S/PV.142 Security Council

cNo, I suggest disCUf,ingit chapter bychapter.The , controversialpoit.'s would be examined at a later meeting. . 'If' we were to' consider the report article by Sinous procedionsal'examen article pararticle, article, we should.b;:;'in danger of getting an in- 'nous r.squerions d'avoir une vue fragmentaire du complete picture of the report. It woUld therefore. rapport. Il est done preferable d'etudier tout le bepreferabie to consider the reportas a whole at ' rapport au cours de la seance d'aujourd~hlU, en today's meeting, and try to agree on the nonparvenant aune decision ell ce qui concerne lea Le PRESIDENT: Non, je vons propose de le illscuter chapitre par chapitre. Les points litigieux seraient examines au cours d'une seance ult6rieure. C()~troversial points. points les plus faciles. , M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques 50- cialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): n est exact que nous devons examiner le rapport chapitre par chapitre, mais chacun de ces chapitres se subdivise en ai'ticles. 11 en resulte que nons devons examiner chaque article separement. ¥r;G~c~Iy:gO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (trllnslateafrom Russian): I agree that we shoiiId take it chapter ·by chapter; but the chapt('.rs are sub-divided into ~cles,so we should discuss the, chapters article by article. Mr. LANGE (Poland) : I think that the method suggested by you, Mr; President, is appropriate fot the purpose. I imagine that the procedure would be to 'take a chapter for study; Ha member has some observations to make concerning a particular article, he may make them. M. LANGE (Pologne) (traduit de 11anglais,): Je,pense, Monsieur le President, que 1:,t methode que vons proposez convient bien au but recherche. 11 me semble que la maniere de proceder serait de prendre un chapitre et de l'tStudier. Si un membre a une observation quelconqueapresenter-au sujet de l'article donne, illui sera possible de le faire.

As the Polish-representative has just suggested, we shall consider the report chapter by chapter and liliall ask you today for a decision on those articles upon which there was no disagreement in the Military Staff Committee. We shall now consider chapter I of the report, which deals with the purpose of the a:rmed forces. , Le PRESIDENT: Nous proceclerons done ch?<- pitre par chapitre, comme vient de l'indiquer le representant·de la Pologne, et je demanderai, anjourd'hui, une decision, article' par article, pour les seuls articles sur lesquels il n'y avait pasdesaccord au sein du Comite d'etat-major. Nons abordons maintenant le chapitre premier du rapport] qui traite de robjct des forces armees. The President rp,ad articles 1 and 2 (chap- Le Pre.sident .donne lecture de 11article premier et de l'article 2 (chapitre premier). ter~); " The IJRESIDENT (translated from French): As there are no remarks on.these two articles, I shall Le PRESIDENT: Puisqu'aucune observation n'est presentee sur ces deux articles, je les oon!Jidererai comme adoptes, sous reserve de la decision que prendra finalement le Conseil sur rensemble , du rapport. ". consider them as adopted, subject to the Council's final decision on the report as a whol~. Le PRESIDENT: Le chapitre 11 traite de la corn- '. p9~i1iQI1.clesfor~es armees. , ' The PRESIDENT ('translated from French): _ Chanter. 1I .~deals.withthe_comDosition·of .the ·arin~d f~r~~. -- --~. c - Le President donne lecture des a~ides 3~t 4r-c.".j. (chapitre 11). ' The President read articles 3 and 4 (chapt~r Il). Le PRESIDENT: Y a..t-ildes observations sur ces deux articles? Puisqu'il n'y en pas, je considere ces Si nous procections rexamen article par article, .,

Are there any observations on these two articles? " As there are not, I shall consider them as adopted. The President read articles 5 and 6 (chap" ter Ill).

The Soviet delegation has made a reservation re" garding articles 7 and 8. in connexion with the decision to be taken on article 11: I am therefore asking now for your views on only articles 5 and 6. In accordance with our decision, articles 7 and 8 will be referred to a later meeting. Le PRESIDENT: Les articles 7 et 8 font l'objet d'une reserve de la part de la delegation sovietique,en relation av~c la dec.lsion a prendre pour ' l'article 11. .le ne vous demande donc actuellement vos observations eventuelles qu'en ce qui conceme les articles 5 et 6. Comonnement a la decision que nous avons prise, l'examendes ar" tides 7 et 8 est renvoye a uneseance ulMrieure. Colonel HODGSON (Australia) : TheAustralian delegation desires.to speak on article 5. This was the article to which we referred in our statement durIng the general deba,te.1 We 3aid th.~n that it was surprising for this aitid1to state: "Themoral weight and the potenti~lp(,wer . • . will be very great, and this fact will dir'ectly influence the size of the armed forces required." Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduitde l'anglais): La delegation de l'Australie desire prendre la parole au sujet de I'article 5. C'est l'artic1e dont nous avons parM dans notre dec1a" ration au i::ours de la discussion generale\ NOris avons dit alors qu'il etait :surprenant de constater que cet article declare: "... aural'appui d'1llle autorite morale et d'un potentiel immense. Ce f~it aura une repercussion directe surl'importaJlce des forces armees necessaires". Si nous prenons le terme "milita.ire~' dans son sens le plus large, c'est-a-dire s'appliquant a la mer, a la terre et a I'~ir, il nous semble qu'iln'y ait pas du tout la·de principe militaire. OI).peut qll~:­ lifier l'article 5 de lieu commun pompeux, mais, . a nos yeux, en tant qu~ principe sur lequel determiner les effectifs des forces armees, il est denue de substance. Again, the "moral weight" will vary infinitely D'ailleurs, l' "autorite morale" pourra varier a and according to circumstances; it will vary ac- I'infini suivant les circanstances; elle variera suicording to the size and nature of the armed forces vant les effectifs et la nature des forces armees at the disposal of the United Nat,ioDS; it will vary ~es a la disposition des Nations Unies; eUe va-· according to their distribution; it will depend on riera sUivant leur repartition;. elle dependra de la the nature of the aggression; it will depend on the nature de l'agression; eUe dependra de l'effectif size of the forces of the potential aggressor against des forces armees de l'agresseur eventuel contre whom the United Nationsforc,es areto be usi::d. . qui les forces armees des Nations Unies devront etre employees. Therefore, we should ill..~ that article to be re- Nous aimerions donc que le Comite d'etatconsidered by the Military Staff Committe~ with major procedat a un nouvel examen de cet article, a view to adding, at the end of the article, a en vue d'ajouter a la fin de l'article la phr-ase sui"' phrase reading "which, however, .must be adevante: "... qui, cependant, devront correspondre quate for the task assigned to it by the Security a l'importance de la mission que le Conseil de se:' Coullcil for the maintenance or restoration of incurite leur assignera pour le maintien ou le reta" Usingthe word Hmilitary" in the broadestsense, that is, to cover sea, land, or air, it seems to us that this is not a military principle at all" You may call "article .5 a pious platitude but, to our minds, it has no substance as a principle on which the size of the forces is to be determined. te~national peace and security". The article will blissement de la paiX et de la securite intematiothen be a military principle.' nales". AIors, cet article contiendra un principe militaire. . However, to say that the moral weight will de- Quoi qu'H en soit, dire que l'autorite morale termine the size of the forces required ;,S not, in determinera l'effectif des forces necessaires n'est our opinion, a military principle. I suggest that pas, a llotre avis, un principe militaire. Jestime the present text is not adequate, 'an4 that it is not que le,texte actuel ne convient pas et qu'il n'est definite enough; I cannot see how it is going to be pas assez precis; je ne vois pas comment, dans a guide. to any future military staff committee at l'avenir, un comite d'etat-major pOurra s'enservir the time when that committee has to work out comme guide lorsqu'il devra computer les e1Iectifs the size of the forces for a particular task, if it is necessaires a une mission donnee etqu'il se tr()uconfronted with an imponderable such as is set vera devant un imponderable co:nnne celuiqui out in the present draft of article 5. I would therefigure au present texte de l'article 5. Je demande Cc' Mydclegation does not find in article 5 the Ma deleg~iionne voitpas dans.l'iuticle5ceque implication which Mr. van Langenhove feels is M. van Langenhove estirne y av6irtrouve: c'est~a", present; that is, that the Military Staff Committee dire que le Comite d'etat-rpajory arrive ala con- .. .has concluded that the armed forces made availelusion ql1e les forces-armeesnrises a la disposition able to the Security Council may not be used in du Conseil de securite ne perivent pas etre utillsees case ol aggression by one of the great Powers. It . en cas d'agression partl~e desgrandes Puissances. does not appear to us that article 5· is fairly sus- .11 n~nous semble pas que l'article5 se pretea c.eptible of that interpretation. I £houl4.like tb, 'cetteinterpretation. J'aimerais ajout.et quela delestate that the United States delegation to the gation des Etats-Unis au Comite d'etat-major Military Sta.q Committee shares these views. '.partage cette opinion.· . . Article5,asitappearstous,isasimpleaffirma- L'article 5; a notre avis, n'est que la simple tion of an obvious fact. Article 5 was unanimously affirmation d'un fait evident. Le Comite d'etatagreed to by the Military Staff Committee, and major a accepte cet article al'unanimite et ma my delegation hopes that itwillbe'unanimou-<;ly delegation espere que le Conseil desecurite fera accepted by the Security Council. de meme. '. Nor is my delegation able to share the appre- M2 delegation ne partage pas non plus les I h~nsion voiced by the representative of Australia. craintes exprimees par le representa):lt de l'Aus- It seems to us that article 5 must be read in contralie. 