S/PV.1340 Security Council

The Security Counoil is meeting again at the request of the United Kingdom to oonsider the grave situation resulting from the continuance of the illegal racist régime in Southern Rhodesia. 4. The Counoil has already adopted resolutions designed to restore the situation to normalcy. We have voted in favour of a11 these resolutions, not because we believe that they Will, in themselves, remedy the situation, but because we felt that they were a step in the right direction and, as such, shouldnot be opposed, We had hoped for more positive results, but the progress achieved was far less than our expectations. 5. It is the view of my delegation that our action, SO far, was confined almost to mere warnings and limited measures which by-passed the substance of the problem to unimportant side-issues. We warned against this at the time, and Ian Smith’s adamant disregard of the rule of law has demonstrated the soundness of the stand we have taken. It is clear that the racist minority Government of usurpers does not wish to abide by the directives of this organ, and is intent on the reckless and dangesous course it has adopted. TO this we must put an end, not through further mild warnings, but in a language that Ian Smith and his party will understand. There is a pressing need for this, since the rebels do not believe ip majority rule and can only be made to realize the illegitimacy and folly of their rebellion by effective measures, 6. The United Kingdom reported to the Council that the recent informa1 talks with Ian Smith ended in failure. This was not unexpected. In faot, Mr. Smith himself predicted such failure. He himself has openly declared that there will be no African rule Yn my lifetime”. 7. On 29 April 1966 Mr. Smith stated that Southern Rhodesia would enter the informa1 talks “determined never to surrender”. Even before starting the talks he emphasized that his rggime was not giving up its independence. He said that Southern Rhodesia had proved it could take and withstand sanctions, 8. My delegation was hoping that the SecurityCouncil would adopt steps similar to those now requested calling for mandatory sanctions at the very outset. We believed that anydelaywouldnotbein the interests of either the United Kingdom or the United Nations. We wanted the United Kingdom to treat rebels as rehels-nothing more, nothing less. We cited Chap- 9. My delegation, guided by the same reasons as in the past when we supported the Security Councildeci- 9. motifs approuver ce malheureux le principe NOUS donnons que, quelles ci complètement convaincus visagées IS/7621/Rev.l], d’étudier duits nos [S/7630/Rev.l] Uni. Ma délégation listes siens on this unfortunate problem, endorses, at this sta.ge, the principle of mandatory, relevant and selective sanctions, We give this endorsement on the strict understanding that whatever measures are enacted wil.1 be effective and Will lead to the complete suppression of the rebellion. We are not certain of the effectiveness of the limited items contained in the United Kingdom draft resolution [S/7621/Rev.l], and we therefore cal1 upon the Council to consider the propcsed additions to the expert and import lists presented by our African colleagues as an amendment [ 7630/Rev.l] to the United Kingdom draft resolution. MY delegation supports a11 these additions to the export and import lists. 10. Nous sanctions d’être voudrions du Sud, s’acquittent la Charte s&urité mentionné tugal, car leur comportement des Nations Ils ont en effet appuye le regime de la résolution en date que le Royaume-Uni pour que les réserve. & la force, le dgbut. 10. We must remind the Council, however, that sanctions cannot be effective unless implemented by a11 members. We would like to see both Portugal and South Africa fulfil their obligations under the Charter, and carry out the decision of the Security Council calling for sanctions. We have singled out South Africa and Portugal because their behaviour vis-a-vis United Nations resolutions does not give a promising picture. They have rendered support to the rebel regime, in violation of Security Council resolution 217 (1965) of 20 Novembcr 1965. We therefore hope that the United Kingdom Will use a11 its influence to ensure respect for Article 25 of the Charter, as well as full implemlentation of the mandatory sanctions. Ctherwise, the on.ly alternative is the resort to force, and that we have been advocating a11 along. 11. Since my delegation supports the adoption of measures under Chapter VII, we feel that in any resolution to be adopted by the Councilit should determine first that a situation exists which threatens peace within the meaning of Article 39, The United Kingdom draft resolution omits specific mention of this question of fact and it is not enough, in our view, to bring out this point by implication, that is, by mere reference to resolution 217 (1965) and Article 39 of the Charter. I repeat, determination that the situation threatens international peace and security should precede the adoption of any suitable measures under Chapter VII. We must, as a first step, declare unequivocally that th.ere is a situation which in fact poses a threat to international peace and security and, needless to say, 11. au titre dans toute résolution devra qui constitue ticle mentionne et il ne suffit simplement et 21 l’article d’adopter aux dispositions ciser la paix commencer par dBclarer 12. In conclusion, let me say that the answer to such rebellion is condemnation and suppression. It amour& to invasion against the right of the majority. It is an EiCt of aggression which oannot be condoned, The answer to such invasion and aggression is Chapter VII; it is action vis-a-vis defiance of the United Nations authority and values in one area and definitely encourages other defiances in other areas. We have warned against this on many occasions, because we wanted to safeguard the authority of this Council, The interests, and the future, of this body dictate that there should be one law, one standard, and one criterion in order to safeguaxd the effectiveness of this gxeat hope of humanity-the Security C ouncil. 13, Time and again this pxoblem has been debated and carefully considered in a11 its aspects by this august body. Decisions have been taken, but the problem, in a11 its dimensions and tragic effects, persists. We shall now adopt another resolution, which embodies mandatory sanctions, but our success depends on the genuine determination of a11 parties concerned, and a11 Member States, to bring about the downfall of the Ian Smith rebellion.

