S/PV.1333 Security Council

In accordance with the decision previously taken by the Council [1331st meeting], and with the consent of the members of the Council, 1 shall invite the representatives of Zambia, Senegal, Algeria, PakistanandIndia to take the seats reserved for them facingthe Cour&1 table. At the invitation ofthe President, Mr. S. M. Kapwewe (Zambia), Mr. D. Thiam (Senegal), Mr. T. Bouattoura (Algeria), Or. Amjad Ali (Pakistan) and Mr. G* Parthasarathi (India) took the places reserved for them near the Council table.

The Council has met to consider further the question Of Southern Rhodesia-a question which once again has 3. Why has this problemof SouthernRhodesia become a matter of such world-wide concern? A clue to the answer cari, 1 think, befound in thefact that the régime of Salisbury, headed by Mr. Smith, which illegally declared itself independent and sovereign over a year ago, has yet to be recognized as such by a single Government. There is a solid reasonwhy this unilateral action of the Smith régime has beenrejected while the independence of a score of other States has been acclaimed and recognized by the whole community of nations in recent times. In a11 cases in which colonial peoples, during the life of the United Nations, have acceded to independence, that accession has never been tainted with the application of principles of racial superiority. Just the opposite is the casein the régime of Mr. Smith. Whatever that régime may assert in its propaganda, its legislative enactments and its whole course of conduct have clearly been designed to thwart majority rule andperpetuate racial superiority. 4. Indeed, the claim of independence by the Smith régime is a false and spusious claim, made by and on behalf of a small white minority for the purpose of assuming control in a country 94 per cent of whose people are non-white. It is contrary to the spirit of the United Nations Charter and to the principles enshrined therein, including universal “respect for” and observance of “human rights and . . . fundamental freedoms for a11 without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”. 5. On behalf of my Government, 1 reiterate once again that we shall not recognize that régime. The objective which the United States supports is that stated last May by President Johnson: “TO open the full power and responsibility of nationhood to a11 the people of Flhodesia-not just 6 per cent of them.ll 6. We well understand the apprehensions of the other nations of Africa, particularly Southern Rhodesia’s neighbour, Zambia, concerning the Southern Rhodesian crisis. Zambia is seeking to make its way in the world on the only basis which cari possibly promise peace, freedom, and progress-namely, a multiracial society in which the majority rules and the rights of minorities are protected. We understand and share the concernof the leaders of Zambia at the prospect of a neighbouring régime which in its one year of so-called independence, has already intensified its discrimination against the African majority and introducednew decrees under the extended Emergency Powers Act which are anathema Y Held in London from 6 to 14 September 1966; see Rhodesia-Proposais for a Settlement, 1966, London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, Cmnd. 3159, appendix A. 7. The refusa1 of the United Kingdom-the constitutional authority-to recognize the illegal act of the Smith régime in attempting to throw off British authority is no denial of freedom for the people of Southern Rhodesia. Rather it is a decision not to permit a small element in that country to deny freedom to the great majority. This decision is not that of a Power which obstinately stands in the way of granting genuine independence to colonial territories. 8. Since the founding of the United Nations, it is pertinent to recall, Great Britain bas accorded independence to twenty-eight nations-nearly a quarter of the membership of this Organization. That is a record of substantial achievement in peaceful decolonizationand one which does credit both to the United Kingdom and to the peoples which were formerly under its authority but which are now independent, It helps to explain why the Council has recognized that the main responsibility for action is in the hands of the United Kingdom which has, in the words of the Commonwealth communiqué, “constitutiona authority and responsibility for guiding Rhodesia to independence”. 9. The United States believes that the exercise of that responsibility remains a wide policy. 1 do not say that if we had been the constituted authority we would have done everything exactly as it has been done, every step of the way, by the British Government. No nation could say that. But we do respect the fact that it is the United Kingdom that has borne and still bears this responsibility, and that this has been affirmed by the Commonwealth and recognized by this Council. 