S/PV.1339 Security Council

In acco:rdance with thé decision previously taken by the Council [1331st meeting], and with the consent of the Council, 1 shall now invite the representatives of Zam’bia, Senegal, Algeria, Pakistan andIndia to take the seatr; reserved for them near the Council table. Sur l’invitation {Zambie), M. Diop (Sknbgal), M. H. B. Azzout rie), M. Amjad Ali (Pakistan) et- M. Anup Singh (In&$ prennent place aux sièges qui leur sont rt%erv&s face à la table du Conseil. At thc? invitation of the President, Mr. J. B. Mwemba Pmtbia), Mr. Diop (Senegal), Mr. H. B. Azzaout (&c?z’-ia), Mr. Amjad Ali (P&stan) a.nd Mr. Amp singh (India) took the places reserved for them near the C!ounoii table. 2. Lord CARADON: Mr. President, I apologize to you and to the Council for intervening at this stage, but 1 have an important proposa1 tobringbefore the Coun- Cil. In fact, 1 wish to introduce an amendment to the 2. glais]: vous et du Conseil une importante 4. My Government has decided to propose this amendment as a useful supplement to other measures, and it should have a significant effect on the Rhodesian régime. Hitherto, motor vehicles have been assembled in Southern Rhodesia from parts imported from the United Kingdom. As a result of the illegal declaration of independence, the supply of these parts from the United Kingdom has been totally stopped, with the result that stocks in Rhodesia will shortly run out; it would plainly not be in the spirit and the purpose of the draft resolution which we have presented if the Rhodesian r6gime were able to meet this serious and imminent difficulty by importing vehicles and parts from other sources. This additional measure, in fact, will bit the transportation system in Southern Rhodesia as a whole.

When the rebel movement led by Mr. Ian Smith issued its so-called declaration of independenoe, the French Government condemned in the clearest terms the atteinpt which was being made in SouthernRhodesia to establish a régime based on racial discrimination and the domination of a vast African majority by a white minority. The establishment of such a régime is in every respect contrary to the democratic principles on which a11 French institutions are based. 6. At that time 1 received instructions to state in the most categorical terms, on behalf of my Government, our total reprobation of the decision taken at Salisbury. That oondemnation remains to this dayunchanged and no less categorical. Nothing cari softenit, because of the political principles involved. 8. On the other hand, we still consider that the constitutional ties which existedpreviouslybetweenthe United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia have not been affected by the unilateral action of the latter. Any other conclusion would, indeed, amount t,o giving practical effect to a measure which, on the contrary, it is our intention to regard as illegal and hence invalld. Consequently, Southern Rhodesia is still under United Kingdom sovereignty, against which, as the London Government has stated, the Rhodesians are in a state of rebellion. 9. The statement made in the Security Council on 8 December [1331st meeting] by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom Government confirms thisview of ours. Mr. George Brown asked us to direct our attention to “the continued existence of an illegal rggime “, The aim of the United Kingdom Government is “to bring the rebellion to an end” and “to compel the rebel regime to return to legality”. Thus, the Seourity Council is again called upon to take a decision on a situation the character of which has not changed sinoe the illegal declaration of independence on 11 November 1965. 10, During a11 the previous discussions on the Rhodesian question in the Security Council, my delegatlon has adopted an attitude of extreme reserve and has not voted on the draft resolutions submittedto the Cou~xil. The current debate has procluoed nothing that might lead it to modify its basic appraisalof the international scope of the situation and the limits accordingly placed on action by the United Nations. 1.1. This view which my delegation holds does not in any way mean that it overlooks the prime interest which the African States have in this matter and the need which they feel to inform us of their keen disappointment and of the means they regard as most appropriate for its settlement. It is, then, in this spirit that we must understand the statement of the Minlster for Foreign Affairs of Zambia [1332nd meeting], whose sincere emotion stemmed from the very heavy burden placed upon his oountry by the measures already taken, not to mention those which mig’ht yet be taken. Again, we listened with particular interest to the Mini&er for Foreign Affairs of Senegal [1333rd meeting], who set forth with convincing calrnness his doubts-which, we amongothers, shareconaerning the effectiveness of the proposedmeasures. Lastly, we gave due attention to the StatementS, again expressing misgivings, of the representatives of Uganda, Nigeria, Mali and Algeria. 