S/PV.143 Security Council

The first item on our agenda is the adoption of the provisioIial agenda which has been circulated to the members oi the Couilcil. Are there any comments? Mr. GROMYKO Jnion of Soviet Socialist Re- ' publics) (tratislated from Russian)·:. I have already had an opportunity to express the views of the delegation ~f the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on item 2 of the agenda. Some days ago, I drew the Security Council's attention to the fact that the Council cannot discuss the nomination of the governor of Trieste. until the Italian peace· treaty has been ratified. I cannot therefore aglt:e to this item being put on the Security Council's agenda. I do not need to remind you that without preliminary agreement between the representativ~ of the four Powers who took part in the·decision. of the Council of Foreign MiniSters of12 December 1946, it would n~turally be a waste of time for the Security CJuncil to discuss·this question, since no decision can be taken unless there is agreement between ,the reprcsent~tivesof the four Powers. That is the additional comment I wanted to make today in connexion with the discussion of , item 2 of the agenda. ' Sir·Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): I should like to say a few words, since it was my Government which requested the inclusion of this item in the Council's provisional agenda. It must be remembered that certain responsibilities fall upon the governor immediately upon. the entry into force of the treaty. Therefore, it iscssential that we should have agreement on the.choice of governor by that date. The· USSR representative observed that the CounCil could not discuss this matter before the ratification of the Italian peace treaty, but I do .not know from where he draws his argument. I am unaware of any provision of that kind, of any prohibition on the Council, or of any bar to disc'l.IssIon of this question. 177. Adoption de I'ordre du iour Le PRESIDENT : Le premier point a notre ordre du jour est l'adoption de l'ordre du jour provisoire, qui a ete distribue· aux membres du(Jonseil. Qttelqu'un a-tail des observations a presenter?. M. GROMYKO (Union des RepubliquessoeialiStes soyietiques)(traduit du russe) : J'ai deja eu l'occasion d'exposerl'attitude de la delegation del'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques '& l'egardclu point 2 de l'ordre clu jour.I1 y a que1ques jours, j'ai fait observer au Conseil de securlte. qu'il ne pouvait examiner la question de la nomination du gouverneur de Trieste tant que le traite de paix avec l'Italie ne serait pas ratifie. Par consequent, je nepui,s accepter que ron inscrive cette question a l'ordre du jour du Conseil de securite. Inutile de rappeIer qu'a moinsd'un accord prealable sur cette question entre les representants des quatre Puissanees dQnt les Mifiistres des Affaires etrangeres ont participe a la decision du 12decembre 1946, l'exa~ men de cette question au Conseil de securite constituerait,pour ainsi dire, nne perte de temps, puisqu~il est impossible de prendre une decision si les representants' des quatre Puissances ne sont pas d'a,ccord. Voila la remarque complCmentaire que je tenais a· faire aujourd'hui a propos de l'examen du point 2 deJ'ordre dujour. Sir Alexander· CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): Jevoudrais prendre brievement la parole,puisque c'est mon Gouvemement .qui a demande l'inscrj,ption de ce pomt a l'ordre du jour provisoire du Conseil. 11 faut se rappelerque, des l'entree en vigueur du traite de paix, certaines responsabilites incombent au gouvemeur. 11 est done indispensable que nous nous soyons mis d'accord sur le choix du gouverneur acette date. , LerepreSsentant de l'URSS a fait remarquer que le· Conseil ne pouvait discuter cette question avant que le traiteS de paix avec 1'Italie ne fo.t ratifieS, mais je ne sais sur quel argumentil s'appuie. A ma connaissance, il n'existe pas de disposition eri ce sens;rien n'interdlt au Consell.,..... ,de se saisir de la question,rien ne l'efupeche d'en discuter. ~ Voir les Proces-verbau" officiels. du Conseil de seeuritC, Deuxieme Annee, No 1I9, Le representant de l'URSS a·fait valoir, en second lieu, que le ConseiI pel'drait son temps The USSR representative added as a second reason that it would be a waste of time for the