S/PV.1282 Security Council

It has been about half a year now since the illegal declaration of independence of the Ian Smith regime. The question has been considered and debated time and a&ain in the Council but no firm and effective measure has been taken to suppress the rebellion. We regret that all the steps we have taken so far did not go far enough. Although we have asked for and are still advocating stronger and decisive measures, we have not withheld our support for decisions taken, hoping that they will bring us closer to a solution. We have given this step-by-step approach the benefit of the doubt. But I must admit that we have met with disappointment, It seems to us that the British step-by-step approach could not bring us to the goal which has been envisaged. The problem becomes more complicated every day, and the longer the Ian Smith r6gime continues the more difficult it will be to solve it. More than a month has passed since, at the request of the United Kingdom, the Security Council invoked Chapter VII of the Charter and i& a& called upon the United Kingdom in its resolution 221 (1966) “to prevent by the use of force if necessary the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for IRhodesiatf. What has that step accomplished? What progress have we made since that injunction7 Two tankers, and possibly others, were prevented from carrying oil to Rhodesia through Mozambique, But has this action succeeded in preventing oil from reaching Southern Rhodesia? The answer is, of course not, While trying to close the front door to Rhodesia in Portugueseheld territory, we have left the back‘door in South Africa wide open. Both the tobacco and sugar crops of Southern Rhodesia have found their way to outside markets through South Africa. 3. On the other hand, according to information given in the working paper prepared by the Secretariat,u South Africa %ould provide Southern Rhodesia with virtually everything it had been importing from the United Kingdom”. On 2 March 1966, the Cape Times reported that South African exporters had moved into the trade vacuum caused by the United Kingdom Government’s ban on exports to Southern Rhodesia, That report quotes a statement made by Mr. Hughes, President of the Associated Chambers of Commerce L/ Dwument A/AC.109/L.264/Add.2; for the text, see official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Seesion, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23 (A/63OO/Rev.l), chap. III, part I, sect. E. Sur l’invitation du Pr&ident, M. G. Parthasarathl (Inde), M. Amjad Ali (Pakistan), M. 0. S, Diop (S&& gal), M. S. M. Kapwepwe (Zambie) et M, A. I&ha! (A&?rie) prennent place ii la table du Conseil. 2. M. EL-FARRA (Jordanie) [traduit de l’anglaisj: Six mois se sont 6~0~16s depuis la dBclaration illt5gah d’inddpendance du regime Ian Smith. Le Con41 i examine et debattu cette question a maintes reprises mais il n’a pas pris de mesures energiques et effi. caces pour dtouffer la r6bellion. Nous regrettons dr constater que toutes les d&isions adopt&s jusqu? present ont Bt& insuffisantes. Encore que BOUS ayon! demand6 et continuions de prgconiser des mesuret plus energiques et plus d&isives, nous ntavons paf desavou6 celles qui ont deja BtB prises, car nou? esperions qu’elles nous rapprocheraient d’une solu. tion. Nous avons accord@ le b&#fice du doute z?l c&t< tactique d’action progressive, mais je dois avouel que nos espoirs ont et6 d@us. 11 nous semble qut la mtfthode graduelle des Britanniques ne nous permettra pas d’atteindre l’objectif vise. Le probl8rnt devient chaque jour plus complexe; plus on laisst au regime Ian Smith la possibilite de se malntenir plus 11 sera difficile de parvenir a une solution. Il! a maintenant plus d’un mois qu’& la demande dr Royaume-Uni le Conseil de sBcurit6 a invaqucS le Cha’ pitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies et a mz&aIu ment demand6 au Royaume-Uni dans sa rtSsoluti0 221 (1966) ttdtempdcher, au besoin par la force l’arrivee B Beira de navires dont on a lieu de CrOir qu’ils transportent du p&role destine & la Rbod&+ie” Quel a bt6 l’effet de cette mesure? Quels progre avons-nous faits depuis cette injonction? On a emp&ch dew petroliers, peut-6tre davantage, de faire parvenl du p&role en Rhodesie par le Mozambique. Mai cela a-t-i1 empecht5 la Rhodesie du Sud de recevoi du p&role? La &ponse, bienentendu, estn&stive,ca si on s’est efforc6 d’interdire l’entree principal de la Rhodesie par le territoire portugais, 011 a 1aiSS grande ouverte la Porte de service en Afriqne d Sud. Ainsi, les ri%oltes de tabac et de sucfe de 1 Rhodesie du Sud ont pu, par cette voie, atteindre le mar&h&s ext6rieurs. 3. Par ailleurs, selon des renseignements we dorm un document de travail Btabli par le Secretariat& PAfrique du Sud peut “vendre a la Rhod&le du 3~ pratiquement tout ce clue celle-ci faisait venir d Royaume-Uni.” Le 2 mars 1966, le journalcape Time signalait que les exportateurs sud-africains avaiel comb16 le vide cr.% par l’embargo du Gouvernemel du Royaume-Uni sur les exportations versla Rhodes1 du Sud; le mBme article citait a ce propos une d&la ration de M. Hughes, president des chambres d u Document A/AC.109/L.Z64/Add.2; pour le teite, Vofr &KXIInan offlciela de l’A&mbl8e~g$&le, vingt et u&me aesslon, Annaxe additif au point 23 de l’ordredu jour (A/6300/Rev.l)r chap. 111, pram@ partie, se&. E. 4. At the very outset, on 12November 1965,my delegation requested that both Portugal and South Africa, in view of their involvement in the matter, should be invited to participate in our deliberations [1257th meeting, para. 1101. The Council shared our view. It was clear that the .co-operation of both States was needed if we were to achieve fruitful results, We regret that the invitation was rejected by both Portugal and South Africa. Both chose to continue to serve as artificial lungs giving life to the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia. 5. It is clear, therefore, that an oil embargo on Beira in Mozambique will not bring down the illegal regime. We must admit that we find this a unique situation. We are blocking one pipeline while leaving the other operating at full capacity, 6, In previous deliberations on this issue, the United Kingdom has counselled patience, The United Kingdom said: Everything will be all right; let the Council adopt a step-by-step approach; let us be patient. I submit that the Power which is advocating the stepby-step approach and which has the sole responsibility for the present situation in Southern Rhodesia did not present to us a clear and complete plan explaining all the steps envisaged. We are not given a timetable. We were not informed of the forthcoming steps. Of course, we supported the Beira embargo. We reluctantly accepted the view that it was a step in the right direction. One month has elapsed since that time, Should we not now ask: where do we stand and what will the next stage or stages be? If the United Kingdom actually has a comprehensive plan to bring down the racist regime in Salisbury, then, I submit, it must present it to this Council now; for, without this plan and forthcoming steps, the Council will have to work within a certain limited and undefined scope, which is exactly like walking in the dark. 7. We continue to maintain that the solution does not lie in a gradual approach to the problem. This has been the experience of my delegation, and we can perhaps draw an analogy between this problem and the question of Palestine, which started with British imposition of conditions facilitating European Jewish immigration into the country and, later, the imPOsition of a minority rule on the nation’s inhabitants, Christians and Moslems, There also, the United Kingdom advocated the step-by-step approach. The first Step: it said to the Arabs of Palestine, “Independencen; to the Jews of Europe, it said, “A Jewish national home”. The second step, it said to the Arabs of Palestine, would be self-government; and to the Jews of Europe they encouraged further immigration. As to the third step, they said to the Arabs: “Let us have a round-table conference; let us have negotia- 4. Des le 12 novembre 1965, ma delegation a demand6 que le Portugal et 1’Afrique du Sud, tousdeux directemerit intfiress&s, soient invites a participer a nos deliberations [1257eme seance, par. HO]. Le Conseil a approuve notre demande, Manifestement, la collaboration de ces deux Etats Btait indispensable si lion voulait obtenir des r&ultats positifs. Nous regrettons que ces pays aient decline l’invitation du Conseil choisissant de jouer le r61e du poumon dlacier qui permet au regime illegal de la Rhodesie du Sud de survivre. 