11 nous semble que cetartic!e 5 doit etre junction with article 6 and, when that is done, in considere conjointement avec I'article 6 et, a notre Oui' view,any substance in the objection raised by avis, lorsqu'on aura procede a cet examtn conthe representative of Australia will be met when .joint, I'objection forrnulee par le representant de thos~two articles are considered together. l'Australiedisparaitra completemer:t. Mr. EL-KlIotflU (Syria) : It is evidentthat the Military Staff Committee, before starting to determine the size of armed forceS, should take into consideration certain factors wHich would/be used as a b.asis of measurementfor~the overall strength . ofthose forces, and to what extent the latter would-be required. In fact, there are only two a.rticles in chapter III which give certain bases ot . M. EL-KHoURI (Syrie) (traduit de l'anglais): Il est evident. qu'il conviendrait que le Comite .d'etat-major, avant de commencer a detenr.iner I'effectif des forces armees, prit en consideration certains facteurs pouvant servir a evaluer l'effectif total de ces forces et jusqu'a quel point ces dermeres seront necessaires. En fait, il n'y a, au chapitre HI, que deux articles qui fournissent certainesbases de computati m. L'article 5 ditsimplement que "toutedecision ... du IComeil de securite ... aura l'appui d'une autorite morale et d'un potentiel immense". Comme le representant de l'Australie vient de le declarer, ce qui est uniquement d'ordre moral n'aurait en pratique aucun effe\':. Je penseque cet appui ne serait d'aucun poids pour Ccqui est del'emploi dela force. Nous savons que l'appui d'une autorite morale nationale, quand elle est mise auservice d'un pays oblige.de se defendre lui-meme, aurait sur le plan spirituel et sur le plan materiel un dIet plus puiSsa.nt que si 1'0n recourait a d'autres forces armees qui necombattent pas pour clles-memes, pour leur pay(l ou pour leurs interets immediats. Je ne pense pas que cet article puisse servir de base pour calculerl'effectif des forces armees a mettre a la dispositiondu Conseil de securite. m~asureinent. i\rticle 5 is, simply "the. moral weight and the potential power 'behind any decision"of the Security Council. What is altogether moral would have no . practical effect, as' the Australian representative has.just stated. I do not think tha.t this would have anyweightin regard to 'the use of force.. Wekn.owthat national moral weight, when it isincorporated in theself~defenceofany nation, would include stronger morals and a stronger effect than when other forces are. used which are not defending themselves, their country andtheir direct interests. I do nof consider this article to. be a factor which can serve as a'basis of.measurement· for th~ size of the armed forces to be put at the'disposal of the Security Council. There is a basis of measureInent in article 6, .which is simply that the forces "shall be limited to' a s.,trength sufficient to enable the Security L'article 6 fournit, lui, une certainebase d'estimation en declarant simplement que les forces armees "seront limitees a la p'uissance suffisante. I '138eme seance. '.Toir lesProces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securite, Deuxieme Annee, No 43. . __",4 b : M. JOIINsoN(:Etats-Q~ d'~eri~ue) (trl1~ duit de fanglais} :'n seDlble~,Ill~ delegation que ceqwsf'passe al'heure actuelIeau Comite d'etatmaj'Drrepondparfaitementa la proposition du l'epresentant de la Syne. Si je ne me trompe, le Comite" d'etat-major est prec~ementen' train d'etudier cette,.question etses travl:J.ux seraient facilites s'il pouvaitobtenirl'approbati(>1l du C!Jn"': seil sur 'les articles dece chapitre; c,,?la lui fom-- wait un point de depart qui lui permettrait dce continuer son,travail ayec assurance. I would suggest a dlaffingcbange in aftieIe cb Je propose de modifier la redaction'de l'article , whio'h'wouldstrengthenitandimprovethemean;.-6pour lUi do:htrerplusdef6t~eet.'de~clarte:'ilm:e'·.c~ iug. In the second line, the words "shall' be Emsemble que ce serait une amelioration-de rempla':' ited to", as applied to the armedforces, might,.jt ~ei;a la deuxiemeligne, les m.qts "limitees. ala''' :seems 1:0 me, be improved hy,omittingthe wetds par lemot,,"de",cequi donnerait la phrasesm.. "limited to" and inserting the word "of", sothat vante.:,"LesJorces armees mises a la disposition du the sentenc~ would read, "The ,armed ,f9tces Conseil' de securite pa,r les Nations Membres de made available to the SeCurity COcundl by Iv.iem-l'Orgapisation des NAtions Uniesseront de puis-' ber nations of the United Nations shall b~()f a sa,nce suffisante ...'~, ceq,ui feraitdisparaltrede strength sufficient ...", instead,of £eeming-,t3 put l'article l'apparence d'UI1e. idee negative. n est a :negative idea in the article. That niight possib~y possible que cettesolution donne satisfaction aux go some way to meet the views of,the representa- 1representants,qui ont exprime une certaine inql~e­ tives who have expressed some concern about this tude au sujet decet article. Ma delegation est article. That small change, it-appears to my deled'avis que ce petit changement donneraitplus de gation, would strengt.benarticle,~. force a l'article 6. . Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America): It .appearsto:tny delegation thattl,1esuggestion made by therepresentative of Syria is, in fa.ct,1:,eingmet bythe presentsituation in the:MilitaryStaff Committee. As I understand it, the" Milital1' Staff Committee is now studying that very question. Its work wetlld be facilitated if it could obtain the Councii'sapprovalof the articles,in this chapter; this wGrild give the,Committee a basis OH which to proceed With confidence. Mr. GROMYKO (tJiUon of Soviet Socialist Re- M. GROMYKO (Union des Rcpubliques sopublics) (translateil trom Russiaf!-): It seems to cialistes sovietiques) (traduit du,russe): n me me that chapter IH, article 5 of the MilitaryStaff semble que l'article 5,chapitre Ill, du rapport Committee's report is well formulated, and there du Comite d'etat-major est redige d~ fa~on satisis no need, in my opinion, to alter the text. Must faisante, et il n'est pas necessaire, a mon avis, we, in fact, take into consideration the qualitative d'en modifier le texte. Eneffet, devons-nous character of the armed forces put at the disposal prendreeIil consideration la va}eur qualitative dt'.s of the Security Council? The Soviet delegation forces armeesmises ala disposition du Conseil de thinks that we should. This question has two assecurite? La delegationsovietique estime que oui. pects:aquantitativeand a qualitative, and tl1e Cette question a deux-aspedf:iUn aspect quanquantitative undoubtedly depends partly on thetitatit~=~aspect qualitatif, re premier etantsans qualitative aspect of this question. The very fact nul doute so:bordQJ:!!1e au second, du moins en that the armed forces put at the disposal of the pame. Le seul fait quel~force§armees misea a la Security Council by the United Nations are the disposition .du Conseil de securite'par-Ies..:N'£l.tions a.rmed forces not of an individual State but the Unies n'appartiennent pas a un seul pays iriais', a.rmed forces at the disposal of the Security dependent du Conseil de securite - ce.seul fait, Council-this very fact gives these forces a pardis-je, confere a ces forces uneautorite particuticular, specific weight. This fact, I think, cannot liere. n me semble que c'est la un Clement indebe denied; this fact must be taken into account. niable qu'il y a lieu de prendre en consideration. rrn ---------~~--------' the~edforces putatthe disposal of the Security Council, indudenot only, atld notso much, milit~uy.techtrlca1, ias military-political factors. In any f;ase,both.themllitary-technicaland the Inilitarypolitical>aspects of th!s1!f9hl~mare united in the .'ba,sicprinciples;thatTswhythey are called: "Gen-. : eral principles governing the organization of the " armed forc~ madeavallable to the S~curity Council by Member nations of the United NatiollS".· - This:, then, is the basicreas~n for keeping the wording in the form agreed upon'by the Military Staff Oommittee. In addition, ~ the United States representative. has already pointed out, article5·shouldbe cOn$dered inconn~xionwith article 6r whichstates that "the armedforces made . 'av~ilab!e to the,SecuritY,Council by Member na- ~tioilSofthe,unitedNatioIlSshall he limited to a str~gth sUfficient~'-let me stress that word~ "slifficient to enable the Security Council to. take , • '" t prompt action ..•' e c. 6~andthai is the only way they should be con~ et 6, et c'est bien ainsi qu'il faut proceder car iIs sidered, since, one supplements the,'other-then se completent, nous n'apercevrons pas, il me sem- ;W~csh~not,}tseeIIlSt()me, ..find that.oInissioll_bJe, lalacune dont a, parle le representant de :'referrecrtoDy---rh~-AtrstralianTepresentattve.:Both '1'Australie.-Vun 'et'l'autre de cesarticlesrepond of theg~ articles provide, on the whole, a fairly dent assez pleinement aux considerations de rar- 'fuU defmition -of'the criterion dealt with in article tide 5 et a l'importance de ces considerations dans -5, ~,well as. showing the importance of this· crila, determination, quantitative des forces armecs terion in determining the qUflntitative strength of mises a la disposition du Conseil de securite. .thearmed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Jen'estime pas qu'il soit necessaire de modifier le texte de l'artic1e 6, ainsique l'a propose le representant'des Etats-Unis. Cette modifjcation ne -se- :raitpas soubaitable, a mon sens, puisqu'en l'adoptant nous ad~ettrionsla necessite pour leConseil de securite de disposer de forces armees d'une importance numerique considerable,alors que ce n'est pas sur ce point-la que le tex.te du Comite d'etat-major attire notre attentioll; en d'autres termes, ce texte n'insiste pas sur la necessite pour le Conseil de securite de disposer de forces al'Illces d'une importance nqmerique considerable, mais, tout au contraire, il indiqueque l'importance nu- . merique des forces armeesmises ala disposition du Conseil de securite doit etre limitee, bien que suffisante pour'permettre au Conseil d'entreprendre une action rapide en tout point du globe en vue du maintien de la. paix. Je souligne encore une fois cette disposition: ~"s1:1ffisante pour permettre .au Conseil de securite d'eritreprendre uneaction rapide en tout point du globe ..."TI me semble que cette redaction combine de fa~on satisfaisante les deux aspects dont nOllS devons tenir compte: d'une part, la necessite de placer a la disposition du Conseilde securite des forces armees d'llne .n. .' .......h. ..._zt1 I do notthink there is any need to a.1terthe text of article 6, as suggested here ,by the United --'States represenlative;-Inmy opu:uon, such an alteration is undesirable, since its adoption would '='~ean'accentuating the, need for armed forces of considerable size to be made available to the Security Council, whereas tlte worcijng approved by the Military Staff Committee draws our attention not to this aspect of the question, ie., the necessityof placing armed forces of considerable numerical strength at the disposal of the Security Council, but, on the contrary, to the necessity of making available tu the Security Council armed t >rces limited in numerical strength but sufficient to enable 'the Security Council to take the prompt action needed for the maintenance .of peace", I stress this clause: "sufficient to enable the Security Council -to take prompt action in any -part of the world ..." It seems to me that this formulation $uccessfullycombines the ~wo aspects which we have to consider: on the one hand, the need fCir placing comparatively small armed forces at the disppsal of'the Security Council, and,.on the other, the need for making available armed forces of a numerical strength sufficient to enable=the- It see"lS to me that the wording agreed upon by the Military Staff Committee' is well-chosen;' 'and the Soviet delegation considers that it should be preserved. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): I should just like to clarify this point. Those of us who were at the Paris Conference have in mind that·representatives other .than the permanent •. members . were confronted ·with articles, which· had been agreed upon. I hope that the position taken there is not going to be followed here, If we are told that this article. has/been agreed upon, that nothing we say or do,is going to alter it, if that is the attitude which j.s going to be taken by the perma~ nent members, we' might as well just put one simple motion. We hope that is :Q.ot the case. ~a position prise acett~ Q~nferenc'..e ne se repetera pas ici. Si l'onnous dit que cetarticly eatrlefmi.. tivement arrete, que rien de ce que ilOUS pOUVOJlS dire ou faire ne le rnodifiera, si telle est l"attitude queveulent adopter le.s me!l1bres permartents, l'on pourrait tout aussi bien nous presenter une seule motion. Nous esperop.s que tel n'estpas le cas. In the only remarks that have been.mad,e by Dam les seules reinarques qui ant ae fait~par two permanent members, VIe· are told that we deux membres permanents,.·i1 nous aete illt que should read articles 5 and 6together. If that isso, ' nous devrions lire cCllljointtmient l~ articles 5 et I can appreciate some of the reasons for the de- ,6. Si tel estre cas, je puiscomprendre certaines des lay. That seems to me confused thinking. Article raisons duretard. Mais c'estIa, me semble-t-il, 6should really come first in this repolt, because it un raisonnement confus. En l'ealite, C'M l'artic1e deals with the armed. forces made available to 6 qui devrait venir en premier lieu .dans cera~ the Security Council by Member natioDs .asa port, car il traite de l'e:ilsembl~ des forces arm&:s whole. That is one distinct·concep~,__al1the .. rn.isesaladispositiondllCoIlSeJLc;J&,SeftUit~p~_, -armed forces asa whole~'But article 5 is an en- -1esNitions Mem])r~ aeiNatlons Unies;, C'est la tirely different matter because it deals with a une notion distincte: l'ensemble de toutes les fordecision to employ a particular force on a par-ces armees. Mais l'article 5 est totalement diffeticular task. How can we read both articles torent, parce qu'i! traite d'une decision tendant a gether, and how are they connected? mettre .en reuvre une force p~culiere pour accomplir une mission detenninee..Comment pourrions-nous considerer ces delJX articles cQnjointement et comment se relient-iIs? LOfl"4ue no~ dcc~dons, en ,taut qu'organisme militaire, de remplir une mission particuliere, on nousdit d'employer la force morale comtne un facteur d'evaluation pour°estimer l'impqrtance de nos forc~, au lieu de nous fonder sur un principe militaire. Le representant de l'Union ~ovietiqueme dit ensuite que nous devrions tenir compte des facteurs qualitatifs. Je vous renvoiea l'article 4: c'est apropos de ce texte qu'il semble s'etre produit au sein du Comite d'etat-major une cd'nfusion dans les termes. Parlant en ma qualite d'officier d'etatmaJor ayant de nombreuses annees de service, je dirai que l'artic1e 4 est qualitatif, parce qu'il precise que les forces armees mises a la disposition du Conseil de securite ~~sont preleveessur les unites les mieux entralnees et equipees ..." Voila le facteur qualitatif. Mais il n'y a aucun facteur q~alitatif dans l'article !?; il y a un facteuruniquement moral. Je voudrais entendre les vuea'des autres membres permanents avant que le Conseil ne passe ala .question suivante. Je demande de nouveau que le Comite d'etatmajor procede a Un nouvel examen ~e I'article 5 When we are deciding, as a military body, on a particular task, we are told to use the moral far~tor as. an assessment to illdicate the size of our force, instead' of having a military principle. :rh~n I am told by the Soviet representative that we should t.ake into account the qualitative 'factors. I refer you back to article 4; that is where there seems to be a confusion of terms in the Military Staff Committee. Speaking personally, as a staff officer of many years' standing, I find alticle 4 qualitative because itsays that theforces shall be made available "from the best trained and equipped units". There is the qualitative factor. But there is no qualitative factor whatsoever in article 5. That is purely a moral factor. I should like to hear the views of the other permanent members before the Council passes on to the next point. I restate my request-and I am fully in accord with what the representative of Syria states-'that article 5 should be given furtrz.,------.........-...............~~~~~~~~~-~~~~ Le .colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l)anglais): Je voudraissimplement eclairdr ce point. Geax d'entr~nollS qui ont assiste ala Conference de Paris se souviennent que lerrerrresen~ tants desuays autres que1es m.embrespeimanefi~' du Consell se sont trouves en presjmce d'artides' sur lesqueIs l'accord s'etait deja fait..J'espere que With regard to article 5 as it stands at present, the Australian representative may be right in reproaching the Military Staff Committee for oc- . cupying'itseH with moral weight. But I suppose that this article was included primarily with the object of explaining to those criticg.-there might becrities who would say that the force proposed was inadequatefor all the purposes that might be assigned to it-that the UnitedNations,once enga~d· in any action,'is committed ultimately to the employment of the whole of its potential, and, therefore,that the force, though.it might seem small and inadequate, is notso in fact, because ithas behindit the whole potential of the United NatiQns, iIlcluding the permanent members of the Security COJillcil. Mr. HSIA (China) : I should like to say a few words on article 5. The view of the Chines~ delegation is very much similar to the one expressed by those who desire to maintain the present wording. I think there is a slight.misapprehension on the part of those who wish to have this artide amended. Our interpretation of this art;ic1e is that there are two principles enunciated here by the Military Staff Committee to determine the overall·strength; ~ Surely, this is an important principle contained in articleS. Suppose the Security Council and the United Nations had net been in existence; what sort offorce would be required to maintain peace andsecurityin the world? The kind of force would have to be considerably larger than is anticipated here. ·The force envisaged here would be muc::h smaller'.than otherwise requi.'ea because of this fact of moral weight and the potential power be~ hind any.decision, which would be very great. For s'effor~ait d'aprimer dans l'amendement qu'il a propose a l'article 5. Je ne crois pas me tromper, .~~ e.lfet, en disw~tqu'il proposllt· d'ajouter ala fin de l'article 5 la phrase suivante: "laquelle, toutefois, doit etre suffisante pour remplir 1~ tache que lui aura fixee le Conseil de securite pour le maintien ou le retabli~ement de la paix et de m. . securite internationales". Cette idee, certes, est contenue dans l'article 6, qui declare que les forces annees mises a la disposition du Conseil "seront limitees a la puissance suffisante pour permettre au Conseil de securite d'entreprendre une action rapide en tout point du globe pour le maintien ou le retablissement de la paix et de la securite internationales..." Je pense done qu'en fait l'article 6 accomplit ce que le~ representant de l'Austra.lie voulait faire au moyen de la formule.qu'il proposait d'inserer. En ce qui concerne l'artic1e 5 dans sa forme actuelle, il se peut que le representant de l'Austra.lie ait raison de reprocher au Comite d'etat-major de se preoccuper de l'autorite morale. Je suppose toutefois que cet article a ete insere avec l'objet essentiel d'expliquer aux esplits critiques - il se pe~t qu'il y en ait parmi eux qui disent que les forces proposees sont insuffisantes pour remplir toutes les missions qui pourraient leur etre assignees - que l'Organiation des Nations Dnies, des qu'elle a entrepris une action que1conque, est en definitive obligee d'employer tout son potentie1 et par consequent que ces forces, bien qu'elles puissent paraitre faibles et insuffisantes, ne le sont pas en realite, parce qu'elles ont derriere elles tout le potentiel des Nations Unies, et ceci comprend les membres permanents du Conseil de securite. M. HSIA (Chine) (traduit de l'anglais): Je voudrais dire quelques mots a propos de l'article 5. L'opinion de la delegation de la Chine est tres semblable a celle des membrC$ qui ant exprime le desir de s'en tenir a la presente redaction. Je crois qu'il y a un leger malentendu de la part de ceux qui veulent que l'on amende cet article. Notre interpretation de cet article est que le 00- mite d'etat-major a formule ici deux principes pour determiner la puissance d'ensemble des forcesarmees. Certes, c'est un principe important que contient l'article 5. En supposant que le Conseil de securite et l'Organisation des Nations Dnies n'existassent pas, de quelles forces aurait-on besain pour maintenir la paix et la securit6 dans le monde? De telles forces devraient etre considerablement plus irnportantes que cellesqu'envisagele texte en question. Les forces envisagees iei pourraient etre beaucoup plus faibles qu'i! ne le faudrait du fait meme de la tres grande autorite......... In other words, our interpretation is that this is oneoLthetwopri_'lciple.s, the second ofwmch is contained in article 6.