12. But how can we now give expression to the manifest ooncern which is apparent from Our diseusalions? Refusa1 to recognize Mr. Ian Smith’s régime is a. unanimous and continuing initial demonstration of solidarity towards Africa. As for the measures tu exert economic pressure on Rhodesia, it is the opinion 13. 1 must point out, howevex, that such measures relate to a United Kingdom Territory and that any kind of action designed to bring the de facto Rhodesian authorities to their senses are, in our opinion, the concern of the London Government, to which France is pxepared to give a11 the assistance it cari, as it has done ‘SO far. 14. In the past, my Government, as soon as the United Kingdom authorities expressed a wish for it, took a number of economic measures, including a ban on imports of the principal commodities fxom Rhodesia. It feels that, in this respect, it has responded as scxupulously as anyone to the requests made to it. It proposes to continue in this course, regardless of any judgement that may be passedconoerning the effectiveness of the economic decisions which have already been taken with a view to ending the rebellion. In particular, my Government Will continue to apply the measures now in force in respect of Rhodesian imports and will give due oonsideration to anyfurther measures which the United Kingdom Government may regard as desirable. Whatevex the final decision taken by the Council, my Government, while it cannot associate itself with that decision, Will thus haveresponded to the United Kingdom’s appeal to the international community.

The frequency with which the question of Southern Rhodesia cornes before the Security Council is a sure indication of the fact that the situation created thexe xepresents a real danger to peace and security in the region, and consequently throughout the woxld. At the same time, it reveals the great tragedy of the Zimbabwe people, who are under the domination of a xacist white minority which has been established in power. 16. It should be noted that this is the second consecutive time this year that the United Kingdom bas placed this item on the agenda ofthe Secuxity Council. In view of the United Kingdom’s stubborn resistance in the past to any request for consideration of the question by United Nations organs, one might be tempted to welcome its action, Such, indeed, would have been the natural reaction of any unbiased person and of anyone who had not followed the developments of the Rhodesian question closely. However, a more thorough consideration leads to the inevitable conclusion that this move by the United Kingdom was inspired, not by the desire to seek a way to put an end to domination by the white minority, but solely by the desire to impress world public opinion, to create a current of feeling favourable to the United Kingdom position and to rid itself of its responsibilities by turning this question over to the United Nations. The end puxpose is obviously to inspire faith in the good intentions of a Government grappling with the need to maintain unity in a community which is calling for effective action to put an end to this intolerable tiOnS, Of the United Kingdom Government in the matter of Southern Rhodesia, He said that he did not doubt the intentions of the African representatives when they spoke on the question. One wonders who, indeed, oould doubt the motives and intentions of the Afrioan countries, which are defending their African brethren and which, as in the case of Zambia because of its special situation , are affected much more than Southern Rhodesia itself by the measures taken and evisaged. 18, It may be that the United Kingdom Government has good intentions; it may even wish to do something to relieve the dreadful plight of the African population of Southern Rhodesia. “The road to hell is paved with good intentions”, as the proverb says, and we might add chat it is a hell to which the African population of Southern Rhodesia is being consigne6 for what use are statements which are not backed up by action and by effective measures? The tangible proof of fine motives and good intentions is not resounding statements, but positive and effective measures capable of remedying a deplorable and catastrophic situation which has been created by decades of complacence and ctomplicity with the racists of Southern Rhodesia. de bonnes intentions, et m8me qu’il veuille apporter africaine de la Rhodesle du Sud. “L’enfer bonnes intentions” ajouter qu’il s<agit ici d’un enfer destin6 B la population africaine de la Rhod&ie du Sud. Que valent, effet, des déclarations qui ne sont pas appuyees par des faits et des mesures efficaces? Les preuves Palpables de bons mobiles et de bonnes