S/PV.1332 Security Council

Pursuant to the decision taken by thecouncilat its 1331st meeting, and with the consent of the Counoil, 1 shall invite the representatives of Zambia, Senegal, Algeria, Pakistan and India to take the seats reservedfor them facing the Council table, on the understanding that, in accordance with established practice, when ths time cornes for them to speak, they willbe invited to take a seat at the Counoil table. Af the invitation of the President, Mr. S. 1M. Kapwepwe (Zambia), Mr. Diop (Senegal), m-. Ta Bouaftoura (Algeria}, Mr. Amjad Ali (Pakistan) and Mr. G. Parfhasarathi (India) took the places reserved for them near the Council fable.

I now cal1 on the first speaker on my list, the representative of Zambia. 4. I am increasingly convinced that the solution of the question of Southexn Rhodesia has been purposefully delayed by the United Kingdom Government. That Government has, without doubt, the power at its command to extinguish the nagging problem of a rebellious minority in a colonyunder its jurisdiction; it must only have the courage to discharge its responsibilities; it must only have the sincerity to act as it speaks. There should be no need for us to be back hexe today, aftex six long months of added disillusionment. 5. I wish to draw the Council’s attention to its xesolution 217 (1965) adopted on 20 November 1965. By the fixst four operative paragraphs of this resolution, the Secuxity C ouncil: “1. Determines that the situation resulting from the proclamation of independence by the illegal authorfties in Southern Rhodesia is extremelygrave, that the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland should put an end to it and that its continuance in time constitutes a thxeat to international peace and secuxity; “2. Reaffirms its resolution 216 (1965) of 12 November 1965 and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960; “3. Condemns the usurpation of power byaraoist settlex minority in Southexn Rhodesia and regards the declaration of independence by it as having no legal validity; “4. Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom to quel1 this rebellion of the racist minoxity”. 6. AS 1 said in my address to the Security Council in May: “British policy of economic sanctions has failed, and, in the first case, it is ridiculous for an administexing Power to resort to the use of economic punishment in dealing with a small racist minority in its territory.” [1278th meeting, para. 24.1 This failure has been made clearex in the months following the last meetings of the Security Council on the question of Southern Rhodesia. 7. 1 also condemned the holding of talks between the United Kingdom Govexnment and the rebels at that time. Apaxt fxom the illegality of these talks, Iknew that they wese not in the interest of the majority in Southern 9. Al1 my feaxs have been realized, and tangible pxoof of this cari be found in the new British White Paper,ll Here are some of the proposals which are contained in the woxking document worked out during the Decembex talks. The Legislative Assembly which is proposed would be composed of 67 seats. There would be an “An roll of 33 seats, a “B” roll of 17 seats and a reserved European roll of 17 seats. Thus, 17 seats would be xeserved purely fox Europeans. This provision fox 17 reserved European seats represents a constitutional retxogression from the 1961 Constitution. The 1961 Constitution provided for 50 “A” roll seats and 15 ltBn roll seats making a total of 65 seats in the Legislatuxe. précademment, 10. Because of the income and education hurdlethe high qualifications needed-the “A” roll is almost entirely fox Whites, while the “BN roll is a common roll for Whites, Africans and others who cari satisfy less stringent xequirements. The present Wilsonproposai would ensure 17 seats for the 200,000 Whites in perpetuity and not less than 50 seats for a long time to corne. On the other hand, the 4 million Africaris cari Count only on a possible 17 seats and, it must be remembered, only 2 seats have been added to the previous 15 seats, making a total of only 17 seats, which, if 1 may say SO, is only a token. This is the betrayal that the “talks about talksll have produced. du croit que les Britanniques de nos jeunes contre demandent mesure des électeurs, fix8 11. The British Government has gone furthex than that in this document. It provides that to be enfranchised Africans must have xeached the age of thirty. 1 do not know of any constitution which requires that one has to be thixty years of age before one is qualified to vote, 1 know that the British had to send some of our people at the age of eighteen to defend their rights against Hitler. But today they are asking the people of Southern Rhodesia to wait until they are thixty years of age before they axe qualified to vote. We should go deepex than that. This is a calculated reduction in the number of voters, beoause if the age qualification for voting is thirty, there are fewer voters, while if the age is eighteen, there are more. 1/ Rhodesia-Proposals for a Settiement 1966, London, Her Majesry’s Stationery Office, Cmnd. 31.59. 