5. I1 est done clair que I’embargo sur le p&role dont on a frappe Beira ne suffira pas a renverser le regime rebelle. Nous devons avouer que cette situation nous paralt extraordinaire: nous bloquons un pipeline pour laisser l’autre fonctionner a plein rendement. 6. Lors des discussions anterieures sur cette question, le Royaume-Uni nous a conseill6 d’etrepatients; il nous a dit: Tout va s’arranger; que le Conseil prenne des mesures progressives; faisons preuve de patience, Je dois faire remarquer que lapuissance qui prBconise la methode graduelle et qui est la seule responsable de la situation actuelle en Rhodesie du Sud ne nous a pas soumis un plan clair et d&ail16 avec toutes les Btapes pr&rues. On ne nous a fait part d’aucun calendrier, on ne nous a pas informes des mesures qui doivent suivre, Certes, nous avons appuye Itembargo centre Beira. Nous nous sommes ralli&, non sans reticence, & ceux qui y voyaient un pas dans la bonne direction. Un mois s’est Bcoul& Ne devons-ncus pas demander maintenant ou nous en scmmes et cluelles seront les &apes suivantes? Si le Royaume-Uni a vraiment un plan detailI& capable d’amener la chute du regime raciste de Salisbury, 11 doit le soumettre d&s a present au ConSeil de S&Xrit8, car, si oelui-ci ne connatt ni le planni les mesures a prendre, il sera contraint de travailler dans un cadre limit6 et ma1 defini, c’est-a-dire dtagir en aveugle. 7. Nous persistons B croire que la solution du probleme ne r&side pas dans la mi%hode graduelle. C’eSt du mains ce que llexphrience a enseigne &ma d818gation, et peut-btre pouvons-nous f%ablir un parallele entre ce probleme et la question de Palestine; les Britanniques ont impose d’abord des conditions facilltant I’immigration de Juifs europeens dans le pays, puis ils ont impos4 aux habitants du pays, chr&iens et musulmans, un regime minoritaire. La encore, le Royaume-Uni preoonisait une action Btape par Btape. Premiere &ape: il parlait aux Arabes de Palestine nd’ind&pendancen et aux Juifs d%urope d’un “foyer national juifn. Deuxieme &ape: il disait aux Arabes de Palestine que ce serait l’autonomie, cependant qu’il encourageait les Juifs d’Europe a continuer dtimmigrer. L&ant a htroiSii?mei%ape, elk? COnsiStait a dire aux Arabes: Vonvoquons une conf&ence de la 8. I have already said that six months have elapsed since this question was raised in the Security Council and that we should do our best to avoid further delay. As time passes the problem becomes more complicated. We feel that it would have been easier to reach a solution last November than it is today. Tomorrow the situation may give rise to further problems and complications. The United Kingdom and the Security Council should act now. The United Kingdom and the Security Council stand to benefit by taking immediate action. 9. The New Statesman of 15 April 1966 stated: “It is time for the [United Kingdom] Government, secure in its massive majority, to reappraise the Rhodesian situation and to regain its standing and international prestige by moving ahead of events instead of being pushed by them.” 10. We have been informed that talks are going on between the United Kingdom Government, on the one side, and what that Government had previously branded as rebels, outlaws and traitors, on the other. This, to us, is another unique situation. On the one hand, the United Kingdom admits that the seizure of power by Ian Smith amounts to treason, that it was a rebellion and that Ian Smith was an outlaw and a traitor. In fact, the United Kingdom joined the other members of the Security Council in condemning the regime and in declaring the unilateral declaration illegal. On the otherhand, we see that the United Kingdom is trying, to resolve this act of treason through informal talks with the traitors, the rebels, the outlaws. 11. We do not think that the United Kingdom can bring about the end of the rebellion through negotiations or informal talks. On the contrary, we think that this may be the perfect way to keep alive the hope of the illegal regime of getting away with its treasonable seizure of power. In fact, the Ian Smith regime now takes it for granted that its presenoe is not negotiable. This illegitimate regime has received so much encouragement that it is now seeking the 8. J’ai dit que six mois deja s’&aient Bcoul& depuis que la question s’est posee au Conseil de s6curit8, et nous devrions faire de notre mieux pour Bviter tout nouveau d6lai. En effet, plus le temps passe, plus le probleme se complique. Nous pensons qu’il aurait Bt6 plus facile d’arriver a une solution en novembre dernier qu’aujourd’hui. Demain peut-Qtre se trouverat-on en presence d’autres problemes et d’autres complications, Pest maintenant que le Royaume-Uni et le Conseil de securite doivent agir. 11s ont tout Ei gagner a le faire sans retard. 9. On trouve dans le New Statesman du 15 avril 1966 le passage suivant: “11 est temps que le Gouvernement [du Royaume- Uni], assure d’une majorite Bcrasante, revoie la situation rhodesienne et recouvre son rang et son prestige international en devanc;ant les Bvenements au lieu de se laisser pousser par eux.” 10; On nous a dit que des conversations Btaient en tours entre le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni et ceux que ce gouvernement avait precedemment qualifies de rebelles, de hors-la-loi et de traltres. N’est-ce pas la encore une situation extraordinaire? D’un c6td, le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni reconnalt que la prise du pouvoir par Ian Smith constitue un acte de trahison et que l’auteur de cette r&bellion est un hors-la-loi et un traltre; en fait, le Royaume-Uni se joint aux autres membres du Conseil de scScurit& pour condamner le regime rebelle et qualifier d’ill& gale la declaration unilaterale dlindependance. Mais d’un autxe c&8, nous voyons que le Royaume-Uni essaie de r&soudre le probleme que pose cet acte de trahison par des entretiens officieux avec lestraltres, les rebelles, les hors-la-loi. 11. Nous ne crayons pas que le Royaume-Uni puisse mettre un terme a la rebellion par des negotiations ou des entretiens officieux. Nous pensons au contraire que c’est peut-8tre la le meilleur moyen dlentretenir chez les rebelles l’espoir de se maintenir aupouvoir. Dlailleurs, le r&gime d’Ian Smith considere dlores et deja comme acquis que sa presence ne peut faire l’objet de negotiations. Ce &gime illegitime a et6 encourage! au point que maintenant il cherche a se 12. It is not my intention at this stage to deal with the advisability or validity of such a new approach. I shall have more to say on this subject at a later stage. I should like to point out, however, that the Security Council, in its resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, called on the United Kingdom “to quell this rebellion of the racist minority” and Wto take all other appropriate measures which would prove effective in eliminating the authority of the usurpers and in bringing the minority rbgime in Southern Rhodesia to an immediate end”. Can this be, a2cotiplished through informal i talks? Do such talks come within the letter or the spirit of this resolution, or did the Council have in mind another measure, one which would be appropriate, real and effective? Of coursel we take it that the United Kingdom entestains the hope that informal talks and negotiations will lead to a legal solution of the problem. But the question that arises in the mind of my delegation is: what if these so--called informal talks fail? Would the United Kingdom seal the Rhodesian border effectively? Would the United Kingdom use force, if necessary7 Would the United Kingdom agree if the Security Council requested it to send observers to the key posts on the South African/Rhodesian border to ensure that no products were sent to the illegal regime or were exported from it? Or would the United Kingdom follow the Palestine example and tell us: “We have done our best, but this is now a United Nations responsibility “? 