S/PV.1335 Security Council

Pursuant to the decision taken by thecouncilat its 1331st meeting, and with the consent of the Council, 1 shall invite the representatives of Zambia, Senegal, Algeria, Pakistan and India to take the seats reservedfor them near the Council table. At the invitation ofthe President, Mr. S. M. Kapwepwe (Zambia), Mr. Diop (Senegal), Mr. T. Bouattoura (Algeria), Mr. Amjad Ali (Pakistan) and Mr. G* Parthasarathi (India) took the places reserved for them near the Council table. 2, The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I draw the Councilts attention to the fact that amendments t0 the United Kingdom draft resolution bave been submitted by the representatives of Mali, Nigeria and 4. The sponsors and the African Membess of the United Nations which they have the honour to represent realize, however, that they do not have a monopoly of wisdom by any mariner of means, and that it may be possible if we put our heads together here in the Security Council for other members to amend our amendments and submit proposals, provided it is clearly understood that the purpose of the exorcise would be to make the draft resolution effective and to achieve the desired result in the shortest possible time. 5. What do the amendments set out to achieve which the draft resolution does net? The British delegation is, naturally, at pains to demonstrate that the United Kingdom, with the best of intentions, has done a11 it could ta solve the problem of Southern Rhodesia. Not only does the United Kingdom absolve itsclf of any kind of blame, but it is even most anxious to exculpate each and every one of its trading partners, including South Afrioa and Portugal, despite the well-known part that these two oountries have playedinbolstering the racist Smith rt5gime. 6. The sponsors of the draft amendments feel that, without undue recriminations, the Council’s attention should be drdwn to the abortive efforts of Great Britain to bring down the illegal racist minority rggime and its deliberate refusa1 to use any kind of force. And not only did it not use force, but it even warned Ian Smith that it would not use force, no matter what Ian Smith did subsequently. ‘7. The action of certain States-not only South Africa and Portugal-in rendering ineffective Seourity Council resolut,ion 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965 deserves, in the view of the co-sponsors, and, again, without labouring thc point unduly, special mention. This, too, has been mentioned in our draft amendments. That is a11 that is said of the chief dramatis Eersonae in this tragic drama. Apart from noting and deploring what certain Members of the Organization have done or left undone, no harsh words of censure or abuse or condemnation have been uttered against any of them. The proposals in the draft amendments speak for themselves. 8. The second important function of the draft amendments is to enlarge the list of items contained in operative paragraph 1 of the United Kingdom draft resolution, In addition to the inclusion of oil and oil products, which the co-sponsors consider vital to the success of the whole exercise, we feel that coal and 9, It is noteworthy that no othes items, except the three mentioned above-oil, coal and manufactured goods-have been added to the list of commodities proposed in the United Kingdom draft resolution. My delegation’s clear undesstanding was that the United Kingdom would readily have included coal and manufactured goods but for fear of injuring Zambia’s economy. Now that we know how Zambia feels about the embargo on coal and manufactured goods, wehave no doubt that Great Britain would be only too glad to Support the inclusion of these two items. turés figurant La Royaume-Uni l’égard produits Royaume-Uni 10. The other amendments consist in the main of exhortations and requests addressed to the United Kingdom in its capacity as the administering Power to declare positively that there Will be no further Valks about talksn with the rebel r6gime; that there would be no further offers of independence to the rebel régime; that whatever promises were held out to Ian Smith and his desperate band have now been withdrawn. This may appear to be somewhat superfhous, but when the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom made his statement one realized how important it is that Great Britain should declare forthrightly here and now that the end of the road has been reached between itself and Ian Smith. If 1 may quote from the statement previously made by the Poreign Secretary of Great Britain: qu’il entretiens” offres paratire tendu la déclaration étrangeres importe équivoque finitivement passage faires “Before 1 conclude, 1 should also emphasize that, besides this proposa1 for mandatory sanctions, certain other consequences Will flow from Mr, Smith’s rejection of OUF offers. 1 hope that this draft resolution Will, with the full support of our partners in the Commonwealth, be approved on the lines I have proposed. If SO, Britain Will proceed to the related further step which we have already undertaken ta carry out in those circumstances: namely, we Will withdraw a11 previous proposals for a constitutional settlement which have been made to the Rhodesians; in particular, we Will not thereafter be prepared to submit to the British Parliament any settlement which involves independence before majority rule.” [1331st meeting, para. 40.1 11. The point that I want to emphasize is that there iS mention here of the support of Gryat Brita”n’s i’ 3 12. But, apart from that, what would happen if this resolution were, by some mischance, not passed by the Security Council? Would that mean that Great Britain would then go ahead and offer independence to Ian Smith before majority rule? 1 hope that that is not what was intended by the Foreign Secretary. Whatever was intcnded 1 think that it is absolutely essential that Great Britain should, at this stage, declare that there Will be no further proposals intended to give independence to Ian Smith and his henchmen before majority rule has been attained in Southern Rhodesia. 