that effective economic sanctions are being undertaken against the Smith regime. In reality, however, the facts show that in this respect, too, the picture is by no means reassuring. I am using an extremely mild expression to describe the situation. The United Kingdom Government’s economic sanctions were put into effect very late and proved ineffective in substance in a situation where the United Kingdom itself, and especially Smith’s closest allies , the Portuguese colonialists and the South African racists, are sabotagingor circumventingdecisions on the economic boycott of Southern Rhodesia. 110. In the Special Committee of Twenty-Four discussion of the situation in Southern Rhodesia, to which I have already referred, the representatives of African countries rightly pointed out that the United Kingdom’s actions in implementing economic sanctions in their present form amount in effect to connivance at the regime in Southern Rhodesia and therefore’ &mot inflict any serious harm on the Ian Smith clique’s economic position. 111, If we take up this question not only in the foreshortened form imposed upon us-two oil tankers, one of which has come into an African port-but also in its decisive and fundamental aspects, then we find that the policy of economic sanctions is also ineffective because the Ian Smith regime leans, as usual, on an alliance of racists and colonialists in southern Africa, on that same alliance which, as Ihave already had the honour of reporting to the Council, was created with the active participation of the principal and leading NATO Powers, including the United Kingdom and the United States. 112. Despite the Security Council’s decisions and the General Assembly’s resolutions, Portugal and the Republic of South Africa continue to pursue a policy of supporting the regime in Southern Rhodesia, thereby undermining the execution of the economic sanctions provided for in United Nations decisions. No one can be under any delusion about the fact that the countries to which I have referred would hardly have dared to challenge the United Nations and the whole of world public opinion if they had not felt that the direct support of the principal imperialist Powers was behind their backs. In the case of Portugal, in particular, does not everyone know that it is carrying 109. Le Conseil de sgcuriti: ne sait toujours pas quand et comment on se propose dlexBcuter ces dgcisions du Conseil qui ont force obligatoire pour leRoyaume- Uni, conformbment a la Charte de l’ONU, notamment la r&olution 217 (1965) adoptee le 20 novembre 1965. Pour d&ourner tant bien que ma1 l’attention de ces faits, on a fait grand bruit ces derniers jours - et B nouveau aujourd’hui - au sujet de l’application de sanctions &onomiques centre le r&gime de Smith, Or, les faits montrent que la situation sur ce point $galement est. loin d’&re brillante, pour employer un euphemisme. Les sanctions bconomiques dbcidbes par le Gouvernement britannique ont 6th appliquges avec un grand retard et n’ont pas eu d’effet marquis! du fait que le Royaume-Uni et plus particuli?3rement les allies les plus proches de Smith, les colonialistes portugais et les racistes d’Afrique du Sud sabotent ou tournent les d&isions relatives au boycottage Bconomique de la Rhodesie du Sud. 110. Ainsi que l’a montrb la discussibn sur la situation en Rhod&ie du Sud au Corn% des Vingt-Quatre B laquelle jlai deja fait allusion, les repr&entants des pays africains ont signal& 21 juste titre que les mesures prises par le Royaume-Uni en vue d’appliquer des sanctions &onomiques centre le regime de la Rhodesie du Sud refletent, sous leur forme actuelle, la complicitii: existant entre les deux gouvernements et sont done incapables de porter sibieusement atteinte a la situation Bconomique de la clique d’Ian Smith. 111. Envisageons les sanctions kconomiques, non par le petit bout de la lunette comme on s’aoharne a le faire en nous parlant uniquement des deux p&oliers dont lfun a relQch$ dans un port africain, mais dans leurs aspects essentiels. Nous constatons que si elles ne sont pas efficaces, c’est que le regime d’Ian Smith continue a s’appuyer sur l’alliance des racistes et des colonialistes du sud de l’Afrique, alliance qui, comme jlai eu l’honneur de le dire au Conseil, ‘a 6th crbee avec la participation active des principaux Etats membres de l’OTAN, notamment le Royaume-Uni et les Etats-Unis d’Ambrique. 