Council to discuss this before previotls agreement had been reached among the four Powers. I do not think that is so. We have wasted a gre~t deal of tillleamong the four Powers since last January or very early February, if I am correct, and we still have not reached·an agreement. I am afraid that this is apt to happen. We see it in other cases. We saw it, in pa~ticular, quite recently in connexion with. conventional armaments, where the procedure was adopted of asking the five Powers to get together to produce ~ unanimous report. They could not, and the result was that a majority report and a minority report had to go to the full Commission for Conventional Armaments, which was able. to take a decision alter .a few sittings.1 s~il examinait ce probleme avant que les quatre Puissances ne se missent d'accord. Je ne part<l.ge pas ~on point d~·vue. Si je ne me trompe, les quatre Puissances, depuis janvier demier ou les les I.out premiers jours de fevrier, ont perdu beaucoup de temps et ne sont toujours pas arrive~sa se mettre d'accord. Je crains que ce ne soit la une eventualite possible. La. situation s'est deja. presentee en d'autre cas. Nous c,"1 avons eu unexemple, en particulier tout rec~m~ ment, aproposdes armements de type classique, quand il a· ete decide de df'..mander auxcinq Puissances de se reunir pour presenter un rapport unanime. Elles n'ont pu lefaire etil a ft..illu, en o:msequenee, saisir la Commission pIeiliere des armemernts· de type classiqued'un rapport de la majorite et d'un rapport de. la minonte, la Commission pIeniere, au bout de que1ques seances, est enfin parvenue a une decision1• Therefore, I think that, in view of.the difficulty hitherto experienced in obtaining unanimity among the four Powers on the question of the governorship of Trieste, it would be very well for them to sit with the other members of the Council to see whet.,;'er, with· the help of those members, they could arrive at a satisfactory, .unanimous decision in regard to an appropriate candidate. The Council would.then be in a position formally· to appoint that candidate on short notice when the time came. J'estime done qu'en raison des difficultes qui se sont presentees jusqu'a present pour obtenir l'unanimite des quatre. Puissances sur laquestion de la nomination du gouverneur de'rrieste, il serait bon que leurs representants deHberassent avec les autresmembres du Conseil de securite afin de voir si, avec l'aide de ces derniers, Us nepourraient parvenir a une decision satisfaisante, unanime, quant au choix d'un candidat repondant aux conditions voulues. Le Conseil serait alol's en mesure denommer officiel~ lement ce candidzLt, a bref delai, quand le moment en serait venu. Therefore, I do hope the·Council will agree to this suggestion that the Council with all its members should meet as a Council ior this purpose- I should hope, in private, because we should be dealing with personalities-in order to try to reach unanimous agreement. Such a procedure would save time, not lose it. Je souhaite donc vivementque le Conseil approuve ma. suggestion de se reunir au complet pour examiner cette question -.- en seance privee, je l'espere, car il sera question de personu nalitesafin d'essayer de parvenir a un accord unanime. Cette Pl'ocedure nous ferait gagner du temps, et non en perdre. Colonel HODGSON (Australia)·: The Austral~ ian delegation at Paris maintained that the selection of the governor of Trieste should be made not by the Security· Council, but by a special body consisting of representatives of the four major Powers together with those of three other States chosen by· the Conference. Le colonel HODGSON (Australie)(traduit de I'anglais): A Paris, la delegation de l'Australie a soutenu qu'il n'appartenait pas au C6nseil de securite de choisir le gouverneur de Trieste, mais a un organe special compose des representants des quatrePuissances principales et des representants de tro~ autres Etats choisis par la Conference. The Australian representative drew attention at that time to the way in which the veto had Le representant de l'Australie a faitremarquer a ce moment comment l'exerdce du droit de veto avait retardepeIidant plusieurs semaines la designation du Secretaire general des Nations caus~d a deadlock for weeks in the.appointment of a Secretary-General for the United ·Nations, , Far from achieving unanimity, this proc,edure in regard' to the Trieste govemorship is an example of the way in which the veto tends to block almost any decision. 