12. After this document had been produced, one constitutional expert asked Mr. Smith: “If you accept this document, how long do you think you Will be in power?” Mr. Smith said: “1 shall be in power for fifty years “-that is, if he is still living then. But the answer gives us the clue to the fact that this document was worked out in order to give power ta the white minority. 13. The British Government went even further than that. It even proposed an act of union; that is, that the British Government would unite with the Southern Rhodesian Government in osder to work together, In short, the population of England, which is overpopulated, would unite with the population of Southern Rhodesia, and power would be in the hands of the Whites for a11 time. In a11 that, we see nothing but appeasement. We have said time and again that no amount of appeasement will make Mr. Smith willingly surrender his powers. The min& of the white minority in the southern part of Africa are SO disfigused by prejudice, racialism and hate for the Blacks that these people have been turned into political dwarfs. 1 say this to Mr. Brown: you cari love a dwarf, you cari even kiss him, but you cannot make him into a giant, 14. In holding the so-called “talks about talks” with the rebels, the United Kingdom Government has openly exposed its collusion with a racist minority régime that is committing crimes against the people of Zimbabwe, World opinion now holds the Wilson Labour Government criminally responsible for the denial of freedom, independence and self-determination to those people, and for a11 the racial turbulence and the menace to our peace and security that seem certain to lie in store for southern Africa. The Wilson Government’s iniquitous policy is creating the fuel for a racial war in Africa. Yet the United Kingdom representative here yesterday talked about peace. That is very strange. 15. It may seem strange that the United Kingdom Government, after rejecting the many resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council, after frustrating the many attempts by the African States and Commonwealth countries to arrive at a really correct solution, should now return to the Council at this late hour with yet another ineffective formula: the so-called mandatory selective sanctions. 1s this the new Wilson stratagem of saving face, or is it the finalact in the plot to betray the African majorfty of Southern Rhodesia and destroy Zambiats economy? 16. Where is this Wilson Government leading us? We should like to believe that the realpurpose of a11 these debates, meetings and resolutions is to remove the Smith régime and thereafter to grant majority rule to Southern Rhodesia, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), that is, by universal voir 11. That story tells clearly why we are “putting the finges” on the British Government for trying to put fuel in southern Africa; and why, when racialtroubles corne, the British Government should be held responsible for the atrocities which some of cari see lying ahead, 18. Since economic sanctions have not brought about the desired result in the past year, why should we be led to anticipate any better results in the months ahead? In theory there is a difference between voluntary comprehensive sanctions, as oalled for by the United Nations resolutions, and mandatory selective sanctions, as now called for by the British draft resolution [S/7621]. But that difference is merely academic. On practical application the latter might well be to the advantage of the rebels, for the result would depend upon the political realities both at the United Nations and in southern Africa. As was demonstrated by a very recent General Assembly resolution, resolution 2151 (XXI) of 17 November 1966, these political realities have not changed for the better. South Africa and Portugal are still adamantly opposed t0 any sanctions against Southern Rhodesia; they voted against the above-mentioned sesolution. And a11 the Western Powers abstained. Our hand offriendship has been rejected by the West. They are only interested in exploiting us. In Africa we have a proverb: Lunshi ukukukonka nipacilonda, which in English means that a fly is your best friend and companion only when you have a sore on whichit feeds, and when the sors heals you see it no more, pas produit Theoriquement, solutions [S/‘7621] cette pratique, des politiques ridionale. de l’Assemblée du 17 novembre n’ont et le Portugal 3 toutes ont voté contre les puissances main seul avons qui signifie et fid8le plaie dont elle se repaît, tat la paie guérie. contrevenu contre la politique vigoureusement opposè pourtant les propositions cains tions de la Charte, a-t-il Parce mettent du Royaume-Uni indéfinie. 19. Britain has been one of the chief offenders in the policy of permissive sanctions against the Smith régime. Yet that is the policy that theunited Kingdom Government stoutly advocated. The United Kingdom opposed the use of force, which up to this point is still the only sure solution, and it gave no support t0 the proposals that the African States made here in May for across-the-board mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter, Why did the British Government choose voluntary sanctions as its policy? Because those voluntary sanctions provide loop-holes in which the Government and individual British business men cari manœuvre almost indefinitely. 