S/PV.1290 Security Council

In accordance with the Council’s Previous decision, I invite the representatives of Syria, Israel and Iraq to take seats at the Council table in order to participate, without vote, in our discussion. 1. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l’anglais): Conform& ment & la &cision anthrieure du Conseil, j’invite les repr&entants de la Syrie, d’Isra51 et de 1Wak h prendse place P la table du Conseil afinde participer, sans droit de vote, B notre discussion. At the invitation of the President, Mr. G. J. Tomeh (Syria), Mr. M. Comay (Israel) and Mr. K. Khalaf (Iraq) fookplaoes at the Council table. Sur 1 ‘in vita tion du Pr&iden 1, M. G. J. Ton& (syre), M. M. Comay (IsraW et M. K. Khalaf (Irak) prennent place 2 la table du Consell. 2, The PRESIDENT: Before the Council resumes the discussion of the item on its agenda, I should like to draw the attention of members to thefactthat we have now received the two reports of the Secretary-General relating to sub-items (a) and (b) of our agenda, which reports, at the 1288th meeting, we asked him to submit. They have been circulated in documents S/7432 and S/7433, respectively, and were issued yesterday evening. In addition, in connexion with document 2. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l’anglais) : Avant que le Conseil reprenne la discussion de la question qui figure a son ordre du jour, je voudrais attirer l’attention des membres sur le fait que nous avons maintenant requ les deux rapports du Secr&aire g&bra1 avant trait aux points. a et b_ de notre ordre du jour, rapports que nous 1faGons pri6 de nous soumettre lors de la 1288Bme sbance. Ces rapports ont &$ publi& hier soir et distribues respectivement sous 3. In connexion with document S/7434, I have here a note addressed to me by Mr. Ralph J. Bunche of the Secretariat, which, with the permission of members, I should like to read to the Council. The note is dated 28 July 1966 and reads as follows: “It may prove helpful if you would call the following to the attention of the members of the Security Council. “After the circulation of the reports on the afternoon of 27 July, the question was raised with me as to the exact meaning of the last sentence in the first paragraph of the report on(h) of the agenda [S/7433). The explanation was given by me that thesole intent of this statement was to indicate why the specific incidents dealt with in that report were those pf - .- 13/14 July only, There was no ready basis for determining the selection of incidents to be covered in the report other than the time of their occurrence. The statement in question sought to convey this and only this and was not intended to imply or suggest anything beyond this clear and simple fact. “Since the Secretary-General has been absent this week, I have had to submit the reports and I accept full responsibility for them. “1 may inform you also that we have been advised this morning by cable from General Bull of the certification of the death of a boy as a victim of the air raid on 14 July 1966. An addendum to report S/7432 on this matter is being issued today setting forth further information received from the Chief of Staff. “Since inquiries have been made, a word of explanation is also due on S/7434, ‘Note by the Secretary-General on efforts of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to relieve tension along the line between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic’. In presenting reports on incidents the Chief of Staff invariably includes information on the activities of himself and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in seeking to relieve the tension and eliminate the causes of the incidents. The Council, however, requested separate reports on (a) and (9 of its agenda. To avoid repeating the identical material in each report it was decided to issue it separately in the form of a note from the Secretary-General which would deal exclusively with the efforts of the Chief of Staff and of the Truce Supervision Organization. Since its sole purpose was to avoid useless and uneconomical duplication, the issuance of this note is not to be interpreted as having any bearing on any question of the relationship between incidents. On this issue the Secretariat scrupulously avoids taking or supporting any position. The Chief of Staff is called upon to investigate 3. J’ai recu, au sujet du document S/7434, une note qui rnla bti! envoyee par M. Ralph J. Bunche, du SecrBtariat; avec la permission des membres du Conseil, je voudrais donner maintenant lecture de cette note, datbe du 28 juillet 1966, qui est ainsi concue: Yl pourrait Btre utile que vous attiriez l’attention des membres du Conseil de securiti? sur cequi suit: “AprBs la distribution des rapports, au tours de ltapres-midi du 27 juillet, il mla et.6 demand6 d’expliquer le sens exact de la derniBre phrase du premier paragraphe du rapport sur le point b, de l’ordre du jour [S/7433], J’ai expliqub que ce paragraphe est uniquement destine a indiquer pourquoi les incidents prbcis dont ce rapport traite sont uniquement ceux des 13/14 juillet. Pour determiner le choix des incidents dont ce rapport devait traiter, nous n’avions pas d’autre critere que le moment oh ils sont survenus. Le paragraphe en question avait cette signification et ne voulait rien dire d’autre; il n’avait pas pour but de sous entendre ou d’impliquer quoi que ce soit d’autre que ce fait clair et simple. “Le SecrMaire g&&al gtant absent cette semaine, jlai d0 soumettre moi-m8me ces rapports et jlen prends la pleine responsabiliti!. “Je puis vous informer iitgalement que nous avons recu ce matin du g&&al Bull un tel$gramme annonqant officiellement la mort d’un enfant qui avait ete victime du raid aerien du 14 juillet 1966. Un additif au rapport S/7432 sera publib aujourd’hui; il contiendra les renseignements SupplGmentaires repus du Chef d’i?tat-major. “Puisque des questions ont &6 po&es, il faut aussi donner quelques breves explications sur le document S/7434: “Note du Secretaire g&n&al concernant les efforts dhployes par l’organisme dss Nations Unies chargh de la surveillance de la trbve en Palestine pour reduire la tension le long ds la ligne d’armistice israSlo-syrienne”. Lorsqu’il presente un rapport sur des incidents, le Chef dIGtat-major communique toujours en m&me temPs des renseignements sur ses propres activitks et sur celles de 1’ONUST en vue dlamener une detente et de supprimer les causes de ces incidents. Toutefois, le Conseil avait demand& des rapports &par&s sur les points 2 et b_, POW Bviter de repi?ter des don&es identiques dans chacun de ces rapports, il a eti! decide de les publier &par$ment dans une note du Secshtaire g&n&al, qui traiterait exclusiwment des efforts deploy&s par le Chef d’etat-major et par 1’ONUST. Puisque le seul but de ce document etait d’gviter des doubles emplois inutiles et COfiteW Cette note publibe s$par&ment ne doit pas btre interp&tee comme portant sur une question quelconque relative aux rapports entre les incidents. Sur cette

I am grateful to you, Mr. President, and to Mr. Bunche for the clarification just made. It certainly leaves no room for doubt about the intention and the meaning of the note we have before us as well as the report on sub-item (5). I hope that in the future the Secretariat will continue to inform members of the Council of all developments on the armistice demarcation line, This certainly is very helpful, The Council is entitled to know and every member is entitled to be acquainted with what goes on. 5, The PRESIDENT: I now call upon the representative of Syria who wishes to exercise a right of reply that he reserved at an earlier meeting,

