S/PV.1331 Security Council

This meeting of the Security Council has been convened at the request of the representative of the United Kingdom, in, accordance with his letter of 5 December J.966 [S/7610]. 2. Requests have been received from the representatiVeS of Zambia [S/7613] and Senegal [S/7615] asking that they should be allowed to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion of%he Council on the item before it. Just a few moments ago also, the President received requests from the representatives of Algeria [S/7623], Pakistan [S/7624] and India IS/7625]. If I hear no objection, 1 shall invite the representatives of the above-mentioned States to take the seats reserved for them faoing the Council, it At the invitation of the President, Mr. S. M, Kapwepwe (Zambia), Mr. Diop (Senegal), Mr. 2’. Bouattoura (Algeria), Mr. Amjad Ai? (Pakistan) and Mr. G. Parthasarathi (India) took the places reserved for them near the Council table.

The Council Will now proceed to the consideration of the question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia in accordance with the request submitted by tbe United Kingdom. 4. Mr. George BROWN (United Kingdom) : 1 thought it right to make a special journey here today in order that, on behalf of Her Majesty’s Government, I could ask the Council to direct its attention once again to the problem created by the continued existence of an illegal rggime in Rhodesia. In our opinion, the events of the last week mark a turning-point inthe history of this problem. Perhaps, therefore, 1 mightbeginbyreminding the Council of the aims which my Government has set itself and the action it has taken since 11 November 1965. 5. Our aim is to bring the rebellion to an end. We have set ourselves to achieve this by peaceful means and we shall now ask the Council to place upon a11 nations the obligation to carry out with the same intensity the measures which we have ourselves taken since the illegal declaration of independence on 11 November 1965. 6. On that day we asked for a meeting of the Council which unanimously condemned the illegal declaration of independence and called on a11 States to refuse reeognition and to deny assistance to the illegal rBgime [sesolution 216 (1965)]. ‘7. A week later, in its resolution 217 (1965), the Council spelt out in greater detail its condemnation and the steps which it called upon my Government and the Governments of other Member nations to take in ordex to restore constitutional rule in Rhodesia. 8. Since then no single Member of the UnitedNations has in fact recognized the Rhodesian regime. Many have joined with us to assist in the campaign of economio pressure which we then initiated. Let me say right away that my Government is grateful for that support and assistance. 9, At the beginning of April an emergenoy was created by the imminent arriva1 of bulk supplies of crude oil for Rhodesia at the port of Beira. TO deal psomptly and effectively with this particular threat my Government sought and obtained anurgent meeting of the Council. The outcome was completely successfui. Acting under the international authority of the Council, Britain was able to thwart that COnSPiraCY: 11. We have pursued this aim in two ways. First, we have sought to outlaw the Rhodesian Front regime and to bring home to it and to its supporters by economic pressure that there is no future for Rhodesia if they continue in their attempt to defy the civilized world. 12. The abject of the programme of sanctions has been to reduce Rhodesian economic activity andprospects to a point where even the most stubborn members of the Rhodesian Front Party could see that there would be no tolesable economic future for their country if their present policy were pursued. The best way of achieving this was and still is to strike directly at Rhodesian earning power by action against the exports which are most important to it in international trade. This is the essence of the proposals which 1 shall be laying before the Council today, 13. This economic pressure was, as the Council decided, then based on voluntary action. This was an experiment in international co-operation. For avariety of reasons, early forecasts were not borne out by events. Quite frankly, we expeoted a greater economic and political impact. But do not let this lead us to underrate what we have in fact achieved. The impact on the Rhodesian economy has indeedbeen significant. 14. After twelve months, despite every effort to circumvent our sanctions, Rhodesian experts have been tut by about 40 per cent from a level of f.143 million in 1965 to a current annual rate of f80 million. In particular, the greater part of this year’s tobacco trop, upon which Rhodesia depends fox no less than one third of its earnings abroad, lies unsold in Rhodesian warehouses and much of it is deteriorating in impsovised storage. 