21. It was also reported that Bxitain gave the necessary co-operation to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to increase its imports of Rhodesian coppex and asbestos in view of the metal supply shortage in the world. Again, as is shown, Bxitain is not only violating the resolutions of the Council and the General Assembly, but also encouraging some of its allies to do likewise. British businessmen have also been importing substantial supplies from the xebel colony thxough agents in South Africa and Mozambique. Also, instead of putting pressure on the rebels and making them pay fox their crimes, the British Government has sheepishly paid interest and made capital repayments amounting to about $3 million within the current year on debts incurred by the rebels with the Woxld Bank. 22. 1 should now like to spell out some of the economic haxdships that Zambia has been living with as a result of the United Kingdom Government’s irresolute and inconsistent policy on Southern Rhodesia. It must first be recognized that before the unilateral declaration of independence 97 per cent of our imports came from or thsough that British colony, We were not responsible for that unfavourable state of affairs. It was the handiwork of British colonialism. The United Kingdom made Zambia almost totally dependent on Southern Rhodesia for economic survival, and that policy was cemented during the ten abortive years, between 1953 and 1963, of the now defunct Federation-a federation that Zambians never wanted but the socialist Labour Party encouraged. 23. In order to co-opexate with the sanctions policy, it is necessary for Zambia’s economy to be completely reoriented. This is no mean feat. Two-thirds of our normal impoxts from Southern Rhodesia are now banned; invisible payments have been restricted; we restrict to a minimum the volume of goods moving through the British territory on the jointlyownedrailway system; and we limit foreign exchange payments 24. However, a11 this does not include the huge economiC Costs which are not easily meashrable on an accounting basis, Our present four-year development Plan now stands in jeopardy if the situation cxeated by the unilateral declaratîon of independence is not bxought to a speedy end, We suffer from increased bottlenecks in supply, and the transportation problem gxows daily more acute. These adverse factors affect OUF ability to attxact urgently needed foreign capital for our economic development goals, threaten the health of OU~ own cuxrency and menace our hard-won stabilîty and social peace. 25. Yet what is the Wilson Government doing about a11 this? It has promised us $39 million in what it would like to cal1 “aid”; but oux definition of aid is different. It is because of the United Kingdom that our economy is now in its pxesent precarious shape. That Government, therefore, owes us compensation on a point of obligation. The more their bankxupt Southern Rhodesia policy destroys oux economy the more compensation they are going to be called upon to pay. Even the present $39 million so-called aid is offered with strings attached; SO in effect it is nothing more than the British aiding themselves at the expense of Zambia. In any case their offer is highly inadequate, as members here would agree, considering the damage they have done to Zambia’s entire economic structure. We shall in time ask them to pay fair and equitable compensation. 26. British policy in southern Africa is one of abominable dishonesty. The United Kingdom Government iS engaged in a two-faced policy: one face shows humiliating appeasement to the “kith and kin”; the othex seeks to placate blaok Africa with patronizing handouts of an exhibitîonist nature, but, a11 in ail, the policy of the Unîted Kingdom is guided by Ckronic selfishness. The United Kingdom wants to have and enjoy the best of both worlds. The United Kingdom has been shying away from mandatory compxehensive sanctions, which are the only sanctions that Zambia at this point would agree to, because of the fear of a confrontation with South Africa. The United Kingdom is afraid of losing an annual export trade of $766 million in south .@rica and it does not want to jeopardise the $168 miI.ti%n annual earnings fxom its $2,669 million illegal but nevertheless profitable investment in the land of apartheid. 27. It is shocking to sec the Labour Govenmd Which olaims to be a sooialist Government-with an 28. Let us be realistic. Sanctions are not going to work without the active co-operation of South Africa, which the United Kingdom Government has chosen to protect. In the last months the Southern Rhodesian economy has swung more and more to dependence on South Africa. Therefore any feasible new proposa& must take that phenomenon into account; if they do not, then they are shoddy and not worth the paper on which they are written. 