'Such situations are grievously damaging to the prestige ahd the effectiveness of the United Nations; and, in this particular 'case, one result is the indefinite con.. tinuance of conditions of econon;lic and political insecurity in the Trieste area. Because the Australian Governnient considered. that the Security .Council had no jurisdiction under the Charter to accept the obligations contemplated under the peace treaty with Italy and its annexes,1 the Australian repre~entative on the Security Council strongly opposed approval by the Security Council of the Statute and other instruments. The Australian representative abstained2 from voting on the resolution of 10 January, to which reference is made in the letter from the Unitc::d Kingdom 'represent~tive.s However, the Council, by ten votes, decided to approve the three relevant annexes to the Italian treaty. The Australian Government signed the treaty of peace and will, when the treaty has been ratified, be bound by all its provisions, inclUding those referring to.the duties of the' Security Council in relation to Trieste. The present concern of the Australian delegation is, therefore, an attempt to give effect to the .intention of the treaty and to endeavour t9 ensure that the established machinery, imperfect as we feel it is, shall not be obstnicted or delayed. The immediate task of the Council is to make arrangements for the appointment of the appropriate kind of gove~or of Trieste, who can assume his responsibilities in the manner and at the time required. . The USSR representati've contends tb.at no action can be taken by the Council until the peace treaty enters into force. None of the arguments he has advanced in support of his <;oiltention is valid. He is advancing two main Loin de favoriser l'unanimite, la proc~dure adoptee pour le choix du gouverneur de Trieste montre comment le droit de veto tend a para· lyserpresque completement l'action du Cotl!leil. De telles situationscompromettent gravement l'efficacite clu travail et le prestige de l'Organisation des Nations Unies et auront notamment pour effet,_ dans ce cas particuli~r, de prolonger indefiniment dans la region de Trieste l"instabilite economique et politique. Comme le Gouvernement de l'Australie esti· me que le Conseilde securite n'est pas ~abi1ite - par la Charte a accepter d'assumer les obligations prevues au traite de paix avec l'Italie et a sesannexesl, sonrepresentantaupres duConseil de securite s'est fermement oppose a ce que le Conseil de securiteapprouvat le Statut et les autresinstruments. Le representant de l'Australie s'est a'bstenu de voter sur la resolution du 10 janvier, a laquelle le representant du Royaume· Uni a fait allusion dans sa lettre3• Toutefois, le Conseil a, par dix voix, decide d'approuver les trois annexes du traite de paix avec l'Italie qui serapportent ala question~ Le Gouvemement de l'Australie .a signe le traite de paix, et, quand celui-ci aura ete ratifie, l'Australie. sera liee par toutes' sesdispositions, y compris celles qui ont trait aux obligations du Conseil de securite concemant Trieste. La delegation de l'Australie se preoccupe donc actuellement derealiser les intentions du traite et dechercher as'assurer que l'action du mecanisme etabli, si imparfait· qu'il nollS semble, ne sera ni retardee, ni paralysee. Le Conseil 'a le devoir immediat de prendre des mesures pour designer legente de gouvemeur qui con- -vienne a.Trieste et. qui puisse assumer ses oJ>ligations.de la maniere et aU!p-oment.prevus. Le represenhnt de l'URSS· pretend que le Conseil de securite ne peJlt prendre de decision avant l'entree en vigueur du traite de pai:x: Aucun des argumen-q; qu'il a presentes al'appm de cette allegation n"est valable. Il invoq1.le deux 1 Voir Ies Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de seeurite, Deuxieme Annee, SuppIemettt No I, A~nex.e 2. ~atteris outside the orbit of consideration by the Conncil. The Council has undertaken the responsibility of appointing a governor. There is no particular caucus or junta or cal-al which must make the decision, but the Council itself. Le Conseil de securite a assume l'obligation de designer wlg01.lVerneur. n