S/PV.1298 Security Council

A draft resolution on the item before the Council has been submitted today by the delegation of New Zealand [S/7456]. 3. The first speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Bulgaria, to whom I shall now give the floor. 3. Le premier orateur inscrit est le repr&entant de la Bulgarie, & gui je donne la parole. 4. M. TARABANOV (Bulgarie): La t&he de la dBl& gation de la RBpublique populaire de Bulgarie se trouve facilitee du fait gue les declarations que nous avons entendues jusqu’& present ont jet6 une certaine lumi&!e sur la plainte du Royaume-Uni et les circonstances qui l’entourent. De &me que d’autres, notre delegation a Btt! frappee par ltincompatibilit8 existant entre la demande de convocation d’une seance immediate du Conseil de &curite [S/7442] et les

The fact that the statements made SO far have cast some light on the United Kingdom’s complaint and the circumstances surrounding it has made matters much easier for the delegation of the PeOPlh’s Republic of Bulgaria, My delegation, like others, was struck by the inconsistency between the request for an immediate meeting of the Security Council [S/7442] and the allegations adduced as evidence in SuPPort of 5. The lack of evidence to justify an examination of this question by the Security Council has already been stressed. It would be hard to find in the archives of the Council any documents which show such complete contempt for established facts as this case does. Indeed, the complaint before the Council is basedonly on suppositions which, in turn, are based on other suppositions. Row can the Security Council seriously be expected to deliberate on the basis of evidence such as the shell cases which have been found and which have apparently been provisionally identified7 How can we follow the logic of the letter to the effect that these shell cases make it possible to determine the provenance of the aircraft and even the airfield from which they took,off? 6. Faced with such an absence of arguments to support the request which was submitted, many delegations wondered whether the question should be placed on the agenda. The statements made by the United Kingdom representative at the two previous meetings of the Security Council confirmed that his country’s recourse to the Council was not in any way justified. 7. The United Kingdom’s record in that region of the world is far from spotless, and hence the role of complainant and victim is not becoming to it. 8. The obvious lack of justification for the United Kingdom’s complain to the Council has raised the question of the motives for these United Kingdom tactics. As the representative of a country which is a member of the Special Committee on decolonization,y my delegation has been able to follow the United Kingdom’s policy in Aden and in the protectorates of South Arabia. That policy is characterized by the most brutal repression of any legitimate aspiration of the people to freedom and independence. Patriots defending their inalienable rights are persecuted, tortured, thrown into prison or expelled from the country. The United Kingdom is engaged in an outright military action, with tanks and aircraft, against villages and tribes that oppose the British colonial regime and its puppets of the so-called Federation of South Arabia. 9. It would be appropriate to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the fact that the most brutal actions undertaken by the United Kingdom against a people resisting the colonial yoke have taken place in the areas adjacent to the Yemen Arab Republic. By means of a “scorched earth” policy, the British colonialists are trying to stem the wind of freedom blowing from the Arab countries that have been freed from the colonial yoke. 10. Being unable to wipe out the national liberation movement, the United Kingdom resorted to political u Special Committee on the Situationwith regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 5, Le manque d’818ments pouvant justifier l’examel de cette question par le Conseil de &curitt! a d&j: BtB soulign8. I1 serait difficile, nous semble-t-il, d1 trouver dans les archives du Conseil des document qui denotent, comme dans ce cas, un mepris austi total des faits Btablis. En effet, la requate dont 1 Conseil est saisf n’est fondle que sur des supposition qui reposent elles-m@mes sur d’autres suppositiont Comment peut-on serieusement admettre que I Conseil de s6curit8 puisse delibker sur la base dl preuves telles que les douilles retrouvees qui auraiel BtB provisoirement identifiees? Comment suivre 1 logique de la lettre selon laquelle ces douilles pel mettent de determiner l’origine des avions et m&n1 l’af5rodrome dtoiI ils se seraient envol6s7 6, Devant un tel manque d’arguments & l’appui de requi%e pr&sentAe, beaucoup de d616gations se SOI demand6 s’il fallait accepter d’inscrire la questit & l’ordre du jour. Les interventions du reprgsenta du Royaume-Uni lors des deux pri.Wdentes sOan0 du C&seil ont d’ailleurs confirm& que le reoaurs 1 ce pays au Conseil nl&ait nullement justifik 7. Le dossier de la Grande-Bretagne dans cei, r&ion du monde est, dkilleurs, loin d%tre tiergl et d&s lors le Ale de plaignant et de victime ne 1 convient pas, 8. Le manque evident de justification de la plain britannique devant le Conseil de securitt! a soule la question des motifs de cette tactique de la Grand Bretagne. En tant que representant d’un pays memb du Cornit& special sur la dt5oolonisationQ; mad&$ tion a eu lloccasion de suivre la politique de Grande-Bretagne B Aden et dans les protectorats llbrabie du Sud. Cette politique est caracterisee II la repression la plus brutale de toute aspirati 1Bgitime de la population a la 1iberttS et & l’ind&pE dance, Les patriotes defendant leurs droits inal:i nables sont per&cut&, torturOs, jet&s en prison expulses du pays, La Grande-Bretagne entrepn une veritable action militaire, avec blind&s et aviol centre villages et tribus qui s’opposent au rOgi: colonial britannique et h ses Pantoohes de 1aprOtenc Federation de 1’Arabie du Sud. 9. I1 serait interessant d’attirer l’attention ( membres du Conseil SW le fait que les actions plus brutales entreprises par la Grande-Bretal, oontre une population qui s’oppose au joug CO101 ont lieu dans les regions voisines de la Repubh arabe du Yemen. Au moyen de la politique dc Verre brOlBe” les colonialistes britanniques s’eff cent dlarr@ter le vent de la liberte qui souffle pays arabes lib&?& du joug colonial, 10. Ne pouvant venir B bout du mouvement delibe! tion nationale, le Royaume-Uni a eu recours 1/ Cornit. spkial charge d’gtudier la situation en ce qui cone l’application de la Diklaration sur I’octroi de I’indipendance aux et aux peuples coloniaux. 11. By bringing this matter before the Security Council, the United Kingdom raised very serious doubts about the aims it was pursuing. Was it trying to exonerate itself for these misdeeds, or was it trying rather to create a screen behind whichit would be able to implement a policy that would assure the perpetuation of its privileges in another form, more convenient than direct colonial domination? Or was it trying to do both? 11. Par sa demarche auprBs clu Conseil de 58CUrit6, la Grande-Bretagne a fait planer un doute trh s6ricux quant aux buts poursuivis. Essayait-elle de se disculper de ces m&faits, ou cherchait-elle plut6t 3t creer un paravent pour se garantir la mise en pratique d’une politique qui lui assurerait la continuation des privil’kges acq+ SOUS une autre forme Plus commode que la domination coloniale directe? Ou bien encore Btaient-ce les dew? 12. The fact that, following the session of thespecial Committee on decolonization in Africa, the question of Aden and South Arabia might certainly be raised in the Security Council by those concerned or by the action of the Committee itself, appears to haveplayed a large part in the United Kingdom Government’s decision to raise the question now: for the Committee did consider at Cairo-in a most propitious atmosphere, I might say-certain aspects of the situation in Aden and reiterated the General Assembly’s appeal to the Security Council concerning “the dangerous situation prevailing in the area as a result of British military action against the people of the Territory”& Obviously this refers to the Territory of the southern Arabian peninsula. 12. La certitude qu’apr&s la session en Afrique du Cornit special SUF la dt?colonisation, la question d’Aden et de l’hrabie du Sud pourrait &tre soulevee devant le Cons&l de s6curit6 par les int&ess& ou par l’action du Cornit lui-m&me a jou8, pardt-il, un grand rale dans la d6cision du Gouvernement britannique de poser la question maintenant. Le Cornit a, en leffet, examine au Caire, dans une atmosphere t&s propice d’ailleurs, certains aspects de la situation B Aden et a r&it6rt5 l’appel de l’Assemblee gen6rale adress au Conseil de s&urit6 ‘sur la situation dangereuse gui existe dans la region par suite de l’action militaire clu Royaume-Uni dirigee centre le peuple du territoire2”. 11 slagit, bien entendu, du territoire du sud de la pBninsuIe arabique. 13. In the particular case now before us, the United Kingdom has sought to employ a subterfuge that is as old as the hills: seize tilt; initiative, pre-empt certain arguments that the adversary might have used, and present them as one’s own. The Council may remember that this manoeuvre has already met with some success in the case of Southern Rhodesia, when the United Kingdom Government kept world public opinion in a state of uncertainty concerning the movements of a certain ship, the Manuela, while the white minoritv in Southern Rhodesia was consolidating the racist regime there. 13. Dans le cas particulier c@ nous occupe, le Royaume-Uni a cherche a user dlun subterfuge vieux comme le monde: intercepter l’initiative, reprendre certains arguments que lladversaire auraitpuutiliser et les presenter comme siens. Cette manoeuvre a deja eu, le Conseil s’en souvient, un certain succes dans le c&s de la Rhod&ie du Sud. En effet, le Gouvernemerit du Royaume-Uni a tenu en suspens llopinion mondiale sur les agissements d’un certain bateau, le Manuela, alors que la minorit blanche en Rhodesie du Sud consolidait le regime raciste dans le pays. 14. L’activitB fievreuse d&eloppBe B l’heure actuelle sur llinitiative du Royaume-Uni, les discussions au Conseil de s&curit&, l’atmosph&re pleine de tension cri%e dans la r6gJon ne peuvent servir, une fois de plus, que de rideau derrii?re lequel le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni essaie de mener a bien des manoeuvres destin6es a faire legitimer la pretendue FBd&ation de l’hrabie du Sud. D’autre part, l’organisation de cette dernibre doit permettre au Royaume- Uni, par des trait& militaires et autres, de slassurer tous les int6r&ts strategiques et Bconomiques, ainsi que l’exploitation des richesses naturelles du pays. 14, The feverish activity that has now developed on the initiative of the United Kingdom, the discussions in the Security Council, the tension-filled atmosphere created in the region, can only serve once again as a smoke-screen behind which the United Kingdom Government is trying to complete manceuvres that are designed to set the seal of legitimacy on the socalled Federation of South Arabia. The purpose of organising this Federation is to enable the United Kingdom, through military and other treaties, to secure all its strategic and economic interests and its exploitation of the natural wealth of the country. 15. 11 est vrai que les tentatives de la Grande- Bretagne de faire passer la F&l&ation de 1’Arabie du Sud comme reprgsentant le peuple dlAden et des protectorats ant &how5 jusqu% p&sent. LtAssemblke 15. It is true that the United Kingdom’s attempt to pass off the Federation of South Arabia as being representative of the people of Aden and the protectorates have so far failed, In its resolution 2023 16. Cf special interest, in the particular case which concerns us, are the United Kingdom’s efforts to make it appear that all this activity in defence of colonialist interests is intended to guide the people towards self-determination, The United Kingdom’s statement and those of certain Western representatives here, who did not fail to glorify the United Kingdom Government’s activities for the preservation of colonial domination, under new guises, in that oil-rich region of the world, were largely taken up with such propaganda, However, to present this manoeuvre under the banner of decolonization is no easy task. The reservations contained in the last letter from the United Kingdom representative to the Secretary- General.?/ reveal its futility. Those reservations, which the United Kingdom representative described as “certain arrangements”, really leave nothing of the United Nations resolutions standing, despite the madeto-order enthusiasm shown for them by certain Western representatives in connexion with that letter. Such an attempt to have the United Kingdom’s reservations accepted would force the United Nations to disavow its own resolutions. 17. We should like to remind the members of the Council that the resolutions adopted since the eighteenth session have stated that the Special Committee “deplores the setting up by the administering Power of an unrepresentative r6gime in the Territory, with a view to granting it independence contrary to General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII) and appeals to all States not to recognize such independence as is not based on the wishes of the people of the Territory freely expressed through elections held under universal adult suffragell. It is not, of course, difficult to identify the unrepresentative r6gime mentioned inthe Special Committee’s resolution. It is the so-called Federation of South Arabia. 18. Under these circumstances, any attempt to represent as mere trifles the United Kingdom’s reservations concerning United Nations resolutions would be tantamount to setting the Security Council against the General Assembly and against the policy laid down by United Nations and by all its organs, It would be an attempt worthy, perhaps, of the traditions of the United Kingdom, but impossible for the United Nations to accept. 