Since the debate started on oui? complaint to the Council, so many side issues have been raised and discussed that we are about to lose sight of the real issue which is under consideration. The real issue is sub-item (a) of the Security Council’s agenda, as, was originally contained in document S/Agenda/ 1288, which is the subject of the Syrian complaint. 6. M. TOMEH (Syrie) [traduit de l’anglais]: Depuis que le dhbat a commenci! sur la plainte que nous avons soumise au Conseil de s.%curitb, tant de questions annexes ont bti! soulev6es et discut&es que nous risquons de perdre de vue la question v$ritable qui ‘nous occupe. Cette question vi?ritable est le point 5 de l’ordre du jour du Conseil de s6curit8 tel qu’il figurait a ltorigine dans le document S/Agenda/I288 et qui Porte sur la plainte syrienne. 7, The facts pertaining to that complaint have now become abundantly clear. On 14 July, by their own recognition, the Israel authorities started an aerial attack on Syria which resulted in great damage, since in that attack they used napalm bombs, The situation becomes the more dangerous since that attack on Syria was not the first of its kind; Israel planes and Air Force have already resorted to such attacks. It was premeditated, as was abundantly clear in the letter of confession of responsibility presented on 14 July to the Security Council by the Israel representative [S/7411]. All this leads us to believe that the incidents and events mentioned in the letter of the Israel representative in justification of that unprovoked premeditated attack were actually fabricated and had no foundation. 7. Les faits relatifs ?i cette plainte sont maintenant t&s clairs. Le 14 juillet, de leur propre aveu, les autoriGs israeliennes ont d&lenchQ sur la Syrie une attaque aerienne qui a cause de graves dommages, car des bombes au napalm ont 6tk utilisbes. La situation devient d’autant plus dangereuse que cette attaque centre la Syrie n’est pas la premiere de ce genre. Lea avions et la force a6rienne drIsraGl en ont deja fait d’autres. Elle a et.6 prem$ditGe, comme le montre amplement la lettre, qui est un aveu de responsabilitg, adressbe le 14 juillet 1966 au Conseil de &curiti! par le repr&entant d’l’sragl [S/7411]. Tout ceci nous Porte B croire que les incidents et 6v6nements mention&s dans la lettre du representant israelien pour justifier cette attaque non provoquee et p&m&dit&e ont 6th invent&s de toutes pi?Xes et n’Ont aucun fondement. 8. It falls within the Israelis’ pattern of behaviour to create an artificial situation with a view to realizing their ultimate aims and objectives. Those who are acquainted with the history of Zionism in Palestine know very well that this was not, inthe history of that unhappy part of the world, the first instance where Zionist machinations have created false situations to justify their ends and ultimate objectives. Furthermore, one should not lose sight of the fact that that attack took place inside Syrian territory. It tookplace on a development project aiming at the utilization of water resources in Syria with a view to raising the standard of living of the people. That project was 8. I1 rentre bien dans les habitudes d’Israg1 decreer une situation artificielle pour pouvoir atteindre ses buts et objectifs ultimes. Ceux qui connaissent l’histoire du sionisme en Palestine savent tres bien que ce nlest pas la premiere fois, dans l’histoire de cette partie du monde si Gprouvee, que les mameuvres sionistes ont cri?e des situations fausses pour justifier leurs fins et leurs objectifs ultimes. En outre, n’oublions pas le fait que cette attaque a eu lieu en territoire syrien. Elle &tait dirigee sur des travaux de mise en valeur des ressources en eau de la Syrie, travaux entrepris pour iSlever le niveau de vie des habitants. Ces ouvrages ont 6th dbtruits, et ce n’ittait 4. M. EL-FARRA (Jordanie) [traduit de l’anglais]: Je vous suis reconnaissant, Monsieur le Pr&ident, et je suis i?galement reconnaissant B M. Bunche pour lea &laircissements qui viennent dldtre don&s. 11 n’y a certainement plus auoun doute sur l’intention et le sens de la note elle-meme ainsi que clu rapport sur le point k_ de ltordre du jour. J’espere que le Secr&ariat voudra bien dans l’avenir continuer h informer les membres du Conseil de tous les &&nements qui surviennent sur la ligne de d&marcation d’armistice; cela eat assurGment fort utile. Le Conseil est en droit de savoir ce qui se passe; c’est le droit de chaque membre du Conseil d’btre au courant des bv&ements, 5. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l’anglais) : La parole est au representant de la Syrie, qui souhaite exercer le droit de reponse quW s’Btait r&ervi! lors d’une seance pr&&dente. 10. Thus we are faced here with a new concept in international law: that the brevity of an aggression justifies or minimizes the gravity of the attack, We know very well that the Israelis have an atomic reactor in Dimona, that Israel is among the countries listed to join the nuclear club. One day they may develop the nuclear bomb and try to impress the Arab countries in their usual manner. They will immediately come to the Security Council and say: “Well, this atomic attack on Syria or Jordan or the United Arab Republic took only two to five minutes; therefore, let us forget about it.” 11. The ultimate objective of this attack was not really in retaliation of the so-called acts of sabotageand infiltration which took place on 13 and 14 July; they actually attacked a place in Syria where a development project is taking place, It is now 28 July 1966 and Israel is a Member of the United Nations. But the designs on that particular place in Syria, on the rivers in all the Arab countries, actually go back to the very first time that Zionism started scheming against the Arab world, in conjunction and co-operation with the colonial Powers, 12. I have in my hand a document of which I believe the Council should be apprised. On 3 February 1919, the World Zionist Organization submitted to the Peace Conference in Paris a document embodying the aims of the World Zionist Organization. That document was submitted at the Paris Conference by a leader from Russia, Mr. Chaim Weizmann, by a Zionist from France, and another from England, and they discussed that document at the Conference. They requested the High Contracting Parties to give the Zionist Organization a part in the historic title to Palestine because of the so-called historic associations which have existed between the Jews and Palestine, 13. I am not going to deal at length with that very strange but at the same time very significant document because in 1919 there were only 60,000 Jews in Palestine; there was no State of Israel at that time. That document gives the boundaries of Palestine, and as given they include what is now Jordan-all of southern Lebanon, ‘and all of southern Jordan. Incidentally, the boundaries of Palestine, as presented in that document, included all the rivers which are under dispute and all the headwaters of the rivers. I shall read a few lines only: “The boundaries above-outlined are what we consider essential for the necessary economic founda- 10. On nous propose done un nouveau concept sn droit international, B savoir que la brieveti: d’une agression justifie ou minimise la gravitb del’attaque, Nous savons fort bien que les Israeliens ont un r$acteur atomique B Dimona, qu%ra$l compte parmi les pays qui doivent adherer au club nuclbaire, Un jour les IsraGliens fabriqueront peut-&re leur propre bombe nucleaire et s’efforceront d’impressionner lss pays arabes de leur maniere habituelle. Puis ils viendront immediatement au Conseil de &curitit pour dire: “Oh, cette attaque atomique centre la Syrie, ou la Jordanie, ou la Rbpublique arabe unie, nla durit qu’entre deux et cinq minutes, par cons6quent, nfy pensons plus. n 11. Le but final de oette attaque n’&tait pas en &alit& une action de represailles centre les pretendus actes de sabotage et d’infiltration qui ont eu lieu les 13 et 14 juillet; Israsl a en fait attaqui? en Syrie un endroit oh l’on effectuait des travaux d’int&& public, NOUS sommes aujourdlhui le 28 juillet 1966, et Israsl est Membre des Nations Unies. Mais les desseins d’Isra& sux cet endroit particulier de la Syrie, sur les COWS dleau de tous les pays arabes, remontent en r&alit& aux tous premiers temps oh le sionisme a commenc6 d’hlaborer des plans centre le monde arabe, de concert avec les puissances colonial& et en coophration avec elles. 