29. Zambia is willing to go a11 the way with mandatory comprehensive sanctions in which South Afxica and Portuguese Mozambique would be forced to comply; but Zambia is not prepared to go half the way, thereby subjecting itself to greater eoonomic sacrifices to no avail. It is time the United Kingdom Government emerged from behind its mask of hypocrisy, Zambia has already sacrificed enough through obedience to the Charter and to the United Nations resolutions on Southern Rhodesia. Per capita we have suffered far more than anv other State, and by comparison the United Kingdom’s losses have beeninfinitesimal, Yet we are still preparcd to go a11 the way in a lastditoh effort to bsing clown Smith and restore majority rule in Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom, however, must first display courage, honesty and moral leadership in this effort, 30. 1 speak with such feeling, not because Ihate anybody personally, not because I hate the oolour of any person, but because the British Government is acting in a two-faced manner. It is not honest enough. It knows what is happening in South Africa, The British have been in South Africa since 1800 and they know what is happening in South Africa; they know exactly what is happening in Southern Rhodesia; they know exactly what is happening in southern Africa; and they hlow what is going to corne out of southern Afrioa if this particular problem is not solved properly, Mr. Brown has been trying here to tellpeople about peace: there is no peace in southern Africa. If this particular problem is not solved it is going to bring a war between black and white, a war which, 1 feas, we have no judge to put right because both of us Will be in the wrong. 1 hope that we shall find a judge, but 1 do not think we 31. It iS Char t0 my delegation that the new British PrOpOsals Will not work; indeed, they are anothertrap to bind African Governments and this Council to totally unworkable and ineffective arrangements. Any embargo that excludes oil is absolutely useless, and I am sure that the Wilson Government knows this, oil is now largely supplied from the Sonarep Refinery at LOUrenÇO Marques and is being imported by rail, Oil is nlso coming straight through by road from South hfrica. Additional petsol storage tanks have been built at the railhead from Lourenço Marques and oil companies have been asked to double the storage capacity. If there are to be any worthwhile sanotions against the rebels, then those oil supplies that I have just mentioned must stop. 32. Southern Rhodesia is now a fully fledged police state. African leaders have been imprisoned, detained and restricted; the entire African population is intimidated and kept hostage under the brutal rule of Smith and his henchmen. Therefore, it is essential that there should be complete political amnesty and that the African population Should have absolute freedomfrom fear of intimidation before the formulation of any working proposals for arriving at a new constitution. 33. On H.M.S. Tiger and during the entire course of the “talks about talks”, the United Kingdom at best found itself on the same frequency as the 200,000 European minority in Southern Rhodesia. We therefore demand the release of a11 politicalprisoners, detainees and restrictees, and the disbanding of Smith’s police State machinery before the exploration of any further proposais. 34. We fear that-and we want to say this here now- Smith is trying to ask the British Government to talk again, since he has agreed to the document 1 have spoken about, which is a criminal document. If this document is going to be implemented, then of course we must forget about African maj ority in that CountrY, because it does nothing except strengthen and reentrench Smith; it is the British Government POliCY of “kith and kin”. This document has even gone to tribal representatives in Mashona Land and Matabele Land. It is not only racialist but a190 tribal. At one time, some people called me an extremist because 1 bave oalled Mr. Wilson a racialist. Those who bave the opportunity of reading this document Will understand what 1 meant. There is some speculation that the British Government may continue discussing with Smith, I should like to emphasize here the fact thst Zambia would not accept this document. There is only one point on which I agree with the British Government; that is, to take power from Smith and give it back to the Governor, who Will be under the 35. In conclusion, permit me to go over thefollowing pertinent points whioh are of gxeat importance to my delegation. 36. First, my Government continues to believe, as indeed we have from the start, that a British military presence or intervention remains the only sure and speedy way to topple the illegal Smith régime. We know that the longer this problem remains, the more problems Will be created. Therefore, Zambia believes most strongly in a speedy method to finish the régime. 37. Secondly, short of such a military solution, a11 evidence will continue to indicate that the Wilson Government is acting in collusion with Smith; that the Wilson Govexnment is motivated by racialism in its policy towards Afrioa; that the collusion of Smith and Wilson is substantiated by Wilson’s ruling out the use of force befoxe Smith’s unilatexal declaxation of independence; and that Wilson now seeks to rule out a total embargo on oil SO as to make his long-advocated economic sanctions totally futile and unworkable, 38. 