intentions ne sont pas des déclarations sonnantes, mais des mesures rbelles et efficaces pouvant remédier a une situation déplorable et catastrophique, cr&e par des décennies de complaisance et de complicit6 avec les racistes de la RhodBsie du Sud. 191. Xt is only in the light of facts and of effective measures to put an end to such a situation that the world judges, and will judge, the motives and intentions of the United Kingdom Government. However, the facts do not speak in favour ofthe United Kingdom Government, with respect either to the measures proposed in the past or to those proposed by the United Kingdom Fore@ Secretary in his statement [1331st meeting] and in the draft resolution which he in.troduced. On the contrary, the facts testify to the U:nited Kingdom Government’s intention of reaching a compromise with the leaders of the white minority, to the detriment of the interests of the Zimbabwe people. That is the situation, 19. Ce n’est qu’à la lumiere des faits et de mesures efficaces prises pour venir a bout d’une telle situation que le monde juge et jugera les mobiles et les intentions du Gouvernement britannique. Or, les faits ne parlent pas en faveur du Gouvernement britannique, aussi bien les mesures propos6es dans le passé dlEtat [1331eme séance] et le projet de résolution présenté. Ils timoignent au contraire qu’a le Gouvernement compromis avec les chefs de la minorité au detriment Telle est la situation. 20. Les sanctions économiques proposées par le Gouvernement britannique n’ont pas, en effet, influé consid&ablement jusqu’a present. Elles n’ont servi tout au plus qu’a souligner ce qui a Bt6 déja dit d’ailleurs lors de discussions pr&édentes sans un embargo sur le p6trole et sans des mesures qui obligeraient l’Afrique soumettre, aucune autre mesure économique ne peut &re efficace. Par conséquent on est oblige de constater avec regret proposées jusqu’ici par le Gouvernement britannique n’ont servi influencer mondiale. Un moment dramatique de cette propagande 20. The economic sanctions proposed by the United Kingdom Government have not SO far had any considerable effect on the situation in Southern Rhodesia. At the most, they have served only to emphasize what has already been said during previous debates on the question, namely, that without an embargo on oil and mleasures that would force South Africa and Portugal to comply, no other economio measures can be effective. We must therefore note with regret that a11 the economic measures SO far proposed by the United Kingdom Government have served only as material for propaganda to influence African and world public opinion. One dramatic moment in that propaganda campaign was, you may recall, the discussion of the question of the three oil-tankers coasting off SOU~~ 22, Aocording to the statements by the United Kingdom leaders and by Ian Smith himself, full agreement was reached between the United Kingdom Government and the racist regime concerning the future of Southern Rhodesia, but certain differences of opinion regarding the interim period prevented the implementation of the agreement. Nevertheless, the leaders of the racist regime have not sought to conceal their satisfaction at the agreement which was reached, since it assures them of recognition of their independence-an independence based on white supremacy. Not without reason, they regard that agreement as a compromise on the part of the United Kingdom. Ms. Ian Smith stated in his recent televised press conference that if the United Kingdom had made those proposals last year he would not have needed to resort to a unilateral declaration of independence. 23. Ian Smith’s régime now seems to be expecting to win further concessions from the United Kingdom Government. Certain statements made in the Bouse of Commons, particularly those of Mr. Bowden, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, justify the hopes of the sacist régime. According to press reports, Mr. Bowden has not ruled out the possibility of a la&-minute compromise with Ian Smith. Yesterday evening [1338th meeting], you may reoall, the representative of Uganda, speaking on behalf of the members of the Afrioan group and introducing some amendments to their own amendments, very clearly expressed the same fears. Moreover, this same Mr. Bowden openly suggested to Ian Smith that he should apply the terms of the new Constitution, regardless of the differences of opinion withrespect to the interim period. Again according to the Press, a question put by a Labour ’ Member of Parliament on what would happen if Ian Smith accepted that suggestion received a very significant reply from the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs. 1 quote from The New York Times of 8 December 1966. “1 give an absolute assurance that we would treat this matter very propos de du Commonwealth, justifient presse, M. Bowden n’a pas exclu la possibilit8 d’un plus, le même M. I/ See Rhodesia--Proposais for a Sectlement 1966, London, I-Ier MajeSty’s>~%ffice, Cmnd. 3159. 