S/PV.13 Security Council

1 would like to suggest ta theCouncil that this might be an appropriate moment to adjourn the proceedings. If there is no objection, ! will take it that it is thewish of the Counci! that we shall now.adjourn. That is adopted. The next meeting of the Council, 1 would suggest, ~ght be on Saturday afternoon at 5 p.m. Is that approved by members of the Council? Adopted. The Council stands :\djourned. The meeting rose at 7.25 p.nt. 1 THIRTEENTH MEETING Held at Church Bouse, Westminstp.r, London, on Saturday, 9 February 1946, at 5 p.m. President: Mr. N. J. O. MAKIN (Australia). Present: The representatives of the following countries: .Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt, France, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of·America. 54. Provisional agenda 1. Adoption of the agenda. . 2. Letter from the Head of the Ukrainian SSR delegation to. the Presîdent of the Security Council dated21 January 1946.1 3. Letter from the Head of the YugoSlav delegation to the Executive Secretary (undated).2 4. Letter from the He'ads of the Lebanese and Syrian delegations to the Secr~taryGeneral dated 4 February 1946 (document 8/5).8 ,5. Report by the Chairman of the Committee of Experts on the alterations made by the Committee in the proyisional rules of procedure of theSecurity Council (document ~/h\ 4 -{ - J' 55. Adoption of· the agenda 1 Ibid., Annex 5. . • Ibid., Ar.uex 9. •Ibid., Supplement No. 2, Annex1. Mr. MANUILS:SY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist . RepubIic) (translated trom French): Three facts are beyond dispute on the question of Indo- nesia. ln the mtplace, conflicts have been going on for. six months between the British troops and the Indonesians in Java. These are military con- flicts in which use has been'made of tanks, guns, aeroplanes, in brief, alI types of modern weapons. This fact is not disputed by anyone. .accepter l'interprétation ln the second place, during these ttüIitary coriflids, Iapanese troops have beenllsed in the strugg!e against the Indonesians. Finally, none of the numerous facts which 1 have mentioned during the discussions has been ·contested either by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom nor by .the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Nether- . lands. They have given another interpretation to these facts, but they have. not denied them. 1 cannot. regard the ironical remark' of Mr. Bevin thatall theinforination brought for.vard . is derived from a British source, the English newspapers-as a·contradiction of these. facts. One may. have different opinions on the press of this country or that one, but it is clear that thè press reproduces the known facts of the world: Moreover~ kIlowing my responsibility, J have verified'the facts bycomparing the English :reports withthose of the press of other counmes. In order toclarify our discussion, 1 would Iike to draw the attention ~f the Security Council to the points on which my delegation is notin agreement with .the· delegations of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. ln the fust place, my delegation is;,unable to accept the interpretation put forward by the delegation of the United Kingdom regarding the .task entrusted by the AlIied Command to the British troops in Indonesia. This task con- . sîsted'in receiving the surrender of the Japanese troops and in disarming them. Has this funda- mental andcmef taskbeen carried out? My an- swer Ïs: No, it liaS not been carried out. Not ouly have the Japanese. troops. not been dis- armed, but they have been used in the struggle againstthe Indonesians. Consequently, the agree- !Dent between the AlIied Great Powers regarding the Far East has been violated. . The argument has aIso been advanced often during the discussion that there was a treaty be- tween the British Government and its Ally, the Netherlands, providing formilitary he1p in Indo- nesia. We respect this treaty, but we wish to . know of what this military aid consisted. The sole object of this military aid was toexpel the Japanese from the territories belonging tn the Dutch. That is how we regard the obligation arising from the treaty. But did the obligation undertaken by the British Government in re- gard to the Netherlands altn imply that it should use arms to prevent the Indonesian population from asserting and defending its elementary rights? If so, 1 think that the second part of the undertaking would be contrary to the Charter. Permit me to quote Article 103 of the Ch~er: "In the event of a conflict between the obliga- tions of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under anyother international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall pre- vail." Consequently, we think that any other obligation than that of fighting the Japanese was outside the framework of the Charter and was not binding. The British delegation aIsoexplains the mili- tary action Ll1 Indonesia as having been L'!lposed by the necessity of self-defence; this is the second poirit of difference between the Britishdelega- tion and the Ukrainian delegation. We are told that the British troops were attacked and had to defend ·themselves. Here, 1 wish to make a slight observation. The United Kingdom's Secre- tary of Statefor Foreign Affairs, Mr. Bevin, re- proached mewith not having mentioned· the amount of the British losses. 