19. In fact, nothing could be more mischievous than to represent the activities of the British colonialists for the preservation, under other forms of domination, of their privileges acquired by force as being in conformity with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and u Ib&, chap. VI, annex V, pam. 6. 16. Ce qui, dans le cas partioulier qui nous oooupe, pr&ente un int&+t sp&oial, ce sont 1eS efforts du Royaume-Uni en vue de pr&enter toute oette activitb, deployee pour la defense des int6r&ts colonialistes, comme &ant destinee a orienter la population vers ltautod8termination. Cette propagande occupe une place importante dans l’intervention britannique et dans celles de certains repr6sentants occidentaux, ici, qui n’ont pas manque de glorifier I’activitG meneepar le Gouvernement britannique pour p&server la domination coloniale, sous des fornies nouvelles, dans cette region du monde riche en p&role. Cependant, presenter cette manoeuvre sous le drapeau de la decolonisation n’est pas une t&he aisle. Lea r6serves contenues dans la derniere lettre du representant du Royaume-Uni au SecrBtaire g&&ral.Z/ en demontrent la futilite. Ces rbserves, qualifiees par le reprgsentant clu Royaume-Uni de “certains arrangements”, ne laissent en realit rien subsister des r6solutions de I’ONU malgrc! I’enthousiasme de commande manifest6 B leur 6gard par certains representants occidentaux envers cette lettre. Une telle tentative de faire accepter les reserves britanniques forcerait IfOrganisation des Nations Unies B renier sea propres r&solutions, 17.. Nous voudrions rappeler aux membres du Conseil que dans les resolutions depuis la dix-huitikme session, il est dit que le ComitB special “dEplore que la Puissance administrante ait &abli un regime non repr6sentati.f dans le Territoire afin de lui accorder une independance qui serait contraire aux r&olutions 1514 (XV) et 1949 (XVIII) de l’Assembl6e g&&ale et fait appel a tous les Etats pour qu’ils ne reconnaissent pas une indgpendance qui ne repose pas sur les vo?ux librement exprimBs au moyen d’Qlections au suffrage universe1 de la population adulte du territoire”. I1 n’est pas difficile, bien entendu, d’identifier le regime non representatif dent parle la resolution du ComitB sp6cial: il slagit de la p&endue Federation de l’drabie du Sud. 18. Essayer, dans ces conditions, de p&senter les &serves britanniques concernant les r&olutions de 1’ONU commes bagatelles Bquivaudrait B opposer le Conseil de securit6 a l’Assembl6e g&&ale et a la politique definie par 1’ONU et par tous ses organ& Cleat une tentative digne, peut-i%re, des traditions du Royaume-Uni, mais qu’il est impossible aux Nations Unies d’accepter. 19. En r&alit%, il n*y a rien de plus abusif que de presenter l’activit6 deployee par les colonialistes britanniques pour p&server, sous d’autres formas de domination, les privileges acquis par la force comme &ant conformes & la Ddclaration sur ltoCtrai de l’ind8pendance aux pays et aux peuples coloniaux ?f Ibid., chap. VI, annexe V, par. 6. 20. It is this United Kingdom activity which is at the bottom of the explosive situation in Aden and the protectorates; it is also at the root of the tension in the frontier areas. 21. In view of these facts, only one conclusion is possible: to find that the allegations contained in the British complain are without basis and to reject them, It only remains, therefore, to consign the United Kingdom’s complaint to its proper place, which is among the many and varied manoeuvres designed to camouflage the United Kingdom’s intention of perpetuating, in one way or another, its domination in southern Arabia. 22. However, even though the inconsistency and extravagance of the United Kingdom’s charges have been laid bare in the course of the discussion, which has been only too protracted, the representative of New Zealand, inhis statement the day before yesterday, suggested that the Secretary-General should be authorized to organize “an immediate investigation by a United Nations team”. His notion is that “as well as investigating all material evidence, the United Nations investigators would have access to all eye-witnesses, including those already mentioned in this debate, and that they would have the right to interrogate such key witnesses as the British officer who went to the scene” [1297th meeting para. 371. Today we already have before us a draft resolution submitted by the representative of New Zealand [S/7456]. 23. I should not wish at this moment to go into the details of the suggestion made at the 1297th meeting which defines the “key witnesses” among them the “British officer who went to the scenel’, for I should be obliged to challenge the impartiality of the proponent. 24. I should, however, like to express the views of my delegation regarding this ‘suggestion, from the standpoint of the effectiveness of the investigation and the implications that would result therefrom prejudicial to the United Nations. 25. We have before us an accusation which is devoid of everything an accusation must include if it is considered well-founded. We are told of shell cases that have been recovered, witnesses that have been produced including the British officer, and damage that has been caused, an attempt being made, by means of some rather artificial deductions, to present them as material evidence. The members of the Council have aiready’ had the opportunity to assess the value and importance of the material indications and of the testimony gathered by the British authorities. The New Zealand representative argues that the United Kingdom Government would not have made its accusations “unless it had been convinced that the allegations had substance”. Allegations again., . 20. C’est cette act&i@ de la Grande-Bretagne gri est B la base de la situation explosive a Aden et dans les protectorats; ctest eIle dgalement qui estg la base de la tension dans les regions frontslieres. 21. En face de ces faits, une seule ConChdon S’impose: constater que Ies allegations contenues dans la plainte britannique sent d&u&s de tout fondement et les rejeter. 11 ne resterait done qu’a replacer la plainte britannipe dans son contexte, c’est-a-dire les multiples manauvres visant St camoufler llintention de la Grande-Bretagne de perp&uer, dQ.me faGon ou d’une autre, sa domination dans le Sud arabique. 22. Or, bien que l’inconsistance et l’extravagance des accusations britanniques aient et?? demontrees au tours de la discussion c~ui n’a que tropdur8, dans son intervention d’avdnt-bier, le representant de Ia NoUvelle-ZBlande a suggere d’autoriser le Secr&aire general a organiser VimmBdiatement . . . une enquete par un groupe d’observateurs des Nations Unies.” D’apres lui, Yes enqugteurs des Nations Unies, outre qu’ils verifieront toutes les preuves materielles, pourront entendre tous les temoins ocnlaises, y compris ceux d&j& mentionnds dans cette discussion, et auront le droit dlinterroger des temoins clefs, comme l’officier britannique qui s’est rendu sur les lieux”. [129’7&me seance, par. 3’7.1 Aujourdlhui deja, nous sommes en presence d’un projet de r&solution soumis par la Nouvelle-ZBlande [S/7456]. 23. Je ne voudrais pas entrer maintenant dans les details de la suggestion faite B la 1297&me sgance, qui definit les “tt5moins clefsn, et parmi eux “I’officier britannique qui s’est rendu sur les lieux”, car je serais oblige! de mettre en cause llimpartialitt! de I’auteur. 24. Je voudrais toutefois exprimer l’opinfon de notre d&&ation sur cette suggestion du point de vue de l’efficacite de l’enqu&e et des implications portant prejudice aux Nations Unies c@ en r&ulteraient. 25. NOUS avons devant nous une accusation qui manque de tout element indispensable pous &re considB&e comme bien fondle. On nous parle de douilles retrouv&es, de temoins produits, dont l’officier britannique, de destructions causees, en essayant, a Ifaide de deductions assez artificielles, d’en faire des preuves mat8rielles. LeS membres du Con&l ant deja eu la possibilite d’appr8cier la valeur et la portBe des indices materiels et des temoignages recueillis par les autorites britanniques. Dlaprf?s l’hypcth&se avanc6e Par le representant de la Nouvelle-ZBlande, le Gouvernement britannique n’aurait pas lance son accusation “s’il n’avait pas r% convaincu que ses allegations Btaient fond&s”, Toujours des aI& gations . , . 27. It has been submitted, but the quality and the nature of this alleged evidence are such that, even if it is inspected on the spot, as suggested-and we are sure that the British authorities have taken every precaution to ensure that shell cases of Soviet or&in are there, that the damage is there and that the key witnesses are there-such evidence could in no way assist in establishing a relation of cause and effect between the indications, the action charged and the agent who allegedly committed it. 28. In this connexion, it would be well to recall that, in their statements last Thursday [1296th meeting], the representatives of the United Arab Republic and the Yemen Arab Republic rejected on behalf of their respective Governments the United Kingdom’s charges against their countries. If the Security Council is to form its final judgement, we are sure that it cannot equate allegations based on the suppositions of certain persons with responsible statements made on behalf of Governments. 29. Thus, it is clear that, from the standpoint of effectiveness, such an investigation would have no constructive results, since this is a case which is defective in its premises, in its material evidence, and in its conclusions. 30. To try to involve the United Nations and its institutions in such an affair would be to subject the Organization to a test which could have no justification and which would certainly render a great disservice to its prestige and its role in the peaceful settlement of international disputes. 31. If the United Kingdom were truly interested in maintaining peace in that part of the world, in reducing the dangerous tension prevailing in the area, it would long since have accepted the recommendations of the General Assembly that the Sub-Committee on Aden should be allowed to go there. However, the United Kingdom Government not only seems to have no interest in the implementation of General Assembly recommendations but did not even deem it necessary to participate in the work of the Special Committee in Africa and in particular at Cairo, where the question of Aden was considered very thoroughly with the participation of many petitioners, including the President of the Aden Council; the United Kingdom GoVerIWZnt would have nothing to do with it. An investigation of the kind now proposedto US would obviously, therefore, be useless. 32. It has been amply proved that the United Kingdom’s complaint is inadmissible and should be dismissed. 27. Elles ont BtB prCsent8es, mais la qualit et la nature de ces pretendues preuves sent telles que, meme si elles sont constatEes sur place, comme on voudrait le faire - et nous sommes certains que les autorites britanniques ont pris toutes les precautions pour que des douilles d’origine sovi&ique Solent la, pour que les destructions soient I& et pour que les t&moins clefs soient 19 - de telles preuves ne peuvent en rien aider B determiner la causalit entre les indices, l’action imputEe et l’agent qui l’aurait commise. 28. A ce propos, il serait bon de rappeler qle, dans leurs declarations, jeudi dernier [1296ame seance], les representants de la RBpublique arabe unie et de la RBpublique arabe du Yemen ont rejett?, au nom .de leurs gouvernements respectifs, les allegations britanniques vis-&-vis de leurs pays, Si le Conseil de s&urite doit former son jugement dgfinitif, nous sommes certains qu’il ne peut pas mettre sur un pied d’6galiW des allegations fondles sur les suppositions de certaines personnes et les dBclarations faites en toute responsabilit& au nom des gouvernements. 29. 11 est done clair que, du point de vue de l’efficacitB, une telle enqu&te n’apportera rien de constructif; car il s’agit d’un cas atteint d’un vice c# touche g ses prBmices m&mes, a ses preuves mat&ielles et aux conclusions qui en d&oulent, 30. Vouloir entralner les Nations Unies et leurs institutions dans une affaire pareille signifierait soumettre l’organisation 2 une Bpreuve I@ ne pourrait pas 6tre justifiee et qui certainement rendrait untres mauvais service a son prestige et & son r61e dans la solution pacifique des differends internationaux. 31. Si le Royaume-Uni s’int&essait vraiment au maintien de la paix dans cette partie du monde, 2 la reduction de la tension dangereuse qui existe dans la &gion, il y a longtemps d&j& qu’il aurait accept6 les recommandations de l’Assemblt5e gEndrale visant a permettre au Sous-Comitt! d’Aden de se rendre sur place. Cependant, non seulement le Gouvernement britannique ne semble pas in&es& E?. l’application des recommandations de l’Assembl8e g&&ale, mais encore il n’a pas jug6 n&zessaire de participer aux travaux du Comite special en Afrique et, notamment, au Caire oh la question d’Aden a et% examinee d’une maniere t&s approfondie avec la participation de nombreux p&itionnaires, parmi lesquels le President du Conseil d’bden; le Gouvernement britannique n’a pas voulu en entendre parler. Or, une enqu&te telle que celle qui vient de nous &tre psoposBe ne servirait maintenant a rien. 32. 11 a et& largement demontre que la plainte britannique est irrecevable et devrait Btre clas&e. 34. If the United Kingdom really wishes to show that 34. Si le Royaume-Uni veut reellement montrer it is concerned for the maintenance of peace, it should qu’il se prf?occupe du maintien de la paix, il devra do so by taking measures for the immediate implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, unreservedly and without any restrictions.

