S/PV.1317 Security Council

In accordance with the decisions taken previously, 1 shall now, with the consent of the Council, invite the representatives of Israel, the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Arab Republic to take their seats at the Council table in order to participate without vote in the discussion, At the invitation of the President, Mr. M. Comay (Israel), Mr. G. J. Tomeh (Syria) and Mr. M. A. El Kony (United Arab Republic) toc& places at the Council table.

In explaining the way which Mali Will vote on the draft resolution [S/7575/Rev.l] before us, I must first make the following observations on behalf of my delegation. 3. For some days now we have a11 been making every effort to obtain a consensus. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to do SO, and today we bave before US a draft resolution. My delegation oonsiders that, in the highly political atmosphere in which our consultations and talks took place, it seemed unlikely, from the first, that a consensus would be possible. 4. Unfortunately, everyone knows that, whatever the outcome of the vote which is abput to be taken, it Will not put an end to the tragedy which is being enacted in the region concerned. In my delegation’s opinion, it would be more realistic and more humane if we paid more attention to the fate of the men, women and children who have been or Will be the victims of a twenty-year-old problem for which no solution is yet in sight. I do not know what justifiable satisfaction this Council or the peoples concérned canderivefrom what 1 cari only cal1 the war of resolutions. 5. In the view of my delegation, it is not by condemning Israel or Syria today or tomorrow that the Council Will enable the peoples of the Middle East to live together finally in brotherhood. My delegation greatly fears that this course of procedure which the Security Council has adopted is not really worthy of it and cannot benefit the people concerned. 6, My delegation feels that, instead of worrying about the interpretation that may be given to a resolution by a particular section of the Press or a particular information service or about the political repercussions that a resolution might have, the Council should rather concern itself with the peace and security necessary to ensure a peaceful life for the peoples concerned. 7. In the view of the delegation of Mali, the solution of the problem does not lie in the adoption of resolutions carefully concocted for some unavowed purpose. On the contrary, we believe that the solution Will be found in an objective, and hence constructive, analysis based on the affection we bear towards the peoples of the region concerned. 8. In view of what 1 have just said, and especially after reading the two Secretariat reports contained in documents S/7572 of 1 November and S/7573 of 2 November 1966, 1 must say that, in the opinion of my delegation, some new factors have emerged which may help us achieve greater objectivity. 9. What, in fact, do we find in those reports? I shall now quote from the first report: “Since 1951, Israel has taken the position that the Mixed Armistice Commission is not competent to deal with issues pertaining to the demilitarized zone, asserting that these issues should be dealt with by the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission and that he should contact the Israel delegation with a view to their settlement.tl [S/7572, para. 3.1 Further on, we read: “The inability of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission to function undoubtedly weakens the efforts to maintain quiet along the line between Israel and Syria. As a result of this situation, 10. In the second report, it is stated: “The above-mentioned Israel and Syrian complaints have been submitted daily for several years. Israel authorities have requested no investigation af their complaints alleging encroachment by Syrian fortifications upon the demilitarized zone, Syrian authorities have asked for the investigation of their above-mentioned complaints in respect of Israel fortifications in the demilitarized zone.” [S/7573, para. 6.1 These are Secretariat documents, We have tremendous faith in them, and, at this stage of our work, 1 would point out that the delegation of Mali, for its part, is anxious to make an objective and impartial contribution here in the Council. In this connexion, 1 would like to mention that not long ago a member of the Council clearly made the following statement: “The Syrian Government has indefatigably and feverishly sought to hinder. , , II. 11. In the light of what 1 have just read out to you from Secretariat documents and the brief passage which 1 have just quoted from statements made here by a member of the Council, the delegation of Mali feels constrained, in a11 conscience, to point out to you the necessity of examining very carefully paragraph 2 of the draft resolution which is before us. The present text of that paragraph seems unacceptable tc my delegation. If the sponsors of the draft resolution would be good enough to allow a separate vote on that paragraph, Mali could once again demonstrate its complete solidarity with its African brothers from Nigeria and Uganda,

The next speaker on my list is the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic, Mr. Tomeh. 1 now cal1 upon him.

