S/PV.1316 Security Council

In accordance with the decisions taken previously, 1 shall now, with the consent of the Council, invite the representatives of Israel, the Syrian Arab Reputiic and the United Arab Republic to take their seats at the Council table in order to participate without vote in the discussion, At the invitation of the President, Mr. M. Comay (Israel), Mr. G. J. Tomeh (Syria) and Mr. M. A. EI-Kony (United Arab Republic) took places at the Council table. 2, The PRESIDENT: 1 should like to draw attention to a six-Power draft resolution on this item, which was distributed this morning as document S/7575, dated 2 November 1966. 3. The first speaker on my list is the representative of Jordan, but before giving him the floor 1 should Iike to ask the Council’s co-operation in a procedural matter. 1 would hope that a11 members of the Council who desire to speak-and this is without reference to those who desire to speak and have complied with this-would register with the Secretariat, SO that we may have one list of speakers, Iknow that the practice in the Security Council has differed throughout the years-sometimes registration is made with the 4. This does not militate against members askingfor the floor at the meeting itself; of course, when thea do ask for the floor the Chair Will recognize any member of the Council. But without making this more than a request I would hope that members of the Council and others, when they clesire to speak, would indicate their desire to the secretary, SO that we may have only one list. If there is no objection to this-we are following this practioe in the First Committee of the General Assembly and, perhaps, in others as well-we cari proceed in this manner and thus facilitate our work.

1 would like, at thevery outset, to pay a tribute to the Secretary-General, who was able to arrange to have two very important documents before this Council within a very short period of time. These are two reports bas’edon factual information presented by the UnitedNations machinery in the area, and we believe that the documents should be given adequate consideration before any draft resolution is adopted. The first report, dated 1 November [S/7572], was presented the day before yesterday and the second report, dated 2 November [S/7573], was circulated last night. 1 notice that the draft resolution [S/7575], which 1 saw this morning, makes reference to the first report but not to the second report, which came out too late to be mentioned therein.l/ 6. In the first report [S/7572], it is clear that Israel adopted, as of 1951, a policy vis-a-vis thecompetence of the Mixed Armistice Commission in relation to the demilitarized zone. This policy has resulted in the inability of the Mixed Armistice Commission to hold regular meetings since 1951. Prior to 1951, Israel did attend the meetings of the Commission, did not contest the competence of the Mixed Armistice Commission and did not present the claims which we have been hearing recently. 7. In paragraph 12 of the report it is clearly stated that: “The inability of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission to function undoubtedly weakens the efforts to maintain quiet along the line between Israel and Syria. As a result of this situation, matters which properly should first be considered in the Mixed Armistice Commission and whichoften might well be disposed of there, are brought instead directly to the attention of the Security Council”- and this is very important-tfto the attention of the Security Council where they cari be considered primarily in a political context and atmosphere.” g A revision of the draft resolution was iesued on 3 November [S/7575/Rev.l] for the purpose of adding a reference to the second report. 9. 1 have already stated at the 1310th meeting that the place for a complaint of this kind is the Mixed Armistice Commission. It does not serve any îruitful purpose to encourage Israel to bring a11 its complaints to the Security Council. The Secretary-General rightly mentioned that the Security Council would have to consider such complaints primarily in a political context and atmosphere. 1 need not emphasize this point. These questions are for the Mixed Armistice Commission; they should be considered and determined there and it is not advisable that this Council should take the place of the Mixed Armistice Commission at this stage. This is not a fact-finding body. If it was, there would have been no need to agree on having the machinery in the area. The machinery was created for a purpose, and we cannot ignore it completely and handlv every singlc incident in the Security Council. 10. We must not forget that a11 complaints are based on charges of violations of one part or another of the Mixed Armistice Commission and no part of the Mixed Armistice Commission could be properly separated from the other. The Armistice Agreement was dictated by military and not political considerations and the armistice machinery was created by the consent of both parties, in order to assume specific functions. TO bypass the machinery is to encourage more incidents, which, 1 am sure, is not the desire of the Security Council. We feel that we should say that it is the duty of the Security Council to preserve the sanctity of the Agreement, to preserve the effectiveness of the Agreement, to preserve the authority and the responsibility of the machinery specified in the Agreement. In this way, we cari creale an atmosphere of confidence; this is the way to serve the purposes of the United Nations, 11. 