The list of speakers being exhausted, 1 shall speak as the representative of URUGUAY. 15. Our approach to this question must be intesnational and must transcend aggressive assertions of sovereignty and selfish economic interests. We must overcome prejudice and imbue ourselves with higher ideals of solidarity appropriate to the developments we axe witnessing in OUF world, which grows daily smaller as a xesult of a technology which has suxmounted distances and geographical barriexs, and yet grows daily larger through the progress of science and through the belief that menof allraces and creeds must draw closex together. The search for solutions to strengthen the interdependence of States as opposed to destroying ox undermining it, and to promote the belief that there is nothing in the woxld, whatever the region or people concerned, that does not affect US and the remaining peoples of the world, whether in the material, moral, political ox economic spheres, is beooming incxeasingly urgent, Only in this way cari we achieve fitting solutions to the problems bxought before this body, responsible a6 it is for collective peace and secuxity. 16. If we approach the Rhodesian question as though it were something remote and alien fox the Latin Amerioan peoples, we would be guilty of mental blindness and complete disregard of those modexn realities which affect and concern us a11 and which could make a11 of us victims through the mere faot 1.5,. Although we may hold the most divergent views and have the most conflicting feelings we are, whether we like it or net, bound togethe:? by ties of economic interdependence and human brotherhood, which force us to judge disputes in any part of the world by the satme standards and with the same dedication andlove as if we were deciding our own future. Only this type of international outlook cari save US from a disaster vihioh could destroy us a11 through the selfish attitudes, conscious or otherwise, which frequently restrict the horizons of peoples and prevent them from seeing the general and complex panorama of humanity because tbey are circumscxibed by their ownfrontiers, by their own interests, great or small, and by their own desires, irnmediate or long-term. This is true bath of the great Powers and of the countries lacking strength or wealth. 1!3. The abnormal situation in Southern Rhodesia does not only affect the inhabitants of that Territory. It affects the administering Power; it affects the countr4es of the Commonwealth; it affects the entire African continent, Even more, the subtle interplay of economic causes and effects and the influence of the new and universal attitude to human rights affect a11 the peoples of the earth and involve them, willy-nilly, in a struggle for which they are net directly responsible but which does concern them indirectly. 20. We must face Ian Smith’s challenge to humanity, secure in the knowledge of our duty and imbued with an international outlook whichrises above allprejudice and self-interest and puts us on a higher plane as a community of nations in which the political aims of States do not obscure the humanitarian and moral albjectives of power. 21. Bearing that in mind, 1 would recall that, aS early as May this year, Uruguay stated its position in regard to the illegal, minority and racist de facto Government of Southern Rhodesia, which iS a ma- I:ignant growth in the organic process of decolonization 23. Complications have now arisen. Far from proving beneficial, the remedies applied in May 1966 have had the opposite effect. The months which have passed have worked in favour of Ian Smith. Time is not only a physical phenomenon. When it affects the essential rights of a people it takes on thenature, authority and transcendental quality of a juridical factor and a political force, We are thus faced with a situation which has become more serious and, consequently, requires the adoption of more severe and drastic measures for the decisive esadication of the evil before it develops into a collective disaster, spreading to neighbouring countries and causing a catastrophe of quite unpredictable proportions. 24. The United Kingdom has therefore aoted wisely in bringing this matter again to the attention of the Security Counoil. The United Kingdom draft resolution [S/7621/Rev.l] refers to the appeal to ail States to break off economic relations with Southern Rhodesia and expresses concern at the faot that this cal1 has not brought the “rebellion” in that Territory to an end. 25. We do not intend to dwell on legal teohnicalities for the sake of academic quibbling. The aim and nature of our position are essentially constructive. That being SO, we believe that, by referring in its draft resolution to the situation as a rebellion, the United Kingdom, far from advancing its own cause, may well be yielding ground to those who argue that it has exclusive responsibility as the administering Power and who oppose any intervention in this emergency by the organs of the international community. 26. Rebellion is a penal, juridical term in domestic law. It does not go beyond the frontiers of .the soveseign State within which the offence is committed, nor oonstitute grounds for intervention by international juridical or politioal organs. 27. We did not wish to refer to specific definitions in existing penal codes and we have therefore consulted specialized dictionaries of international repute to enhance the objectivity of our thinking. The Petit Dictionnaire de Droit of Dallez says: “Rebelliez the act of using violence to oppose the execution of either laws or actions by the public powers; it may be either a crime [serious offence] or a d& [less serious offence].fi In the Vocabulaire juridique of Caaitant, we find this definition: “The act of opposina thé exe&tion of laws or other acts or ordinances of 28. It clearly follows that we are dealing with an offence which should be repressed by the competent organs within the State where it was committed. Furthermore, the actions which the United Kingdom Government itself has described as a rebellion constitute a further offence which the oompetent organs of the country affected are also responsible for punishing in accordanoe with domestic positive law. A. study of the actions of Smith and his accomplices if3 sufficient to show that his continued illegal exercise of powes is a typioal example of the offence of Qsurping public powers” which it would be pointless for me tu define at this juncture. 29. This intrinsio combination of offences (rebellion and the usurpation of public powers) falls within the imternal jurisdiction of the State in whioh the acts were carried out. Judicial authorities are competent tfo adopt the necessary punitive sanctions in accordance with the legal and constitutional structures of every country and, where there is resistance, armed force may be used to the extent that the oircumstances require to re-establish public osder and the rule of law. 30, There is thus no doubt whatever that, in the case of rebellion and the usurpation of powers, the interna1 authorities of the country concerned are entitled to adopt any measures, whether they are persuasive or legal, or whether they consist of political repression or the use of public forces on a wider scale. It should, h.owever, be noted that, given the exceptional nature of the unprecedented actions of Ian Smith and his clique, this responsibility of the administering Power is allied to another international responsibility which is not exclusive, but complements the responsibilities which the Government of Her Britannic Majesty has undertaken and must continue to discharge within its domestic jurisdiotion. In actual fact, the usurpation of the powess of the Government of Rhodesia by a tiny racist oligarchy, inviolation of the legal standards set forth in the Charter of the United Nations in 1945, and of the resolutions adopted by bodies representing the international oommunity, mean that the organs of the United Nations are competent to intervene in aooordance with the maohinery created to that end, without prejudioe to the duties devolvingupon the administ,ering Power in the domestic sphere. 91. Before 1 refer specifioally to the international measures indicated in this case by the interplay of “Deeply concerned that this call has not brought the de facto, illegal minority and racist Government in Southern Rhodesia to an end.” With this wording, the concept of international law introduced in the draft resolution and conoerned with the violation of the Charter and of the resolutions on decolonization, racism and SO forth, would justify the ooercive economic measures which should be taken, while leaving intact the rights and powers of the administering State in a11 matters which have a bearing on its sovereign interna1 jurisdiction which, in the present case, entails not only an authority but also an obligation. 32. Turning now to the consideration of the international economic sanctions proposed by the United Kingdom in the draft resolution [S/7621/Rev.l] and amended by the three African countries on the Security Council [S/7630/Rev.l], 1 have the followingcomments. First, we consider that the references to resolutions 216 (1965) of 12 November 1965, 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965 and 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966, are in keeping with the prinoiples of law and with the political situation in the Territory. Nevertheless, we believe the United Kingdom draft resolution to be weakened by an omission of a juridioal nature, the correction of which is simple and Will serve to overcorne the arguments of those who have held that the sole and exclusive responsibility belongs to the administering Power and who have refused to admit the oompetence of the United Nations. We agree with the eminent Argentinian jurist, Mr. Ruda, that the mere enumeration of Article 39 of the Charter is not sufficient. When, as in the present case, it is intended to take action under Chapter VII, the provisions of Article 39, which sanctions intervention by international bodies and justifies whatever measures they may adopt, must be explicitly defined. Consequently, we consider that the relevant paragraph of the United Kingdom’s draft resolution should expressly use the words “the existence of any threat, breaoh of peace or act of aggression”. 33. We must not forget that the very nature of these events has removed the Rhodesian situation from the United Kingdom’s domestic jurisdiction and made it a matter of international concern. 34. Secondly, we reiterate the view that the United Nations is competent to apply economic, financial and other sanctions and we think it appropriate to recall General Assembly resolution 1747 (XVI) which states that Southern Rhodesia is a Non-Self-Governing Territory. St is therefore covered by the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) concerning the eradioation of colonialism and a11 practioes of segregation and discrimination associated therewith, 35. Thirdly, my delegation reiterates its utter rejectiom of the illegal, minority and racist rggime of Ian Smith, whioh is an affront to the civilized world and a challenge to the international community. It is, however , our hope that the indigenous people of Southern Rhodesia Will eventually exercise their right to self-determination, using their constitutional powers and setting up their own democratically elected government. 36. Fourthly, in view of the statement by theForeign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Mr. George Brown, it is not difficult to justify mandatory coercive measures under Article 41 of the Charter, without resorting to the use of force. In this connexion, my delegation’s statement of 18 May 1966 was extremely explicit and positive, 1 quote: 11 . . . the other measures whose adoption could be considered are those involving the use of armed force. In this context 1 would like to differentiate between two situations which are juridically very different although we have the same fundamental objections to both. The first concerns the possible use of force in Southern Rhodesia by the United Kingdom, which would be incumbent upon it as the administering Power. My delegation, by voting in favour of paragraph 5 of resolution 21’7 (1965), called upon the Government of the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, to take a11 appropriate measures which Will prove effective in bringing the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia to an end and lead the people of that Territory to genuine selfdetermination so far as their political future iS aoncerned. The second situation in which the use of force might arise relates to a possible request iaddressed to a specific country, in this case the United Kingdom, to use its armed forces for pur- Poses not directly connected with its status as an iadministering Power and which would affect third oountries. ‘We fully appreciate the possible practical utility of a recommendation along these lines which would allow the United Nations to use direct and effective methods where it might otherwise be paralysed. But at the same time, 1 must enter and express certain reservations on such a course. It would allow a given country very considerable latitude in the actual application of such coercive measures, even though that country may merit our entire trust, Furthermore, 1 must point out incidentally that any request the Security Council might address to one or several countries to use their armed forces for aparticular purpose would not, in my delegation’s view, be binding on those c?ountries since, unfortunately, the United Nations Charter was not followed up as regards the establishment of United Nations forces, because the agreements provided for in Article 43 and those following it in the Charter werenot signed and the United Nations does not automatically have “Mine is a small country and as such is averse to the use of force. We hold the deep and traditional conviction that a11 peaceful methods must be exhausted in the search for a solution to international conflicts.” [ 1281st meeting, paras. 34-36.1 37. Uruguay today reaffirms that position, which corresponds to that stated by OUF Latin American colleague, Mr, Ruda, in dealing with this matter in the current debate. He said: “Among such measures provided for in the Charter, we are in favour for the time being of those provided for in Article 41, which do not involve the use of armed force, We consider that before resorting to the final step, it would be well to try such measures as may achieve the same purpose of maintaining international peace and security, avoiding armed confrontations whose consequences would be quite unpredictable at this time. Weunderstand the attitude and feelings of the African delegations in this connexion, but we also understand that it is our duty, andour responsibility, to proceed with caution in regard to such serious measures, and this should in no way be taken as a lack of firmness.” [ 1332nd meeting, para, 5’7.1 38. Fifthly, we also believe that the measures to be adopted must be weighed not only in terms of the need for them but in terms of their effectiveness. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the sanctions provided for under Article 41 are not only binding upon a11 Members of the United Nations, as stated in Article 25, but are also obligatory for non-member States in acoordance with Article 2, paragraph 6, of the Charter. 