112, Malgrg les decisions du Conseil de sbcurit& et les &olutions de 1’Assemblee g8nerale, le Portugal et la ‘Rhpublique sud-afrioaine continuent B mener une politique de soutien du ri?gime en Rhodesie du Sud qui fait obstacle B l’application des sanctions economiques p&vues par des decisions de 1’ONU. Personne ne sly trompera: ces pays n’auraient certainement pas o& lancer un d&fi a ltOrganisation des Nations Unies et B toute l’opinion mondiale s’ils ne s’htaient sentis directement soutenus par les prfncipales puissances imphrialistes. Pour ce qui est du Portugal, notamment, qui ne sait qufil m&e sa politique oolonialiste avec l’appui direct de BBS 114. Following the statement of the representative of the. African country of Uganda in the Council, a legitimate question arises in our minds: is the United Kingdom Government really interested in the speediest possible solution of the Southern Rhodesian problem or is this next propaganda mancevure to conceal the United Kingdom’s faiiure to fulfil the Security Council’s decisions and meet the demands of the Zimbabwe people? We cannot but be on our guard, especially since, in the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom, as has already been rightly pointed cut, the whole problem has been reduced to a particular case connected with an attempt to supply oil to the Southern Rhodesian racists through the port of Beira. The representative of Uganda convincingly pointedout this circumstance in his statement, and we share and support the view he expressed. 115, It goes without saying that we, like all other merhbers of the Council, are obviously against any atte.mpt to deliver oil to the Smith regime. But, in [order to carry out Council resolution 217 (1965) in this respedt, too, its decisions must -first of all be unconditionally executed, 116, Without discussing the details of the United Kingdom proposal, may I state cur conviction that the way in which the question has beenput, both in the United Kingdom representative’s statement and in the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom delegation, is aimed primarily at some sort of justification of the inaction in executing the Council’s decisions of 20 November 1965, including genuine application of economic sanctions, At the same time, there has been. an obvious attempt to divert. the Council 1 from the main and decisive causes of the continuing crisis in Southern Rhodesia, Let us examine what we have not been told here-we who are perhaps not prepared to accept the framework for discussion of thfs question imposedupon us by the United Kingdom delegation at this meeting of the Council. 117. I 8m using my notes from the interpretation, and I apologize in advance if they do not coinbide word for word with the verbatim record of this meeting; but’ I can assure you that I shall not distort the meaning bf what I am about to refer to In the 117. J’utilise les notes que j’ai prises au tours de l’interpr&aticn et vcus prie de m’excuser & l’avance si elles ne correspondent pas mot pour mot au compte rendu st6nographique de notre sbance, mais je puis vous garantir que je n’aurai pas deformi! le sens des 114. Apses ce qu’a dit au Conseil le repr$sentant de l’ouganda, pays africain, nous scmmes fond& B nous demander si le Gcuvernement du Royaume-Uni veut vraiment que le problbme de la Rhod$sie du Sud soit rGg16 au plus vite ou s’il s’agit d’une de ces maneuvres de propagande destinbe B dissimuler le refus britannique de tenir compte des dbcisions du Conseil et des revendications du peuple du Zimbabwe. Le seul fait que dans le projet de r’esolution pri%entb par le Rcyaume-Uni tnute l’affaire se rbduise, ainsi qu’on vient de le faire remarquer a juste titre, 8. un cas particulier concernant une tentative de livraison de p&role aux racistes de Rhodgsie duSudpar le pqrt de Beira, ne peut que nous mettre sur nos gardes. Le representant de I’Ouganda a insist6 sur ce point dans son intervention et ncus partageons et appuyons l’opinion qu’il a exprimbe. 115. 11 va sans diret qu’avec tcus les autres membres du Conseil, ncus sommes hostiles a toutelivraison de pMrcle au rhgime, de Smith. Mais, pour mettre en euvre la disposition de la r&oluticn 217 (1965) qui a trait aux livraisons de p&role, il faut en appliquer inconditicnnellement toutes les dispositions. 