n'appartient pas a que1que cli!fue, factionou coterie de prendre cette decision, mais au Conseil lui-meme, In the second place, the USSR represtntative contends that the Council cannot discuss the qllestion of appointment until the .treaty has en- .tered into force. If he had said that there could be no fornlal appointment, there would be some merit in his contention. En second lieu, le representaI)t de l'URSS. pretend que le Conseil ne .peut ·discuter de la nomination du gouverneur avant que le traite de paix ne soit entre en Vigueur. S'il avait dit que le -gouverneu" ne peut etre officiellement nommes son argumentation aurait eu quelcjpe tr -.dement. . To determine the legal position, it is necessary to look at the combined effect of the peace treaty, the Instrument for the P:roviSional Regime, and the Perma.'lent Statute. Until the treaty comes into force and article 21 becomes applicable, the Free Territory will continue to be administered by the Allied military cominands within their / respective zones. Immediately after the treaty enters into force, Italian sovereignty will be ternlinated andthe Free Territory will be governed in accordance with the Instrument for the Provisional Regime, which will remain in force until such date as the Security Council shall fix for .the coming into force of the Permanent Statute. Pour juger de l'aspect juridique de la question, il faut examiner.I''effet combine du tTaite de paix, de I'Instrument reIatif au regime provi- . soire et du Statut permanent. Jusqu'aumoment ou le traite entrera en vigueur et ou l'article 21 deviendra applicable, le Territoire librecontinucra d'etre administre par les -commandements militaires allies, agissant chacun d~_ sa zone propre~ La .souverainete de l'Italie ·prendrafin' des l'entree en vigueur du traite et le Territoire ,libre sera administie co~ormement aux disP9- sitions de l'Instrument relatif au regime provisoire, lequel demeurera en vigueur jusqu'a la date que le Ccnseil de securite fixera pour l'entree en vigueurdu Statut permanent. In the·third place, article 1 of· the Instrument for the Provisional Regime 1 provides the following: "The Governor shall assume office in the Free Territory at the earliest possible moment after the coming into force of the present Peace Treaty. . ." The right of the Security COlmcil to appoint a governor is derived from article 2 of the Instrument for the Provisional Regime which provides that H. • • all other provisions of the Permanent Statute sh~n be applicable during the period of the provisional regime as and when these pro"isions prove to be applicable and in so far as they are not superseded by the present Instrument. . ." En troisieme .lieu, l'article premier de l'Instrument reIatif au regime provisoire1 dhlpose que: '~Le Gouverneur entrera en fonctions dans le Territoire libre le pluS tat possible apres l'entree en vigueur du present traite de paix •.." Le droit du Conseil de securite de nommer un g()Uvemeur decoule de l'article 2 de I'Instrument relatif au ret.me provisoire, qui stipule que " . . . toutes les autres dispositions du Statut permanent seront applicables pendant la. duree du r~gime provisoire, a IIlesure que ces dispositions se reveIeront applicables et pour autant qu'elles ne soient pas remplacees par celles du present Instrument'''. One of the provisions of the Permanent Statute L'une des clispositioDs du Statut permanent du Territoire libre de Trieste applicable au·regime provisoire, et que I'Instrument n'ap~ remplacee, est celle de l'artide 11 qui porte : "Le Gouverneur·sera nonune par le -Conseil fo~ the Free Territory of Trieste which is. applicable to the provisional regime and not superseded by it is artiCle 11, which provides that "the Governor shall be appointed by the Security 1 For full text of Instrument, see Official· Rtlcords uj ihe ,I i Vok te text~ complet de l'Instrument dam les Proces- &ui!4r#y Councii,8econd Year, Supplement No. I, pages verbau" ofjiciels du Comeil de securite, DeuxU:me Annee, 12 to 14. '- _ Supplement No I, pages 12 a 14. However, the Security, Council is. not concerned at the moment with the formal appointment ,of a governor.. All it ~ concerned with is making the selection and deciding who the governor shall be, so that the formal appointment can be made immediately after ,the treaty enters into