1 am very glad to Nevertheless, justice obliges me to say aIso that the war which has now broken out in Indo- nesia is of a very peculiar character. It is a trifle . one-sided. On the one hand, we have an army equipped with modem arms; on the other, we have small detachments or a badly armed popu- lation. It goes without saying that the losse~ of the latter are bound to be much greater than those of we British army. Here, allow me to quote---:-pcrhaps for the last timc so as not to annQY Ml'. Bevin-the Daily Herald, with which 1 -am well acquainted. The Daüy Herald has great respect forMr. Bevin, and 1 think that Ml'. Bevin has great respect forthat newspaper. It wrote on 22 November: "At Soerabaya, the battIe continued with bows and aITows." This shows quite well that the war had not the same character for both sides. When Mr. Bevin spoke of the Bri~h troops being obliged to defend themselves, he put the question to me direcdy as ta what the Ukrainian Government would have done inthis situation? ~ will answer this-question immediately in a very serious manner. But 1 should aIso remind you that Mr. van KIeffens aimed a shaft at me .which he apparendy thought WM going to \\round medeeply. He asked me what our troop~ would have don~, ü they bad found themselves in the same situation in a Danish town? 1 will ward off dûsshaft immediately with a brief statement:· The soldiers of my country will· not defend the interests of Shell Oil; they will defend theinterests. of the country. My answer to Mr.Bevinwill be.a very suhstantial and serious one;· bis. question .~ .quite legitimate. 1 think (and l am convinced) that the Govern- mentthatwas to restoreorder in. Indonesia should,. in the firstplace, have sought by aU means to a'Void bloodshed. W.asitpossible to avoid bloodshed? Yes, 1 assert that it. was.Mter the capitulation (1 did not want to bruach this question,. but ithas been raisedandI must answer it) afterthet::apitula~. tipn of the Japançse troops.in Indonesia, .there Was neither British nor Dutçh ~uthorityin the éountry.•.A <numbel' of .ètmtral. and localorgans of authoritywere immediately cre~ted. Tarn certain that ifit hàd been deciredthat bloodmed $heiuldbe avoided, one. h~donlyto apply-te> "We used. to administer these territories; when I say 'we', I mean the Indonesians and the Dutch together, before the war. We did not need troops, armies, to keep order there. We had for that' purpose our police . . • . in this country, which, when youproject it on a map of Europe, stretches from the west of Ire1and as far as well into the Caucasus, the nümber of police în allwas 1,100 Europeans - and sorne ,28,000 Indonesians."1 That the population, which had no tanks, and whose police force comprised ooly 28,000 Indonesians, was able.to hold a territory as large as an area stretching from the west of Ire1aild far ioto the Caucasus is the mast striking proof. That is the tribute which Mr. van Kleffens has paid to the population. And the reply given to this population was: No, we do not need you; authority isin the hands of the Japanese. You asked me à question, Mr. Secretary of ~tate for Foreign Affaire of the United Kingdom. My Government would never have done a ..~ ,ug like that. The third pointaf difference·between us con- cerns our assessment of the national movement which has sprung up in Indonesia. 1 did not want to broach this question, but since it has been raised 'in spite of and against me, 1.must revert to it. It is certain that the Japanese fascist authorities used many young people, certain ele- ments and certain groups .to 'strengthen their action in Indonesia, ~d 1 can affirm that the Japanese llave·leftbehind themagents who are still in Indonesia. -. The .Ukrainian delegation will never agree tothe support of these elementS, neighbout'S~ nay even on a broader scale, in the hope of conquering other peoples. Do the Indo- nesian people really threaten anybody in the Far East? No. AIl they seek is ta be master in their own house. 