116. Permettez-moi maintenant, sans en&er dans l’examen d&ail16 de la proposition britannique, de dire notre conviction qu’en posant la question sur ce plan comme il l’a fait dans l’intervention de son representant et dans le projet de &solution qu’il a prBsent6, le Royaume-Uni cherohe surtout B justifier son inaction face aux d&isions du 20 novembre 1965 dti Conseil, notamment en ce qui concerne l’application effective de sanctions eccncmiques. En mame temps, on s’efforce ouvertement de dgtourner le Ccnseil des principales causes de la crise qui se prolonge eq Rhod&ie du Sud. Ecoutez plut8t ce qu’cn vient nous dire ici, %, nous qui ne sommes peut-btre pas p&s d’accepter que la discussion se place uniquement sur le plan que la dbl6gation britannique veut nous imposer. of us together here, except the United Kingdom--“will be helping the illegal regime In Southern Rhodesia and will be weakening the significance of the United Nations, lf we allow ourselves to discuss broader questions, then we shall he helping the Southern Rhodesian regime” -and so on, and so on. Can there be anything more monstrous than this attempt to put the question topsy-turvy, as we say in Russian? I do not know how that will sound in English, but probably it will be something in the same spirit, 118. The United Kingdom delegation stands before the Council as a delegation answerable for the nonfulfilment of the Council’s decisions and is trying, contrary to the Council’s decisions of 20 November 1965, and contrary to the position set out at length here and put forward on behalf of the African oountries, to make us responsible for what the United Kingdom itself, it now appears, did not implement and the actions which it did not take in good time in accordance with the Security Council’s decisions. 119. I think this is such a monstrous assertion that any further comments from me on this occasion would be entirely superfluous, But, returning to the form and the framework in which the United Kingdom representative raised the question, a serious question arises, Is it not strange that the United Kingdom authorities, who have more than adequate naval contingents in that area, have suddenly found themselves unable to prevent an oil tanker from reaching the shores of Mozambique? 120. Nor can we fail to draw attention to another fact. The preamble to the United Kingdom draft resolution expresses concern over the possibility of the resumption of oil pumping through the Companhfa do Pipeline Moqambique-Rhodesia (CPMR) company’s pipeline? But who, it may be asked, owns this company? Is is known that 62.5 per cent of the company’s capital is controlled by the London firm of Lonrho Ltd., and I state this for the information of my United Kingdom colleague. Perhaps no further comment is neoeseary in this case either. 121. Certain passages from the press communique released by the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the morning of 8 April 1966 are very significant, This communiqutS shows quite unequivocally that the responsibility for the situation which has arisen in Southern Rhodesia lies not only with Portugal but also with the United Kingdom Government. The communique states: “The oil aboard the tanker in Beira was supplied by large international companies, whose names are known and who could have stopped the supply at the origin had they wanted.” Another part of the communique ,states that “bank operations for payment were effected through Netherlands banks”-and I say this for the information of my colleague from the Netherlands who has come forward so actively in support of the United Kingdom draft resolutions--” Greek and Panamanian companies were also drawn into the operation. The company which owns the oil is South African. The United King- 118. Comparaissant devant le Conseil en tant ql dGlegation qui doit repondre de l’inex&ution df decisions du Conseil, la d&legation britannique s’e force, en depit des d$cisions prises par le Conse le 20 novembre 1965, en depit de la position q a 6ti: amplement exposee ici par les pays africain de nous rendre responsables de ce que le Royauml Uni aurait dQ faire et nta pas fait B temps, en ver des decisions du Conseil de &curit& 119. Pour moi, cette affirmation est si extravagan qu’elle se passe de tout commentaire. Mais, pot en revenir au cadre etroit que le repr6sentant Royaume-Uni veut nous imposer, n’est-il pas curie1 - et cela est grave - que, disposant de forces n vales plus que suffisantes dans la rggion, les aut rites britanniques aient &g soudain incapables d’i terdire l’acces du Mozambique B un petrolier? 