39. It follows that we must take a11 the measures necessary to ensure strict oompliance with the resolution which we adopt. As Maraiïen reminds us in one of his masterly works, man is the only animal which trips over the same stone twice. The ooercive measures adopted in 1935 by the League of Nations we?e one of the fundamental causes of the collapse of that body, not because they were unjust but because they were not implemented. De Visscher’s wise reflections, of which we are xeminded, are very appropriate at the present time: “The defeat of sanctions against Italy was the coup de gr&ce for the League of Nations, On October 7 and 10, 1935, the representatives of more than fifty nations in the Council and Assembly had deolared Italy in violation of the Covenant and reoommended a conference of States belonging to the League to co-ordinate the sanctions to be imposed under Article 16. By July 1936, eoonomic and financialsanctiens had proved powerless to change the course of events in Ethiopia, and the delegates of these same States with one exception pronounced themselves 413. In the light of this unhappy and discouraging example, we must ensure that the just sanctions against Ian Smith are unanimously implemented byall States without exception. On this occasion the impleratives of collective security must be givenpriority over national individualisms. 40, A la lumière de ce précgdent malheureux et décourageant, nous devons faire en sorte que les justes sanctions décidges contre Ian Smith soient unanimement appliquées par tous les Etats sans exception. A cette occasion, les impératifs lective doivent prévaloir tionaux. 41. D’une maniére génGrale, amendements africains mulons quelques rdserves premibrement, sur le nouveau paragraphe 2, a, dont la suppression n’enl&verait rien !I la valeur duprojet, mais en renforcerait deuxi&mement, Btant don& le caract&re non obligatoire des mesures adoptées en vertu de la résolution 217 (1965) et sans en méconnaître lebien-fond8 et le poids moral, nous jugeons peu approprié le texte du nouveau paragraphe 2, k~; troisièmement, étant donné nos arguments dVaujourd%ui sur l’emploi de la force au cours de cette Premiere étape, nous nous abs tiendrons lors du vote sur le nouveau paragraphe 5; quatri&memen,t, nous considérons comme ngcessaire de Pr&iser le sens du nouveau paragraphe 8, A notre avis, les mots “aide financière économique” ne comprennent pas et ne péuvent pas comprendre la fourniture de m6dicaments, d’aliments, de Stements a destination des habitants autochtones de Rhodésie. 11 est nécessaire de bien préciser ce concept, car nous estimons que les fournitures usage humanitaire méritent selon l’attitude que L’Uruguay a toujours adoptée en la matigre. 41. We are in general agreement with the Afrfcan amendments [S/763O/Rev.l] but we have certain reservations and misgivings on some points, For example, the omission of the proposed paragraph 2 (&) w’ould not detract from the draft resolution andwould, in fact, further its adoption; secondly, in view of the non-obligatory nature of the measures adopted under resolution 217 (1965), and without disregarding the justice and moral weight of the latter, we consider the proposed text of paragraph 2 (III) in the African amendment to be inadequate; thirdly, on the basis of ouf arguments today ooncerning the use of force at this fiirst stage, we would abstain from voting on the proposed new paragraph 5; fourthly, we believe that some clarification is needed of the sense and scope of the proposed operative paragraph 8. In our view “financial or other economic aid” does not and cannot include tlhe supply of medicines, food or clothing for the indigenous inhabitants of Rhodesia. This interpretation must be clearly stated since, in our view and in accordance with the position Uruguay has invariably adopted in such matters, supplies of a humanitarian nature deserve special treatment. 42. Il est très difficile de parler le dernier, surtout lorsque ceux qui ont pris la parole avant vous font partie d’un a6ropage d’hommes d’un niveau sup6rieur , dont le talent, la sagesse et l’experience ne laissent guère de chance & l’originalité en dernier, 4:2. It is very difficult to be the final speaker, particularly when those who have spoken earlier are a aompany of outstanding men whose talents, wisdom and experience leave very little room for the person ?Xinging up the rear to offer any original thoughts. 43. Nous nous sommes efforcés la solution de ce grave probleme mondial. La Rhodesie du Sud, l’Afrique 43, We have tried to contribute to the Settlement Of this serious world problem, Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, South West Africa, Mozambique, Zambia, the ‘I public, .!./ Charles De Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public International k&Y~ translated from che French by p. E. Corbett (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1957), p, 58. 44. My country offers its wholehearted and sincere collabqration to the United Kingdom, whose responsibility as the administering Power means that it is in the van of those involved in this serious question. We shall fulfil our international obligations faithfully with the aim of re-establishing, as soon as possible, the rights which the racist régime of Ian Smith has infringed and the humanitarian sentiments which it has flouted. We would also appeal to the United Kingdom Government to make every effort and apply every interna1 measure simultaneously with the economic sanctions decided upon by the Security Council, acting within its international jurisdiction. 45. We would also express our helief in the good faith of the undertakings given to this Council by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Brown. We trust that no settlement affecting Rhodesian independence Will be submitted to the United Kingdom Parliament unless it is based on the democratic decision of a majority of theindigenous people of the Territory. But that is not ail. We trust that the United Kingdom Government Will apply itself immediately, assiduously and with dedication, to removing the obstacles to the independence of the colonial Territory for which it is juridically responsible although the de facto Government is in the hands of a repugnant racist oligarchy. 46. It should not be forgotten: (5) that there cari be no human rights in Southern Rhodesia while racial inequaiities exist; (b) that there cari be no democracy in Southern Rhodesia SO long as the indigenous people does not exercise its inalienable power of selfdetermination; (Q) that in Southern Rhodesia there cari be no representative government nor electoral justice as long as 200,000 people, because their skin is white, have greater influence on democratic procedures than 4 million persons whose skin is black. 47. As for myself, 1 would assure you that 1 Will spare no effort tc achieve a settlement in the interes ts of the truc people of Rhodesia, without hostility towards the United Kingdom, which Will be a definitive triumph for the international communitywhose instrument must be the law and whose end the happiness of mankind. 48. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom) : We are coming to the conclusion of this debate and 1 certainly do not wish to go over a11 the ground again or to reopen the many complicated and difficult questions which have been raised. 1 believe that the Council would wish me at this stage-and in explanation of vote-to concentrate on the detailed provisions of the amendments that have been put forward to the draft resolution which we have proposed. No purpose cari be served 51. ht the same time, referring to this particular first amendment whioh is put forward, in which you suggested that there might have been some improvement in the wording of the amendment, 1 would say that both the original draft resolution and the amendments which have been put forward and revised, have been the subject of most careful and exhaustive consultation, in accordanoe with the traditions of this Cou.nci.1. 52. 1 would also say that in those consultationsit has 52. J’ajouterai que, lors de ces oonsultations,ilnous been made very clear to us that it is the wish of the a étB dit d’une mani??re trés claire que les auteurs movers of the amendments-and, 1 believe of a11 des amendements et, je crois, tous les membres du members of this Council-that we should not delay Conseil, souhaitent qu’on ne retarde pas davantage in proceeding to a conclusion of our proceedings. l%ssue de nos travaux. Nous avons donc &outé avec Although, therefore, we listened with the greatest le plus vif in&& interest and the greatest respect to the comments commentaires que vous nous avez faits, Monsieur which you have made to us, and though we welcome le Pr&ident, your action in this final stageinourdebate in remindrappel&, au cours de cette phase finale de notre ing us of the basis principles which we must a11 bear debat, les principes in mind, 1 believe that it Will be the wish of the Countenir compte. Je crois, cependant, que le Conseil cil, having taken careful note-and certainly my deledécidera, apri?s avoir pris soigneusement note de tout gation and my Government will take careful note-of ce que vous avez dit - je suis certain que ma dBa11 you have said, that we should, when we have conlégation ainsi que mon gouvernement le feront - sidered in detail the amendments which are before us, qu’apr&s avoir étudie en détail les amendements dont without delay, and following the extensive and exnOus sommes saisis et après ces longues consulhaustive consultations which have takenplace, proceed tations si compl&es, nous passerons aux conclusions t0 our conclusions. sans plus attendre. 53. Je suis heureux maintenant de pouvoir dire au Conseil que lmon gouvernement juge acceptables un grand nombre des amendements et remaniés. Je crois que nous avons tous toujours reconnu que l’amendement le plus important de tous est le quatrième amendement du document S/7636/ Rev.1. C’est celui qui traite du pgtrole et qui interdit ia fourniture la Rhodésie du Sud. 53. I would go on to say that 1 am glad to report to the Council that many of the amendments which have been put forward and revised are acceptable to my Government. 1 think that we have a11 recognized throughout that the most important amendment of a11 is the fourth amendment in document S/7630/Rev.l, the amendment dealing with oil, the amendment which prohibits the supply of oil or oil products to Southern Rhodesia. 54. A la 1331éme skance du Conseil, le 8 décembre, ie Secrétaire d%tat aux affaires ktrangéres de mon pays avait dgclaré, certainement, que notre délégation ne S’oPPosera Pas 54. At the 1331st meeting of the Council on 8 December > my Fore@ Secretary, you Will remember, said thalt my delegation would not oppose an amendment dealing with oil, if it were made in acceptable terms. 55. My Government is also ready to support thefirst amendment and also the sixth amendment which seeks to add new paragraphs 12 and 13. 56. With respect ta the fifth amendment, my Government Will support the addition of the newparagraph 6. We also support the new paragraph 8 concerning financial and economic aid to the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia, but on this 1 must make one comment, 1 must explain that we cannot regard it as inhibiting the continued payment by the United Kingdom of pensions, travel to Rhodesia for approved purposes, and payments on humanitarian grounds, which was a subject referred to in the statement we bave just heard by the President of the Council, and the continuation of the work of certain missions, andmedioal and charitable organizations. Subject to that comment, we support the new paragraph 8. 57. I now corne to the second amendment. That amendment proposes to add a new paragraph 2 (3 which “Deplores “(5) The refusai of the United Kingdom to use every means including force to bring about the downfall of. . . If the illegal régime. My Government’s position on the use of force has fxequently beenmadeplain, lastly in the speech of my Fore@ Secretary to this Council on 8 December. The Council Will, therefore, understand that we could not accept this amendment. 58. Nor cari my Government aocept the proposednew paragraph 2 w. They do not consider it appropriate for such accusations to be made in this draft resolution, nor helpful in the context of the generaI support for this draft resolution which we a11 must expect. 59. 1 now go on tu say that my Government will accept that part of the second amendment, the new paragraph 1, which reads: “Determines that the present situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security”. This is a point whichhas been emphasized by yourself, Mr. President, and also by the representative of Argentina. 60, The third amendment, proposing the indUSion of coal and a11 manufactured goods to the commodities whose import from Southern Rhodesia Will be Prohibited, is of particular concern to mY Government. GlDVernment to take whatever action it feels necessary, but 1 must make it quite clear that the serious 10s~ and damage which would arise in Zambia from the adoption of this amendment could not fa11 on my Glovernment. It would be the responsibility of the United Nations as a whole. 61. propos8 dlEtat dans devant que selon résolution. rel&vent britannique peut accepter 611. T now turn to the fifthamendment,whichproposes a new paragraph 4. My Secretary of State, in his speech to this Council on 8 December, set out my Government’s position, 1 must make it quite plain that the paragraph as now proposed, is in our opinion entirely out of place in this draft resolution. Moreover, it, impinges on matters within the sovereignty of the B’ritish Parliament. It is for this reason thatit cannot be accepted by my delegation as part of the draft resolution. 62. 1 turn now to the new paragraph 5, which invites my Government “to prevent by a11 means the transport tn Southern Rhodesia of oil or oil products”. 1 have a.lready said that we will accept the general provision regarding oil. But this paragraph goes muoh further. My Government cannot acoept the inclusion of such an invitation in this mandatory resolution, since it implies a responsibility for enforcement on my Government alone, by force if neoessary, and without any limitation whatsoever on the obligation plaCed upon us, if we were to acoept this invitation. 62. qui invite les moyens du Sud de pétrole déj& dit que nous étions disposés générale graphe ne peut pas accepter dans elle nement besoin l’obligation tions cette demande, (13. Lastly, my Government cannot support the proposed new paragraph 7, since we do not consider that t,his paragraph forms an appropriate operative part of EL draft resolution whioh we have introduced in fulfilment of an undertaking to seek mandatory economic sanctions, 63. d’appuyer dérons approprié nous sanctions 64. Finally, and from what 1 have said, you Will appreciate that we have given the most careful Consideration to the amendments which have been proposed and have endeavoured wherever possible, following the consultations which have taken place, to meet the wishes of other members of the Council, 1 wish t0 ,state that 1 shall say nothing now, at this final Stage in our debate, to perpetuate disputes or to reopen wounds. As we embark on an unprecedented COU~S~, 1 trust that our motives in bringing these proposals to the Council Will not be doubted. 1 trust that the frankness with which we have spoken Will be respected. 1 trust that, whatever other differences we may Still have, we shall now act together and show that we fully agree on the next step to be taken. I trust that a11 members of this Council Will respond whOleheartedly to the appeal we have made for international action. There is no action more likely to have an effect for good, SO 1 am convinoed, than a unanimous vote of this Council this evening, making clear the 64. nous avons dements mes suite aux desiderata dirai perpétuer nous entreprise des propositions mettra J’espkre subsistent afin chaines membres ;2 1 ‘appel que nous avons lancé en faveur internationale.