12. Je n’ai pas l’intention, B ce stade, de traiter de l’oppoxtunit8 ou du bien-fond8 de cette nouvelle tactique. J’en reparlerai par la suite, Toutefois, je tiens & faire observer que le Conseil, dans sa r&.olution 21’7 (1965) du 2 novembre 1965, priait le Royaume-Uni “d%touffer cette rebellion de la minorite raciste” et “de prendre toutes autres mesures appropri8es qui se r&eleraient efficaces pour a&antir l’autoritt! des usurpateurs et pour mettre fin immediatement au regime minoritaire en Rhodesie du Sudt’. Cela peut-il Btre accompli par des entretiens officieux? De tels entretiens sont-ils conformes a la lettre ou a llesprit de cette r&solution, ou bien le Conseil pensait-il plutBt B une autre mesure, qui fat appropriee, reelle et efficace? Bien entendu, nous supposons que le Royaume-Uni espere vraiment que ces entretiens et ces negotiations de caractere officieux conduiront a une solution juridique du probleme. Mais ma delegation se pose les qnestions suivantes: qn’adviendra-t-i1 si ces entretiens officieux, comme on les appelle, Bchouent? Le Royaume-Uni verrouillerat-i1 efficacement la frontiere rhodesienne? Aura-t-i1 recours a la force, s’il. le faut? Acceptera-t-il,.si le Conseil de sdcurite le demande, d’envoyer desobservateurs aux pastes clefs de la frontiere qui &pare l’bfrique du Sud de la RhodtSsie pour assurer qu’aucurie marchandise ne parvienne au regime illggal ou ne soit exportBe par lui? Ou bien fera-t-i1 comme en Palestine et nous dira-t-il: ttNous avons fait de notre mieux, l’affaire est maintenant entre les mains des Nations Unies”? 13. M. KIRONDE (Ouganda) [traduit de l’anglais]: De repri%entant du Nigeria nous a demande d%viter les figures de rhetorique et les discours enflammes, de garder la plus grande r&serve possible et de nous borner B presenter des propositions constructives. Je dois dire qu’& mon avis le debat au Conseil de securitl! a Bt6 d’une t&s haute tenue. Je vais, moi aussi, m’efforcer de me maintenir & ce niveau et de parler seulement des aspects de la question qui appellent des precisions et des explications. Je ne chercherai pas a marquer des points ni a mettre un orateur au pilori, si Bloigne que je puisse Btre de partager son point de vue. 13. Mr. KIRONDE (Uganda!: We have been requested by the representative of Nigeria to avoid rhetoric and flamboyant speeches and to strike as sober a note as we possibly can and only put forward constructive proposals and suggestions, I must say that, in my view, the standard of debate in the Security Council on this occasion has been notably of high order. I also shall try to maintain that standard and dwell only on those aspects of the question which need clarification and explanation. I shall avoid the scoring of points or the pillorying of any one speaker, no matter how much I might disagree with him. 14. 11 me semble que ceux qui ont Critiqu& le Projet de resolution p&sent% par les membres africains du Conseil [S/7285/Add.l] partent du principe que la situation est bien en main, que tout sederoule comme pr&u, qu’il n’y a pas lieu de s’alarmer et que 1eS mesures que nous proposons et l’adoption de notre projet de resolution pourraient tout bouleverser. On nous a dit que les sanctions avaient de graves effets. Buit mille travailleurs de la Rhodesie du Sudauraient perdu leur emploi a la suite de l’applieation des sanctions. L’orateur a volontairement omis de pr6- ciser gue ces 8 000 malheureux sont en fait des Africains. On nous a tigalement dit de faire ConfianCe 14. It appears to me that the basis of the arguments Of those who have spoken against the draft resolution which has been produced by the African Members of the Council [S/7285/Add.l] has been that the situation iS well in hand, that everything is working according to plan, that there is no need for alarm and that the steps we propose to take and the adoption of our draft resolution might upset the apple-cart. We have been told that the sanctions are biting. The figure of 8,900 workers in Southern Rhodesia who have been thrown out of work as a result of the operation of sanctions has been. reported. The speaker deliberately left out mention of the fact that those 8,000 unfortunates axe, 16. Thirteen years afterwards, in 1923, whenBritain purported to do precisely the same thing she had done in 1910, she had become smarter and wiser; to use an American expression, this time she “played it cpoln. There was no trumpeting, no beating of drums; she secretly handed over another four million blacks to a mere handful of a quarter of a million whites, but the whole thing was done on the strict “QT”, We did not know this had been done until a year or so ago, when ,we were told by Britain, “1 have already handed over the blacks. I have no more power, Southern Rhodesia is practically independent, I have even armed the white people there or permitted them to arm themselves”. Against whom? Against the blacks. 17. Let me say, while it can still be said, that the African has lost faith not in Britain generally-because I still have the greatest respect for British systems, principles and ideals-but in the British capacity to follow an impartial line where black and white are concerned. 18. I stand subject to correction, but I can see no evidence in the whole history of British imperialism of any time when Britain has been impartial where black and white are concerned. But for the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, we would have been confrontedwith exactly the same situation there as we are today facing in Rhodesia. It was not because Britain was impartial, or intended to be so, that Kenya won its independence, It is my considered opinion that the Africans of Kenya wrested independence from the unwilling hands of Britain, that Britain still wanted to hand over eight million blacks to just a mere handful of 55,000 Europeans, It is always a case of “White is right”. 19, Britain contends that she would like to be helpful and has even told us that what it really wants’to do ,in’ ‘Southern Rhodesia is to bring about a peaceful solution, Well, we are all peaceful people, we all love peace. Where a peaceful solution will do, none of us would advocate the use of force. But what completely defeats us and what makes us even more sure than ever before that there has all along been duplicity in British intentions is the question of why Ian Smith was told beforehand that no force would be used. Surely surprise is an essential element in any kind of strategy, whether military or political, 16. Treize ans plus tard, en 1923, quand elle a pr& tendu faire exactement la m&me chose qulen 1910, la Grande-Bretagne avait acquis de l’experience etdu savoir-faire; cette fois, elle a agi de sang-froid. Saris tambour ni trompette, la Grande-Bretagne, en secret, a remis de nouveau le sort de 4 millionsde Noirs a une poign6e de Blancs, un quart de millions d’hommes, le tout tres discretement. Nous ne l’avons appris $1~11 y a un an environ, lorsque la Grande-Bretagne naus a dit: “J’ai deja dispose des Noirs. Jo n’ai plus de pouvoir. La Rhodesie du Sud est pratiquement independante. J’ai m6me arm6 les Blancs ou du moins leur ai permis de s’armer eux-memes.” Contre qui? Centre les Noirs. 