13. Since the United Kingdom is also the administering Power for Southern Rhodesia, it has also been asked to prevent, by a11 means, the transport of oil and oil products to Southern Rhodesia. Here 1 should like to pay a tribute to the prompt action of the United Kingdom when it dispatched a frigate to Beira within a matter of hours after the adoption of the Security Council resolution last April [resolution 221 (1966)], to stop oil from reaching Rhodesia in contravention of the resolution. Heartened by its past performance in this connexion, the sponsors expect Great Britain to do her duty even on this occasion. 14. Here 1 must pause and refer to certain cryptic remarks made by the Secretary for l?oreign Affairs of the Wnited Kingdom. He said: “Net only must we proceed step by step in dealing with this situation, but it must not be allowed to develop into a confrontation-economic or militaryinvolving the whole of southern Africa, I, have no doubt the Council realiees that such action could have incalculable consequences to the whole of central and southern Africa, going far Qeyond the issues raised by the Rhodesian problem-and indeed none of us could predict the consequences. Indeed, they could very rapidly dwarf the Rhodesian problem and defeat the very purposes which we pursue.n [ 1331st meeting, para. 32.1 15. It is by no manner of means clear what the Secretary for Foreign Affairs meant when he spoke of proceeding step by step. Does that mean that we should start off with the weaker of the two culprits and stop the importation of oil into Rhodesia through Mozambique, and, after that has been done, proceed with the bigger and more powerf’ul of the two culprits-South Africa? 1 suggest that the only effective measure that could be taken under the circumstances is a total banning of oil, no matter where the oil cornes from, and no matter whether this involves, in the end, a 16. While discretion is the better part of valeur, it does not pay to approach a situation like this with a defeatist attitude, which the British have been doing. The United Ilingdom is clearly obsessed by the thought that the operation of the sanctions might hurt South Africa, its chief trading partner, and might therefore hurt its own interests. None of the sanctions are directed against South Africa as such. 17. ‘On the other hand, these are mandatory sanctions and every Member of the United Nations is expected to comply with this Security Council resolution if it is adopted. If South Africa proposes to go against a United Nations resolution, how cari a great world Power like Great Britain, with some claim to moral leadership in the international community, plead economic distress and succour of its defaulting partner? 18, The important thing is that this is amoral issue; it is not just a domestic matter of desperate men rebelling against an imperial Power. In the history of mankind, rebellions have sometimes been justified. What is at stake is that we have a band of desperatc men who have the most obnoxious policy which they have imposed on the majority of the people who live in Southern Rhodesia. That is what is at stake. This is a big moral issue. 19, The rest of the proposals which have been made are-as 1 said before-exhortations and reaffirmations. In ‘one clause it has been found necessary to refer to General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and to reaffirm the inalienable rights of the people i>f Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence. This is nothing new in the life of the Organization andI am quite Sure that. the United Kingdom delegation Will accept this without any demur. 20. The only other important clause that 1 needrefer to is one that calls upon a11 States not to render any sort of financial or economic aid to the illegal racist rggime of Southern Rhodesia. This has been directed particularly ta banks which operate a lucrative trade in that country and it is felt that the co-operation of a11 financial interests, from a11 parts of the world, is extremely necessary before we cari expect anysort of succèss in this exercise. 21. The last two paragraphs are intended to keep some sort of review of the implementation of these Proposals. The Secretary-General is requested to report to the Counoil at regular intervals on the implementation of the resolution, and it is hoped that the ,first report will be forthcoming by 1 Maroh 196’7. 23. Although 1 have spoken at greater length than 1 had intended, 1 feel that 1 have put forward the views of the sponsors of the amendments. Any member of the Security Council is free to contribute to the discussion, and 1 feel that there should be no difficulty in accepting the proposals that have been put forward by the sponsors.

1 am speaking at this stage in support of my colleague, the representative of Uganda, who has very eloquently introduced to the Council the amendments to the United Kingdom draft resolution in document S/7630, which Nigeria and Mali are also sponsoring. 25. Since he has reviewed a11 of the clauses of our draft seriatim, and explained adequately to the Council why we feel that these provisions are necessary, and since the members of the Council have still to make their views known with regard to these provisions, 1 shall refrain from going over that ground again this morning. 1 shall confine myself instead to making a few observations on the general position of the African countries whfch we represent here on this very important and crucial question that affects ail our people, wherever they may be, on the African continent. “TO me, and to my Government, this is primarily a great moral issue.” Those words are not my own; 1 have taken them from the second statement made before this Council by Mr. Brown, the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, on 9 December [1332nd meeting]. On that occasion he was exeroising the right of reply to the statement made before the Council a few moments earlier by the Foreign Minister of Zambia, 26. When Mr. Brown ended his remarks, 1 was tempted to ask for the floor; but I resisted the temptation, 1 did SO because the time was not then available and also because 1 felt that perhaps it would be as well to wait until today in order to reply to Mr. Brown on this point. 