force. If the Council does not take that anticipatory action, the .assumption of office by the governor will be indefinitely delayed; and; until h~ assumes office, 'the Free ,Territory will continue to be administered by the Allied military commands within their ,respecti~e zones. It should be the objective of the Security CoUncil to give effect to the clear intention of the treaty: namely, to terminate the military administration and to establish the Civil administration by the governor at the earliest possib!e moment after, the ~ntry into force of the treatY. It is essential, therefore, that the Security Council , should proceed at once to discuss possible candidates for the governorship. I would add these two ob~ervations. You will J'aimerais presenter encore deux observations. recall, Mr.'President, that"when the questions of Vous vous rappellerez, Monsieur le President, the admission of Italy and Hungary came before que lorsque le Conseil a examine les demandes this Council,! the Australian representative ob- , d'admission aux Nations Unies de l'Italie et de jected to those items being placed on the "\genda la Hongrie1, le representant de l'Australie s'est because the peace treaties had not been ratified; oppose a ce que ces points fussent inscrits al'orhe consid~redthat, under the Charter, those items dre du jour, alleguant que les traites de paix could not be examined by this Council, since n'avaient pas ete ratifies; il estimait qu'en vertu the basis for membership was the sovereign equalde la Charte, le Conseil ne pouvait examiner ity of the States, and the two countries were not ces points, etant donne que l'Organisation est yet sovereign" and that nothing could be done fondee sur le principe de l'egalite souveraine until the treaty: was ratified. The USSR repredes Etate et que ces deux pays ne disposaient pas sentative refused to accept that argument and encore de leur souverainete; il avait doncconvoted for the inclusion of these items,in the tIu que l'on ne pouvait rien faire tant que le agenda: Now he endeavours to use the same traite ne serait pas ratifie. Le representant de argument in the other direction when it suits his l'URSS refusa de se rendre ~cet argument et purpose. vota en faveur de l'inscription de ces deux points a l'ordre du jour. Maintenant, il cherche a se servir du meme argument, mais dans le sens contraire, parce que cela lui convient. My second observ~tion is the following. I also. r ·11 to mind the observatioIlsof the USSR represc;t..ative a short time ago that there were some questions on which even the Security Council must act by common sense. If ever there was,a question requiring the application of common sense, this ~.one. Therefor~, we are going to vote -{(id1ie adoption of the provisional agenda. Toutefois, le Conseil de securite n'a pas, pour l:instant,a nommer officiellement de gouverneur. Il n'a qu'a examiner les candidatures et a se mettre d'accord sur un nom, pour ctre en mesure de procederofficiellement a cette nemination des que le traite de paix sera entre en vigueur. S'il ne prend pas cette mesure prealable, l'entree en fanctions du gouverneur sera indefmiment retardee et, tant que le gouvemeur . ne sera pas entre en fonctions, le Territoire libre continuera d:ctre administre par les commandements militaires allies, agissant chacun dans sa zone propre. Le Conseil de'securite devrait se preoccuper de mettre a execution ce que le traite a manifestement voulu realiser, a savoir : mettre fin a l'administration militaire et instaurer une administration civile sous l'autorite du gouverneur le plus tot possible apres l'entree en vigueur du traite. :ij est done absolument necessaire que , le Conseil' de securite discute immediatement des candidats possibles au poste de gouvemeur. Ma seconde remarque est la suivante : je me rappelle eg~ement que le representant de l'URSS a declare, il y a peu de temps, qu'il y avait des questions que mcme le ConseR de securite devrait considerer a la lumiere du bon sens. S'il en est uI:le qui exige que l'on fass~ .appel an bonsens, c'est. bien celle-ci. Je voter~ done pour l'adoption de l'ordre du jour proVlsoire. sentt~s pour refuter l'allegation du representant de l'URSS, seIon laquelle le Conseil desecurite n'aurait pas le droit dediscuter cette question en ce moment. Je dec!arerai cependant