10. We, as members of the Council, have our own responsibilities in this matter under the Charter. But in a11 fairness we must recognize the difficulties confronting the United Kingdom and respect the strenuous efforts it has made to find an agreed solution compatible with the principle of majority rule and acceptable to the Rhodesian people as a whole. Certainly a negotiated settlement conforming to these criteria would have been the best solution. II. NOW, unhappily, the effort to achieve that settlement has not been successful. As a result, the United Kingdom has again corne here to obtain the hacking of the Council, and thereby the co-operation of a11 Members of the United Nations, for the next step. It is right and wise that this should be done. For, if the problem is to be resolved in peace-and surely we a11 share the obligation to see that it is resolved in peace-the co-operation of a11 other nations Will be required. Under the Charter of the UnitedNations this 13. The United States considers that these sanctions have one purpose and one purpose only-to bring about a peaceful and honourable settlement of the Rhodesian problem. We do not look upon them as punitive or vengeful. We support them in the honest conviction that they are now necessary in order to drive home to the illegal régime that the international community Will not tolerate the existence of a discriminatory system based on minority rule in defiance of the United Nations and its principles. 14. In considering this serious step, my Government has taken into account the problems that it Will have to face because of the loss of a source for certain materials critical to our industrial economy. In the discharge of our Charter responsibilities we are prepared to assume this cost. We are well aware, moreover, that the impact of the requested sanctions Will fa11 heavily on Zambia-whose economy my country has taken substantial steps to support-and on other nearby countries of Africa and, to a very substantial degree, on the United Kingdom itself. 15. we know also that, apart from economic problems, questions are raised as to the legal basis for this proposed action. In particular, it is asserted that the question of Southern Rhodesia is an interna1 matter of sole concern to the adminisfering Power. Butwhile we recognize that responsibility for action lies on the United Kingdom, the record shows that the UnitedNations, over the years, has also recognized Southern Rhodesia as falling within the provisions of Chapter XI of the Charter! Under this Chapter, and specifically under Article 73 b, the administering Power accepts the responsibility for the inhabitants of the territories it administers and in particular: Yo develop selfgovernment, to take due account of thepolitical aspirations of the peoples, and to assist themin the progressive development of their free political institutionsll, 16. Therefore, as far as the United Nations is concerned, the administering Power has always had an international responsibility to the United Nations in regard to Southern Rhodesia. And it is precisely the exercise of this responsibility that the Smith régime seeks to frustrate and obstruct. 18. We in the United States sadly learned over one hundred years ago that any attempt to institutionalize and legitimize apolitical principle of racial superiority in a new State was unacceptable. The effort to do SO created an inflammatory situation, and our nation had to rid itself of this false and hateful doctrine at great cast. It should not be necessary for me to emphasize that what could not be accepted by the United States in the mid-nineteenth Century surely cannot be acoepted by the international community in the late twentieth Century. 19. Any person familiar with recent history would have to be blind and deaf not to peroeive the danger in the course of action of the Smith régime. Some will nevertheless ask: why is it proper, for example, to impose mandatory sanctions in this case and not in others? The answer to this, in our judgement, lies in the fact that there are a number of unique elements in the Southern Rhodesian situation. Here we have witnessed an illegal seizure of power by a minority bent on perpetuating the political subjugation of the vast majority on racial grounds. That act itself is bound to create a dangerous and inflammatory situation, Moreover, Southern Rhodesia, as 1 have said, is a territory whose population is subject to protection under Chapter XI of the Charter, which, among other things, calls for the development of self-government to take account of the political aspiration of the peoples. What we have seen in Rhodesia under the Smith régime has been precisely the contrary. 