S/PV.1336 Security Council

Pursuant to the decision taken at the 1331st meeting, and with the consent of the Council, 1 shall invite the representatives of Zambia, Senegal, Algeria, Pakistan and India to take the seats reserved for them near the Council table. At tbe fnvftatyon of tbe Presfdent, MT. S. M. Kapwepwe (Zambfa), Mr. 0. S. Dfop (Senegal), Mr. A. Bensid (Algerfa), Mr. Amjad Alf. (Pakfs tan) and Mr,‘G. Parthasarathf (Indfa) took the places reservedfof them near the Councfl table, 2, The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): 1 give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the represen tative of India. 4. The dramatic events of the past few days have confirmed the belief that my delegation has always held,’ namely, that the answer to the grave question of whether Africa Will be a continent of peaceor a scene of bloodshed and war depends on the speedy, bold, forceful and successful solution of this problem. It is now thirteen months sinoe a handful of racistq, defiantly and in utter contempt for the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations, dared to usurp authority from a Power many times stronger than itself and declared Rhodesia to be independent. 5. The illegal seizure of power by Ian Smith and bis henchmen was condemned by the entire world community. The United Nations expressed its determination to put an end to the intolerable state of affairs in Rhodesia and repeatedly calledupon the Government of the United Kingdom, in its capacity as the administering Power, to exercise its authority to the utmost to restore constitutionality and establishademooratic Government in Southern Rhodesia, based on the principle of one man one vote. The BritishGovernment itself declared the Smith régime illegal, and gave assurances of its firm resolve to put down the rebellion. 6. We had hoped that the administering Power would take appropriate steps to fulfil itspromises. However, it is admitted on a11 sides-and the BritishGovernment would itself agree-that the measures adopted SO far to deal with the rebellion have proved totally inadequate to produce the desired results. 7. My delegation has always held, and continues to hold, that the only really effectivemethodis the use of force, which the administering Power is fully empowered to employ in dealing with suoh a situation, It is hardly necessary to go into ail the details of the economic sanctions imposed by Britain and others on a voluntary basis; their ineffeotiveness has been conclusively established. The very fact that the Council% present meeting has been convened on the initiative of the Government of the United Kingdom isfinal confirmation of what has been SO earnestly urgedby many ’ delegations in the United Nations: half-hearted measures, imposing a limited embargo on trade, would serve no purpose. Ian Smith and his henchmen will not corne to ‘their senses as long as they are treated with kid gloves, 8. As the Council is aware, the question of Southern Rhodesia was discussed at great length at the last 9. The then Foreign Minister of India, Sardar Swaran Singh, who participated in the conference, subscribed to these basic features, but made it unmistakably clear that India was not fully satisfied with the results of the conference. For one thing, most Heads of Government, including mine, urged that Great Britain should make a declaration that independenoe would not be granted to Southern Rhodesia before majority rule was established on the basis of universal adult franchise, and that this declaration should not be conditional on whether the illegal régime agreed to surrender or not. 10. However, no categorioal assurance in this respect was forthcoming from the British Government. Again, most delegations, including ours, were convinced that mandatory sanctions of a general and comprehensive character should be appliedunder Chapter VII, Articles 41 and 42, of the United Nations Charter, and should caver both experts and imports. The British Government, however, would not go beyond giving the assurance that they would approach the Security Council for the imposition of effective and selective mandatory sanctions if, by the end of the year, the rebellion was not brought to an end. 11. My Government has always had the gravest misgivings over the negotiations which had been going on between the officia1 representatives of the Government of the United Kingdom and the illegal régime in Salisbury. The British Government had repeatedly stated in the beginning that it would not, and in fa&, could not, enter into officia1 negotiations with a rebel régime. We a11 know, however, that the so-called “talks about talks” were aotually highlevel negotiations between the two sides. Senior ministers and officiais of the British Government made several trips to Salisbury to induce the Smith rbgime to corne to some understanding. The climat of these negotiations came last week when no less aperson than the British Prime Minister himself met the head of the illegal régime on Brittsh territory. As the talks were held in utmost secrecy, we waited with anxiety and apprehension to learn the terms offered to Mr. Smith aboard H.M.S. Tiger. 3.2. The proposals made by the British Government, whioh have now been published in an officia1 White Paper,.!f have confirmed our worst fears. Indeed, it has corne as a great surprise to many of us that the u Rhodesia-Proposais for a Settlement 1966, London, Her Majesty’s stationery Office, .Cmnd. 3159. 