que, de ravis de la delegation des Etats-Unis, il n'y a, ni clans la Cha",t,e, ,ni clans notre reglement int€rieur,ni dam. le traite de paix avec l'Italie qui attend encore d'etre ratifie, ID dans le Statut de Trieste, de disposition qui, du point de vue juridique,. interdise au Conseil de discuter cettc question. Il est evident (ne l'un ne peut proc€der ala nowiT.lation d'un gouverneur tant -que le traite de paix n'aura pas ete ratifi€. Toutefois, le traite et tous les instruments connexes ttablissent clairement que le gouvemeur de Trieste devra entrer en fonctions aussit6t que possible apres l'entree en vigueur du traite, Obviously, no appointment of a governor can be made until the treaty is ratified. However, it is the plain intent of the treaty, and of all the related instruments, that the governor of Trieste shall enter into the exercise of his functions as soon as possible after the treaty comes,into effect. En outre, I'article n du Statut stipule que le Conseil de securite doit consulter les Gouvernements de Yougoslavie et d'Italie sur lanomination du gvuverneur. Toutes ces mesuresdemandent du temp3. Furthermore, article 11 of the Statute provides that Yugoslavia and Italy must be consulted by the Security Council concerning the appointment of· the governor. All of those measures require time. A mon a'vis, le i'epresentant de l'Australie a fait valoir l'un des arguments les plus convaincants quand i1 a dit que c'etait, de la part du Ccnseil, temoigner de bon sens que de veiller ace que le gouverneur put etre nomme le plus tOt possible apres la ratification du traite et son entree en vigueur. The representative of Australia made, I think, one of the most cogent argument'5 which h,we been presented: that is, t.l:lat it is a matter of common sense for the Council to make possible the appointment of the Governor as soon as possible following the entry into force of the treaty and its ratification. L'attitude du representant de l'URSS est d'autant plus surprenante quand en se rappclle les termes du Protocole du Conseil des Ministres des Mfaires etrangereS, en date du 12 decembre 1946,qui et ete publie etdont, avec votre permission, je vais donner lecture : The attitude of, the USSR representative is particularly surprising when one recalls t.1}e Protocol of the Council of Foreign Mmisters of 12 December 1946, which was published and which" with your permission, I shall read: "Les representants des Etats-Unis d'Amerique, d~ la France, du Royaume-Uni de Grande- Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, et de l'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiquec, reunis le 12 decembre 1946, a New-York, en Conseil des Mi.'listres des Mfaires etrangeres, sont convenus que leurs Gouvernements feront toute diligence pour assurer la designation du Gouverneur du Territoire libre, de Trieste aussi rapidement que possible et dans les conditions prevues au projet de statut permanent, en vue cl'assurer sa nomination par le Conseil de, securite ala date de l'entree en vigueur du Traite de Paix." Je ne puis imaginer comment le Conseil de securite pourrait faire coincider la nomination du gouverneur avec l'entree en vigueur du traite de paix, si, avant cette date, il n'a pas examine lescam:lidatw'cs possibles et ne§~eSfpasrnis d'accord sur un nom. "The representatives of the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,'assembled on December 12 IS46 at New York as the Council of Foreign Ministers, have agreed that their Governments will' take all possible, steps to secure the ' designation of the Governor.of the Free Territory of.Trieste at the earliest possible date under the conditions laid down in the' draft Permanent Statute so as to ensure his appointment by the ~ecudty Council simultaneously with the. entry mto force of the Peace Treaty." How it would be possible for the Security Council to ensure the appointment of the governor to coincide with the entry into force of the peace treaty unless we discuss possible candidates and agree in the Council on a designee before that time-that is a situation which I cannot imagine. ' Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The USSR Government is as anxious as all the other Governments concerned to have a governor of the Free .Territory of Trieste appointed immediately after the peace treaty with Italy