S/PV.139 Security Council

We shall continue the general discussion on the report submitted by the,Military Staff'Committee. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Re~ Le PRESIDENT: N~us poursuivons la discussion' g~neral qui s'est engagee sur lerappdrt presente par le Comite d'etat-major.· . M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiquessoci~­ Iistes s()vietiqu~) (traduit de l'anglais): Lerap.. port du Comite d'etat-major est consacre a une question importante, a savoir l'application de p'~bli91): The ~eport of the Military Staf,I Comnuttee IS devoted to an important q1.1.estion, to the fulfilment of Article 43 of the United Nations 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de secttritl!, Deuxieme Annee. No 43. W.e all know that, in the past, Hitlerite Ger- . many and Japanese aggressors did not encounter. a due rebuff. The absence of this rebuff to the aggressor States resulted in the fact that they forced the most destructive war upon humanity. It was precisely because of this sad experience of the past that the Organization of the United Nations, from its very inception, showed concern that, in the event of a breach of international\ peace, it should be in a ):osition to undertake proper measures for ensuring the restoration of peace. This is the task which Article 43, in particular, is designed to fulfil. . . The report submitted to US by the Military Staff Committee is a result of the study of Article 43 from a military point of view. It contains recommendations on the basic principles for the organization of armed forces, that is, on the question concerning which the Military Staff Committee had to submit its proposals to the Se~urityCoun...il in accordance with the task entrusted to it by the Council. " I think that all of us will agree that the working out of the basic principles for the organization of armed forces is not only an important but also a complicated task. Its complexity can be explained by the mere .fact that this is a new task, with which we have not had occasion to deal -previously. Therefore, some of the difficulties which cpnfronted theMilitary Staff Committee in .its work may be explained by thiscrrcumstance. Nous savons tous que dans le passe, l'Allemagne hitlerienneetles agresseurs japonaiS·n'oIlt pas rencontre 1'0pposition qui eut convenu. En l'absence .d'une telle opposition, les Etats agresseuTS ont pu imposer a I'humanite la p!l1S destructive des guerres. C'est en 11Uson, precisement, de cette triste experience anterieure que, des le debut de son existence, l'Organisation des Nations Unies s'est preoccupee d'etre a meme, en cas de rupture de la paix internationale, de prendre toutes mesures necessaires pour assurer la restauration de la paix. Telle est la tache que I'Article 43 en particulier est appele a remplir. Le rapport que nous a soumis le Comite d\~tat­ majorest le resultat de l'etude de l'Article 43 sous l'angle militaire. Il contient des recommandations sur les.principes fondamentaux qui doivent regir I'prganisation des forces armees:c'est-a-dire la question meme a laquelle le Comite d'etat-major devait proposer une solution au Conseil de securite, en vertu de la mission que ce dernier lui avait confiee. - Nous reconnaissons tous, je crois,que definir, les principes fondamentaux de l'organisation des forces armee5 est une tache non seulement importante, mais complexe. Cette complexite peut s'expliquer par le simple fait qu'il s'agitd'une tache llouvelle, que nom n'avons pas eu l'occasion d'aborder anterieurement. Certaines des difficultes que le Comite d'etat-major' a' rencontrees au cours de ses travaux peuvent donc s'expliquer par cette circonstance particuliere. . , However, in evaluating the report, which con- , Toutefois, en etudiant ce rapport, qui contient tains not only proposals on which agreement has non seulementles propo~tionssurlesque1les l'enbeen reache'd but also pr,oposals on which agreetente s'est realisee, mais aussi les propositions sur ment has not been achieved, one cannot but point lesquelles l'accord n'a pu se faire, onne peuts'em-. Therefore, I consider it necessary and useful to dwell upon some of the important questions which have not been agreed upon, and also upon the question as to what are the real reasons for insufficient progress inthe work of the Military Staff Committee. I proceed from the following: first, that it is time to sum up the results of the work of .this body during the period of its existence; and secondly, that an understanding ofthe realreasons for the slowness of its work may facilitate the possibility of reaching agreement in the Security Council concerning those important questiop8 on which agreement has not yet been reached. va~. Je pars des principes suivants: premierement, le moment est venu de resumer les resultats obtenus par cet organisme depuis sa creation; deuxiemement. la connaissance des veritables raisons de la lenteur de ses travaux pennettra peutctre, au.sein du Conseil de securite, d'arriver plus facilement a une entente sur les questions importantes pour lesquelles l'accord ne s'est pas encore fait. Il ressort du rapport du Comite d'etat'7major ,que cet organisme n'a pas reussi a resoudre la question du principe a adopter pour determiner l'importance relative des forces .armees que les Etats auront a mettre a la disposition du Conseil de securite. Nous devrolls done prendre une decisionapropos de cette l111portante question au seL"! du Conseil de securite. nest necessaire d'aboutir a un accord sur la question de la puissance et de la comppsition des forces armees que les Etats qui sont des membres permanep.ts du Conseil de secu..rite auront a mettre a la disposition de ce dernier. J'entends par la un accord de principe, laissant de cote poUF le moment, quitte a le regler plus tard, le probleme concret de l'importance numerique des contributions des membres perma'7 nents. La gravite de cette question est pien evidente, surtout si nous tenons compte du fait 'que les forces armees fotirni,es par ces Etats joueront un role decisif. n est necessaire de dire franchement que les divergences d'opinioris qui se sont reveIeesausein du Comite d'etat-major a propos de cette question sont serieuses. Le fond de ces divergences'est le smvant: l'Unionsovietique insiste pour maintenir l'egalite entre tous les'membres permanents du Conseilde 'securite en ce quiconcerne leurs contributions en forces. armees. Cette egalite sera assuree si ces cont1;ibutions reposent sur le principe de l'egalite. ' It appears from the report of.the IVfilitary Staff Com..tnittee that this organ has not succeeded in solving the question as to what principle should govern the deterInination of contributions in armed forces to be made available to the Security Council by States.· Therefore, we shall have to decide uponthis important Question in the Security Council. It is ne-cessary to come to agreement on the question of the strength and composition of the armed forces to be made available by the States which are permanent members of the Security Council. I have in mind an agreement in principle, leaving aside for a while, for further decision, the question of the concrete size of contributions of the States which are permanent members of the Security Council. The importance of this question is quite evident, especially if we take into account that the forces made available by these.States will play a decisive role'. It is necessary to' say frankly that the divergences on this question which have appeared in the Military Staff Committee are of a serious nature. The substance of these divergences is as follo:ws:The Soviet Union inSists (;m the preservation of the equal position of all the permanent members of the Security Council in the contribution of armed forces. This equal position will be secured if all the permanent n:?:mbers pontribute armed forces in accordaJ!.ce with the principle of equality. The appropriate Soviet proposal submitted to La propositionsouniise a ce sujet. par,l'Union the Military Staff Committee reads : sovietique au Comite 'd'etat-major est'la'suivante: "Permanent members of the Security Couri~~' "Les membres permanents du Conseil de secus~al1 make available armed forces (land, s~a and rite mettent a la di&position de ce ConseLl des aIr)' on the principle of equality regarqing the forces armees de terre, de mer et de l'air seIon le overall strength and the composition of these principe de l'egalite en ce qui concerne la puisforces. lIn individual instances deviations from sance d'ensemble et la composition de ces forces.. this principle are permitted by special decisioIls of Des derogations a ce principe sont per~es dans the Security Council, if such a desire is expressed des cas particuliers, sur decisions speciales du Conby a permanent member of the Security seil de securite, si l'un des membres permanents de Council."1 \ . ' . C il . 1 d" 1 " ce onse' en expnme e eSlf. 1t would seem that this proposal should not meet with any objections, slp.ce the necessity that the five PowerS preserve an equal position in this respect is obvious. However, an objection to it has been put forward. Instead of the principle of equality proposed by the Soviet Union, the delegations of other countriesrepresented on the Military Staff Committee 'put forward the principle 'of socsalled "comparable contributions". In accordance with this proposal, the permanent members ofthe Security Councilwould contribute only comparatively equal contributions. This formula provides that·such contributions may differ both in overall strength and iIJ. composition. This was also confirmed by appropriate explanations given _in the course of discussion of this proposal. It is not difficult· to note that there is a considerable difference between these two proposals. , , The principle of equality in the contribution of c~~,~np.