S/PV.1324 Security Council

Tuesday, Nov. 15, 1966 — Session None, Meeting 1324 — New York — UN Document ↗ OCR ✓ 2 unattributed speechs
This meeting at a glance
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Speeches
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Countries
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Resolutions
Topics
General statements and positions Security Council deliberations War and military aggression Syrian conflict and attacks General debate rhetoric Israeli–Palestinian conflict

The President unattributed #122662
In accordance with the decision taken previously [132Oth meeting], I shall, with the consent of the Council, invite the representative of Israel, Mr. Comay, to take a place at the Council table. prend place à la table du Conseil. At the invitatjon of the President, Mr. M. Comay {Israel) took a place at the Council table, 2. J’aimerais nement appuy8 notre d’agression contre
Mr. El-Farra JOR Jordan on behalf of my Government #122666
1 should like to express, on behalf of my Government, our gratitude to a11 members who supported our just complaint and who condemned the outrageous and wanton Israel act of aggression against Jordan. 3. dit& dticument recueillis vies l’agression 3. We pay tribute to the Secretary-Genexal for his prompt action in putting before the Council, in document S/7593, the first officia1 United Nations figures of our casualties and damage resulting from the Israel aggression of 13 November 1966. 4. It is unfortunate that, even after the crime had been committed, the Israel representative intervened in an attempt to belittle the attack and minimize the gravity of the cold-blooded act of terrorism and, consequently, the importance of our deliberations. 4. commis, essayer d’att6nuer de sang-froid 5. At the very outset we said that the facts we have pxesented to the Council were based on a preliminary report and therefore demonstrate that we take our obligations responsibly. It is not difficult to follow the Israel example and resort to falsehoods. We chose not to deviate from the truth. Subsequent inspection carried out by United Nations observers has shown that our preliminary estimates were under-estimated. 6. Mr. Comay referred to the equipment used as “a relatively small and mobile task force” [ 1320th meeting, para, 651. He also said “, , . the size and nature of the forces involved should not be given inflated dimensions,, . they were not of brigade strength but., . a relatively small mobile force of tanks and personnel carriers” [1321st meeting, paras. 25 and as]. 7. Mr. Comay is entitled to present any argument he wants, but 1 regret to say what Mr. Comay said w-as not supported by any evideme and there is, tberefore, a clear attempt to mislead this Council. Mr. Comay cannot say that the strength of the force was not brigade strength, when his own Government, and his own military spokesman, announced openly that the raid “bas been in brigade strength”. What 1 have just quoted is a dispatch of the Associated Press which reached New York a few hours after the attack. 8. It was alleged that the number ofhousesdestroyed was only thirty. Paragraph 10 of the United Nations officia1 report [S/7593] states that in As Samu alone n ..* the investigating United Nations military obsexvers saw that 125 houses, the village medical clin@ a 6-classroom school and a workshop had been completely demolished. In addition, one mosque and 28 houses had been damaged. Twenty Jordanian army txucks, two Jordanian army jeeps and one civllian bus were totally demolished,” 9. Paragraph 15 of the report states thatinKh. Jinba “15 stone buts had been totally destroyed, 7 damaged and one water well had been destroyed by demolitfon.” Pasagraph 16 states that “the police post of Rujm el Madfa’a was almost totally destroyed.” These are the officia1 figures of the United Nations. Need 1 say any more? 10. I have pictures showing some of these houses, showing the damaged house of worship, showing scenes of animals brutally gunned. 1 cari make these pictures available to members of the Security Council. These pictures recall to my mind, with painful accuracy. the pictures of the villages of Deir Yassin, Nahhalin, Qibya, Qalqiliyah, Shuqba, Bani Soubaila 12. Those who were watching television in New York the other day saw the whole crime proudly presented by the Israelis on the screen for the American public to sec. Even these films were taken by the Israelis, to be presented without shame, for the whole world to see. Yet Mr. Comay keeps mentioning that that was limited local defense action. 13. The report of the Secretary-General shows that the casualties were: 3 civilians killed, including 1 woman; 15 military personnel killed, including 1 major and 1 pilot; 37 military personnel wounded, as well as many civilians. These are the figures of the officiaï United Nations:report. Ineed not say any more, 14. Mx. Comay said, in reference to the decision of the Mixed Armistice Commission on the question of Tel el Arba’in, where, on 29 and 30 April this year, Israel military forces crossed the armistice demarcation line into Jordan and launched a major, unpxovoked and premeditated attack against the village of Tel el Arba’in, killing eleven persons, including a twentyyear-old girl, and wounding many othexs anddestroying over ten houses, that 1 quoted strong language from that decision, and that 1 omitted to tel1 the Council that the language was inserted into the decision by Jordan, and that the Chairman dissociated himself from the strong language used. He said that it would be advisable, in these matters, if decisions are quoted, to put a11 the facts before the Council. 15. It has not been the practice when quoting a deci- Sion of any United Nations organ to xefer to the explanation of vote, or the debates preceding the adoption of the decision. 1 did not choose a paxticular language in the decision. 1 simply quoted the operative paragraphs of that resolution. Rut even if Mr. Comay does not like the language adopted by the Mixed Armistice Commission, is he in a position, right here and now, to challenge the fact that the Israel army committed the crime, that the Commission found that that attack was not justified or provoked, and that a11 elements of that crime coincide with a11 elementsof the present act of aggression now before the Council, with one exception? The exception is that the present operation was more offensive, used more armoured equipment, more tanks, the air force, and involved more death and destruction, 16. 