20. Al1 this has happened, I wouldemphasize, against the express Will of the sovereign authority of that territory, the United Kingdom. Regrettably, the effort of the United Kingdom in recent days to negotiate a settlement on the basis of the Charter hasfailed. Now the United Kingdom has corne to this Council asking for a Council decision under Article 41 to apply mandatory sanctions in order to tope with the situation which has developed. None of us should be surprised by this request. The Security Council has already found in previous meetings, particularly on 20 November 1965, that the continuance in time of such a situation was likely to lead to a threat to peace [resolution 217 (1965)J. This situation has not only continued; since negotiations have failed, it has obviously grown more acute, especially since the rejection by the Smith régime of the recent direct effort of the British Prime Minister to find an honourable solution. 21. We thus have a situation in a colony where a small minority seeks to subjugate the majority. We have an effort by a small minority to suppress the political rights of a majority, to extend into a Non- Self-Governing Territory practices of racial discrimi- 22. What we have here, in short, is not a static but a deteriorating situation in which the danger to peace is obviously growing and to which the Council properly must address itself. 23. Resolute and prompt action by the Security Council to deal with this problem in a peaoeful but effective way Will lessen the danger of more drastic developments from whatever quarter they may threaten to corne. 1 am well aware that whereas some criticize the proposed action as too strong, others complain that it is too mild to achieve its purpose. The latter critics point out that the measures which the Security Council has recommended in the past have not proved sufficient to rectify the situation. Whateves views there may be about the efficacy of the economic measures already taken, there is a key and vital difference between them and what is now proposed. Unlike the voluntary sanctions which the Council approved a year ago, those now requested are mandatory. Under Article 25 of the Charter a11 Members are obligecl to carry them out, and indeed a11 non-Members are also called upon to do SO in the draft resolution, as the Organization is authorized to ensure by virtue of Article 2, paragraph 6 of the Charter. Lf any Member or non-Member should substantially fail to carry out the Council’s decision, this failure would be a violation of Charter provisions and obligations. 24. It has been asserted also that the League of Nations failed in its attempt to impose effective economic sanctions. But surely this fact should not discourage US, The United Nations is different from the League of Nations not only in the breadth of its membership but in the fact that it has already done successfully many things which the League found impossible to do. While it is apparent that success in the present enterprise cannot be guaranteed in advance, the probabilities of success will be greatest if allof us in good faith bend a11 our efforts to ensure its successas indeed we are obligated to do. 25. For my own country, 1 wish to say categorically that if the Council decides to take the action pursuant to Article 41, which we anticipate, the United States Will apply the full force of its law to implementing that decision in accordance with the authority established under the United Nations Participation Act of 1945. 26, The Rhodesian situation presents a grave practical problem with great moral implications. It is sometimes said that moral considerations are irrelevant in the practical affairs of nations. But my Government takes the contrary view, and SO does the United Nations Charter, The law of the Charter is based on many moral considerations. The day that law is held 28. It is an unhappy fact, which we must recognize, that 801118 situations exist in the world in whioh the Council has been unable to act effectively. Here is a situation in which we cari act. If eVery States does its duty in the work that now lies before us, our action Will nOt only exert a profound effect in Salisbury: it will do much to build respect for the United Nations as a force for peace and justice in Africa and throughout the world. 29. It is for all those reasons that the United States supports the course of action proposed by the United Kingdom. 30, The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): Inow cal1 on the representative of Senegal.

1 should like, first of all, to thank the Council for once again giving me an opportunity to address it. It îs always a rewarding experience to participate inthe debates of the Security Council, but frankly, my delegation would have preferred that it were not, once more, on the subject of Rhodesia, Unfortunately, because of the procrastination of the United Kingdom and the inadequacy and, sometimes, the inconsistencies of the measures taken or proposed by it, no progress has been made on the Rhodesian problem for more than a year. 32. The purpose of this intervention, which Will be very bsief, will be to examine the new measures proposed by the United Kingdom and to see whether, objectively considered, they axe capable of bringing down the illegal régime established in Southexn Rhodesia. 