1 now turn to the second report [S/7573]. Here, the Secretary-General presents to us a picture of the status of the demilitarized zone. He says in paragraph 7: “Since June 1956, United Nations military observers have been prevented from carrying out investigations in the Hagovrim and Susita areas.” He says, in this connexion, that “Such restriction on the freedom of movement of United Nations military observers has prevented the investigation of recent Syrian complaints relating to Israel fortifications in the demilitarized zone.” Let me state that Israel fortifications in the area, according to paragraph 10 of the report, “go beyond what is required for the protection of civilian life”. In the same paragraph, it says that the “Chief of Staff.. . ‘requested the dismantling of the fortifications in question’ and that Israel did not comply with this request and ‘continued to extend the fortifications in this area”‘. portantes qu’Israël continué 1% Paragraph 10 of the report also refers to “some minOr Syrian works of fortification”, and it continues: par la Syrie” “Syrian authorities, when requested by the Chief of Staff to demolish these works, replied they were 13. According to the report, Israel is still refusingto dismantle these fortifications; therefore, these questions then arise: Who is encroaching upon the demilitarized zone? Who is attempting to claim sovereignty over the demilitarized zone? 1 need not dwell upon these questions, since they are answered in paragraphs 16 and 17 of the report. 14. In paragraph 16, the report tells us that: “The part of the central sector of the demilitarized zone which is on the eastern bank of the Jordan River is a narrow strip of land, generally controlled by Syria, while the western bank, generally controlled by Israel, is a large area. On the western bank, Arab villages have been demolished,ll-and 1 want to emphasize this: complete Arab villages have beendemolished-l’their inhabitants evacuated.” Arab inhabitants of Arab villages, controlled by the Israel authorities, were evacuated, and their homes demolished, razed, destroyed. The paragraph continues: “The inhabitants of the villages of Baqqara and Ghanname relurned following Security Council resolution 93 (1951) of 18 May 1951.” But their troubles did not encl there. Instead, the report states: “They were later, on 30 October 1956, forced to cross into Syria”-and spend a year, for the second Lime-“where they are still living.” 15. Thepeople of the Arab villages in the demilitarized zone-which, by the way, was occupied by Syrian forces when the Armistice Agreements were signed-were expelled from their homes, 1 do net know whether many of my colleagues are aware that the demilitarizecl zone was occupied by the Syrian army when those hgreements were signed, permitting the area to be evacuated and made into a kind of buffer zone. 16. This area, whichwas occupiedby the Syrianarmy, under Syrian authority, was later occupied by Israel, in violation of the Armistice Agreements. Its villages were destroyecl and its inhabitants were expelled and forced to live in tents and huts, a prey to hunger. If one of them crosses the border-and it is a legitimate right for one to cross a border to his own home-he is called a criminal, while those coming from Europe or other parts of the world are the ones who are here complaining, and pointing the finger of accusation at him, the rightful inhabitant of that home. And paragraph 16 continues: “Their lands on the western bank of the river, and Khoury Farm in the same area, are cultivated by Israel nationals.” 1 repeat, the inhabitants were expelled, their villages destroyed, and their land8 are now being cultivated by Israel nationals. 18. Now let us consider paragraph 17 of the same report, which reads: “With regard to the use of land in the central sector of the clemilitarized zone, the Syrian delegatien to the Mixed Armistice Commission has continu& to complain that Israelis cultivate ‘the Arab lands of Baqqara, Ghanname nnd Khoury Farm’. The Israel delegation, on the other hand, complains of Syrian cultivation and grnzing in Israel, in an area west of the zone, the Kibbutz Almagor area (MR 2085-2590). The Israel delegation bas also complained of the presence of ‘Arab hcrds and armed shepherds’ in parce1 four of block 13027, east of the area of lhe former Lake Huleh, which has been reclaimed by Israel. Arab farmers have continued to use parce1 four, which they do not own, ancl Israel farmers have continued to use landwhich they do not own in the same area. Disputes about cultivation have occasionally resulted in serious fighting incidents. ‘1 19. Thesé are the two paragraphs which refer to part of the picture, and, unless this partis made very clear, 1 think it Will be very difficult to pass judgement on just one side of the problem now before the Council. 20. The other question which my delegation feels should be put before the Council is thequestion of SOcalleci terrorists. 1 am not in faveur of terrorism anywhere, but it might be helpful to define it. Looking at the problem, we find that this very creation of Israel is the result of terrorism. 