1 sincerely hope that Mr. Comay will discontinue his tactics of distortion and misleading which do not fit the high esteem which he owes this body. 1 never thought it possible that any Member of the United Nations could manifest such contempt for international .authoxity. Only the Israelis, it seems, are capable of 17. We have corne to the Security Counoil for speedy action, and for the adoption of firm, adequate and effective measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, Delay does not serve any fruitful purpose. Any resolution similar to those adopted in the past would not ease the explosive situation in the area. We have to go a step further. The question which the Council has to answer is very clear and simple. Will the Council take effective action? Would the Council help Jordan ease tension in the area? Or does the Council want the Government of Jordan to turn to its people and say that because of certain considerations, better known to some members here, the Security Council is not prepared to go beyond statements and resolutions which have already proved futile, not once or twice, but on several occasions, 18. 1 cal1 on this Council to face up to its responsibilities. 1 cal1 on the Security Council not to embark on action that has proved ineffective. 1 oall upon it not to repeat resolutions which have been proved absolutely futile, In sueh a horrible case, it is imperative that we should move one step further. This is the very least that the Council cari do to discourage aggression and potential aggression, not only in the Middle East, but in other regions of the world. Unless we do that, we Will undermine the authority of the United Nations and shake confidence in it. Any failure of the Council to go just one step beyond action that has yielded negative results would serve clear notice on the viotims of aggression that from now on they are entirely on their own. 19. In this case, there is no need for Jordan to appear as the complainant before the Council since statements of regret and sympathy do not heal the injured, bring life to the dead or prevent further lsrael brutality and massacres, What is before the Council is indeed a challenge. Our people are patient and peace-loving,. but their patience should not be misunderstood; their faith and courage should not be underestimated. 24. Jordan will not be alone because allpeaoe-loving peoples will support it since its action will be the legitimate action of self-defence, reflecting world conscience. Al1 our people are waiting with hope to see what action Will be taken by the Seourity Council to remedy the situation, 21. Determined as we are not to be taken by treachery and surprise attack, we still believe in and have faith in this august body and in the world Organisation, and we hope that the Councilts reaction tothe crime which it has been considering and which, in fact, has been condèmned and deplored unanimously, will reinforce that faith and that belief. 24. 1 must say that acceptance of Mr. Comayfs suggestions, and reference to a11 or any of them in a resolution, would not only amount to condoning an act of war, but would also constitute an encouragement for the criminal topersist inhis crimes, lawless behaviour and contempt of international authority. The referenoe in Chapter VII should be verydefinite in the resolution SO as to carry some weight, the more SO since there is no disagreement as to the facts of the case, 25. Last Friday, at the 1323rd meeting, we requested invoking Chapter VII of the Charter, that is, sanctions. Even as this request was being made, according t0 The New York Times of last Saturday, 19 November: “Highly plaoed sources [in Washington] insist that the United States’ policy toward Israel remains one of friendship, aid andproteotion-as it has been sinoe Israel’s birth 18 years ago.” 26, Now, what does this insistence of friendship, aid and protection by highly placed sources inwashington, 27. What I have already stated is the deduction of any reasonable man from the article itself, and the quotation attributed to “highly placed sources”, as well as other circumstances not unknown to members of this Council. 28. If you Will permit me, Mr. President, 1 will address you as the representative of the UnitedStates of America. If this appraisal is a mistaken one, it would give me and my delegation pleasure to be corrected, because 1 must stress the point that these statements have been of grave concern to my Government, and other Arab Governments, since they may reflect on the position to be taken by the United States on the question before the Council, and on the Palestine question as a whole. 29. We cannot ignore the fact that forty-six of the tanks that invaded Jordan were American Pa&on tanks, which were delivered to Israel recently by the United States to be used for defensive purposes. They were used for invasion-for invading Jordanwhich Mr. Comay, to meet United States requirements, chose to cal1 a “defensive operation”. They, too, were delivered in conformity with the policy of friendship, aid and protection-but used for murder and destruction, 30. Having explained the complaint of Jordan and put a11 the facts before this honourable body, it remains for me to state specifically what measures we think the Council, in its wisdom, should take to prevent any further aggression in the future, 31. First, the Security Council should condemn Israel for the wanton and outrageous attack of 13 November 1966, which was carried out by its regular ‘military forces against the territory of Jordan and its people. Secondly, it should express its grave concern at the failure of Israel to comply with its obligations. Thirdly, it should decide that the said act is a flagrant violation of the Charter of the UnitedNations andof the General Armistice .Agreement between Israel and J0rdan.u Fourthly, it should further decide that the said armed attack constitutes aggression under the provisions of Article 39 of the Charter. Fifthly, it should cal1 upon Members of the United Nations to adopt the necessary measures for applying economic sanctions against Israel. u Officia1 Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 1.