12. J’ai ici un document dont, je crois, le Conseil devrait avoir connaissance. Le 3 fevier 1919, l’organisation sioniste mondiale a soumis B la Conference de la paix B Paris un document exposant les buts de ladite organisation, Ce document a et6 pr&sentir & la Conference de Paris par un dirigeant de Russi% M. Chaim Weizmann, par un sioniste de France, et par un autre sioniste d’Angleterre, qui en ont discute g la ConfBrence. 11s demandaient aux hautes parties contractantes de donner & 1’Organisation sioniste uns part du droit historique sur la Palestine du fait dss pr&endus liens historiques qui ont exist6 antre les Juifs et la Palestine, 13. Je ne veux pas m%tendre longuement sur ce document tres &range mais en mbme temps lourd de signification, car, en 1919, il n’y avait en Palestine que 60 000 Juifs; a cette &oque, lEtat d%ra~l n’existait pas, Dans ce document, on indique les front&es de la Palestine, et elles embrassent 0s qui est maintenant la Jordanie, tout le sud du Liban et tout le sud de la Jordanie. Incidemment, lesfrontibres de la Palestine, telles qutelles sont presentees dans ce document, englobaient tous les tours d’eau qui font l’objet d’un diffbrend et tout leur tours supbriaur. Je n’en citerai que quelques lignes: “Les frontieres ci-dessus esquissees sont Csllss que nous jugeons essentielles pour que le pays ait 1’ * . . . . . “The economic life of Palestine. , #depends on the available water supply. It is, therefore, of vital importance not only to secure all water resources already feeding the country, but also to be able to conserve and control them at their sources.” “La vie economique de la Palestine . . . dSpend des r&serves d’eau disponibles. 11 est done vital pour la Palestine non seulement de s’assurer toutes les ressources hydrauliques qui alimentent dBj%lepays, mais egalement de pouvoir les conserver et Ies contrbler d&s leur source, fl The subject of our complaint is the source of one of those tributaries of the Jordan-one of the headwaters of the Jordan, The document goes on to state: L’objet de notre plainte Porte precisgment sur la source de l’un de ces affluents du Jourdain, un des tours sup&ieurs du Jourdain. Le document poursuit en ces termes: “The Herrnon”-Mount Hermon, mentioned in the Bible-“is Palestine’s real ‘Father of Waters’ and cannot be severed from it without striking at the very root of its economic life,‘l/ “Le mont Herrnon” - qui est mentionnQ dans la Bible - ‘lest le veritable “P&e des Eaux” de la Palestine et ne peut en btre coup6 saris que soient sapbes les racines memes de sa vie Bconomiqueti.” Mount Hermon is now in Lebanon, but some of the tributaries of the Jordan do rise from Mount Kermon. Le mont Hermon est maintenant au Liban, mais certains des affluents du Jourdain y prennent leur source. 14. Therefore, once again allow me to say that the real issue-the issue which is the subject of our complaint-is a premeditated act of aggression with far-reaching ultimate motives, reaching not only, to the present, which we are discussing now, but as far back as 1919 and even before that, when Zionism was conceived by its founders as a great scheme directed against the Arab world. 14. En con&quence, permettez-moi a nouveau de dire que le probleme &el - celui qui fait l’objet de notre plainte - est un acte d’agression prbm&dite dont les motifs ultimes sont B longue porthe; ces motifs n’ont pas uniquement trait au present, qui fait l’objet de notre discussion, mais leur origine remonte & 1919 - et mgme avant oette date - lorsque le sionisme ,fut congu par ses fondateurs comme une vaste entreprise dirigbe centre le monde arabe. 15. I would have been satisfied with that, but unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately, the very lengthy statement of the Israel representative contained so many side issues. In .fact, there was not one issue left which was not raised by the Israel speaker; so much confusion has been thrown around our complaint that-while, I assure you, I am very oonscious of the value of the Council’s time-1 feel bound to refute those allegations, 15. Je me serais contenti: de ce que je viens de dire si malheureusement - ou peut-$tre heureusement - la declaration fort .longue du repr&entant d’Isra81 ne contenait pas tant de problemes annexes. En fait il nty a pas un seul probleme qui n’ait && souleve par l’orateur israeliem cela a semB autour de notre plainte une telle confusion que - bien que, je puis vous l’assurer, j’ai conscience de la valeur du temps du Conseil - je me trouve dans llobligation de refuter cks allegations. 16. En s’adressant au, Conseil de sbcurit6 lundi dernier, le representant d’Israg1, citant mes paroles disait: “Au tours de son expose, le representant de la Syrie a accusi: mon gouvernement de vi&es expansionnistes et colonialistes sur la Syrie et les Etats arabes voisins.lt [1288eme seance, par. 126.1 Je suis vraiment stupefait d’une telle declaration venant du Porte-parole d’Isra81 et, en mbme temps, je ne sais par quoi commencer pour prouver les desseins expansionnistes d’Israg1 et du sionisme. Mais puisque nous sommes maintenant devant le Conseil de securitb, prenons comme termes de r&fbrence les resolutions adopt6es par ce Conseil. 16. In addressing the Council on Monday, the representative of Israel referred to me, stating: “In the course of his statement the representative of Syria accused my Government of expansionist and NOnialist designs on Syria and neighbouring Arab States. It [1288th meeting, para. 126.1 I am really astonished at such a statement coming from the Israel spokesman, and I am also, at the same time, at a loss at where to start to prove the expansionist designs of Israel and of Zionism. But since we are now in the Security Council, let us take as our terms of reference the resolutions of the Security Council. 17. En 1948, aprbs la cessation des hostilit& entre Israg et les Etats arabes, le Conseil de securiti: a ordon&, dans au moins cinq r&olutions qu’il a solennellement adopt&es, qu’aucune des parties ne devrait tirer aucun avantage pendant ou apres l’armistice et le cessez-le-feu. Mais qu’a faitIsrai%? 17. In 1948, after the cessation of hostilities between Israel and the Arab States, the Security Council ordered, in at least five solemn resolutions adopted by the Council, that no one party shouldbenefit during or after the armistice and the cease-fire. But what did Israel do? Israel expanded to a very large extent and .-_-. Y se J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East (Princeton. New Jersey, D, Van Nostrand Company, IX., 1956), vol. 11. 1914-1956, pp. 47 and 48. Y Voir J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East (Princeton, New Jersey, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.. 19.56). vol. II, 1914-1956. p. 47 et 48. I 18. Also within the context of this Security Council, there are demilitarized zones over which, according to the General Armistice Agreements, no one party is supposed to exercise sovereignty. But what did Israel do? In a laxge area between Egypt and Israel, 6,OOQ to 7,000 Arab bedouin were thrown off their lands, The Mixed Armistice Commission was called upon to look into the matter. It passeda solemn resolution asking for the return of those Arabs to their lands. Then an appeal was made to a special committee, in which an Israel representative was supposed to take part, But up to today that special oommittee for appeals has not been able to meet, because of the fact that the Israel representative was not able to take part therein. Let us ask the Israel representative whether this is true or false. 