27, Let me say straight away that 1 concux with what Mr. Brown said, and 1 believe that a11 African countries concur with that statement, including Zambia. Zambia has been in the front line of the battle; it is African people who are suffering-notably, the people of Zimbabwe and the people of Zambia, If the Foreign Minister of’zambia spoke with such heat and passion, it was because he and his people were at the receiving end of the consequences implied for OUP continent by the continued existence of the illegal racist regime in Southern Rhodesia. This is primarily a moral issue. That has been the stand of Africa a11 the time, That is the challenge posed by the Rhodesian question, not only for the United Kingdom, but also for Nigeria, 28. The question that we of Africa ask ourselves is: how are we meeting this challenge? The challenge is direoted not only to Great Britain but to a11 of us, Great Britain, however, bears the primary responsibility, We did not give Great Britain that primary responsibility; it is a responsiblitY which floWs directly from that nation’s historical connexion with Southern Rhodesia. Great Britain made that bed; Great Britain must lie on it. If it is an uncomfortable bed, Great Britain has my sympathy. But who made the bed uncomfortable? The present Government of Great Britain is heir to a legacy whichis most uncomfortable-a legacy of previous policies thatwerewrong, 1 do not want to go into this history at great length this morning, especially since Great Britain itself acknowledges the fact of its primary responsibility. The question 1 want to raise this morning is, first of ail, hoW Great Britain ha4 discharged that responsibility to date, and, secondly, how it proposes to dischargeit in the future. 1 am prepared to agree that the benefit of the doubt should be given to Great Britain, with regard to motive. 1 am prepared to agree that Great Britain means well, but, as 1 indicated in my intervention when we disoussed this question in May, it is not sufficient to rnean well. It is not sufficient to say that you want to protect the indigenous people of Zimbabwe, that you want to dismiss the illegal racist régime in Rhodesia; it is necessary to take adequate steps to accomplish this objective. 29. Even in May, when we last discussed this question, the British took the position that the steps they were taking were adequate. Events have once more proved them to be Pn the wrong. 1 think it is only fair that the’ British delegation should acknowledge this fact, that they should aoknowledge that in May, when they said the measures they were taking were adequate, they, were wrong, and that when in May the representatfves of Africa said that those measures were inadequate, we were right. I think that if they were to do thfs, we could then prooeed with the rest of our work in a spirit of greater mutual understanding. 30. It is not being suggested by me that they bave taken no .measures at ail-that Great Britainhas taken no measures at all-because they bave. It iS nOt SUggested by me that voluntary sanctions have had no effect at ail, because they have. The point of the matter is that those measures have been grossly inadequate. That was the point we made in May; that was the Point we made even earlier, and it is the point noW: in a11 honesty, Great Britain and a11 its friends, including Nigeria, should now acknowledge it to be the case that Great Britain was wrong and Africa was right. We opposed the idea of talks about talks; we said that those talks were dangerous. We said that those talks conflicted with the assurance previously given bY 31. Anybody who has read the reports concerningthe things that have taken place since then must surely acknowlodge, now, that here again Great Britain was wrong and we were right. 32. In his statement before us the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, for whom 1 have great respect, went on to point out that the die was ca& that, as far as his Government was concerned, a new page had opened. They were now prepared to be tough with the racist rggime, Al1 they asked was support, first, by the Commonwealth countries and, secondly, by the remainder of the United Nations, in their effort ta topple the racist rbgime in Southern Rhodesia. I am very grateffil for those remarks of his, but I hope he Will pardon us if we add that we are expecting that deeds Will match those words. 33. Why do we say that, with respect? Because of what a newspaper in the United Kingdom calls Vhe lingering farewells between London and Salisburynthat is to say, today it is farewell, tomorrow it is welcome again, followed by, on a third day, farewell once more. For that reason, without casting any aspersions on the Foreign Secretary or his Government, we expect that everything that the British Government will do henceforth Will match his assertions-that the die is now cast, that we have reached a turning point, the point of no return. 34. 1 say this in complete awareness of the difficulties of Mr. Brown of the Prime Minister, and of the British Government. The British are a democratic people, They have a thing called the Opposition-an Opposition that was partly responsible for what 1 cal1 the unfortunate legacy of the Wilson Government. Some of us have been reading the contributions of that Opposition to recent debates in the House of Commons. For that reason we recognize the difficulty of Prime Minister Wilson. It is a pity that the Opposition in Great Britain is taking the line it does-an Opposition which, when it was the Government of the day, made it clear to the then Government of Southern Rhodesia tbat it was not going to tolerate the kind of government that is there today. In spite of their profession of belief in democratic government in Southern Rhodesia, the Opposition is now singing a different tune, It is most unfortunate. 35, But if the task of Prime Minister Wilson is difficult, that is no reason why he should abdicate his responsibility. The people of Great Britain gave their votes to Prime Minister Wilson rather than to the leader of the Opposition because they would rather 37. The original draft submitted by the United Kingclom was put forth after considerable consultation, as Mr. Brown indicated here, and in the course of that consultation he was told by African countries which were involved in those consultations that the measures proposed by the United Kingdom were inadequate. He stressed over and over again the fact that the support, first of the Commonwealth countries, and then of a11 other Members of the United Nations, was imperative if the job in Rhodesia was to be done thoroughly and satisfactorily. We acknowledged that necessity, but we take the view that that job cannot be done by supporting the United Kingdom on the basis of the draft resolution which it put before this Council. That is the crux of our difference. 