17. Je voudrais dire, pendant qu’il est encore temps, que les Africains ont perdu confiance non dans le Royaume-Uni en g&&al - car je garde leplus grand respect pour les syst&mes, principes et id6aux britanniques - mais dans l’aptitude des Britanniques & agir avec impartialite lorsque des Blancs et des Noirs sont en jeu. 18. Je peux me tromper, mais je ne vois pas d’exemple, a aucun moment de toute l’histoire de 11imp8rialisme britannique, oil ce pays ait BtB impartial lorsqu’il etait question de Blancs et de Noirs. Saris la r&olte des Mau-Mau, nous aurions Connu, au Kenya, exactement la meme situation qu’aujourd’hui en RhodBsie. Ce n’est pas parce gue la Grande- Bretagne a 6te impartiale, ou en a eu Itintention, que le Kenya a obtenu l’independance. Je suis convaincu que les Africains du Kenya ont arrachfi l’ind8pendance a la Grande-Bretagne centre Son grB, que la Grande-Bretagne voulait une fois de plus remettre 8 millions de Noirs a une poign6e de 55 000 Europeens. Toujours ce principe, “le Blanc a raison”. 19. La Grande-Bretagne pretend apporter son aide et nous a m&me dit que son veritable d6sir est de faVOriser une solution pacifique en Rhodf%ie du Sud, NOUS sommes tous des gens pacifiques, nous d&irons tous la paix. Lorsqu’une solution pacifique est possible, aucun d’entre nous n’irait demander l~emploi de la force, Mais ce q$ nous deconcerte tout a fait et (Pi nous oonvainc encore plus qu’auparavant de la mauvaise foi britannique, c’est ceci: pourquoi Ian Smith a-t-i1 su a l’avance qu’il n’y aurait pas de recms a la force? On ne niera pas qne llelement de surprise soit essentiel dans toute strategic, qu’elle SOit n~ili- 20. Let me now dwell more particularly on what has been put before us here as a sort of Magna Carta for Rhodesia-the six points. Or axe there five? I believe there are supposed to be six. If so, I think there are five points too many, The British are famous for being very succinct, very epigrammatic, very sparing in their use of words. Now, why have they come out here with six points? What are they trying to cover up? I think the British are protesting too much. One of their poets has said: 20. Je voudrais maintenant parler plus longuement de ce que l’on nous a present6 comme une sorte de Grande Charte pour la RhodBsie, c’est-El-dire les six points. A moins qu’il n’y en ait que cinq? Je crois qu’il y en a six. Dans ce cas, il y en a cinq de trop. Les Britanniques sont c&l&bres pour leur concision, leur laconisme; ils sont &onomes de leurs mots. Dans ce cas, pourquoi six points? Que cherchentt-ils B caoher? Je crois que les Britanniques protestent trop fort. L’un de leurs poBtes a dit: Woxds are like leaves: and where they mast abound, Much fruif of sense beneath is rarely found. Les paroles sont oomme les feuilles: ISi 02 elles [foisonnenf, On frouve raremenf de bons fruits. 21. I suggest that we should look at these six points more closely, The heading says: “Independence: Principles of British Policy”. 21. Je propose de regarder ces six points d’un peu plus p&s. Voici le titre: “Independance: Principes de la politique britannique”. 22. The first one tells us: “The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed.fi 22, Le premier point dit ce qui suit: “Le principe et ‘I’intention de poursuivre sans interruption le progr&s vers la loi de la majorit&%, deja inscrits dans la Constitution de 1961, devraient &re maintenus et garantis. n 23. The second point states: “There would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution,” 23. Le deuxieme point est congu comme suit: nI1 devrait Bgalement y avoir des garanties centre un amendement de la Constitution qui marquerait une Bvolution r&rograde..* 24. Let us deal with the first two points. What is the purpose of telling us about progress to majority rule? That is covered, as is also the second point, by just one principle: “One man, one vote”. That is all; that is all that the Africans are asking for. They do not want any progress, any guarantees; they do not want any process that leads to majority rule. What they want today is nothing more than establishment of the principle of “One man, one vote”. 24. Examinons %es dew premiers points. Pourquoi nous parler du progr&s vers la loi de la majorit67 Ce point, comme le second, s’exprime dams 3e simple principe: “A chacun une voix”. Cela suffit; c’est tout ce que demandent les Africains. Ils ne veulent ni progres, ni garanties; ils ne veulent pas d’un processus conduisant P la loi de la majorit& Ce qu’ils veulent aujourd%ui, ce n’est rien de moins que l’application du principe “A chacun une voix”. 25. Le troisieme point est le suivant: “11 faudrait une amelioration immediate du statut politique de la population africaine.” Que veut-on dire par 187 Que signifie une am6lioration du statut politique de la population africaine? Donnez-leur le droit de vote et leur statut politique s’am8liorera aussitbt. Cleat tout ce qu’ils demandent. 25. The third point tells us: “There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population,” What is intended here? What is meant by an improvement in the political status of the African population? Give them the vote and their political status will immediately improve. That is all they are asking for. 26. Si je peux revenir sur le deuxieme point - qu’il devrait y avoir Bgalement des garanties centre un smendement de la Constitution gui marq[uerait une Bvolution retrograde. Ce que l’on veut dire par la, c’est, apparemment, que la constitution rbod@ienne doit &ont%nir des clauses qui empdchent toute Erosion des garanties constitutionnelles acoord6es a la population noire. Mais cette notion ne vaut meme par le papier sur lequel elle est &rite. Nous savons tous ce qu’il eat advenu des clauses figuraht dansla Constitution de 1’Afrique du Sud de 1910. L’une apr?+s l$@s., toutes ces clauses ont eti jetees par-dessus bord. I1 26. If I may refer again to the second point, that there would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution. Apparently what is intended here is that there should be clauses entrenched in the Rhodesian constitution to prevent an erosion of any of the’constitutional guarantees given to the black People there. This, however, is not worth the paper on which it is written. We all know what has happened to the clauses that were entrenched in the Constitution of South Africa in 1910. Every singleone of those chses has gone by the board, There can never be any Constitutional guarantees. What. is wanted is the 28. Then, point number five: “The British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.” I do not understand what the purpose of this is, That again is covered by the first point I propounded, “One man, one vote”. Give them the vote and this mattes will take care of itself. 29. Then, point number six: “The need to ensure that, regardless of race, there is no oppression of majority by minority or of minority by majority.” This question, again, does not arise. The vote-that is all that is needed to solve this problem. 30. There is another point whichwe have not been able to resolve: When are these principles to be implemented? Are they intended to be implemented before independence or after independence? This is not just a rhetorical question; I really should like a reply to it, 31. If the intention is first to grant independence and then begin to implement all these points by having entrenched clauses embodied in the constitution, then, I say, that is dead wrong from the very start, After independence is given to these minority white racists-which, I suppose, is intended here-is it then the intention of Britain to come back in ten years time and ask for the invocation of sanctions against Rhodesia because they have refused or failed to observe the provisions of that constitution’? And will the major trading partners of Rhodesia then be more forthcoming in passing such a resolution? I do not understand it; I really should like a reply to that, 32. If, on the other hand, it is intended that these Points should be adhered to before independence, then 28. Vient ensuite le cinquibme point: “Le Gouvernement britannique devrait avoir l’assuranoe que toute base proposee pour l’ind6pendance est acceptable pour la population rhodesienne dans sonensemble.” Je ne saisis pas le sens de ce point, Une fois encore, cette question est r&glee par le principe que j’ai propose au debut: “A chricun une voix”. Que 140n donne le droit de vote aux Noirs et la question 6e reglera d’elle-meme. 29. Enfin le sixieme point est ainsi conpu: nIl faut s’assurer, Bans considhation de race, qulilnlyattW d’oppression de la majorit par la minorit ni de 1s. minorit par la majorit&” La encore, la question nc se pose pas. 11 n’est que d’avoir le droit de vote Pour resoudre ce probl8me. 30. 