When the Security Council recessed for the purpose of reaching a consensus instead of a draft resolution, and many meetings were held either among the permanent members of the Security Council or among the non-permanent members, the Syrian delegation, in a spirit of co-operation and goodwill, spared no effort in order to help the Parties concerned with peace and security in the Middle East to reach a consensus on the basis of an agreement. Unfortunately, this was not the case, and a draft resolution [S/7575/Rev.l] has been submitted to us today. 14, My delegation, however, wants to underline this fact, that during those deliberations we felt, time and again, that certain members of the Security Council taking part in the deliberations to reach a consensus 16. But our most important objection relates to operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution [S/7575/ Rev.11, which states: Vnvites the Government of Syria to strengthen its measures for preventing incidents that constitute a violation of the General Armistice Agreement.” Operative paragraph 2 implies that Syria is being admonished, that Syria is being blamed for not having taken the necessary measures; whereas we have maintained, and still maintain, that Syria, as a Member of the United Nations, as a party to the General Armistice Agreement, as a country fully respecting the United Nations machinery-the Mixed Armistice Commission; the Truce Supervision Organizationfully respects its obligations and responsibilities under the United Nations Charter and under the Armistice Agreement. The incidents about which Israel has complained are attributed to Palestinians who have their own organizations, with which the Syrian Government has no association and over which it has no authority. They are a people who have been driven from their own land and are within reach of their own country. Therefore Syria has no responsibility whatsoever for the actions of the Palestinian people. This has been the case, and this remains the case. Operative paragraph 2 completely overlooks that fact. 17. However, when the co-sponsors of the draft resolution explained operative paragraph 2, we heard two different interpretations-one which did not give the paragraph the meaning of admonishing Syria, and the other which did. Regrettably, 1 do not have here the exact text of the introduction to and the interpretations of operative paragraph 2, but if 1 did 1 could show that two different interpretations appear beyond any doubt. The fact that operative paragraph 2 has “Invites the Government of Israel to co-operate fully with the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission.” And operative paragraph 4 states: Walls upon the Governments of Syria and Israel to facilitate the work of the personnel of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine in their tasks of observation and investigation on both sides of the armistice demarcation line.Il 19. Luckily, two reports have been submitted to the Council by the Secretary-General [S/7572 andS/7573]. Some of the members who have spoken today have referred more or less to those two reports. The responsibility of the party which is obstructing the work of the United Nations machinery is in no doubt; the relevant paragraphs whichprove the responsibility of Israel in not co-operating with the United Nations machinery are very clear. But this is a problem which has been before the Security Council since 1951, when, only two years after the conclusion of the General Armistice Agreement, Israel committed an attack upon Syria. In fact, reference is made in the first report to Security Council resolution 93 (1951), which was adopted on 18 May 1951 and which contained the following paragraphs: “Calls upon the Governments of Israel and Syria to bring before the Mixed Armistice Commissionor its Chairman, whichever has the pertinent responsibility under the Armistice Agreement, their complaints and to abide by the decisions resulting therefrom; “Considers that it is inconsistent with the objectives and intent of the Armistice Agreement to refuse to participate in meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission or to fail to respect requests of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission as they relate to his obligations under article V, and calls upon the parties to be represented at a11 meetings called by the Chairman of the Commission and to respect such requests.” 20. New, at least fourteen or fifteen years of unhappy history lie behind that resolution. But when those particular paragraphs were adopted by the Security Council, the Council then, as today, had before it a report, dated 12 April 1951, on the status of operations in the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission, in which the Acting Chief of Staff reported that at a meeting of the Commission on 3 April 1951, when the Chairman 21. It was obviously with reference to this portion of the Acting Chief of Staff’s report that the Security Council, in its resolution 93 (1951) of 18 May 1951, stated that it considered it inconsistent with the objectives and intent of the Armistice Agreement for any of the parties to refuse to participate in meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission and called upon the parties to be represented at a11 meetings called by the Chairman of the Commission. 22. The same report of the Secretary-General [S/ 75721 refers to resolution 111 (1956) which contains a similar paragraph calling upon the two parties to abide by the General Armistice Agreement. In that connexion also, General Burns, who was Chief of Staff -and is now a member of the Canadian delegation to the twenty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly-reported in a memorandum to the Secretary-General, that: Yt is apparently impossible to resume regular meetings unless Israel agrees to submit to the Mixed Armistice Commission the interpretation of article 5 for a decision as to its competence in matters concerning the demilitarized zone, a procedure which, according to the legal advice 1 have received, is in accordance with the terms of the Armistice Agreement. Israel, however, is not prepared to agree to this,“.&/ 23. Later, in 1962, the Security Council also discussed this same problem and adopted resolution 171 (1962) which is also referred to in the report of the Secretary-General. In that connexion, the Chief of Staff at that time, General von Horn, also submitted a report, which is contained in the annex to the 1001st meeting of the Council, in which the responsibility was placed on the shoulders of Israel for not cooperating with the United Nations machinery. 24. We have also the other report of the Secretary- General on the demilitarized zone in whichstatements are very clear about who is obstructing the work of the United Nations. 1 should like to quote the following therefrom: “Access to the Dardara area, in the central sector of the demilitarieed zone, has also been refused to United Nations military observers. Such restriction on the freedom of movement of United Nations military observers has prevented the investigation of recent Syrian complaints relating to g Officia1 Records of the Security Council, Eleventh Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1956, document Sj3596, annex 7. IlOn the western bank, Arab villages have been demolished, their inhabitants evacuated. The inhabitants of the villages of Baqqara and Ghanname returned following Security Council resolution 93 (1951) of 18 May 1951. They were later, on 30 October 1956, forced to cross into Syria where they are still living. Their lands on the western bank ofthe river, and Khoury Farm in the same area, are cultivated by Israel nationals.” [Ibid., para. 16.1 25, Mr. Comay cornes here to convince the Security Council that his authorities are oo-operating with the United Nations machinery. Although 1 might seem to be dwelling at length on this problem, 1 feel it is absolutely necessary since we are a party that is directly connected with the dispute. Mr. Comay made a lengthy statement about the United Nations machinery during the debate. I quote from his interpretation of the General Armistice Agreement. He said then: férend. “Except with regard to plenary meetings, to which 1 shall refer again shortly, the armistice machinery functions normally and with full Israel co-operation. This co-opesation is carried on through the Israel and Syrian delegates to the Mixed Armistice Commission who are appointed especially for this purpose.” 11309th meeting, para. 137.1 26. But the answer to that interpretation is to be found in article VII, paragraph 1, of the General Armistice Agreement which states: le paragraphe “The execution of the provisions of this Agreement shall be supervised by a Mixed Armistice Commission composed of five members, of whom each Party to this Agreement shall designate two, and whose Chairman shall be the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization or a senior officer from the observer personnel of that organization designated by him following consultation with both Parties to this Agreement.llzl That paragraph shows very clearly that the Mixed Armistice Commission operates only when the full membership of the Commission is meeting and not when only one member of the two parties meets with the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission. The statement that this co-operation is carried on through the appointed member is only a half-truth, which is meant to confuse the issue. mission tous lorsqu’un rencontre d’armistice. ration n’est les cartes, 21. Mr. Comay went on to say: “There is regular contact between the Truce Supervision Organization and the Armistice Affairs Division of the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem, and 2/ bld.. Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 2. 28. Mr. Comay went on to say: “attheUnited Nations Headquarters in New York there is close contact with the Secretary-General and his advisers on a11 armistice mattersw [w., para. 381, This is a cleartut evasion of the very obvious jurisdiction of the United Nations machinery on the spot, beoause the contacts between any of the permanent delegations and the Secretary-General are of the very nature of the work of any permanent .delegation. 29. Mr. Comay further stated: “The difficulty about holding plenary meetings of the Commission was caused many years ago by Syrian attempts to place on the agenda questions over which the Commission had no competence.” [Ibid., para. 139.1 The answer to this is to be found very clearly in article VII, paragraph 8, of the General Armistice Agreement, which states: ?Vhere interpretation of the meaning of a particular provision of this Agreement, other than the preamble and article I and II, is at issue, the Commission’s interpretation shall prevail. The Commission, in its discretion and as the need arises, may from time to time recommend to the Parties modifications in the provisions of this Agreement.‘-/ 30. But in the statement of Ms. Comay there is a clear recognition that his authorities have completely paralysed and immobilized the work of the Mixed Armistice Commission when he claims that Syria has put questions which do not fa11 within the competence of the Commission; the competence, according to paragraph 8 of article VII of the Armistice Agreement, is not to be decided by one party, either Syria or Israel, but is to be decided by the Commission itself. 31. TO conclude this first part, Ishouldliketo stress the fact that it is not enough to speak of the General Armistice Agreement and to ask for respect for the General Armistice Agreement. One shouldprove onets co-operation by action-by deeds and not by words. Furthermore, Israel should have brought its complaint of the incidents to the Mixed Armistice Commission and not to the Security Council. The Security Council would have been spared the time and the effort. Israel cannot claim that it is co-operating with the United Nations machinery and that it respects the General 32. Reference was made today to an article which appeared in The New York Times this morning, in connexion with which we heard the statement that the incidents occurring inside Israel territory were not coming from flying saucers. Surely they are not, but, as the source of law is analogy and as we are bound a11 the time to think by analogy and to reach our judgements by analogy, including legal judgements, there is an analogy that immediately cornes to one’s mind at this meeting, The analogy is a very near one. Not flying saucers but flying Israel bombers attacked Syrian Territory on 14 July 1966. Israel bombers also attacked Syria in 1964, in 1962, in 1954 and in 1951. They were not flying saucers. They were regular Israel forces. If we are to think by analogy, we cannot under any circumstances compare the incidents that are currently the subject of the Council’s deliberations with our complaint of July 1966 or that of 1964, for there you had an act of war committed by a regular army against a Member State which, in the case of the attack of 14 July 1966, was recognized by the Israel authorities. Yet on that same occasion no effort was spared to defeat a draft resolution that wasput before the Council in order to condemn the Israel attack on Syrian territory and people as a result of which a whole project was destroyed, nine workers were wounded and one woman and a Child were killed. Yet the Security Council did not then adopt any resolution. 33, On that same occasion an attempt was made to argue against the draft resolution that was submitted to the Security Council. With a11 due respect and with the best of goodwill, 1 wish to quote a passage which 1, who labour with a language not my own, find really very impressive; this passage is from the statement by the representative of New Zealand, Mr. Corner: “One cari hardly pretend that such a resolution would make a dramatic contribution towards solving the Palestine problem; but nearly twenty years’ sobering experience of this question has taught US not to expect dramatic solutions. One does what one 34. Now I corne back to the reference that was made to the article in The New York Times of today. There are other things that were written in that article. What was emphasized was what was stated by the Chieî of State of Syria, but there is also a paragraph about what happened in the whole Arab world on the occasion of 2 November. Iquote from the same article: “The anniversary of the Balfour Declaration was observed throughout the Arab world. The Baghdad radio reported that traffic throughout Iraq was stopped for a minute at noon and the Cairo radio reported public rallies. Arab Palestinian organizations issued statements, and newspapers in Arab capitals from Beirut to Kuwait discussedthe meaning of the anniversary.tf That shows unequivocally how the Arabs feel, notonly in Damascus, not only as expressed by the Chief of State of Syria but a11 over the Arab world. The quotation from the Chief of State of Syria also stated this about the United Nations: “They are raising a fuss over some exp1osions in Israel but they arenot lifting a finger against the war of destruction in Viet-Nam.11 35. In this connexion I wish to refer to what appeared in the same newspaper, The New York Times, on Monday 31 October 1966. 1 shall quote only two paragraphs, in connexion with the explosion of the water pipeline in the Negev. The article, quoting various Israel newspapers, says: lvOmer, the newspaper of the Government-controlled Labor Federation, said: ‘Either Syria puts an end to the threats and acts of provocation or the fire of war, whose scope and outcome no one cari foretell, Will be lit’.” The article concludes with this paragraph: ttThe general view here is Chat Syria, considered to be the source of almost a11 the terrorism, would be the target of any retaliation. It is also believed that the strike would not be confined, as in the past, to a brief air attack against Syrian border positions but a penetration aimed at eliminating the bases of sabotage.” 36. Finally, 1 corne to the draft resolution submitted by the representative of the United Kingdom and the representative of the United States; my remarks thereon Will be very brief. 37. In our minds and in the minds of a11 Arab peoples, there is no doubt whatsoever about the complete identification of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom with Israel, and behind tlOn the Jewish side, I have found Zionist officiais of the Jewish Agency uncompromisingly outspoken in their determination that Palestine at the end of this war shall become not merely a national home for the Jews, but a Jewish state despite any opposition from the l,OOO,OOO Arabs living there. In various ways the main result of many of their efforts seems to be to goad Palestinian Arabs into breaking the informa1 truce that has existed since the war began. This enormously increased assurance on part of Jews in Palestine stems from two main sources: (a) their feeling that they have the increasing support of public opinion in Great Britain and the United States; (&) their confidence in their increased numbers and in their supply of arms that makes them feel they cari more than hold their own in actual fighting with the Arabs of Palestine.” The letter goes on to say, and this is very significant: “It is no secret that the Haganah, their secret Jewish military organization, has plans fully made and is well equipped not only with small arms, but also with tommy-guns and machine-guns, many of them purchaeed from Vichy French forces in Syria and smuggled into Palestine during the past two years.% 38. It is very significant that this goes back to 1943, when the letter refers to 1 million Arabs being the majority of Palestine, to the fact that there was a secret army called the Haganah, which was ready to withstand a11 the Arab armies and which had smuggled tommy-guns and machine-guns from the Vichy French, who were co-operating with Nazi Germany in Syria, into Palestine, 39, But in ous very interesting exchange, Mr. President, you refesred to Mr. Churchill as being a spiritual Zionist. But Mr. Churchill, after the acts of terrorism and sabotage in Palestine, stated the following in the House of Commons: “If ous dreams for Zionism are to end in the smoke of assassins’ pistols and our labours for its future are to produce a new set of gangsters worthy of Nazi Germany, many like myself Will have ta reil Forelgn Relations of the United States; Diplomatie Papers, 1943, VOL -r!f The Near East and Africa (Washington, US. Government priatin;Office, 1964), p. 748. “The goal envisaged by France and Great Britain in prosecuting in the East the war set in train by German ambition is the complete and final liberatien”-note how many times “liber’ationll occurs in this text --“of the peoples who have for SO long been oppressed by the Turks, and the setting up of national Governments and administrations that shall derive their authority from the free exercise of the initiative and choice of the indigenous populations. “In pursuit of those intentions, France and Great Britain agree to further and assist in the setting up of indigenous Governments and administrations in Syria “-Palestine is not mentioned here because at that time it was part ofsyria-lfandMesopotamia, which have already been liberated by the Allies”- note again the word ltliberatedll-ltas well as in those Territories which they are endeavouringtoliberate, and to recognize them as soon as they are actually set up. “Far from wishing to impose this or that system upon the populations of those regions, their only concernl’-the Allies’ concern-‘5s to ofIer such support and efficacious help as Will ensure the smooth working of the Governments and administrations which those populations Will have elected on their own free Will to have; to secure impartial and equal justice for all; to facilitate the economic development of the country by promoting and encouraging local initiative; to foster the spread of education: and to put an end to the dissensions which Turkish policy has for SO long exploited. Suchis the task which the two Allied Powers wish to undertake in the liberated territories.” The words “liberationl and “liberated” occur four times in this text. Those same people who fought on the side of the Allies, who were starved to death, whose intellectuals and leaders were hanged in Jerusalem, Haifa, Damascus, Beirut and Tripoli, are still fighting for their country, but they are referred to here as murderers and intruders. At thattime they were heroes and martyrs, 41. Thus, the issue in the final analysis is not one of incidents between Israel and Syria but the continuing 4/ A Survey of Palestine, vol. 1 (Palestine, Government Prlnter, 1946), chap. II, p. 73.