~~JQr<.:~~by..tbe.fiveJ)~!Ill~~nt_IllelIl1::l~,rs •of theSecurityCouncil,the prmciple proposedbythe representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, is based on the provisions ofthe United ~ Nations~Charterwhich place the main responsibility for. the maintenance of international peace upon theseStates, which is in accordance withthe equality of their position in. the Security Council. This principle prEServes the equal status. of the permanent memBers in respect of the decision on this important question. It does not permit any preferential positionfor anyone of the permanent members in the contributionofartlled forces by them. ,; Under the United Nations Charter, .the five Powers have been placed in a special position in comparison with the other States JyIembers of the lJnitedNations. Their special position consists in the fact that they are charged with aspecial responsibility, bothfor the activities ofthe Security Councitmrespectofthe maintenance of Ll1tema- -Qonal peace· a~wellas.for the -activities ,of the United Nations in general. . However,holding such-a specialposioon in comparison with other nations, the five Powers at the same tinte.occupy.an equal position in relation to one'anQther. Theyhave equ31 rights in deciding a,lltheimportant questions relating to the maintenance of peace_ . While the Soviet proposal proceeds fromnthe -necessity ofpr~ervingthe equal status ~fthe five Powers on this question, the proposal of other countries' ignores ..this ••• nec~ary. ·condition.... At- -temp~are being made,to convince us that such a requir~ment.may be disregarded in this·instance, that equality.of the permanentmembers under the Charter is one thing and that theiralttual equality in.sc;>lvingsucli. all· impott~t;question, as .that It is impossible to agree that the legitimate demand for the preservation of an equal position for all permanent members of the Security Council in solving this important question shouldbe ignored. One may say that not all of the States which are permanent" members of the Security Council are in a position to contribute armed forces of equal strength and composition. Such a possibility cannot be excluded. It is quite possible that one State or another will find it difIicuilt to contribute armed forces of the same strength and the same composition as other nations. It might be possible that a countrywould find it difficuh to make avail-' able under agreement, for example, air forces equal in strength to the contributions in air forces made by other States. This situation,< however, can be regarded as an exception to the general rule, an exception which is taken into account in the Soviet.proposal alreadv mentioned. In such a case, the S-ecurlty Council, in accordance with a country's desire, can take a special decision to l11eet this desire. r~e, e..xc-e-ptionenvisagee d'ai!!.e~rs---~-1a"propo~~.---:_·~ sition sovietique mentionnee ci-dessus. Dans ce cas, le Conseil de securite peut prendre une decision speciale pour tenir compte des desirs de tel ou telpays. C'est pourquoi la proposition de I'Union des Republiques .. socialistes <sovietiques relative au principe de l'egalite des contributions est assez souple pour tenir compte des possibilites reelles de chaque pays et pourprevoir des exceptions dans des cas de necessite effective.'J'insiste sur ce point,parce que les auteqrs de la pr9position :rela~ tive aux contributions comparables s'exprimen.t parfois comme si la proposition de l'Uniondes Republiques socialistes sovietiques. ne .tenait pas compte du fait que la puissance militaire descinq Puissances n'est pas egale. Mais en realite, cOIlline nous le voyons, nen va differemm~nt. Les adversaires duprincipe de I'egalite des con.; tributions soutiennentque ceprincipeestincompatible avecune organisation'efficace des forces armees. Cette assertion est absolument sans fondement. Pour queUe raison des forces armeeS d'une puissance et d'une composition identiques, mises a l::l disposition du Conseil de se.curite par les mern:bres permanents de ce Conseil, seraient-e11es moinsefficaces.que desforcesinegales au point de vue puissance et composition? .C'est le secret de ceux qui invoquent cet etrange argument. L'efficacite des forces arme~ et le princip'e de l'egalite des contributions sont chosesdifferentes, mais elles ne presentent aucune contradiction. Qui plus est,en un sens, I'egalite des contributions renforce l'efficacite des forces armees au point de vue, parexemple, del'emplacementgeographique de ces dernieres,. puisque, conformement a ce principe, des forces .armees d'une puissance et d'une composition identiques sont mises a la dis- Thus, the proposal of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the principle of equal contributions is sufficiently flexible to take into consideration the actual possibilities of one country or another, and to make exceptions in cases of real necessity.. I point this out because the authors of the proposal on comparab.le contributions speak . sometimes as though the proposal of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not take into consideration the fact that the military might of the five Powers is not equal. But in reality, as we see, the situation is different. The opponents of the principle of equal contributions maintain that thiS principle is incon- .sistent with the establishment of .effective atllled forces. This assertion is absolutelygroundless. Why armed forces of equal strength and composition, .made:; available by the permanent members ohhe Security..Council, should be less effective than: forceswhich are not equal in strength and CQmposition, .remains the secret of those who present such a strange argument. . Th~effecti~eness of armed forces and the prin- CIple of equality of contributions are different things, but there is no contradiction between them. Moreover,. equal contributions in a sense strengthen the effectiveness of armed forces from the point of view, for instarice; of their goographicaJ.location, since accordingto this principle there Inthe present situation, it would be sufficient for the Security Council to have at its· disposal relatively small armed forces. The correctness of this conclusion becomes even more obvious.in the lighfoftIle resolution oftheTI:nited Nationson the general· reduction. of atmam,ents and armed forces. 1Itwouldbeimpossibleto justify a situation whereby, simultaneously w;.th the consideration of m~asures.for the implementation of.this decision, Members of. the Organization, in particular. the States which are permanent members of.the SecurityCQuncil, woll1d maintain inflated armed forces and.would moreover legalize the maintenance of suchforces by concluding agreements with the Security. Oouncil. It would· be impossibl~ ;,0 reconcile such a situation with the above-meri"' ticmed. de~ision of the United Nations and with -the obligations which have been undertaken in accordance with this decision by all States Members of'the Organization. Moreover, it would ·be ~ombre excessif 'et IegaliSeraient, en outre,. le maintien de ces.forces en passant des accords·avec le Conseilde securite. n serait impossible de concilier une tellesituation avec la decisionsusvisee des Nations .Unies et avec les obligations cOntractees par tous les Etats Membres del'Orga:rlisation conformement a cette decision. De plus, .cette situation 'serait meme incompatible a~ec·lesdites unders~and,sti11less to justify, such a situation. When we seek to solve questions relative to the size of the contributions to be .made available to _the Security Council, we must take into· account this resolution on the general reduction of armaments and draw the appr,opriate practical conclusions for the determination of the s~ength of the contingents to be made available. Since it would be sufficient for the Security Council to have at its disposal relatively small armed forces, it follows that even those nations which are weaker in military and economic respects will not face serious-difficulties in placing their contributions of armed forces on a principle of equality with more powerful nations. Thus, the proposal of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics compares favourably with the proposal put forward by the representatives of some other nations in this respect. It'is not only in full conformity with t.l~e-principlesof the United Nations, since it proceed<; from the necessity of preserving the equal status of the :five Powers, but it is also in keeping with those important tasks wh;ch our Organization has set itself in conn~on with the resolution on the gener~l reductio!! of d~ cinq Puissances,'mais eIle est aussi compatible avec l'importante mission que notre Organisation s'est assigrreeala suite de b resolutionrclauveala - reduction generale des armements. . Telle est la situation en ce qui conceme la question de 1'egalite des CQntributions ou du principe des contributions comparables. Tel est le fond des divergences d'opinions qui se sont, manifesteesa ce sujet. Comme vous pouvez le voir, ces divergences sont assez· serieuses. CelanGus contraint a discuter la question sous