38. In my intervention in May, 1 said: “Our case is that the measures already approved by the Security Council and the measures already taken by the United Kingdom are inadequate to do the job” [1285thmeeting, para. 71. We feel that, if one believes in sanctions, then the best way to demonstrate that belief in the effectiveness of sanctions is to make them mandatory. Today, the United Kingdom Government is prepared to make sanctions mandatory, but the fact that sanctions are mandatory will not of itself topple the racist rt5gime in Southern Rhodesia. The sanctions have to caver enough ground. In the course of consultations wîth members of our own African group, a representative said: you are talking of oomprehensive sanctions; the British are talking of selective sanctions, We had better not talk at cross purposes. What is important Is that sanctions should hit the right things, and a11 the right things at the right time, SO that one obtains the right effect. Sanctions on golf clubs willnot topple the Ian Smith regime. Two heads are better than one. The African members of this C ouncil have a XeSerVOir of talent in the African group that we consult from 39. We have proposed additions to the export list. We have proposed additions to the import list. The challenge Is now before the Counoil. That is why 1 said earlier that it is not sufficient for theMembers of the United Nations to blame the Unitecl Kingdom; it is not sufficient for the oritics of Africa to blame Africa. Th,e repponsibility now xests with the United Nations, This xesponsibility is in our hands. 40. Those who purport to be friends of the United Kingdom cari help very greatly in this matter. We have been told, for instance, that it would be wsong and unwise to saddle the British with more than they cari carry. 1 agree oompletely. If the British are not going to carry the whole burden, who is going to carry it if we want this objective to be achieved? The United Nations must carry the burden, How cari we help the United Kingdom? 1 submit that we oan help it, first, by approvingthe draft amendments beforc us, or appsoving alternate draft amendments which Will do the job very well. Secondly, by complying with this sanctions decision. 41. The representative of Argentina made a very interesting intervention the other day [ 1332nd meeting] in which he said: “The condemnation of suohrégimes” -that is, suchr6gimes as the Ian Smith racist regime- %kes precedence over material interests of any kind”. How many of us are prepared to subscribe to that? Portugal and South Africa are supposed to be Members of the U,nited Nations-Members tolerated in the United Nations, Members who subsaribed to the Charter, Members who have flouted SO many resolutions of the United Nations including the resolution of this Council on Southern Rhodesla. Are we ail, great and small, prepared to say, as the representative of Argentina said, that the condemnation of such xêgimes takes precedence over material interests of any kind, because it was not only Portugal and South Africa which defaulted on the obligation oast upon them by the Secuxity Council in itsearlier resolution. Eaoh country should searoh its own heart and see whether it discharged that obligation faithfully, in accordanoe with a statement of this kind. 42. The representative of Japan pointed out yestexday [1333rd meeting] that, if this sanction decision that we are going to take here was obsexved by ail, the job would be done, Are we all prepared to get our different countries to carry out faithfully the decision that is going to be taken by this Council? 43. It is unfortunate but some of the statements made in ox outside this Council by spokesmen of Britain have not ‘been sufficiently firm on this point. 1 refer in partioular to their statements in regard to the position of South Africa. In those statements, they are committing the same kind of error as that which they committed when they s,tarted to tel1 Southern 44. 1 shall be very glad if the United Kingdom, instead of saying that it is net prepared for a confrontation with South Afrioa, would say that if it is to oonfront South Africa, the consequences to Britain would be such that it cari only do SO with the eoonomic support of its friends and of a11 the Members of the United Nations, 1 say that because the point 1 want to underline here is the responsibility that the rest of us bear. It is not right for the Members of the United Nations to leave Britain, to leave Zambia, to leave Malawi, to leave a11 the other neighbours of Zimbabwe, and Zimbabwe itself, to bear a11 the consequences of the decision that the Security Counoil is going to take. 45. Those of us who say that we wish Bxitain well must then be prepared to help; the developed countries, which say that we should not impose upon Britain more than Britain can bear, should cesse from saying that sort of thing and should say-on behalf of their respective countries-that they are prepared to support Britain with a11 their economic might, whatever the oonsequences of a confrontation with South Afrioa. 46. We in Africa cannot live with what Southern Rhodesia and South Africa represent on our continent indefinitely, and the sooner those who purport to be our friends, outside of Afxica, appreciate this, the better, 47. This is primarily a moral issue; a moral issue must be faced squarely. 