In my statement last Friday [1312th meeting], 1 said that the Japanese delegation found some constructive elements in the draft resolution [ S/‘7568] which had been introduced by the United Kingdom and the United States. 1 also referred to a draft resolution that was before the Council last summer in connexion with the attack on Syrian territory by the israel Air Force on 14 July. I had said at the time that we did not feel that the draft resolution took tlsufficiently into account the related aspects of the situationll. 1 then went on to indicate, last Friday, that, in our view, %uch the same comment might apply in certain respects to the draft resolution” introduced by the United Kingdom and the United States. 1 then supported the proposition, enunciated by the representatives of Mali, Uganda, Nigeria and France, that an effort be made to achieve a consensus, and1 expressed the hope that, given tirne, it would be possible to formulate a text acceptable to the Council. 43. Thereafter, members of the Council have been engaging in intensive consultations in an effort to achieve a consensus among a11 Council members as to the ways and means of establishing lasting Peace in the future in the area, taking into full consideration the broader context of the problem, without dwelling too much on the past. As aresult of these consultative efforts, a draft of a consensus was formulated. However, as the representative of Uganda said this morning [1316th meeting], this draft consensus did not commend itself to a11 members of the Council, although many delegations supported it. 44. In view of the fact that many delegations supported the draft consensus the Japanese delegation, together with those of Argentina, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria and Uganda, is pleased to co-sponsor the draft resolution [S/7575/Rev.l] which is a reshaped version of the oonsensus. The representative of Uganda having, on behalf of the co-sponsors, introduced the draft resolution in such a lucid manner, followed by detailed explanations by other co-sponsors, it would seem superfluous for me to add anything more to what has already been said, 1 merely want to say that we believe the text is even-handed, fair andwell balanced; it is designed to relax tensions and, through the fuller use of existing machinery, to contribute to the peace of the area. My delegation earnestly hopes, therefore, that the draft resolution Will be supported unanimously by a11 the members of the Council. 45. However, 1 should like to propose a very miner amendment, for the sake of completeness, that, Ihope, will be accepted by the other co-sponsors and commend itself to other members. 1 would Propose that a reference be added at the end of the preamble to the Secretary-General 1s report oontained in document S/7573 of 2 November l.966. This cari easilybe done by