As the Australian representative has asked'the permanent members of the Council to make their views known, I, as the representative of FRANCE, shall explaip my understanding of the matter. Article 5 and 6 are a statement of ge~eral principles; they.simply contain gen~ral indications, which the Military Staff Committee has placed at the beginning of this chapter, of the course which it intends to follow-and which it is indeed already following-in determining the overall strength of the l".rmed forces. It might have been possible to word these two articles differently; there are always different ways of expressing the same idea. The important point to decide, howeyer, is whether these ideas are right. These ideas strike me as being right, and it seems to me that it was useful to express them. Le PRESIDENT: Puisque le representant de'" l'Australie a demandeaux membres permanents du Conseil de faire connaitre leur opinionten ma qualite de representant de la FRANCE j'indiquerai ma mani~rede voir. Les. articles 5 et6 posent des principes generaux; ils renferment simplement des indications generales que le Comite d'etat-major a placees en tete de ce chapitre pour montrerles conditions dans lesquelles il entend poursuivre - et, en realite, dans lesquelles il pOUrsuit des maintenant -le travail relatif a la.determination de la puissance d'ensemble des forces armees. Des redactions differentes de ces deux artic1essont concevables: .des redactions differentes sont toujours possibles pour exprimerune meme idee..Ce que nous .devons surtout prendre.·en consideratioIl, ..c'est le point de savoir si ces idees sont justes. Or, elles me paraissent justes d'une part, ..et, d'autre part, je crois qu'il·etaitutile·de~lesfofmuler. L'article 5 fait etat d'une remarque gene.rale qui, en effet, a des repercussions sur la determination de la puissance des forces armees.qu'il est utile de mettre a la disposition des Nations Unies. Cet, article aurait peut':'etre pu etre redige de maniere a exprimer que, pour determiner la 'puissance cl'ensemble des forcesarmees a mettre a la disposition des Nations Unies, il seraittenu compte de la consideration que toute decision qui les mettrait,en jeu aurait l'app~ d'uneautorite morale et cl'un potentiel immense. Mais c'est 'la la meme idM,.et,cette idee m.e parait ,<:"xacte. . De mcme,Ja formule employee dans l'a,rticle 6 me paraiLexai::te. Certes, elle aurait pu etre ~e sous, une forlrie positive au lieu d'une fOrme negative; ce serait, a mon av,is, unemei1leure redacti.on. En tout 'cas, les principes exprimes dans les deux articlesme para'issent des principes justes. Ces deux articles ontdeja fait l'objet de discus., sions, probablement de. longuesdiscussions, ,au sein du Comite d'etat-major. Dans le dcbat general, il est apparuquele Comite d'etat-major avait eu ,besoin d'un long delai pour preparer son rapport. Je crois,personnellement, qu'ilyaurait daIls le cas present, un inconvenient a renvoyer ces articles a l'examen du Comite d'etat-mrAjor. Celui-ci est maintenant engage dans un travail pr€.cis, Il n.ous faut eviter de le retarder, sauf si, .vraiment, un nouvel examen de certainsartic1es s'irnposait. Mettle en ce cas, me semble-t-il, il nous appar- Article 5 contains a general remark, which has a bearing on the determination of the .overall strength of the armed. forcesto be made available to the United Nations. This article might, perhaps, have been worded in such a way as to indicate that, in determining the overall strength of the armed forces to be made available to the United Nations, account would be taken of the fact that any decision to employ.these forces would have very great moral weight and potential power behind it. But this conveys the same idea, which seems to me to be perfectly correct. The wording of article 6 also seems exactto me. Admittedly, it might have bec.'ll worded in a, positive rather than a negative form; in fact, I think that would have been preferable. In any case, in my opinion, the.principles expressed.in these two articles are correct. These two articles have already been discussed, and probably extensively discussed, by the Military Staff Committee. The general debate revealed that it took the Military Staff Committee a long time to prepare this report. I, personally, feel that in the present case it 'Would be undesirable to return these articles to the Military Staff Committee for consideration. The latter is at present engaged on a precise task. We shQuld avoid delaying it, unless it is absolutdynecessary to have certain articles re-examined. Even in such a case, it would be advisable to indicate to the'Military b Mr. v4N ~GENHOVE (Belgium) (translated Jrom Frenc!],)!: The observations of thepermanent member~ of the Security Council have, to a certain extent, defined the scope of articles 5 and 6. I refer particularly to the remarks of the United StatesrepresenLJ.tive in .reply to my question. Moreover, in my opinion, the amendment proposed by the United States representative improves the wording of article 6. If this amendment is put to the vote, I intend to vote in favour of it, on behalf of the Belgian delegation. I feel, however, that article 6 is somewhat ambiguous, and I should like this clarified II possible. Article 6 states:' "The armed forces made available to the Security Council by Member nations'.•.•" This-is Lite s~me .e."C.pression as'is used in Article 43 of the Charter, but in this case it seems to be used in a different sense. Article 43· of the Charter envisages.a concrete case of disturbance of the peace or aggression and a decision by the 'Council calling on the United Nations to place their forces at its disposal,'whereas article 6 of the report refers rather to armedforces heldinreserve in virtue of special agreements, in order to be placed at the Security Council's disposal should the latter call for them. , If my interpretation is correct, I feel that it tnlght be inadvisable to' use the same ,terms to' convey_two different meaninL1. In' any case, I should like to know, if possible, whether my interpretation of artide6 is correct. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): I am not quite sure that I understand the diffi- 'culty of the representative of Belgium. He seems td think, that the expression "made available", ,which occurs in article 6, is used ina different con- . nexion from that in which the words ."m~e available" are used in Article 43 of the Charter. As I understand it, Article 43 of the Charter does not'contemplate the case of forces made available for_any particular action; it.deals, with . forces]i1ade available to the Security Council "on its eaU and in accordance with a special agreement ,or agreements ..." Therefore,I take it M. VAN ,LANGENHOVE (Belgique): Les observations que les membres permanents du Conseil de securite ont bien voulu formuler ont precise, dans Ul?,e certaine mesure, la portee des articles 5 et 6. Jevise particulierement les observations faites par le representant de.s Etats.:.Unis en reponse a une question que j'avais moi-meme posee. D'autre part, I'amendement suggere.par le representant des Etats-Unis ameliore, a mon avis, la 1'erlaction de l'a,rticle 6. Si cet amenqement est mis aux voix, je me propose, au nom de la delegationbelge, de voter en sa faveur. n.me semble cependant qu'il subsiste dans rarticle 6 une certaine ambiguite que je ~ouhaiterais eclaircir, si cela est possible. L'artic1e 6 dit endIet: "Les forces armees mises a la disposition du Conseil de securite par les Etats ~embres; .."Ilreprend ainsi l'expl'ession qui figure a l'Article 43 de la Charte, mais il semble l'employer dans un sens different. En dIet, rArticle 43 de la Charte vise un cas concret de rupture de lapaix ou d'agression et une decision du Conseilinvitant les Nations Unies a IDf.ttre des forces a sa disposition, tandis.que I'article 6 du rapport viseplutot lel? forces armees tenUe3 en reserve par les accords speciaux pour, ~tre mises ala disposition du Conseil de securite sur sa demande. Si mpn interpn5tation est exacte, il me semble qu'il.pourrait yavoir quelque inconvement a employer les memes termes dans des sens differents. l'aimerais .en tout cas,'si cela est possible, savoir si I'interpretation que' j'ai donnee de l'article 6 est correcte. ' Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduitde l'anglais,): Je ne suispas tout a fait,certain de comprendre ladifficulte a laqueUe se hetirte le representant de la Belgique. Il semble croire que I'expression "mises a.ladisposition", qui figure a l'artic1c 6, est employet(dans un sem different de Gelui de l'expression "mettre a la disposition" qui figure a I'Article 43 de la Charte. A mon sens, l'Article 43 de la Charten'envisage pas le cas de forces armees lTIises a la disposition du Conseil, de securite en vue d'une'action determinee; il concerne les forces arinees misesa la disposition du Conseil de securite "sur son invitation et conformement aTin accord special ou a des accords speciaux. . ." En consequence, j'estirlleque la phrase employee acetegard dans.......l

I Le PRESIDENT: Je crois egalement, pour ma also think that the forces held in reserve, as the part, que les forces mises en reserve, suivant rex- Belgian representative puts it, would be those pression dll representantde la Be1gique, sont pr~ which would be made available for any particucisement celles qui interviendraient dans un cas lar action. The strength of the forces to be made· 'particulier. n s'agit de determiner d'avance le available to the Security Council in case of neces-· cadredes forces quiseraientmises ala dispositi()u sity should be determined in advance. I therefore du Comeii· de'securite pour eke utiIisees.le caS feel that there is no need to make the distinction ecneant. A mon sens, donc, il n'y a paslieu d'etasuggested by Mr..van Langenhove, but, of course, blir la distinction faite par M. van Langenhove, I may be IIiistaken. .mais je me tromI:e peut-etre. M; VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgique): D'apres les termes de I'Article 43 de la Charte, il me sernblait que, pour que des forces fussent mises ala disposition du Conseil de securite, il fallait une invitation du Conseil en ce sens; de sorte que, pour ma part, je suis porte a envisager deux stades: le pren;rier stade est celui des accords speciaux en vertu desquels des forces sont mises en reserve .pour etre utilisees; au second stade, sur invitation Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) ('translated from French): It seems tn me that, under the terms of Articl~ 43 of the Charter, in order that arnied forces s40uld be placed at the disposal of the Security Council, a request to that effect would first have to be made by the Council. I, therefore, envisage two'stages: the· first stage is that ofthe speCial agreements un,der which forces would be placed in reserve for use as needed; in #le second stage, these forces could be used to deal with a concrete case, if called u,pon by the Security Council. •Therefore,articIe6, which we are considering, does not envisage a sp~cific case; it envisages all cases which might arise.