I now call onthe representative of the United Arab Republic.

It is with reluctance that I am asking to speak today, since neither the statements of the United Kingdom representative nor the discussions in the Council have introduced any new elements which might sensibly provide any ground to pursue the matter further. I doubt, therefore, that there is any need for my delega-. tion to deal once again at length with the British allegations . 37. I have already assured the Council, in the name of my Government, during my first statement [1296th meeting] that planes belonging to the United Arab Republic Air Force have not undertaken any kind of operation in Beihan. Furthermore, the Arab-Yemen Joint Command has also announced that none of its planes was airborne on 30 July 1966, and that they undertook no operation on that day whatsoever. 38, Consequently, it W;LS normal to expect that the debate would have been concluded. It was therefore a surprise to my delegation-and I believe to many others-to hear the representative of New Zealand, at the 1297th meeting, suggest investigation of the matter. 39. In his comment on this suggestion the representative of Jordan rightly stated: “It is even more important at this stage to consider the dangerous precedent the Council would be establishing if it accepted the idea of sending an investigation team to the area. If, on the face of it, the charge has not been corroborated by any evidence admissible under the circumstances, how can we take action-even preliminary action--on such a charge?” [ 1297th meeting, para. 521. 40. The representative of the Soviet Union stated in this connexion: “In the light of all these facts, it is quite obvious that there can be no question of any investigation of any reports, or of dispatching any missions to investigate this groundless Britishcomplaint. There is nothing for the Council to investigate, nothing for it to discuss, for the United Kingdom’s claim is without foundation, nothing but a fabrication. What would there be to investigate?” [Ibid., para. 108.1 le faire en prenant des mesures pour mettre imm& diatement en application la D1irclaration sur l’octroi de l’independance aux pays et aux peuples coloniaux, saris restrictions ni r!$serves aucunes. 35. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l’anglais): Je donne maintenant la parole au rep&se&ant de la RBpublique arabe unie. 36. M. EL-KONY (Republique arabe unie) [traduit de l’anglais]: C’est avecbesitation que je demande aujourd’hui la parole, puisque ni les d&larations du rep&- sentant du Royaume-Uni ni les disc&ions au sein du Conseil nlont apporte un 8lementnouveau quelconque pouvant fournir une raison de prolonger les debats. J’Bprouve done quelq[ues doutes sur la n&cessitB, pour ma d?%gation, de traiter & nouveau des allegations britanniques. 37. J’ai deja don& au Conseil, au tours de ma premibre intervention [ 1296Bme seance], parlant au nom de mon gouvernement, l’assurance qulaucune operation d’aucune sorte nra 8te effectuee sur le territoire de Beihan par des avions appartenant aux forces aeriennes de la RBpubliqe arabe unie. En outre, le commandement unifie arabo-y&menite a egalement fait savoir que, le 30 juillet 1966, aucun de ses avions n’avait pris llair ni entrepris d’op&ation, quelle qu’elle soit. 38. Par cons&&lent, il Btait normal de s’attendre & ce que le debat soit ~10s. Ma delegation a done Et6 surprise - comme, je pense, de nombreuses autres d&&gations - d’entendre it? reprgsentant de la Nouvelle-Zelande, au tours de la 1297&m@ seance, suggerer qu’une enquete soit faite Zt ce sujet. 39. Commentant cette proposition, le representant de la Jordanie a dit avec raison: “Au stade actuel, il importe encore davantage de prendre en considgration le pr&edent dangereux que creerait le Conseil s’il acceptsit l’idbe d’envoyer une Bquipe d’enqu&teurs dans la region. Si a premiere vue l’accusation n’est corroboree par aucune preuve recevable compte tenu des circonstances, comment prendre une mesure quelconque, ftlt-ce une mesure prgliminaire?” [ 12978me seance, par. 52.1 40. Le repr&sentant de 1’Union sovi&ique, M. Pedorenko, dt?clarait B ce sujet: “A la lumiere de tout ce qui a 8tB dit, il ne saurait Bvidemment &re question dlune enqu&te, quelle qu’elle soit, ni de l’envoi de je ne sais quelle mission chargee de faire rapport a propos de cette chicane des Britanniques. Le Conseil nla sien a Btudier, rien B examiner, car la chicanebritannique est d&&e de tout fondement et forgee de toutes pieces.” [Ibid,, par. lu8.1 42. Having already exposed the fallacy of the British allegation itself, it is appropriate to begin to search for the reasons behind this British complaint. What are the designs? I have already mentioned some of these reasons in my first statement, and now, after hearing the United Kingdom representative, the curtain rises to reveal the first act of the United Kingdom designs. It has become obvious that they are attempting to divert international attention from the explosive situation prevailing inside Aden and the Aden Protectorates-and I repeat inside the Territory-which constitutes the real cause of tension. By this, they seek to create the artificial impression that it is an international dispute between two countries, instead of being a colonial problem, as it has always been, and should be, considered by the United Nations. 43. The representative of Yemen has already enumerated [1296th meeting] the military attacks by the British colonial forces against his country. Their frequent recurrence is a standing proof of the aggressive policy of the British Government. We understand that the hostility of the United Kingdom to the Republic of Yemen is only a by-product of the British policy in Aden and the Aden Protectorates, and is a result of the Britishpersistence in perpetuating their presence in the area. 44. The brutal colonial war which the British are waging against the people of Aden and the Aden Protectorates transcends this Territory, It is the source of tension in the whole area, and affects its very security. 45. The real issue is a colonial one. The Yemeni Government is to be commended for its restraint in not reacting to the British provocation. 46. The General Assembly on its part has been decisive in exposing the real source of tension. In every resolution adopted by it since it had been seized of the problem of Aden and Aden Protectorates, the General Assembly has stressed the grave repercussions of the British colonial presence in the area. 47. General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) stated the following in its preamble: “Deeply concerned at the deteriorating situation in the Territory, the continuation of which is likely to lead to serious unrest andto threateninternational peace and security”. 42. Apr&s avoir mis en 6vidence la faussete des all& gations britanniques, il convient de rechercher maintenant les raisons de cette plainte. Quelles en sont les intentions? J’ai deja mentionne certaines de ces raisons lors de ma premiere declaration; aujourd’hui, aprbs avoir entendu le representant du Royaume-Uni, je vois le rideau se leyer sur le premier acte des machinations du Royaume-Uni. 11 est maintenant evident gue le Royaume-Uni s’efforcer de detourner l’attention internationale de la situation explosive qui r&gne actuellement B Aden et dans les protectorats - je dis bien a l’interieur du territoire - et qui constitue la cause reelle de la tension. Le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni essaie ainsi de creer artificiellement Ilimpression qu’il slagit 18 d’un differend intexnational entre deux pays et non pas d’un probl&me colonial, comme les Nations Unies l’cnt toujours consider6 B juste titre. 43. Le representant du Yemen a deja tSnumer6 [12968me seance] les attawes militaires effectuees par les forces coioniales britanniques centre son pays; la frequence de-ces-attaques est la preuve permanente de la politique d’agression du Gouvexnement britannique. Nous crayons comprendre que l’hostilit8 du Royaume-Uni & 1’Bgard de la RBpublique du Yemen est une simple consequence de la politique britannique & Aden et dans les protectorats et resulte de l’insistance des Britanniques & se maintenir dans cette r8gion. 44. La guerre coloniale brutale que les Anglais m&lent centre la population dt Aden et des protectorats dEpasse les limites de ce territoire; elle est la source de la tension dans toute cette region et affecte sa &curit& 45. Mais, en x8alit8, nous sommes ici en pri%ence d’une question coloniale. Le Gouvernement Yemenite merite tous nos Bloges pour la retenue dont il a fait preuve en slabstenant de reagir a la provocation britannique, 46. De son c&e, Z’AssemblBe g&&ale a nettement diZmasc$& la source vtjxitable de tension. Dans toutes les resolutions qu’elle a adcptees depuis qu’elle a Bte saisie du probleme d’Aden et des protectorats, l’AssemblEe generale a souligne les graves repercussions gui decoulent de la presence coloniale des Britanniques dans cette Sgion. 47. Au preambule de la resolution 1949 (XVIII) de l’Assembl8e g&&ale, nous lisons ce qui suit: “ProfondBment p&occupfZe par l’aggravation de la situation dans le texritoire, dont la continuation risque d’entra’lner des troubles graves et de menacer la paix et la secuxite intexnationales”. 49. Lest the representative of the United Kingdom find those two resolutions outdated, I should like to refer to a resolution adopted as recently as 15 June 1966 by the Special Committee. That resolution states: 49. Pour le cas oh le representant du Royaume-Uni trouverait ces resolutions trop anoiemzes, jevoudrais le renvoyer B une resolution adopt&e tout r&zemmentt le 15 juin 1966, par le Comitt? sp8cial. I1 y est dit: “Deeply concerned at the critical and explosive situation which is threatening peace and security in Aden and the Aden ProteotoFates, arising from-the policies pursued by the administering Power in the Territory”. “Profondement preoccupe par la situation critique et explosive qui menace la paix et la &curite a Aden et dans les protectorats et qui est due a la politique suivie dans le territoire par la Puissance administrante w. Le reprr%entant de la Bulgarie s’est deja rBf&% a cette r&olution. The representative of Bulgaria has already referred to that resolution. 50. Telle est la position qne 1’0NIJ a adoptee eu dgard a la tension et a la situation dangereuse qui r&gnent dans cette region. En con&quence, si le Royaume-Uni desire, sincerement que la tension diminue, le remBde r&side dans l’application integrale et immediate de la r&solution de 1’Assemblee g&%ale, B savoir clans le respect du droit Cl Ifadod~termination, dans la liberation d’Aden et des protectorats, dans le retrait de toutes les troupes britanniqnes et dans la liquidation de la base militaire. 50. That is the position of the United Nations with regard to the tension and the dangerous situation in that area. Therefore, if the United Kingdom sincerely desires to ease the tension, the remedy lies in the full and immediate implementation of the General Assembly resolutions-that is to say, respecting the right of self-determination, liberating Aden and the Aden Protectorates, and withdrawing all Rritishtroops and liquidating the military base. 51, This background cannot be divorced from the socaIIed British complaint. It is obvious that what we are now witnessing is a British attempt, under cover of the usual United Nations procedure of investigation, to achieve a seemingly innocent move which, in fact, they hope will be the beginning of other steps, seeking to divert the United Nations from the road it has charted for itself in Aden and the Aden Protectorates. 51. On ne peut pas dissocier cette toile de fond de la pretendue plainte britannique. I1 est manifeste que nous sommes en presence d’une tentative faite par le Royaume-Uni, sous couvert de la pro&dure habituelle d’enqu&e des Nations Unies, pour prendre une mesure apparemment inoffensive dont il esp&re qu’elle pr& ludera en fait a dfautres actions tendant a detourner les Nations Unies de la voie qu’elles se sont tra&e en ce qui concerne Aden et les protectorats. 52. Any attempt to confuse the issue or distract the attention of the United Nations from its aims should not be allowed to succeed. The United Kingdom should not be given any reason for hope in its search to further its colonial aims through the United Nations. The United Nations should continue undeterred on the right path. 52. Tout effort pour embrouiller llaffaire ou detourner les Nations Unies de leur but devrait &re voue & 1’Bchec. 