The President unattributed #122670
1 thank the representative of Jordan for his comments. With the permission of the Council, since he has addressed an inquiry to me, 1 shall make a very brief statement as the representative of the UNITED STATES, in the exercise cf the right of reply. 34, United States policy on the matter before this Council has been set forth here in clear terms. I do not believe it needs to be ‘dedÜced from the columns of a newspaper. I would refer the representative of Jordan to the statement 1 made on 16 November of this year [132Oth meeting] before this body. It was net a persona1 statement; it was a statement of United States policy and represented the considered view of my Government. That statement, of course, referred to the.particular complaint before the Council. 35. With respect to our policy in the Middle East generally, 1 would refer to the statement 1 made on 28 October 1966, from which 1 quote: “As stated on many occasions before the Security Council, in dealing with various aspects of this matter, United States policy respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a11 countries in the Middle East, Member States of the United Nations, as the Untted States is required to do under the Charter. United States policy firmly supports the maintenance of a peaceful situation in the Middle East , . .il [1310th meeting, para, 74.1 36, Mr. BERRO (Uruguay) (translated from Spanish): Once again we have before us the question of Palestine. This endless series of incidents between Arabs and Israelis is a real challenge to the authority and prestige of the United Nations. There cari be no countenanoing this perpetual flouting of the purposes and principles of the 1 international oommunity, which offends bath the legal and moral conscience of the world and. the pacifie spirit which the Charter demands as a prerequisite for membership of the Organization founded at San Francisco. 37. Where there is no peace and no desirefor Peace, where the possibility of war is always present, where minds are filled with hate, it seems somewhat foolish to invoke the aims andpurposes set forth in the instrument which was signed twenty years ago to light the way to a better world. 38. This is the third time since 1 took my Seat in the Council that 1 have had to address myself, sadly and pessimistically, to the Palestine problem and its record of sabotage and illicit incursions of open and deplorable aots of reprisal. It is always the same: men who fear each other, who hate each other, who 39. The prime purpose of the Security Council is to ensure peace. This being SO, it is reasonable to ask: what has the Council done about the confliots in Palestine? Has it really performed its duty? Has it taken the necessary steps to safeguard peaoe andprevent the Member States in that important part of the world from continually flouting its resolutions and creating a standing threat to collective security, without incurring the relevant provisions of Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter, in SO far as they apply? 40. Before answering these questions, 1 must point out that on two earlier occasions [1293rd and 1308th meetings], 1 oonfined myself in my statements toconsidering the complaints of Syria against Israel and of Israel against Syria from a legal point of view, in an endeavour to reach conclusions which might enable the Council to take effective and constructive measures to prevent a recurrence of the incidents, but without a specifio attribution of blame which would have necessitated a statement of condemnation, in the belief that to treat the matter in that way would promote understanding, conciliation and peace between the stubborn antagonists in the Middle East. 41. In developing this thesis 1 did not, of course, overlook the fact that, under law, eaoh party was to blame, to a greater or lesser degree, against the background of hostility and hate whioh has prevailed in the area sinoe 1947, as the records of the Unfted Nations show, 1 did not disregard the sots of sabotage against Israel, nor did I hide my disapproval of the reprisals against Syria. 1 applied the Roman maxim suum cuique tribuere (to render to everyone hisown). Instead of calling for condemnation, I thought it more in keeping with my duty that I should seek ways of preserving peace and preventing further incidents. therefore tried to avoid provoking hostile reactions in minds blinded by passion and consequently unlikely to respond to punishment, however well deserved.it might be in law and in justice. 42, At the time of the last incident, I summarized my position on the events of July 1966. My conclu- 43, This related to the July incidents, 1 then turned to the October complaints and analysed certain statements by Syrian leaders, the gravity of which impressed me, as a man of law and as a member of the ,aupreme body for the maintenance of collective peace and security. 1 ‘Spoke with some apprehension of those statements, which taken as a whole seemed to be the expression of a fully developed doctrine that advocated opposition to law and peace and preaohed the principle of the unlimited sovereignty of the State vis-à-vis the organs and instruments of the international community. However, 1 did not take a condemnatory attitude. 1 maintained the same realistic and humane position 1 had taken in connexion with the mutual complaints in July, 1 appealed to the ambassadors of Syria and Israel, repeating the same words that had previously fallen on deaf ears, Overcoming my disappointment, 1 again spoke hopefully, saying to the obstinate oontenders of Palestine that, instead of condemnation and punishment, the application of which might create a new source of dissidence, I should prefer the debate in the Council to be treated as a binding admonition to the parties to comply with the provisions of the Charter in their future conduct. Finally, 1 emphasized that both States must observe the Armistice Agreement of July 1949 and 1 gave a detailed oommentary on its provisions, pointing out the repeated breaches of their duties and obligations under it, I did net, however, advooate any penalties, I simply addressed the representatives of Syria and Israel in the following 43. Telles ler concernant les incidents de juillet. l’examen d6clarations dont la gravité de membre de la paix et de la s6ourit8 collective, tion, avec une certaine inquiétude, dont l’ensemble cohhrente, nisant le principe 1tEtat face aux organes et aux moyens que possédait la oommunaut8 & condamnation. de rèalisme en étudiant adresse d’Israël auxquelles, Surmontant mon d6sappointement, une voix pleine diateurs condamnations constituer ferais pour les parties, et l’efficacité ligne de conduite se conformer Il . . . it only remains for your Governments to fulfil the commitments which thcy undertook seventeen years ago in July 1949. There is no need for any new instrument; it would be superfluous. Al1 that is needed is a new attitude to the fuIfilment of old obligations. Al1 that is necessary is a change in the minds of men, not further agreements, resolutions and judgements whioh would add nothing to the commitments already inourred. Even if such new instruments were adopted, they would remain a dead letter while Wose responsible for implementing them continued to be motivated by the same spirit which has led them to leave their previous commitments unfilfilled. The latter have the same legal force and are just as relevant as in those distant days of 1949.” [Ibid., para. 104.1 44. The debate was followed by lengthy, arduous, trying and oomplex negotiations with a view to achieving a solution by consensus. 