The discussion started by the Belgian representativeis. important. We must dear up this point, since.it b~arson the exact meaningofArticle 43 of the Charter. . . According to my interpretation, this Article appears to mean that the Security Council, on the basis of special agreements entered into at its suggestion·by a number of countries,. would be able to determine in advance what forces would be at its disposal, should the necessity arise. In order to, make use of these forces, the Security Council would have to pronounce a decision in each separate instance: .a decision, and not an invitation. As the agreements~would have been concluded in advance, I think that ~a decision of the Security Council would be sufficient. Moreover, article 18 6f the Military Staff Committee's report states that for~es will be used "by the decision of,the Security Council". " . . . Therefore, my interpretation of Article 43; at least ofthe expression"on its call", is not the same as that of the Belgian representative. According to Mr. van Langenhove'sinterpretation,•indeed, the Security Council would have to make a fresh call before the forces at· the disposal of the United Nations could be used. In my opinion~ this is. not so.As1 understand it, Article 430£ the Charter determines .'beforehand the forces which migr,; be placed.at the Security Council's.disposal, ai"u which, according to Mr. van.Langenhove, would be only forces ~ept in reserve. . d~ .~onseil de securite1 ces forces pourront 'etre utilisees dans un cas concreto . Or, rarticle 6 que nous etudions ne vise pas un cas concret; il vise tous les cas qui peuvent se presenter. Le PRESIDENT: La discussion que vient d'amorcer le representant de la Belgique est import..ante. Nons devonselucider-ee point, pni.~u'i! vise le sens exact de l'Article 43 de la Charte-. .Tel que jecomprenais cet Article, il me paraissait signifier que le Conseilde securite, par dC!> accords speciaux. passes, sur son invitation, entre un certain nombre de pays, pourrait determiner d'avance les forces qui, le cas echeant, seraient mises asa disposition. Pour l'emploi de ces forces, une decision du Conseil de securite devra intervenir daDs chaque cas particulier: une decision, et non pas une invitation.· Les •accords ayant ete conclus d'avance, je crois qu'n doit suffire d'une decision du Conseil de securite. C'est d~ailleurs ce qui est dit a rartic1e 18 dA rapportdu Comite d'etat-major~oui! est precise que les forces serant utilisees "sur decision duConseil de securite"•. Par ·consequen~;mon..interpretation. de.1'Ar" tide 43, tdut au moins cellede l'expression."sur son invitation", n'est pas la memeque celledu representant de la Be1gique.Selcm l'interpretation deMo vanLangerihove,en dIet, il fawIrait, pour utiliser les forces mises ala ilispositiondes Nations Unies,une nouvelle invitation du Conseil de securite. Or, a mon avis, ce n'estpas le cas, 11 me semb}e que PArticle 43 de la Charte determine a l'avance les forces qui pourraient etremises ~ la dispositiondu Gonseil de securite et. qui,·· selon M. van Langenhove, ne.seraientque des forces mises en reserve.

I agre~ with Mr. van Langenhove on this point. Gentlemen, if there are no further remarks in connexion with these two articles, it only remains .for w to come to a decision on them. If ·1 ant·· not mistaken,-tlie' A-ustralian repre.,; sentative has suggested that article 5 he referred back to. the Military Staff Committee, and the Syrian representative has requested that article 5 and 6 \he similarly dealt with. The United States rc;:presentative has also proposed an amendment to article 6: he suggests that this article be given a positive form instead of the present negative one. I do not think there were any other proposals. Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America): I do not offer that as an amendment. It was intended only as a suggestion. The Soviet repre- .sentatiYf has objected to it, and I, therefore, do not desire to press that suggestion. Mr. LANGE (Poland): I think that 1t is the purpose of our meeting to arrive, if possible, at a unanimous opinion concerning our outstanding ,questions. Although I do not share the objections of the representative of Australia concerning articles5 and 6, I think that it is only fair to accept his suggestion and refer those:: articles to the Military Staff Co~ttee, with the understanding that the Military Staff Committee, in reviewing them, will take into account the discussions held in this Council. '

Perhaps I had betterput to the vote the Australian - •.and Syrian representatives' proposals. These were .~that articles 5and c6 shouldbe referred bacK to the Military Staff Commi~ee. Mt. GROMYKO '(Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 'publics)'~ Did they 'submit formal proposals on thesU'bject? 'TheI>REsIDENT (translated from French): I understoocithat two formal proposals were submitted, one by the Australian representative.and ,theotherbytheSyrianrepresentative, butperhaps I had better ask those representatives to confirm this. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): The. remarks made by the representative of Belgium indicated that there was a difference of view. I should like to repeat that article 6, in our opinion, showd have come first, because it deals with the overall .'strength and the general principle of all the forces; it is in-that article thatstress should be laid on the .moral'-factor, if considered necessary. Le PRESIDENT: Sur ce point, je suis d'accord , avec M. van Langenhove. Messieurs, s'il n'est plus fait d'observations sur ces deux articles, il nous reste a prendre une decicision a Ieur egard. '····Sij'aibien'cornpris; ndus. sdnimesa;ctueliemeri.C~= en presence d'une demande de renvoide I'article 5 au Comite d'~tat-major, faite par le representant de l'Australie, et d'une demande de renvoi des articles 5 et 6, emanant du representant de la Syrie. 11 y a d'autre part un amendement a la redaetion de I'article 6 propose par le representant des Etats-Unis:une forme positive serait donnee a cet article au lieu de sa forme negative actuelle. . Je ne crois.pas qu'il y ait d'autres propositions. M. JOHNSON (Etats-UI1is d~Amerique) (traduit de I'anglais) : Ilne s'agit pas la d'un amendemept~ mais d'une simple suggestion. Le representant de l'Union sovietique s'y est oppose; je ne desire done pas insister sur cette proposition. M. LANGE (Pologne,) (traduit de I'anglais) : J'estime que n<:itre reunion a pour hut d'aboutir, si possible, aobtel1ir l'unanimite des memhres au sujet de nos problemes essentiels. Bien que je ne' m'associe pas auxobjections elevees par le representant de l'Australie en ce qui concerne les articles 5 et 6, j'estime que I'on ne peut"qu'accepter sa proposition et renvoyer ces articles au Comite d'etat-major, etant hien entendu que ce dernier, lors de son examen, tiendra compte de nos debats. Le PRESIDENT: Peut-etre convient-il alors que je mette aux voix les propositions des representants de l'Australie et de la Syrie concernant le renvoi au Comite d'etat-major des articles 5 et 6? M. GROMYKO (Union des Repuhliques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit de I'anglais): Ontils presente de~ pi'opositions formelles a ce sujet? Le PRESIDP..:~U:.J'ai compris que deux propositions formelles avaient ete presentees, I'unepar le representant de l'Australie, l'autrepar le repre.. sentant de la Syrie. Je demandeeependanta, ceux-ci de hien vouloir nous eclairer eux-memesa cet egard. . , Le, colonel HODGSO:ri[ (Australie) (~raduit de ['anglais): Les remarqti~s faites par le representantde la BeIgique indiquaientqu'il y avait une divergence. d'opinions. Je· voudrais repeter que ran aurait ducommencer, a notre avis,pad'article 6, parce qu'il traitede la puissance d'eIlSemble et du principe general de toutes les forces armees; c'est dans cet article qu'il faudrait faire porter·l'accent sur le facteur moraI,si onle juge necessaire. What is the principle with regard to the size of Que! est le principe determinant l'importance that forceior a particular task? There is no indide cette force po~une ~iQp.d0n.nee? ll.n.'ya cation whatever. We say that the force shouldber aucune indicatioD.'8. -cet egara~: Nousdisons que· adequate. Therefore, we should ask for an ex-' ces forces doivent etre suffisantes. Par consequent, pression of views on this subject. Even if we ask nous devrions demander aux membres d'exprimer· the Military StlULf Committee to make a second leur opinion a ce sujet. Meme si nous demandons . examination hi. the light of our discussion here, an Comite d'etat-major de procedera 'Un nouvel we do not wish, as you suggest, unduly to prolong exameu en tenant compte de nos discussions, noU8... the matter. If the Committee finds that it cannot ne lui demandons pas, comme vons le Bugg~.rp;, reach agreement, it might well report back. We de faire trainer la question outre mesure. Si le should.be qwte satisfied as long as it did re-ex- Comite decouvre qu'il ne peut par,rernraun acamine the situation in the light of what has been cord sur cette question, il pOUIra faire un rapport said here. In order to obtain an expression of the en consequence. Nous nous estimerions satisfaits views of the members, we would ask you, Mr. s'il reexaminait effectivement la situation a la lu- President, to put th~ matter to a ~ote. miere de nos debats. En vue d'obtenir que les membres expriment leur opinion, nous vous demandons, Monsieur le President, de bien vouloir mettre la question aux VQix. , .