My delegation would like to reserve to itself the possibility of making a substantive statement at a later stage. The only purpose of my intervention at this point is, withthe indulgence of the Council, to draw its attention to a letter which 1 addressed to you, as President of the Council, earlier today and which, 1 understand, is being distributed as document S/7576. 1 should like to read this letter to the Council. It reads as follows: “With reference to the present Security Council consideration of the Israel complaint against Syria, I have the honour to draw attentiontofresh sabotage raids into Israel and warlike threats by Syrian leaders, in the last few days. “Four days ago a water pipe-line was sabotaged in the desert. The day before yesterday another vehicle was blown up by a land mine on the Syrian border. It was a civilian truck engaged in land reclamation work, Fortunately nobody was killed. At the same spot, next to a Syrianmilitary position, other vehicles were blown up on 6 and 9 September and 18 and 23 October. “During this debate”-1 refer to the Council’s present debate-“the terrorist raids into Israel have been stepped up, and they are now occurring at a faster tempo than at any time since they started nearly two years ago. There is not the slightest indication that the Syrian authorities have taken any measures to prevent the raids, or that they contemplate taking such measures. On the contrary, the Syrian Government is feeding the tension by its own inflammatory statements, which constitute open incitement to war. A week ago, on 23 October, a speech by the Syrian Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister, Dr. Ibrahim Makhus, was broadcast by Radio Damascus. It includes the following passages: slWe Will not lose anything by fighting the popular liberation war. The people must be ready from now on for a11 eventualities. We must not fear anything. The Arab nation oan onIy be united through battle, and Israel cari only be eliminated through battle.’ (British Broadcasting Corporation monitoring service), “1 must draw particular attention to the speech made yesterday by President Atassi of Syria at a mass rally. Il-the speech which has been referred to during the course of today’s proceedings-“He attacked other Arab rulers as criminals for firing at ‘Palestine fighters returning from the occupied territory after they had performed their duty’. He added that, ‘In their name 1 proclaim that Palestine Will be restored to its owners’ , . .”