1 do not intend to caver a11 of the ground that has just been covered by the representative of the United Kingdom, but 1 feel that 1 should make just one ox two comments on the matters upon which he has touched. 67. 1 might say that 1 am particularly exercised by the protective tare displayed here by the United Kingdom representative for a country which was once under his Government’s tutelage and which, 1 hope, has since been emancipated. 1 refer to the point that he raised regarding the danger to the economy of Zambia. This, 1 feel, is tantamount to insufferable priggishness on the part of the British. This sort of thing is a11 very well for countries still undex British tutelage, but the only representative who cari tel1 us whether the economy of Zambia Will be adversely affected by any measure adopted by this Council is the representative of Zambia. 68. The Committee of Six, which was appointed by the Organization of African Unity and to which 1 had the privilege of belonging, and which has worked out the draft amendments in consultation with the United Kingdom, was attended by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zambia. It was he who gave us the green light, and who, in fact, insisted that both coal. and manufactured goods should be included. What business, then, has the representative of the United Kingdom to talk of the adverse effect which this Will have on the economy of Zambia? Al1 that he cari say is that, if Zambia should find itself in necessitous circumstances, it should net turn to the United Kingdom for assistance, That is all that he is entitled to say. 69. 1 wish now to refer to one other matter, to which 1 also referred yesterday: the declaration which we invite the United Kingdom to make here and now that 70. This simply means that the United Kingdom does net ever want to close the door or, if it ever closes, it does not want it to be bolted. The United Kingdom would like to keep on hunting with the hounds and running with the hare; it boils down to that. We are not necessarily imputing motives; 1 think that we are just being realistic. The United Kingdom’s performance, ever since the Rhodesian issue arose, has net given us much confidence in any future action on the part of the British. We cari seenothing whatsoever here which is difficult for the British to declare. This has been the policy of Great Britain ever since it embarked upon this exercise of decolonization. T’here has not been a country anywhere in the British Commonwealth-apart from South Africa, of course, w‘hich is in the same boat as Southern Rhodesia-where independence has been granted by Great Britain without m.aking absolutely sure that there is majority rule. 7:l. We are not asking for anything new; we are, in fa.ct, endorsing the very policy which the UnitedKingdom has been pursuing a11 along. What, then, is the di.fficulty in making this declaration? Bow cari the United Kingdom corne to the Security Council asking for mandatory sanctions when it still intends to make further offers to Ian Smith? Surely the offers should be withdrawn; we should know, now, that this is not going to be a matter between Great Britain and the racist regime. When Great Britain cornes to the Security Council, the matter is at once internationalized. It is now the responsibility of the international community, and for Great Britain to COntinUe to make concessions to Ian Smith is, in our view, completely wrong and should not be done. SO, we oan see no earthly reason why it should be difficult for the distinguished Ambassador to accept a new paragraph 4 in the fifth amendment. 72. AS 1 said before, 1 do not intend to go through a11 the points which have been covered. 1 had also hoped that, perhaps, in the intervention of the representative of the United KingdOm, an attempt would be made by him to reply to a few of the questions which 1 asked yesterday, even if he cannotmake the declarati.on on the mandatory sanctions which is required Of him. 1 thought at least he oould tel1 us whether 73. Before concluding, 1 should like to clarify a point: because of the submission by the United Kingdom of their revised draft resolution, it Will be necessary to make a small alteration in the fourth amendment; sub-paragraph (3 therein should be changed to subparagraph (e) and sub-paragraph (e) becomes subparagraph (9.