1 need not refer to the gang of Irgun or Haganah; 1 think we are a11 acquainted with the history of the creation of Israel. The very demarcation lines are also the creation of terrorism, long before the creation of the authority it1 Israel. This is another question, Terrorism does not stem from our area; it came into our area from outside. We are now facing a question of occupation, and the answer to occupation is liberation; it is as simple as that. Foreign occupation does not bestow rights; it imposes a duty on every occupied area to struggle until it has rid itself of the occupying force. Whether it be in Rhodesia, South West A.frica, Palestine, Asia, or anywhere in the world, occupation imposes a duty to struggle until the occupying foreign element is eliminated. 21. If the Security Council would look at the problem from this angle, would try to see the real reasons behind what is going on in the area and to understand the point of view of the Palestinian who has crossed the border, and comprehend the feelings of such a 22. The reports are very important, very clear; the facts are fully given, but unless we have a resolution which is balanced, which actually and sincerely takes account of the facts in the report, it Will be very difficult for the Security Council to reacha helpful solution, 23. What is wrong with having in a draft resolution a truly objective pnragraph, a balanced paragraph, inviting the Governments of Syria and Israel to strengthen their efforts to co-operate fully with the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission, whose inability to funclion, according to the report of our Secretary-General, “undoubtedly weakens the efforts to maintain quiet along the line between Israel and Syria” [S/7572, para. 121. What is wrongwith a resolution which would, first, ask Israel to co-operate with the Mixed Armistice Commission-because the report tells us why this problem exists now along the demarcation line-and, secondly, asks a11 parties to prevent a11 such attacks and incidents on the armistice demarcation line which violate the Armistice Agreement? Anything along this line would be helpful and realistic; would reflect the facts in the situation, reflect the situation as it actually is, and would be of great importance in the area.

Mr. President, in your remarks earlier this morning you referred to the draft resolution now before the members of the Council. In introducing this draft resolution 1 should like to refer briefly to the events preceding it since 1 am one of those who believe that, quite often, the present is almost incomprehensible without a knowledge of the past. 25. The work done hy members of the Council since this complaint was submitted to it by Israel is well known to a11 members of the Council. Theywill recall the two-Power draft resolution [S/7568] which was submitted at the 1310th meeting on 28 October and they are aware of the fact that there was such a Sharp reaction on the part of certain members that, in the spirit of co-operation which has always prevailed here and which, 1 nm happy to say, has been very much in evidence at a11 times since my own membership of the Council, it was decided that it would be necessary to hold informa1 consultations in order to find a compromise which would be acceptable to everyone concerned. A. few non-permanent members were, in the event, commissioned by their colleagues to try to put into writing something which would operate as a consensus and which would be acceptable to a11 members. This consensus was in fact drawn up and submitted ta the Council’s permanent members. 28. 1 shall now briefly speak of it. The rationale behind thls document was twofold. It was felt by the sponsors that it was absolutely necessary, in view of the rapidly deteriorating situation in the Middle East, for the Security Council to pronounce itself, to take a stand that Will have an impact in the Middle East and that Will improve the relationship between Israel and Syria. That was the first purpose. 29, The second purpose was that, since it always takes two to make a quarrel, and in view of the remote and immediate circumstances that preceded the incidents of which Israel complained, best results wauld be achieved not by condemning one or the other of the two parties but by appealing to both parties in the Middle East. With these two ideas inview, members Will note, in paragraph 1, after deploring the incidentsthe events which have been the subject of our debate, the loss of life, the damage to property, and SO onthat paragraph 2 “Invites the Government of Syria to strengthen its measures for preventing incidents that constitute a violation of the General Armistice Agreementt’. Now 1 should like to stress that the meaning which was intended in this paragraph was not a condemnation of any State whatsoever. The cosponsors are perfectly aware that the Government of Syria has been engaged in strengthening measures necessary for preventing incidents from occurring in this area, but it was felt by them that these measures need to be further strengthened to make absolutely certain that no incidents occur. That is a11 that the cc-sponsors are asking the Government of Syria to do. They are inviting themto continue working evenharder than ever before to make absolutely sure that no incidents which constitute a violation of the General Armistice Agreement occur in the future. 