has come into force. But in discussing this question, we should follow the normal procedure, the normal method, as envisaged by the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The Australian repres(".ntative has tried to point to an alleged mconsistency in the USSR representative's attitude. He recalled that, when the question was considered of putting the Italian Government's application. for Italy's admission to the United Nations on the Council agenda, the V§SR representative voted for its inclusion, but now that the United Kingdom representative's letter is being considered, the Soviet representative objects to its inclusion in the agenda. This accusation of inconsistency is, of course, fallacious. 1 should like to remind 'you that, when. the inclusion in the Council's agenda of the Italian Government's application for admission of Italy to the United Nations was being discussed, I said that the application in question should be considered jointly with similar applications from other countries with whom peace treaties were being made, and that Italy's application, like those of the other countries mentioned by me, should be considered when the peace treaty with Ital~ was ratified and came into force. I would have no objection to putting on the agenda the question raised by the United Kingdom representative if, in placing it on the agenda, we decided to discuss or consider it only after the treaty with Italy comes into force. I would agree to the question being put in this way since this is exactly the position taken by the USSR representative. when we considered the question of placing Italy's application for admission to the 'United Nations on our agenda.' As you' see, there is no inconsistency but complete consistency. The .PRESIDENT (translated from French): Are there any further cOInJ:r.en;.s? I shall have one to make myself, but I shall first call on the United Kingdom representative. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques sodalistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Le Gou- ,vernement de l'URSS, comme les autres Gouvernements interesses, est desireux que le gouverneur du Territoire libre de Trieste sait nomme aussitot apres l'entree en vigueur du traite de paix avec l'Italie. Mais pour examiner cette question, il faut suivre la procedure nor~ male, ·l'ordre normal, prevus par la decision du Conseil des M~tres des Mfaires etrangeres. Le representant de I'Australie s'est efforce de prouver que l'attitude du Gouvemement de I'URSS etait illogique. n a rappele que lorsqu'il etait question d'inscrire a. l'ordre du jour du Conseil de securite la demande d'admission adressee par le Gouvernement italien a. I'Organisation d-es Nations Unies, le representant de I'URSS a vote en faveur de cette inscription mais que, a present, lorsqu'il s'agit de l'examen de la lettre du representant du Royaume-Uni, ce .memerepresentant s'oppose a. ce qu'elle sait inscrite a. l'ordre du jourdu Conseil. n va sans dire que cette accusation d'illogisme n'est pas fondee. _ Je vous rappellerai qu'au moment OU nous discutions le point de savoir s'il fallait porter a l'ordre du jour la demande d'admission adressee par le Gouvernement italien a.I'Organisation des Nations Unies, j'ai dit qu'il faudrait examiner cette demande en meme .temps que celle des autres pays avec lesquels on etait en train de conclure des traites de paix, et que l'examen de la demande de I'Italie, ainsi que des demandes sourruses par les pays dont je viens de pader, devrait avoir lieu apres la ratification et l'entree en vigueur du traite de paix avec l'Italie. Je ne m'opposerais pas a. ce que la question soulevee par le representant du Royaume-Uni !Ut inscrite a. l'ordre du jour si, ce faisant, nous decidions d'examiner cette question apres l'entree en vigueur du traite de paix avec I'Italie. J'accepterais cette solution, car eUe est entierement conforme a I'attitude ad.optee par le representant de l'URSS a:u cours des debats sur l'inscription de la demande d'admission adressee par l'Italie a. l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Vous voyez done qu'il n'y a la. aucune inconsequence et que mon attitude est logique. Le PRESIDENT: Y a-t-il d'autres observations? J'en aurai moi-meme une a. presenter,mais, allparavant, je donne la parole au representant du Royaume-Uni.