11 ne faut donner au Royaume-Uni aucune raison d’esperer qu’ilpourra atteindre plus faoilement ses objectifs coloniaux grace aux Nations Unies. Les Nations Unies doivent faire preuve dlune r&solution int?branlable et pers&&er dans la bonne voie. 53. Cela &ant, ma di%Qgation est convaincue que le Conseil fera preuve de sagesse et tirera la conclusion qui s’impose en ce qui concerne la plainte non fond&e du Royaume-Uni, 53. In the light of that consideration, my delegation feels sure that the Council, in its wisdom, will draw its conclusion regarding the groundless British case. 54. We should have expected the representative of New Zealand to display more objectivity and fairness. Yet it seems that solidarity with the mother country has clouded his Government’s judgement. 54. Nous nous serions attendus a ce quo le rep&- sentant de la Nouvelle-ZBlande fasse montre de plus d’objectivit8 et d’Bquit& I1 semble cependant que la solidarite envers la mere patrie ait influence le jugement de son gouvernement. 55. Au tours de notre derniere seance, le rep&- sentant du Royaume-Uni a parlO tr&s haut de la promesse de son gouvernement d’accorder l’independance au territoire en 1968, au plus tarcl, mais, beaucoup plus bas, des reserves de son gouvernement quant a cette independance. Ea fait, ces reserves sont en contradiction avec les recommandations de llhssemblee g&&ale. Le Gouvernement. britannique n’a pas. davantage don& l’assurance ferme clue lretat cl%.& gence impos8 au territoire serait lev8. Or cette 55. At the last meeting of the Security Council the representative of the United Kingdom boasted of his Government’s promise to grant independence to the Territory by 1968, but in a subdued voice he referred to the reservations of his Government on that independence. The fact is that those reservations contradict the recommendations of the General Assembly. Nor is there a definite assurance by the British Government that the state of emergency imposedupon the Territory will be lifted. Such a measure, among “The action taken hy the United Nations should in no way be prejudicial to progress towards independence, or affect the expression of the people’s right of self-determination.” [ 1297th meeting, para. 66.1 57. The British complaint, as I have said, should be placed in the proper perspective and against the background of the action which the United Nations has pursued and is still pursuing to liquidate colonialism. 58. May I repeat that it is in the light of that consideration that my delegation feels sure that the Council, in its wisdom, will draw its conclusion,

I should like to start by returning thanks to the United States representative for his very kind remarks concerning my Presidency of the Security Council during the month of July. 60. With regard to the subject matter of the Council’s present debate, I would say the foIlowing. 61. The Nigerian delegation, along withour colleagues from Africa and other friends in this Council, has given this matter considerable thought. We must confess that at, the conclusion of the Council’s first meeting on the subject we went home feeling as befuddled as the representative of New Zealand apparently felt. Here was a situation in which two States Members of the United Nations presented to the Council two flatly contradictory views of the facts of a case. If the facts are as stated by the representative of the United Kingdom-including what he has said about the snub-nosed aircraft-then there is a case concerning which the United Arab Republic and the Republic of Yemen must give an answer. If there is no substance to the case presented by the United Kingdom, then the United Kingdom owes not only the United Arab Republic and the Republic of Yemen but also the Security Council an apology. 62. But how does one proceed to determine which view of the facts is right and which view is wrong? We have been wondering whether some ascertainment of the facts by a third partywouldnot be of assistance to this Council. The Nigerian delegation has always felt that the only person who can form a proper judgement is one who has taken the trouble to ascertain the facts. We have always felt that the proper course for any State Member of the United Nations which feels aggrieved, rightly or wrongly, is to”come to the Security Council with its complaint, We have always taken the view that the other course, the type that we were discussing a few days ago in this Council-that is, taking the law into one’s own hands-is the wrong course. 63. For that reason we feel, with respect to those who feel otherwise, that however flimsy a case presented to this Council may appear to us to be, “L+interPention des Nations Unies ne devrait en aucune fagon oompromettre la marche vers l+ind& pendance ou entraver l’expression de la libre determination d’un peuple. ++ [ 129’7eme sgance, p. 66.1 57. La plainte britannique, ccmme je l+ai dit, doit 6tre placee dans une juste perspective et examinee compte tenu de la position prise et maintenue par les Nations Unies pour liquider le colonialisme. 58. Je r&Pete que c+est 2 la 1umiCre de cette consideration que ma delegation est convainoue que le Conseil, dans sa sagesse, tirera les conclusions gpli s’imposent. 59. M. ADEBO (NigBria) [traduit de l+anglais]: Je voudrais tout d+abord remercier le representant des Etats-Unis des aimables paroles qu+il a prononcees 9. propos de la fapon dont j+ai preside le Conseil de securite pendant le mois de juillet. 60. En ce gui concerne l’affaire dont le Conseil est saisi, je voudrais faire les declarations suivantes. 61. La delegation niggrienne, tout comme nos ~01% gues d+Afrique et nos autres amis en ce Conseil, a beaucoup r&?&hi B la question. Nous devons avouer qu+& la fin de la premiere seance du Conseil consacxee & cette affaire, nous sommes partis aussi perplexes que le repr&sentant de la Nouvelle-ZBlande nous a declare l+avoir t%. Nous &ions devant une situation dans laquelle deux Etats Membres de l+ONU pr&entaient au Conseil dew versions diametralement opposees des faits. Si les faits sont tels que les a exposes le representant du Royaume-Uni - y compris ce qu+il a dit de l+avion a nez relevtS - la RBpublique arabe unie et la RBpublique du Yemen doivent une explication. Si la these soumise par le Royaume-Uni n+est pas fondle, c+est le Royaume-Uni gui doit des excuses non seulement a la Republique arabe unie et B la RBpublique du Yemen mais aussi au Conseil de s6&- rit8. 62. Mais comment dktexminer quelle version est la bonne? Aussi nous sommes-nous demand6 si une verification des faits par une tierce partie ne serait pas utile au Conseil. La delegation niggrienne a toujours estime que seul peut juger valablement celui qui s+est donnl! la peine de verifier les fait% NOUS avons toujours pens6 que la procedure correcte, pour tout Etat Membre de l+ONU qui, B tort ou a raison, se sent l&G, est de presenter une plainte au ConSeil de &curit& Nous avons toujours Bte d’avis que l’autre procgdure, celle dont nous discutions il y a welq.ueS jours en ce Conseil et qui oonsiste B se faire justice soi-meme, n+est pas la bonne marche & suivre. 63. Voil& pourquoi nous estimons, tout en respectant I’opinion de oeux qui pensent differemment qu’aussi peu convaincante que puisse nous sembler une cause 64. What is Nigeria’s stand about it? That stand was demonstrated when we supported General Assembly resolution 2023 (XX) at the last session, We have no doubt concerning what we would like to see in that part of the world: anindependentstate under a responsible Government that is not a stooge either of Britain or of any other Government in the world. And we made it clear by our support of that resolution, for which we make no apologies, what we thought Britain ought to do in that part of the world. Our view that the British complaint should bepursuedfurther is without prejudice to this fundamental position of Nigeria on the situation in that area, 65. In the second place, that view is withoutprejudice to the merits or demerits of the case submitted by the United Kingdom. If an investigation were made that proved that that case had no merit .at all, we would be prepared to join with our colleagues in denouncing the action of Britain. Our view about the need for an investigation also implies no reflection, of course, on the veracity of the United Arab Republic, with which we have very intimate relations and for which we have the highest admiration, a Government which has stated categorically that its aircraft were not involved in this matter. We hope that any investigation, if held, would confirm that statement, Again, our view about an investigationdoes not imply doubting at this point the word of the Yemen Arab Republic as given to us by its representative at this Council table. 66. All we ask is that an accurate view of the facts should be established, if possible. I add “if possibleI’ advisedly because it is quite a while now since the aircraft was discovered. It is quite some time now since the discovery of shell cases. A lot of water has run under a lot of bridges since then. And if an investigation is to be worthwhile it is going to be necessary for this Council and for that devoted servant of peace, the Secretary-General, to examine the matter very carefully with a view to settling the most effective modalities, 6’7. The effectiveness of action of the kind that is contemplated by the representative of New Zealand requires, we think, that if possible there should be a consensus to that effect inthis Council. Outsiders to the United Nations sometimes are worried that we are always looking for a consensus in most of the things we do, They wonder why, having assured yourself of a majority of Council members or of Assembly Members, you do not just proceed with a resolution-push it through the organ concerned regardless of the result. The reason, of course, is 64. Quelle est la position du Nigeria a cet sujet? Nous lfavons ddfinie en appuyant la resolution 2023 (Xx) de l’Assembl8e g&&ale au tours de ladernii?re session. Nous n’Bprouvons aucun doute quant B ce que nous voudrions voir clans cette partie du monde, & savoir l’av&nement d’un Etat independant dot& d’un gouvernement capable et qi ne soit l’homme de paille ni du Royaume-Uni ni d’aucun autre pays. En appuyant cette &solution - attitude qui ne nous semble pas appeler d’excuses - nous avons clairement indi@ la ligne de conduite que devrait adopter le Royaume-Uni dans cette partie du monde. Par consequent, notre decision de poursuivre l’examen. de la plainte britannique ne change rien a la position fondamentale adoptee par le Nigeria 2 1’Bgard de la situation qui r&gne dans cette rggion. 65. D’autre part, l’opinion que nous exprimons ici ne prejuge en rien les merites de laplainte presentee par le Royaume-Uni. Si une enqu&e a lieu et prouve que cette plainte n’&ait pas fondle, nous serons prets 9 nous associer a nos coll&ues pour denoncer cette action du Royaume-Uni. Que nous souhaitions une enqu&te n’implique pas non plus que nous entendions Bmettre des doutes quant B la veracite de la th.hese dEveloppee par le Gouvernement de la Republique arabe unie, pays avec lequel nous entretenons les relations les plus Btroites et pour lequel nous avons la plus grande admiration, Or, ce gouvernement a categoriquement d&la& gue ses avions n’avaient pris aucune part dans cette affaire, et nous esperons que toute enqu&e, si elle a lieu, viendra confirmer cette declaration. De meme, le fait que nous estimions une enqu&te necessaire n*implique pas non plus que nous entendions infirmer les declarations qu’a faites ici m&me la RQpublique arabe du YBmen par la voix de son reprgsentant. 66. Tout ce que nous d&irons, clest que les faits soient &ablis avec autant d’exactitude que possible. Je dis “que possible” car il s’est &zoul8 un certain temps deja depuis que l’incident a eu lieu et que des douilles ont BtB df%ouvertes. Beaucoup d’eau a pas& sous beaucoup de ponts depuis ce moment-l& Pour qu’une enquete ait quelque valeur, il faudra gue le Conseil et ce serviteur dfJvou6 de la paix qu’est le Secretaire gengral examinent la question avec tout le soin nBcessaire pour fixer les modalit& les mieux appropribes. 67. Si l’on veut que les mesures proposees par le repre sentant de la Nouvelle-ZBlande soient rcellement efficaces, je pense S(ue nous devrions autant que possible parvenir ici a un consensus. Ceux qui considBrent 1’ONU de l’exterieur se tracassent parfois de nous voir le plus souvent rechercherun consensus. 11s se demandent pourquoi, lorsque nous sommes assur& d’une majorit au sein d’un conseil ou de lfAssemb18e, nous ne cherchons pas tout simplement .?t faire adopter une &solution par llorganisme in% reSS6. Sam nous pr&occuper des cons6quences. LaraieffectiW for the pWpOSt3 we have in mind. What is the (1% Of nn investigation if all the parties are not going to co-operate, including those who have heen fairly or unf:lirly charged with an attack upon somebody else’s tCXTitCX*&J? (8. Icar these reasons, in these circumstances, I should like to make nn appeal to the members of the ~‘oLuK!~~ that more time should be given for us to IIX\~X~ IYIO~~ in-formal consultations with a view to seeing whut should be done in all the circumstances, :Ind that there&ter you, Mr. President, after holding the usunl consultations should Summon us back here. I ndtiress this appeal particularly to the represtsntotive DE New Zenland. What is important is not just 8 decision one way or the other. What is important is a dccis-lon that hns the effect of helping to reduce tllc st:;te of tension in the area with which we are canc~!rnecl. A little more time to enable LIS to reach a bottcr :ind mare effective decision would not be time wasted l,uC, Instead, time very usefully applied. G9. t’)nee more? I restate this appealto the members of the Council: thut tlf’ter tod:ly’s meeting we should have II fi&zher acljournment <inring which we could consult and see whether WC t?auld not arrive at a consensus that took account of the feelings of all or. most members of this Council, which would enable us to discharge OCI~ responsibilities in this Council in a very effective nl:trlIEr.