1 do not wish to cite many examples to you. 1 could doso, but 1Jear 1 should prolong our discussion. In many cases, movements of this kind have been wrongly inte.rpreted, ei@er by ill-informed men or by men who were opposed ta them. In order not to make a mistake, we should listen to the voice of these peoples. Finally, the fourth point of difference between us concerns the special commission to be sent out to Indonesia. This commission, backed up with the authôrity of the United Nations, would be able to establish real peace and put an end to the abnormal situation existing there. The creation of this commission'is rendered necessary if .only by the contradictory nature of the in- formation at our disposal:. on the one hand, the information· given by the Netherlands repre- sentative, Mr. van KIeffens, and, on the other, the information given by Mr. Bevin. It is desir- able that the Council should have its own infor- mation on the situation in Indonesia. .The Ukrainian delegation. does not .wBsh to hear any more reproaches based bn· English sources ofinformation and English newspapers. We pre"' ferto have international sources. . The creation ofthis commission is also called for by public opinion, which is concerned about .the problem. Telegrams are comîng in from all quarters.We are asked to put an end tQ this situation.Mr. Bevin told us that the British G.ovemment had sent one ofits best diplomats, .sir Archibâld Clark Kerr.. We.know Sir Archi- batdClark Kerr, but however great bis qualitiça FinaIly, 1 should like to reply to a question. Mr. Bevin said that he did not know what to reply . because he did not know what the Ukrainian delegation wanted. After reading the newspapers yesterday, 1 am convinced that everybody realizes what the Ukrainian delega- tion wants. 1 am sure that Mr. Bevin aIso knows what we want. But since this question has been raised, 1 am quite willing to state exactly what oUl position is. . (1) The Ukrainian delegation, which rep- resents a Member of the United Nations, considers that the use of British troops in com- . bating the national movement in Indonesia is neither just nor proper. (2) The Ukrainian delegation l'egar.ds as inadmissible any use of Japanesetroops against the Indonesian people,' 'who are defending their elementary national rights. (3) The Ukrainian delegation insists that the principles and Iights established by our Charter should be applied te the people of Indonesia, particularly the principle recegniz- ing the tight of every people to determine its own fate and to choose its own fOrIn of government. . (4) The Ukrainian delegation requests . that a special commission be created. 1 ask you, Mr. Bevin, to accept this proposaI. 57. Supplementary statement of the United Kingdom representative Mr.BEVIN: (Uilited Kingdom): 1 do not want to keep the Securlty Council very long, because th.e speech we have listened to really goes over the statements that were made at our twelfth meeting. . There is a very great point ofprinciple raised on which we must come to a conclusion. In aIl the statements we have heard. today and at the previous meeting, the sovereignty of the Nether- lands was not questioned. So, if you look at paragraph 7 of Article 2 of the Charter, it says: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations ta inter- venein .matters which are essentially within thedomestic jurisdiction of any State orshaIl 1 am not going to he singled out in an internal matter to accept invitations which 1 do not think any other Government would accept. Incidentally) at the Couneil of Ministers of Foreign MaiTs 1 suggested an enquiry into the troubles in Roumania and BuIgaria. The Soviet Government said that they were sovereign Powers and it was declined. 1 did not question it, although we did not have this Constitution before us then. 1 thought that was quite a legitim~te answer last September. Why shouId Great Britain andt.,.e Nether- lands be selected for an experiment which does not comply with the Charter? It may be that some other government will have some internal troubles somewhere. When internal troubles arisè, are we always going to be sending com- missions to investigate and deal with the proh- lems arising within a sovereign Power? 1 cannot agree to it as a question of principle. On the question of merits, nobody is denying, as far as 1 understand, the Netherlands policy; nobody is denying the Indonesians the right to have their former government. No one is deny- ing the rights of the Indonesian people. 1 must here point out that it is not the whole of the Netherlands East Indies that is concerned; it is really only one part. The islands east of Java have been handea ove!' to the Netherlands Gov- ernment, and there, as in Bomeo and 'Sumatra, everything is perfectIy quiet. The main trouble occurred in and around Java. Therefore, nobody is denying it. What we s~d on the first day we arrived is: "Come and negotiate. Do not have any fighting, have a truce. Join ",ith us and get this tliing cleared up." But it was not bows and arrows we fought with and it was not the small number of casualties that was referred to; it was 1,479 all told. The bèst advice· you can give the Indonesians is: There is Dr. van Mook, who is the respon- sible representative of the Netherlands, ready and waiting with proposaIs which, if 1 under- stand constitutiôns and rights at all, go as far as anything 1 have seen, certainly, 1 think, as far as any rights that the Ukrainian Government has within the·Soviet Union. Heis ready to ne- gotiate, and the < faet that our troops are there trying to clear up the