I feel that the Australian representative's statement calls for some explanation, since he seems to have put a different interpretation on article 5. I understand this article to mean that any deci- .sion of the Security Council to call,in a particular case, upon the international forces and upQnthe considerable potential which would be behind these armed forces, would carry great weight. Therefore, smaller forces might be held in reserve than would have been necessary without the moral weight attached· to the Security Council's decisions. This, moreover, applies also to all the .other ekments and facilities determined by the Military Staff Committee. But the moral authority attached to the decisions of the Security Council.should be relied. upon.oilly in order.to deter.., mine in advance the direction of the Military Staff Committee's work in determining the overall .strength of the fotces to be placed in reserve. . Le PRESIDENT: Il me semble que ceque vient de dire le representant de l'Australie appelle,un eclaircissement,caril parait yavoir une difference d'interpretation concernant Iesens de l'article5. ]ecomprends cet article comme signifiant que toute decision du ConseiJ. de securite mettanten jeu, dans un cas palticulier, desfor.ces interna,:, tionales' et l'importantpotentiel qui serait derriere ces forces, aurait uneautorite considerabIe. Pour cette raison, la determination.des forces a mettre . en reserve pourrait. etre faite ··en.tablant sur des forces inferieures a celles qui seraient necessaires sanscette consideration d'autoritemorale qui . s'attache aux decisions du COnSeilde securite. Cela d'ailleUI'!'~'appliqueegalementa l'ensemble des autres elements et facilites determines par le Comite d'etat-major. Maisl'autorite morale·des deCisions du Conseil de securite· ne doit etrere- . tenue que pourdonner a l'avance unedirection au travail, du Co'mit~ d'etat~majoren cequiconcerne la determination des.forces mises, seIon l'~-. pression employee, en reserve. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): Articles. 5 and 6,as Ksaid before, are intended to estab~h. certain bases for the. measure.ment of the size of the armed forces to b~ put at the disposal of the Security Council. According te the text, as it stands, the twparticles.do not contain sufficient clarification on·that pomt. For that' reason, I hope that the two articles will be returned to the.Military Staff. Committee, in order that they may be clarified and serve. as substantial bases for defining and fixing the siZe of the armed forces. The two articles are not sufficient asth~YIlow stand. The Military Staff Committee might try· again, and might find other bases which are more solid and more clear. b-.__~ l\\!L EL-KHOURI {Syrie} (ttaduit de l'anglais): Comme jel'ai deja dit, les.articles 5 et 6 visent a "'''lblir.certaines bases pour mesurer la puissan<:e ,-_3 forces armecs a mettrea la disposition du Conseil de securite. D'apres le t~xte, dans saredaction actuelle, ces deux articles ne sont pas suffisamment clairs sur' ce point. C'est pourquoi j'espere queces deux articlesseront renvoyes au Comite d'etat-major afin qu'iIs .puissent etre clarifies et qu'ils puissent servir .de base pour definir et determinerl'importance des forces armees. ..,Sous 1ell,f-forme actuelle, ces deux articles ne sont pas suffisants. Le Comite d'etat-major pourrait lesreprendre et trouver d'autres bases plus solides et plus J>recis~. I am very conscioUS-as are aJl members of the Council---"-Of the long period of time which Cwas necessary for the Military Staff Committee to prodJIce this report. It seems to me that we shall get into really·interminable difficulties if we send back paragraphs without havi..'1g reached a decision. If the Council reaches apositive decision on articles 5 and 6 and sends back those two articles with the decision, that is one thing. However, it seems to me thatsimply to send these articles back to.theMilitary Staff Committee for further consideration would establish a principle which might greatly delay a final de~ision on this report as a whole. The .PRESIDENT (translated. from' French) : After this exchangeof views, I, too, am of the opinion that theonly matters to.be referred back tp.the Militaty Staff Committee are questions of .<}rafting. If I ~ not mistaken, itis a question of placing catfide6 before article 5, and of a slight alteration in the wording of the latter. But I feel that we are now very near agr~eingon the meaning .of these'two' articles, and in. view of this, I wonder whether it is really neces·gary tointerefere with the plan of work of the Military Staff Committee, which is engaged·on important sp~cific questions, by referring backto it two articles concernirtggeneral principles which I feel we·have satisfactorily clarified. 1··shoUld therefore like to ask my colleagues whether they still insiston these articles being referred back to the Military Staff Committee. . Colonel. HODGSON (Australia): In view of the observations made by the representative of the United States,it seems to me thatthere is very sad confusion; indeed, in his lastremark, he stated thatitwas alwaysthe understanding of the United States delegation that the size of the armed forces . meant that required under the military agreements. As we see it, the whole of article 5 deals with the force behind any decision..The governing .~~...Cor 'me le Comite d'6tat"major s'occupe precisement de .detertnineI' les contingents que de- . vront fournir les differents pays,.Ilia delegation espereque le Conseil pourra approuver, des a.u· jourd'hui, les arti<?les 5 et 6, ce qui faciliterait la tache du Comite d'etat..major. Plus tard, nous pourrons essayer d'aboutira un accord sur les ar· ticles 7, 8.et 9.Cependant, si nous pouvions arriver aun accord aujourd'huisur ces deux ar. ticles, la tache du Comiteet du Conseil-en~er~t facilitee~ .. Je me rends hien compte,·comme tous les membres du Conseil, du temps qu'il a fallu au Comite d'etat-major pour etablir le' present rapport. :0 me semble que nous aurons afaire face a des difficultes intemlinables sinous lui renvoyons des pa· ragraphes sans avoir pris de decision. Sile Conseil prend une decision precise au sujet des articles 5· et 6 et les renvoie au Comite d'etat-major avec la decision qu'il aura adoptee,ce sera que1que chose d'acquis. Cependant, en renvoyant simplement ces aitiClesau Comite d'etat-major pour qu'illes examine a nouve~u, nous risquerions, me semble· t-i1, de creer un precedent qui pourrait retarder conslderablement la decision finale sur I'ensemble 'du present rapport. Le PRESIDENT: l'ai, moi aussi, l'impression qu'au point Dunous sommes parvenus, apres les explicationS .qui ont ete echangees, le renvoi au Comite d'etat-major ne porterait plUs guere que sur des questions de redaction. Si je comprends bien, il s'agirait de·mettre l'article 6 avant l'artide 5, et de rediger ce dernier un peu differem- . ment. Mais je crois que nous sommes maintenant tres pres de nous entendre sur le sens de ces deux articles, et, dans ces conditions, je me demande egalement s'il est vraiment necessaire de modifier le programme de travail du Comite d'etat-major qui porte sur des questions precises etimportantes, pour que ce dernier revoie deux articles de principes generaux que nous venons, me semble-t.il, j d'ec1aircir d'une maniere suffisante. . Je voudrais donc demander de nouveau a nos collegues s'ils insistent encore pour le renvoi au Comit6 d'etat-major• Le colonel HODGSON {Australie) (traduit de I'anglais): A la suite 'des observations fonnulees par le representant des Etats-Unis, il me semble qu'une confusion tres regrettable se soit produite. .Notre collegue a, en effet, declare, danssaderniere intervention, que la delegation des Etats-Unis avait toujours entendu par importance des forces armees l'importance des forces requises en vertu des accords militaires. Comme nollS le voyons, l'ensemble de I'articIe 5 a trait a la force qui epaulera toute decision d~ The article would have a different sense and meaning for us if it were put that way. We do not press that to a vote. However, the result of the discussion this morning shows that there will be serious differences of interpretation in the future, and I think that the matter should be Cleared up at the outset. We suggest that the Military Staff Committee might well have another look at the articles,' in the light of this morning's discussion and of the doubts and questions which nave been raised. We do not press the matter to a vote, but we might arrive at a general understanding that the articles will go back to the Military Staff Committee. Co~ite d'etat-major. The PRESID7lNT (translated from French): I should like to submit the following suggestion to the Council. We could invite the Chairman of the Military Staff Committee, or his representative, to come to the Council table and give us any explanations required. This article was unanimously adopted by the Military Staff Committee, but in view of the different opinions expressed by the Council, it would be desirable to have the Military 'Staff Committee's own interpretation of this article. If there are no remarks, I shall act accordingly and shall then call upon the representative of · the Soviet Union. Le PRESIDENT: Je voudraispresenter au Conseilla suggestion suivante: nous pourrions demander au President du Comite d'etat-major,ou a son representant, de prendre place ~ la table du Conseil et de nous donner, 'cventue1lement, tous eclaircissements. Il s'agit la, en effet, d'un article' adopte a l'unanimite par le Comite d'etat-major et sur lequel'il importerait, par consequent, en presence des divergences de vues qui viennent de se manifester, de connmtre l'interpretation du Comite d'etat-major lui~meme. S'il n'y a pas d'observations de votre part, je vais ainsi proceder, et donnerai ensuite la parole au representant cie l'Union sovietique. Mr. EL-KHOtJRI (Syria); You asked me a question and I wish to answer it. The question was whether I pressed for a vote or not. As long as the representative ef the United States has said that the Military Staff Committee is at present studying those points to which I refer, I think that it is not necesary to refer this article back to the Committee until we SC€l what the result of its study will be. Therefore, I am not pressi.'g for a vote on this question. M. EL-KHOURI (Syrie) (traduit de l'anglais): Vous m'avez pose une question et je desire y repondre. La question etaitde savoir si j'insistais pour que l'on vote. Puisque le" representant des Etats-Unisnous a dit que le Comite d'etat-major etudie en ccmoment les points en question, il n'est pas necessaire, amon avis, de renvoyer le present article au Comite avant que nous parviennent les resultats de ses deliberations. Je n'insiste done pas pour que ma proposition soit mise aux voix-. - ,..