My delegation listened with the greatest :&&&ion to the United Kingdom representative’s stntemcnt in support of the complaint made by his Government concerning an air attack on the town Of NLIC~~~I, in the Amirnte of Beihan in the Federation of Youth nrabia, said to have been carried out on 30 ,J~~~Y 1966 by two aircrafts of the United Arab Republic )lir IForce operating from an airfield in the Yemen Arnb Republic. 7 I, we listened with equal attention to the statements of the representatives of the United Arab Republic :~nt~. the Yemen Arab Republic, categorically denying nny p&icipntion in that attack, and to the statements on tile question made by other members of the Security Council. 72, Thus, we find ourselves in a pOSitiOn where, in the vicw of my delegz&on, the first pointto be decided ly the c:ouncil is not what substantive measures or what precepts of the United Nations Charter and of internat~onnl law should be applied, but sii=plY whether tile events did occur and, if so, howa C@, tc tort OU fI raison, Ont 6t6 accus&es dtavoir dt%lenche une attaque centre le territoire dlautrni? 68. Pour les raisons que je viens d’exposer, je voudrais demander aux membres du Con&l que nous disposions dlun peu plus de temps pour poursuivre des consultations officieuses afinde oonsiderer ce qu’il convient de faire dans le cas pr&ent. Les Consultations terminees, le President du Conseil pourrait nous convoquer 2 nouveau ici. Cet appel s’sdresse tout particuli&rement au representant de la Nouvelle-Zglande. Je rep&e que ce qui importe, ce n’est pas simplement d’arreter une decision dans un sens ou dans l’autre, mais bien de parvenir B une decision propre & rEduire la tension dans la region qui nous int&csse. Que l’on nous permette done de disposer d’un peu plus de temps pour parvenir a une decision meilleure et plus efficace. Ce temps, loin d’btre gaspill6, sera au contraire fort utilement employ& 69. Clest pourquoi je r&t&e mon appel auxmemhres du Conseil en leur demandant de bien vouloir aocepter d’ajourner le &bat & l’issue de la seance de o&t apr&s-midi afin de proceder a de nouvelles consultations et de nous efforcer si possible de parvenir Fl un consensus qui tiendrait compte des opinions de tous les membres du Conseil ou au moins de la plupart dlentre eux, nous permettant ainsi de nous acquitter de nos responsabilit& de la manibre la plus effiCaCe. 70. M. MARQUES-SERE (Uruguay) [ traduit de l’espagnol]: Ma d&&&ion a &out6 t&s attentivement la d&zlaration du representant du Royaume-Uni ~1’aPPUi de ltaccusation form&e par son gouvernement touchant une attaque a&ienne qui aurait BtB effect&e le 30 juillet 1966 centre la ville de Nuqub, dans 1lEmirat de Beihan, en Arabie du Sud,par deux avions appartenant B 1’armGe de l’air de la Rgpublique arabe unie, a partir d’un aeroport sit& dans la RGpublique arabe du YBmen. 71. NOUB avons Bo0ut.B avec une dgale attertlon les. d&larations des representants de l.aRBpublique arabe unie et de la RBpublique arabe du YQmen niant oat& goriquement toute participation B oette. attaque et celles des autres membres du Conseil de s&urit& 72. NOUS nous trouvons done dans une situation ohs de 1 Iavis de notre d&ggation, le COnSeil doit en Premier lieu se prononcer non pas SUF les mesures de fond ou SUT les principes de la Charte des Nations Unies et du droit international qu’il oonvient d’appliquers mais sur les faits qui se sont produits et sur les circonstances dans lesquelles ils se sent produits. 74. The fact that this complaint has beenmade-leaving aside, for the moment, the incident itself-only confirms the existence of tension in the region, to which the representative of the Yemen Arab Republic expressly referred in his statement. 75. The Security Council, therefore, is faced withtwo alternatives: either to take some decision now, on the basis of the evidence it possesses-in which case the position of each delegation will have to be based primarily upon a subjective judgement of the circumstances surrounding the complaint-or to seek proper means of trying to establish clearly the facts which have been alleged, 76. When I say “proper means”, I am, of course, indicating that the body or the persons appointed to determine the facts must be impartial and must confine their activities to this particular case. ‘77. My delegation is strongly in favour ofthis second alternative, which does not in any way prejudge the substance of the matter and, it must be understood, constitutes a safeguard for both parties. We believe that the Security Council should deal as fully as possible with all incidents likely to disturb international peace and security which axe brought before it by States Members of the United Nations and that it should not initiate a practice of insisting on the submission of prior evidence. 78, We believe this in the case of incidents where the complainant State is a great Power, because to do otherwise would mean discouraging the use of the procedures laid down in the Charter of the United Nations, and encouraging, instead, the use of other means, which are incompatible with international law. We believe this all the more when the complainant is a. small State, since recourse to thesecurity Council is often the only defence such a State has. 79. For all these reasons, we regard the New Zealand representative’s proposal that the Council, as a first step, should try to clarify what took place, as a constructive proposal. My delegation supports it, in the hope that a formula satisfactory to the parties and to a majority of.the CounciI will be found. 80. I do not consider that this is the organ or this the appropriate time to deal with the problems of the territories of South Arabia, but I do wish to stress, once again, that my country made its position on this question clear when at the twentieth session it voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 2023 (XX). At that time, with other Latin American countries and 74. Cette accusation, si nous faisons abstraction pour l’instant de l’incident lui-meme, ne fait que confirmer la tension qui existe dans cette region et dent a par16 le representant de 1aRepublique arabe du Yemen dans sa d&laration. 75. Le Conseil a done le choix entxe deux methodes: ii peut prendre d’ores et dej& une decision, fondle sur les &18ments d’appr&iation dont il dispose et, dans ce cas, la position de chaque d&Egation devra &re essentiellement fond&e sur des &ements subjectifs touchant 1’apprBciation des circonstances qui entourent cette accusation, ou bien le Conseil peut rechercher des moyens appropries pour tenter d’Bta-= blir clairement les faits denon&. 76. Lorsque nous parlons de “moyens appropri8s” nous voulons parler bien sQr de 1’impartialiW de l’organe ou des personnes charges d’btablir les faits consid&r& et de l’action du Conseil dans le cas qni nous occupe. 77. Nous sommes resolument partisans de cette denxibme methode qui ne prejuge en aucune facon le fond de la question et qui, il faut en convenir, offre une garantie aux deux parties. Nous crayons que le Conseil de s&uritd doit examiner, de la faqon la plus complete possible, tous les incidents susceptibles de compromettre la paix et la sEcuritB internationales dont les Etats Membres de 1’ONU le saisissent et quril ne doit pas entreprendre d’exiger que le bien-fond8 drune plainte soit d’abord Btabli. 78. Nous sommes partisans de oette methode lorsque l’ncousateur est une grande puissance parce que sinon cela Bquivaudrait 2 dbcourager le recours auxmoyens pr&us par la Charte des Nations Unies et a favoriser le recours a d’autres moyens incompatibles‘avec le droit international, Nous en sommes plus partisans encore lorsque llaccusateur est un petit Etat parce que souvent le recours au Conseil de &urit~ est le seul moyen de di5fense dont dispose un tel Etat. 79. Pour toutes ces raisons, nous estimons que la proposition du representant de la Nouvelle-!ZBlande tendant & ce que le Conseil commence par essayer de faire la lumi&re sur les faits est extr@mement constructive. Notre delegation appuie cetteproposition dans l’espoir que Iron pourra trouver une formule qui satisfasse les parties int&es&es et la majorite des membres du Conseil. 80. Je ne pense pas que ce soit ni le lieu ni ie moment de traiter des problemes que posent les territoires de 1’Arabie du Sud, mais je tiens cependant a rappeler une fois de plus que monpays a deja adopt6 une position B cet Qgard iorsqu’il a vote, lors de la vingtikme session de l’Assembl8e generale, en faveur. de la r&solution 2023 (Xx); il s%tait a cette occasion, 81. Mr, MATSUI (Japan): The Council, scarcely having COIllpleted its consideration of one series of UnfOrhdX?. incidents in the Near East, has now found it necessi~ry to initiate a discussion of yet another fh’e-Up in that region of the world, Based upon the IJnited Kingdom complaint, contained in document S/7442, of an air attack upon the village of Nuqub, we hnve thus far listened in the Council to charges and counter-charges, denials and counter-denials, concerning not only this particular incident, but also XI whole series of incidents which, taken all together, have contributed for far too long a time to the increase of tensions in the area of the Southern Arabian peninsula. 82. We have thus been presented with a mostregrettable state of affairs, posing a dilemma to members ol’ the Council not directly involved in the situation brought to our attention and now under our scrutiny. But. if we are confronted by a clilemma, the Council should not seek, for that reason, to divest itself of its responsibility under the Charter for dealing as speedily und effectively as possible with the situation tlrat has been brought to our attention. 83. I have in mind, nol; only the particular complaint brought by the United Kingdom, which is the immediate subject of our meetiugs, but the entire complex situation which that complaint reflects. In our opinion, it is far too serious a matter to permit any avoidance of resllonsibiiidies. 84, As a practical matter, it would seem to me that our dilemma consists primarily in the extreme difficulty of sifting the evidence presented to US, of evaluating it, and of reachingtenable conclusions based upon such an evaluation. We can, however, be absolutely sure of one thing. Over the past few years, there has been a whole series of incidents which have been one of the main causes of a spiral of ill will and serious tensions in the area we are now concerned witil. I would venture to say, however, that the irnportatlt thing is not to gel: lost in a search, which might well be illusory, for detailed and efuSiVe facts in an effort to fix responsibilities. Rather, in our opinion, the Council should focus its attention on the main point, which is the existence of very serious tensions in the area, and on the positive Steps necessnry to alleviate that situation. 