13. Whatever Mr. Smith’s reasons for rejecting the British offer, it is obvious that for the people of Zimbabwe, the proposed constitution would have been entirely unacceptable. It is based on the same discredited 1961 constitution which was rejected by the Africans , as well as the United Nations, as being unjust and undemocratic. Under the proposed constitution, the British Government offered to increase the “B” roll seats, which are reserved for the Afrioans, by only 2, while earmarking 17 “reserved” seats for the Europeans. The qualifications for franchise were SO framed-as the Foreign Minister for Zambia has pointed out [ 1332ndmeeting]-that theEuropeans would still have had 50 seats in an Assembly of 67. Of the 26 seats in the Senate, 12 would be reserved for the white minority and 6 for the Chiefs. The effective majority, therefore, in the Senate too, would have remained with the white minority and their feudal supporters. Further, what Ian Smithdescribes as the “unrepresentative interim government” would, in fact, have been headed by himself and would have been made up mostly of his own racist Rhodesian Front; with only 2 Africans, to be appointed by the Governor, in the cabinet. The proposed interim government could hardly have inspired confidence in the people of Zimbabwe when vital decisions regarding their future were tobe taken by this authority. We in India are familiar with devices of this kind adopted by the imperial Power to present a façade of constitutional advancement, but that was many decades ago. We are amazed that, after the progression of a11 these years, the British Government should have made such retrograde proposals. 14. The efforts to reach accommodation with the Smith régime having failed, the United Kingdom Government has taken the initiative of bringing the matter to the Council in pursuance of the assurance that Prime Minister Wilson gave to the Commonwealth Conference. 15, May 1 now turn to the measures envisaged in the draft resolution contained in document S/7621? The commodities originating in Rhodesia, whose import into other States is to be prohibitedunderparagraph 1 (8) of the draft resolution, may, theoretically, constitute about half Rhodesiafs total annual exports. We believe, however, that even if a11 States were to im- 16. The most important single item, of oourse,is oil, The voluntary oil embargo has proved totally inadequate. Oil has reached Rhodesia through South Africa and Mozambique in quantities more than enough for Rhodesian needs. The total requirement of oil in Rhodesia constitutes only 3 per cent of the consumption of oil in South Africa. It would, therefoie, net be at a11 difficult for South Afrioa to continue supplying oil to Rhodesia for an indefinite period. The diplomatie representations made by Britain and others to South Africa and Portugal have not met with any sucoess. The only effective course is to ban theexport of petroleum and petroleum products to Rhodesia under Article 41 of ths Charter, 17. Ii. has been argued that mandatory sanctions of a general and comprehensive nature would inevitably lead to a confrontation with South Africa and Portugal. This may well be true. Indeed, both the South African and Portuguese Governments have made it olear that they tiould not participate in any sanctions against Rhodesfia, thus once again demonstrating to the world the exis’tenoe of the unholy alliance between theforces of racism and colonialism in southern Africa, Thé British Government has publicly declared that the new sanctions must be oonfined to Rhodesia. In the words of Prime Minister Wilson: “This must not be allowed to develop into a confrontation, eoonomic or military, involving thewhole of southern Africa. Such a confrontation”-and economic might lead to military-ncould have incalculable consequences for central and southern Africa going far beyond the issues raised by the Rhodesian problem,” 18. Such a statement at this juncture is unfortunate as its would encourage South Africa and Portugal in their defiance of the world community, even as an earlier affirmation by Prime Minister Wilson that on no account would force be used encouraged Mr. Smith ta make his illegal declaration of independence. 19. Nobody would underestimate the serious import of the firm measures required to deal with an irresponsible racist r6gime like Ian Smith’s and its friends. My delegation believes, however, that any hesitation on 20. In view of the considerations 1 have urged above, the measures envisaged in the draft resolution contained in document S/7621 hnve to be amplified and strengthened. The African members of the Council, after due deliberation, have proposed amendments [S/7630] with which my delegation is in full agreement. 21. Sanctions of the type that have been advocated would bring considerable hardship and suffering to the Government and people of Zambia. Bere my delegation would like to pay a most sincere tribute to President Kaunda and the other leaders of Zambia for their resolve to undergo any sacrifice, with a view to restoring the lawful rights of the African people of Zimbabwe, Zambia has suffered a great deal-both financially and otherwise-beoause of the Rhodesian crisis. Comprehensive mandatory sanctions would mean still more hardships for Zambia. A concerted programme of aid to Zambia to counteract these effects would have to bepursued as amatter of highest priority, My Government, whioh has already made a modest contribution in this regard, is willing and ready to participate in such a programme to the extent that our resources permit. 22. Cur debate here oonoerns itself with the terms and clauses of the United Kingdom draft resolution, on whioh 1 have offered some comments. Let us not forget, however, that the course of history is irreversible and irrevocable. We are convinced that nothingandnobody cari now put up an obstacle or a dam to prevent the forces of freedom in Africa from advancing to their goal. Gur debate today and the decision of this Council must therefore be directed to assisting a speedy solution ta the problem. The oost may be heavy and the course may be hard, but the stakes are high-and the stakes are the freedom and independence of the 4 million people of Zimbabwe and the issue of war and peace in the Afrioan continent.