The Argentine delegationls statement during the genesal debate [1332nd meeting] was intended to be sufficiently broad to caver a11 aspects of the Southern Rhodesian question and to make clear the Argentine Government’s support of vigorous measures to put an end, with the participation of the United Kingdom, to the state of rebellion existing insouthern Rhodesia and thus to allow thepeople of that Territory to exercise their right to self-determination in the immediate future, without racial inequality and with full respect for a11 the principles of the United Nations Charter and for the resolutions on this question adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly. 75. On that occasion, we expressed support for the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and we stated our willingness to give full consideration to the addition of further measures which could make the already important United Kingdomproposals more effective-if that were possible. We expressly excluded, at that time, measures involving the use of armed force. 76. We mtist now state our position withregardto the amendments submitted by Nigeria, Mali and Uganda [S/7630/Rev.l]. The Argentine delegation considers them a positive contribution to the body of measures proposed by the United Kingdom and therefore has no difficulty in accepting them in general terms. 77. Nevertheless, in view of the reservations with regard to the use of force, which we expressed and explained fully, we axe unable to support two of the amendments by the African delegations. The first is in the part of the second amendment which proposes a new paragraph 2 (a) to read: “2. Deplores : I’(a) The refusa1 of the United Kingdom to use every means including force to bring about the downfall of the Ian Smith régime in Southern Rhodesia”. The second would involve a new paragraph 5 in the fifth amendment, to read: “5. Invites the Government of the United Kingdom to prevent by a11 means”-and we interpret that to 78. non plus posé qu’il constitutionnel ce pays déjh gouvernement, grette tenir 8 décembre étrangéres le Conseil Parlement ment dépendance du pouvoir cette trêmement position yeux, cette déclaration ‘78. Nor cari the Argentine delegation vote in favour of the insertion of the new paragraph 4 proposed in the fifth amendment. We consider it unrealistic in that it interferes with the United Kingdom’s constitutional system. The representative of that country has now explained his Government’s point of view to us -BS he had already done previously-and the Argentine delegation regrets that the sponsors of the amendments should have been unable to use the wording of the statement made to this Council on 8 December by the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Mr. George Brown, when he told us that no settlement would be submitted to Parliament involving the granting of inldependence without majority rule. We welcome that statement and consider it of capital importance and, of course, interpret it as an officia1 position, For our part, that solemn statement would be sufficient. ‘79, Those are the only three points on which the A:rgentine delegation has objections. The remaining amendments are acceptable and in keeping with the position adopted by my Government with regard to this problem, which we feel to be of the utmost gravity in that it threatens international peace and security. 79. tions dements la position cette que nous sécurité 80. Such were the views which we expressed to the Council in April this year; subsequent developments have only confirmed them. 80. opinion n’a fait que la confirmer. 81. plus d’orateurs dre la parole le représentant mettre paragraphe, ce soit nous sommes 83.. The PRESIDENT (translatedfromspanish): There are no more speakers on my list to take the floor before the vote. 1 understood that the United Kingdom representative requested that each amendment should be voted upon paragraph by paragraph. This Will mean that we shall have to take thirteen votes and, although th.at is a number of il1 omen, on this occasion we regard it with optimism. 82. Pour que le nombre fatidique, sur dement. ment sur le nombre