24. In the light of recent developments towards compromises with Ian Smith, the recommendations of the Ge:neral Assembly seem even more pertinent. ‘The time has corne for the United Kingdom, which bears the responsibility for the situation in Southern Rhodesia and on several occasions has asserted its claim to that responsibility-and a number of delegations have already stated their views clearly on the matter-to tak.e a11 the necessary measures, including the use of force, to put an end to the illegal racist régime. That régime will never yield unless such measures are applied. Unfortunately, the United Kingdom seems unwilling to take this course, Rather, it is trying to evade its obligations and is proposing that the Counoil should undertake half measures, which it is true may create certain difficulties for the Smith rggime but wil.1 never bring it down. 25. Although the Secretary of State did not explicitly mention the main reason for the choice of Rhodesian expert goods which would corne under the proposed embargo, it was quite clear from the United Kingdom reply. The idea is not to affect the shipment of oil to ,Southern Rhodesia through South Africa. 26,, We fully agree with the sepresentatives of the African countries who have convincinglydemonstrated the absurdity of the United Kingdom proposa1 that South Africa’s relations with Southern Rhode sia should net be affected; for effective action against Southern Rh.odesia cannot be reconciled with the continued delivery of goods, especially fuel, by South Africa whioh is assumed, if not provided for, in the United Kingdom proposal. The two things are mutually exclusive, Must we once again embark on a venture like that of the “voluntary sanctions”, which produced no results because the United Kingdom was unwilling to cu:rb trade between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, with the obvious aim of not affecting certain United Kingdom interests in South Africa. 27. The General Assembly was quite right when in resolution 2151 (XXI) it calledupon the United Kingdom “to take prompt and effective measures toprevent any supplies, including oil and petroleum products, from reaching Southern Rhodesia”. Instead of complying with this General Assembly recommendation, the United Kingdom again wants to protect its partner, South Africa, from any unpleasant consequences which measures against Ian Smithts rggime might bave. Thus, the Pretoria-Salisbury axis continues, and Will Continue, to exist, and SO will the mutual assistance between the two racist rggimes. % Quoted in English by the speaker. “The significance of the last year’s struggle was that the Labour Government gave up any real chance of winning before the struggle began. It did SO by ruling out the use of force in Rhodesia. n-?/ 29. If the United Kingdom Government had said then that it intended to use force and would not tolerate the establishment of an apartheid régime in Southern Rhodesin, the leader of the white minority in that country would have yielded immediately. That is obvious, particularly since the racist régime could not have resisted in the face of theuse of force by the United Kingdom, surrounded as it was by the hostile mass of the African population, It wouldhave submitted immediately and would have been ready to accept a11 the measures which the United Kingdom Government would have proposed and has proposed. After all, this same Government has used force in many places where the ,objective was to break down the resistance of coloured populations, as has been pointed out here on several occasions by African speakers, particularly the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zambia. When it is a question of crushing the resistance of a white minority, however, the United Kingdom refuses touse the same methods. This seems to be in keeping with the major financial interests bothof the United Kingdom and of the other countries which have links with it. Nevertheless, if we truly wish to arrive at a settlement of the Rhodesian question, it is absolutely imperative that the United Kingdom should take effective measures, including the use of force, under the auspices, if necessary, of the United Nations. 30. In the light of these considerations, the delegation of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria supports the amendments proposed by the African delegations, Mali, Nigeria and Uganda, in document S/7630/Rev.l, as representing the first stage towards crushing the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia. 31. It is also prepared to support any other effective measure which might be proposed for the speedy elimination of this régime, which represents a danger to peace and security in southern Africa and throughout the world.