1 give the floor to the representative of Zambia.

1 thank you, Mr. President, for giving me this second chance to address 25. 1 stated that in 1910 the British Government granted independence to the Whites in South Africa, and this is true. I said that, immediately after this so-called independence, the Africans on the voters’ roll were removed and that there remained only a Government of white people in South Africa. This is truc. And ten years later, in 1920, when the League of Nations decided to hand over South West Africa to another Government, the British Government chose to give it to South Africa, even though theyknew full well that South Africa’s policy was to treat the black man as a sub-human being, which is still true today. The white man is still entrenched in Scuth Africa; white supremacy is still being promoted there, and 1 cannot see that 1 told a lie about that. As1 am speaking here now, there are, I think, about seventy-five resolutions in existence which have been adopted by the United Nations, including those adopted by this Council, on the policy of treating the black man as a sub-human being. 26. In 1953, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was promoted by the Bi+itish Government against the wishes of the African people. Before thatwas dissolved, the Africans organized themselves against it for ten years until it was finally broken upr If you ask me which Government promoted this, 1 can tel1 YOU that it was the Labour Party, which is still in power. 1 agree with those who say: “ScratchaLabour man and you will find a Conservative.” This cari never be called a lie; it is true. 27. AS to discrimination in the use of force, whioh 1 want to prove-and they deny-is racialism, it is very true that, in Guyana, when the British Government did not like the leadership there, a11 the ministries and the Parliament were suspended, troops were sent there, and the people were told that any resistance would be crushed. In Kenya the same thing happened. When the people wanted to fight, the forces of the British Government were mobilized to suppress the wishes and the determination of the African people in Kenya. Thousands of Afrioans were killed. In Malawi the same thing occurred. Even as 1 speak,,the same thingis happening in Aden. The people there have only one wish-to be 28. Even here in America we should remember one incident in 1773~the Boston Tea Party. On this very island, the British fought, using force trying to suppress the Americans. They killed many people in this country; they butchered people on the streets. In Boston, in New York and elsewhere force was used. 29. The point I am trying to make is this: it is only Mr. Smith who has been a favoured rebel in a11 of British colonial history; it is only he who cannot be arrested or imprisoned. The Nehrus, the Gandhis, the Jomo Kenyattas, and others went to prison, with the exception of one man-Ian Smith. For him they rolled out the red carpet instead, for his visit to H.M.S. Tige??. Just one man in a11 colonial history hasreceived suoh treatment. Why? Perhpas because he is white. 30. Only one man in colonial history has beenable to defy the Crown. 1 am one of those people who bas suffered at the hands of the British; 1 have gone to goal several times merely for saying: “Iwant myfreedom”. 1 was in goal for more than ayear, for two years. But Smith cannot go. Instead, he is theoneman in colonial history who has ever had the distinction of defying the British without even a slap on the wrist in return. Instead, he gets the red carpet treatment. 31. That is why 1 established then, when I spoke earlier, that that was raoialism. If that is not clear.2 Will prove it by another point, 1 said that if we look at the White Paper which was produced at Gibraltar, we Will find it very clearlystated that there were to be 33 seats on the “A” roll. For the “A” roll there are very high qualifications, which Africans in Zimbabwe could not meet. Even if there were some who might qualify, they would never be an influence on the “A” roll, even to the extent of electing one Member of Parliament. No, they could net, because the qualifications, educationally and monetarily, are very high. Therefore, the 33 seats on the “An roll are meant for the white people in Zimbabwe. The “BN roll has 17 seata, and these are meant for the Africans, but it is also open to Europeans to find theirown candidates for it, provided they are black, and therefore they can fight there too. They oan get some seats by using their own stooges. 1 am speakingfrom experience; this “A” roll and “Bn roll system was applied in Zambia when the British were not interested in handing over power to us. 33. This is very clear, but even clearer is the fact that while Europeans have to be twenty-one years old to qualify as voters, Africans have to be thirty years, on the nBn roll, in the same country, in the same State. They must be over thirty years of age. NO~, ycu tel1 me this is not discrimination. Seats are separated and reserved. Ages are separated, thirty and twentyone-and the British Government says this is untrue. Weil, 1 may not understand English, but from a11 they have taught me, I think this is truc. 34. 