30. Earlier I stated that it was felt that it was necessary to produce a balanced document. What iS needed is peace, not condemnation, not just resolutions. Since it takes two to make a quarrel it was felt that perhaps there is something which Israel has not done which it ought to do; that injunction is embodied in paragraph 3 of the draft resolution, which ++Invites 32. After reading through the reports of the Israel- Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission and the various reports which have emanated from the area, one is struck over and over again by the lack of co-operation, sometimes by one side and at other times by the other side; my delegation’s view is that if this co-operation is not forthcoming perhaps the time has corne for a different machinery to be devised, a machinery which could command the respect and co-operation of a11 parties. This is very clearly laid out in paragraph 4. It was felt by thepromotersofthe draft resolution that if there were more co-operation fromboth sides there would be more peace in the Middle East. 33. Paragraph 5 contains a more general statement which Wrges the Governments of Syria and Israel to refrain from any action that might increase the tension in the area”. 34. The last paragraph requests the Secretary- General to report to the Security Council from time to time as he may deem appropriate. 35. 1 recommend to the members of the Security Council the adoption of this draft resolution.

My colleague, the representative of Uganda, has performed, with his usual excellence, the task entrusted to him by those of us who have presented to this Council the draft resolution contained in document S/7575/Rev.l. 37. 1 should like to do two things in my intervention: first, to subscribe fully to everything that Mr. Kironde has said, and secondly, to endeavour to make the position of Nigeria on this case clear beyond any possibility of misunderstanding. 38. When, on behalf of my country, 1 spoke in this debate on 20 October, 1 said: “The Nigeriandelegation submits, with a11 due respect, that in order to bring stable peace to the Middle East it Will be essential to tackle the Palestine problem as a whole.” [1309th meeting, para. 89.1 1 went on to saythat, in the meanwhile: ‘lit Will be essential to insist upon the implementation of a11 the provisions of the Israel-Syrian Armistice Agreement” [lu., para. 911. Ithenindicated two things that had to be done for this immediate purpose. 1 said that the fullest use must be made of the Mixed Armistice Commission, and that: “Whichever party is unreasonably standing in the way of reactivat- 39. 1 had net, at that time, had the OpportUnitY of seeing the report on the functioning of the Mixed Armistice Commission which, thanks to the importunity of mY friend, the representative of Jordan, and the prompt CO-Operation of our SeCretary-General, we how have before us in document S/7572. of I may say SO, with a sense of appropriate humility, that document confirms the importance that 1, in my statement, attached to the proper functioning of the Commission. 40. The representative of Jordan has already quoted the pertinent pasagraph of that document, of which this Council simply must take adequate notice. With your permission, 1 shah quote paragraph 12 again, It reads as follows: “The inability of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission to function undoubtedly weakens the efforts to maintain quiet along the line between Israel and Syria. As a result of this situation, matters which properly should first be considered in the Mixed Armistice Commission and which often might well be disposed of there, are brought instead directly to the attention of the Security Council where they oan be considered primarily in a political context and atmosphere. The Mixed Armistice Commission, of course, is the machinery,created by the parties and for whose operation they alone are responsible. It is the product of their solemn undertaking in the General Armistice Agreement. Its effectiveness depends upon the willingness of the two parties to abide by the General Armistice Agreement and to participate fully in and co-operate withit.“[S/7572.] 41. In view of this document, which we received since my last statement, there is no doubt which party ought to do something about enabling the Armistice Commission to operate. 42. The second immediate requirement of any transitiOna1 peace that I indicated in my earlier statement was contained in the following passage of that Statement, which 1 apologize for quoting: “Similarly, the Nigerian delegation appeals to the Government of Syria to co-operate in the reactivation of the Mixed Armistice Commission, and to do a11 in its powsr ta prevent unofficial organizations from committing acts that would constitute a breachofthe Armistice Agreement. From what we have already said in the earlier part of this statement, the representative of Syria cari be in no doUbt that Nigeria appreciates the difficult situation in which the Government of Syria is placed in in respect of Arab refugees suffering from a sense of grievance that their case is not being actively, expeditiously and fairly pursued in the TJnited Nations. That difficulty’ in our view, would be minimized by the Proposa1 we have already put forward for a reactivation of the Security Council’s own efforts in search of a final 43. TO their credit 1 wish to say that they then proceeded t;o amend their draft as far as they thought able to meet the points that we had put forward. But they were left in no doubt that ehere were still one or two points in that old draft to which we could not possibly subscribe. 