1 want to explain that these admonitions which 1 have made are not addressedonly to great countries; they are addressed to a11 of our countries. There is a little story that 1 should like to tell, with the President’s permission. It is a true story that relates to the days of the ancient Romans, The Romans found themselves in great difficulty with a certain section of their population, and the leaders of Rome met in council; one after another, the senators got onto the rostxum to complain about how weak the Govexnment of Rome had become-the very same way that we complain about how weakthe United Nations is. Then, one old senatox got onto the rostrum and said something that 1 have never forgotten. Incidentally, the section of Rome that was giving trouble, if the womenfolk of the United Nations will permit me, was the women of Rome. 1 do not recall what kind of trouble they were giving, and how far it diffexs fxom the kind of trouble that husbands have to put up with these days, Whatever it was, the old senator said: “If we were not what we axe, the women of Rome would not be what they are.” The moral is simple and clear; if a11 our oountries were prepared to accept the challenge of this moral issue, if Britain were prepared 48. No gunboats, let alone warships, would benecessary to stop anything flowing into South Africa if a11 our countries did not allow anything to flow to South Africa from our countries. The fear is that SO many of our countries put material prosperity above moral issues that we Will not meet this challenge and it is for that reason that poor Britain is apprehensive. Therefore, we oan help Britain,by passing this resolution, and by assurances that we are going to support Britain and Afrioa in getting through with this matter. The die is oast. Are we prepared to accept the challenge? 49. In conclusion, 1 want to add that there is no other way; there is no othex way. And 1 want to do so by underlining something that 1 said in an intervention to which 1 have already referred more than once. With the Pxesidentls permission, 1 shall quote from it again: “One important British organ of opinion said several months ago that while it appreoiated the difficulties of Premier Wilson in applying force to solve the problem of Rhodesia, it felt thatthe result of the delay in applying force would be that the solution of the Rhodesian problem, insteadof being, as it inevitably would have been, nasty, brutish and short, Will be nasty, brutish and long. That is the situation today and we regret that it is thus because it is oUr own people in Zimbabwe who are suffering more than anybody else in the world. It is oUr own people in Zambia who are suffering terribly.” [1285th meeting, para. 10.1 50. The die is cast. We who represent Africa here feel that we have reaohed a point at which nobody: requires to be pexsuaded that the illegal racist regime in South Africa constitutes a thxeat to international, peace and security, that drastic measures now have, to be taken and that inadequate measures Will not, do the job. Inadequate measures Will simply, pralong the eoonomic sufferings of Britain,. the intolerable ec,onomic sufferings of Zambia, the eoonomic dislocation suffered by all the neighbours of Zimbabwe and the problems that are created for the whole continent of Africa by the presence of this raoist regime in SoUthern Rhodesia, 51. Speakïng for the Afrioan countries, I trust that that challenge Will be acceptedby the Security Council. AS the representative from Uganda pointed out earlier, we do not pretend to possess a11 the wisdom in the world, What we have put before you represents the minimum that, in African opinion, is necessary to do this job.

The United Kingdom having SO willed it, the Security Council has been obliged to convene again on the question of Southern Rhodesia, thus confîrming once more the power of the Crown, even at the level of this august Council. Today, as on 9 Aprilandl.7 May 1966, the United Kingdom, motivated solely by concern for its material interests, has with skilful hypocrisy cast its problem into the arms of the United Nations, in accordance with a cynical plan. 54. When Africa, while there was yet time, exposed the sosry spectaole which was being staged by the United Kingdom, there wese many who turned a deaf ear. 1 would therefore like again to recall the warnîngs uttercd by a11 the Afxican countries concerning the Rhodesîan problem. 55. Before Ian Smith’s unilateral declaration of independence for Southern Rhodesia, a11 the African peoples had conveyed their apprehensions to the United Kîngdom. Nevertheless, disregarding a11 the moving appeals addressed to it, the UnitedKingdom, incollusion with the rebel rbgîme in Rhodesîa, unhesitatîngly chose to defend sordid materîal interests rather than the fundamental legitimate rights of the indîgenous population of Rhodesia. 56. Wîthout hesitation, the United Kingdom chose to support 200,000 of its nationals to the detrîment of 4 million human beings for the simple reason, perhaps, that the latter were black. It is hard to us to imagine for one second that any man worthy of the name could be SO bold as $0 dispute the contemptible motives which govern the Unîted Kingdom’s behaviour in this matter. The whole of Africa accuses the United Kingdom of nurturing the seeds of the most terrible kind of war-the kînd of war whioh the world has every interest in avoîding, namely, racial war. Despite a11 the warnîngs heaped on the United Kingdom byits own friends, as well as by the peoples who are subjected to the constant humiliation of being reduced to the level of animals, the United Kingdom has never aotively sought a fair, honest and humane settlement of the situation which has been created in Rhodesia, 57. Its sham talks with Ian Smith axe an cloquent illustration of this attitude, but it is true that, for those who know the United Kingdom, one more pîeoe of hypocrisy on its part cari scarcely cause surprise. HOW cari one believe for a moment in the sincerity of the United Kingdom when ît has not hesitated t0 go down ,on its knees to plead with the rebel, Ian Smith? Has not this same United Kîngdom, on other occasions, arbitrarily imprisoned leaders whose only crime was to work for the emancîpation of their peoples? 58. I read the following in a newspaper report on 6 ‘December 1966. 1 quote: “Mr. Harold Wilson announced today, in a televised message to the Rritish nation, that the tims This speaks for itself. 59. In a11 good faith, Africa had hoped for and had hailed Mr. Wilson(s victory in the United Kingdom elections, thinking that the majority gained by the Labour Government would at last enable him to humanize Rhodesia. Sad to say, it was a grievous disappointment. A Conservative victory could not have been worse. The world has followed the course of the Rhodesian crisis, sustained by the United Kingdom, which has firmly deolared that it would never use force against Ian Smith’s racist rebel regime. The world has watched the martyrdom of the valiant people of Zimbabwe and the no less valiant people of Zambia, whose economy has been sevesely upset as a result of the United Kingdomrs procrastination in taking the measures which are necessary to crush the rebellion. 