1 just wanted to prove, on this racialism issue, which is very clear, that what is going on in southern Africa is going on with the blessing of the British Government. 1 mentioned here that when Zambia deoided, in accordance with a resolution adopted by the United Nations, to close the railway, this meant that copper would not go through Rhodesia, SO that we would not give any fore@ currenoy to therebels, and this in turn meant preventing everything from coming in. We knew we were going to sacrificea lot, but what happened? The British Government flew immediately to. say “Don!t close itw-and yet they were responsible for the sanctions. They said they were prepared to pay money for transporting their copper; they were prepared to pay Smith the fore@ currency. We cannot understand this, because what 1 have said, and a11 that 1 bave said, in the Security Council, is true, not untrue; those werenot abuses, theywere onlyfacts, but the British Government, because they were painful, chose to term them abuses, 35, 1 have no intention of abusinganyone, MyGovernment has never had any intention of quarrelling with any Government. We believe in peace and we seek peace, except that there is just one thing on which we differ from the British Government, This is that we stick to our principles; we stick to the truth-and that is the difference. 1 should like anyone who oares to check my statement that there were no abuses; there was just the truth and nothing but the truth. 1 do not want to take up too much time, SO let me conciudé. 1 only wanted to put this point very clearly, and to put it on the record that what 1 said was truc, 37, 1 would go even further than that and say that even if you added oil, as we have done-it is not a matter of just adding oil on paper, since the South African Government is not prepared toparticipateand Mozambique is not prepared to participate. Therefore, it is useless to talk about adding oil, unless we are also talking of having the power to helpimplement the sanctions-which is force. New, if it is a matter of putting something down on paper which we know is going to be rejeoted, and then we go into it and find that Zambia is collapsing, there would be no point in our supporting this, unless we are assured by the Security Council, here, that it is going to enforce it, by using some form of foroe. But if, as 1 have said, this is not the case, then of course there is no point even acoepting adding oil, since it is not going to be implemented; Zambia Will have to go into this immediately, and when it does, it Will find itself in an impracttcal enterprise, just as before. We told the British Government that voluntary sanctions wouldfail. They never acoepted that. We said that theywould fail and they have failed, but the British Government, as the representative of Nigeria said this morning [ 1335th meeting], could not corne out and say “Yes, they have failedlf. They cannot just corne out and say t’o the world, “Yes, they have failed”, SO, instead, they have moved for another smokescreen, to do what they have done before, to make another move with which to impress the world. NOW, it may impress the world, but it cannot impress Zambia, 1 am afraid. 38. It is not my intention to attack the British Government. 1 am only explaining and 1 have omitted many things which 1 could not say here owing to my diplomatie restrictions, My Government and Great Britain have exchanged letters and they wouldbequite shameful if 1 exposed them here, but because of my diplomatie restrictions 1 cannot do SO. So 1 shouId like the Council to understand that 1 am not the firebrand and not the mad person that they called me in the Press. I am not. It is only that nat one of us, if his house and children were on fire, could just be dormant or act in slow motion. Hewould have to hurry 33. In December last year 1 had a talkwith the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, face to face, as 1 was On my way here to the United States. The British Prime Minister told me that the key to thesanctions to bring down Smith was oil, and indeed they put oil on their Voluntary sanctions, He said that this was the key, the main key, to the whole thing. But when you look at their draft resolution today, that key is not there. If the key is not there, what are wetalking about? We are Orly talking about a smokescreen. 40. May 1 say this? The exercise which is proposed bere by the British Government is a delaying tactic. Smith and the British Government are working on a scheme which they must carry out to entrench 220,000 Europeans in Zimbabwe, to strengthen the British Empire for their trade, and to keep their economy poing, In fact, they have even gone SO far that it is Smith who has stopped the sell-out. Had Smith agreed to the sell-out, it would have corne to pass, as the document says. Now 1 understand the Prime Minister of South Africa is saying to Smith that he must agree, that this is a good scheme. If the Prime Minister of South Africa says that this is good, it must be in oonformity with his policy. And this is very true; it is in conformity with their policy, when the Africans have got 17 seats and the Whites 50. That is quite clear: it is the white supremacists’ belt. 41. 3 just wanted to say these few things. 