44. The adjournment to seek a consensus was promoted by African members and was supported by a number of other delegations and, in the spirit in which this Council works, an adjournment was conceded and we went into consultations. The Nigerian delegation played its mode& part in the course of those consultations. At no point in those consultations did we hesitate to let both parties to the dispute know how our mind was working. Our mind does notnecessarily function correctly a11 the time, because the Nigerian delegation is composed of fallible human beings. But at every stage of the game we let it be known how our mind was working, and when we were included in the small sub-committee of non-permanent Powers that was to try and present a draft statement likely, in our view, to command unanimous agreement, again we made our modest contribution. 45. That statement has been referred to by my colleague and is the foundation upon which is based the clraft resolution now before the Council. 11; did not prove possible to secure unanimous agreement to that document, even among the non-permanent Powers. It praved impossible also to secure unanimous endorsement of it, or of any other substitute document, by the great Powers. It was felt at that time that something else had to be done, As we saw it-and, again, we might be wrong-the alternatives were to continue the search for a consensus, or to let the authors of the original draft resolution continue with the pursuit of their resolution, or, thirdly, to promote a draft to which a great many of the members of the Council might be able to give their support. 46. If anybody had been able to claim that the further pursuit of a consensus would yield something useful, in the light of what we were toldwas the deteriorating situation in the Middle East, nothing would have 47. 1 am referring to operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution [S/7568] co-sponsorecl by the United Kingdom and the United States. That paragraph originated from the Nigerian delegation. It was put forward by the Nigerian delegation in the hope that it was going to contribute in fact to the solution of the Middle East situation. Then, from discussions which took place iater, it became clear to the Nigerian delegation, as well as to other delegations, that it was going to do nothing of the kind. 1 do not propose to go into the reasons why other delegations, or the parties to the dispute, or one of them, felt that this would not be a useful contribution; I merely make the point that this indicates how-even if you are well meaning-you could be wrong and you could cause injury. Therefore, I apologize to the authors of the original draft for having asked them to include that clause in their draft resolution, and 1 am glad to see that it does not appear in the text which we are now putting before the Council. 48, If the new text of our draft resolution [S/‘7575/ Rev.11 is examined, it Will be found-as 1 indicated before-that a number of clauses have beenredrafted. Operative paragraph 2, for example, to which exception continues to be taken by a number of my colleagues on this Council for whom I have great respect, represents a compromise wording which, 1 think, does justice to the merits of the case, because we are not auggesting that the Covernment of Syria has done nothing to prevent incidents. But incidents, in spite of the measures it has taken, have occurred, and we are inviting it to strengthen its measures for preventing incidents. 49. In operative paragraph 3, we have done justiceto the case against Israel and have invited it once again to “co-operate fully with the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission”. I do not propose t0 add anything to what my colleague from Uganda has 50. in this connexion, if my colleagues Will take another look at document S/7572, they Will observe that that document, in paragraph 12, concluded by stating, in regard to co-operation with the Israel- Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission: “The several appeals of the Security Council to the parties to this effect have thus far been unavailing. Serious consideration might well be given now as to whether there might be some more fruitful approach to the goal of enabling the Israel- Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission to function eff ectively . II 51. 1 should have liked to be able to include, in operative paragraph 6 of our draft resolution, something that would enable further steps to be taken pursuant to the reports in documents S/7572 and S/7573. But from the informa1 discussions that have taken place, 1 am quite sure that any attempt to do SO at this point, under this paragraph, would not receive the unanimous support of Councif members. 52. In concluding, 1 wish to reiterate the spiritwhich has imbued the participation of the Nigerian delegation and, I believe, the participation of other delegations, too, in the informa1 discussions in which we took part for the purpose of arriving at a consensus. 1 still regret that those efforts did not succeed. There is no doubt in my mind that such a consensus would be better able to achieve the objective we have in mind. But in the circumstances now facing us, 1 have no hesitation at a11 in recommending to the Council acceptance of our draft resolution. 1 also wish to appeal to the parties to this dispute to take seriously whatever emerges from these Council proceedings. 53. If the draft resolution is adopted, 1 hope that each party Will take more seriously what it contains, more seriously than one or both parties did in the past; because to corne to the Security Council with a complaint is not enough; to subscribe to the United Nations Charter is not enough. Both these acts must be fo ilowed by a willingness to give the greatest weight to decisions taken by United Nations organs andin that way contribute to the maintenance of international peace.