1 apologize for interrupting the representative of Israel, but a point of order has been raised by the representative of Jordan. 48. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l’anglais): Je regrette de devoir interroinpre le repr6sentant d’Israé’1, mais une motion d’ordre a Bté soulev6e par le representant de la Jordanie. 49, Mr, EL-FARR4 (Jordan): This is net the first time that Mr. Comay bas tried to inject irrelevant statements and issues into our deliberations. Whatever statements are made about Arab differences should not be exploited by Mr. Comay. They are differenoes among brothers and it is none of Mr. Comay’s business to speak about any statement by any Aràb leader against any Arab State. That is not before the Council and he has no right to exploit such a situation. 49. M. EL-FARRA Ce n’est pas la premiére fois que M. Comay cherche 2 faire des d6clarations ou à introduire dans le d6bat des questions qui lui sont Btrangères. Quelles que soient les d6clarations faites au sujet des diff&ends entre pays arabes, M. Comay ne devrait pas essayer de les exploiter. Il existe des différends entre fr&res et il n’appartient absolument pas & M. Comay d’évoquer une quelconque d6claration faite par un dirigeant arabe contre un Etat arabe, Le Conseil n’en ayant pas été saisi, il n’a pas le droit d’exploiter une telle situation. 50, Mr. COMAY (Israel): 1 understand perfectly that this does not make pleasant reading for some people. Al1 1 am doing is quoting from aletter which has been circulated and which quotes the Chief of State of a Member State of the United Nations. 1 repeat: 50. M. COMAY (Israël) [traduit de l’anglais]: comprends fort bien que la lecture du présent document ne soit pas tr&s agr6able pour certains. Je ne fais cependant que citer une lettre qui a ét6 distribuée et dans laquelle est reproduite la déclaration d’un chef d’Etat Membre des Nations Unies, Je &p??te donc: “1 must draw particular attention to the speech made yesterday by President Atassi of Syria at a mass rally. He attacked other Arab rulers as Criminals for firing at ‘Palestine fighters returning from the occupied territory’. , .ll.