1 have said this purposely because I want the British Government not to go back to a xesolution in which the Security Council permitted it to send a small token force to stand by at Mozambique in ordex to. stop the Joanna V. We should not like to see a force of this kind, We should like to see a total stoppage of oil. We should like to see the use of complete power to stop it. If this is what Mr. Brown had in mind, we cari say now that we cannot accept that particular point, If there is a genuine wish, as Mr. Brown stated before this Council, to put an embargo on oil we shall be very happy because that would mean something, unlike the token force, They came here and saiddeceiving the world-that they had power to stop the oil, when we knew that oil was going in through Durban and Cape Town to Rhodesia. 39. The ultimate aim of the Wilson plot is to bolster white supremacy in southern Afxica and ultimately to expand the noxious doctrine of apartheid and racialism from the Cape to the Congo and, if possible, to Caixo, as was the dream of Ceci1 Rhodes, 41. Britainls abortive sanctions policy is therefore aimed at destroying Zambia, bit by bit, because it is doing no harm to the rebels, whose chief was invited to secret talks on H.M.S. Tiger. Zambia condemns the double-dealing of the Wilson Government, and calls upon a11 States to denounce the plot to betray the Africari majority of Southern Rhodesia and to destroy Zambia. We shall continue to support the just struggle of the people of Zimbabwe for their inalienable right to freedom, independenoe and self-determination in accordance with our obligations under the Charter and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). In this connexion, we wish to appeal to a11 States to redouble their efforts in support of the noble and just cause of those people, and in support of the cause of justice, humandignity, freedom and peace. If they are deserted, the sure result Will be a racial war. 42. My Government cannot accept the British draft resolution contained in document S/7621. This draft seeks to tackle only half of the problem. It is directed mainly at the expert industries of Southern Rhodesia and at the importing of arms and ammunition. The draft says nothing of oil which, indeed, is the vital element in the whole issue of sanctions; 1 have already spelt out the reason for this omission. We are again back to the episode of the Joanna V in which Britain sought to ignore the main issue with diversionary tactics. Britain must improve the draft to include a complete embargo on oil coming from a11 sources, that is, South Africa, Mozambique and Overseas. Britafn must bring a halt to a11 financial operations with or fox the Smith régime; its banks in Southern Rhodesia must be closed. We ask Britain to improve the draft to include a11 imports and experts, making it a mandatory comprehensive endeavour. Zambia Will then accept these improvements to the British draft and 1 shall be prepared to speak again on this issue. 43. May I be allowed to say this? Today we are speaking of oil and pig iron. But if this problem iS not solved, or if no answer is found to it, we shall be speaking tomorrow of how many Whites and how many Africans have been killed.

When nothing came of the talks between the Prime 45. Since May, when the Council last discussed this question, the situation has continued to deteriorate and the United Kingdom GoVernment has been unable t0 make any progress in the search for a solution to this difficult problem. On the contrary, these is every indication that, with the passage of time, the Salisbury régime has oontinued to strengthen its position, even though it has not been recognized by any State, and to overcome financial and economic difficulties. YeSterday, in this chamber [1331st meeting], the Pore@ Seoretary of the United Kingdom, Mr. George BrOWn, conceded that, although the steps taken SO far should not be disparaged, his Government had hoped that the measuses taken would have a greater economic and political impact. The Smith Government’s position is obviously sufficiently strong for it to have rejectedout of hand the United Kingdom’s Gibraltar proposals, which would have allowed it to end the rebellion. 46. The long, difficult and arduous negotiations ketween the United Kingdom and the illegal r6gime have produced no appreciable positive results. The overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations have implemented the decisions of the United Nations set out in General Assembly resolution 2022 (XX) and Security Council resolutions 216 (1965), 217 (1965) and 221 (1966). My Government has fully supported tbe decisions of the United Nations because it believes that the existence of a minority Government based on racial inequality is not only an affront to human dignity but also a threat to peace and se- Mlrity, both domestic and international, This is not a popular rebellion against the colonial yoke,’ like the rebellions of our peoples in the Americas in the eighteenth and nineteenth oenturies; it is simply a manœuvre to extend to other parts of Africa racial theories designed to maintain the powerful economic interests of a minority. 