I ask the Chairman ofthe Military Staff Committee to take his place at the Council table. LeTRiSIDENT: Je demande au representant du Comite d'ctat-major de bien vouloir prendre place a la table du Conseil. M.GR01rIYKO (Union des Republiques 50- Cialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Je ne comprends pas exactement queUe decisionnous sommes appeles a prendre, Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Re- publics) (translated from Russian): I am not clear what decision we are now adopting. !?the.Co~cil table, and, sin.ce no objecti~nw~ ~t auc~ne observ~tion n'ayant ete formulee, j'al. ~'aISed, I mterpreted your silence as a SIgn 01 mterprete votre silence comme une approbation. approval. ~~~~".MJ;. (JRQ.:MYKO (Umon of.SpvietSodaJist Re- publics).· (translated from Russian): I feel that t.. wp .. qu.esti.·.ons. have been qUI..te unnecessarily nux.. ed J up. The first is the discussion of the proposals of ... ~. ~~ttAustralianandSyrianrepresentatives; the second isthe question of inviting the Chairman of the MilitaryStaff Committee. Not only have these two questions been confused, but their order has been.changed. I completely fail to· understand why this need have been done. I will therefore startfrom the end, that is, with the second ques- tion. . . Idonot know whether the present Chairman of.the Military Staff Committ~e can give any in- terpretation, or, if so, what interpretation he can give·in the name of. the .other four delegations represented on the Committee.·! very much doubt that he can. If we wish to consult the Military Staff Committee on 'any point,. let us decide that the Committee should state its views on,and give its interpretation of,a specific question. ~ we all knoW, the Military Staff Committee is function- ing. Thereforeit .should be approached directly, ·if an interpretationis required. With all respect to the Chairman of the•Military ~taff Committee, no matterwhat country he represents, I am bound to say that he cannot supply an interpretation on behalf' offour of the delegations,. particularly.if . these delegations have not agreed on a common interpretation or if no such 'in~erpretation'exists. M.. GR01\-I'YKO (Union d<:s Republiquesso, cialistes sovietiques,) (traduit dzt russe) : Je pense quel'on a, sans necessite aucune, confondu deux questions, a savoir:d'une part, l'examendespro- positions presentees pades representants de I'Aus.- tralie et de la Syrie, et d'autre part, ~l'invitation .auPresident du Comite d'etat-major. En outre, on a non seulement confondu ces deux questions, trIais on en a egalement modifie I'ordre. Je n'en vois vraiment pas la raison. C'est pourquoi je commencerai par la fin, c'est-a-dire parla deuxie- me question: Je ne sais pas a quel titre le President du Comite d'etat-major pourrait nous donner une interpre- tation et, a fortiori, comment il pourrait le faire au nom des quatre autres delegations representees au Comite. Je doute fort que ce soit en son pou. voir. Si nous voulons consulter le Comite d'etat- major sur un sujet quelconque, invitons-Ie a ex- primer son poWt de vue et a fournir son interpre- 'tation. Comme on le sait, le Qomite d'etat-major siege en ~e moment. C'est pourquoi, si 1'0n veut tonnaitre son interpretation,' il convient de s'adresser directement a lui. Malgre toutmon res· pect pour le President du Comite d'etat-major et quel que soit le pajrsauquel il appartienhe, je dois .dire qu'il n'estpas ameme de donner une inter- pretation au. norn des quatre delegations, surtout si ces dernieres ne se sont pas mes d'accordsur une interpretation commune, ou s'il n'existepas .d'interpretation. commune. C'est la·ma premiere observation. My second remark. I shoUld like to say I am Je passe rnainten?-nt a la deuxieme observation. sorry to have interrupted at t.~etime when we Je regrette d'ctre intervehu au moment oit on were going to vote on the Australian.and. Syrian aIlait proceder auvote sur la proposition presen· proposal. I have come. to the conclusion iliat. I tee par l'Australie et la Syrie. Je suis arrive ala should not have interfered. I did it because, as it conclusion q:ue je n'aurais pas dil mtervenir. Si je seemed t~ me, no forma}. proposal had been sub- I'ai fait, c'est parce qu'il me semblait qu'aucune ... mitted.by: theAustralian and S:yrian.r.epresenta:-- .propositi()nformelle n'avaitetepresentee par les tives. That is why I thought·there was no need representants de l'Australie et de la Syrie. Je pen- to take a vote. But both the Australian and Syrian sais, par consequent, qu'il ne devait pasctre pro· representatives have confin;.qed,.tAAt~j4~y.",0~dcedea un vote. Pourtant, les representantsde like .a vote to be taken on their proposal. Since l'Australie· et de la Syrie ont confirme leur desir this is their wish, I think we should begin by, de voir leur proposition mise aux voix..Puisqu'il taking a vote on the Australian and Syrian repre- en est ainsi,·il conviendrait,.a man sens, de mettre sentatives' proposal to refer these two articles tout d'abord aux voix leur proposition visant a 'back to theMilitary Staff Committee. Personally, renvoyer les articles 5 et6 au Comite d'etat-major; I do not think this the proper policy inthe present En ce qui me conceme,'je ne crois pas que ce soit case. Articles 5 and 6 should be approved as they une solution heureuse. A mon avis, il se,rait pre. stand. I agree withthe United States representa- ferable d'adopter les articles 5 et 6 dans leur forme tive that the work of the MilitaryStaff Committee actueIle. Je partage le pohlt de vue du represen- should be put on some kind of a basis as soon as tant des Etats-U~ qui estime preferable d'etablir possible. The adoption of articles 5 aD;d 6 as at une certaine base de depart pourles travaux4 Tha~ is my first remark. I do not consider it necessary to refer these·ar- ticles back to the Military Staff Committee. Mr. ]OHNSON (United States .of America): The representative of Australia read are-draft,of article 5; with the insertion of one or two words, the net result of which was exactly the meaning of article 5 as now drafted. The United States delegation would' have no objection or clifficulty whatever in accepting here and now the minor amendments to article 5, as suggested in the text read out by the representative of Australia, if he or any other member wishes to propose it. That might possibly clarify this article., The words he suggested in no way change the meaning of article 5' as now drafted and, in'some respects, give it greater precision. M. JOHNSON. (Etats-Unisd)Ameriq~e) (tra-\ duit de,l'anglais}: ,Le representantdel'1\ustralie' a lu une nouvelleredaction deI'articIe5, ou un ou deux mots ont ete inseres; le, resultat. en est que le sens del'article, teI ~u'jl est redige. actuene~ ,- -- - ment: n'en a pas du tout ete affecte. La delegation des Etats..Unis serait toute disposee a accepter, des maintenant, le texte de l'article5legerement modifie que ilOUS a lu le representant de l'Aus- tralie, si lui ou un autre membre desire proposer ce texte..L'article pourrait peut-etrey gagneren cIarte. Sa -redaction ne modifie en aucune'ma;., niere le sens de l'articIe 5 clans sa forme acttielle et, acertains egards, lui confere une plus grande precision. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): Inasmuch as the Chairman of the Military Staff Committee is present, I should like to ask him a question through the President, if I may. Le colonel HODGSON (AustraIie) (traduit de l'anglais): Je voudrais profiter, Monsieur le Pre- sident, de lapresence parminous du Presidentdu Comite d.'etat-major pour lui poser,_par votre in- termediaire, une question.' C.J