Mr. President, may I formally ask you as the President of this Council to make a ruling on this question. That is not part of OU?? problem, it is not part of the Israel complaint. It is intended to distort the whole question and confuse the whole issue. 1 should like you, Mr. President, to make 51. M. EL-FARRA Monsieur le PrBsident, puis-je vous demander officiellement, en votre qualit de Pr6sident du Conseil, de vous prononcer sur cette question? Tout cela n’a rien a voir ni avec le probl8me qui nous occupe, ni avec la plainte israelienne, Il s’agit d’une tentative

The President of the Council is the servant of the Council andnot its master. It has been the practice of the Council to permit any representative on the Council and any Member of the United Nations which has been invited to appear here to make a statement, to make that statement as he sees fit. The President of the Council proposes to follow the usual procedure unless the Council decides otherwise.

Do 1 understand, Mr. President, that you Will permit Mr. Comay to speak on any question relating to the Arab world whether or not it has anything to do with his complaint? That point is not clear to me, and 1 should like your clarification of it,

1 think that my statement was quite clear. 1 shall repeat it. The President of the Council presides here as the servant of the Council, and he presides under established practices and procedures. The established practice and procedure, as 1 understand it, is for the President of the Council not to censure the remarks of any member of the Council or, indeed, any Member of the United Nations who is speaking with the permission of the Council. Therefore, as President of the Council, 1 propose to follow the establishedpractice and to permit the representative of Israel to continue his remarks. Many remarks have been made in the course of this debate. 1 am at the disposa1 of the Council. If my statement does not meet with the approval of the Council, it is entirely free to take another course.

Mr. President, with a11 due respect, 1 think that it is your privilege, as President of the Security Council and as the guardian of the proper conduct of our business, net to permit any foreign substance to be injected into our deliberations. That is a right which you are perfectly entitled to exercise; otherwise, we might hear statements about thirteen Arab States and you may have thirteen Arab States coming to the Council to refute the charges made by a representative, Mr. Comay, who has injected an extraneous element into the discussion. I should like that to be made very clear, and 1 am sure the members of the Council wish to see the business of the Council conducted properly.

1 appreciate the comme& of the representative of Jordan, Mr, El-Farra. It is quite clear from the conduct of this debate, which does not differ materially in its conduct from that of other debates, before 1 took the Chair and afterwards, that considerable latitude has been allowed to a11 who have spoken. 1 do not propose to depart from that practice. Therefore, 1 Will request Mr. Comay of Israel to continue his remarks. 1 am at the disposa1 of the Council. If the Council wishes to adopt another

Wehave had various speakers corne before us in this present debate, inciuding at least one speaker who, to thegreat interest and education of the Council, has ranged widely over the whole question while he was discussing it, May 1 submit that in this particular case the reference that has been made by the representative of Israel, far from not being germane to the particular matter before the Council, is directly relevant to it. The reference in question is in fact a demonstrationof the will, and indeed the ability, of other States neighbouring on Israel to prevent such activities through their territory or across their borders. 1 would ask, Mr. President, that you allow the representative of Israel to continue. If there is objection to that course, you should make a ruling, and if that rulingbe challenged, the Council Will take a decision on that matter.

We have heard the representative of New Zealand state that the text quoted here by the representative of Israel was highly relevant to the question which we are discussing. At the same time, he said that we had heard here a representative speaking about a large number of questions raised by him in the course of his statement. 1 agree with him, but I must make the following observation. When representatives who ask to speak here have made their statements, no one has objected to their touching on questions which have been raised here. Now, however, we are faced with a different situation, A representativ who is perfectly familiar with hrab affairs has requested that inter-Arab quarrels-if they existshould not be brought into the discussionof the matter before the Council. 60. It is not my intention to dwell at length on the question of procedure. I wanted merely to ask that issues extraneous to the debate should not be brought in here, unless they contribute something of value to the discussion. It is perfectly justifiable for the representatives of certain States members of the 62. 1 shall make a specific ruling, SO thatthere is no ambiguity. That ruling may be challenged. The Council controls its proceedings. The President presides and makes rulings, which the Council cari reverse. My ruling is the following: In accordance with what 1 see to be the established practice ofthe Council, 1 propose to allow the representative of Israel to continue to read this letter, which has been distributed, That is my ruling. If anyone wishes to challenge it he may do SO.