45. The valiant efforts of the representatives of Nigeria and Uganda, to whom 1 paytribute, steadfastly overcame obstacle after obstacle, until Me final stage was reached; and then, when success seemed certain, came frustration and failure. 46. I had the honour of taking an active part in those negotiations and of joining the other non-permanent members of the Council in the searchforan impartial and constructive solution, In the face of certain counter-proposals which were unacceptable in terms of a consensus, I strongly advocated the formula of justice which reflected our approach. 1 remember having opposed certain amendments on the ground that they destroyed the balance on which the ideological and moral structure of a consensus depended. 1 was striving for a balanced text whioh would be the expression of an intellectual exercise, based on reason, logic, moderation and equity, and would take into ac- Count the moral values and realism ,expected of a body whose: essential function is to preserve peace. 1 did not want a purely forma1 and insubstantial balance, amounting to no more than an exhibition of political gymnastics or dexterity akin to that displayed by cirous acrobats on the slack wire while the audience applauds the artists’ fleeting cleverness, whichyields no useful or practical result but the transie@ pleasure of an idle entertainment. 47. Mowever, the Charter requirement that any solution must have the support of the five permanent mem- 48. Are we following the right course? Are we fulfilling the duties imposed on us by the Charter as preservers of collective peace and security? 49, When 1 spoke in the Genesal Assemblyafew days ago on the questionof South West Africa, contemplating the infuriating continuation of South Africa’s failure to comply with the mandate, the intolerable apartheid system and the passivity of the United Nations, 1 voiced some thoughts which corne into my mind today when 1 see the impunity with which serious incidents constantly recur in Palestine. In reply to certain legal reservations, which were in any event quite without foundation, I said: “Sbmeone said that certain juridical aspects are lacking for the clarifioation of this point, In our view nothing is lacking. We are conoerned, yes, with the possibility of perpetrating an omission or negligence by not acting immediately in legitimate defence of the interests of the international oommunity. “We are oonoerned about our passivity, when we ought to be active. We are concerned that the responsibilities inseparable from the work we are doing should be accepted. This is the only juridical and moral problem that we must solve without delay. We have waited over twenty years. Let us hope that moderation Will not become the vice of weakness.. . Il ..a “What is happening? The shadows of Geneva are looming over New York. Rave we no faith in the effectiveness of the United Nations? 1s prudence killing the concept of our own responsibility? Have we lost faith in ourselves?“u 50. The serious complaint by Jordan which we are considering raises those same painful issues that confronted us in our discussion of the case of South West Africa. Basically, of course, the answers must corne fxom the great Powers, without whose unanimous concurrence no decision cari be made, however hard we a Officia1 Records of the General Assembly, ‘Ikenty-first Session,. plenary Meetings, 1448th meeting, paras. 128, 129 and 137. 51. The report of the Committee of the Uruguayan Senate, in recommending parliamentary ratification of the San Francisco Charter, says of its Purposes: “The Charter declares that the first and fundamental purpose of the organized community is to maintain international peace and security (Article 1, paragraph 1). This is the dominant and vital aim of the entire system: peace and security at any-or almost any-price. The whole document shows that, in fulfilment of that purpose, the Seourity Council is unquestionably the organization with power to maintain peace and security above ail,, , The arrangements made for the Council show that the real problem of security decisively dominated the legal question of international community. The abject was to create security through organized force,. .” The parliamentary report goes on to say: “Has the problem of security as a legal theory of power truly been solved? Will this unified power, in the form of organized force, prove effective in maintaining security? Our answer must be that genuine security is not security through force but security through law, not material securitybut legal security. States, like men, feel secure whentheyfeel protected by law, not when they feel coeroed by force. There is somethingelse, however: within this framework of neoessity and security, the five vlctorious Powers must act; indeed, they bear tbe responsibility for unity, If this unity is breached, the Organization collapses. Will unity be maintained? Unity will inevitably be the result of a combination of the world’s prudence with the political wisdom of the leaders of the new Organization, sinoe unity has to be maintained among five Powers of different geographical extent, with different interests and with different soaial structures. Of course, the Charter makes the fate of the Organization dependent on the unity of the five Powers before the five great Powers have achieved unity among themselves on the settlement 3/ Oppenheim, International Law-A Treatise, 8th ad. (London, Longmaris, Green and CO., 1955), vol. 1. 52. Professor Le Fur, of the University of Paris, speaking on the same subject, justifies the need for the unanimous vote of the five great Powers in these words; “After all, let us bear in mind that if a decision had to be implemented, the great Powers wouldhave to bear the brunt of the fighting. As they have greater obligations, it is natural that they should have special rights. n 53. Mr. Juan AndrBs Ramhez, the eminent professor of constilutional law at the University of Montevideo, in his opinion on the San Francisco Charter which had been requested by the Senate, referred to the composition of the Security Counoil in the following terms: “1 accept as a fait accompli the predominant influence of the great Powers within the international community. It is a fact-a fact which we must accept, because otherwise, any effort to establish peace and law firmly throughout the world would fail. 1 may add that there is some justice in this situation, inasmuch as those who made the greatest expenditure of life and property for the freedom of a11 and who will also have to bear the greatest responsibility and the greatest sacrifice, should the ideal of peace based on law which is the supreme aspiration of mankind at this decisive moment of its history fail once again, undoubtedly have some right to be accepted, not, of course, as masters, but as leaders of the international community.” 