85. ~~~~~ely, I should think we might all agree that the two greatest issues we are dealing with are: First, the relief of tensions and the establishment of lasting, peaceful and harmonious relations among the Governtnents and peoples concerned in the area; Second, in a 31. M. MATSUI (Japan) [traduit de l’anglais]: Apeine le Conseil a-t-i1 ache& d’examiner une s&rie d’incidents regrettables survenus dans le Proche-Orient, qu’iI se hm.W? dans la n6cessit6 d’enereprendre nne discussion au sujet d’une nouvelle flamb& &violence qui a hAat dans c&e m$me r6gion. A propos d’une plainte d6posbe par le Royaume-Uni, et figurant dans le document S/7442, concernant une attaque a6rienne dirigde centre le village de Nuqub,nous avons jusqu’ici entendu au sein du Conseil des accusations et des centre-accusations, des dEmentis et des con&- ddmentis non seulement au sujet de cet incident-l& mais de toute une s&rie d’incidents qui, ensemble,ont contribu6 depuis bien trop longtemps a accro’itre les tensions qui existent dans la region m&idionale de la pdninsule Arabique. 82. Nous nous trouvons done devant un &at dechoses t&s regrettable qui pose un dilemme aux membres du Conseil que n’int6ressepas directement lasituation qui fait l’objet de notre discussion, Mais,nous trouvor devant un dilemme ne doit pas nous inciter 3 nous soustraire a la responsabilit6 qui nous incombe aux termes de la Charte mais a nous occuper aussi promptement et aussi efficacement que possible de la situation dont nous avons Bt6 saisis. 83. C’est moins la plainte pr6cise du Royaume-Uni qui me p&occupe que la complexe situation g6nBrale dont cette plainte est une manifestation. A notre avis, cette question est trop serieuse pour nous autoriser & Eluder nos responsabilit6s. 84. Sur le plan pratique, il me semble que notre dilemme reside principalement dans le fait W’il nOUS est extrhmement difficile de passer les preuves Vi uous sont pr&entdes au crible de la raison, de les &valuer et de parvenir 2 des conclusions valables a partir de cette Evaluation. Nous pouvons cependant atre absolument sQrs cl’une chose, Ces dernierss an&es, toute une s6rie d’incidents se sent produits qui sent une des principales causes d’un courant grandissant de mauvaise volont6 et de tensions graves dans la zone dent nous nous occupons actuellement. J lose dire cependant qu’il importe de nepas Se Perdre dans la recherche, qui risque d%tre illuSOir% de f&s dgtailles et insaisissables dans le but de d&erminer les respons&ili&. A notre avis, le Conseil devrait pIut& slattacher & l’examen du ph6nom~ne Principal* a savoir llexistence de tensions trF?s graves dans ia region et des mesures positives ?i prendre Pour ameliorer la situation. 85. ~ous sommes certainement tous d’accord sur le fait que les deux grandes questions dent nous noUS occtlpons sent: premi&ement, le rel%chement des tensions et l’&ablissement de relations durablss, pacifiques et harmonieuses entre les gouvernements 86. First of all, I think that the Council should make it clear that the minimum it expects is that the Governments involved in this situation will scrupulously refrain from any action that could possibly aggravate it further. But this is not enough. 87. Second, the Council has the right to expect that the Governments concerned will also take positive steps to lessen tensions and bring about as promptly as possible a situation of peace and tranquillity in the area, free from recurring incidents such as those that have been reported to us from time to time over the past few years, including the incident which is the subject of the United Kingdom complaint. 88. Third, given the very regrettable nature of the situation we are dealing with, it is quite likely that the Governments concerned will need some help in their positive efforts to achieve peace and tranquillity in the area. The provision of such help would reasonably appear to be part of the general responsibilities of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, on the one hand and, on the other, for the advancement of peoples towards the fullest possible degree of self-determination and independence. The Council might very well, therefore, as I believe the representative of New Zealand mentioned at the 1297th meeting, ask the Secretary-General to use his good offices to assist the parties in bringing about peaceful conditions in the area. It is hardly necessary to stress the Secretary-General’s impartial objectivity and his rare and oft-proved ability in dealing effectively with such situations, as I am sure that all members of the Council are of one mind in this regard. 89. Naturally, we would expect the Secretary-General to employ such means, including the investigation of facts, as he would find appropriate and useful in the discharge of his mission, and to report to the Council, 90. I should think that the three points I have just mentioned might commend themselves to all members of the Council, If so, it would be our hope that a consensus of the Council, along theseor similar lines, might be achieved. 91. With regard to the suggestion or appeal made by the representative of Nigeria just now, I should like to state that my delegation will not have any difficulty in accepting it, and we shall stand ready to come to the Council table when you, Mr. President, and the Council will consider it proper to reconvene, 86. Tout d’abord, je pense que le Con&l devrait prgciser qu’il slattend pour le moins Et ce que les gouvernements interess& s’abstiennent scrupuleusement de toute action pouvant aggraver la situation. Mais cela ne suffit pas. 87. Deuxiemement, le Conseil est en droitd’attendre des gouvernements in&es&s qu’ils prennent aussi des mesures positives pour diminuer la tension et r&ablir dans la region aussi rapidement que possible une situation paisible et tranquille exempte d’incidents rep&& du genre de ceux qui nous ont BtB rapport&s & diverses reprises ces dernieres an&es, notamment l’incident qui fait l’objet de laplainte du Royaume-Uni. 88. Troisibmement, &ant donn& lanature tr8s regrettable de la question dont nous nous occupons, 1eS gouvernements in&es&es auront sans doute besoin de quelque aide dans les efforts positifs qu’ils font pour r&ablir la paix et la tranquillit. dans la rggion. Assurer cette aide semble raisonnablement faire partie de la responsabilite g&&rale qu”a I’ONU de maintenir la paix et la s&uritE internationales, d’une part, et, d’autre part, de favoriser le progrss des peuples vers le plus grand degre possible d’autod& termination et dlindgpendance. Le Conseil pourrait done tr8s bien, comme l’a dit lo representant de la Nouvelle-Zglande & la 12978me sgance, me semblet-il, demander au Secretaire g&&ral d’user de ses bons offices pour aider les parties interessees & Btablir des conditions pacifiques dans la r&gion. Point n’est besoin d’insister sur l’objectivit& et l’impartialit6 du Secrgtaire g&&al et ni sur la comp&ence rare dont il a fait preuve en maintes occasions pour r&oudre heureusement des situations analogues, car je suis stir que les membres du Conseil sont unanimes B cet Bgard. 89, Naturellement nous attendrions du Secretaire g&&al qu’il mette en o3uvre les moyens, notamment l’enqu&te sur les faits, qu’il jugerait approprih et utiles pour s’acquitter de sa t&he, et qu’il fasse rapport au Conseil. 90. Les trois points que je viens de mentionnor pourraient, il me semble, &tre approuves par tous les membres du Conseil. Dans ce cas nous esperons pouvoir parvenir 3. un consensus, selon ces grandes lignes ou des lignes similaires. 91. A propos de la suggestion ou de l’appel du representant du Nig&ia, je tiens ?i affirmer que ma delegation n’aura aucune difficult8 & l’accepter, et que nous serons prifts B revenir ici lorsque le President, et le Ccnseil estimeront opportun de se reunir 3. nouveau. 93. The objections of these two members of an impartial United Nations investigation or, at leak% the objections they were prepared to declare here, appeared to be based on two grounds: first, that the evidence brought before the Council was inadequate and, secondly, that such evidence as there was had been submitted by the United Kingdom, an interested party. 94. I should have thought that the conclusion which one would normally draw from a lack of conclusive evidence to substantiate such a serious allegation was that one should seek further evidence; and that if evidence produced appears partial, then further evidence should be collected by an agent of the Council whose standing is unquestionable. 95. But the conclusion which the representative of the Soviet Union drew from the situation was that the Security Council should cease considering the item. 96. The inference one can drawfrom this remarkable position is that if a complaint of aggression is to be seriously considered by the Security Council, then the onus is on the complainant to present a water-tight case to the Council, But what would the Soviet Union regard as sufficient evidence? The fact of the matter is that in sneak attacks like the one which it is alleged took place on 30 July-or in raids by ground forces carried out by stealth-there is in the nature of it little concrete evidence available apart from shell, bomb or mine cases and fragments, damagedproperQ and dead and wounded. Are complainants in future to be expected to produce certified photographs or films of attacks? But it would then be argued that these can be faked. It seems that the accounts of eyewitnesses are equally suspect, and equally capable of being denounced as merely the report of things the witnesses thought they saw with their eyes. 97. The logic of such a position is that when allegations of aggression by sneak attack or stealth come before the Security Council they should be lightly dismissed unless the attackers are prepared subsequently to identify themselves or unless an impartial observer chanoes to be at the exact spot at the precise moment. 98. The message being proclaimed to potential aggressors is clear, and indeed this is not the first time we have heard it: cover your tracks well; use no weapons which could be used to identify you to the point of absolute certainty; choose your moment; and above all, do not confess, If you do this, the Security Council will not give serious consideration 93. Les objections de ces deux representants & une enqu&e impartiale me&e par l’ONU, ou du moins les objections qu’ils ont bien voulu Bnoncer ici, m’ont semble se fonder sur deux points: premisfement, les preuves fournies au Conseil Btaient insuffisantes et, deuxibmement, ces preuves avaient et6 fournies par le Royaume-Uni, partie in&es&e. 94, J’aurais pen& que la conclusion normale 8. tirer d’un manque de preuves concluantes pour appuyerune si grave allegation Btait la n6cessit8 de chercher d’autres preuves; et que, si les preuves avancees semblent partiales, de charger alors un agent du Conseil dont l’impartialitg ne peut &re mise en doute d’en recueillir d’autres. 95. Mais la conclusion que le representantde 1’Union sovietique a tirge, lui, c’est quele Conseilde s(icuritB ne devrait pas continuer B s’occuper de la question, 96. On peut deduire de cette attitude remarquable que, pour qu’une plainte d’agression soit prise en consid&ation par le Conseil de &curit&, il incombe au plaignant de p&enter des preuves irr8futables. Mais quelles preuves IYJnion sovietique jugerait-elle suffisantes? En effet, les attaques sournoises comme celle qui se serait produite le 30 juillet, ou les attaques furtives par des forces terrestres, laissent PSU de preuves concr&es en dehors des fragments d’obns, de bombes ou de mines, des biens endommages, des morts et des bless&. Les plaignants devront-ils a l’avenir exhiber des photographies ou des films 18galis& des attaques? On pr&endra alors que ces documents sont truques. 11 semble que les r&its de Gmoins oculaires soient Bgalement suspects et peuvent Btre ddnoncEs comme &ant le r&it de chases We les temoins ont cxu voir de leurs propres yeux. 97. La logique de tout ceci est gue le Conseil devrait rejeter les allegations d’agressions survenues sous forme d’attaques en traltre ou par surprise a moins que les assaillants ne soient disposes a se faire conna?tre ou 2 moins qu’un observateur impartial se soit trouve par hasard sur les liens m@mes de l’attaque au moment p&is. 98. Le message lance aux agresseurs Bventuels est done clair et ce n’est pas la premiere fois que nous l’entendons: effacez bien vos traces; n’employez aucune arm8 qui pourrait vous faire identifier avec une certitude absolue; choisissez bien le moment de votre attaque et surtout n’avouez jamais. Si VOW observez bien ces principes, le Conseil de s&urite 99. 