Mr. President, apparently it has been a little difficult for us to communicate with each other. We were speaking on two different questions. 1 never expected you to be a mind reader. You have a wide knowledge of many things, but 1 do not think that is among your qualities. 1 am not against the reading of this letter. Mr. Comay cari read it twice or thrice, and I shall listen to him. But Mr. Comay started reading from a newspaper and started injecting irrelevant issues, and 1 am against these extraneous subjects being introduced into our deliberations. 64. Therefore, 1 accept your ruling, Mr. President, if it is a ruling confined to the reading of the letter. Of course 1 am not a,gainst it. But 1 would only beg you, if you hear Mr. Comay speaking about something which is irrelevant to our consideration of this item, to be kind enough, in your wisdom, to stop him.

1 thank the representative of Jordan and 1 take note of his statement. 1 request the representative of Israel to proceedwithhis statement.

1 wish to give the representative of Jordan an assurance that I haveno desire whatever to embarrass him or to embarrass his Government. The Israel Government has brought no complaint to this Council against the Government of Jordan. The remark to which he takes exception is, 1 grant him, a very offensive remark. It is not my remark; it is the remark of the Chief of State of a sister Arab State, and 1 am not responsible for its content. “Threats by Syria against the territorial integrity and political independence of Israel, and open Syrian incitement to war against Israel, in violation of the United Nations Charter and the Israel-Syrian General Armistice Agreement.” What 1 am reading from my letter [S/7576] is strictly relevant and corroborative of the validity of that complaint. If a particular sentence in that letter is embarrassing to the representative of Jordan, 1 am quite happy not to repeat it, but Will go on reading from the letter after that particular sentence, Ifthere is anything else in the remarks of President Atassi to which the Jordanian representative would like to take exception, 1 shall be quite happy to have him inform the Council of his reaction to President Atassi’s views, and I shall be quite happy to skip reading such remarks as well. Having said that, Mr. President, and with your permission, 1 shall continue reading from my letter. 68. President Atassi, in the passage of this letter at the point at which 1 was interrupted, was referring to certain “Palestine fighters returning from the occupied territory after they had performed their duty”. The letter continues: “He added that, ‘In their name 1 proclaim that Palestine Will be restored to its owners not through the United Nations and not through reactionary rulers, but through the instrumentality of a popular war’...” If the representative of Jordan wishes to take exception to this phrase %eactionary rulers”, 1 am quite happy to skip that, too. The letter continues: “The President of Syria then referred to the present debate in the Security Counci.1 and attacked and derided the Council for bothering about vehicles being blown up in Israel instead of concerning itself with important things. “It would be superfluous to stress that the reckless and irresponsible proclamations violate the United Nations Charter and the Israel-Syrian General Armistice Agreement. “1 have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as a Security Council document.” 69.. Mr. TOMEH (Syria): Mr. Presicient, 1 do appreciate your generosity in allowing me to reply immediately to this letter, and 1 promise that 1 Will be very brief. First of all, let us deal with the incidents referred to in the letter. There is a mention of a water pipeline which was sabotaged in the desest. A description of this incident is to be foundin an article Furthermore, this incident took place at Arad, which is in the Negev, which is at least 200 miles from the nearest point of the Syrian border. That speaks for itself. ‘70. With regard to the other incidents in the vicinity of Syria, I wish to state the following. When the incident of the explosion of a mine occurred, the Chie£ of Staff, General Odd Bull, was notified by the Syrian authorities of the fact that the demilitarized zone is a war area, and that there were mines which had been put in the area as far back as 1948; the possibility does exist that these mines, or some of them, had drifted because of waterfalls or water sheds, and anyone who knows this area will know that this is possible. Furthermore, we know that in the western desert of Egypt, in the Mediterranean, in Berlin, and in various other places where battles have taken place, mines have been found up to the present time, and sometimes have been exploded unwlttingly. 71. The frequency of the complaints of the Israel representative about these incidents should itself raise doubts in our minds as to the real intention behind them. Why is it that they are happening now? Why is it that the Israel representativeis complaining SO much? For the answer to this question, 1 shall refer to an attack by Israel against Syria which took place on 10 December 1955. It is described by the then Chief of Staff, General Burns, in his book in the following terms: “As a reason for the attack onthe Syrian positions near the shore of Lake Tiberius, the Israel Foreign Ministry had cited the firing by Syrians on Israel fishing boats and their police escort on 10 December 1955. They also alleged that during 1955 there were ‘at least twenty-five incidents on the lake following the opening of fire by Syrian outposts on Israel fishermen and police launches causing loss of life and property’. In fact, the Israelis had submitted twenty-two complaints to the MAC [MixedArmistice Commission], but in none of them did they ask for an emergency meeting, or state there had been an Israeli killed or wounded. n Then the attack took place, and about forty Syrians were killed and wounded. General Burns went on to say: “Al1 the oircumstances point to the probability that the police boat was sent [by the Israelis] on 10 December deliberately to provoke an incident which would serve as excuse for launching the 73, With regard to threats of war, 1 shall again repeat the statement contained in the Israel newspaper, Orner, which speaks for the Governmentcontrolledlabour Federation. It stated: “Either Syria puts an end to the threats and acts of provocation or the fire of war, whose scope and outcome no one cari foretell, Will be lit.” This is a much stronger statement than anything that Mr. Comay has mentioned here. This obsession with Syria, and Syria alone, in these circumstances is very indicative and should be a warning to the Security Council.