54. These opinions, expressed in 1945, are clearly and strongly relevant to current events and show plainly that the international community founded at San Francisco undoubtedly wanted to be governed by principles of law but that, in view of the overriding politioal realities, it inevitably had to be erected on the old principle of the balance of power, as had happened in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia, in 1713 with the Treaty of Utrecht, in 1815 with the Treaty of Vienna and in 1919 with the Treaty Of Versailles, 55. It is nevertheless true that the right of Veto granted to the great Powers, which leaves the fate of the world to be settled, in the last resort, by forae, was felt to be not a privilege but a sacred responsibility jointly assumed by the great Powers towards a11 the peoples of the earth. 56. It was SO understood by the great men of Latin America from the very beginning of United Nations operations. 57. Victor Andrés Belatinde, a great jurist and a great man, described the tragic history of the liberum veto which led to the disintegration of Poland and vitfated the work of the League of Nations in manY He continued: “The struggles and the debates had not been in vain. They gave the words in which the right of veto was expressed a deeper meaning. The great Powers had contracted a solemn moral obligation concerning its exercise. The smaller Powers interpreted what they had confessed, not as a privilege, but as a responsibility. The Peruvian delegation stated in Commission III that the historic debate had given the Article which was adopted moral significance. Thereafter one could not speak of a right of veto, but only of the obligation of ananimity. This is not a oasuistical distinction. A veto may be imposed at the beginning of a debate, without taking account of the arguments, whereas the obligation to seek unanimity requires objective consideration of a problem, discussion of it in good faith, appraisal of proposa& and a striving for reconoi1iation.n~ 58. Peace in Palestine, the subject of the Council’s discussion, therefore depends primarily on the unanimous combined vote of the five great Powers in favour of a solution which also has the support of at least three non-permanent members. The efforts, arguments, energy and eloquence of fourteen members of the Council Will be of no availif their votes in support of a resolution do not include the votes of those Powers which bear on their shoulders the responsibility of maintaining and preserving equilibrium and peace in the new world that came into being after the Second World War. 59. We are once again confronted with a serious upheaval in the Middle East, the latest in the endless series of bloody confliots which, since they cannot be ended by a voluntary decision of the parties, place an important part of the world in serious peril. 60. Of course, we non-permanent members have our responsibility, and we axe prepared to shoulder it with a11 the determination and energy whioh the circumstances require, but whatever we do will be doomed to frustration unless the unanimous support of the five permanent members is assured in advance. 61. My delegation holds that at this point the Counoil must state its position clearly and unequivocally, disoharging its responsibilities under Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter and fitting its action to the circumstances and characteristics of the case. -/ Veinte Aiios de Naciones Uaidos, (Madrid, Ediciones Cultura Hisplnica. 1966), p. 16. 63. Two weeks ago, when voting on draft xesolution S/7675/Rev.l, I said that, although it did not embody all our views, it was the only positive measure likely to win the Council’s support, and I also said that failure to take a decision would be prejudicial to the prestige of the United Nations and could have deletexious repercussions in the area concerned. In concluding, 1 said: “We would have preferred a different text, but we cannot xemain inext. We would not want to throw away our vote by supporting a draft xesolution doomed to failure or by abstaining. We wish to make some contribution to the solution of this serious problem, even though that contribution may not pexfectly reflect oux thinking, and we make it in the highex interests of co-operation and harmony.w [1316th meeting, para. 77.1 64. We are prompted by the same motives today in considering the serious complaint which has been submitted by Jordan and amply confirmed by the report of the Armistice Commission read out by the Secretary-General [1320th meeting]. 65. The facts speak for themselves: violation of Jordanian territory, tanks and military aircraft in a combined action, destruction of villages, homes in ruins, many lives lest, both civilian and military, and considerable material damage. What is the legal name for these events? I am not going to improvise any concepts. The tradition of Uxuguay is very rich in this field. Even if we wanted to, we could not turn our backs on our countryls undeviating international conduct at congxesses and confexenoes from 1889 until the San FXancisco Charter, and including the Txeaty of Versailles. 66. In the circumstances, it is very relevant to xecall the position taken by Uruguay in September 1923 aftex the bombardment and occupation of the island of Corfu by lVIussolini~s forces as an act of axmed reprisa1 against Greece fox the muxder of members of an Italian military mission, The matter was bxought before the Council of the League of Nations, which decided to refer it to a special Commission of Jurists, under Articles 12, 13, 14 and 15 of the Covenant.a 67. Amid the vacillations of the legal doctrine of the time, Uruguay spoke thxough the person of theformex s( Sec Charles de Viss&er, Revue de droit international et de tigislation comparée, (paris, A. Pedone, 1924), Saries 3, vol. 5, pP* 213 and 377. “None of the drafters or signers of the Covenant had any idea that the slightest possibility of the use of violence to settle disputes between peoples might be left open in the future. Al1 the drafts on which the discussion of the Covenant was based are perfectly clear in that regard, President Wilsonts draft stated: ‘The signatory Powers Will in no case resort to armed force.’ The draft of the French Ministerial Commission was no less explicit: ‘The League of Nations has as its aim to maintain peace by substituting Right for Might as the arbiter of disputes. It will thus guarantee to a11 States alike, whether small or great, the exeroise of their sovereignty.’ The Italian delegation, in turn, proposed this wording: ‘Every action or attempted action constituting a curtailment of or menace to the political independence or territorial integrity of a State contradicts the principles upon which the League is founded. The Contradicting States undertake to abstain from every coercive act, one against the othert.“u 68, My compatriot, with his knowledge of the law of the law of treaties, concludes by stating that, except in the circumstances provided for in Article 16 of the Covenant, the use of force must be considered abolished in contemporary international law, as laid down in the Treaty of Versailles. In accordance with Article 16, war would be possible and legitimate only when waged “to protectthe covenants” of the League itself. Article 12 of the Covenant imposes on Members a strict obligation to submit to a judicial procedure (judicial settlement or inquiry by the Council) all disputes, whether legal or political. 69, Uruguay has consistently conducted its relations with other States in keeping with these principles, which form the basis of our juridfcal oulture. ‘70. In fact, long before the Covenant was drafted, Uruguay had a distinct international policy of favouring comprehensive arbitration for the settlement of disputes between States, This position, whioh was reflected in arbitration treaties ConcludedwithParaguay and El Salvador in 1883, was given added force early in the present Century. Examples cari be found in the 6( See Revue générale de droit internationalpuhlic, (Paris, A. Pedone, 1924), vol. XXXI, p. 290. 71. Consistent with that policy, Uruguay oonoluded with Italy in 1914 the most comprehensive andradical treaty of arbitration ever signed until then. The message to Parliament concerning ratification of the treaty stated that “war must not be declared for any reason unless an offer of arbitration has first been maden.a 72. Thus, the repudiation of reprisals and the recognition of arbitration as a means of settling international disputes are incontrovertible principles of Uruguayan public law and a vital element of the culture of Uruguyans as a civilized, peace-loving and law-abiding people. This was our stand long before it was decided at San Francisco to condemn reprisals and abolish violence as a means of settling differences or disputes between States Members of the international community. 73. Our oountry’s positionon suchmatters as aggression, violence and reprisals was not worked out today to fit the circumstances of today. It has a long history and stems from deep-rooted, firm convictions. As Professor Gros Espiell states in his book,ElUruguy y la preservaci6n de la paz: “Perhaps in a few matters as in this-the affirmation of the principle of peace-is there such complete concordance between the conduct demanded by the oonstitutional system and the actual fact of a virtually undeviating tradition of international policy whioh moreover is upheld unanimously by public opinion. n 74. 1 should like lastly to refer to a paragraph in the Uruguayan Government’s reply of 27 February 1964, to a letter from Mr. Khrushohev, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, which requires no comment, It reads: “Anything that serves to reaffirm SO basio aprinoiple as the prohibition of the use of unlawful violence is of very speoial interest to those countries which, beoause of their size and their capabilities, rely on the prevalence of legal norms and of peaceful negotiation in the settlement of disputes and to those which, like Uruguay, have a long tradition of peaceful relations as called for in article 6 of its Constitution and in many treaties against war signed during the last forty years.” 75. As may be seen, a long, firm and unvarying line of oonduct marks our position. We are invitingno new a Roberto B. Giudice par Efraîn Gonz?dez Conzi, Bactley el Batllismo, (Montevideo, Editorial Medina, 1959), p. 341, 76. TO abandon this position would also mean disregarding the obligations imposed by the Charter. Article 2 states: “Al1 Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. “AIl Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence ofany state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purpose of the United Nations. “Al1 Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accosdancc with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the Uhited Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action. “The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles SO far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and securityen 77. And as we a11 know-although it may be well to recall it once again-the first paragraph of the Chapter on the Purposes and Principles of the Charter by which we are govesned states: “The Purposes of the United Nations are: “1. TO maintain international peace and security, and ta that en& to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.” 78. Anyone who employs violence of any kind, anyone who does not use peaceful means, anyone who does not submit international disputes or situations in which he is involved to the competent organs of the United Nations is deliberately, by his own actions, placing himself outside the laws which govern the international oommunity. 79. My delegation is not overlooking the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence which is allowed under Article 51 of the Charter if an attack occurs against a Member ofthe United Nations, It is also aware of the authority which the Security Council has in such cases. However, the clear difference between a mere act of reprisa1 and the exercise of the right 81. The items axe serious. Danger knocks at our door. We cannot fold our arms. Statutory obligations written into the United Nations Charter and contractual obligations sealed in the Armistice Agreements clearly lay down the duties of the Governments concerned. 32. Inaction on the part of the Council would be fatal to the future of the region involved and perhaps to world peace. The time has corne for action. Upon the great Powers rests the essential responsibility of achieving unanimity among themselves. 