11 est un autre point quo nous n’avons pas pu r& soudre: quand ces principes seront-ils appliqu6s? Est-il pxdvu de les appliquer avant ou apres lYnd6- pendance? Je ne pose pas cette question pour la forme; j’aimerais vraiment qu’on y r6ponde. 31. Si on a pr&u d’accorder l’indhpendance dlabord, et ensuite de commencer a appliquer tous ces Points en inscrivant des clauses C la Constitution, alors je dois dire que clest une erreur radicale d8s le dhpart. Une fois que l’ind6pendance aura et6 octroyee 5t cette minoritt! de racistes blancs - ce qui et& je suppose, l’intention ici -, le Royaume-Unf a-t-f1 l’intention de revenir au Conseil dans une dizaine d’ann6es pour demander des sanctions centre la Rhodesie parce que ce pays n’aurait pas observe les dispositions de cette constitution? Et est-ce 9u’a Ce moment-la les principaux partenaires commercial de la RhodBsie seront mieux dispos6s a adopter semblable rholution? Je ne comprends pas; je vofidrais vraiment que 1’011 m’explique. 32. Si, d’autre part, on veut dire que CeS Points seront respect& avant l’ind8pendance, dans ee Gas 33. But, there is again another area which remains fuzzy: what is the intention of Britain? It is holding talks now; they are supposed to be exploratory, and more substantive talks, I suppose, will follow in due course. Is it the intention now to get Ian Smith back into the saddle? Has Britain gone back on what she promised at the last Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference-that it would institute direct government over Rhodesia and make sure that a proper constituent conference was held at which a constitution for Rhodesia would be hammered out? Ian Smith has shown what he is worth; he cannot be trusted, Is Britain working on the assumption that when Ian Smith comes back she will shake hands and be friends again, and will ask him to go and behave himself and treat the Africans better than he has been treating them? This again is to us another sign of British bad faith. Britain has never treated any rebel in the past with such kid gloves; this is the first time. 34. Some speakers have told us here that the black people need not really be considered in ‘Rhodesia; they need not come to the conference table; Ian Smith is the de facto ruler of Bhodosia; he has an army; he has a militia; and “all is quiet on the western front “. 35. I sheuld like to quote here an extract from T& .TM of London of 18 May 1966 which shows that all is not “quiet on the western front” and that a situation very similar to that which arose in Kenya during the Mau Mau is just about to erupt in Rhodesia and that steps should be taken, and soon, before a similar situation arises there. We have been informed here that we do not really know what is going on in Rhodesia; only a few things leak out fxom time to tome. Indeed, the situation may actually be much worse than what we learn, But I should like to read this to the Council, if I may: “Security forces are tonight searching the farming district of Hartley, about 70 miles from Salisbury, for members of an African,terrorist gang who are believed to have murdered a European farmer and his wife, Mr, and Mrs. Johannes Viljoen, in the early hours of today* “The couple were both in their early thirties. Their two children; a four-year-old boy and a four-month-old girl, were found safe in an adjacent. room whose walls were bullet-scarred.* I shall not read the rest9 but I shall read another past: 33. Mais un autre point demeure dans le vague: quelle est l’intention du Royaume-Uni? A l’heure actuelle, il poursuit des pourparlers qui sont tenses 6tre des sondages, et je suppose que des entretiens de fond suivront. Est-ce qu’on va remettre Ian Smith en selle? Le Royaume-Uni est-il revenu suree qu’il a promis a la derniere Conference des Premiers Ministxes du Commonwealth - a savoir qu’il instituerait un gouvernement direct en Rhod6sie et s’assurerait qu’une conf6rence constituante serait tenue dans les formes voulues, au tours de laquelle serait BlaborOe une constitution veritable? Ian Smith a montre de quoi il est capable; on ne peut lui faire confiance. Est-ce que le Royaume-Uni part du fait que lorsque Ian Smith reviendra ils pourront se serrer la main et redevenir amis, et que le Royaume-Uni lui demandera de se tenir tranquille et de traiter les Africains mieux qu’auparavant? Encore une fois;ceci est pour nous un signe de mauvaise foi de la part des Britanniques. La Grande-Bretagne n’a jamais trait6 un rebelle avec autant de p&caution; c’est la premiere fois. 34. Certains orateurs nous ont dit ici mOme qu’il n’etait pas vraiment ndcessaire de tenir compte des Noirs en Rhodesie; il n’btait pas utile qu’ils viennent a la table de conference; &fait, le chef de la Rhod&ie., c’est Ian Smith; il a une armee; il a une milice; et on peut dire “A l’ouest, rien de nouveau”. 35. Je voudrais maintenant titer un extrait du Times de Londres, paru le 18 mai 1966, montrant gu’a I’ouest il y a du nouveau, qu’il seprdpare en Rhodesie une situation t&s proche de celle qu’a connue le Kenya pendant la periode des Mau-Mau et qu’il faut prendre des mesures sans tarder pour eviter une situation analogue en Rhodesie. On nous a annonce ici m&me que nous ne savions pas vraiment ce qui se passe en Rhodbsie; seules quelques nouvelles filtrent de temps a autre. En fait, la situation risque d’&tre beaucoup plus grave que nous le cxoyons ici. Mais que le Conseil me permette de lire ce passage: “Les forces de s&urite sont & la recherche, ce soir, dans le district agricole deHartley, B 70 miles environ de Salisbury, d’une bande de terroristes africains qui sont soupponnes du meurtre d’un fermier europeen et de 88 femme, M. et Mme Johannes Viljoen, commis aujourd’hui a l’aube. “11 s’agit d’un couple d’une trentaine d’ann8es. Leurs deux enfants, un garqon de quatre ans et une petite fille de quatre mois, ont tittS retrouvds sains et saufs dans tine piece voisine dont lea murs Otaient crib& de balles.” Je vais passer sur le reste, pour vous lire un autre passage: 36, In one of the speeches, reference was mademetephorioally, of course-to the need to ensure that the patient, when this political operation is carried out, should survive, It appears quite plain to me that we do not all have the same patient in mind. The speaker must have been thinking of Ian Smith as the patient, 37. We do not intend that Rhodesia should be destroyed in the process, but there are some of us who think that it would not hurt anybody if Ian Smith were to be politically destroyed in the process. 38. I think that we really have come to a divergence of ways here. There are those who look on the quarter of a million Europeans in Rhodesia with charitable commiseration: they have been besieged by 117 independent countries, and expected to pity them and give them whatever succour we can. Nobody ever thinks of the 4 million blacks there who are being held as. hostages; If there had been just a handful, a hundred Europeans-white people-there would have been a bombing raid, as happened only recently in the Congo. The whole world would have been outraged; it would have been big news. But no: the aim of British policy and that of her allies is to ensure the political survival at all costs of their fellow white folks, 39. We note in reading The Times of London that there is “growing respect for Ian Smith as a fighter”, I suppose it could have been said by some cynics that there was growing respect for Mussolini and Hitler as fighters; they fought even harder than Ian Smith. 