47. In our opinion, the rejection of the document drawn up at the Gibraltar meeting is proof of Salisbury’s anxiety to maintain privileged positions. The refusaI to return to legality on the basis of a government in which Africans and independents would be represented shows clearly that the crux of the probe lem is resistance not only to majority government but also t0 even minimal repxesentation of the majority in the government. 48. We believe that the Smith rdgime’s intransigent position and the consequent failure of the United Kingdom’s negotiations and the endeavours of the United Nations, are due mainly to the fact that some countries bordering upon Southern Rhodesia have failed te implement Security Council resolution 217 (1965), 49. We a11 know, and indeed it has been admitted, that there has been no real embargo on oil, as the Minister fOX Foreign Affairs of Zambia showed a few moments ago, and that substantial amounts have entered Southern Rhodesia by rail and road. Ii’urthermoxe, while it is true that Rhodesian experts have been reduced by 40 per cent, as the Foreign Secretaxy of the United Kingdom stated yestexday, 60 per cent has found purchasers abroad. This is a truly sizable Proportion, if viewed in the light of Secuxity Council resolution 217 (1965). As regards this question of experts, we know that it is not only Southern Rhode- 818’s neighbouxs that are involved, but also other powerful countries in other parts of the world whose businessmen have joined openly in purchasing Rhodesian expoxts, 50, In short, Security Council resolutions 216 (1965), 217 (1965) and 221. (1966) have not been suffioient to Put an end to this state of affairs, as was the intention of the Council when it adopted them. Those who have failed to comply have argued that resolution 217 (1965) is not legally binding and they have flouted the Council’s moral authority, their genexal policy being to reject sanctions or to adopt a passive attitude and allow matters ta continue as they were before November 1965. 51. The Security Council is thus faced with a situation which may be more diffioult than it was a year ago, because time has worked to Smith’s advantage, but in which we have gained experience that makes for a clearer appraisal of developments and there has been a gradua1 dissipation of doubts regard& the solutions. 52. Unquestionably, the time is ripe for fuxthex steps to ensure that this explosive situation does not have much graver consequences. The time bas passed for appeals, such as my delegation pxoposed la& May, to those who have not implemented xesolution 217 (1965). We must now bypass this Stage and pxoceed to the application of measuxes binding uPop a11 Membexs, in conformity with the obligations th@ assumed under the Charter, 53. We therefore support the adoption of these measures because, in oux view, the situation in Rhodesia has becorne a threat to the peace in the sense of Article 1, paxagraph 1, and Article 39 of the Chartes. We consider that XeCOmm~n~tionswhich would be one of the alternatives undex Article 39-are no longer. suffioient and that it is necessary to decide, I xepeat, to decide, what measuxes shall 55. In that connexion, we cannot understand why the United Kingdom dxaft xesolution [S/7621] does not speoifically mention that the situation is a thxeat to the peace. In OUF view, it is not enough to state this by implication thxough a mention of resolution 217 (1965) and Article 39 of the Charter. We believe that, when action in the content of Chaptex VII of the Charter is involved, the Secuxity Council’s primary obligation undex Article 39 is to determine “the existence of any threat to the peace, bxeach of the peace, or act of aggxession” and then to decide on whatever measures it considexs appropriate. Article 39 states, in our view very clearly, the following: “The Secuxity Council shall determine the existence of any thxeat to the peace, bxeaohof the peace, or act of aggxession and shall make xecommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restoxe international peace and secuxity.” TO refrain from specifically determining the existence of a thxeat to the peace and mexely to deoide what measuxes should be taken would be comparable to rendering a judgement which states the penalty but net the crime. 56. Acooxdingly, in view of the cixcumstances, and since the situation falls into the category of a tbreat to the peace, we believe that the adoption of effective collective measuxes is justified. 1 would stress the word “effective”. 