16. Of course, the regime has by propaganda and censorship concealed both from its own citizens and and to Some extent from the outside world the effects which sanctions have already had on its economy. NO one here needs reminding how truth cari be hidden for quite a time in a police state with total censorship. But this only hides; it cannot dispel the real 16. Whilst seeking always to increase these eoonomic pressures, we have at the same time kept open the way to a settlement by means of informa1 talks with the regime. There have been two main issues which we have continuecl to explore with them in this way: first, the way in which the rebelrégime could be replaced by a broad-based and legal representative government with whom an independent constitution could be agreed; and secondly, the constitutional provisions whioh would be needed to give effect to the six principle& which we a11 believe must be the basis of the future independent constitution of Rhodesia. 1’7. Throughout the informa1 talks conducted at many levels the regime maintained a stubborn and recalcitrant attitude which seemed to hold out only the most meagre hope that they would be willing to end their rebellion on terms which we oould regard as just and equitable. Nevertheless, our main abject has throughout been to get such a settlement in a peaceful way. Therefore, as you a11 know, the Prime Minister decided that he would invite Mr. Smithtomeet him for a final and decisive round of talks last week in a British warship off Gibraltar. Mr. Wilson’s purpose in proposing this top-level encounter was to explain to Mr, Smith in person, beyond a11 doubt or possibility of misunderstanding, what would happen if he and his Rhodesia Front colleagues were not prepared toallow their captive countrymen to return to legal and constitutional sule. The Prime Minister also thought it right to test, through this final meeting with Mr. Smith, whether-even SO very late in the day-an honourable settlement might not still be achieved through a personal effort at the highest level. 18. During the talks which took place last week in H.M.S. Tiger, a working documentzl was jointly prepared by the Prime Minister and Mr. Smith which, if it had been accepted by the régime, would have secured a stable future for Rhodesia based on the six principles. In particular, it would have provided immediate political advancement for the Rhodesian Africans, and would have contained guarantees of unimpeded progress towards majority rule and against retrogressive amendment of the constitution, The document provided also for a return to legality through the setting-up of a broad-based legal government of a xepresentative character, including Afxicans and independent members. Under such a government it would have been possible to test freely and fairly the acceptability to Rhodesian opinion as a whole of the proposed constitutional settlement. As an essential precondition of this test, a11 censorship would have &‘See Rhodesia-Proposais for a SertIement 1966, London, I+X Majesty’s Statlonery Office, Cmnd. 3159. 2/ Ibid., appendix B. 19. The independence constitution which we proposed was fully safeguarded with an ultimate right of appeal to the Privy Council in the United Kingdom. We also proposed that the legal Rhodesian Government and we ourselves should together negotiate a bilateral Anglo- Rhodesian treaty guaranteeing the independence constitution. This treaty would then have been registered with the United Nations. Despite the fact that such a document was jointly worked out, Ms. Smith declined either to join the Prime Minister in accepting it there and then or even to recommend it to his colleagues. Nevertheless, it was accepted in full on Sunday, 4 December by the British Cabinet. 20. The document formed a comprehensive solution, and had it been accepted by Mr. Smith and his colleagues, 1 would have been reporting a settlement here today which I could have commended to the aonscience of the world. Alas, on Monday, 5 December, it was rejected by the Smith régime. Thus, in the full knowledge that we on aux side had en.dorsed the terms, Mr, Smith made clear bis and his Rhodesia Front colleaguest total unwillingness to accept a just settlement which would have guaranteed to the people of Rhodesia as a whole progress in freedom to majority rule. 21. As we repeatedly warned them, the fact that the document has now been sejected in Salisbury has created a new situation. The Rhodesian Front rbgime have shown conclusively that they intend to persist not only in their rebellion but in their defianoe of civilized opinion everywhere. In the opinion of my Government, the continuation of the rebellion presents an ever greater challenge to the international community. In these circumstances, there is an urgent need for us to strengthen and fortify our actions internationally to overcome this challenge by the best and most effective means open to US. 22. In its resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November last year, this Council determined that the %ntinuance in time” of the situation resulting from the Proclamation of independence by the illegal authorities in Southern Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace and security, That situation has now continued for more than a year, and it is against that background that my Government cornes before the Council with a request that it reinforce, with a resolution under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the 23. The action of the Rhodesian Front in making the illegal declaration backed by the repressive use of force, followed now by their rejection of this fair and reasonable settlement, has brought in its train the most far-reaching consequences. The dangers to peace and stability in the whole region of central and southern Africa are acute. Even outside Africa stresses are being created between nations by this issue. 