TO make the total number of votes pleasanter, let us have two votes on paragraph 2 in the second amendment. 1 should like to have one vote on sub-paragraph (a) and another on sub-paragraph (Q) of paragraph 2, thus havingfourteen votes instead of thirteen. 83. aux Royaume-Uni posés Rev.l.1. aux voix par le Royaume-Uni du représentant

We shall proceed to vote on the draft resolution sponsored by the United Kingdom [S/‘7621/Rev.l] and the amendments to it submitted by Mali, Nigeria and Uganda [S/763O/Rev.l]. E 1 hear no objection, 1 shallfirst put the amendments to the vote in the manner requested by the United Kingdom and following the Jordanian representative’s suggestion. A vote was taken by show of hands. .I% favour: Argentina, Bulgaria, China, Japan, Jordan, Mali, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay. Agains t: None. Abstaining: France. The amendment was adopted by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention.

We shall now vote on new paragraph 1 of the second amendment which reads: “1. Determines that the present situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security”. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Argentina, Bulgaria, China, Japan, Jordan, Mali, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Unitecl States of America, Uruguay. Agains t: None. Abstaining: France, The paragraph was adopted by 14 votes tonone, with 1 abstention.

We shall now vote on new paragraph 2 (a) in the second amendment which reads: “2, Deplores: (a) The refusa1 of the United Kingdom to use every means including force to bring about the downfall of the Ian Smith régime in Southern RhOde’sia~~. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Bulgaria, Jordan, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Against: None. Abs ta.Lnîng: Argentina, China, France, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay. The result of the vote was 6 infavour, none against, with 9 abstentions. The paragraph was not adopted, having failed to obtain the affirmative votes ofnine members. A vote was taken by show of hands. 1n faveur: Argentina, Bulgaria, Jordan, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Against:‘None. Abstaining: China, France, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdomof Great Britain andNorthern ireland, United States of America, Uruguay. The result of the vote was 7 in favour, none agains t, with 8 abstentions. The paragraph was not adopted, having failed to obtain the âffirmative votes ofnine members.

We shall now proceed to vote on the third amendment, which reads: “Amend sub-paragraph (8) of former operative paragraph 1 as follows: in the third Une, insert between ‘leather’ and ‘originating’ the following: ‘, coal and a11 manufactured goods”‘. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Argentina, Bulgaria, Jordan, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republios, Uruguay. Agains t: None, Abstaîning: China, France’ Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. The result of the vote was 8 infavour, none against, with ? abstentions. The amendment was not adopted, having failed to obtain the afHrmative votes ofnine members.

We shall now proceed to the vote on the fourth amendment, which would become sub-paragraph 0 of paragraph 1 of the revised draft resolution [see para, 73 above]. It reads as follows: “After sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 1, insert the following sub-paragraph: “(f) Participation in their territories or territories under their administration or in land or air transport facilities or by their nationals or vessels of their registration in the supply of oil or oil products to Southern Rhodesia”. A vote was taken by show ofknds’ In’favour: Argentina, Bulgaria, China, Japan, Jordan, Mali, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom Abstaining: France. The amendment was adoptedby14 votes to none, with 2 abstention.

We shall now proceed to the vote on paragraph 4 in the fifth amendment , which reads : ~~Calls upon the United Kingclom to withdraw a11 offers previously made to the illegal régime and to make a categorical declaration that it Will only grant independence to Southern Rhodesia under majority rule”. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favocrr: Bulgaria, China, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Uruguay. Agains t: None. Abstaining: Argentina, France, Japan, Jordan, Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom of Great Britain andNorthern Ireland, United States of America. The result of the vote was 7 infavour, none against, with 8 abstentions, The paragraph was not adopted, having falled to obtain the affirmative votes of nine members.

We shall now proceed to vote on paragraph 5 in the fifth amendment, which reads: “Invites the Government of the United Kingdom to prevent by a11 means the transport to Southern Rhodesia of oil or oil products”. A vote was taken by show of hands. In faveur: Bulgaria, Ch.ina, Jordan, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Agains t: None, Abstaining: Argentina, France, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay. The result of the vote was ? Jnfavour, none agains t, with 8 abstentions. The paragraph was not adopted, havfng failed to obtain the affirmative votes of rine members.

We shall now proceed to vote on paragraph 6 in the fifth amendment, which reads: “Reminds Member States that the failure or refusa1 by any of them to implement the present resolution shall constitute a violation of Article 25 of the Charter”. Agains t: None. Abstaining: France. The paragraph adopted by 14 votes to none, with .1 abs ten tion. paragraphe

We shall now proceed to vote on paragraph 7 in the fifth amendment, which reads: 93. votons cinquième “Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Inckpendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV); and recognizes the legitimacy of their struggle to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations”. A vote was taken by show ofhands. Jordanie, Pays-Bas, tiques, In favour: Argentina, Bulgaria, China, Japan, Jordan, Mali, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Uruguay. Agains t: None, Royaume-Uni Nord. Abstaining: France, United Kingdomof GreatBritain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. The paragraph was adopted by 12 votes tonone, with 3 abstentions . paragraphe 94. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l’espagnol): Nous allons maintenant voter sur le paragraphe 8 proposé au cinqui’éme amendement et qui est ainsi conçu:

We shall now proceed to vote on paragraph 8 in the fifth amendment, which reads: “Calls upon a11 States not to render financial or other economic aid to the illegal racist régime in Southern Rhodesia”. A vote was taken by show of hancis. d’Amérique, Japon, Jordanie, Mali, Nigéria, Nouvelle- Zélande, Grande-Bretagne Républiques socialistes soviétiques, Uruguay. In favour: Argentina, Bulgaria, China, Japan, Jordan, Mali, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United StateS of America, Uruguay, Agains t: None, Abstaining: France. paragraphe The pa.ragrap’h was adopted by 14 votes tOnOne, with 1 absfention. 95. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l’espagnol): passons amendement et qui est ainsi conçu:

We shall now proceed to vote on paragraph 12in the sixth amendment, which reads: IlRequests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the progress of the implementation of this resolution, the first report to be submitted not later than 1 March 1967”. A vote was taken by show of hands. Against: None, Abstaining: France, The paragraph was adopted by 14 votes tonone, with 1 abstention.