120. 11 y a encore un fait qui ne peut manquer d’a tirer l’attention. Le preambule du projet de resolutt britannique exprime l’inquietude que le pompage p&role ne reprenne dans le pipe-line de la COmpati do Pipeline Moqambique-Rodesia (CPMR). Or, b 9 appartient le CPMR? Comme on le sait, 62,5 p, 1 de ses capitaux sont contr816s par une so&t6 long nienne, la Lonrho Ltd., ceci pour la gouverne de m collegue britannique. La encore on se passe, jeCmi de tout commentaire. 121. Plusieurs passages du communique de preI publie par le Minist’ere des affaires i%rangeres prl gais le matin du 8 avril sont t&s rev&+teurs ressort sans 6quivoque de ce communique! que Gouvernement britannique est responsable a 1’81 du Portugal de la situation qui slest c&be en Rhod&# du Sud. Le communique? declare notamment: ‘I pi%.role se trouvant B bord du petrolier qui eSt eni dans le port de Beira a 6th fourni par de grant COmpagmes internationales dont on a la hste et I auraient pu suspendre leurs livraisons si ell l’avaient VOU~U.~~ On lit plus loin: “Les 0pkratL de paiement ont 6ti: ri?alis&es des banques fit landaises” - cela pour l’information de man ~1 legue nderlandais qui a d&fendu aveo tant de fol le projet de resolution britannique - Vne oompag grecque et une compagnie panameenne sont 6galem impliquees dans cette affaire. Quant B la soofet& pl prietaire du p&trole, clest une so&i% sud-africai 122. Far be it from me to justify the actions of the Portuguese authorities, who are, of course, to a high degree responsible for the situation in Southern Rhodesia, including the shipments of oil to which I have referred. But I have quoted this communiqu6 as evidence of the way one of the accomplices in colonial crimes has given away its other accomplices in those same crimes. 123. It is surely quite clear that steps the United Kingdom took to convene the Security Council, and all the dramatization in the presentation of this question, are an obvious attempt to divest it of responsibility for the failure to implement the Security Council decisions on the question of Southern Rhodesia and the deterioration of the situation in that country, where, as we have already pointed out, the white minority regime is being further consolidated with United Kingdom connivance. 124. We are provoundly convinced that every day the terrorist regime of the racist minority continues in power in Southern Rhodesia increases the burden of suffering on the freedom-loving African people of Zimbabwe and galvanizes the remnants of colonialism on African soil. This situation is fraught with serious consequences for peace on the African continent and not only on that continent. 125. In the prevailing circumstances, it is particularly important and indeed essential not to reduce this whole matter to one separate isolated fact, but to take the most urgent and broad measures to ensure immediate fulfilment of Security Council and General Assembly decisions on the question of Southern Rhodesia, and in particular, the Council’s decision of last November, to which I have already repeatedly referred. 126. The Council must condemn the actions of the United Kingdom, the Portuguese colonialists and the South African racists as well as all those in oomplicity with the racist Smith clique in Southern Rhodesia. In this connexion I must refer to the generally known fact that Greek tankers have participated in the shipments of oil, and Greece bears responsibility for this. 127. The Soviet Union has been and is in favour of taking the most effective measures against the Southern Rhodesian racists, right up to sanctions in accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, in complete conformity, of course, with the Purposes and principles of the Charter. 128. In the light of all that has beensaid, it is hardly necessary to prove in any detail that the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom is inadequate, since it does not provide for the adoption of the decisive measures appropriate to this question. 122. Loin de moi l’idee de vouloir justifier les actions des autorit6s portugaises qui sont naturellement au plus haut point responsables de la situation en Rhodesie du Sud et notamment des livraisons de petrole dont il est question. Si jlai rapport6 oe communiqu6, c’est ;2 titre de temoignage pr6sentB par l’un des complices des crimes coloniaux qui n’h$site pas a livrer ses autres complices. 