I should like to remind you that, in inviting the representative of the Military Staff Committee to attend our meeting, I was only suggesting a course adopted previously when we were considering the report of the legal experts and asked the Chairman of the Committee' of Experts to attend our meeting in order to 'give any.explanations which might be desired. I consider s~ch a COlL.TSe to be perff:ctlycorrect if it is agreed to by the Security Council. In this particular case, I feel that it would be Dans le cas actuel, il me paralt qu'ilseraitfaeasy for the Chairman of the Military StaffCom- .cile au President du Comite d'etat-major de nous mittee to explain that Committee's views regardindiquer le point de vue de ce Comite pour tous ing all the articlesunaniInously agreed' upon by it. les articles ou celui-ci est arrive Et une decision That was whyI made the suggestion. If I am not unanime. C'est dans cet esprit que j'avaiS fait mistaken, however, it does not meet with the apma proposition, mais, si je comprends bien, eIle proval of the representative of the Soviet Union. renco~re une opposition de la part du represen- Is he still opposed to this proposal? If so, J would tant de I'Union sovietique. Je demande a celui-ci suggest that c our discussion be postponed toa debien vouloir indiquer s'il maintient cette oplater meeting, in order to allow the Chairman of position. S'il en est ainsi, jeproposerais la prOCe-" the Military Staff Committee to consult his col-. dure suivante: nous ajoumerions notre discussion leagues,and so be in a position to co:nununicate. ' aune seance uIterieure de maniere a permettre au to us explanations reflecting the views of the other President du Comite d'etat-major de consulter ses four delegations which form the Military Staff collegues afin d'etre en mesure de nous apporter Committee., id des explications qui refleteraient la pensee des quatre autres delegations composant leComite d'etat-major.. Je demande done au representant de l'Union sovietique s'il maintient son opposition a I'audi... tion du. President du Comite d'etat-major? Le' PRESIDENT: En ce qui concerne l'audition du representant du Comite, d'etat-major, je vous ' rappellerai que lorsque nous av.ons examine le rapport des experts juridiques, nous avons demande au President du Comite d'experts de sieger pa;.rmi nous afin de nous fournir les •explications dont nous pourrions avoir besoin. Je considere cetteprocedure comme tout a fait nonnale, si une decision en ce sens est prise par le Conseil de securite. I therefore ask the representativ'eof the Soviet Union whether he is still opposedto our hearing the Chairman of the Military Staff Committee. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I have no M. GROMYKo(Union des RepubIiques socialistes sovietiques) (tradttit du russe): Je n'a! ...._--~~ Cliairm~'sopirljonlle c()nsideted.. intlJ.e._~kfuni~= bresduCoInite d'etat-maJor. Jugez-enpar VOllSt stances, as reflecting the views of thefivede1ega~ mfunes: est-:ilpossible,dans-ces conditions, d'ad:' tions? It couldnot.Pethaps theMilit~f Staff mettre que 1'opinion du Presidentrepresentecelle Committee will-discuss this question,and thede.-<l dnq delegations? Nullement.Le Comite J31la~a.n willJ;~p()rt .t() ushow tile matterstAAc:ls d'etat-major poul'l'aitpeut-etre,e:s:a.minerla quesand what the delegations'views are 011 this question:, apresquoi son President nous dirait ce qui tion. That would be of SOmeJlse. .At presellt the en est etllous~xpost:raitles.poinu; de vue des,di- Chairman canno~report the view on this question ve!:'ses delegations. Ce serait la bonne solution, of the Soviet delegation.or the Sovietrepresentaalars que .maintenant.·le. President n'est pas en tiveson the Military Staff Committee. mesure d'exposer le point de yue de la MIegation . sovietique et,des representants sovietiques au Comite d'etat-major. .Ufaut distinguer entre les deux procedures suivantes :inviter ,le President, ou lui demander d'exposer les vues du CoIilite. d'etat-major. Now pouvons fort bien inviter le President; quant ala declaration que l'on attend de lui, il ne sera pas eh mesure de.la faire.En effet,les membres du Comite d'etat-majorne sesont pas mis d'accord sur une'mterpretation commune et, d'ailleurs, ils n'ont pas encore examine la question: L· We must 'draw a distinction between two dll" {erent· procedures: the· invitation· to the Chairman,>and his statement on the interpretation and . views qf the Military Staff Committee. We can invite the Chairman to attend our meeting. But he will 110tbe ableto make a statement,asthe repre~ sentatives on,the Military Staff Committee have not agreed upon the interpretation to be adopted, and, what is more, .have not even discussed the matter. The PRESIDENT .{translated from French): We should finish this discussion ofpr,ocedure. I suggest that we act in the folloWing way: I shall first formally ask you for your decision regarc:liIlg the invit~tion to the Chairman of th~ Military,Staff.Committee, or his representative, to attend our meeting. If it is.your wish that he . shouldattend,the representative of the Military Staff Committee will be Invited to take his place at our taille.;;;, . I shall·then ask the Australian'representativeto tell us exactly what question he wishes.to ask the representative of the Military Staff Committee. We shall then adj~)Urn our meeting, .and the answer to the Australian representative's question C,' '-~willcbe.submitted to us at ()urnextmeeting,ll possible; otherwise, as soon as the representative of the Military Staff Committee is able to give us a reply, after consulting the other members of his Committee. , I now ask the Security Council whether it is its wish'that the representative of the Chairman of the Military Staff Committee be invited to take his place at the Council table. A. vote waf taken by show of hands, and· by ten'votes in favour and one abstention, the Security Council decided to invite the representative ,of the Chairman of the Military Staff Committee to sit at· tke Council table• Le PRESIDENT: 11 convient de terminer cette discussion de prOcedure. Je YOUS propose d'agir de la fa~on suivante: je vaistout d'abord vousconsulter formellement pour. connaitre votre decision an sujet de .l'invitation au President dn (iomited'etat-maior, ou ason repr~entant, de sieger aYe~ nous. Si tel est "votre avis, le representant du Comite d'etat-major sera invite asieger anotre table. Je demanderai ensuite au representant del'AustraIie de bien vouloirformuler exactement la question qu'il desire poser.au representant du Comite d'etat-major. Nous ajournerons alors la seance, et la reponse ala, question posee' par le representant de rAustralie nons sera donnee,si possible, anotre pro-' .. chaine seance, et sinon, des que le representant du Comite d'etat-major, apres avoir consulte les autres menibres du Comite, sera en mesure de nous repondre: Je consulte le Conseil de securite ~ur le point de savoir s'il entend· inviter le representant du President du Comite d'etat-major a sieger a la table du Conseil. Un vote a lieu amain levee, et par dix voix, avec une abstention, le Conseil de s.ecurite decide d'inviter le representant du President du Comitl d'etat-major asieger ala table du Conseil. Abstention .' 'Union of '3oviet Socialist Republics Le PRESIDENT: Le representantdu" President du Comite d'etat-major est done invite asieger a la table du eonsei1. . The", PRESIDEX'>."r· (translated from French) : The representative of the Chairman of the Military Staff Committee is invited to sit at the Council tab!e. Le colonel HODGSON (Australi~)(traduit de l'anglais): La question que je desire poser n'est. pas une question e..mbarrassante tQuchant l'interpretation du texte. ]e ne vais done pas mettreimmediatement le President du Comite d'etat.;major dans une situation dif!icile, eottnne l'a laisse supposer M. Gromyko. n n'en reste pas moins que ma question est, amon sens, importante. Le representant de la Syric" a retire sa proposition parce qh'il croyait savoir que le, Comite d'etat-major examine de nouveau, en ee moment, les questions qui nous occupent, et qu'il reverrait les articles 5 et 6. La delegation australienne eroit comprendr,e que le Comite d'etat-major n'examine actuellement aucun article sur lequel l'aecord s'est.fait, mais qu'il s'occupe de tout autre chose. En d'autres termes, si le representant de la Syne retire sa proposition, dIe ne sera pasexa.; minee du tout par le CO'i::tite d'etat-major... " Ma question est la suivante: le Comite d'etatmajor examine-t-il, ou examinera-t-il d.e nouveau; des articles qu'il a deja acceptes's'il ne re~oit pas d'instructions du Conseil de securite acet effet? Colonel HODGSON (Australia) : My question is not an embarrassing question of interpretation, so I will not place the Chairman of the Military Staff Committee in an immediate difficulty, as suggested by Mr. Gromyko.But I think it is an . important question. . The representative of Syria withdrew his pro- .posal because he understood. that the Military Staff Committee was reconsidering these questions and would reconsider articles 5 and 6. The Australian delegation understands tllat the Military Staff Committee is not giving consideration to ap.y article agreed to at all, but is proceeding . with entirely new work. In other words, if the representative of Syria withdraws his proposal, it will get no consideration whatever from the Military Staff Committee. My question is: Is the Military Staff Committee giving consideration, or will it give, consideration,'to articles agreed to unless there is a direction from this Council? . Ihe PRESIDENT ( translated from French): Gentlemen, the question has been' asked and, as I have justremarked, it will be answered, if possible, at our next meeting. That meeting will take place on Friday morning and m~w·have to be continued on Friday afternoon. 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