83. Within the framework 1 have described, we shall support any just solution that may be reached with the indispensable concurrence of the five votes required ,under Article 27 of the Charter. Mindful of our duty, we shall vote in favour of a proposa1 for peace under law whioh Will promote the tranquillity and well-being of the Middle East while unequivocally condemning acts of reprisai, in accordanoe with the steadfast line of international conduct followed by my country. Without underestimating the deterrent effect of a sentence aocording to the theory of criminal law, we shall endeavour not to confine ourselves simply to an academie statement on the definition of the acts referred to in Jordan’s complaint, but shall go on to the study and elaboration of constructive proposals for strengthening, as far as necessary, the means, the powers and the .resources of the United Nations agencies working at the very scene of the events, including the creation, if necessary, of other bodies with broader scope that might effectively perform the important functions for which ultimate responsibility rests with this Counoil, to which the international community has entrusted the supreme and sacred task of safeguarding world peace. 84.. It is unnecessary to dwell on the authority of the Council. It has olear juridical duties, of course, but its prime and essential obligation is to maintain international peace and security. Article 23 and succeeding Articles of the Charter make aux duties and responsibilities perfectly clear. Any omission or negligence in that sphere could seriously jeopardize the very SUX- ViVal of the human race, The causes contributing to almost a11 major conflagrations have tended to lack focus, even when fed fxom below by old and deepseated passions, vanities, interests and ambitions which corne suddenly and unexpectedly to the surface, In the case of Palestine, the evil isapparent. It is our duty to extirpate it. No usefulpurpose would be served by a solemn judgement of condemnation unless it was accompanied by rational and practioal solutions designed to eliminate the sources of unrest and tragedy in that part of the world. 86. Since we have the United Nations, a body created to ensure peace among men despite ideological, racial, religious and other differences, it is no longer neoessary ta resort to the just war of which Cioero spoke, much less to unjust acts of violence which endanger collective peace and security. 87. Under the auspices of the United Nations, Arabs and Israelis must once for ail decide to taokle and resolve the real and deep-seated causes of their differences, co-operatively and constructively. We a11 know these causes, and they know them better than we. 88. The course is olear. It need only be taken. Do SO, and you Will receive the worldts help and God’s blessing.
The representative of Jordan presumed to lecture me this morning about the way 1 present my Government’s views to this Council. Some of the interventions which the Council bas heard in these weeks and months have been in deplorable taste and lacking in those standards of debate which this Council is entitled to expect. It is not my delegation which has been at fault in this regard. We have always tried to address the Council with dignity, restraint and factual integrity. Mr. El- Farrats remarks are not presented to the right address. 90. Before pxoceeding any further, Mr. President, 1 should like to draw the attention of the Counoil to the letter which 1 presented to you this morning as President of the Council and which has been circu-. lated as document S/7594. That letter makes certain factual observations on the report by the Chief of Staff of U’NTSO, which is attached to the Secretary- General’s report. 1 quote from it and may 1 say, before doing SO, that it is not true that my delegation questions in any way the integrity of the United Nations staff in this matter. “It appears from General Bull’s report that the account of the Israel action given in it is based on “First, the sole objective of the Israel action was to demolish a limited number of emptyhouses, after thoir occupants had been evacuated. This was done as a warning against aiding and harbouring saboteur and terrorist groups that had been carrying out a number of raids into Israel in that sector of the border. The number of houses demolished was far less than the number stated in the report. Vecondly, the Israel troops were given strict instructions to take every precaution for the avoidance of OaSUalties. The total civilian casualties, as confismed by the Chief of Staff’s oorrected report, were 3 killed and 17 injured. Of the latter, 10 suffered minor injuries, requiring only first-aid, and returned home the same day. (Unfortunately, in the report as first distributed, the oivilian casualty figure was given as 3 killed and 97 injured, owing to an error in transmission, This erroneous figure gained wide publioity.) It is not stated how or at what stage of the incident these casualties were oaused, and at least part of them may have resulted from the military clash. Their number confirms that empty houses were demolished after their occupants had first been evaouated. It may be noted that according to the report the village had a population of 5,000, and 1,200 houses.” Je voudrais barde, mitraillé, eu des centaines donn& ioi. 1 would merely like to interpolate here that if, in faot, we had been bombing, shelling and demolishing an occupied village, there would have been many hundreds of casualties, and not these figures. “The main oasualties occurred in an unexpected clash between the Israel task force and a Jordanian unit which rushed to the soene in fifteen to twenty trucks, and launched an attack. The Israel force disengaged itself and withdrew as soon 88 possible, The milltary casualties were 15 killed and 37 wounded (29 lightly) on the Jordan side, and 1 killed and 10 wounded on the Israel side. MY Government deeply regrets a11 loss of life and injury that may have been oaused either to military personnel or to civilians. “Thirdly, the number of Israel tanks used in the area of the incident was ten. None of them were Patton tanks, “Fourthly, the total number of personnel involve$ w+s under 400. *-That is roughly10 per cent, maybe, of a brigade group.- “Most of these men were needed to ensure evacuation of houses and prevention of. casualties. “Lastly, there was no artillery shelling. “It is essential for the Security Council to have a correct factual appreciation of the 13 November action, “My Government earnestly hopes that there may now be an end to violence and bloodshed of any kind. It appeals to the Governments of neighbouringstates to co-operate to this end in order to ensure a peacefui and undisturbed existence fox the population on both sides of the bordes.” 91. 1 should now like to make some comments on the statement made this morning by the representative of Jordan, and on the kindofdecision he wants. He calls fox a harsh, one-sided and threatening resolution by this Council; such a xesolution would be out of place and lacking in any sense of proportion or equity. The Israel action, whethex members of the Council deploxe it or net, did not take place inany vacuum. The Council is familiar with the backgxound, especially the long sequence of armed raids into Israel from the territory of neighbouxing States causing serious 10~s of life, injuxy to persans, damage to psoperty, dynamiting of homes, mining of xoads, dexailing of trains, disxuption of normal civilian life and conditions of great danger and insecurity for the peaceful inhabitants of our exposed border villages. 