The representatives of Uganda and Nigeria, who spoke before me, have lucidly explained the meaning of the draft resolution [S/7575/Rev.l] sponsored by them, the representatives of Japan, New Zealand and the Netherlands andmyseIf.Nevertheless, considering the importance of the matter, my delegation wishes to express, in somewhat greater detail, its views on the measures which we believe the 55. We feel that the importance and gravity of the situation fully justify the time and effort the Council haa devoted to this matter. Although some of the statements in this debate have been charged with feeling, and not always couched in conciliatory language, we believe it has been very profitable for the Council to have been informed, in the greatest detail, of events in that part of the Middle East and of the attitudes of the Governments in the area. It is distressing to note that, seventeen years after the signing of the Armistice Agreements, there is still considerable dissension in regard to their application, It is even more distressing to note that no progress has been made in strengthening peace and stability in the region. 55. Les efforts et le temps que nous avons consacrés Z% cette affaire sont, a notre avis, parfaitement justifiés, en raison de l’importance et de la gravit8 de la situation. Les déclarations faites au cours de ces dkbats ont été passiont&es et n’ont pas toujours té- moign8 un esprit de conciliation souhaitable. Il n’en a pas moins été fort utile que le Conseil soit informé, en détail, de ce qui se passe dans cette rkgion du Moyen-Orient, de ladite region. Il est deplorable d’avoir a constater que, 17 ans apr&s la signature des conventions d’armistice, on discute encore de leur application plus regrettable encore qu’aucune nouvelle mesure n’ait pu être prise en vue de consolider la paix et la stabilitB de la région. 56, Opportunities for the Council to become acquainted with the situation have not beenlackingin the past and we had a very constructive debate last July. The present case, perhaps even more than previous cases, has served to bring out the potential danger of every incident and to show how even a minor incident cari spark off a conflagration. de se renseigner sur la situation et, en juillet dernier, nous avons eu a cet Egard un dBbat fort utile, Mais le cas prksent, plus encore peut-être que les Pr&- cédents, a mis en évidence le oaract&re explosif que revêt chaque nouvel incident, et a fait apparaftre qu’un incident même mineur peut faire jaillir l%tincelle qui risque d’allumer une conflagration 57. As 1 remarked when speaking on this question at the 1308th meeting, my delegation believes that the Council must be as fully informed of developments as possible, and it is confident that the final solution will be found, by those very Governments which are parties in the dispute, to lie in adopting conciliatory attitudes and in reaffirming to the United Nations that they desire and intend to discharge a11 their international obligations. nous l’avons dit au cours de la 1308éme s&ance, renseignements les plus complets sur les faits et fournie par les gouvernements eux-mêmes qui sont parties conciliantes et réaffirment, des Nations Unies, leur intention et leur désir de national. portantes m&me. En revanche, les gestes de conciliation n’ont pas &é aussi nets ni aussi dhfinitifs objective, ainsi que nous l’avons déclar8 au cours de présent8 par les d&égations des Etats-Unis et du Royaume-Uni [S/r1568] ne nous semble pas apporter sur des considérants dont le Conseil n’a pas reçu rejetés, au cours de ce débat, par l’une des parties en cause. 58. The Secretary-General’s reports, and the statements made round this table, have given the Council a great deal of very important information. On the other hand, conciliatory attitudes have still not been as much in evidence, as my delegation would have wished. We have taken a scrupulously objective poSition since the beginning of this debate, as we made clear in our opening statement. The draft resolution sponsored by the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom [S/7568] did not appear to US t0 meet the needs of the present situation since, despite its moderate tone, it was based on premises which have not been proved in this Council and which were formally rejected during the debate by one of the parties. 59, Por that reason, and because of the difficulties ancountered by the Security Council in achieving Unanimity-despite the many and resolute attempts to do so-we, and five other non-permanent members of the Council, have decided to submit a joint draft resolution which we hope expresses views acceptable to a majority of delegations. This text has been ~eticulously drafted to take aocount of the VariOUS 59. C’est pourquoi, et en raison des difficultés que le Conseil de sécurit8 a rencontrées, malgré des efforts multiples tr8s &rieux accord géngral, nous nous sommes efforc&, cinq autres membres non permanents du Conseil, de trouver une formule qui, en raison du sentiment qui l’inspire, majorité des d818gations. Le projet de r&olution, 60. We have heard cogent explanations of the circumstances which oould have led to these subversive acts, but the rules of international coexistence, to say nothing of the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter, are such that no Government cari justify incidents such as these which injure another country. 