40. All this shows that there is a great difference in the way in which we look at this problem, and some of us feel that we have probably come to the parting of the ways. We cannot continue for all time to be expected to display the same patience as we have been displaying in the past, My colleague did mention the fact that the African is a patient human being. That is very true indeed. I suppose it is a sort of second wind which any oppressed people acquires. Did not Shakespeare’s Shylock say: “Patience is the badge of all our tribe”? Rowever, there is a limit, We cannot all the time be. expected to be patient. We have been advised, for instance, in this Council that we should avoid converting victory into defeat, that the Security council should remain united, We have been asked to adopt a “wait and see” policy, We put it to the Council that it is within the power of our critics to ensure that there is unanimity. It is for them to vote with us, We see nothing in our draft resolution to which they Can seriously object. If they are asking fox co-operation, $y do they expect us to do the co-operating while they only do the wcom-ing all the time. 36. Dans l’un des discours, l’orateuxafait allusionc(8tait une mdtaphore I?videmment - a la n&es&e de s’assurer que le malade survivra a l’op6xation politique qu’on lui fera subir. Pour moi, il est olair que nous ne parlons pas tous du meme malade. L’orateur devait pensex 2, Ian Smith, 37. Nous ne chercherons pas El d&ruire la Rhodesie au tours de l’op6ration, mais certains d’entre nous pensent que si Ian Smith disparaissait, sur le plan politique, personne n’irait plus mal. 38. Je pense que clest a ce stade que se manifestent les divergences. 11 y a ceux qui sont pleins de compassion a l%gard du quart de million d’Europ4ens vivant en RhodBsie: ils ont Bt6 assaillis par 117 pays independants, il faut avoir piti d’eux et les secourir. Personne ne songe un instant aux 4 millions de Noirs qui sont detenus comme otages. Stil y avait eu seulement une poig&e, une centaine d’Europeens - des Blancs - il y auxait eu un bombardement, cornmet cela s’est passe tout r6cemment au Congo. Le monde entier se serait r6volte; il y aurait eu de grandes manchettes a la une. Mais non, le but de la politique du Royaume-Uni et de ses allies est d’assurer a tout prix la survie de leurs congtSn&res blancs. 39. En lisant le Times de Londres, nous notons q~‘il y a un “respect grandissant a 1’Bgard d’Ian Smith en tant que lutteur”. Je suppose que cextainsoyniques auraient pu dire qu’il y avait un respect croissant pour Mussolini et Hitler en tant que lutteurs; ils Ont combattu avec encore plus d’acharnement que Ian Smith, 40. Tout cela montre qu’il y a une grande divergence de vues a l%gard de ce probleme, et cextains d’entre nous pensent que nous sommes arrives a la croistle des chemins. On ne peut attendre de nous gue nous manifestions 6texnellement la meme patience pe par le passe. Mon collegue a mention& le fait que l’Afxicain est un 6tre patient. C’est tout a fait vrai. Je suppose que c’est une faGon de reprendre souffle que tout peuple opprimt! finit par acquerix, Le Shylock de Shakespeare ne dit-il pas: “La patience est lamarque de toute notre tribu”? Mais il yades limites. NoUS ne pouvons pas &re patients Bternellement. On nous a conseilltS par exemple, ici m&me, d’&viter de txansformer la victoire en defaite, de prf%erver l’unite du Conseil de s&curit& On nous a demand6 d’adopter une politique d’attentisme. Nous deolarons au Conseil gue ceux qui nous critiquent ont le pouvoir dlassurex cette unanimit6. 11 ne depend gue d’eux-m&nss de voter avec nous. Nous ne voyons dans notre Pxojet de &solution rien qui puisse provoquer de s6xisuses objections de leur part, Sils r6olament la OooPeration, pourquoi faut-il que ce .soit toujours nous qui coop6 rions?

My delegation has followed with the closest attention the statements made before the Council both bymembers of the Council and by the distinguished persons who asked to take part in its debates. What impressed me most-and it was perhaps themost strikingfeature of the statements of the African representatives-was the heightened anxiety which they expressed here on behalf of their countries and the whole of the continent at the steady deterioration in the living conditions of the African community of Rhodesia, which constitutes the great majority of the population of that Territory, while the Territory’s future, far from having been settled on 11 November 1965 as somewould have liked to believe, remained fraught with uncertainty. 42. M. SEYDOUX (France): Ma d618gation 8 &2oUtt! avec la plus grande attention les expos&s qui ont 6% faits devant le Conseil tant par sea membres que par les hautes personnalit6s qui ont souhait6 participer aux d&bats. J’ai not& avant tout -et c’est I& sans doute le trait le plus frappant des interventions des rep?%- sentants africains - combien s’&ait aggravde l’inqui8- tude qu’ils nous exprimaient au nom de leur pays et de l’ensemble du continent, en constatant que les conditions d’existence de la communaut6 africaine trEs largement majoritaire en Rhoddsie ne cessaient de se d&&iorer, tandis que l’avenir m9me de ce territoire, loin d’avoir BtB r&g16 le 21 novembre 1.966 comme certains ont voulu le croire, restait charge d’incertitude. 43. We share that concern like all the other Members of our Organization. It was particularly cogently voiced by the representatives of Senegal [ 1278thmeeting], of Algeria and of Nigeria [1279th meeting], It is true, as the representative of Senegal has pointedout, that the challenge hurled by the Salisbury authorities is unprecedented and reflects their deliberate intention to intensify racial discrimination. Apartheid, he told us, exists in deed in Southern Rhodesia. Once again, the French Government cannot but condemn such a policy, which is contrary to the fundamental principle of the equality of men within a country and the equality of peoples within the international community. 43. Cette inquietude, ncus la faisons nBtre Bl%galde tous les Membres de 1’Organisation. Elle a Bte marquee d’une maniere particulierement convaincante par les repr&entants du SBnBgal [12788me seance], de l’Alg&rie et du Nigeria [12798me sbance]. 11 est bien vrai, comme l’a dit le representant du S&i&gal, que le d6fi lance par les autorites de Salisbury est sans pr6cddent et qu’il recouvre la volonte delib&+e d’affermir un regime de discrimination raciale. En fait, nous a-t-i1 d&la&, llapartheid existe en Rhod&ie du Sud, Le Gouvernement franqais ne peut, une fois de plus, que condamner une telle politique qui est contraire au principe fondamental de l’Bgalit8 des hommes clans leur pays et de ltbgalit6 des peuples au sein de la communaut.6 internationale. 44. The representative of Nigeria, for his part, in a statement which won our admiration because of the sincerity of his convictions and the nobility of his standpoint, stressed the constant desire of the African States so far to do nothing to impede an improvement in the situation in the natural course of events, But he also pointed out that such patience had its limits, that the intransigence shown by Mr. Smith was daily becoming more intolerable and that the entire’ continent 44. Le reprr%entant du Nigeria, pour sa part, dans une intervention qui a for& l’admiration par la sincerite des convictions et par l’bl6vation des vues, a soulignB le ddsir constant qui a 6te jusqu’ici celui des Etats africains de ne rien faire qui puisse contrarier une amelioration naturelle de la situation, Mais il nous a fait aussi entendre que cette patience avait ses limites, que l’intransigeance manifestkepar M. Smith devenait chaque jour plus inadmissible et que c’&ait le continent tout entier qui souffrait de cet &at de chases. Les interventions que nous avons entendues suffisent d’ailleurs a montrer que les pays africains, m&me si leurs vues peuvent differes sur certains points, aboutissent tous aux mt?mes conclusions et s’expriment d’une seule voix. C’est l&u, facteur important non seulement dans le cadre de l’affaire rhodesienne, mais sur un plan plus large s’il est vrai que c’est souvent dans 1’8preuve que se forge ltunite d’une nation comme celle d’un continent. Was suffering from the situation, The statements which we have heard suffice, incidentally, to show that the African countries, even if their views may differ on certain points, all arrive at the same conclusions and speak with one voice. This is an important factor not Only in the Rhodesian affair, but also in a more general sense, even if it is true that national, like continental, unity is often forged in the furnace of Suffering, 45. I should nevertheless recall that, although my Government is aware of this psychological trend, it sees no reason, to judge from developments, to change the position it adopted previously and which I last described at the 1277th meeting. 