15. Between 1950 and 1951, 700 to 800 Syrians were thrown out of the demilitarized zone between Syria and Israel, in flagrant violation of the Armistice Agreement; they are still out, 20. But 1956 was quite a date in modern history, in the history of the Palestine question and in the history of Zionis’m, for 1956 brought the whole world to the brink of war, and it topk the United Nations-both the Security Council and the General Assembly-a great deal of effort with at least eight condemnations and eight resolutions requesting Israel to withdraw from Gaza, the Sinai peninsula and other occupied parts before it did so under the pressure of world public opinion, the decisive stand taken by the Soviet Union in safeguarding the peace, and the threat of the cutting off of economic assistance from the United States to Israel, President Dwight D. Eisenhower made that very clear in his second book of memoirs, and lately a book on the market by General Moshe Dayan also explains this very fact. So this is as far as present history goes. 21. But the colonialist idea of Zionism, as embodied in Israel now, which is seen and known by every Arab, has existed from the very first moment that the idea of Ispael was born in the mind of its founder, Mr. Theodor Herzl. The three following lines from his, book, Der Judenstaat, which was wrrtten in 1890, are sufficient to make this quite clear: “If his Majesty the Sultan [of Turkey] were to give us Palestine, we could in return undertake to regulate the whole finances of Turkey. We should there form a portion of a rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism.“-The term “barbarism” is used here as a description of the Arabs of Palestine and the Middle East. - “We should as a neutral State remain incnn- 18. En restant dans le contexte du Conseil de s&ritb, il existe des zones dQmilitari&es sur lesquelles, conformBment & la Convention d’armistice g&&T&l, aucune des parties nlest censhe exercer la souverainetg. Mais qu’a fait Israbl? Dana une vaste region situi?e entre Israg et lIEgyp@ 6 000 $1 000 Bedouins arabes ont &i: expul&s de leurs terres. La Commission mixte d’armistice a 6th saisie de la question. Elle a adoptit une r&solution solennelle demandant le retour de ces Arabes dans leur partrie. Ensuite, un appel a &b interjeti! auprbs d’un comiti? spgcial dont le reprgsentant d’Israg1 devait faire partie. Mais, jusqu% p&sent, ce cornit special charge d’examiner les appels n’a pas pu se r&mir, car le reprhsentant dlIsrag1 n’a pas pu y participer. Demandons au reprhsentant d’Israg1 si cela est vrai ou faux. 19, Entre 1950 et 1951, 700 & 800 Syriens ont iirt& expul&s de la zone dbmilitaris&e entre la Syrie et IsraBl, et cela en violation flagrante de la Convention d’armistioe. Et ils n’y sont toujours pas revenue., 20. Mais 1956 est une date qui marquera dans l’histoire caitemporaine, dans celle de la question de Palestine et dans celle du sionisme, car, cetteannbe- 18, le monde entier s’est vu au bard de la guerre, Tant au Conseil de sbcurit& qu% 1’Assemblge g&n&- rale, l’organisation des Nations Unies a dtl deployer des efforts consid&ables, prononcer au mains bit condamnations et adopter au moins huit r6solutions demandant a Israg de se retirer de Gaza, de la p&insule du Sinai’ et d’autres regions occupbes par lui, avant qu’il ne slen retire sous la pression de l’opinion publique mondiale, de la position decisive adopt&e par 1’Union sovihtique en vue de maintenir la paix et sous la menace de la suppression de l’aide Bconomique accordhe a Isragl. par les Etats-Ihis. Dans le deuxibme tom& de ses memoires, leprkeident Dwight D. Eisenhower l’a clairement expliqub, Comme aussi le g&&al Moshe Dayan dans un liars r&mment paru. VoilB oh nous en sommes actuellement, 21. Cependant, laconceptioncolonialistedusionisme, telle qulelle a pris forme maintenant en Israg et que tous les Arabes connaissent bien par e$@ienCe, existe depuis le moment oh l’idite meme d%ragl a pris naissance d?ns llesprit de son fondatsur, M, Theodor Herzl. Les trois lignes qu.i suivent, extrsites du livre 1’Etat juif qulil a hcrit en 1890, le montrent assez clairement: “Si Sa Majeste le Sultan [de Turquie] devait nous donner la Palestine, nous pourrions, en Bchaw, nous charger de gerer les finances de la Turwie. Nous ferions alors partie d’un rempart dkfensif en Europe et en Asie, nous serions un bastion de la civilisation face a la barbaric.” - Ls terme “la barbaric” est employ& ici pour designer les Arabes de Palestine et du Moybn-Orient, - “En 22. But today a strange phenomenon occurs, Mr. Comay-as the representative of Jordan stated at the 1289th meeting of the Security Council--coming as he does from South Africa, sits here on a pedestal of legality and attacks us, the Arabs, as taking illegal positions, 23, Let me again turn to the founder of Zionism, Mr. Herzl himself, He visted Palestine in 1875 and wrote a book of diaries. This is the introduction to the chapter on Palestine taken from that book of diaries of Mr. Her-21 himself: “In 1898, Palestine was a thinly inhabited land, Only 8 per cent of the soil was cultivated; its total population probably did not reach 500,000. It contained eighteen Jewish rural settlements . . , none of them over twenty years old, and only three or four large enough to warrant the name of village. Perhaps 4,500 Jews, all told, lived on the land. None of these settlements, moreover, had a legal basis for its existence; permission to reside in Palestine, buy land, or build, was obtainable only through bribery or outwitting the laws. About 45,000 Jews lived in the cities, chiefly Jerusalem and Jaffa; and the majority of these urban Jews depended for a miserable existence on a world-wide collection of ‘religious alms, Il.%/ World-wide collections are still going on, but not of religious alms. 24. To put it very briefly, when the Zionists were confronted, with the fact that there were Arabs in Palestine, they decided on a final solution of the Arab problem. Everyone has heard about the final,solution of the Jewish problem worked out by the Nazis. But what of the final solution of the Arab problem worked out by the Zionists of Palestine7 That is a fact. I should like to quote from a statement’ by someone who once belonged to the Zionist movement and turned against it, no less a man than Menasha Menuhin, the father of the famous violinist, Yehudi Menuhin: “I once belonged to the ‘gang’. After living a ‘full Jewish life’ in the Pale of Settlement in Russia and in Jerusalem up to the age of fifteen, I was further indoctrinated in the ‘full Jewish life’ of Jewish political nationalism in the Gymnazia Herzlia in Jaffa-Tel Aviv, for five solid years, up to the age of twenty. The Gymnazia Herzlia was 3 See: Theodor Her& The Jewish State (New York, American ~mht Emergency Council, 1946), p, 96. ?/ The Diaries of Theodor Herzl (New York, The Uqiversal Library, Grosset and Dunlap, 1962), pp. 276-277. 22. Mais il se produit, aujourd’hui, un etrange phi%om&ne. Ainsi que le representant de la Jordanie l’a fait observer B la 1289eme seance, M, Comay, qui est originaire d’bfrique du Sud, s’installe ici sur un pihdestal de 16gitimit6 et nous accuse, nous les Arabes, de soutenir des theses contraires au droit. 23. Je voudrais titer encore M. Herzl lui-m&me, le promoteur du sionisme. I1 a visiti! la Palestine en 1875 et a bcrit un livre sous forme de journal. Voici l’introduction au chapitre concernant la Palestine, extraite du journal de M. Herzl: “En 1898, la Palestine etait un territoire B population clairsemee. Huit pour 100 seulement de son sol etaient cultives. Llensemble de sa populalation nlatteignait sans doute pas 500 000 habitants. II y avait 18 colonies rurales juives dont aucune n’etait btablie depuis plus de 20 ans et dont trois ou quatre seulement Qtaient suffisamment importantes pour meriter .le nom de village. Sur ce territoire vivaient en tout quelque 4 500 Juifs. En outre, aucune de ces colonies n’avait d’existence &gale; la permission de resider en Palestine, d’y acheter de la terre ou dry construire ne pouvant s’obtenir que par des moyens de corruption ou en tournant la loi. Quarante cinq mille Juifs environ habitaient les villes, surtout & Jgrusalem et ?l Jaffa, et la majorit de oes Juifs des villes vivait d’aumanes religieuses, provenant de colleotes faites dans le monde entier, qui leur assuraient une existence mis6rable 9, n Ces collectes se font toujours dans le monde entier, mais il ne slagit plus d’aum6nes religieuses. 