24. Here we have a small set of reckless men whose actions have provoked and a.re now serving to prolong a most critioal situation, a situation fraught with great and growing danger of interracial strife andbloodshed througbout southern Africa-a danger which it is me duty of every one of us to do his utmost to avert. My Government accordingly believes that this Council cannot permit the situation to deteriorate further. It considers that the combination of circu.mstances flowing from the initial actions of the Smith regime, in purporting illegally and unconstitutionally to declare their independence, affects not only the stability and progress of Rhodesia’s immediate neighbours, but also the maintenance of international peace and security. The situation thus created is such that the Council should now invoke certain measures under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, 25. 1 am therefore introducing a draft sesolution [S/7621] proposing that the Council should take decisions pursuant to those Articles which will then becorne binding upon Member States by virtue of Article 25 of the Charter, This draft resolutionprovides for mandatory sanctions on the export of those commodities which are of critical importance to Rhodesia’s foreign trade and the import of arms and military supplies. 26. 1 know that these are those who say this is insufficient and urge the use of force, My Government has frequently made plain its position on this. 1 should only like today to add one word to it, and that is this: we a11 know from experience that it is easy to start to use force, but often very difficult to see just where it will lead or how it Will be possible to control or stop it. In the mind of everyone here in this room today there are not only past examples but very pertinent present ones to remind us of the truth of that. 27. In our view, therefore, the immediate need is to take the next step of applying deliberately, responsibly and universally selective mandatory sanctions on certain critical commodities. These economic measures are both more certain of success and far more susceptible of proper control. 1 Will deal in a moment with how 1 suggest these commodities should be selected. 28. In approaching the question of intensified sanctions, we must have our eyes wide open to the realities of the situation and to the consequences of what we What 1 said then is, I believe, very relevant to our present situation, and the draft resolution which I am putting before the Council has been drafted in that sense. 29. Another consideration in our mind has been the need to safeguard the essential economic interests of a11 countries represented in this Organization and, in particular, of neighbouring oountries in southern Africa, which are especially vulnerable for geographical reasons. 1 cari say this with real undexstanding because of the gxeat burden which we in Britain have accepted ourselves, especially in relation to our balance of payments during this last year, We must seek to end the Rhodesian rebellion without causing any further unnecessary damage to the economy of any of our countries. It is the Rhodesian economy we seek to affect. 30. We are entitled to expect that when the Council bas taken this action a11 Members of the United Nations Will fulfil their obligations and apply loyally the sanctions which Will have become binding when the draft resolution now before us has been adopted. 31. The first step is to lay down the effective sanctions. If-and it is at this moment entirely hypothetical-any country were to decide that it could not conform with the Council’s decision, this would of course create a new situation which would no doubt be raised in due course, But we are proposing selective sanctions against Rhodesia only, 32. Not only must we proceed step by step in dealing with this situation, but it must not be allowed to develop into a confrontation-economic or militaryinvolving the whole of southexn Africa. 1 have no doubt the Council will realize that such action could have incalculable consequences for the whole of central and southern Africa, going far beyond the issues raised by the Rhodesian problem-and indeed none of US oould predict the consequences. Indeed, they oould very rapidly dwarf the Rhodesian problem and defeat the very purposes whioh we pursue. 33. 1 referred above to the question of how the con+ modities for sanctions should be selected. First, they should be expert commodities, since our experience has shown that it is in this way that we most effectively reduce Rhodesian economic activity and earning power. Secondly, the sanctions proposed should be those which Will cause the greatest economic damage to the illegal régime. This means blocking 3 Officia1 Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-firSt kk%ion, Plenary Meetings, 1436th meeting, para. 76. 