Ipromised, Mr. President, to be very brief and 1 shall be very brie& 1 am on your list ta speak on this question tomorrow. At this time I would simply like to answer the last statement of Mr. Comay. 75. Mr. Comay referred to certain statements made by leaders in the Arab homeland. Of course sometimes we have our differences, and they are healthy differences; and ‘sometimes we hear strong statements in our area. But one thing is certain: Mr. Comay cannot impute one thing to us which we cari impute to hirn. We believe in decency, we believe in morality, we believe in human rights, and we believe in achieving our goals by decent means. Since Mr. Comay quoted from certain clippings, let me quote something to him from The New York Times concerning their behaviour-how they behave in our area, how they attain their goals in our homeland. Thk. is from a book by Major-General Carl von Horn, who was the man in charge of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization; this book was published today in English, in Lond0n.g These are not my words, but what he said about the way in which the Zionists-and Mr. Comay is one of them-achieve their goals and attain their designs. He said that in Jerusalem, attractive 3 Lieutenant-General E. L. M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli (Toronto, Clarke, Irwin and Company, Ltd., 1962), p. 118. d/ Major-General Carl van Horn, Soldiering for Peace (London, Cassel1 and CO., Ltd., 1966). 76. Now, we believe in decency. We cannot achieve our goals through such indecent means-at least Mr. Comay cari give us credit for that. Tomorrow 1 shall have more to say about Mr, Comay and about the practice of Mr. Comay’s destructive, political Zionist movement. However, since we are speaking about morality, let me put a few questions to Mr. Comay, and since he raised his hand, let him answer these questions. First, is it within the moral ethics of the ‘Zionist movement and of Mr. Comay to displace over one million Palestinian Arabs to make room for foreign Zionist immigrants? I want to see whether this has a foundation in the moral code of Zionist ethics. Seoond, is it fair to create a State against the Will of the majority of the people in an area and in complete defiance of the right of self-determination? Third, is it fair to expand that State, to displace more Arab Palestinians and to acquire more land in order to make room for more foreign immigrants? Fourth, is it fair to use the regular Israel army against Arab lands and peoples, to destroy, kil1 and murder, in cold blood and in the dark’? Fifth, is it fair to occupy demilitarized zones-and this is in the reports of the United Nations presented to the Council yesterday and this morning-in the south and in the north, and to try to change the status of those zones? Sixth, is it in accordance with the moral ethics of Zionism to build hotels in no man’s land, a few yards from the Jordan-Jerusalem-Bethlehem road, in violation of the decisions of the Security Council? Seventh, is it permissible to have the military and the Israel Air Force attack development projects in Syria, in violation of the United Nations Armistioe Agreement? ‘77. 1 could go on to raise a11 kinds of questions for Mr. Comay to answer, but 1 know the hour is late and this is not the time for raising questions, However, I have one thing to say, one thing for Mr. Comay to ponder. Our area-Asia and Africa-has had many invaders. We have avery rich history. Many invaders- Romans and others-came to our area but didnot stay very long, beoause to the area they represented a foreign intrusion, Mr. Comay and the Zionist movement and Israel cannot be exceptions to this rule. It may not be today, but it Will be tomorrow.

The representative of Israel has asked to speak, and 1 now cal1 upon him.

1 Will take only one minute of the Council’s time. Out of the very deep regard that we feel for the Government and the people of Sweden, and out of the very deep regard that we feel for the Secretary-General and his staff, against 80, Mr. EL-FARRA (Jordan): 1 feel sorry for the great nation of Sweden and for its Government when 1 think of the sacrifices made in the cause of peace and when 1 remember Count Folke Bernadotte, who was killed by the Zionist gang in Palestine.

We have now completed the list of speakers who asked to speak before the vote, except for three: the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Fedorenko; the representative of Jordan, who has indicated he would like to speak later; and the representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Tarabanov, who has also indicated he would like to speak later before the vote. These three colleagues of ours have informed me that they wish to speak as 1 have indicated, before the vote, and that they wish to do SO not today but at the meeting of the Council tomorrow. It had been my hope as President of the Council that the Council could complete its consideration of this item, which has been on our agenda since 14 October, at this meeting. 82. However, we have an additional complication, and that is that the General Assembly has addressed a communication to me which requires that within the next few minutes we meet to consider that communication and to play our part in the completion of the proceedings for the election of members of the International Court of Justice. 1 therefore propose, if the Councii is agreeable, that the next meeting of the Council on this issue be scheduled for 10.30 tomorrow morning, and if 1 hear no objection it Will be SO decided. 83. I also propose that we convene again within five minutes to commence our second meeting on the election of the justices of the International Court of Justice. The meeting rose at 5.10 p.m. HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED United Nations publications may distributors throughout the world. write to: United Nations, Sales COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS Les publications des Nations Unies sont agences dépositaires du monde entier. ou adressez-vous CI: Nations Unies, Section COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas casas distribuidoras en todas partes dirijase a: Naciones Ut-ridas, Seccion Litho in U.N. Price: U.S. 1.00 (Or equivalent in other currencies)