24. Pour &re bref, je dirai que lorsque les sionistes ont 6% places devant le fait qu’il y avait des Arabes en Palestine, ils ont d&id& de donner h la question arabe une solution radicale. Tout le monde a entendu parler de la solution radicale du probleme juif elaboree par les nazis. Mais qu’en est-il de la solution radicale du probleme arabe Blaborbe par les sionistes de Palestine? C’est pourtant un fait. Permettez-moi de titer une d6claration faite par quelqulun qui a appartenu jadis au mouvement sioniste pour se retourner ensuite centre lui, je veux dire Menasha Menuhin, p&e du o&&bre violoniste Yehudi Menuhin: “J’ai autrefois appartenu &la “banden. Apr&s avoir men&, jusqu% l%ge de 15 ans, une “pleine vie juive I7 dans la zone de rbsidenoe autorisee en Russie et 8. Jerusalem, jlai et6 ensuite impr6gn8, jusqu% ll$ge de 20 ans, de la doctrine de la “pleine vie juive” du nationalisme politique juif au gymnase Herzlia de Jaffa et Tel-Aviv, pendant cinq longues u Voir Theodor Her& The Jewish State {New York, American Zionist Emergency Council, 1946). p. 96. ?/ The Diaries of Theodor Herzl (New York, The Universal Library, Grosset and Dunlap, 1962), p. 276 et 277. “We, the first graduates of the ‘sacred temple’ of Jewish political nationalism, were dedicated and ‘ordained’ to redeem our ‘Jewish homeland’ at any cost and make Palestine ‘Goyim rein’ (clear of Arabs). “1 know whereof I speak, because I have followed the doings of my ‘gang’ all these years. It took me a lifetime, however, to divest myself of theprimitive, harmful philosophy of rabid ‘Jewish’ nationalism, which I see as a neurotic form of collective egoism. This nationalism considers itself supreme, owing nobody anything but to whom the world owes everything. II 25. Mr. COmay spoke at great length about terrorist mining. I should like to quote the following paragraph from a British Command on the subject of terrorist organizations in Palestine in 1945, 1946 and 1947- organizations in which, it was later established by the British Government, Ben-Gurion, Moshe Sharett and other great leaders of the Zionist movement whose names we do not know, took part: “The Haganah and Palmach:- An illegal and wellarmed military organization, oyganized under a central command with subsidiary territorial commands, in three branches, each of which includes women, viz,: a static force composed of settlers and townsfolk, with an estimated strength of 40,000; a field army, based on the Jewish Settlement Police and trained in more mobile operations, with an estimated strength of 16,000; a full-time force (Palmach), permanently mobilized andprovidedwith transport, with an estimated peace establishment of 2,000 and war establishment of some 6,000.n$ Those were the terrorist organizations that frightened the Arabs out of Palestine between 1947 and 1948. 26. In his statement at the 1288th meeting, the representative of Israel defined the issue, He said: “The real issue is the basic one of peace or war.” The word “peacel’ is a very noble word, and the idea of peace is a very lofty idea of mankind. There are messengers and prophets of peace. And there are false messengers and false Messiahs who speakabout peace. The great thinkers of mankind have brooded about the problem of peace, whether individual or collective. But let us leave these men aside and turn to the Security Council. I am sure that whenever anyone hears the Israelis speak about peace and repeat that they want peace, he thinks, “Why is it that the Y See Palestine; Statement of information relating to acts of violence (London, His Majesty’s Stationery Office, July, 1946), Cmd. 6373, p 2. “Premiers diplam& du “temple sac&” du nationalisme politique juif, nous &ions vou& et “consac&s” ?I. racheter notre “patrie juive” & n’importe quel prix et a rendre la Palestine “Goyim rein”, c’est-a-dire & la debarrasser des Arabes. “Je sais de quoi je parle puisque j’ai suivi les activites de ma “banden tout au long de ces annbes. Toutefois, il m’a fallu une vie enti&re pour me libgrer de la doctrine primitive et nocive du nationalisme “juif” enrag8, que je considbre comme une forme n&rosde d%goi’sme collectif. Ce nationalisme se qualifie de suprBme: il ne doit rien a personne mais le monde entier lui doit tout.” 25. M. Comay nous a longuement par16 de mines posees par des terroristes. Permettez-moi de oiter le paragraphe suivant que je releve dans un document britannique officiel relatif aux organisations terroristes de Palestine en 1945,1946 et 1947, orgaaisations auxquelles ont pris part, ainsi que le Gouvernement britannique l’a Btablipar la suite, Ben Gourion, Moshe Sharett et d’autres dirigeants de premier plan du mouvement sioniste dont nous ne connaissons pas les noms: “La Haganah et Palmach: organisation militaire ill&gale et bien armQe, disposant d’un commandement central et de commandements regionaux auxiliaires, est divisee en trois secteurs, dont chacun comprend des femmes, a savoir: une force statique evaluBe a 40 000 colons ruraux et citadins, une armee de campagne s’appuyant sur la Jewish Settlement Police, et dont l’effectif est evalub a 16 000 activistes, entrafnee pour des opbrations plus mobiles, et enfin une force r&uliere (Palmach_, mobilisee en permanence et disposant de moyens de transport dont les effectifs sont Bvalu& en temps de paix & environ 2 000 hommes et en ten’@S de guerre & environ 6 000 hommesy.” Telles Btaient les organisations terroristes qui devaient faire fuir les Arabes de Palestine entreI947 et 1948. 26. Dans la declaration qu’il a faite a la 1288Bme seance, le reprdsentant d’IsraE1 a Clairement posk le problbme en disant: “Le problbme est celui de la guerre ou de la paix.” La “paix” eSt un mot tres noble, et le concept “paix” represente un ideal t&s &eve de l’humanitk. 11 y a des messagers etdes proph?%es de paix, mais il y a aussi de faux messagers et de faux messies qui parlent de paix. Les grands penseurs de l’humanit8 ont longuement medite sur le probl&me de la paix, individuelle ou Collective. Mais laissons ces hommes de c&e et revenons au Conseil de &curit& Je suis persuade que, chaque fois qu’on entend les Isra&liens parler de paix et repeter qu’lls y Voir Palestine; Statement of information relating to acts of vi+ lence (Londres, His Majesty’s Stationery Office, jtilIetI946),cmd+ 6373, it-x- 27. In 1948, the Security Council appointed a United Nations Mediator, Count Folke Bernaclotte. We know very well that he was assassinated. But why was Count Folke Bernadotte assassinated? He was assassinated because he suggested that the Arab refugees should go back to Palestine, that the Negev should be given back to the Arabs in return for West Galilee, that Arab Palestine should join Jordan and constitute one Arab kingdom. 27. En 1948, le Conseil de s6curitb a d&sign6 un mediateur des Nations Unies, le comte Folke Bernadotte. Nous savons parfaitement qu’il a BtE assassin& Mais pourquoi le comte Folke Bernadotte a-t-i1 kt6 assassin67 11 a 6t6 assassin6 pour avoir sugg6r8 que les rBfugi6s arabes retournent en Palestine, que le NBguev soit rendu aux Arabes en Bchange de la Galilee occidentale et que la Palestine arabe s’unisse a la Jordanie pour constituer un seul royaume arabe. 28. Count Bernadotte, the messenger of peace sent by the Security Council to Palestine, left a book of memoirs in which he clearly stated that he felt the threats coming. But he was a courageous man. He was assassinated on 18 September 1948. In its resolutions 57 (1948) of 18 September and 59 (1948)of 19 October, the Security Cou&l condemned Israel for the cowardly act that had been committed by a criminal group of terrorists, In resolution 59 (1948) it reminded that Government that all its obligations and responsibilities must be discharged fully and in good faith. 28. Le comte Bernadotte, ce messager de paix envoy6 en Palestine par le Conseil de sbeurit6 a laiss6 un livre de m6moires clans lequel il dBolare nettement qu’il a senti la menace peser sur lui. Mais c’&ait un homme courageux. 