tous ses aspects et de maniere approfondie, et a trouver une solution quiserve lesinterets, non de pays pris ind,ividuellement, mais de l'ensemble des Nations Unies. Des divergences d'opinions nonmbins gravesse sont manifestees au sein duComite d'etat-major sur la question des bases. Le fond de ces divergences est le suivant: lesrepresentants des Etats- 'Unis et du Royaume-Uni ont soumis' -c;les propo:' sitions aux termes desquelles les accords speciaux vises a l'Article43 de la Charte doivent prevoir, non seulement les forces armees, l'assistance et les facilites' envisagees dans la Chart~, niais' encore des bases militaires, navales et aeriennes, que les Etats Mt:mbres doivb1t metre it la disposition du Conseil de securite.Le representant de la France a soumis une proposition dont le texte est quelque peu different, mais dolit le fond est,identique. Naturellement, la discussion de cette question et des propositions correspondantes au sein du Comite d'etat-majorne pouvait aboutir a un accord pour des raisons tout afait evidentes. LeS propositions relatives aux bases ne peuv~t etre adoptees, tout d'abord pour la raison que ni . l'Article 43, pi la Charte des Nations Unies en general ne prevoient la mise de ces bases ala disposition. du Conseil de securite. La Charte ne parle meme pas de bases. Elle parle de forces armees, d'assistance et de facilites, y compris les droits de passage, mais elle ne parlepas de bases. arm~ents. Such is the situation in respect to the question of, equal contributions or comparable contributions. Such is the substance of the divergences on this question. As you can see, the divergences a:re . rather serious. This obliges us to discuss the.matter carefully and from all angles, and to find such a solution as would correspond, not to the interests of individual countries, but to the interests of the United Nations as a whole. Divergences which are not less serious have appeared in the Military Staff Committee on the question of bases. The'substance ofthe divergences - consists ()f the following: The'United States and United Kingdom representatives submitted proposals-according to which the special agreements referred to in Article 43 of the ,Charter should provide not only for the armed forces, assistance and facilities emdsaged in the Charter, but also for military, naval and air bases, to be made available to the Security Council by Member States. The Frenchrepresentative submitted a proposal,_ which is somewhat different in wording but th~ same in substance. For quite obvious reasons,the" discussion of this question and of the respective proposals ip. the Military Staff Committee could not, of course, lead to an agreement. - The proposals on bases cannot be accepted, in the first place, for the reason that the provision of bases is envisaged neither in Article 43 nor in the United Nations Charter in general. The chat- - ter does net even mentionbases. Itspeaks of armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of. passage, but notbases.' '~Specjfic agreements, concluded.at the ap- "Les accords particuliers conclus au moment prapriate time between the Security Council and opportlID entre le Conseil de securite'et les Etats the MeJ;Ilber nations concerned, will indicate the Membres interesses preciseront la dt,Tce etles duration and the other conditions involved in the autres modalites d'exercice desdroits ainsi ace~ercisc ofrights thus extendedto the armedforces cordes aux forces armees operant sous la direction operating under the direction of the Security du Conseil de securite:' Council."1 As I have already pointed out, this proposal is in full conformity with the United Nations Charter. This~otbe saidabout the. proposals submitted by the representatives of otherSta~es. In addition to the ,fact th~t the posing ,of the Comine je l'ai dejasouligne, cette proposition est absolument conforme ala Charte des Nations Unies. On ne peut en dire autant des propositions soumises par les representants des autres Etats. Outre le iait qu'il est hors de propos de soulever la: <luestion desbases puisque la Charte ne laprevoit pas, il est· egalement incompatible avec les~~o= principes de 1'Organisation des Nations Unies de demander des bases. Que signifiela fomniture de ces bases par certains Membres de 1'Organisation? QueUes soni: les consequences de la fourniture de ces bases? Toute fourniture de bases afi'ecte inevitablement la souverainete· des nations. Le fait que cette question des bases serait re" glee par des accords conclus avec le Conseil de securite ne change rien a l'affaire. Ce ri'est, au contraire, qu'une circonstance aggravante, car, .avec de tels accords, le Conseil de. securite Iegitimerait, par suite de 1'etablissement de ces bases, le maintien de troupes appartenant a certains Etats Membres dans les territoires et les eaux territoriales'd'autresEtats Membres de l'Organisation.' qu~ti()nof.1?~.i~ir.relev~t,sinfet~qu~estion is not providedfor in the Cli~er,the demand for bases is also inconsistent Witrithe principles of the United Nations. .Whatdoes'the provision of such bases by some Members of the Organization DJ.can? What does such a provision of bases entail? The provision-of bases inevitably affects the sovereignty of ~atioris. The fact that the provision ofbases woul~ be taken ca.!'e of by agreementsconcIuded with the Security Council does not alter the situati.Qn. -On the contrary, that.would only make the situation worse, since by such action the Security Council .;w6uld legalize, in connexion with the establish-, .ment of bases, the continuous stationing of troops of certain Member States in territories or waters of other States Members of the Organization. - ' - . I iThe acceptance of the proposal on bases would L'adoption de la proposition relative aux bases he utilized by someStates ~a means pf exerting serait utilisee par ceI'tains Etatspour exercerune,. politicalpressure on other nations which provided pressionpolitique sur d'autr.es Etats qui auraient :suph bases. 'There, can be no doubt· about this,. fourni ces bases. Cela ne fait aueun doute, notam- ,especially if we take into account well-known m~nt si nous tenons compte de faits analogues .analogous ,facts from the .field of, intet:national bien oonnus dans le domaine des relations interna- ,relations. Each of us could without ~ulty give tionales. Chacun de nous pounrait sans difficulte .a number of examples confirming the correctness citer un certain nombre d'exemplespourcon- -of this conclusion. The demand for ba.~ cannot firmer 1'exactitllde de cette conclusion.• La debe evaluated other than as an attempt to by-pass , mande de bases ne peut etre consideree que .the United Nations Charteron thisquestion inthe ..comme un effort pour tonrner la Charte des Nainterests of the policy of certain powerfulnations, tions Unies sur cette question afin de favoriser l!l .and to impose on the Member States of the Orpolitique de certaines grandes Puissances et d'iInganizationobligations which aIi~ not envisaged in poser amc Etats Membres de 1'0rganisationdes the Charter. . . responsabilites qui ne sont pas prevues parla. Charte. . " 1 Voir le chapitre VII, article 26"du rapport ,dUCODl!te d'etat-major: Proces-verbaux otficiels dtt Cons~ilclesccfJntc, Deuxieme An~&:, Supplement speci~l N,o 1. It is not difficult to note that the Charter protects the sovereign rights of States and, in this respect, gives them the right to decide what obligations they will undertake in accordance with the special agreements provided for in the Charter, and what obligations they will be unable to undertake. _Consequently, ~e must speak not of a "general guarantee of rights of passage" as stated in the above-mentioned proposal, but of the rights of passage 'Which are granted by a State in accordance with a concrete agrF-ement to be concluded. We must speak, n9t of general guarantees which are to be defined beforehand, butof concrete cases · which are provided for in particular agrF-ements. ~eux qu'ils ne seront pas en mesure de prendre. En consequence, nous devons parler, non d'une "assurance generale concernant les droits de passage", ainsi que le mentionne la proposition en question, mais des cItoits de passage qui sont accordes par te1 oute! Etat, aux termesd'un accord concret a conclure ultel'ieurement. Nous devons parler, non d'une assurance generale dMi- 'nieal'avance, mais de Ca! concrets qui font l'objet d'accords speciaux. . En outre, il n'est pas difficile de c9nstater que cette proposition ne respecte pas suffisammentles droits des Etats. Elle lese notamment les mterets des petites nations. Celles-ci neseront pas en mesure de mettre a li disposition du Conseil de securite un contingent quelconque de forces arme~, ou encore ne pouITont mettre a sa dispositionque des contingents plus ou·moins importants; etleurs contributions prendront, en majeure pame, la forme d'assistance, facilites et octroi de droits de passage. Loin dediminuer l'importance de la question, .cette consideration la souligne plUs fortement encore. J'aborde maintenant la question de I'emplacement des forces armees. Le Comite d'etat-major a longuement etudie cette question, et ce1a est comprehensible. La question de l'emplacement des Moreover, it is hot difficult to 'Ilote that this proposal shows insufficient respect for the rights of. States. This especially affects the interest~ of small nations, which will either be unable to make available to the Security Council any contingents .of armed forces at all or will be unable to make available more or less considerable cO]1tingents, and whose contributions will be mostly intheform of assistance, facilities, and the granting of rights of passage. However, this does not minimize the iInportanceof this question; on the contrary, it emphasizes its importance all the more. . I shall now proceed to the question of the locatIOn of armed forces. The Military Staff Committ~ has given considerable attention to tbisquestIon. This is comprehensible. The question arises It is necessary to decide where the armed forces which are to be made available to the Security Council by the States under special agreements shculd\b~ stationed. Should they.be stationed in their own territories, or may they be stationed outside their own territories, in the territories and territorial waters of other States? It is clear that the difference between the two possible solutions of tills .problem is of paramount importance. It is necessary to bear this in mind it'. discussing the question in the Security Council. The proposal of the Union of Soviet Socialist: Republics onthe question of the location of armed forces provides that these forces should be sta- . .