61. The draft resolution also invites and urges the Governments concerned to give consideration to a series of measures aimed at maintenance of peace in the area, including the need for them to facilitate the work of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in fulfilling its delicate functions. The Secretary-General’s report [S/7572] on the inability of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission to act in the present situation confirms the need for this appeal, as does his report [S/7573] on the current situation in the demilitarized zone, 62. We believe that the ideas in the draft resolution are the least that the Security Council canput forward in the face of the incidents under discussion. Our endeavours to define a position commanding the greatest support obliged us to omit certain other potentially useful points, some of which were set forth in draft resolution S/7568, while others were raised during the debate or in the consultations held over the past few days. But our aim, our reason for sponsoring this draft resolution, is to prevent the paralysis of the Council which could result from a serious divergence of opinion, and instead to offer practical, positive solutions for a crisis which we regard as serious, not SO much because of the facts before us but because of the potential danger which is SO readily apparent.

Already, more than three weeks have passed since the Secur‘ity Council received the letter dated 10 October 1966 [S/7536] of the representative of Israel, which gave rise to our debate. Since that day, the situationinthat area has, if anything, worsened. The acts of terrorism on Israel’s soi1 have continued. Another building has been blown up; another army patrol ran into a land mine; a train was blown up; a water pipeline was likewise blown up. Surely, unless we are to believe that these acts of terrorism are due to flying saucers, they must be committed by groups operating from somewhere 64, For a11 these reasons, il is mandatory that the 3ecurity Council should clearly throw its full authority behind an attempt to put an end to these acts of violence, The form in which this is done, whether by a resolution of by consensus, is, in our opinion, of secondary importance. 65, My delegation would have been prepared to support, and vote for, the draft resolution introduced last week by the delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States [S/7568]. However, further consultations with a11 the members of the Council have shown that a somewhat more restricted resolution seems preferable. My delegation would likewise have been prepared to support a consensus, if that had been possible to aohieve. But now that a more restricted form of resolution seems the most likely to aohieve the necessary support in the Council, my delegation has no objection to that, provided that this new resolution contains the main elements essential to improve the dangerous situation in the Middle East. 66, For this reason, my delegation co-operated with other non-permanent members of the Council in drafting the resolution which is now before us [S/7575/ Rev.11. With your permission, Mr. President, 1 should like to make a few remarks on this draft resolution, although 1 must immediately say that 1 have little to add to the excellent exposé of the representative of Uganda, when he introduced the draft resolution. 67. It is, at this moment, of little use for the Council to try and apportion blame, and the draft resolution therefore does not make any suoh attempt. The Council should, however, in our opinion, deplore the incidents which have been the subject of our debate and, in particular, the unnecessary loss of lives which resulted therefrom. But what is more important than this is to direct a11 our efforts atpreventing a repetition; for this reason, five out of the six paragraphs of the draft resolution look to the future rather than to the past. 68, The first of these guidelines for thefuture, which is contained in operative paragraph 2, invites Syria to strengthen its measures for preventing incidents that constitute a violation of the General Armistice / Agreement. Thzit this admonition is far from superfluOUs is shown by the constantly continuing number I of acts of terrorism on Israel soi1 near the border. If ’ the Government of Syria would be prepared strictly to adhere to its obligation under article III, paragraph 3, of the Israel-Syrian General Armistice 69. Operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution, on the other hand, invites Israel to co-operate fully with the Mixed Armistice Commission. The report of the Secretary-General of 1 November [S/7572], which has been referred to in our debate this morning, states clearly that: “The inability of the Israel-SyrianMixed Armistice Commission to function undoubtedly weakens the efforts to maintain quiet along the line between Israel and Syria.” 