57. Among such measuxes pxovided fox in the Chaxter, we axe in favour for the time being of those provided fox in Article 41, which do not involve the use of axmed force. We considex that, before xesorting to the final step, it would be well to try such measures as may achieve the same puxpose of maintaining international peace and secuxity, avoiding armedconfxontations whose consequences would be quite unpredictable at this time. We understand the attitude and feelings of the Afxican delegations in this connexion, but we also understand that it is our duty, and our responsibility, to proceed with caution in regard to such serious measuxes, and this should in no way be taken as a lack of firmness. We have said on other occasions, and we xepeat now, that the general policy of my country in regard to measures under Article 42 is that they should be applied only in vexy extreme 58. My delegation therefore rejects the use of force and supports the application of measures undes Article 41, as provided for in the United Kingdom draft sesolution and it is prepared to give full consideration to the addition of such other measuies as delegations more thoroughly acquainted with the problem may wish to propose. As to oil, my delegation supports its inclusion in the United Kingdom draft resolution, both because it was mentioned specifioally in resolution 217 (1965) and because studies have shown that such an embargo-as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zambia pointed out-is the key to the success of these measures in the case .of Rhodesia. 59. Because it oonsiders measures under Article 41 a sufficient iemedy for the situation, my delegation supports their adoption, At the same time, however, it wishes to state that it will not concur in the approval of measures which have no real chance of success. Our desire is, to use the wording of Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Charter, that these collective measures shall be truly “effective”. If however they are to be effective, as well as sufficient for the current circumstances, they must be implementedbyallStates, whatever their economic interests or geographlc position, In that connexion, we must point out that the proposed measuses are no longer merely voluntary, like those laid down in resolution 217 (l.965); theyare obligatory. They are obligatory for a11 Members by virtue of Article 25 of the Charter, under which they have agreed to accept and carry out the deoisions of the Seourity C ouncil. Any which fail to do SO Will be openly violating the obligations they assumed under the Charter when joining the Organization, and particularly the obligations set out in the Charter itself. The measures are also binding on non-member Si%tes, under Article ,2, paragraph 6. If these measures are adopted, no one can avoid implementing them. 60. In conclusion, 1 wish to draw very special attention to the United Kingdomfs responsibilities in this matter, and we welcome Mr. Brown’s annOUnCement 61. My delegation reserves the right to speak again in this debate when any amendments or further draft resolutions are submitted.

I give the floor to the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Mr. George Brown, to exercise his right of reply. 63. Mr. George BROWN (IJnitedKingdom): Mr. President, as you and 1 think most of my colleagues know, 1 have to leave New Yoxk tonight because of other urgent and pressing business elsewhere. 1 therefore appreciate the opportunity of saying just a few words of comment on what we have heard this morning. 64. May 1 first say that I took very careful note of and great interest in the very constructive and thoughtful speech we have just heard from our colleague fxom Argentina, and Will look very carefully at some of the things he urged on me? But I really want to use this opportunity to say a woxd about the speech which came from the Foreigh Minister of Zambia. 65, In SO far as it contained detailed accusations against or about my country, they will be dealt with in due course in this debate, but the attribution to us of false motives, hypocrisy and racism shocked me and, 1 believe, calls for immediate, firm and frank rejection by me as being both unworthy and untrue. 66. 1 hope that this debate Will continue on our proposals on their merits as other members of the Security Council may see them. Differences about them can be argued out, That is what a debate is for. Construotive criticism we a11 understand, welcorne, and cari take advantage of, but abuse SS no substitute. 67. Britain has been frank with this Council and with the world about our own economio situation, and we have recognized fully the problems of others. Nevertheless, we have played and more than played our part, arising from this situation and accepted fully alld willingly the oonsiderable addition that this has made to our own balance of payments and other economic difficulties, and we have corne here now with this proposal, fully and frankly recognizing what its adoption Will mean for us and for others, 69, The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): 1 have consulted a11 the members of the Council and, as 1 have no more speakers on my list, the Counoil will continue its consideration of this item on Monday at 3 p.m. The meeting rose at 12.55p.m. HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED United Nations publications may distributors throughout the world. Write to: United Nations, Sales COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS Les publications des Nations Unies agences dépositaires du monde entier. ou adressez-vous à: Nations Unies, Section COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Las publicaciones de las Naciones casas distribuidoras en toda,s partes dirijase a: Naciones Unidas, Section Litho in U.N. Price: $US. 0.50 (or equivalent