60. In the pursuit of its perfldious polioy of selfinterest, the United Kingdom is trying to avoid any damage to the trade relations it maintains with South Afrioa at the expense of the African masses. Thus, the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary stated here in the Council that any measure relating to an oil embargo might be considered by the United Kingdom Government, provided, however, that it was framed in acceptable terms. 61. Continuing its diabolloal self-seeking, the United Kingdom Government would like us to play its game. Before the Fore@ Secretary could make this reference to oil, Southern Rhodesia must of course have had time to lay up a stockof oil for at least two years, and its supply lines must have been assured; otherwise, why should oil not have been included in the embargo which was advocated a year ago? No one is taken in by this monstrous British farce, the sole purpose of which is to make Smith’s rebel regime stronger with every day that passes. 62. We are deeply distressed-and SO, 1 believe, is the whole world-to see the Council reduced to the role of a compliant tool employed by the United 63. We have stressed that the problem of Rhodesia is a domestic problem, a British colonial problem. There is no need for the United Kingdom to assert a paternity claim which no one is contesting. We do feel, however, that it must face up to its responsibilities. It is quite well equipped to do so, in view of its experience in colonial matters. We have always recommended to it those measures which are necessaryand which alone cari help it to put down the rebellion of its colony, Everyone knows that it has rejected them for reasons of self-interest. Then why a11 this show of running to the Security Council? We feel that this mischief of bringing about another explosive situation in the United Nations must not be encouraged. The United Kingdom has already brought here enough inextricable problems which are paralysing our Organization. Why allow it to add another? Everyone, 1 am sure, knows the problems 1 am referring to. We have the problem of Kashmir, the problem of Cyprus and its two communities, and the problems of Aden, of the Sultanate of Oman and Muscat, of South Africa and its system of apartheid, of South West Africa and of Malaysia-which seems to have been settled. We are exposing this stratagem before it is too late. 64. A newspaper report on 10 December 1966 stated: nThe United Kingdom Government is no longer master of the situation in the Rhodesian crisis.” According to the report, the Leader of the Conservative Party, Mr, Edward Heath, said at a party meeting that “the decision now rests with the United Nations”. Ms. Heath also stnted that “legislation to give effect to the sanctions will take months, if not years, of preparation, and the deterioration of the situation might lead to a military conflict”. Mr. Heath added: “We are faced wlth the following dilemma: some members of the Security Council will not tolerate the sanctions’ remaining ineffective. On the other hand, effective sanctions would bring about a confrontation with South Africa.” Mr. Heath therefore favours a resumptien of the talks between London and Salisbury, 66. Onr fear is amply justified, especially in the case of a country whioh, unmoved by the sufferings of 4 million Africans, has shown itself SO adept in the art of deception. The fear of the Afrioan is, I repeat, justified in the oase of a country which, even though it cari claim to have given or offered independenoe to twenty-eight or thirty colonies beoause it was forced to follow and conform to the inexorable historic prooess of deoolonization which is the mark of our times, must nevertheless accept the bitter realization that its former colonies retain some superfioial memories which do not strike any lofty chord, 66. The United Kingdom bears the sole responsibility and guilt in the Rhodesian affair, and Africa 67. We shall always insist that the use of force is the only means of putting down the rebellion of the British colony of Rhodesia. TO maintain the contrary would be truly to demonstrate a lack of logic. The economic sanctions which the United Kingdom wielded ended inevitably in failure, while at the same time developing in Rhodesia a kind of immunity against the embargo. 68. We cannot stress too strongly that international peace and security are endangered in southern Africa. Xt is time for the United Kingdom-that great Powerto live up to the stature conferred upon it by its p’osition as a permanent member of the Security Council. It has been offered every assistance in that task, beginning with the example of Zambia, a small country which, rising above questions of material interest, has accepted a sacrifice a thousand times greater proportionately, in order to contribute effectively to the realization of the ideals of the Charter of the United Nations in a region where the lure of profit is still the primary motive behind every act and every relationship, 69. It is time fox the United Kingdom to realize that its collusion with South Africam to the detriment of 4 million Africans in Rhodesia cari hardly be regarded as worthy of the moral example which it should set as a permanent member of this Council. The Africans have shown great patience and still venture to hope that the Council, by virtue of the trust which we are entitled to place in it, Will be able to play its rightful role. We have already said-and we still maintainthat the only effective means of bringing down Ian Smitlirs rebel ‘régime is the use of force. As far as economic measures are concerned, we disagree with the United Kingdom proposa1 for so-called selective sanctions,’ and we believe that mandatory comprehensive sanctions covering oil and petroleum products, coal and manufactured goods, must be effectively applied by a11 Members of the United Nations, as a part of the assistance they owe to the United Kingdom in putting down the rebellion of its 200,000 white se ttler s in Rhodesia. 70. The United Kingdom must reoall with bitterness that a few years ago these same Africans who today, through complicity and greed, are being refused justice were used as cannon-fedder to save those who are now denying them the elementary right to life. That is a truly sad fact. 71. We believe that the Council, in the cause of justice, Will give its full support to the African amendments contained in document S/‘7630.