34. On that basis we suggest that the commodities most appropriate for selection should be asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat products, and hides, skins andleather. Those commodities are the most important Rhodesian experts which cari be identified and controlled. Togethex, theix value at 1965 levels was £84 million per annum. If the sanctions on those commodities axe effeotively applied-and the essence of our proposa1 is that it lies within the power of each of us effectively to apply them-the result on the Rhodesian economy would be immediately damaging. 35. The continued application of these sanctions by Member States would be seen to deny any future to the essential industries of the country. The reduction of export earnings cari be expected to lead to serious limitations on imports and have a progressive effect on the whole of Rhodesian commerce and industry. Commercial confidence, already shaken, Will then be sapped, because it will be only too clear that there will be no prospect of alleviation until the rebellion has ended. 36, The best and simplest way to make certain that the commodities proposed are not sold for the benefit of the Rhodesian economy is to ensure that they are not received or bought in other countries. In this way we cari avoid any unnecessary interference with legitimate trade. The draft resolution before the Council therefore calls upon Member States to prevent the import of and trading in these commodities. Asa supplementary oontrol it also proposes the prohibition of shipment of these commodities. The responsibilityfor preventing txade would thus lie simply and directly on each Member State to pxevent the impoxting of or the trading in these commodities in their territories, or the shipment of them by vessels or aircraft of theix xegistration. 37. Provision is made in tbe draft resolution for Membex States to report to the Secretary-General the action they bave taken to this end. 1 know that the powers necessary to carry out the requirements of the draft resolution are not noxmally held by certain Member States. But such powers cari be taken under the authoxity of this mandatory resolution and should, 1 am sure, be seen as preferable tomoxe complicated and undisoximinating measures of control. 38. We have been consulting very widely, bothbefore and since 1 came here, and I appreciate the strong measure of support that exists for the inclusion of oil in the mandatory sanctions, If an amendment in this 39. It is important that this draft resolution should have an immediate and telling effect, and it therefore also provides that the sanctions on the designated Rhodesian exports should apply at once, notwithstanding any contracts previously entered into or licences pseviously granted. 40. Before 1 conclude, 1 should also emphasize that, besides this proposa1 for mandatory sanctions, certain othex consequenoes Will flow from Mr. Smith’s rejection of our offers. 1 hope that this draft resolution Will, with the full support of our partners in the Commonwealth, be approved on the lines 1 have proposed. If SO, B&ain Will proceed to the related further step which we have already undertaken ta carry out in those oiroumstances: namely, we Will withdraw allprevious proposa& for a oonstitutional settlement whioh have been made to the Rhodesians; in paxticular, we Will not thereafter be prepared to submit to the British Parliament any settlement which involves independence before majority rule. 41. As 1 said, we have corne to a turning-point. In one direction li.es the way of international oo-operation by a11 Members in a sensible, practioal, effective and, above ail, sustainable programme of sanctions suchas I have outlined. If it is to succeed, a11 Members-1 repeat, a11 Members-must put their international responsibilities first, but 1 cari think of no case where these international responsibilities would conflict with real national interests. If a11 Members were to agree on this, 1 see no reason why we should not achieve rapidly by peaceful means, in accordance with the Charter, a just solution to the Rhodesian problem. 1 believe the Rhodesianpeople would-sooner rather than later-corne to see that a return to their legal constitution would be preferable to cumulative economic atrophy and paxalysis-to put it no higherand to continued rejection by the world. 42. In the other direction lie dangerous oourses. It is unthinkable that this rebellion cari succeed. But fEdUre to act loyally together in the spirit of the draft resolution by any one of us in whose power it is to SUSUre its success could bring incalculable conse- WenCeS, and not only threaten the peace but bring measureless misery and ruin to the whole of southern Africa. When this draft xesolution is adopted by the COUnCil-as 1 firmly believe it will be-not only will it be in the interests of every one of us, but also the SOlemn duty of every one of us to see that it is effectiVely carried out. 43. The PR.ESIDENT (translatedfrom Spanish): Thexe are no other names on the list of speakers for this