- nonedin·· their OWll teu~tories and only iIl their . own territories. This proposal states ~ "Armed forces made available to the Security Councilby Member nations ofthe United Nations shall be garrisoned within the frontiers of the contributing Member nations' own territories or territorial waters except in cases envisaged in Article 107 of theCharter.»1 . , I shall not speak on the reference to Article 107 of the Charter. This Article deals with thespecialrights of Allied'States in connexion with the exercising of control over ex-enemy States. There are no pivergences on this question. There are divergences on the first part of the above-stated proposal, that is, on the question as to whether these armed forces may be kept in territories-:-with the exception of ex-enemy territories-other than thei::r own territories or territorial waters. ~ B~ides the proposal of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the report includes: 1. The jointUnited States, United Kingdom and Chinese propo~al; 2. the French proposal. 1 i As on the question of bases, the difference .between the last· two proposals mentioned is not substantial. Both recommend a solution to the question which is different in principle from the one provided in th~ proposal of the Unjon of Soviet Socialist Republics. Both ofthese proposals . provide for the location Of armed· forces in their ( .e 1 Voir le chapitre IX, article 82. du rapport du Com,lt d'ctat-majw': proces-ver.baux officielf du Conseil de sectmt:....l, . .' . Deuxieme Annee, Supplement special No 1. . Indeed, how is it possible to justify the presence of armed forces in the territories of other States when there is no need for their presence? Itis clear that such a sit~ation cannot be justified. The presence of armed forces outside their own territories could only cause corrip~catlons.fo, the countries in whose territories these forces were located, and not for those countries alone. The effect would be of more than local nature. The presence .of armed forces of certain States in territories of other States, including Members of the United Nations, would constitute a means of political pressure on these other States. The situation will not be changed if we say that armed forces may be stationed iD. territories C?r waters "to which they have legal right of access", as 'stated in the proposal ofthe United States, United Kingdom and China. The situation will be equally· unchanged if we say that armed -forces may be stationed within territories or waters of other natioIl$ to which armed forces "have access under international agreements .registered . with the United Nations Secretariat and published by it in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter", as stated in the French proposal. The mention of "legal right of access", or even of the agreements, does not eliminate the negative 'consequences which result from the presence of foreign troops, both for the States iD. whose terri- .tories such armed forces are·stationed and also for relations among States in gep.eral. Reservations such as the above-mentioned, when they concern this question, lose their significance to a great extent, especially if we take into account that,· as experience haS shown, the line of demarcation between "legal right of access" and illegal access, according to the conception of .some people, is sometimes distinguished with difficulty. This is not excessive nihilism in respect to agreements and "legal right of access") but a statement of wellknown facts. • The consideration of the question of the locatlO~ of foreign troops in the territories of other nations, as well as 6f the question of bases, beco~es of.particular importance precisely in con- IIIfiIiIR: the ;eciaI a~eem~n~ provided.:r.. con~oivent, est souvent biendifficile atracer. Ce n'est pas la professer un nihilisme excessifa l'egard des accords et dt'! droit legal d'acces, mais un simple desir de faire etat de faits bien connus.. L'exanien de la que...stion du stationnement de troup.es etrangeres sur les territoires d'autres nations, aussi bien que de la question des bases, revet une importance speciale, precisementquand il s'agit des accords speciaux prevus parla Cliarte. Deserving of no less attention is the question of the withdrawal of armed forces, whichis thequestion of what time limits should be fixed within which the armed forces must be withdrawn to the territories and territorial waters ofthe States which contributed them, after these armed forces have completed the tasks entrusted -to them by the Security Council for the maintenance of peace. This question applies equally to the armed forces which have utilized rights of passage. As can be seen from the report, the Military Staff Committee was also unable to reach agreement on tlll.s question. The divergences which have appeared greatly resemble those CL the question of the location of armed forces. Two different approaches to the solution oftms problem have made themselves evident in this case as well. Accordingly, two different proposals have been submitted to the Military Staff Committee, one of which has been submitted and defended by the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.1 What is the essence of both these proposals anC:- w4atis the difference between them? Theproposal ofthe lTnion of Soviet Socialist R,epublics provides that, after the a.."'ffied forces' have fulfilled the measures for the maintenance of peace which ate envisaged inArticIe 42 of the Charter, they must be withdr<.:.wn to their own territories and their own territorial water'> within atimelimit of thirty to ninetyciays, unless otherwise dec'ded by the Security Council. These time limits should be provided for _in the special agreements concluded under Article 43 of the Charter. Tb:. is the/essence ofthe proposa! oftheUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics. However, the essence· of the proposal defended by the representatives of other States is quite dif:'; ferent. This proposal 'states only that after the armedforcesmade available to theSeeurity Councilhave fulfilled the tasks entrusted to them by ,the Security Council they shall be withdrawn "as soon as possible" to the, generallocationsgoverned '1S~ ~hapter V, article 20, report of the Military Staff Committee: Official 'Records of the Secu"ity Council, Second Year, Special Supplement No. 1. 1 Voir le chapitre V, a:-ticle 20, du rapport du Comite d'etat-major: PrQces-verbauxojJiciels du Conseil de securite, Deuxieme Annee, Supplement special.No 1. . A comparison of these two proposals reveals a great difference betweenthem. Instead ofthe clear statement, contained in the proposai of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that armed forces must be withdrawn to their own territories and their own territorial waters within a deiL-rlte time limit after they have fulfilled the tasks entrusted to them by the Security Council, it is proposed not to mention any time limits for withdrawal in the agreements. The general formula providing for the withdrawal of ~ed forces "as soon as possible" is absolutelYinsufficient. It does not obligethe armed forces to leave the territories of other States when their pre<;ence is no longer nec~ary and when it is not called for in the interests of the maintenance ofpeace. This formula, ifaccepted, wouJld be used as a pretext for the continuous presence of foreign troops in territories of other States, which is inadmissible from the point of view of the basic purposes of our Organization. For the purpose of justifying this preposal, the argument is brought forward that the Security Council will take concrete cases into consideration and will take a decision on the withdrawal of armed forces to their own territories when it considers such a withdrawal to be necessary. The Security Council should, of course, take the concrete casesinto account. We cannot, howev-er, shut our eyes to the fact that, in accordance with this proposal, a decision of the Security Council is required not to leave the troops in foreign territories, but to withdraw them from the foreign territories to their own. This radically changes th(~ situation in comparison with the provisions con- . tained in the proposal of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This is evident from