123. N’est-il pas clair que llinitiative de convoquer le Conseil de s8curit8, prise par le Royaume-Uni avec toute une mise en scbne, n’est qu’une tentative de ce pays pour se d&gag& des responsabilit6s qu’il Porte pour l’inex&cution des decisions du Conseil de securiti: relatives 3, la question de la Rhodesie du Sud et pour l’aggravation de la situation en Rhod6sie du Sud 051, comme nous l’avons deja fait remarquer, se poursuit la consolidation du regime de minor&? blanche avec la compliciti? du Royaume-Uni? 124. Nous sommes convaincus que chaque jour qui passe oh le regime terroriste, minoritaire et raciste reste au pouvoir en Rhodesie du Sud aggrave les souffrances du peuple africain du Zimbabwe Bpris de liberti: et galvanise les elements du colonialisme qui existent encore en terre africaine. Utie situation semblable est lourde de consequences pour la paix sur le continent africain et dans 1s reste du monde. 125. Dans ces circonstances, il importe particulierement, il est mame indispensable de ne pas reduire l’affaire aux proportions d’un fait isole et de prendre les mesures les plus urgentes et les plus g&&ales pour mettre en ceuvre sans retard les decisions du Conseil de sbcuritb et de l’Assembl6e g&n&ale relatives B la Rhodgsie du Sud, notamment les d6cisions auxquelles je me suis deja rkf&ri!Bplusieurs reprises, je veux parler des decisions adopt&es par le Conseil en novembre dernier. 126. Le Conseil doit condamner les actions de I’Angleterre, des colonialistes portugais et des racistes sud-africains ainsi que de tous ceux qui se font les complices de la clique raciste de Smith en Rhodbsie du Sud. A ce propos, comment ne pas rappeler le fait connu de tous que les petroliers qui devaient livrer le p&role Btaient grecs et que la Cr&ce porte une responsabilite dans cette affaire? 127. L’Union sovietique continue de demander comme dans le passe Itapplication des mesures les plus efficaces centre les racistes de Rhod6sie du Sud allant jusqu% l’application des sanctions pr&ues au Chapitre VII de la Charte, conform6ment aux principes et aux buts de la Charte. 128. Ce qui a &i! dit devrait suffire pour montrer que le projet de r6solution present6 par le Royaume- Uni est insuffisant parce qu’il ne pr&oit pas l’adoption des mesures decisives qui s’imposent. 130. The Soviet delegation calls upon the Security Council to consider the critical situation in Southern Rhodesia in all responsibility and seriousness and take, in accordance with the Charter, the measures required by the situation, measures which will ensure the removal of the racist regime ofSouthernRhodesia and give the Zimbabwe people the opportunity to determine their own future and exercise their inalienable right to freedom and independence. 131. The PR.ESIDENT (translated from French): I still have a number of names on the list of speakers but, in view of the lateness .of the hour and after having consulted the members of the Council, I suggest that we adjourn this meeting now and meet again at 3.30 p.m. The meeting rose at’li4S p.m. La stknce est levde d 13 h 45. 130. La d616gation de I’Union sovi$tique invite le Conseil de sbcuriti: 8. examiner de la faGon la plus responsable et serieuse la situation critique qui s’est c?r%e en Rhodhsie du Sud et B mettre en ceuvre, conform6ment B la Charte, les mesures dictees par la situation qui doivent amener la chute du regime raciste de Rhod6sie du Sud et donner au peuple du Zimbabwe la possibilit.6 de determiner son avenir et d’exercer son droit inali6nable 8’ la libert6 et a 1 ‘independance. 131. Le PRESIDENT: J’ai encore plusieurs orateurs inscrits sur ma liste, mais, &ant don& l’heure tardive et apres consultation avec les divers membres du Conseil, je suggere que l’on ajourne cette seance pous la reprendre a 15 h 30. . * . *,. ’ I . . HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Notions, Sales Section, New York or Geneva. COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES Les publications des Nations Unies sont en vente dans les librairies et les agences depositaires du monde entier. Informez-vous aupres de votre librairie ou adressez-vous 13: Nations ilnies, Section des ventes, New York ou Get-&e. COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas eston en venta en librerias y casas distribuidoras en todas partes del mundo. 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