11 a 6tk assassin6 le 18 septembre 1948. Dans ses &solutions 57 (1948) du 18 septembre et 59 (1948) du 19 octobre, le Conseil de s&uritB a condamn6 Israg pour cet acte de l&he@ commis par un, groupe de terroristes criminels. Dans sa &solution 59 (1948), le Conseil de s6curit6 a rappel6 au Gouvernement d’lsrael qu’il 6tait tenu de s’acquitter pleinement et de bonne foi de toutes ses obligations et de to&es ses responsabilit6s. 29. After the assassination of Count Bernadotte, the Acting Mediator was no less a person than Mr. Ralph Bunche, sitting with us today in the Security Council Chamber. I should’ like to quote the following from a report that he submitted to the Security Council: 29. Apr&s l’assassinat du comte Bernadotte, le m&liateur par interim ne fut autre que M. Ralph Bunche, qui si&ge aujourd’hui avec nous dans la salle du Conseil. Permettez-moi de titer lepassage suivant d’un rapport qu’il a soumis au Conseil de skcurit6: “Get attentat constitue un d6fi grave lanck parune bande d&ham&e de terroristes juifs al’effort m&me que fait 1’Organisation des Nations Unies pour realiser, au moyen de mediation, un rBglement paoifique du conflit palestinien. De faGon plus g&&ale, il indique non seulement un m6pris certain des d&&ions du Conseil de s6curit6, mais enoore un d6dain cynique envers l’organisation des Nations Unies dans son ensemble. 11 faut absolument prendre des mesures d’urgence pour faire en sorte que les intentions des Nations Unies en Palestinene soient pas dejou&es par des bandes criminelles OIJ par des individus ou groupes qUi pSUVent eSp&rer tirer parti des actes de ces bandes u./.” “These assassinations constitute a critical challenge from an unbridled band of Jewish terrorists to the very effort of [the] United Nations to achieve, by means of mediation, a peaceful adjustment of the dispute in Palestine, In a broader sense, they give evidence not only of contempt for the actions of the Security Council, but also of a cynical disregard for the United Nations as a whole. It is clearly imperative that urgent measures be taken to ensure that the aims of the United Nations in Palestine should not be frustrated by criminal bands or by any individuals or groups who might hope to profit from acts of such bands.“?/ I think that that is the best commentary that could be made on the statement of the Israel representative that the real issue is one of war or peace. It is in the record of the Security Council. Je pense que e’est 13 le meilleur commentaire que l’on puisse faire sur la dgolaration du reprBsentant d’Israg1 selon qui le probl&me fondamental est celui de la paix ou de la guerre. Ce texte figure dans les archives du Conseil de s6curit.6, 20. One part of the complaint against Syria presented by the representative of Israel refers to threats of war. At the 1288th meeting on 25 July I quoted a paragraph from the Government Year-book of Israel in which Eretz Israel, as conceived by Mr. Theddor Herzl, is defined as extending from the 80, La plainte d6pos6e par le representant d’Isra6.l centre la Syrie a trait, en partie, 3 des menaces de guerre. A la 12888me seance du Conseil jlai oit6 un paragraphe tire du Government Year-book d%ra&?l dans lequel “1lEretz IsraiSl”, tel que le concevait M. Theodor Herzl, est dQfini comme s%tendant dyNi1 3 Voir Pro&-verbaux officiels du Conseil de sbcurid, troisi.+me an&e, Supplhent cl’oclobre 1948, document S/1018, par. 15. 9 See Off& Records of the Security council, Third Year, Supplement for October 1948, document S/1018, para. 15. 31. But to know the real spirit of Israel I shall be satisfied with a few lines that are very revealing indeed from Menachem Begin, author of The Revoitg and leader of one of the terrorist gangs who says: “We fight, therefore we are.” One is definitely reminded of the happier days when we used to read Descartes: ‘fCogito, ergo sum-Je pense, done je suis.” But now: “We fight, therefore we are.” sachem Begin goes on to say: “Out of blood, fire and ashes, a new specimen of human being was born, a specimen completely unknown to the world for over eighteen hundred years, ‘the fighting Jew’. “Pirst and foremost, we must take up the offensive. We must attack. “With blood and with sweat a generation shall be raised strong and powerful, n That is the spirit of Israel for peace. “The Jewish homeland, the area which covers both sides of the Jordan, is a complete historic and geographic entity. Dissection of the homeland is an unlawful act; agreement to dissection is also unlawful, and is not binding on the Jewish people. It is the duty of this generation to return to Jewish sovereignty these parts of the homeland which were torn off from it and given over to foreign rule.” 32. However, in faitmulness to the truth, I must say that there are other voices in Israel such as Judah Magnes and Martin Buber. Martin Buber, especially, occupies a very great place as a thinker and as a philosopher. His comments on Israel morale, attitude and stand gives an accurate idea of the issue that we are facing here. Professor Buber said: “When we’ returned to Palestine, the decisive question was: do we want to come there as an ally, as a friend, as a brother, as a member of the coming community of the peoples of the Near East, or as the representative of colonialism and imperialism? “It was Hitler who brought Jewish masses to Palestine, not selected people who felt that here they must fulfil their lives and prepare the future. So, selective organic development was replaced by mass immigration and the indispensable necessity to find political force for Its security . . , The majority of the Jewish people preferred to learn from Hitler”-this is Buber, not an*Arab speaking- “rather than from us . . . Hit&r showed that history does not go the way of the spirit but the way of power, and if a people is powerful enough, it can 6/ Menachem Begin, The Revolt, Story of the Irgun (New York, Henry Schuman, 1951). 31. Pour dkvoiler le veritable esprit d?sra81, je me bornerai & titer quelques lignes fort r6v6latrices de Men&hem Begin, l’auteur de La R6volteG et chef d’une des bandes terroristes. 11 a dit dans son livre: “Nous luttons, done nous sommes.8 - cela nous rappelle immediatement les jours heureux ofi nous lisions Descartes: “Je pense, done je suis,” Mals aujourd’hui cela est devenu “Nous luttons, done nous sommes. n Et Menachem Begin poursuit: “Un nouveau specimen d%tre humain est n6, du sang, du feu et des oendres, un sp6oimen totalement inconnu du monde depuis plus de 18 si&les, “le juif combattant”. “D’abord et avant tout, nous demons prendre l’offensive. Nous devons attaquer. “Dans le sang et la sueur nous forgerons une gkn6ration forte et puissante.” Voila l’esprit de paix d’Israi?l. “La terre juive, qui, sIbtend de Part et d’autre du Jourdain, est une en& geographique et historlque compl&te. Diss6quer notre foyer est un aote ill6gal: oonsentir B la dissection est tout aussi ili6ga1, et ne lie pas le peuple juif. C’est le devolr de la generation pr6sente de r6tablir la souverainet6 juive sur les aarties de la terre juive qui nous oat 6t6 enlev6es et ont 6t6 plac6es sous -dominatfon ktrangbre. w 32. Toutefois, je dois 8. la v6rit6 dedireque d’actres voix s’kl&vent en Israel, telles celles de JudahMagaes et de Martin Buber. Celui-ci, en parttculier, eSt un penseur et un philosophe de premier plan. Ses rb flexions sur lamorale,.l’attitude et laposition adoptbee par Israel nous donnent une id6e exacte du prObl8me dont nous sommes saisis. Le professeur Buber a dit: “Quand nous sommes. retourn6s en Palestine, la question decisive a 6t6 de savoir si nous voulions y revenir comme un alli6, un ami, un fibre, un membre de la communaut6 future des peuples du Proohe-Orient, ou au contraire comme le reprb sentant du colonialisme et de lYmp6rialisme. “Ceux qui ont amen6 les masses juives en Palestine, ce ne sont pas des hommes di61ite, ayant la sentiment qu’ils devaient realiser pleinement leur vie et pr6parer l’avenir, c’est Hitler. Ainsi, au d6veloppement organique selectif se sont substitu6es une immigration en masse et la nkoessit6 imP6- rieuse pour le peuple d’acqu6rir une puissance politique garantissant sa s6curit6 , . . La majorit du peuple juif a prefer6 les lecons d’Hitler auk n&resl’ - ce n’est pas un Arabe crui par& c’est Buber. I,. . Hitler a montr6 que i’histoire vanon dans &/ Menachem Begin, The Revolt, Story of the Irgun (New York, HeW Schuman, 1951). “We made the wrong political entry into Palestine through partition. ‘1 33. All these files that you see here contain such declarations and statements by Israel leaders-not the least among them a whole collection on how they are going to prevent by force the diversion and the exploitation of the water resources of the Arab countries. I assure you that these statements, which are here, outweigh by far the two or three scanty statements that the representative of Israel made here. When we compare words with words, and words with deeds, he has to account for a very great deal to the Security Council. 