70. My delegation realizes that the refusa1 of Israel to co-operate with the Mixed Armistice Commission in the past was, to it, a question of principle and a question of interpretation of article V of the General Armistice Agreement. Also, we would not go as far as some who would try to give the impression that a11 the terrorist acts of the past years are the result of Israel’s non-co-operation with the Mixed Armistice Commission. Nevertheless, it must be stated that the report of the Secretary-General is explicit and clear on this point, and therefore, in order to combat the number of acts of sabotage, we believe that the Council is entitled to ask this co-operation from Israel. 71. The draft resolution furthermore calls upon both Governments to facilitate the work of the personnel of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in their tasks of observation and investigation on both sides of the armistice demarcation line. The Chief of Staff and his military observers and assistants are carrying out their task in a most commendable way. My country is proud that there are several of its compatriots among them. However, the Truce Supervision Organization cannot perform its duties without the co-operation of the two Governments, and should be enabled to move freely on both sides of the border and of the demarcation line. 72. In the present situation on the Israel-Syrian border, diminution of tension in the area is the very first necessity. BothGovernments are thereforeurged, in paragraph 5 of the draft resolution, to refrain from any action that might increase tension in the area. If this is not done, avery real danger exists of hostilities on a much larger scale. This admonition in paragraph 5 is not limited-we would like to emphasize-to acts of sabotage alone. Both parties would be well advised to refrain from military action, and likewise from any inflammatory statements, or from any incitement to warlike acts, and to apply the utmost restraint to both their policies and their utterances, The fact that we are urging this again is not superfluous, as has unfortunately been proved by the very recent appeals which appeared this morning in the Press, appeals for a war of liberation against Israel, for which, according to the same press reports of this morning, recruitment offices are now opened in Syria. 74, My delegation, finally, would like to pay a tribute to those Afro-Asian members of the Council to whom the fair and balanced text of the present draft resolution is mainly due. If it is adopted, as my delegation sincerely hopes, but even more important, if it is adhered to by the parties, then we believe it should do much to improve the situation in the area. 75, The PRESIDENT: 1 have on my listfour speakers requesting the floor to speak before the vote, as well as several who have requested an opportunity to speak after the vote. With the Council’s approval, 1 propose that we conclude our debate this morning by calling upon Mr. Berro, who has asked to make a brief statement now, following which we cari adjourn and reconvene at 3 o’clock. It was SO decided.

The Uruguayan delegation has already made its position clear in its statements to the Council and during the long and abortive attempts to agree on a sane and balanced attitude which would constructively contribute to the reduction of the tension prevailing in the Near and Middle East and kindle a gleam of hope that peace Will finally corne to that region. Unhappily, our steadfast efforts have been vain and we have now reached the point where we are considering a draft resolution [S/7575/Rev.l] which, although it does not embody a11 our views, is the only positive measure likely to win the Council’s support. It is on this ground that we shall vote for it. 77. Failure by the Council to take any decisionwould be prejudicial to the prestige of the United Nations and could have deleterious repercussions in the area concerned. We would have preferred a different text, but we cannot remain inert. We would not want to throw away our vote by supporting a draft resolution doomed to failure or by abstaining. We wish to make some contribution to the solution of this serious problem, even though that contribution may not perfectly reflect our thinking, and we make it in the higher interests of co-operation and harmony. “What is lacking, , . is not better instruments to ensure peace but better men who will not evade their responsibilities.‘t [1308th meeting, paras. 106 and 107.1

1 thank the representative of Uruguay, Mr. Berro. 80. Before we adjourn 1 should like to make a brief announcement in my capacity as UNITED STATES representative. We are not being blasted out of the United Nations by the blasting you have jus-t heard. This blasting is tsking place for a tunnel under the East River. The meeting rose at l.lJp.~.