the mere fact that the agreement of all permanent members is required for the adoption by the Security Council of a decision on the withdrawal of troops; with·· out this.agreement, it will be impossible to adopt such a decision. Th~ adop~on of this proposal would affect the sovereignty of some States Members of theUnited Nations as well. This would be beneficial, not to the Organization.as a whole, hut only to certain great Powers contributing armed forces. It is clear that, under such a condition, the interests of small nations especially may be affected. Si elle etait adoptee, cette proposition porterait atteinteala souverainete de certains Etatsmn sont. egalement Membres des Nations Unies,~et profiterait, non pas a l'ensemble des Nations Unies, mais exclusivement a certaines grandes Puissances qui auraient fourni des contingents .aux forces· armees. Dans ces conditions, il est evi.; dent que ce sont surtout les interets des petites na'- tions qui risqueraient d"etre leses. La presence de troupes en territoire etranger et le retard inutilement apporte ail tetrait des forces The presence of troops in fo~eign territories, as well as unnecessary delay in the withdrawalofthe armed forcesof some States'from the territories of other States after these armed forces have completed. the assignments entrusted to them by the ~IlCilcannot be ~ustified. arm~es de certains Etats des ·territoires d'autres Etats, apres achevement de la mission que leur aurait confiee le Conseil de securite, ne sauraient' se justifier enaucUIl cas. At the same time-and this is of major importance-the proposal of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is based on the principle that suchsituationsshould be considered asexceptions, while the proposal submitted by the representatives of other countries is based on the principle that a delay in the withdrawal of troops exceeding the time limit of one to three months should be a rule. It follows that a situation which should be considered to be an exception is legalized and considered to be the rule; and, vice versa, what should be the rule is treated in the latter proposal as an exception. Is it not c1.<:ar that this is a rather curious picture? inter~1S of the deve1<?pm~ntof friendly relations nisation et au developpement des' relations amiamopg States. This can byno means be said about cales entre Etats; c'est ce qu'on ne saurait aucunethe proposal.submitted on this subject by the' ment afIirr.ner de la proposition formulee sur le representatives of oth~r nations. ! meme sujet par les representants des autres pays. One, cannot fail. to notice the divergence of ' Les divergences d'opinions qui sesont fait jour opinions which has appeared in the MilitaryStaff au sein du Comite d'etat-major sur la maniere de Committee on the logistical. support of arm~d satisfaire auxbesoins "logistiques" d("~ .. forc~ forces to be placed at the disposal of the Security armees qui devront ctre mises a la disposition.d~-­ Council.1 This question is an important compon- ,Conseil de securite, ne sauraient. echapper a perent part of the general question of fundamental ,sonne1 • Cette question fait partie integrante de la principles of the orga.."lization of armed forces~ question generaie des principes fondamentaux de This can be explained even by the.mere fact that l'organisationdes forces armees: Ceci s'explique the proper logistical support of these armed forces meme par le simple fait que l'une des conditions is one of the conditions of~eir effective employde l'emploi efficace des forces armees par le Conmentby the Security Council in the interests of \ seil de securite,dans l'interct du maintien de la ,the~aintenanceofpeal:e. paix, est de po~oir de fa~on adequate aux be- ••. soins logistiques de ces forces. . Que! est essentiellement le caractere des diyer: gences q~ semanifestent sur cette question parIIll / What is the substance of the divergences on this question among the representatives of different , 1 Voir le chapitre VIII, arpcle ~I,du rappo~t du C0lD:it6 d'ctat-major:Proces-verbaux ofjiczel$ duConseJl desecurlte,. Deuxie-ne Annce, Supplement special No 1. Disregarding the question of theinadmissibility of this complicated procedure, which in practice may reduce'the efficiency of measure.i to be carried out by the Security Council, it is necessary to note the basic defect·of such a proposal, which makes its adoption impossible. Its basic defect is that certain nations are subjected in advance to dependent and unequal positionsinthe Organization. This situation can be used for political benefits and advantages by the powerful States which havethe possibility ofsupplying and equippingthe armed forces of other nations. The tendency of 'some powerful nations to supply and equip the a.-.m~dforces of other States may be eva!uated as seeking an opportunity to influence the policies of ~ese ~tates and thus to occupy a dominant position WIth. regard to the armed forces to be placed ctt'the disposal of the Security·Council.' Precisely such a situation would be 'created if ~bse States which contributed military;personnel did not take care to provide this personnel with appropriat~ equipment. It is impossible .to agree to such a SItuation. The United Nations must ensure that this is not'allowed. . One may say that it will be difficult for some . States to provi~~tpilitary perso~el with their own . Dleansan~.facilities. L('lt us admit that possibility. H:owever; ill cases where one nation or another is re:illy tm~ble to provide the available personnel "WIth ~qU1pment and with.all facilities then the •.... SecuptyCouncil?ould consider thisqti~tionand ~te exception!"" ",ch. nation·.• .t\s the reportindicates, the divergences on some other questions which arise in connexion with the working out of general principles for the,org3I1ization of armed forces have not yet been eliminated. Among them is the question of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which provides for the States' inherent right of self-defence in case of armed attack. It would seem that this Article of the Charter is quite clear.,Nevertheless, up to nqw the military representatives have failed to agree upon it.1 The representatives of some of the countries, including' the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, consider that, in workitlg out the general principles, there is no need to include in these principles a special provision dealing with Article 51 of the Charter. The representatives of France and China deem it necessary to link the general. principles with Article 51 ofthe Charter, but the proposal which they havesubmitted for the purpose of establishing such a connexion is not in conformity with this Article of the Charter. It is proposed, for instance, to point out especially in the basic principles that armedforces made availableto the Security Council may be used in case of "national emergencies" .at the discretion of nations contributing such armed forces, that is, not for the purpose of maintaining international peace. The inclusion of such a provision in the general principles might be utilized ill some cases to evade fulfilment of the obligations undertaken by States under the agreements. This could be done On the pretext that it was necessary to use the armed forces contributed for other purposes having nothingin common with the tasks ofmaintaininginternational security, and carrying out international measures to this end. I wish to express the hope that the representatives of France and China will not insist on their proposal, and that it will notbe difficult for us to find a common language on this question in the Security Council. The.question of the air forces also deserves attention. The representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Military Staff Committee supmitted a proposal which provides that the'strength and composition of national air force· contingents, to be put at the disposal of th.c Security Council by Member States to carry out the measures provided for in _Article 45 of the Charter, should be determined by the Security nation~ a la disposition du Conseil de securite,en vue d'appliquer les mes~res prevues a 1'Article 45 de la Charte,doivent etre fixees par leConseil de 1 Voir le chapitre IV, article 17, du rapport du <tom!!!! d'etat-major:Proces-verQaux officie~ du Conseil dest!cullt~, Deuxieme Annee, Supplement special No. 1. As for Article 45, its examination C~"l take place only after the study of Article 43 of the Charter has been completed, and after the conclusion of special agreements on the contribution of armed forces. Mterthe conclusion ofsuch agreements the Security Council, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee, will determine in accordance with Article 45 of the Charter what proportion of the overall strength of the national air force contingents placed at the disposal of the Security Counc:J under the agreements will be held iJ:nm:;diately available for the fulfilment, in case ofnecessity, Of urgent military measures. Divergences on this question, as can be seen, concern the tim.e for the consideration of concrete measures connected with the solution of the question of air forces, rather than the principle. Quant a l'Article 45, nous ne pourrons l'examiner qu'apres avon' acheve l'etude de I'Article 43 de la Charte et apres avoir conclu des accords speciaux relatifs a la contribution de contingents armes. Apres conclusion de ces accords, le Conseilde securite fixera, avec l'aide du