33. Tous les dossiers que vous voyez ici oontiennent des d&larations et affirmations analogues faites par des dirigeants politiques israbliens: j’en ai toute une collection - et ce n’est pas lamoins importante - qui , Porte sur la faGon Uont IsraBl se propose d’emp&her par la force le detournement et l’exploitation des ressources en eau des pays arabes, Je puis vous assurer que ces declarations que jrai ici ont infiniment plus de poids que les deux ou trois declarations si peu Btoffees que le representant d’IsratI1 a faites ioi. Si nous comparons les paroles avec les paroles, et les paroles avec les actes, il y a beaucoup de chases dont il doit rendre comote au Conseil de &curit& 34. Now, on one specific point between Syria and Israel which was raised by the Israel representative at the 1288th meeting regarding the Mixed Armistice Commission, While trying to justify his Government’s boycott of the Mixed Armistice Commission, he seiterated his arguments given on 5 April 1962 before the Security Council [1002nd meeting, paras. 71-761. They were false and they could not refute the statement of General von Horn, Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization (1001st meeting, annex). At the 1006th meeting of the Security Council; the Syrian representative had this to say-and I feel compelled in order to dispel any confusion to reread his statement: 34. A propos maintenant d’un differend particulier entre la Syrie et Israg dont le representant dlsralil a par16 & la 12888me s&%nce et qui concerne la Commission mixte d’armistice. En s’efforgant de justifier le boycottage de la Commission mixte d’armistice par son gouvernement, il a repris l’argumentation qu’il avait exposee devant le Conseil de &curite le 5 avril 1962 llOO2Bme seance, par. 71 B. 761. Mais ces arguments dtaient faux et ne pouvaient refuter la declaration faite par le g&&al von Horn, chef d%tat-major de I’Organisme des Nations Unies [lOOlbme &anoe, annexe}. A la’ 1006Bme &an&e du Conseil de s8curit8, le representant de la Syrie a fait une declaration que je crois devoir relire pour dissiper tout malentendu. 11 a dit: “It is not my intention to refute Mr. Comay’s arguments regarding the status of the demilitasized zone, A great many documents have already been written on the subject of the demilitarized zone, The Armistice Agreement is there to contradict the Israel allegations, and I shall merely mention some of its provisions. “First, according to article V of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria and Mr. Bunche’s comments thereon, which is quoted in the CounFil’s resolution of 18 May 1951 [resolution 93 (1951)], no question of sovereignty arises in the demilitarized zone. Consequently, Israelis not entitled to claim any right of sovereignty over the demilitarized zone. To say that the demilitirized zone is situated in Israel territory seems to me to be contradicting the Armistice Agreement. If acts of aggression occur again, it will be Israel’s responsibility, because the Israel conception of the demilitarized zone, as it has been defined on many occasions, iS one that violates the Armistice Agreement and in itself constitutes an act of aggression. “Secondly, the jurisdiction of the Mixed Armistice Commission extends to the demilitarized zone, In fact, article VII, paragraph 1, of the Agreement provides: “‘The execution of the provisions of this Agreement shall be supervised by a Mixed Armistice Commis- “NOUS avons manque notre entree politique en Palestine en acceptant le partage.” “11 n’est pas dans mes intentions de refuter les arguments de M. Comay en ce qui concerne le statut de la zone d&militari&e. Beauooup de documents ont deja Bte &dig& au sujet de cette zone. La Convention d’armistice est 1 pour contredire les allegations israeliennes; je me contenterai d’en rappeler certaines dispositions. “PremiBrement, l’article V de la Convention d’armistice general syro-israglienne et le commentaire de M. Bunche figurant dans la r&olution du 18 mai 1951 [r&olution 93 (1951)] pr&oient que, dans la zone d8militari&e, aucune question de souverainete ne se pose, Par con&quent, Israglnepeut pretendre a aucun droit de souverainetb sur la zone d8militaris8e. Affirmer que la zone demilitarisee se trouve situee en territoire israelien me parafi contredire la Convention d’armistice, Si des actes agressifs se produisent encore, la responsabilite en incombera a Israel, parce que la conception israelienne de la zone demilitaris&e telle qu’elle a 618 expliquee & maintes reprises est une conception qui viole la Convention d’armistice et qui constitue par elle-m&me un acte d’agression. “Deuxibmement, la juridiction de la Commission mixte d’armistice s%tend B la zone d8militaris8e. Lfarticle VII, paragraphe 1, de la Convention dispose en effet: “L’ex&ution des dispositions de la pr&ente con- ‘%ention sera contralge par une Commission mixte “Thus article VII of the Armistice Agreement places no limitation on the jurisdiction of the Mixed Armistice Commission. Moreover, paragraph 8 of that same article runs as follows: II ‘Where interpretation of the meaning of a particular provision of this Agreement, other than thepreamble and articles I and II, is at issue, the Commission’s interpretation shall prevail. The Commission, in its discretion and as the need arises, may from time to time recommend to the Parties modifications In the provisions of this Agreement.’ “Thus, Mr, Comay’s argument is completely destroyed. The Mixed Armistice Commission is competent to rule on complaints connected with the demilitarized zone, since the restriction imposed on the interpretation of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement affects only articles I and II. The provisions relating to the status of the demilitarized zone are in artible V of the Armistice Agreement. Consequently, a representative cannot come here and argue that: his country will not respect the de’cisions made by the Mixed Armistice Commission in dealing with disputes affecting the demilitarized zone. The provisions relating to the demilitarized zone cannot be separated from the other elements of the Armistice Agreement. Only articles I and II are not subject to interpretation by the Mixed Armistice Commission. rr [1006th meeting, paras. 15 to 18.1 35. It is noteworthy that the Security Council, after hearing both parties in the Syrian complaint presented 20 March 1962, then condemnedlsrael inits resolution 171 {1962) of 9 April 1962. Operative paragraph 7 of that resolution reads as follows: “Calls upon the Governments of Israel and Syria to co-operate with the Chief of Staff in carrying out his responsibilities under the General Armistice Agreement and the pertinent resolutions of the Security Council, and urges that all steps necessary for reaotivating the Mixed Armistice Commission and for making full use of the Mixed Armistice machinery be promptly taken.” 36. Thus, the Israel representative is not putting forward an argument, but he is in fact reiterating the defiance of his authorities of the provisions of resolution 171 (1962) of the Security Council, Defiance by Israel of UnitedNations resolutions has now become legendary, but please ponder on the attitude of the Israelis reiterating their refusal to implement resolutions of this Council and yet coming before this “Ainsi, l’article VII de la Convention d’armistice ne contient aucune limitation a la juridiction de la Commission mixte d’armistice. Bien misux, au paragraphe 8 du m&me article, nous lisons ce qui suit: “Lorsque le sens d’une disposition particulikre “de cette convention, a l’exception du pr&tnbuIe et “des articles I et II, donne lieu & interpr&ation, “l’interpretation ‘de la Commission pr&aut, Lors- “qu’elle l’estime desirable et que le besoin slen “fait sentir, la Commission peut, de temps & autre, “recommander aux parties des modifications aux “dispositions de la presente convention, n “Ainsi done, la these de M. Comay se trouve compl8tement dgtruite. La Commission mixte d’armistice est competente pour statuer sur les plaintes ayant trait & la zone d8militaris&, &ant donne que la restriction apportee & lYnterpr&ation des dispositions de la Convention d’armistice ne touche que les articles I et II. Mais les dispositions concernant le statut de la zone demilitarisee se trouvent contenues dans l’article V de la Convention d’armistice. Par consgquent, on ne peut venir soutenir ici que l’on ne respectera pas les dispositions que prendra la Commission mixte d’armisticequand elle tranchera des litiges interessant la zone d& militarisge. Les dispositions concernant cette zone sont in&parables des autres Elements de la convention d’armistice. Seuls lea articles I et II sent soustraits & l’interpr&ation de la Commission mixte d’armistice.” [10068me seance, par, 15 gl8,] 35. 