45. Dois-je rappeler cependant que, si mongouvernement est sensible & cette Bvolution des esprits; il ne voit pas, dans 1’6volution des chose& de raisons qui puissent modifier la position qu’il-a adoptde et que jlai exposee en dernier lieu 11 la 12778me seance. 46, For what has actually taken place? On the one hand, the action taken against the Salisbury r&-ime has not changed in character, that is to say, the United Kingdom Government has pursued an increasingly stringent policy of economic sanctions and, in addition, 46. Que s’est-il pass&, en effet? D’une part, les mesures mises en ceuvre centre le regime de Salisbury n’ont pas change de caractere, c’est-&dire que le Gouvernement britannique a poursuivi, en la renforpant, sa politique de sanctions dans le domaine 47. Only in this way, we believe, can respect for the Charter of the United Nations be reconciled with effectiveness, since it is only too certain that, by diluting responsibilities, we are likely, in the long run, to render them less effective, I would add that, after listening to the statements made in the past two days, my delegation remains convinced that the gravity of the situation is fully realized in the United Kingdom, just as it is, 0% course, in Africa. It is by making this essential fact very clear at this stage in the crisis that the debate, we are sure, will have demonstrated its undeniable usefulness, 48. Mr. LIU (China),,: The question of Rhodesia has caused universal concern. It is a question fraught with dangerous implications. In common with all members of *the Security Council, my delegation believes that the illegal regime of Ian Smith must be brought to an end so that the people of Rhodesia may freely determine their own future consistent with the principle of self-determination. 49. In resolution 217 (1965) the Council, on 20 November 1965, called upon the Government of the United Kingdom to quell the illegal Southern Rhodesian regime and to take all appropriate measures which would prove effective in eliminating the authority of the usurpers, The resolution further called upon all States not to recognize this illegal authority and to refxain from any action which would assist and encourage the illegal regime, and in particular, to desist from providing it with arms, equipment and military material, and to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products, 50. My delegation supported this resolution, As I informed the Secretary-General on 8 l?ebruary 1966 [S/7130] my Government, by a decree issued on 22 December 1965, instructed all Government Departments to comply with the Council’s resolution, and an embargo has been put into effect on Rhodesian tobacco, which has been an import item for a number of years, Thus, in a modest way, we have been doing our part to implement the Council’s resolution. 47. Ce n’est, crayons-nous, que de cette mani&re que peuvent &re concilih,s le respect de laC!harte des Nations Unies et le souci de llebicacit8, puisqu’il n’est que trop certain qu’& diluer les responsabilit&, on risquerait &. la longue d’en attlSnuer lepoids. J’ajouterai qu’apr&s avoir entendu les interventions de ces deux derniers jours, ma delegation demeure convaincue que la gravite de l’affaire rhodesienne est fortement sentie en Grande-Bretagne, comme elle Ilest, bisn Bvidemment, en Afrique. C’est en faisant appardtre tres nettement ce fait essentiel, B ce stade de In crise, que ce debat aura eu, nous en sommes persu.ad&, son incontestable utilit& 48. M. LIU (Chine) [traduit de l’anglais]: Layuestion de la Rhodf%ie a suscit& une inqui&ude universelle. C’est une question lourde de dangereuses cons& quences.. De mame que tous les membres du Consell de &curit& ma delegation est convaincue qu’l faut abattre le regime illegal de Ian Smith pour que le peuple de Rhod&ie puisse choisir librement son propre avenir, conformement au principe de la libre dhtermination. 49. Dans la r&olution 217 (1965), du 20 novembre 1965, le Conseil invitait le Gouvernementdu Royaume- Uni a mettre fin au regime ill&gal de la Rhodesie du Sud et a prendre toutes autres mesures appropriaes qui se reveleraient efficaces pour aneantir l’autoritt5 des usurpateurs. Cette r&solution priait Bgalement tous les Etats de ne pas reccnndtre cette autoritd illegale et de s’abstenir de toute action qui aiderait et encouragerait le regime illegal et, en particulier, de s’abstenir de lui fournir des armes, de l%quipementet du mat&riel militaire‘ et de slefforcer de rompre toutes les relations dconomiques avec la RhodBsie du Sud, en imposant notamment un embargo sur le$trole et les produits p&roliers. 50. Ma delegation a appuye cette &solution. Camme je l’ai fait savoir au Secr&taire general ie 8 fevrier 1966 [S/7130], mon gouvernement, envertud’undecret promulgud le 22 d?%embxe 1965, a enjoint a tcus les services gouvernementaux de se conformer a la r&olution du Conseil, et l’embargo a BtB mis sur le tabac rhodesien qui est importd en Chine depuis un certain nombre d’annees. C’est ainsi gue nous avons particip6 dans une mode&e mesure & la misc en ceuvre de la &solution du Conseil. 52, This, of course, was too optimistic a view. The fact is that the illegal r&ime Of Ian Smith has not yet been brought to an end. It has existed to this day and there is reason to believe that it will continue to exist for some time to come. But this does not mean that it cannot be toppled or that economic sanctions have been futile and ineffective. The impact on the Southern Rhodesian economy, it iS true, has not been as instantaneous and devastating as one might have wished, There is no question, however, that the Southern Rhodesian economy has already been experiencing serious dislocation since the imposition of sanctions. This has been admitted by the Salisbury r@ime itself. The fact that it no longer publishes statistics on foreign reserves, production, unemployment, imports and exports is evidence of this. The effects of the sanctions are necessarily cumulative and selective. They have already been felt and, I think, will undoubtedly be felt to an increasingly serious degree as time goes on. 52. Mais il s’agissait la, bien s&r, deprBvisionstrop optimistes. Le fait eat que le r&me illegal d’Pan Smith uta pas encore Bte abattu. 11 existe toujours aujourd’hui et il y a lieu de croire qu’il continuera 8. exister pendant quelque temps encore, Ceci ne signifie pas toutefois qu’il ne puisse 6tre renverse, ni que les sanctions Bconomiques aient BtB vaines et inoperantes, Leurs effets sur 1’Bconomie de la RhodBsie du Sud, il est vrai, n’ont pas &6 aussi instantanes et desastreux qu’on aurait pu le souhaiter. I1 n’est toutefois pas douteux que l’bconomie de la Rhodesie du Sud est &rieusement perturbee depuis l’application de sanctions, Le regime de Salisbury l’a reconnu lui-m8me. Le fait qu’il a oessede publier des statistiques sur les r&serves en devises, sur la production, le chbmage, les importations et 1eS exportations est la preuve de cette perturbation. LeS sanctions ont forcement un effet oumulatif et selectif; c&i-ci s’est deja fait sentir et, a mon avis, se fera sarement sentir de plus enplus B mesure gue le temPS passe. 53. Nul ne conteste en ce Conseil qu’il faille mettre fin au regime illegal de la Rhodesie du Sud POW permettre a la population du pays de choisir sa ProPre voie. S’il y a d&accord, il Porte sur leS moYens a employer plut& que sur les fins a atteindre. 53, That the illegal regime must be brought to an end so as to allow the people of that country to choose their own path into tne future, there is no disagreement among Council members. If there is any disag,reement, it is about the means to be employed and not about the ends to be attained. 