Comite d'etatmajor et conformement a I'Articl~ 45 de la Charte, quelle partie de la puissance d'ensemble des contingents aeriens de chaque nation, nris a la disposition du Conseil de securite aux termes de ces accords, sera immediatement utilisable en vue d'accomplir; en cas de necessite, des taches militaires urgentes. Les divergences sur cette question portent, comme on peut le voir, moins sur le principe que sur la question de savoir a que! m.oment il faut examinerles mesures concretes qui permettront de resoudre la question des forces aeriennes. On ne s'est pas encore mis d'accord, non plus, sur la direction strategique des forces armees. La position de l'Union des R~publiques socialistes sovietiques, des Etats-Unis et de la Chine est que cette question n'est pas urgente et qu',en tout cas il ne convient pas de la lier a l'~xamen des principes de base regissant Forganisation des forces armees3 • 11 serait parfaitement normal, au.stade actuel de notre etude, d'ex~erl'Article 43' de , , la Charte du point de vue militaire afin de prevoir simplement, dans les principes generaux, que le Conseil de securite peut, sur l'avis du Comite d'etat-major, designer en temps opportun un commandant d'ensemble ou des commandants d'ensemble des forces armees. On pourta Se livrer ulterieurement a une'etude compMmentaire des questions de directionstra!egiqueet d'organisa- The'question of the strategic direction of armed forces has not yet been agreed upon. The position of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States and China is that this question is not urgent, .and that in any case its study is not con-. nected with the consideration of basic principles for the organization of armed forces. 3 It would be quite normal at this stage of the study of Article 43 of the Charter from the military point of.view merely to provide in the general principles that the Security Council, on the advice of the Military St~ Comnrittee, can at the appropriate time appomt an overall commander or commanders of t~e armed forces. An additional study of the ques- , ~ons of the strategic direction and the organization.of co~and may take place at a later stage. Therrdetailed consideration will cause fewer dif- 1 See. chapter IY, article 16. report. of the Military Staff COImmttee: Ofjicuzl Records ot the Security Council Seccnd Year, Special Supplement Fo 1 ' •Ibid. . ., . " C;See. chapter~, article 41, report of theMilitaryStll-1f mmittee. Ot[iclal Records ot the Security Council, Sec- Iiiiilft.SUPPlement No. 1. 1Voir l~ chapiu:e IV, article I?, du :rappor~ du ~om.it~ d'etat-maJor:Proces.verbauxofjiclels dff Consetl de secuTlte, Deuxieme Annee, Supplement special No 1. ~ Ibid. • Voir le chapitre X. article 41, du rapport duComite d'etat-major: Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securittJ, Deuxieme Annee, Supplement special No 1. Such are the mostimportantquestions onwhich agreement has not yet been reached in the Military Staff Committee, and such is the substance of the divergence on these questions. , I amobligedto drawthe following conclusions: 1. TheMilitary Staff Committee has, of course, done some uSeful work. It has submitted some agreed recommendations onthe general principles .for the organization of armedforces. These agreed proposals will. presumably be approved by the Security COlmciI: 2. At the same time, it is necessary to state that the Military Staff Committee has not solved a number of questions of great importance for the organization of armed forces. The most important of these questions have been mentioned above. 3. The insufficient progress in the work of the Military Staff Committee, and consequently the lack of progress in .the matter of the organization of armed forces to be made available to the Security Council, are explained by the fact that on a number of importaIit questions proposals were submitted which were incompatible with the tasks andp1.ll'poses of the MilitaryStaff Committee and with the fundamental principles of our Organization. Therefore, the responsibility for the delay in the work of this organ rests with those delegations which •have.systematically submitted'such, proposals. 4. The successful solution of the questions connected with the establishment of thegeneralp~­ ciples,as well as any other problems relatingto the .maintenance of peace, is possible only when all.of us are guided.by the basic principles and purposes of the United Nations, an'd not by the interests of some of the powerful and.influential.nations: Up to now, not everybody has observed this indispensable conditionin the work of the Military Staff Committee. ! Allow me, ID conc~usion, to express the.hope that consider~tion of the report in the Security Council will enable us to reach agreement on the questions on which agreement has not yet been teache(;t At any rate, the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will, do its best in order that we may. achieve success. in this .im.. portant matter.. • See chapter x, article 41, report of the Military Staff COplmittee:Ofjicial Records of the Security Council, Second Year,•Special Supplement No. I. 4. Nous ne pouyons arriver a une solution heureuse des questions concernant l'etabli$ement des principes generaux ainsi que les autres problemes relatifs aumaintien de la paix, que si nous ,~ousinspirons tous des principes et des buts essentiels des Natiorls Unies,et non pas des interets de certaines des nations les plUS puissanteset les pl~ influentes. Les delegations n'ont pas toutes rempli jusqu'a presentcette condition pourtant indispen· sable au progres des travaux du Comite d'etatmajor.' . Permettez-moi, pour conc1ure, d'expcimer 1'espoir que I'examen de ce rapport au sel~ du Conseil de securite nous permettra d'atriver l.i un accord sur les qnestions qui n'ont pas encorefait I'objet d'un accord. En tout cas, la deIegationde l'Uriion des Republiques .socialistes .sovietiques fera. de son mieuxpour que nouspWssions,d~J~h cette question importante, arriver a·une conclusion heureuse de nos travaux. d·eta~-m.ajor:proces.'Uer. ba.ux ofjic(e~du c.. ons.eZ.'.l. d.e. se..:.i ..fJte'... " DeUXleme Annee, Supplement SpeCIal No. 1. ..•.• •...• .' 'Voir le chapitre X, article 41, du rapport du Conn,te , Because oftheimportance whichtheAustralian Government attached to the principle that members of the Organization should pledge themselves to co-operate in carrying out, by force if need be, the decisions of the Organization for the preservation of peace, the Australian delegation at San Francisco sought to give strength and certainty to the collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace. It was at the suggestion of Australia that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals (which provided, in chapter VIII, section 3, paragraph 5, that agreementsshould be madeby Members orgroups ,of Members inter se) were amended to provide, inArticle 43 of the Charter, t.qatthe special agreements shall be concluded on the initiative of the Security Council betWeen Council and Members or groups of Members. We must not lose sight of the importance of that charge. The responsibility and the initiative in this matter belong to this Council. ' ' < m~nded that the Security Council "accelerateas 1946\qui recommandeau Conseilde securite "de "much as possible the placing at its disposal.of the hater dans toute la mesure du possible la mise asa armed forces mentioned in Article 43 of the disposition des forces armees ivisees it l'Article 43 Charter.m de la'Charte". The close connexion between the problem of L'etroite relation qui existeentre le proble,me disarmament and the conclusion of the special du desarmement et la conclusion des accords ·agreements is indeed one of the most ~portant' speciaux est, en efIet, l'un des motifs les plus imreasons for dispatch. As I stated before the Comportantsde cette hate. COlllIXle je I'ai declare demission on Conventional Armaments, the Ausvant la Col'l)Illission des ,armeme~ts de· type traliaIi Government regardS early action under classique 2 , .le Gouvernement australien considere Articles,43' and 53 as a primary factor on which que la mise en application sans retard des Articlr.s all planning for disarmament must,be founded.2 43 et 53 constitue un factetir ess,eutiel sur lequel It must be evidentto'anyreasonable observer that, doivent se fonder tous !esplansde desarmement. , ?lltil the United Nations has. developed effective N'impoHe quelobs~ryateurraisonnable peut voir mstr\lIrlenl:s by which it can, in the last resort, que jusqu'a ce que l'Organisation des Nations ' c9mpe1 observ~nceof the law of the Charter~na- Unies ait mis au point les instruments efficaces qui tiQnal· Governments will inevitably be'reluctant lui permettr!Jnt,' en. dernier ressort, 'd'assurer •.la to agree to any significant measures of disaima- 'stricte observation des dispositions de la Charte, ment. However burdensome and costly it may be, les Gouvemementsnationaux repugneront inetho~e'responsible for ~he security and safety ofvitablement a donnerleut accord a tolite mesure t~ell' peoples will tend to rely on individual and de desarmement ~portante. Quellesquesoient bilateral ,and regional 'arrangements for ,selfles depenses et lesdifficultes qu'ils s'imposeront de defence. It is our.imperative duty to establish a ce fait, les Gouvernements responSables de la sesys~em of collective security in which the peoples "curite et dusaIut de leurs peuples auront tend:~.nce " • 1 See Resolutions adopted by the