The next speaker on my list is the representative of Pakistan, to whom 1 now give the floor. 73. Mr. Amjad AL1 (Pakistan): The delegation of Pakistan is grateful to you, Mr. President, and to the 75, We have now corne to a stage in this crisis where rhetoric is clearly out of place and anything smacking of “I told you SO” hardlyhelpful. 1 shall therefore content myself with stating the main oonsiderations of fact and principle which, inour firm conviction, should govern further action by the Security Council. 76. Before doing SO, however, 1 cannot dismiss a basic thought which recurs in one’s mind about the roots and growth of this orisis. We cannot help wondering what would have been the course of events if, in place of Ian Smith and his clique, it had been a people of a different race who had staged a rebellion and established a minority and repressive r6gime. Would not the rebellion have been speedily quelled? Would we not then have heard arguments for the use of force fax more powerful than those that are now being deployed against it? Would the question then have been allowed ta become SO complicated? Much of the apparent complexity of this question is perhaps traceable to nothing more than the colour of Ian Smith. 77. 1 recognize that this thought cari be embittering. But while we may, and should, suppress its emotional overtones, we cannot deny its relevance if the real nature of this question is to be correctly understood. TO observe that the problem has taken its present form because, -and only because, the administering 78. 1 now corne to our main submissions. 1 readily acknowledge that some of them are SO obvious that, at the present stage of the case, they cari be taken for granted. But their reiteration is necessary in view of certain trends which were rather conspicuous in the last debate on this question in the Council. Besides, it is through an interlocking of a11 these considerations that, we believe, the Council cari decide suitable action to remove from the people of Zimbabwe .the curse, and from the world community the cancer, of this racist régime. ‘79, Our main submissions are the following. First, the situation in Rhodesia is not one that merely involves considerations of justice and fundamental human rights; it has been pronounced a threat to international peace and security. Those who were inclined, during the Council’s debate in May, to express doubts whether the Security Council had made a determination to this effect, need to be reminded of two facts. The first is that paragraph 1 of resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965 clearly laid down the determination that ‘lits continuance in time constitutes a threat to international peace and security If -this, of course, refers to the situation in Rhodesia, Since the situation has continued for a much longer time than was originally anticipated, it is now beyoncl dispute that the Council regards it as a threat to international peace and security. The other fact is that resolution 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966 authorized the use of force which, however limited, could not be applied except in exercise of the powers conferred on the Security Council by Chapter VII of the Charter. It is, thesefore, established that the legal prerequisites of action under Chapter VII have already been fulfilled. This is not, of course, to suggest that a fresh declaration as proposed in the first part of the second amendment in document S/7630 would not be both necessary and appropriate. 80. Secondly, though we appreciate the special posltion of the United Kingdom in this question, and the crucial role it has to play, it cannot be maintained that the removal of this threat topeaoeis not as much the primary responsibility of the United Nations, as it is of the United Kingdom. As we understand it, the position is that, while the sovereignty of the United Kingdom over Rhodesia is unquestioned, the procesk of the transfer of that sovereignty to the people of Rhodesia-in other words, the exercise by these people of their right of self-determination-has been thwarted, giving rise to a threat to international peace and security. That it is not a State, but a group of people, which has thwarted this .process and threatened the peace does net make it any less a matter of international conoern, justifying action by 32. Fourthly, there is no basis for the argument, which again was advanced in the Council in May, that action under Chapter VII means either eoonomic measures or military operations. TO contend that the Charter precludes a combination of the two is against a11 reason. Who cari deny that, in certain situations, economic measures Will not be effective unless they are reinforced by a police action? 83. Fifthly, a11 the developments registered in the Rhodesian situation since the Council considered it in November 1965 have disproved beyond a11 doubt some of the main assumptions entertained by the Security Council. The economic collapse which was declared to be imminent for Ian Smith’s régime has not materialized. The fair chance which was supposed to exist for the problem to be solved by peaceful negotiation has completely disappeared. A contemplation of these facts cannot but lead us to the conclusion that the estimates of our African colleagues are sounder and more realistic than those confidently offered by others. We are, therefore, fearful of grave risks if the evaluations made by African members are not taken fully into account. 84. Sixthly, the inadequate action hitherto taken by the Security Council has not only failed to correct the situation but has aggravated it. It has done SO because it has afforded the racist elements time to harden their resistance and to make preparations to combat any measures that the Security Council might employ. We would therefore be chary of SuppOrting any proposals which, in the view of our African Cdleagues, would only continue this pattern and prolong the suffering of the people of Rhodesia and the neighbouring African countries. 85. Seventhly, it is altogether unrealistic to approach the Rhodesian crisis on a premise which ignores the cardinal fact that the mentors, the suppliers and the protectors of the Salisbury clique exist among the Colonial or racist régimes in the neighbourhood of Rhodesia. We are doubtful if any economic sanctions designed to leave these elements untouched Will have a really corrective effect on the Rhodesian situation. 