54. J’ai suivi avec attention les d&la,rations faites au Conseil par les ministres des affaires Btrangeres des Etats africains et par les membres africains du Conseil. J’ai 6tB frappe par 1’8loquence avec laquelle ils ont plaid6 leur cause. 11s ont manifest6 un mecontentement justif% devant les r&ultats obtenus jusqu’ici par l’application de sanctions Bconomiques. C’est pourquoi ils demandent instamment au Royaume- Uni d’employer la force pour renverser le regime illegal. Le representant du Nigeria, dans la remarquable declaration qu’il a faite l’autre jour, a eu soin dlexpliquer gue ltexPression “usage de la force” ne signifiait pas ndcessairement le declenchement d’une guerre proprement dite, 11 a dit notamment ce qui suit: 54. I have listened to the statements made in the Council by the Foreign Ministers of the African States and the African members of the Council with great attention. I nave been impressed by the eloquence with which they have presented their case. I believe that they have been justifiably dissatisfied with the results thus far achieved by the application of economic sanctions. For this reason, they urge the United Kingdom to use force to overthrow the illegalregime. The representative of Nigeria in his remarkable statement the other day, was careful to explain that the phrase %se of force” does not necessarily imply the waging of a full-scale war. He said: WI1 suffira a nos fins que la Grande-Bretagne emploie juste la force necessaire pour abolir ce regime, mQme sfil ne doit slagir que de donner une chiquenaude a Ian Smith.” [1278eme &ance, par. 65.1 “It will suffice for our purpose if Britain applies no more force than is necessary to abolish this r@me, even if it’ only means kicking Ian Smith in the pants and doing no more.” [1279th meeting, para. 65.1 55. I1 est vrai que jusqu’a pr&sent le Royaume-Uni s’est abstenu dtemployer la force, Mais il eSt tout aussi vrai que le Premier Ministre, Harold Wilson, 556 It is true that the United Kingdom has hitherto refrained from using force. But it is ~equally true that Prime Minister HaroId wi1a011, while reluctant 56. The United Kingdom prefers a peaceful settlement to violence and bloodshed. In the words of its own representative the United Kingdom seeks not to create conflict, but to prevent it. Until all avenues of peace are explored and exhausted, there should be no resort to extreme and hasty action, It is a preference, I believe,. that is shared by many members of the Security Council. 57. It is significant to note, however, that the representative of the United Kingdom has not rejected the ultimate use of force out of hand, He has conceded that if a peaceful and just settlement cannot be attained, a new situation would arise and the United Kingdom would have to consider the whole problem further, This, If I understand him rightly, means that the United Kingdom seems to accept the proposition that force might be required at some future time, Indeed, if we accept, as we do, the fact that the Smith regime is illegal and rebellious, the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, has the inherent right, and in certain circumstances the obligation, to employ force for the suppression of the rebellion and the restoration of constitutionality. The question is thus, to use Lord Caradon’s words, amatter of “both timing and tactics nm 58. Inasmuch as Southern Rhodesia has hitherto been under British administration, the primary responsibility lies on Britain. It is also evident that the United Kingdom Government intends to carry out that responsibility, It is therefore difficult for me to see how any decision the Council may adopt could be fully implemented without the complete endorsement of the United Kingdom. I wonder whether it is not the better part of wisdom to leave the matter of using force to the discretion of the United Kingdom, 59. Meanwhile, the Council shouldcallupon all States, especially the immediately neighbouring States, to carry out resolution 217 (1965) with increasing vigour and faithfulness. I submit that the Councilcannot afford to give the impression that it is so divided on the Rhodesian question and thus encourage the Smith r@ime to persist in its course of defiance and illegality.

The list of speakers for this meeting has now been exhausted. With regard to the future course of the debate, there seems to be a desire on the part of many members of the Council that we should, if possible, come to a conclusion this week. A number of members of the Council have not yet spoken, and I would suggest that, if at all possible, 56. Le Royaume-Uni prefere un r&glement pacifique 3, la violence et aux effusions de sang. Pour repreD& les termes du representant du Royaume-Uni, sonpays ne cherche pas 3. crder un conflit mais 8. en pr&enir un, Tant gue toutes les possibilites de paix n’auront pas BtB BpuisBes, toute action extreme et pr&ipit& est a proscrire. C’est 18, je le crois, une opinion que nous sommes nombreux & partager au sein du Conseil, 57. 11 convient toutefois de constater que le rep+ sentant du Royaume-Uni n’a pas exclu absolument le recours & la force en dertiier ressort. 11 a admfs que s’il Btait impossible de parvenir B un reglement Equitable par des moyens pacifiques, on se trouverait en presence d’une situation nouvelle et que le Royaume- Uni devrait &examiner le probleme dans son ensemble, Si j’ai bien compris, cela signifie que le Royaume-Uni semble aocepter l’id8e qu’il serapeut-&re n6cessalre un jour de recourir a la force. Enfait, si nous acceptons - comme c’est le cas - le fait que le regime Smith est un regime illegal et rebelle, le Royaume- Uni, en tant qu’autorit8 administrante, a le droit inherent, voire dans certaines circonstances I’obligation, de recourir a la force pour Bcraser la dbellion et retablir l’ordre constilutionnel. La question r&de done, pour reprendre encore les termes du reprhsentant du Royaume-Uni, dans le choix du moment et de la tactique. 58. La Rhodf%ie du Sud ayant et.6 jusqu’g present sous administration britannique, c’est au Royaume- Uni qu’t5choit la principale responsabilite dans cette affaire. 11 est Bgalement evident que le Gouvernemsnt du Royaume-Uni entend s’acquitter de cette responsabilit6. 11 m’est done difficile de comprendre comment une decision qu’adopterait le Conseil poul’rait &tre pleinement mise en ceuvre sans llappui total du Royaume-Uni. Je me demande si la sages% ne Con+ mande pas de laisser la question de ltemPloi de 1% force & la discredition du Royaume-Uni, 59, Dans l’intervalle, le Conseil devrait sladresser FX tous les Etats, notamment aux voisins imm6dhts de la Rhodesie du Sud, pour qu’ils appliquent la r&olution 217 (1965) avec une vigueur et une rigueur accrues. A mon avis, le Conseil ne peut se permettre de dormer Itimpression qulil est a ce point divise sur la .question de la Rhod&ie, ce qui risquerait d’encour’ager le regime Smith & maintenir sonattitudede &fi et 3. pers&&er dans l’ill6&it& 60. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l’anglais): La liste des orateurs inscrits pour ce matin est ~Pu~s~e Pour ce qui est de la suite du debat, il sembls Fe de nombreux membres du Conseil souhaiteralent (lUe nous parvenions si possible & une conOlUSion cette Semaine mbme. Certains membres n’ont Pas encore pris la parole et je propose que, s’ils le peuventr ils The meeting rose at 12SO p.mc I;a se’ance est let&e d 12 h 50. HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva. COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES les. publications des Nations Unies sont en vente dans les librairies et les agences depositaires du monde entier. Informer-vous aupres de votre librairie ou adresser-vous 21: Nations Unies, Section des ventes, New York ou GenBve. COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS Las publicaciones de ICIS Naciones Unidas est6n en venta en librerios y casas distribuidoras en todas partes del mundo. Cons&e a su liljrero o dirijase a: Naciones Unidas, Secci6n de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra. Litho in U.N. Price: U-S. 0.50 (or Hpivalent in o?Qler omen&s)