1 say them in a11 good Will, not wishing to offend anyone, but merely presenting the case as it stands. 1 may have to leave the day after tomorrow to inform my Government of what I have seen and of developments here in order that it may decicle whether or not to participate in the measures that Will develop out of a11 this, after weighing up how they Will affect my Government. This was what I intended to put before the Council before 1 leave. 42, The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): 1 now cal1 on the representative of the United Kingdom in exercise of his right of reply. 43, Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): Mr. President, if I am right in understanding that you have no other speaker on your list for this afternoon, 1 wauld wish to make a very short reply to the Foreign Minister of Zambia. 45. Nevertheless, 1 would say to him-in the same spirit in which he speaks I speak back to him-that when he seeks to criticize the motives of my Government and my country then it is essential that we should reply, and when he cornes to this Council to say, as he did when he spoke to us before [1332nd meeting], and 1 use his words, that 93ritain is bent on perpetuating White rule in southern Africa”, 1 would ask him to believe that he may be mistaken. And if we are to respect his motives, then 1 suggest that he has an equal obligation to respect ours. 1 would ask him to believe that there are many people who have been concerned, are concerned, and Will be concerned in my country in the vital issues of Africa whichwe discuss, where we regard it as an insult to be told that we seek to perpetuate the rule of any minority,, or any, racial minority, over the majority in any country in the world. It is when he says that my country or my Government is working in collusion with a minority to maintain that minority, that 1 must ask him to accept the fact that what he says cannot be accepted. What is more, 1 woùld say that to make such allegations as to motive is of no service to us in considering the most difficult decisions which lie before us. 46. Al1 of us must consider, with a recognitionof the difficulties and the dangers, what cari best be done at this particular stage, andIwould ask the representative of Zambia to consider again, studying the careful and thorough speech made by my own Foreign Secretary here, to study again the proposals and to consider whether it is not SO that at this time this is the right and the best action to take against the background of the decisions taken by the Commonwealth Conference and those who attended it. 47. If 1 ask the Foreign Minister of Zambia to believe that no people in this matter, no Govexnment in this matter, has any monopoly of morality, 1 would also, in the same breath, wishto say that 1 for one would pay my deep respect to the policy pursued by the Z ambian Government and, in particular, by the President of Zambia in setting an example, as it seems to me, of what a non-racial society should be in Africa. If we are to be accused, then 1 should like to reply to the distinguished Foreign Minister that I shall not reply in the same coin; 1 shall reply with respect for the policy which his Government and his President have consistently followed, 48. He says to us that oil is the key; he knows very well that a draft resolution has been presented to this 49. He says that he goes back to consult his Government. 1 hope ‘that he Will go back in the recognitian that there are other people concerned, gravely concerned, in this matter who are seeking, in great difficulty and in circumstances-it is true-of great danger, to find the right step to take at this time. If 1 may, speaking personally to the Foreign Minister, 1 would say that certainly I nm satisfied that the decisions which were taken in London in September, to which we seelc to give effect, are the right decisions at this time. 1 hope that at any rate he Will be good enough to give some consideration to the words which 1 speak to him and to the speech of my Foreign Secretary, which he listened to last week, 50. As 1 say, 1 thinkthatourtaskis now not to engage in further accusations, not to engage in public polemics here in this Council, but urgently, eagerly, and together, to seek for the best solution of the problem which we have raised in this Council, to which we seek an early and an urgent answer.

This now exhausts my list of speakers, and, after the customary consultations with the members of the Counoil to fix the date and hour of the next meeting to continue our consideration of this item, Ihavelearned that the members consider it would be appropriate for US to meet again tomorrow afternoon at 3.30 p.m. The meeting rose at 4.55’p.m. HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED United Nations publications may distributors throughout the world. Write to: United Nations, Sales COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS Les publications des Nations Unies agences dépositaires du monde entier, ou adressez-vous a: Nations Unies, Section COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLPCACIONES Las publicociones de las Naciones casas distribuidoras en todas partes dirijase a: Naciones Unidas, Section litho in U.N. Price: $U.S. 0.50 (or equikent