1 might add that I also find the reluctance of Jordan and the Soviet Union to support the despatch of a United Nations mission to this area at this moment rather surprising when taken in conjunction with their scarcely veiled charges that the attack was probably carried out by British planes as a preliminary to an attack on the Yemen, These are very serious charges indeed. If they are meant to be taken seriously, then one might assume that their authors would welcome the possibility that a United Nations tea.m attempting to establish the facts of the Nuqub incident might produce the evidence to corroborate their charges too. If they are not meant to be taken seriously, what should we conclude about the attitude of their authors towards facts and, even LLlore important, towards the United Nations? 100. The representative of the United Arab Republic has suggested that New Zealand’s relations with Britain have clouded the objectivity of the New Zealand Government in this matter. Surely our proposal is anything but partial to Britain. All we ask is that the facts be established by the most experienced and impartial people that the world can provide. There are people who have had years of experience in sifting incidents infinitely more complex than this one. If they upheld those who maintain that the incident was a British fabrication, then British prestige and credibility would suffer an enormous blow. Therefore, how are we showing partiality to Britain? And surely we are showingno animus towards any other States. Or perhaps there is some alternative explanation not yet adduced in this debate. Perhaps a genuine accident occurred, For something did take place at Nuqub; shots did come from planes and persons were injured. We, for our part, have studiously avoided assigning blame to anyone, But even if, as the representative of the Soviet Union seems to want us to believe, the planes came from Mars, something did happen. 101. The New Zealand delegation proposed at the 1297th meeting that the Council request the Secretary-General to arrange for an immediate investigation, to be carried out by an impartial United Nations team, to establish the facts of the incident called to the Council’s attention by the British delegation and to report to the Council. What we envisaged is a strictly limited operation. It is not a proposal for a border observation team or a frontier force, or any such operation. Two or three experienced investigators, presumably from one of the existing observation missions, would fly to the area immediately they were authorized to do so by the Council. Their role would be fact-finding, Within a matter of days they would report to the Counciland I would remind the Council that time is passing. Any action the Council might decide to take once it 99. Je dois ajouter que je trouve plut6t surprenant que la Jordanie et 1’Union sovi&ique r6pugnent & voir une mission de 1’ONU aller dans la region alors qu’ils viennent de porter des accusations 3 peine voil6es suivant lesquelles cette attaque a Qt6 sans doute effect&e par des avions britanniques en pr6paration 3 une attaque centre le YEmen. Ces accusations sont en fait tr&s graves. Si leurs auteurs tiennent ?I. ce que nous les prenions en consid6ration alors il serait normal qu’ils se rejouissent de la possibilit6 qu’une Bquipe de l*ONU cherchant a Btablir la v&it6 sur l’incident de Nuqub trouve des preuves qui corroborent leurs accusations, S’il ne fautpas prendre ces accusations au s&rieux, que devons-nous conclure de l’attitude de leurs auteurs envers la r6alit6 et meme ce qui est Plus important encore envers l’ONU? 100. Le repr&entant de la RBpublique arabe unie a sugg&B que les rapports qu’entretient la Nouvelle- ZBlande avec laGrande-Bretagne ont obscurcil’objec-’ tivit6 du Gouvernement r&o-zglandais clans cette affaire. On ne peut certes pas nous accuser de partialit6 envers la Grande-Bretagne car nous nous bornons B demander que les faits soient Btablis par les personnes les plus expBriment6es et les plus impartiales du monde, celles-la m&mes qui depuis des an&es effectuent des enquetes sur des incidents beaucoup plus complexes, S’ils devaient appuyer ceux pour qui l’incident a Et6 month par les Britanniques, alors le prestige des Britanniques en souffrirait BnormBment. Peut-on done nous accuser de partialit envers la Grande-Bretagne? Et nous ne manifestons certainement aucun animosit6 B l%gard d’aucun Etat. Une autre explication non encore invoqu6o da& ce debat est concevable. Un veritable accident a peut- &re eu lieu. Car il s’est produit quelque chose 2 Nuqub; des avions ont fait feu et des personnes ont Et6 bles&es. Nous nous sommes, quant & nous, soiefneusement abstenus d’incriminer qui que ce soit. Mais mbme si, comme le repr6sentant de 1’Union sovi6tique semble vouloir nous le faire croire, les avions venaient de Mars, quelque chose s’est pass& 101. A la 12978me &ance, la delegation de la Nouvelle-Zklande a proposi? que le Conseil prie le Secr& taire g&&al de prendre des dispositions pour qu’il soit immBdiatement proc6d6 a une enqu&e par une Bquipe impartiale de l’ONU, afin d’etablir les Eaits de l’incident port6 a l’attention du Conseil par la d&&gation britannique et de faire rapport au Conseil. Ce que nous envisagionsestune operation tr&slimit6e. 11 ne slagit pas dlenvoyer une &quipe d’observation aux front&es ni des gardes-frontieres ni d’aucune autre operation de ce genre, Deux ou trois enqu&eurs expriment&, appartenant vraisemblablement ?L l’une des missions d’observation d6jtl existantes, se rendraient dans la region au recu de l’autorisation du Conseil. Charg& d’&ablir les faits, ils pourraient faire rapport au Conseil sous quelques jours - n’oublions pas que le temps passe, 11 appartiendrait au 103. The reception which this modest proposal evoked at the last meeting was gratifying. Most members who spoke welcomed it as the rational next step. Encouraged by this, and by your own COiiCluSiOn, Mr. President, that it appeared to be the view of the Council that the suggestion should be pursued further, we are submitting the very brief draft resolution [S/7456], containing no element of pre-judgement, which lies on the table. It reads: “The Security Council “Decides to request the Secretary-General to arrange for an immediate investigation, to be carried out by experienced United Nations personnel, in order to establish the facts relating to the incident referred to in the letter dated 2 August 1966 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations [S/7442], and to report to the Security Council as soon as possible.” 104. I commend this proposal to the Council as a sensible and time-honoured means-the only means available under the circumstances-of obtaining the information upon which a rational and objective judgement by this Council, charged with responsibility for maintaining peace and security, can be based. 105. It has been asked: what is the use of an investigation if all the parties concerned are not prepared to co-operate? More time has been asked for in order to allow an investigation to be carried out on a basis which takes fuller account of the feelings of all members, I would suggest, with respect, that this comment confuses the very limited task of investigation or fact-finding with the much more complex job of conciliation, Clearly, a conciliation commission cannot function effectively, if at all, unless it is set up with the consent of all the States concerned, The same is also true of other actions ranging from peace-observation missions to peace-keeping forces, But fact-finding is quite another matter. In the present case, the State that has brought a complaint to the Council is willing to have its allegations and the evidence it has produced tested by an investigation by impartial observers. As I have already explained, we believe that this should be done because it is the preliminary and minimum aotion needed to enable the Council to decide what it shoulddo about the complaint, Depending upon the results of the investigation, there may be several courses open to the Council; but that is something. to be considered at a later stage. 106. Though I believe this to be the situation in which we now find ourselves, nevertheless I should 103. L’accueil fait h cette modeste proposition lors de notre derniare r&union a &B flatteur. La plupart des reprgsentants qui out pris la parole ont consider& que clbtait 12 une mesure logique. Encourages parcet accueil et par la conclusion du President selon qui le Conseil semblait d’avis de poursuivre l’examen de cette suggestion, nous pr&entons maintenant unprojet de ri%olution [S/7456] trBs bref ne renfermant aucun element qui prejuge l’avenir. En voici le texte: “Le Conseil de &curitG “D&ide de prier le Secretaire general de prendre desmitions en vue d’une enqu&te immEdiatequi sera effectuge par du personnel experiment6 de 1’Organisation des Nations IJnies et aura pour objet d%tablir les faits concernant l’incident mentioun& dans la lettre du reprgsentant permanent adjoint du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord auprEs de l’organisation des Nations Unies en date du 2 aoat 1966 (S/7442), et de rendre compte d8s que possible au Conseil de s&urit&” 104. Je recommande cette proposition a llapprobation du Conseil car il me semble qu’elle constitue un moyen sense et v&&able, le seul moyen disponible compte tenu des circonstances, dlobtenir les renseignements sur la base desquels le Conseil, &qui il incombe de maintenir la paix et la s&uritG, pburra formuler un jugement rationnel et objectif. 105. On a demand6 B quoi sesvirait une enqu&te si toutes les parties int&es&es n’dtaient pas disposees & coop&er. On a demandi: B disposer de plus de temps afin qu’une enqu8te puisse &re effectu6e sur une base qui tienne davantage compte des sentiments de tous les membres. I1 me semble, soit dit sans vouloir Offenser les repr&entants qui ont fait ces observations, qu’ils confonclent la tdche trtis limit&e de l’enqu&te et de 1’6tablissement cles faits avec la thche beaucoup plus complexe de la conciliation. 11 est certain qU’Une commission de conciliatiori ne peut fonctionner efficacement, 011 mgme tout simplement fonctionner que si elle a 6th Btablie avec le consentement de tous 1eS Etats int&ress&. Cela est Bgalement vrai pour des opgrations aussi diverses que l’envoi de missions d’observation relatives B la paix ou de forces de maintien de la paix. Mais ll&ablissement des faits est une op&ration dlun tout autre or&e. Dans le cas qUi nous occupe, lIEtat qui a saisi le Conseil d’une plainte est disposi: B voir des observateurs impartiaux v&ifier ses all8gations et les preuves qu’il a p&sent&es. Comme je l’ai deja expliquB, nous estimons qu’il devrait en &tre ainsi car ce serait 18 une mesure prgliminaire minimum et necessaire pour que le Conseil puisse d&cider de la suite B donner & la plainte. Suivant les ri%ultats de l’enqu&e, le Collseil aurait plusieurs options qui devraient faire l’objet de discussions ult8rieures. 106. Bien que je sois convaincu que la situation actuelle appelle cette mesure, je suis cepeudant dis-

I should like to intervene very briefly to say that my delegation has listened with great attention to the statements made at today’s meeting, and especially to the statement of the representative of Japan and the statement of the representative of Nigeria, which took the form of an appeal to all the members of the Council. 108. While apologizing fox perhaps summarizing rather too succinctly the thinking of the representative of Nigeria, I believe I may say that his statement comprises, as it seemed to me, three main points on which all might be able to agree: the acceptance of the principle of an investigation, the organization and carrying out of the investigation with the agreement of all the interested parties and with the assistance of the Secretary-General, and the need for a consensus to ensure that such an investigation will receive the maximum support and co-operation. 109. It is with this in mind that my delegation will consider any draft resolutions submitted to the Council, and in particular the one which has just been submitted and explained by the representative of New Zealand, However, I wish to reiterate that a formula likely to bring forth general agreement-such as the one proposed by the representative of Nigeria-would be preferred by my delegation.