92. Behind these attacks is the contention of Arab Governments that they are in a state of war with Israel-a Member State of this Organization. That policy is expressed in open threats to our independence and territorial integxity, inopenmilitaryprepaxations, in blockades and boycotts, and in armed attack upon our civilian population in pursuance of what is called “a people’s war”. This is the cause of the tension in the area, and goes to the root of the situation facing the Cour&. That situation involves thxee convexging responsibilities: that of the Arab Governments, that of Isxael, and that of the United Nations, First, there is the xesponsibility of Arab Governments, including Jordan, to prevent their territory from being used for armed attack against a neighbouxing State; that responsibility is dexived from the Charter and specified in clear terms in the Armistice Agxeements. None of the Governments concerned cari evade that responsibility, and to it my Government must fixmly hold the Government of Jordan and the other Governments concerned. We regard this as a commitment not only to the United Nations, but a direct commitment to isxael contained in forma1 instruments signed by the Govexnments concerned. Secondly, there is the responsibility of the Government of Isxael to defend its citizens, its territory and its bordexs against armed attack. That responsibility too is inesoapable, 93. For what is the Council now being pressed to do by the representative of Jordan? It is told to condemn harshly an action by a Government, but to shut its eyes to the reasons for that action, It is told to deal with an incident, but not with the situation of which that incident is a symptom. It is told to address itself to one party in the dispute, in terms of condemnation and threat, without recognizing that the party in the over-a11 picture is the target of aggressive policies and not its source, and is actually under physical attack from its neighbours. The Council must ask itself whether this is really the way to preserve peace and to reduce tension in the troubled Middle East. Of course, that is the way advocated by the representative of Jordan, and 1 do not blame him; he speaks not as a Council member, but as a party to a dispute before the Council. In fact, he is requiredby Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter to abstain from voting in this matter. But what about those other members of the Council who are deeply conscious of their responsibility for peace and who are less interested in judgements than in stability? They have made olear that they do not condone the Israel action of 13 November; but does that bind them to wipe out of their minds what they know about the attacks on Israel? Does it commit them to refuse to note the underlying causes of tension-t0 reject a11 elements of restraint or balance in the formulation of a draft resolution? Such an attitude by the Council would be inconceivable to the people of Israel and to their elected Government whioh must ensure their safety. 95. My delegation craves the indulgence of the Council in putting before it, in such candid terms, the position of my Govesnment and the way in which my people now see this matter. What is involved in this discussion is extremely serious by a11 accounts. What we seek above a11 is a chance to live in freedom from fear of attack. It is our earnest hope that any action the Council may take Will be related to the situation as a whole and as it is, and that such action Will have a calming effect. We believe that Jordan and Israel have a fundamental common interest keeping our border areas peaceful and unmolested, and the way should be left clear for progress in this direction with the help and encouragement of the Security Council and of a11 peace-loving Governments represented on this Council.
1 realize that the hour is late, and i will not oblige my friends and colleagues axound this table to sit here and listen to my answer. 1 shall have time to answer this afternoon. 1 should simply like to make a request. I request formally that a map showing the topography of the area be circulated in this Council. 1 shall demonstrate that the question is net one of a village being the base for certain activities-but on this 1 shall have more to say later-because the report gives a11 the information but this information, standing alone, is not helpfui unless we have this map. That is my first point. 97. Mr. Comay spoke about dignity and restraint. 1 do not think he is qualified even to mention these. 1 do not think the United Nations charge of committing acts of lawlessness entitle him to use these terms in this respectable body, He referred to hearsay evidence, but most of the information and facts upon which we rely are facts embodied in the report based on things which the obsesvers did see. 1 Will just cite one example. Look at paragraph 10, which tells us that the investigating United Nations military observers saw “125 houses, the village medical clin& a 6-classroom school and a workshop had been completely demolishedfl. This is not hearsay. They did go to the area. They did see the area. They did examine the houses. They did report to the Council conoerning these houses. 1s this hearsay evidence? 1 shall have more to say on this question later on. 98. The other question raised is the question of the Jordan Army rushing to the attack, when aotually they were defending their helpless civilian oitizens. 1s he entitled to refer to this as an attack? 1 leave it to the wisdom of the Council to evaluate the statement that the Council has just heard. It was SO decided. 101. My list of speakers for this meeting is not exhausted, but in view of the hour, and of the fact that our colleague from Bulgaria, who was scheduled to speak even earlier, has kindly agreed to defer his statement until this afternoon in the interest of our convenience, I have consulted the members of the Council and, if there is no objection, we shall now adjourn and reconvene at 4.30 this afternoon. 101. BpuisBe; représentant ti?t, a aimablement jusqu’a consuR dlobjections, réunir The meeting rose at 1.3$ p.m. HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED United Nations publications may distributors throughout the world. Write ta: United Nations, Sales COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS Les publications des Nations Unies agences dépositaires du monde entier. ou adressez-vous à: Nations Unies, Section COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Las publicaciones de las Naciones casas distribuidoras en todas partes diriiase a: Naciones Unidas, Seccian
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UN Project. “S/PV.1324.” UN Project, https://un-project.org/meeting/S-PV-1324/. Accessed .