33. We have read very carefully the statement made by the Foreign Secxetary of the United Kingdom on 8 December 1966 [1331st meeting], We have studied the draft resolution which he submitted to the Security Council [S/7621]. For oux part, we haveno faith in the effectiveness of the proposed measures. 1 am sorry, but that is the opinion of my delegation and also of the Organization of African Unity. We have no faith in it for two reasons: firet, because the selective character of those measures weakens and invalidates them; secondly, becau$e their mandatory character is an illusion. 34. It is on these two aspects that 1 should like to dwell. First, I shall comment on the selective charaoter of the proposed measures. At first sight, the 35. We were likewise led to hope that the economic measures which were decided upon a few days after the unilateral declaration of independence, and in particular those based on resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, would be sufficient to bring down the Salisbury régime. Thirteen months later, the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom tells us: 11 ..a early forecasts were not borne out by events. Quite frankly, we expected a greater economic and political impact” [1331st meeting, para. 131. And what does he now propose? Selective sanctions. It appears from its proposa1 for collective sanctions that the United Kingdom has not yet learnt from its failures. It does not seem to realize the gravity and urgency of the situation. It is true, however, that we need not be upset about this; for even if the measures proposed were general comprehensive sanctions applying to the whole of the Rhodesian economy and to a11 commodities, imports as well as exports, the impossibility of making them mandatory wouldrender such measures quite ineffective. 36. 1 saicl a moment ago that the mandatory character of the sanctions contained in the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom was an illusion. This is easy to prove. Rhodesia’s neighbours-1 am thinking, of course, of Portugal and South Africa-will not cooperate actively in the implementation of the resolution. Even supposing that it may bepossible to make Portugal comply with the Council’s decisions, there Will still be South Africa, against which the United Kingdom Will hesitate to apply sanctions, There’are very strong ties of economic interdependence between the United Kingdom and South Africa, which is ‘the United Kingdom’s third largest customer. Thevolume of tradr between the two countries, according to the published figures, is around $730 million. The gold holdings of the United Kingdom, which constitute the hacking for the pound sterling, are 20 per cent owned by South Africa. In the circumstances, United Kingdom concern for economic and financial interests Will prevail over defence of the principles and values contained in the Charter of the United Nations. It is clear, therefore, why .the United Kingdom draft resolution is silent on the question of the sanctions to be applied to States which refuse to comply with the Security 37. It is thus quite clear to the Organization of African Unity that this action by the United Kingdom is a further measure of procrastination, a means of putting off the solution of the problem until doomsday. No one is hoodwinked. The United Kingdom must once again be reminded that the main responsibility in the Rhodesian affair rests with it and that it should put down the rebellion single-handed, as France did in Algeria. TO us, the use of force is clearly the only means of resolving the Rhodesian problem. 38. If, however, the Security Council were to consider the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom, the sanctions, as 1 said a moment ago, ahould be not selective but comprehensive, applying to a11 commodities, including petroleum products. The Security Council should also decide from the outset that a11 States would be compelled to implement the resolution, if necessary, by force. We cannot be satisfied with the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary ‘s statement that the failure of any State-and 1 am thinking, of course, of South Africa-to implement the draft resolution would create a new situation, without any indication of how that new situationshouldbe considered or how it should be resolved. Let us be quite frank. If South Africa does not apply the sanctions, they Will be ineffective. The whole problem is whether the United Kingdom would take the necessary steps to force South Africa to comply with the Council’s decisions. As I have said, we are pessimistic in that regard. Nevertheless, we continue to have faith in the Security Council and to express the hope that if the United Kingdom fails to shoulder its responsibilities -a11 its responsibilities-the international community Will find a way of helping the Africans salve the Rhodesian problem in accordance with the rules and principles of the United Nations Charter.