situation should cause· no trouble. We have sentarepresentative not to con- duct the negotiations but to assist,. because it is "the Netherlands that has to conduct the nego- Assuming that it was any other country in the world and this difficulty arose and Great Britain brought this case here, you would tell us that it is not our business, hecause not one ward has been said in the whole of this discussion ta the effect that' we are endangering international peace. There is no argument advanced. There is not even a request that wc should withdraw. Indeed, no one would he more terrified than the local inhahitants in Java if we did withdraw. With regard ta the statements in newspapers and all the l'est of it, if 1 do not take them tao seriously it is because 1 am used ta reading' the papers every day. As a matter of fact, life would he very dull if 1 did not. A newspaper bas two things to do-three things.. One is ta amr'>e, an- other is ta entertain, and the l'est ta mislead. Anyway, 1 did not say it ta l'aise a laugh, it is tao serious a matter, hut 1 was not impressed by newspaper cuttings. Ml'. Stassen has been quoted. 1 am sure the United States delegation will forgive me when 1 say that if there is .one country in the world that does give prolific advice it is the United States. They have a perfect right ta make these suggestions and 1 do not mind at aIl; But, you see, in this case it is a reflection on this country. If this was done it would assume that all that the representative of the Ukrainian SSR had said was true, and it is not. Then he ends up and says, "1 have made aIl these statements. 1 have collected them from aU the newspapers. 1 have l'ead lots of telegrams. Sorne are from British and sorne are from other sources. Now send out a commission ta find out whether aU the things l have been reading are true". You know thatthat reaUy cannat be taken seriously. That is not the way ta deal with a matter of this character. The question of what is done in Indonesia is a matter for the Dutch Government of its own volition. 1 do thiD.k,' as 1 read the Charter, that we are not entitled to interfere, or we as a Se- ,c?fity Council would be landed in every possible kind of circumstances of that kind. ' . My last ward is this, just ta correct a wrong Impression. The Ukrainian l'epresentative re- We \Vant ta go on and spread that aIl over the island, so that there may be order and to get the public utilities and èverything else going. That is what is actuaIly happening at the pres- ent moment. The South-East Asia Command, as it is called, includes the whole of the Nether- lands East Indies, and aIl the islands east of Java which have been occupied have been aIl handed ove~'to the Dutch authorities without any trouble at all. The situation in.Sumatra and Bomeo is aIl quiet. Really, this trouble is centred around Java. Therefore, 1 think myself that the Council might do well to welcome the negotiations that are about to' begin, let the sovereign authority carry them on, and encourage everybody to solve the thing. That ïs. all 1 need ta say about the thing. But 1 am not willing, unless it is written into' the Charterdefinitely, to admitthat this Councilh~ theright to interfere in internal af- fairs; .1 am not willing ta establish that prece- dent, because of its .repercussions over a' very wide field. . Ml'. VAJ.'f KLEFFENS (Netherlands): 1 shaIl be very brief Hyou will aIlow me to make a few remarks. My.predecessor, Mt. Bevin, reminded the Councilof the fact that, according to the Char- ter, theinternal 'matters of anygi~en State are not for the United Nations todeal with. l think that •is. quite ·right.. The question.tbat. i$before .theCouncil-and 1 would repeat it, if.1.may, .'becauses0tnetimesthere is perhapsalittle'tend- ency .to lose sight qf it-is themilitary action With regard to what Mr. Manuilsky said this afternoon, 1 do not really think he has strength- ened bis case by what he said. Does he really know the facts sufficiently well? He spoke about one-sided war as if the.re were armed forces of Britain, armed in the full sense required by modern warfare, and on the other side merely badly trained and ill-equipped and poorly dis- ciplined native bands. The truth is that there are tens of thousands of very well' equipped In- donesians who operate in military formations. 1 cannot give you the exact number, because so far there are parts of Java-and Mr. Bevin was quite right when he said that it is Java which is the centre of all this trouble--which we have not yet· been able to penetrate. The best information 1 have is that the total number of these well-equipped forces is about 80,000. In addition, there are bands who may be armed with pikes and 1 do not know what, who aIso take part in skinnishes, etc. It is not against those people with pikes that British regular forces have been used. The forces on the Indo- nesians side are well-equipped, as even the RAF knows only toowell; they have anti-aircraft guns and have brought down more than one -British plane. That is one fact which 1 want Mr. Manuilsky to know a little better than he apparently did before. Mr. Manuilsky showed a rather considerable lack -of appreciation 'of the number of prisoners of war. to be rescued. They, too, were to be counted by·the thousand. 