We shall now vote upon paragraph 13 in the sixth amendment, which reads: l’Decides to keep this item on its agenda for further action as appropriate in the light of developments If. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Argentina, Bulgaria, China, Japan, Jordan, Mali, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay. Agains t: None. Abstaining: France. The paragraph was adopted by 14 votes tonone, with 1 abstention.

We have now completed the vote on the amendments. We shall now turn to the vote on the United Kingdom draft resolution as a whole, as amended by its sponsor [S/7621/Rev.l] and by the amendments which have just been adopted. 98. 1 give the floor to the representative of Uganda on a point of order. 99. Mr. ‘KIRONDE (Uganda): 1 should like to movefor suspension of the meeting for ten minutes, under rule 33 of the rules of procedure.

1 give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom on a point of order. 101. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): We are, of course, in the hands of the Council, but 1 think it is the practice that when voting has started it continues without interruption. 1 would hope that we may be able to follow the standard practice of the Council.

1 give the floor to the representative of Nigeria on a point of order.

We are, of course, in your hands, Mr. President; but 1 should like to invite the United Kingdom representative’s attention to the last sentence of rule 33, which reads asfollows: “Any motion for the suspension or for the simple adjournment of the meeting shall be decided without debate.” Consequently, since we were in the middle of voting, vve should abide by the provisions of rule 40. 105. There is no text which deals expressly with this point. If there is no forma1 objection, we shall proceed with the voting. 1.06. Mr. KIRONDE (Uganda): Mr. President, you have inquired whether or not there is any objection to proceeding with the vote. But when Imade a motion for the suspension of the meeting, 1 did not intend it to be an ttobjectiontt. Al1 1 am asking is that there should be a suspension of the meetingfor a very short vvhile, perhaps 5 or 10 minutes, in accordance with rule 33, in particular the last sentence of that rule, which makes it abundantly plain that: “Any motion for the suspension or for the simple adjournment of the meeting shall be decided without debate.” Rule40, which you quoted, is far from relevant to the issue that we are considering here. If thereis any provision under rule 40 that is not included here, 1 think, Mr. l?resident, it would be useful if you wcruld quote it to LIS. 1.07. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): 1 give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom on a point of order. 1.08. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): 1 said just now that it is usual practice once voting has started do continue without interruption. But since it is clearly the wish of the representative of Uganda that we should have a short suspension, and without prejudice to normal practices, 1 should certainly net wish to stand in his way. 1 therefore withdraw any objection 1 have to the suspension-on that clear understanding. 1.09. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): As the United Kingdom representative has withdrawn his otbjection, there is no difficulty in suspending the meeting for ten minutes as the representative of IJganda proposed. T’e meeting was suspencied at 5.2% p.m, and resumed at 6,p.m. 1.10. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): When the meeting was suspended the President was a.bout to put to the vote the United Kingdom draft resolution as amended. I refer to the draft resolution a,ppearing in document S/7621/Rev.L together with the aldopted amendments. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Argentina, China, Japan, Jordan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay. A&tfnst: None. 111, Mr. ADEBO (Nigeria): 1 think that my coileagues round this table, as well as our friends outside this Council, cari have no doubt in their minds as to what the African countries must feel concerning the manner in which this debate has ended, and concerning the nature of the resolution which the Security Council has found it possible to adopt. Our feeling is one of sad disappointment. The British Government has a record in this matter of Rhodesia of which quite a large section of public opinion, even in Great Britain itself, is ashamed. It is a record of which a sizable number of people, even in the governing party in Great Britain, is ashamed. The African countries have been pressing for determined action against the racist régime of Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia for a considerable time now. We pressed for action in advance of the unilateral declaration of independence, and we were rebuffed; we were told by many that Ian Smith would not dare. After that unilateral declaration of independence, we came back to be told that halfmeasures were sufficient. We said from the outset that half-measures would not do. Events have proved us to be consistently in the right. Nevertheless, the Security Council in its wisdom apparently considers that these half-hearted measures should continue to be tried. It is a matter of considerable disappointment to us, and no one should be under any illusions about this. What has been demonstrated by the result of the voting on the African amendments today is the futility of relying upon the Security Council for adequate action to deal with the outstanding problems in Africa. 112. 1 should like to say a few words aboul the amendments that have been rejected. The African countries sought to amend the United Kingdom draft resolution to deplore “the refusa1 of the United Kingdom to use every means including force to bring about the downfall of the Ian Smith régime in Southern Rhodesia”. 113. We appreciated before we started out how difficuit the road would be. But we believe and have always believed quite firmly that force would be essential to bring about the downfall of that racist régime. It is not the hfrican countries alone which believe that force is the only way out; as 1 said before, quite important circles in Great Britain, including important circles which normally support the Labour Party in the United Kingdom, share our conviction, 114. The New Statesman, a reputable journal of opinion in England, is well known as a fervent supporter of the party governing that country. This is what its editor wrote on 25 November 1966: “The real choice before the Government has always been a simple one: we had either to concede that we cari no longer determine events in Africa, 21 Sec resolution 232 (1966). Those are not my words; they are the words of the distinguished editor of the New Statesman, one of the journals of opinion which very fervently supports the governing party in Great Britain. 115. There is no doubt in our minds that there are equally important circles in the United Kingdom which do not approve the use of force. But we know why they do not approve the use of force because we know that they approved its use in colonies other than Rhodesia. But, as 1 indicated in an earlier statement, we expected Prime Minister Wilson to demonstrate the courage which this journal that normally supports him says he lacks. Perhaps it is our fault for expecting him to possess that courage. 116. In one of our amendments, which has been rejected, we asked the Council to deplore Vhe action of States, notably Portugal and South Africa, which have been rendering support to the rebel régime in contravention of Security Council resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965”. People who are not accustomed to the ways of the United Nations Will be very surprised that the Security Council turned this amendment down. They Will find it difficult to reconcile that action with the profession of support for demolishing that rebel régime. They Will find it difficult to reconcile the action of the Security Council with thefact that everybody to whom one has ever spoken in the United Nations has admitted that what made it impossible for the voluntary sanctions to have effect was primarily the action of Portugal and South Africa and, secondly, the action of certain other countries which have surreptitiously broken that resolution. Everybody knows it; no one to whom 1 have spokenin the United Nations has denied the fact. But, of course, 1 have been in the United Nations for four and a half years now, and 1 have learned to live with the fact that people cari believe in a thing and not support it when it is put into a resolution. It is an unfortunate fact for the United Nations. 117. We are not asking, here, that anybody should denounce Portugal and South Africa for what they have net. yet done, or for violating the new decision. That is not what we are asking. SO, any suggestion that we were singling out Portugal and South Africa, in regard to our decision, is mistaken, misguided, if not mischievous, We are doing nothing of the kind. We are tak.ing note of the fact that these States chose to contravene a resolution of the Security Council, and we thought that when the Security Council adopted that resolution, it intended that it should be complied with, and that if people did not comply with it, the Security Council would have the courage at least to deplore their action, if not to apply any remedial measures. 119. What cari one say about the Security Councilfs rejection of our amendment which called upon the United Kingdom “to withdraw a11 offers previously made to the illegal regime and to make a categorical declaration that it Will only grant independence to Southern Rhodesia under majority rule”? What canwe say? 1 am only sorry for the United Kingdom because this confirms the opinion whioh is strongly held in Afrioa that when the United Kingdom said that it was going to do the thing it is called upon to do here, it had no intention of doing it at all. If it had had that intention, one would have expected that it would consider what this provision contains to be added ammunition for getting its efforts accepted by the House of Commons; but such is not the case. Under a purely constitutional technicality, Great Britain turned this provision down. 1 leave it to the representative of Great Britain; 1 leave it to the Government of Great Britain, to deal with this matter. 1 consider it a shame that the British Government did not instruct its representatives here to fight with a11 their might to get this provision aocepted, instead of lobbying with a11 their might to get it rejected. 120. We knew before we started out that a great many of our colleagues might not like the provision asking the Government of the United Kingdom “to prevent by a11 means the transport to Southern Rhodesia of oil or oil products”. Why did we insert this provision7 Because the African countries do not believe in a futile course of action. We do net belfeve that those who support us with words and are not prepared to support us with practical measures are really our friends. What is the use of passing a law without a sanction? Everybody knows that one cari never go to one’s own Parliament and ask it to pass a law and refuse to provide a sanction for that law-refuse to make provision for the implementation of that decision; but, of course, the Security Counoil chooses this course, for reasons of which we are aware, and to which 1 Will corne in a moment. 121. The African countries had hoped that the debate in which we have participated in the last few days would result in a decision by the Council whioh would 122,, I say that we know why we lost amendments to which we attached vital importance. We have lost beciause of the built-in weakness of the Security Council when dealing with African questions. We recognize that ambassadors speak for their Governments and that these Governments have their own policies. We recognize that with some Governments it ia a question of “my friend, right or wrongn. The greater is the pity. 123. We in Nigeria consider ourselves the friends of Great Britain, and the friends of every country which cho’oses to befriend us, but we in Nigeria think that the best way in which to demonstrate friendship to a friend is to tel1 that friend when he is in the wrong, and to get that friend to do what is right. For thirteen months, the British have been adopting half-hearted measures with regard to Southern Rhodesia. We in Nigeria, and the majority of members of the worldwide Commonwealth outside the United Kingdom, have psessed the United Kingdom to take the right course of action. Those countries which have done SO, 1 respectfully submit, are the best friends that Great Britain has. Because a11 of Great Britain’s friends have not done this, it has been encouraged to tie itself into knots with the results which are now clear. 124. If this draft resolution was SO unsatisfactory, why did Uganda and Nigeria vote for it? We voted for it for one simple reason; we recognize that in Great Britain today there are influential circles whose cnly prayer is that no draft resolution shouldbe passed by ithe Security Council imposing any sanctions at all, because their greatest desire is that Prime Minister Wilson should continue an eternal negotiation with the Ian Smith r6gime and settle with him, as soon as possible, on terms which were published recently and which the African countries have said that they were unable to accept. 125. If we and a11 our friends around this table-and we realize that we have friends around this table-had chosen to vote against, or even to abstain from, this draft resolution, and it had net been passed, the circles to whioh 1 referred would have sung hosannahs. They would have told Prime Minister Wilson that the toast wae~ clear, and he would have said: “Weil, 1 have done my best.” We know that he would not be right to say SO, but he would have said it. “1 have done my best. The Security Council is unable to help me, There is no alternative left to me but to continue these negotiaticns”. The hand of the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia would have been strengthened, and in no time we would have been landed with a settlement of the Southern Rhodesian question which would have made the position wcrse. 126. It is, of course, possible that in spite of this Sacrifice which we have made, in spite of this conjOritY rule. He surely must proceed to do that. There is no constitutional technicality which he cari invoke against that course now. Let himnowproceed to do SO. 127. But as we indicated in our earlier intervention [1335th meeting], the responsibility for completing the business which has been SO inadequately begun, but begun a11 the same, today, does not rest on Great Britain alone. We trust that the Security Council Will accept the consequences of the decision which it took today. One of those consequences is to ensure that a decision of a mandatosy character under Chapter VII of the Charter is respected, for, in spite of the imperfections of what we have done today, the Security Council has taken a decision of historic significance. This is a decision under Chapter VII of our Charter. If this decision is violated by any country in the world, that country would be flouting an enforceable decision of the United Nations. We of the African countries would have liked not only to warn such countries, but, in fact, to proceed to determine what we should do in the event of a breach. Our oolleagues have said that we should not jump a fenoe until we reach it. We hope that that fente will never be reached. We hope that Portugal and South Africa and a11 countries, large and small, Will respect and faithfully carry out their obligations under the historic decision taken today by the Security Council. If they do not, when a report cornes to the Security Counoil that the Ian Smith rbgime is still there on 1 March, and there because certain countries are not carrying out their obligations, we hope that our colleagues in the Security Council Will have the courage and determination to join us in applying the right remedies under Chapter VII. You do not walk into Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations today, and trot back to Chapter VI or Chapter V or Chapter III or Chapter II tomorrow. The remedies for a breach of a decision taken under Chapter VII are contained in Chapter VII of our Charter. And it will not do, when we corne back, for any members of this Security Council to go about looking for excuses, looking for technicalities, in order to avoid the consequences of the historic decision taken today. 128. We are very concerned about the implications of the limitations of this decision upon Zambia and the oountries which are neighbours of Rhodesia. We are concerned because, when we sought to stiffen that decision, it was because we wanted their agonies to be short-lived. We fear that because of the limitations of our decision, their agonies may not be as shortlived as we had hoped. We pray that our fears may prove unfounded: and if they do the Nigerian dele- 129. 1 apologize for the length of this statement. In conclusion, 1 should like to express many thanks to a11 the members of the Security Council without exception, Our most copious thanks, naturally, go to those delegations that have supported us a11 the way. Next in line are those delegations which have COoperated with us in consultations, whose position on certain of our amendments was well-known before we started, and also in the course of the consultations, Unfortunately, 1 have to add that in respect of certain of our friends their position either changed, between yesterday and today, or the impression that my African colleagues and I got of their position was mistaken. Even with regard to the United Kingdom, we are grateful that they have beenprepared to accept sanctions on oil. We axe sorry, deeply sorry, that they have stood in the way of obtaining stiffer sanotiens. We hope they Will not think that their success today represents a victory, because it is a Pyrrhic victoxy. 139. We, who were supporting stiffer sanctions, sought to help them to discharge their responsibilities quickly and well. We sought to help them to repair a record that has been very badly damaged, certainly with regard to Rhodesia, and we hope that by the determination they Will show in discharging their obligations under this even limited decision of the Security Council, they will be able to demonstrate, that, even though they were mistaken in the attitude that they took to our amendments, they certainly meant to topple the Ian Smith r6gime in Southern Rhodesia. 1311. My final duty is to say a wordof encouragement to our own fellow countries of Africa. They know how hard we have tried-not only the thxee African members of this Council, not only our manyfriends around this Council table, but also the other three members of the steering committee appointed by the African group to deal with this mattex; 1 refer to the representatives of Algeria, Senegal and Zambia. We know how disappointed they must feel about the results. But 1 would like to appeal to them to take this as a situation with which we have to live in our present position of weakness in Africa. I cari assure them that the three Afxican members of the Security Council tak:e very seriously the provision in this decision which calls for a review of the progressof the implementation of this decision; and as soonas we discover that our fears about the futility of today’s action are justified, we shall corne again before the Security Council.

We bave voted in favour of the draft resolution as amended, because we feel that, although it is not adequate, it maY be “We Will withdraw a11 previous proposals for a oonstitutional settlement which have been made to the Rhodesians; in particular, we Will not thereafter be prepared to submit to the British Parliament any settlement which involves independence before majority rule.” [1331st meeting, para. 40.1 We therefore believe that, legal and constitutional considerations aside, it is premature to insist on incorporating this paragraph in the sanction resolution at this stage. We regret that not a11 the proposed additions to the export and import lists which my delegation supported were acceptable to the Security Council. We also regret that the new paragraph 2 was rejeoted. 133. This is not the first time that the Council has adopted a mild attitude on a question of suoh gravity. Our recent complaint, which was before the Council and reoeived similar treatment, is familiar to my colleagues around this table. 134. Finally, we voted in favour of the draft resolution, although it is not adequate, beoause it embodies an implied warning lest Rhodesia become another Palestine and the minority persist in its policies to the detriment of the rights of the majority of the indigenous inhabitants of the country.