The question of Southern Rhodesia, at the stage it has now reached, is of the most extreme gravity as well as ‘of the greatest complexity, with implications that cannot as yet be entirely known and consequences that cannot now be altogether foreseen. Although this matter is primarily the responsibility and indeed the direct concern of the United Kingdom Government, it is quite apparent that the fate of more than 4 million people, the peace of a continent and the most solemn responsibilities of the United Nations are also deeply involved. My delegation believes that those factors strongly emphasize the obligations incumbent upon a11 Members to bear their full share of the responsibilities involved. 49. It is against that background that the Security COUnCil, on earlier occasions, adopted resolution 217 {1965) on 20 November 1965, following the unilateral declaration of independence by the illegal régime in 42. The Japanese Government has faithfullyobserved and most strictly carried out its commitments in the earnest and sincere expectation that the concerted effort to apply economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia by a11 countries concerned would help achieve our common objective of bringing the rebellion to a speedy end. However, we must say in a11 frankness that the impact of these economic measures based on voluntary action was disappointingly slow and has not SO far brought about the desired result. My delegation deeply regrets that, as the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom himself admits, early forecasts were not borne out by events, for reasons known to a11 of us. 43. In tackling this difficult problem of Southern Rhodesia, my delegation was of the opinion that every effort pointing towards a peaceful settlement should also be encouraged. Unfortunately, we seem to be unable to place much hope in this course of settlement, at least for the time being. The Council was informed that the recent talks which took place between Prime Minister Wilson and Mr. Smith off Gibraltar ended in failure because of the stubborn and recalcitrant attitude held by the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, Thus a new situation was created, andwe believe that urgent and vigorous action should be taken in order to prevent any further deterioration of the situation. 44, It therefore seems appropriate to my delegation, that the United Kingdom Government has corne before the Council with a request that it reinforce with resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter the economic measures which have hitherto been voluntarily applied by Members of the United Nations. We recall that Security Council resolution 217 (1965) determined that the continuance in time of the situation resulting from the proclamation of independence by the illegal authorities in Southern Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace and security. That situationhas continued for more than a year, and the situation is such that the Council should now cal1 for binding measures under Article 41 of the Charter. 45. My delegation fully supports the adoption of mandatory measures as requested by the United 46. We hope and trust that these forecasts Will be borne out by evidence. At the same time, my dele- ’ gation strongly urges that a11 countries scrupulously carry out faithfully and strictly these required measures SO that they equally and impartially share the sacrifice and burden incurred by the international community. These measures are binding on a11 Members under Article 25 of the Charter, and equally on non-members by virtue of Article 2, paragraph 6. Al1 countries must carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter. Any defiant attempt to render the Council’s decision ineffective and, indeed, incapacitate the Council, for whatever reason, is a direct challenge to the authority and prestige of the United Nations. 4’7. In this connexion, my delegation fully shares the view of the representative of Argentina [1332nd meeting] that it is the primary obligation of the Council, under Chapter VII, Article 39 of thecharter, to determine “the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression”, and then to decide on whatever measures are appropriate. Since the United Kingdom proposa1 invokes Article 25 oîthe Charter, my delegation considers that the Council should define in explicit terms that its action is taken under Chapter VII of the Charter, in order to ensure the effective implementation of the proposai. 48. In order to achieve our common objective of bringing the rebellion to an end through economic measures, those measures must be effective. And if they are to be effective, they must be practical as well. 49. As 1 have said, my Government supports the measures under Article 41 provided for in the United Kingdom proposal. At the same time, we fully understand the argument that oil is the most important and indispensable element in this matter and, therefore, should be included in the mandatory sanctions. We have noted the statement of the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Brown, that the United Kingdom Government would not oppose the inclusion of oil if an amendment to that effect were made in acceptable terms. The Council should explore the practical possibility of including oil in the selective and mandatory sanctions. 50. We are also aware of the argument that a total, all-inclusive embargo would be the most effective and surest way of bringing the rebellion to an end. Our view on this point is that economic measures should 52. On the other hand, we must not overlook the fact that the Zambian economy is seriously menaced and the country’s stability and social peace greatly threatened. This very serious situation, by itself, heavily underscores the urgent necessity of solving the Rhodesian problem by the most expeditious and appropriate means. 53. As 1 said at the outset, the question of Southern Rhodesia is of the utmost gravity and extreme urgency. It is therefore essential for us to act effectively and promptly and thereby faithfully fulfil the Council’s obligations as the organ of the United Nations responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security.

There are no more names on the list of speakers for this meeting. 1 have consulted members of the Council, and if there are no objections we shall hold a closed meeting tomorrow morning at 10.30 a.m. to consider the annual report of the Council to the General Assembly. At 11 otclock we shall hold an open meeting to continue the question of Southern Rhodesia. The meeting rose at 4.15 p.m. HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED United Nations publications may distributors throughout the world. Write to: United Nations, Sales COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS Les publications des Nations Unies agences dépositaires du monde entier. ou adressez-vous à: Nations Unies, Section COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Las publicaciones de las Naciones casas distribuidoras en todas partes dirijase a: Naciones Unidas, Seccian Litho in U.N. Price: $U.S. 0.50 (or equivalent in other currencies)