11 y a lieu de souligner qu’apr&s avoir entendu les deux parties 8. la plainte syrienne prhentes 10 20 mars 1962, le Conseil de seouritka alors condamn~ Israel dans sa resolution 171 (1962) du 9 avril1962‘ Le paragraphe 7 de cette rBsolution estlibell~comme suit: “Invite le Gouvernement d’IsraE1 et le Gouvernement de la Syrie B coop&er avec le Chkf d’etatmajor pour qu’il. puisse s’acquitter des responsabilites que lui imposent la Convention Cl’arInistice g&&al et les r&solutions pertinentes du ConseiI de s8curit8, et demande instamment qus soient prises sans retard toutes mesures n&Ssaires pour remettre en activite la Commission mixte d’armistice et pour tirer pleinement parti des rouages mixtes d’armistice”. 36. Ainsi, le reprbentant d’lsragl n’avancs Pas un argument, il ne fait que ri5pp8ter le m@is thmoignk par son gouvernement envers Ies dispositionsdscette r&olution du Conseil de s&uritk. C ‘est une tradition en Israg1 que de mepriser les resolutions de l’organisation des Nations Unies, mais je vous Prie de reflechir & cette attitude des Israeliens qui viennent deposer une plainte devant le Conseil tout sn reiterant .2

I find it alittlebit startling that, after the Security Council has beenurgedby Arab representatives to confine its discussion strictly to sub-item (a) of the item on its agenda, and to do so in a manner which would divorce it from its general background and the broader context, we are now taken by the Syrian representative on an historical ramble which includes the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the diaries of Mr. Theodor Herzl in the 1890’s, the Sinai campaign of 1956, the acts of dissident groups under the British Mandate before there was a State of Israel, the death of Count Bernadotte in 1948, quotations to show-what is a statement of fact-that historical Eretz Israel was larger than the present State of Israel, the philosophy of Martin Buber, and so on, and so on. 39. What emerges from this, unhappily, is an ugly and unrecognizable Arab caricature of the small and hard-working democratic Republic which I have the honour to represent, Israel is a permanent part part of the Middle East landscape; thepeopleof Israel are anxious to build up their own country, and to live in peace with their neighbours and to enter into friendly and fruitful ties of co-operation with other friendly States, particularly in the developing world. 40. I am quite prepared to leave it to others to judge US and we shall bear with dignity the rancour of those who are hostile to us. We, at any rate, look forward to a future when we and our Arabneighbours, who are tied together by ties of blood and history, will be able to speak directly to each other in an effort to reach each other with some goodwill and some understanding. 41. In that spirit, I should like simply to reserve our position at this point on the statements made by the representative of Syria, and not seek to pursue an historical debate which could go on for a very long time, as it has done already, and which, I am sure, would be most unpalatable to the members of the Council-or at any rate to fourteen members of the Council. I suggest, with great respect, that the Council may now wish to get back to the issues which are before us, You, Mr. President, this afternoon submitted to the Council three,documents on behalf of the Secretary-General. Those documents became available to me last night. I have sent them to my Government for detailed instructions, since they deal with matters in ,which my Government and its representatives in the area’are intimately concerned. I wouldmerely ask for an early opportunity, perhaps tomorrow, to make Some observations on the reports which have been submitted on sub-items (a,) and (b) of our agenda, 38, M. COMAY (Isragl) [traduit de l’anglais]: Je trouve un peu surprenant que, le Conseil de securite aYam et.6 invite par lea representants des pays arabes a limiter ses d&bats strictement au point 2 de la question inscrite !l son ordre du jour, et 2 le faire de faGOn & &parer oe point de l’ensemble du sujet et de son oontexte plus large, le representant de la Syrie nous fasse maintenant faire une randonnee historique qui comprend la Conference de la paix h Paris en 1919, le journal de Theodor Herzl des amides 1890, la oampagne du Sinai’ de 1956, les operations des groupes dissidents & l’bpoque du mandat britanniqUe avant la creation de lIEtat dTsrag1, la mart du Comte Bernadotte en 1948, des citations pourprouver - ce qui est un fait - que 1’Eretz IsraBl historique etait plus grand que 1’Etat dtIsra&!l actuel, la philo- Sophie de Martin Buber, et jcen passe, 39. Malheureusement, oe qui ressort de tout cela n’est qu’une hideuse caricature arabe oh l’on ne peut pas reconnafire la petite RBpublique dgmocratique et laborieuse que j ‘ai l’honneur de reprhsenter. Israg constitue un Blement permanent dans l’ensemble du MoyenTOrient; le peuple d’Israd1 d&ire construire son propre pays, vivre en paix avec ses voisins et creer des liens amicaux de ooop&ation fructueuse avec dtautres Etats amis, notamment dans le monde en voie de d8veloppement. 40. Nous sommes tout B fait p&s & laisser les autres nous juger et nous supporterons aveo dignit8 la ranoceur de ceux qui nous sont hostiles. Pour notre part en tous cas, nous appelons de nos vosux un avenir oB nous et nos voisins arabes, qui sommes unis par les liens du sang et de l’histoire, pourrons parler franohement les uns avec les autres et avec une volonte telle, que le contact puisse s%tablir entre nous avec un peu de bonne volonte et de compr8hension. 41. C’est dans cet esprit que pour le moment je voudrais simplement rgservel; notre position sur les dBclarations faites par le reprksentant de la Syrie, saris cheroher B continuer un d&bat historique qui pourrait se poursuivre pendant fort longtemps, cornme cela a deja kt8 le Gas, et qui, j ‘en SUiS Certain, ne serait pas du goat des membres du Conseil - ou en tout cas, de 14 dtentre eux. Avec tout le respect que je dois au Conseil, je lui propose de revenir maintenant aux questions dont il est saisi. Cet apr&s-midi, Monsieur le P&side& vous avez present& au Conseil trois documents au nom du Seor&aire ggngral. Ces documents m’ont BtB communiques hier soir et je les ai envoy& & mon gouvernement en lui demandant des instructions dktaillges, car ils ont trait 2 des questions qui int&essent aupremier chef mon go,uvernement et ses repr&entants dans la r&ion. Je voudrais seulement vous demander de me dormer bientat lloccasion, demain peut-etre, de presenter

I have no more names inscribed on my list of speakers for today, but already four speakers have given notice that they will be prepared to take the floor tomorrow. In the circumstances, if there is no objection on the part of the members, I would propose that we now adjourn and continue our debate at 10.30 a.m. tomorrow, It was so decided. 11 en est ainsi d&id& The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m. La s&nce est lev&e d 16 h 30. 42. Le PRESIDENT: Je n’ai pas d’autre orateur inscrit sur ma liste pour aujourd’hui, mais quatre repr&entants m’ont deja fait savois qu’ils serona prets ?i. prendre la parole demain. Dans ces conditional et s’il n’y a pas d’objections, je propose de lever maintenant la seance pour reprendre le debat denlain matin a 10 h 30.