As 1 have already stated, my delegation maintains, first, that the problem of Southern Rhodesia is a colonial question which is purely for the United Kingdom and, for this reason, the United Kingdom must take the necessary measures to solve it. In my delegation’s opinion, the United Kingdom is a country with sufficient oompetence in this matter and even if, by any chance, it cannot see the right solution, we think that the history of decolonixation could provide it with useful examples. That is why I Will not take it upon myself to indicate methods of decolonization to the United Kingdom. 136. As for the resolution which has just beenadopted by the Security Council, 1 would like to point out that we think that it has been deprived of its positive elements, namely the amendments which we submitted. 137. Certain things surprise us. When we see that in many United Nations committees certain acts com- 138. When the proposed new paragraph 4 in the fifth amendment, which calls upon the United Kingdom to withdraw a11 offers previously made to the illegal r6gime and to make a categorical declaration that it Will only grant independence to Southern Rhodesia under majority rule-which is oompletely in accordance with the principles of the Charter-when that is rejected by the Counoil, this, too, surprises us. 139. Then, again, on the question of Southern Rhodesia, when an amendment inviting the Government of the United Kingdom to prevent by a11 means the transport to Southern Rhodesia of oil or oil products is rejected by the Council, this surprises us even more, We remember the efforts made by the United Kingdom in the Seourity Council to prevent a few supply ships from reaching Southern Rhodesia and when, now, an amendment inviting that country to continue to prevent supplies of oil or oil products from reaching Rhodesia is rejected by this same Council, we no longer understand. 140. We believe that the failure of these amendments is due to the fact-as we have stated before-that the problem of Southern Rhodesia is a domestic problem which may be difficult for the Seourity Council to salve. W’e have reached this conclusion after noting that everything which has been adopted by the Council-and net only today-is exactly what the United Kingdom wanted. Today, the same thing has happened; the United Kingdom has corne to the Security Council and salid: “We have this problem, and here are our suggestions for solving it”. In the end, it is the United K:ingdom’s suggestions which are adopted. 1 think that this confirms even more our belief that this is a problem for the United Kingdom, which the United Kingdom cari settle, since here, in the Council, we never seem to be able to advance, to go beyond the lines drawn by the United Kingdom, in the search for the right solutions to the problem of Southern Rhodesia. 141. The Malian delegation, after having participated farirly actively in a11 the negotiations, felt that it should abstain in the vote in view of these considerations, since the basic faots-first, the contradictions in attitude or attitudes, and, secondly, the rejectionofthe amendments relating to decolonization-make it impossible for us to caver up for the United Kingdom. For this reason we felt that we should abstain.

We have now reached the end of a long debate on a question of great importance both for the United Nations and for Africa itself: the question of the situation in Southern Rhodesia. 1,43. We have just heard two truly moving statements b;y African representatives, Chief Adebo, the repre- 144. In our statement this morning [1339th meeting], the delegation of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria expressed the conviction that if a closer study was made of the position taken by the United Kingdom delegation, the conclusion would inevitably be reached that the United Kingdom’s aim in bringing the question of Southern Rhodesia before the Security Council was not to put an end to the domination by the white minority, but to impress world public opinion, to create an attitude favourable to the United Kingdom position, and to relieve the United Kingdom of its responsibilities by thrusting them on to the shoulders of the Wnited Nations. 3.45. We would also like to emphasize, as many African delegations have done, that even now the Ian Smith r6gime counts on obtaining concessions from the United Kingdom Government. Certain statements made in the House of Commons, in particular by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, have led him to expect this. 146. Then we have seen the representative of the United Kingdom introduce an amendment in his statement this morning and, in explaining thepositionmost reoently adopted by the United Kingdom, refuse to vote in favour of certain African amendments with a view to preserving the prerogatives of the United Kingdom Parliament and, of course, being able to continue negotiations. This was the latest version of the United Kingdom position, which is in effect that the United Kingdom has decided not to break off negotiations with the Ian Smith regime after having said in a11 its statements that it refused to hold talks with him. 14’7. These statements have made it impossible for us to go the whole way and vote in favour of this resolution, which is more or less a resalution accepted, requested and sponsored by the United Kingdom SO that it cari continue negotiations and talks with the Ian Smith régime. What, in fact was the United Kingdom Government asked to do in the African amendments? In the proposed new paragraph 4, the Security Cour&1 “Calls upon the United Kingdom to withdraw a11 offers previously made to the illegal régime and to make a categorical declaration that it Will only grant independence to Southern Rhodesia under majority rulefl. 148. We have been struck by certain, other attitudes ad.opted in this Council. First, we have heard, and indeed seen, that the United Kingdom delegation did net want the Council to deploxe the refusa1 of the United Kingdom to use every means including foroe. But, as we have already said in our statement, if the United Kingdom does not tel1 the Ian Smith regime that it Will use force, then the Ian Smith rggime Will never yield. If the United Kingdom does say SO and makes it cleaxly understood, then the Ian Smith rggtme Will yield immediately, because it finds itself in a vexy dangerous situation. Thexe Will not even be any need to use force if the United Kingdom has the fi:rm intention of using it, because those people know very well that if force is used they Will not be able to resist for long, 149. Then, the United Kingdom does not even want Portugal and South Africa, which have supported the rebel regime in violation of Security Council resolu.tion 217 (1965), to be condemned. What does this m.ean? Naturally, we do not condemn them for what th.ey have not done, but fox what they have done: they have violated a resolution of the Security Council and m.any xesolutions of the General Assembly. Why do we adopt sesolutions in the Security Council when we refuse to condemn those who have violatedthem? This is an attitude which cextainly did not encourage us to vote in favour of this resolution, a resolution which the United Kingdom did not want to see worded in such a way as to make possible the overthrow of the Ian Smith xegime. 160. There is also another reason. We have heaxd tbe representative of the United Kingdom express opposition to the insertion of the woxds “coal and a11 manufactured goods”. Why? In ordex to protect the interests of Zambia. But as the representative of Nigeria has said the Government and elected representatives of Zambîa have already stated that they wished this to be done here in an appropriate manner snd that the Seouxity Council should adopt measures to that effect. The United Kingdom does not want this, not because it wishes to prote& Zambials interests, but for the simple reason that there axe companies- United Kingdom companies-which process copper and wfhich need coal from Southern Rhodesia. It is, of course, in oxder to prote& United Kingdom interests snd not to pxotect Zambia’s interests that the United Kingdom has used the latter as a pretext. 151. In view of a11 the observations 1 have just made, and taking into account the fact that this draft resolutlon with the amendments which were accepted is a xesolution which the United Kingdom Government was pxepaxed to acoept in advance, using every effort to

The position of the Soviet Union on the question of Southern Rhodesia, which has been on the agenda of our meetings, haS been exhaustively stated earlier in the Security Council and our attitude of principle remains unchanged. We fully reaffirm it once again. 153. The Soviet delegation has vigorously supported the position and a11 the proposals of the African countries. We voted in favour of a11 the amendments they submitted to the United Kingdom draft resolution. In doing SO, we assumed that the African amendments would be supported by other delegations, on whose attitude the solution of the problem depended. 154. We hoped for objectivity and an impartial approach on the part of other countries, especially those direotly connected with the dangerous situation created in Southern Rhodesia. Nevertheless, our delegation abstained in the voting on the United Kingdom draft resolution, which we considered unsatisfactory and inadequate without the inclusion of the basic African amendments. We are obliged to act in that way precisely because even the minimal amendments to the United Kingdom draft resolution submitted by the African countries were rejected, as we see it, under the specious caver of an indirect veto, a device to which the Western Powers resort when they wish to undermine or kil1 a draft resolution which is not to their liking and when they are shamefacedly trying to conceal the political indecency of their colonial interests or monopolistic greed. 155. The rejection of the African countries’ amendments by the United Kingdom and by those who cooperate with that country shows yet again who is truly to blame for the tragedy of the people of Zimbabwe. As we have done before, we wish to point out once again that the full responsibility for the criminal situation with regard to the question of Southern Rhodesia lies entirely with the ruling circles in London, which defiantly persist in conniving with the racist rggime in Salisbury. 1.57. Hearing what has been said this evening, however, 1 would say that 1 do not believe that any of us who have been concerned with this problem, together with other problems of southern Africa, would seek t0 be dogmatic. The difficulties are desperately serious, and eaoh decision is taken in the face of a dilemma. There is no course open to us which does net threaten danger, 158. In what has been said this evening there has been evidence of intense feeling; we understand that. But whatever bitterness and suspicion may have been expressed, the fact remains that we have today taken an action unprecedented in the history of the United Nations. 159. The representative of Nigeria says that there bas been no victory here. Certainly there is no satisfaction in scoring, or attempting to score, victories in the vote. Al1 I would say to him, ancl to the other members of the Council, on my own behalf and in my own belief, is that what we did today was the right action, and it was the necessary action; it was the right and necessary action at this time. And 1 trust and pray that when we look back on the decision taken by the Council here today we shall recognize that what we did today represented a major step towards a just solution to the problem which we have debated.

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