1· cannot say for sure, but in fact 1 very much doubt whether they have . all been rescued. . ~ There was some mention of lutte contre les Indonésiens--those were the words used-the struggle against the Indonesians. This is not a fair way of presenting the nature of whatever ~as taken place in Java. Surely there is no ques- tion of any struggle against the Indonesians- the Indonesians. There is only theneed of sub- ?uing-armed bands who try te prevent the carry- mg out of the task of the British forces, which is mO~'e than to disarm the Japanese and accept ~eIr surrender..At any rate, there is no distinc- ti?U dra~ in the.task allotted to tht:m by hig~er militaryauthority betweenroat part of ~heIr task and theotherpart of the task--which 1 think that all Mr. Manuilsky has done in this respect is ta show that he does not have that complete command of the facts which, in my opinion, would alone justify a matter being brought before this Couneil. If the Ukrainian Government wished ta be informed about iliese things, 1 should be only tao happy, through diplomatie channels or any other way it might select, ta supply it with those facts. And 1 am sure the British Government would be quite happy ta furnish it with such information in case it really shows this profound concern in matters out there in the Far East. But to bring such a thing before the Council without some adequate knowledge of the facts-sure1y, the Cauncil does not meet for that. And. l think that Mr. MâIluiIsky was on very dangerous ground when, at one mpm~t, he seemed ta insinuate that British troops were in Java ta defend the interests of the Shell On Company.. Really, can it he supposed that a Government headed by Mr. Attlee, and in whichMr. Bevin is the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a Labour Government, would send an armed force, an expeditionary force to Java to defend the interests of Shell Oil? 1 think that' thatis the sort of argument which turns itself complete1y against the person using it. 1 think that all this only tends ta show that there is something a little hollow in this charge, and 1 can onlY repeat again what 1 said the otherday. Looking at the Charter, looking at the relevant provisions of.that document which must guide our deliberations here, there is no case, and no case has been established. .That is aIl 1 have to say. 1 do not think this Couricil· wants to incur responsibilities in regard to the talks that are now about to begin there about internai matters. So 1 need not go into that point: 1 am quite happy to leave things alone with these few remarks. =

1 understand that members have an important engagement for this evening,and that this might be regarded asa suitable.time for the' adjournment of our pro,: , ceecijngs. If that is the wish of the Council, 1 " shall. tale it,' if there is no objection,as being adopted. FOURTÈENTH MEETING Held at Church Bouse, Westminster, London, on Sunday, 10 February 1946, at 11 a.m. President: Mr. N. J. O. MAKIN (Austl·alia). .bliques Present: The representatives of the following countries: Australia" Brazil, China, Egypt, France, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. 58. Provisional agenda . 2. 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. Letterfrom the Head of the Ukrainian SSR delegation to the President of the Security Council dated 21 January 1946.1 3. Letter from the head. of the Yugoslav dele- gation ta the Executive Secretary (undated) .la 4. Letter from the Heads of the Lebane..~ and Syrian delegations to the Secretary General dated 4 February 1946 (document S/5).8 5. Report by the Chairman of the Committee of Experts on the alterations made by the Committee in the provisional rules of proce- dure of thG Security Council (document S/6).4- - 59. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. 60. Continuation of discussion of the let- ter from the Head of the Ukrainian 5SR..delegation 1

Item 2 deals with the letter from the Hèad of the Ukrainian SSR delegation to the President of the Security Council, dated 21 January 1946. 1 calI upon Mr. Manui1sky, representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, to take a seat at the Council table. ----~,.. ~. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated trom Russian) : NO:E: The following is a translation of a Rus- sza.n text of Mr. TTyshinsky's statement sup,: plzed hy the representative of the Soviet Union after the meeting. . .. The Ukrainian delegation has presented for cialistes NOTE: Y. 1See .official Records of the Security Council, First ear, Fust Series, Supplement No. 1; Annex 4. PreID1ère Annexe 2 Ibid., Annex 5· • Ibid., Annex9' •Ibid., Supplem~nt No. 2, Annex 1.