For the third time within the space of thirteen months, the Council has been called upon, at the instance of the Government of the United Kingdom, to deal with the situation in Southern Rhodesia. In the view of my delegation, the British Government is entirely right in denying the seal of constitutional approval to a régime which 33. In the course of the debate in the past few days, there has emerged an agreement that the UnitedNations should baok up the measures proposed by the United Kingdom. The question that remains is whether these measures would be adequate, 34. On 12 November 1965, Mr. Michael Stewart, then British Foreign Secretary, indicated to this Council that the economic andfinancial measuresput intoforce by his Government, with the support of the United Nations, would be sufficient, in his words, to “compel those who have committed this illegal act to realize th,at they have thereby inflicted grave damage on the trade, economy and currency of their country” [see 1257th meeting, para. 331. The result was the adoption by the Council of resolution 217 (1965). It spelled out the Council’s condemnation of the illegal régime and thle steps to be taken by the British Government and the Governments of a11 Member States with a view to bringing Ian Smith to reason. Many Governments of Member States, including my own, have complied with that sesolution. 3!j. More than a year has elapsed since then. The illegal régime continues to exist. The economic collapse which was said to be inevitable for Southern Rhodesia has not materialized. Mr. George Brown, the present British Foreign Secretary, toldthe Council the other day that he considered that the impact of eaonomic measures has not been as great as expected and that earlier forecasts have not been borne out by events. In retrospect, it must be said that the failure of the voluntary eoonomic sanctions was notunforeseen. The African representatives who particip,ated in the Council debate of November 1965 had already predicted it. 36. Now the British Government has once againcome to this Council to obtain its hacking for the next step. Il: has submitted a draft resolution whioh calls for selective mandatory sanctions. Thepurpose, of course, is to inflict damage on the economy of Rhodesia to such an extent as to convince Ian Smith and his associates that, unless they corne to terms with Britain, their régime has no viable future to look forward to. 37, Doubts have been expressed by several representatives whether such selective mandatory sanctions would be sufficient to force the Smith régime to return tio legality. 1 must say that my delegation shares these doubts, and our doubts are further strengthened by the recent statement of Mr. Smith that these mandatory sanctions would not cripple bis régimeany 38. In these circumstances, it is understandable that the African delegations have pressed for military action. The situation in SouthernRhodesia, they argue, is not merely a matter involving considerations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Security Council, in resolution 217 (1965) of 22 November 1965, has already pointed out that the Vontinuance in tirne” of the situation resulting from the unilateral declaration of independence by the illegal authorities in Southern Rhodesia constituted Ita threat to international peace and securitytf. Since that situation has continued for over a year and has become more explosive with the passage of time, they urge that the Security Council now authorize the use of the enforcement action provided for in Article 42 of the Charter. 39, The dtffficulty here is that the main burden of any enforcement action must necessarily fa11 on the United Kingdom. As the constitutional authority, it mustbear the primary responsibility. In the view of my delegation, it is not for the’ UnitedNations, in this case, to decide on the employment of military action against Salisbury. From the’ very outset of the orisis, the British Government has called the unilateral declaration of independence an act of rebellion against the British Crown, and as such it should be suppressed by the constitutional authority with a11 the means at its disposal, including, if necessary, the use of militaiy force. It is a prerogative which the constitutional authority is entitled to exercise. In fact, the British Government, in April of this year, did not hesitate to ask for authorization to use force inorcler to prevent the shipment of oil via Beira. 40. I cari appreciate the reluctance on the part of the United Kingdom Government to smploy military action, but 1 am not sure whether it iswise or necessary that the legitimate use of force should be ruledout of consideration entirely. The important thing is that the situation should be liquidated as swiftly as possible. Economie sanctions, if they are not effectively applied, Will only prolong the agony and cause increasing hardship to the millions of indigenous inhabitants whose welfare we a11 seek to protect. 41. 1 am, of course, aware that the Security Council, as the representatives of Argentina and Japan reminded us the other day, cannot impose the use of force on any State against its Will if the State has not expressed its consent in accordance with the provisions of Article 43 of the Charter, Nor does my delegationfeel that the Council should, in the present circumstances, make such a specific recommendation to the constitutional ?/ See Rhodesla-Proposals for a Settlement 1966, London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, Cmnd. 3159, appendix B, 43, The PRESIDENT (translatedfromSpanish): There are no further speakers on my list. I have carried out informa1 consultations, and Ibelieve that members of the Council wish to have another meeting this afternoon at 3 o’clock. 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