Gelll!lralAssembly dur- 1 Voir les Resolutions adopUes par l'Assemblee genbale mg the second part of its first session, page 6/). pendant la seconde partie de sapretIliere session, page'65. , This can hardly be said to be rapid progres~. We call it a disappointing rate of progress. Before I proceed to comment on the adequacy of the . principles he~ore us, as a basis on which special agreements may be.speedily worked out, I should like to make clear the view of the Australian ' Government as to the role of the Military Staff Committee ·and its.methods of work. The functions of the Military Staff Comnlittee are defined in the Charter as follows: .to assist the Security Council in making pla~ for the appli~a­ tionof armed force;1. to advise and assist the Security·Council.on all. questions relating to the Security Council's mili~aryrequirementsfor the maintenance of international peace and'security, the·emploYIIJ.ent· and command of forces •placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament;2 and to exerc~~responsibility, under the Security Council, for the strategic direction of any armeddorces placed at the dis·· posalof the Security Council.s The Charter m~kesit abundantly clear thatthe functions ·of the.Military Staff.Committee are limited to advising· and assistiDg the Security Council, and that even lnihe. case ofstrategic "direction the ultimate responsibility.and the ulti- •. matedecisio~ yestwith the Security Council as a whole, including of course ihe non-permanent members. . ." ... Afthispomt,Lwould pause to refer to what I "consider the·most extraordinary cloctrin .. eput,be- ""\' . . ... . 1·Article46. " 1 Article 46. 2Ardcle 47, paragraphe 1. I ask-and we find this throughout the speech -':'is that in strict conformity with the Charter? In our opinion, it is adirect contradiction of everything contained in the Charter of the United Nations. It follows, and must be recognized, that all members of the Council, who share the primary responsibility for the maintenance ofinternational peace and security, rollst be ftilly and constantly apprl-sed of the progress which has been made in the organization of the armed forces,. without, which decisions of the Council-requiring the use of force cannot be made effective. How is it possible for the Council to take decisions which involve, or may involve, action by air, sea, or,land forces unless allthe members of the Council have full knowledge ofsuch forces, their disposition and composition? For over a year, the Military Staff Committee has been meeting in secret and, apart from brief . communiques which indicated little beyond the fact that there were disagreements among members, no infonp.ation has been available to the non-pennanent members of the Council as to the matters under discussion. The Australian Government believes that it is impossible under these conditions for the non-permanent members to d.ischarge their obligatio.ns under the Charter, and that they ~hould be associated with the Military Staff Committee during their term of office. We have constantly pressed in the Committee of Expem for amendments to the rules ofpmce.;. dure of the.Military Staff Committee to give effect to this, without any success. Reprc§entatives ofthe non-perIllanent members of the Security Council cannot even sit .as observers. There is another feature ofthe procedure of the Military Staff Committee which thef\ustralian delegation believes has been largely responsible for the slow rate of'progress. Although there is no provision in the Charter which requires such all' abnormal voting procedure, the Military Staff ~ommittee 'has adopted the rule that decisions, ~~cluding recommendations to the Security Council, can be made only by a unanimous vote of all the members. Itis inevitable that undersuch a rule there should be serious dela.ys and protracted ",:::_:e have cb,allenged the authority for this _ pr 2 rr: r We do not suggest that unanimous agreement in the Committee is not,desirable. The co-operation and agreement ofthe permanentmembers are vital to the peace of the world. What we maintain, most strongly, is that unanimity cannot be automatically' ensured by an artificial rule of voting. .We can only hope to secure unanimityif the issues . are frankly and fully debated in the open, so that no nation can obstruct the proceedings 'of the United Nations without having its actions subject t":., the scrutiny and examiD.atio~of the peoples of the w!Jrld. . , Itis not our purposeto attemptto pinthe blame for'the delays that have occurred on any particular member of the Committee. Indeed, we cannot do s6-no one can do so with certainty-because the Committee acted behind closed doors. Its members even.arrogated to themselves the right . to have a secretariat composed exclusively of their 9wr1 Ilationals, although the Assembly in London rejected· a proposal that,the, secretariat. of the Security Council itself should be independent of the, Secretariat of the ,Secretary-General. The United States representatives 1:lave stated that the United States was not at fault. Wearequiteprepared to believe. that this is correct, but we cannot'make ajudgmentpased'merelyonthe position of. delegations indicated ill the, report. What does seemclearto uS isthatone reason for the delaywas t~e procedure foll.owed~ That at least can, and shoUld, be corrected. I return: now to the reportitself. As I have'said, the ,task given to' the Committee Was to ,recommend principles which s1:l9uld govern the organization of the arinedforces•. In the view of,the majori~e un rapport de la minorite. Nous ne voulons pas direqu'il ne soit pas sou- 'haitable de realiser un accord unanime au sem du Comite. La cooperation et I'accord des mem- .bres permanents sont essentieIs pour .la paix' du monde. Mais nous soutenons avec la plus grande energie que I'unanimite ne peut s'obtenir aptomatiquement au moyen d'une procedure de vote arti..: ficie1le. Nous ne pouvons esperer obtenir I'unanimite que si les problemes en questi{l'il sont discutes ,ouvertement, avecfranchise et, en detail, de sorte qu'aucun pays ne puisse s'opposer a.l'actiodes Nations Dnies sans que sa conduite fasse I'o\.;· jetd'un examen approfondi de la part des peuples du monde. Notre but n'estpas d'essayer de rejetersur , aucun membre particulier au Comite la responsabilite des retards qui se sontproduits; en fait, nollS ne pouvons le faire -'-' personne ne peut le faire avec certitude - parce que le Comite s'est reUni.a. huis clos. Ses membres se sont meme arroge le droit d'avoir Un secretariat compose exclusivement de letirspropres nationaux, bien queI'As,. semblee-reunie a Londres ait rejete une prop~si. tion 'demandant que le secretariat du Conseil de s6curite lui-meme fUtindependa,nt du Secretariat du Sec~etairegeneral. Les representants des,Etats- 'Orris ont declare queleur pays n'est pasabHlmer. Nous sommes'toutdisposesacroire que cette affirmlltion .est ~l{acte, mais nous ne pouvons. nous fake une opinion en nousfondant simplementsur lapos~tion des delegations telle qu'e11e estmey· .queedans le rapport. Ce qui nous semble c1aJl.'" c'est que l'une desraisons deces retards est I~, methode de. travail suivie. Cette methode, du: moins, pent·et doit etierectifiee. . , Je r~viens maintenant au rapport lui-me~e. Comme je I'al' dit, ,lat~che confieeau Conute With all due respect to the.eminent niilitary leaders who have prepared this report; it is clear that there are many questions on which more specific principles must be stated before the actual negotiation of any special agreement could begin. The prmciples before us are certainly useful.The Australian Government is able to accept, subject only tomino:r modifi~ations in oJte or two cases, all the. principles unanimously recommended. It can also subscribe to one or the other, orboth, of the alternatives proposed for the remaining principles. However, we feel bound to draw attention to some areas which have not been covered at all, Of which have been.dealt with in such. genend terms as to give little guidance, either to the CooodIin,negotiating the special agreements, orto the -Governments of Member States in estimating their probable cOlltributionsand commitments. For example, the report does not contain any definite propos~ as to the total strength of the ,United Nations forces, or any recommendations as to the size of forces to be made available by Member States. . pui.~ance d'ensembledes Jorces .armees des Nations Unies, ni de recommandations surl'effectit des. contingents armes que 1es'Etats Membres . d9ivent fournir. .' . Les deux questions essentielles qu'il faut trait~r en detail sont les taches que les forces armees des Nations Unies seront appelees a accomplir d:l1ne part et, d'autrepart, l'importance etla nature des ' fortesarmees qui seront n~cesSaires pour accom- . plir ces,taches.· . ...