I now call on the representative of Yemen.

In my statement at the 1297th meeting I drew the attention of the Council to fresh acts of provocation and aggression against my country committed by the British. Today, I have more details with regard to those incidents, 112. On 3 August, the British Governor of Aden, accompanied by the Sharif of Beihan, went to the British-oocupied post of Sanah. There, the two held a meeting with the British officials in the area. Following the meeting, British anti-aircraft units were transported to and stationed in that post and along the dividing line between the Yemen Arab Republic and occupied South Yemen, In the evening, the British forces stationed on Jabal Assalamah Mountain opened fire on the Yemen Arab Republic town of Qatabah and surrounding posts for one full hour, as I described in my previous statement. 113. Now I have further instruction frommy Government to bring to the attention of the Security Council the following. 114. On 8 August-the day before yesterday-at 0935 and 1030 hours, local time, a British military jet 107. M. SEYDOUX (France): Je voudrais intervenir trBs brievement pour dire que ma delegation a &out& avec beaucoup d’attention les expos6s qui ont Qt6faits au tours de cette s$ance, notamment celui du repr& sentant du Japon et celui du reprbsentant du Nig6xia qui a pris la forme d’un appel a tous les membres du Conseil. 108. En mlexcusant de x6sumer peut-8tre de faGon un peu trap succincte la pensbe du reprgsentant du Nig&ria, je crois pouvoir dire que son intervention comprend, m’a-t-i1 sembl6, trois points essentiels sur lesquels pourrait peut-&re se faire l’accoxd de tous : acceptation du principe d’une enqu&e, organisation et mise en vigueur de l’enqu&e avec llaccord de toutes les parties int&es&es et avec l’aide du Secr&aire g6nBra1, nbcessit.6 d’un consensus pour s’assurer qulune telle enquclte b&$ficiera du maximum d’appui et de coop6sation. 109. C lest dans cet esprit que ma d616gation examinera les projets de r6solution qui seraient soumis au Conseil et notamment celui qui vient d%tre ditpos6 et comment6 par le reprgsentant de la Nouvelle- ZBlande. Mais je tiens & redixe que c’est bien B une formule susceptible de faire l’accord de tous - comme celle, proposBe pax le representant du Nigeria - qu’iront les pr6f6xences de ma ditlhgation. 110. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de I’anglais): Je donne maintenant la parole au representant du Y6men. 111. M. ALAINI (YBmen) [traduit de l’anglais]: A la 1297Bme &ance, j’ai attire llattention au Conseil sur de nouveaux actes de provocation et d’agression commis par les Anglais centre mon pays. Je puis donner a present davantage de d&ails sur les incidents en question. 112. Le 3 aoat, le Gouverneur britannique d’Aden, aocompagni! du Chdrif de Beihan, s’est rendu au poste britannique de Sana oh ils ont tous deux conf6r6 avec les autorit6s britanniques de la r6gion. A la suite de cet entretien, des unit&s anti-abriennes britanniques ont &tb transport&es & oe poste et cantonn6es le long de la ligne de dgmarcation sit&e entre la Fthpublique arabe du YBmen et le Y&men du Sud occup6. Dans la soirge, comme je llai dit pr&%demment, les forces britanniques postbes sur le mont Jabal Assalamah ont ouvert le feu pendant une heure entibre sur la ville de Qatabah, dans la Rhpublique arabe du Ybmen, et sur les postes environnants. 113. Dloxdre de mon gouvernement, je dois maintenant attirer l’attention du Conseil de s6curit6 sur certains faits, 114. Le 8 aoat, c’est-&-dire avant-hier, B 9 h 35 et a 10 h 30, heure locale, un appareil 5 r&action 116. On the same day, at 1557 hours local time, a British military jet airplane flew again over Taeiz. 117. Since 1934, when all the major cities of Yemen were subjected to British bombardment, this is the first time the British have sent their military airplanes to fly over the capital of Yemen. The Yemen is exposed today to premeditated criminal aggression. The Security Council must face its responsibility, and those who talk about peace and security must realize from where peace and security are being endangered. They must not shirk their onerous task. 118. It is clear by now that Britain is out to achieve its colonial objectives through intimidation, through continuous acts of provocation, and through the use of naked force. The Security Council must not allOW this to go unchecked; nor should the Security Council allow itself to be used as a smokescreen in this wicked scheme. 119. It must by now be clear to the Council that the United Kingdom complaint, of which the Council is seized, is but a part of a bigger plan: for, on the same day, while the Council was meeting and the representative of the United Kingdom was complaining, British guns were being aimed and fired at Yemeni cities and citizens, and British war planes were roaring over the capital of Yemen. 120. I hope the members of the Council realize the grave situation which the British are leading us to and the great danger which is threatening my country.

I call on the representative of the United Kingdom in exercise of his right of reply.

The Council has just heard a further allegation from the representative of Yemen, It is not clear to me whether he was complaining about the siting of anti-aircraft defence. It would perhaps not be surprising in the circumstances that there should be some anti-aircraft emplacement in the neighbourhood of the incident about which I have complained to the Council, 123. This is the first notice that I have had of a complaint of an overflight. I shall ask for an immediate investigation, and I can assure the Council that, as iS alWajrS our cu$toin ,on receipt of such a complaint, it will be carefully investigated. I am confident of the result of that investigation: that this complaint will be shown to be* without foundation, 116. Le meme jour, 9 15 h 57, heure locale, un appareil 51 &action de l’arm$e britannique a de nouveau survol$ Taiz. 117. Depuis 1934, an&e oh toutes les villes principales du Y&men ont && bombard&es par l’aviation britannique, crest la premiere fois que les Anglais ont envoyi! leurs appareils militaires survoler la capitale du Y&men. Le Y&men est soumis aujourd’hui B une aggression criminelle pr5m&dit&e. Le Conseil de s8curit8. doit faire face B ses responsabilitgs et les defenseurs de la paix et de la s$curith doivent voir d’oh vient la menace qui met en danger la paix et la sbcurit$. 11s ne doivent pas se soustraire Xt leur lourde t&he. 118, 11 est maintenant bvident que le Royaume-Uni a d&id6 de parvenir a ses fins colonialistes par l’intimidation, par des a&es r$it&& de provocation et par le recours pur et simple &la force, Le Conseil de &curit$ ne doit pas laisser impunis ces agissements et il ne doit pas non plus se laisser utiliser comme un &ran destini: a masquer des machinations coupables. 119. Le Conseil doit maintenant se rendre parfaitement compte que la plainte britannique dont il est saisi n’est qu’un $lgment d’un plan de plus vaste envergure; en effet, le jour mQme oh il se reunissait et oh le reprgsentant du Royaume-Uni pr&entait sa plainte, les canons britanniques tiraient sur les villes et les citoyens y&m&ites et des avions militaires britanniques vrombissaient au-dessus de la capitale du YBmen, 120. J’espbre que les membres du Conseil sont conscients de la -graviti! de la situation vers laquelle nous acheminent les Britanniques et du grand danger qui menace mon pays, 121. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l’anglais): Je donne la parole au reprgsentant du Royaume-Uni, dans l’exercice de son droit de r$ponse. 122. Sir Roger JACKLING (Royaume-Uni) [traduit qe l’anglais]: Le Conseil vient d’entendre une MUvelle allGgation du reprgsentant du Y6men. J’ai cru comprendre que la plainte du Yemen avait trait & l’emplacement des batteries de d6fense anti-a&ienne. Or, btant don& les circonstances, il n’est gui?re surprenant de voir installer un systBme de dgfense antiaerienne au voisinage de Ilendroit oh s’est produit ltincident au sujet duquel jlai port& plainte devant le Conseil, 123. C’est la premiere fois que j’entends parlerd’un survol du territoire ybmirnite. Je vais immediatement demander que l’on pro&de a une enqubte et je puis assurer le Conseil que nous gtudierons cette plainte avec le plus grand soin, comme nous le faisons toujours en pareil cas. L’enquete prouvera d’ailleurs, j’en suis sQr, que la plainte est d&n&e de tout fondement. 125. In any event, however, I shall, as I have said, request an immediate investigation of this complaint, and the result of that investigation will be made known in accordance with our custom.

The Security Council has heard the appeal made by the representative of Nigeria that sufficient time should be granted for further consultations in order that a formula may be sought which would have the support of all the parties concerned. 127. Since no objection has been raised to that appeal, I would suggest that, if no one else wishes to speak now, this meeting should be adjourned in order to permit the consultations to take place. As soon as possible thereafter, I propose to get in touch with members of the Council in order to fix a date for the next meeting. The meeting rose at 5.05 p.m. 125. Quoi quril en soit, je demanderai, je le rhpbte, que cetta plainte fasse l’objet dlune enqu&e immbdiate dont le r&sultat sera, comme d’habitude, communiquG au Conseil. 126. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l’anglais): Le Conseil de securiti: a entendu l’appel du reprgsentant du Nig$ria demandant le temps de proceder & de nouvelles consultations qui permettraient de rechercher une formule susceptible de recueillir l’appui de tout@s les parties in&-es&es. 127. En l’absence de toute objection B cette suggestion, si personne ne d&ire prendre maintenant la parole, je propose d’ajourner la sbance afin de permettre ces consultations. D&s qu’elles seront terminces, je me mettrai en relation avec les membres du Conseil pour fixer la date de la prochaine sgance. La s&nce est lev6e d I? h 5. HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva, COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES Les publications des Nations Unies sont en vente dans les librairies et les agences dbpositaires du mondo entier. Informer-vous aupr&s de votre librairie ou adressez-vous b: Nations Unies, Section des ventes, New York ou Get&e. COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas estan en venta en librerias y casas distribuidoras en todas partes del mundo. Consulte a su librero o dirijase a: Naciones Unidas, Section de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra. Litho in U.N. Price: $U.S. 0.50 (or equivalent in other currencies) 20309-January 196340~