86. Eighthly, in view of the known position Of the South African Government, it will be gross eVasionon the part of the Security Council if it does not address the request for economic blockade specifically to 87. Ninthly, the difference between voluntary and mandatory sanctions becomes nominal if the mandatory sanctions are not of a universal and comprehensive character or are not otherwise effective. In other words, if mandatory sanctions are SO confined to a few selected items that their consequences cari be evaded or otherwise absorbed in the economy of the party concerned, they do not constitute any tangible advance on the voluntary sanctions that have already been authorized. 88. Tenthly, if the effects of mandatory sanctions of a general and comprehensive character are going to be economically ruinous; not only for Rhodesia butfor many other countries as well, a substitute for them would then be not partial economic action but the use of force, If it is agreed that only some coercive action cari relieve the world community of this threat, as it certainly is, then it seems thatwe have to choose between mandatory sanctions, which Will inevitably apply to South Africa if they have to be effective, and a oontrolled use of force. 1 submit that we oannot avoid both these alternatives, 89. Lastly, as regards the political aspect of this problem, we note the statement of the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom in which he said that, if the draft resolution sponsored by him [S/7621] is adopted, his Government Will not countenance any settlement which involves independence for Rhodesia before majority rule. Though qualified, this statement is welcome; but we would suggest that an uriconditional declaration to this effect could perhaps be fittingly embodied in a resolution of the Council. 90. These are the main considerations of fact and principle which, in our humble view, should govern the Council’s decision. We are not, however, putting them forward by way of a comment on. any concrete proposals before the Council. Like the majority of the United Nations Members, Pakistan has wholeheartedly complied with the directions issued SO far. In pledging my Government’s unreserved support to any further positive action which the Council might decide, I will again plead that there is a certain type of attitude which we consider harmful in the present situation, It is the type of attitude whichwas exemplified in the rejection [1285th meeting] of the draft resolution contained in document S/7285/Add.l of 11. May last. The justifioation given at that time of this attitude was that the Council could not subscribe 91. If they have now corne to the firm conclusion that there is no alternative to the use of force to reinforce sanctions, as provided for in Article 42 of the Charter, we urge that the Security Council should not indicate in any manner that this point of view has been disregarded. We have heard the arguments against the use of force, but the question lurks in our minds: if force could be used in Kenya and Malaya in the not-so-remote past, what is the prohibitive element in Rhodesia, especially when force would be used there only to reinforce sanctions authorized by the whole world community, and in furtherance of the objectives of the United Nations? 92. Force is being used today in certain other situations which involve far greater problems of logistics and far more agonizing moral issues than any that would arise in Rhodesia. No one, Asian or African, relishes the prospect of the use of force; no one ignores its difficulties and its perils, but are there not greater dangers attendant on inadequate action being taken under Chapter VII? 93. We do not have to spell out these dangers in detail: the disintegration of the Commonwealth, which Pakistan would deeply regret, especially under these circumstances, the total loss of confidence in t.he United Nations and its sense of purpose, the encouragement of racist elements and the strengthening oftheir pockets of resistance against the historical prOcess of the establishment of racial equality, the arresting of the process of decolonization, indeed, the eruption of a race war. Posterity Will not forgive us for our complacency if we are not mindful of each and every one of these dangers. 94. I should not like to be understood as suggesting that the proposals of the United Kingdom, with suitable amendments, should not receive the COuncil’s aP- 95. 1 submit that this thought alone should induce the Council to reorient its outlook on what action needs to be taken-now or in the future-t0 resolve the situation in Rhodesia and enable its people to exercise the right of self-determination.

Inow give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom in the exercise of his right of reply. 97. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): Having listened to the speeches made in the Council this morning, 1 would wish, in reply, to make three points in a very few words. 98. First, the draft resolution which my delegation has submitted was most carefully considered and drafted, after extensive consultation. We wish to see this draft resolution adopted by the Council by an overwhelming majority, if not a unanimous vote. We wish to see this done with the least possible delay. We believe that the effective action which we have proposed is necessary and is urgent. 99. Secondly, on the most important question of oil, our Foreign Secretary has made our position clear when he spoke here last week. He said, as members will remember: IlIf an amendment [for the inclusionof oil in the mandatory sanctions] were to be made in acceptable terms, my delegation would not oppose it” [1331st meeting, para. 381. We stand by that statement. 100. Thirdly, 1 wish to refer to the amendments which have been put to this Council on behalf of the African countries. Some of those amendments raised new and difficult issues and I repeat that we wish to see our draft resolution adopted without delay. Nevertheless, it is in accordance with the traditions of this Council carefully to consider in full consultation any proposa1 brought to us on behalf of any group or combination of members. 1 wish to sajr at once that we are prepared to enter into urgent consultations with other members of the Council on the amendments whioh have been suggested. We hope that this consultation cari start at once and be completed as rapidly as possible, y See phodesia-Propos& for B Settlement 19.66, London, Her Majesty’s Staionery Office, Cmnd. 3159, apbendix 8. The meeting rose at 1.15p.m. HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED United Nations publications may distributors throughout the world. Write to: United Nations, Sales COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS Les publications des Nations Unies sont agences dépositaires du monde entier. ou adressez-vous à: Nations Unies, Section COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Lus publicaciones de las Naciones casas distribuidoras en todas partes diriiase a: Naciones Unidas, Seccian ---~ ~. ~- Litho in U.N. Price: $US. 1.00 (or equivalent