•. The two outstanding questions which require fuller treatment are the tasks which the United Nationsforces-will be called upon to perform,and the size and nature of the forces which will be needed to carry out those t~ks. . '.A definition. of tasks should be one of the first Tout,pla,n wJ1itaire doit prevoiren premier lieu ~~epsin all military plannirig. Two priri<;:iples have la definition des taches a accompliI'. Deux prinbeen stated for the purpose of the'United Nations cipes ont ete defmis en ce qui concerne l'objetdes' . ,armed forces, one positive, and one negative.The for<;:es armeesdes Natibns Unies: un printipe ~ positive principle is that the forces are intended posjtif, un principe negatif; le premier est que ces for the maintenance or the restoration of internaforces sont destinees aU'D;laintien ou.au retablisse- ~onar peace, and security as prqvi4ed uilderArmentde la paix et de lasecurite' internationales, tIde 42 of the Charter; the negative principle is comme il est prevu a l'Article 42 de la Chmie; le that these' f~rces must not be 'employed'for pursecond est qu'ellC$ ne doivent pas etre employ~es. poses incqnsistent with the purposes, principles, dans des'buts contraires a~ buts et principes ou and spiritof,the Charter. These principles, as £11r a l'esprit de la Charte. L'Australie peut parlaiteas-they go, are quite acceptable to Australia, but ment accepter ces principes, tels qu'ils sont; mais they give orily the 'barest guidiilice as to the actual ils ne donnentqu'une indication tres vague des tasks and objectives of these forces. Until these taches et derobjet reels de ces forces armees·. Tant tasks are clearly defined, neither,the Council, nor que ces taches ne seront pas nettement determi- ~~e Military Staff Committee, nor Member Govnees, nile Conseil, ni le Oomite d'etat-major, niles e-rnments can.proceed .with detailed planning. Gouvernements Membres ne pQurront poursuiwe Presumably, the forces contributed by different l'e:"'boration d'un plan detaille. Les forces arm.ees ~bers will be c~m~ined~Orth~~:~~:::::~:f...fournies par les differents Membres sero~~=:::.~:..~.__ forceS~ tlleir size must be completely adequate to valeur tres limitee, et mon Gouvemelnent est the task: absolument d'avis que, sans tenir compte de l'au- . ~o '~ torite morale qu'elles peuvent avoir, les forces armees des Nations Unies doivent avoir une importance propol'tionnee a la tache qu'elles doivent , accomplir. La delegation australienne note que, d'apres'un communique du Comite d'etat-major en date du 2 juin, le Comite a constitue une commission speciale chargee,d'entamer la discussion officieuse de la question de la puissance d'ensemble et de la composition des forces. armees. Toutefois, il est 'douteux que le Comite soit en mesure de progresser ,s'il n'a, comme base de travail, que les principes generaux soumis clans ce rapport. L'attitude du Gouvemement australien en ce qui concerne les principes generaux de ce rapport sera precisee lorssue nous pass-xons aun examen detailIe. Toutefois, il y a. un principe d'une importance particuliere sur lequel je desire faire des maintenant quelques remarques: il s'agit du principe auquel s'est oppose cet apres-midi le representant de l'Union des Republiques socialisteS sovietiques.. C'est la question de la contribution individuelle, que doivent apporter les cinq membres permanentsduConseil de securite. Ce principe presente une importance particuliere, parce qU'au. -d~but les nlembres permanents,fourniront la majeure partie dt'~ forces armees. De l'avis ciu Gouvemement australien, il serait im- . possible, dans la pratique, de demander a chacun des membres permanents de foumir d.es forces 'armees q'une nleme imp~rtance et d'une meme nature. Il serait inconcevable que, souspretexte. que l'une ou l'alltr~ des grandes Puissances ne possede pas de forceSnavales ()u aerierines suffisantes ou assez no;mbreuscs,,,teRes.que, par ex- I.emple, d~ nav4'e~ porte-avions,les forces des Nal tiOl1s Dnies fussent privees de fettecategoriepar- !t;:uliere de forces armces. .,.The.Australian delegation,' heard.with mter<::,;;t I .La ,delegation australicnne·.·a enteIldu ivec thepertinentre1l1arksof thetlnited St~tesrepl'e- '.mteretles declarations. pertinentes durep:.resctl;tant se.ntativeirt tWsconnexion.Ourown'repri:sentades Etats-Unis a·cetegard. Au cours de ladiscustivc' atSah Frandsco,duringdiscussionof Articl~ sion·de l'Article .45, notrepropre·r.epresentant,a 405, pointed outtI'1lt, 9yringtoj;hespeci;»sl)"-gic Sau~Franciscoa soulign,; qu'~t do"".~:w problems of th~,:::fiC,for example_~i_t:~_~~.~.~,_ .~lemesstrategiquesspeciauxql1ise PQse~~ dansle ,. The Australian delegation notes that, according ~o ~Mm~yStaff CoIIlIllitte~clJmmunique of 2 June, .the Committee has set up a special committee to cQmmence informal discussion on the question of the. overall strength and composition . of, the armed· forces. It is. doubtful, however, whether the Committee will be able to make progressifIt has before it only those same generill principles now submitted to us in thiS report. The attitude of the Australian Government to the general principles of this report will be indicatedwhen we proceed to detailed examination. 1I0wever, there is one principle of particular, importance on which I dE":re to make a few observations at this stage, the same one traversed this afternoon by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. That is the question of theindividual contributionto be made by the five permanentmembers of theSecurity.Council. This is of particular importance, because the permanentmernbers •will contribute '. initially the m,ajoi' portion of the forces. In the view of the Ai!S(l-aliarr Govemment, it would be entirely unrealistic .• f«.)reach permanent,.1pember to make availabl~ forces identical both in size and iilnature. IUs unthinkablethat, because one or another of Jhegreat Powers does not happen to pOSSess suitable or sllf!ident.types of naval ox; 'lrir forces, such as, for exa.'nple, aircraft camelS, the, United Nations fotces should bedeprived of that particulartype of stiiling power. In conclusion, I should like to say that ~ gaps and deficiencies in the principles now before us must be speedily rectified so that the preparation of the special agreements shall not be further delayed. During the recent world war, Australia, both as amember of the British Commonwealth of Nations and as a Member of the United Nations, faced and helped to overcome many of the problems involved in combi.."1ed planning and combined operations. Although we were sovereign and independent States, we over~ame them because we had a common purpose and a common determination. Our experience has given us reason tOhOpeth2.t, with a similar common objective and determination, effective United Nations forces can be organized which will. give the Secur- . ity Council a strong weapon, readily available for the m~tenance of international peace and security. Le PRESIDENT: En raison de l'heure alaque1le

In view 01 the time, I think our meeting should be adjourned. Moreover, the last speaker on my list agrees.The next meetingis scheduled for Tuesday, 10 June, at 3 p.m. The meeting rose at 6.15 p.in. ~oussommes parvenus, je pense qu'il convient d'ajourner not seance. Tai d'ailleurs l'accord du derIDer orateur inscrit. La prochaine seance est fixee au mardi 10 juin, a15 heures. La seance est levee a18 h. 15. (' Ecuador-Equateur Mmioz Hermanos y Cia Nueve de Octubre 703 CasiIIa 10-24 GUAYAQUIL Argentina-Argentitle Editorial Sudamericana S.A. Alsi.'1a 500 BUENOS AIREs Ausualia-Australie H. A. GOddard Pty. Ltd.....· 255a George Street SYDNEY '- Egypt-Egypte Librairie "La Renaissance d'Egypte" 9 Sh. Adly Pasha CAIRO .Belgium-Belgique \ Agence et Messageries de la Presse 14-22 rue du PersiI BaUXELLES - Finland-Finlande AkateeminenKirjaka.uppa· 2, Keskuskatu HELSINKI " .... '--. BoJivia-Bolivie Libreria Cientffica y Literaria . Avenida. 16 de JuIio, 216 Casilla 972 - LA PAZ France Editions A.'Pedone 13, rue Souffiot PARIS, ve Greece-Grece "Eleftheroudakis,r Librairie internationale Place-dela Constitution ATHENES ,Canada The RY~rsonP~s 299 Queen street·West TORONTO ;Guatemala Jose Goubaud Goubaud & Cia Ltda. Sucesor f>a Av. Sur No. 6 y 9a C. P. GUATEMALA Cbi1e-Chil~ Edmundo ·Pizarro ~~",=Me~':edJt46", SANTIAGO Chfua..;;;;..chine The Commercial Press.Ltd. 211 Honan Road SH~GHAI . Haiti-Haiti .Max Bouchereau Librairie E'A laCaravelIe" BOlte postale 111-B PORT-AU-PluNCE - Costa Rica.--:-Costa-RJ"a Trejos. HermanQs ,Apartado. p13 SAN JO~E Oxforc.~ Book & Stationery Co.. Semdia . House NEW DELHI Cuba LaCasa Belga Rene deSmedt O'ReiIIy 455 LA~....NA Iran nangahe· Piaderow 731 Shah. Avenue "TEHERAN '. Czechoslovakia T"he,,()slovttqu;e F. Topic·· Narodni Trida 9 Pro\HAl 'f ," Iraq-frak-,. .... . . l\{ackenzie& Mackenzie The.~ookshop. BA9HDAD IYEfnmark....-Danemark ~war Munskgaard .NorreglUie6 / Leba.non.- ..... L.iba..n KJOBE:N":HAVN '.' . .. ..... LflJrairie universelIe "..f!otn.itticanltepUbP~ BEYR.OUT~ J •.' ;~epl/,klifJue,Do11Zi14t~'i1Je.. '. ¥1Jgoslavia~¥ougoslavie' LibreriaD0niinicana :Netherland~Pays.B~ DrzaVno Preduzece ·Calle.Mercedes No. 49 ~."V! Martinus Nijhoff JugosloyenskaKnjiga Apartadc656 '. .• . Lange Voorhobt 9 MoskoVska UI. 36 .' New Zealand Nouvelle-Zelande Gordon & Gotch Waring Taylor Street ~;WELLINGTON Norway-Norvege Norsk Bokimport A/S Edv. Storms Gate 1 ' , OSLO \ Philippines D. P. Perez Co. 132 Riverside SAN JUAN 'Sweden~uede AB C. E. Fritzes Kungl HofboldlandeI Fredsgatan 2 STOCKHOLM Switzerland-Suisse Librairie Payot S. A. LAUSANNE, GENEVE, VEVEY -MONTREux, NEUOEdTELjO= BERNE, BASEL Hans Raunhardt Kirchgasse 17 . ZURICH I Syda-S)lrie Librairie ·.miverselle DAMAs Union of South Africa Union Sud-Africaine . Central News Agency·Ltd. Commissioner & RissikSts. JOHANNESEURG United Kmgdom RoyaunzemUnt . H.M. Statiq\1!-eryOfiice P.O; Box 5.69 LONDON, S.E.· 1 . and at H.M.S.O. Shops at LONDON" EnINBIlRGH, MANCHESTER, CARDIFF, BELFAST and BlUSTOL .UnitedStates of Atnerica .Etats-Unis d'A.m~ri'iue._ International Documents SerVice . .QQluinbia UniversiW Press' . ·'~2960. Broadway N]i:w YORK 21,·N. Y. ,