Here is what I wanted to say. I think we all agree that the appointment of . the governor of Trieste can be made only afteI the peace treaty has been ratified. I believe we mip'ht even agree that such appointment presuppos~ that the treaty has been ratified. I would remind you that, under article 11 of the Statute of Trieste, no appointment shall be made, as' has just been pointed out, until the Governments of Yugoslavia and Italy have been consulted. This being so, if I have understood the United Kingdom representative's proposal correctly-and I will ask him to confirm my understanding-in his opinion, all we need do at th~ moment is to have a preliminary exchange of views between the members of the Security Council, in order to widen the exchange of views which certain members of the Council have had -and quite properiy have had-on this question. Je rappelle que, d'apres l'article 11 du Statut de Trieste, la nomination ne peut intervenir, ainsi qu'on la souligne tout a l'heure, qu'apres consultation des Gouvernements de Yougo;;lavie et d'Italie. Dans ces conditions, si j'interprete .bien la propositioD. du representant du Royaume-Uni -'- ce que je lui demanderai de bien vouloir me confirmer - il ne, s'agirait, , pour le moment, dans sa pensee, que d'un echange de vues prealable entre les membres du Con~ seil de' sec~te, ayant pour objet d'eIargir les echanges de vues que, tres correctement d'ail· leurs, certains membres du Conseil ont pu avoir sur ("~tte question. If I understand Sir Alexander correctly, all we need do, then, would be to have a preliminary discussion about the various candidatures which have been put forward. We would have a quick disctL.<lSion and see also whether any others might ppsSibly be considered. Naturally, there would be no question of taking a decision at present. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): The President's interpretation seems to be entirely correct. Sir . Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume.;Uni) (traduit de l'anglais) : L'interpretation du President me parait tout a fait juste.

Thank you. If there are no further remarks I shall put the adoption of the agenda to the vote. I shall ask you to vote item by item.on this adoption. As item 1is the adoption of the agenda itself, I shall begin by asking you to vote on items 2 and 3 of the provisional agenda. S'il n'est pas presente d'auttes observations, je vam mettre aux voix l'adoption de l'ordre du jour. Je vous demanderai, Messieurs, de VOllS prononcer, point par point, sur cette adoption. Le point 1 etant l'a,doption meme de l'ordre du jour, je VOllS consulterai d'abord sur le point 2, puis sur le point 3 de l'ordre du jour provi- . . SOIre. Je soumets done avotre appropation I'inscription a l'ordre du jour du point 2 de l'ordre du jour provisoire : "Nomination d'un gouverneur du Territoire libre de Trieste." Are you in favour, then, of including in our agenda item 2 of the provisional agenda: "Appointment of a governor of the :Free Territory of Trieste"? .Iiit· wil> 0= ~ •~.~ •• ,~ Le PRESIDENT: Void l'observation que je voulais presenter. Je crois que nous sommes unanimes a cousiderer que la nomination du gouvemeur -de Trieste ne peut prendre effet qu'apres la ratification, du traite de paix. Je 'pense meme que nollS pourrions etre d'acccrd sur ce point que la nomination suppose que la ratification a eu lieu~ Si j'interprete bien la pensee de Sir Alexander, il ne s'agirait done e,ntre nous que cl'une conversation tres preliminaire, 011 seraient envisagees les differentes candidatureS qui ont pu ctre proposees. 'Nous les examinerions rapidement, et verrions aussi si d'autres candidatures peuvent ctr~ eventuellement envisagees. Bien entendu, il ne saurait etre question de prendre une decision maintenant. Le PRESIDENT: Je vous remerde. Abstention: France

I shall now ask you if you approve of the inclusion in the agenda of item 3, which is a continuation of our earlier discussion on the application of Article 43 of the Charter. A vote was taken by sltow of Itands, and it was unanimously decided to include item 3 of the provisional agetlda in tlte agenda. 118. Procedure concerning the discussion of the appointment of the governor of Trieste

I should like to consult you on how we, should proceed for the consideration of item 2 of our agenda, that is, the appointm~nt,of the governor of the Free Territory of Trieste. It has been suggested, at least unofficially, that this matter should be discussed in private. Now a decision of the Security Council is necessary if a private meeting is to be held. I leave it to you, therefore, to decide on the proposal that this item be discussed in private session. If it were so decided, I would suggest that this item should be taken up only when we meet this afternoon, and that we now proceed with the discussion of item 3 of our agenda. Are there any comments? As there are none, I shall put to the vote the proposal that item 2 of the agenda be considered in private session.

As I have just suggested, item 2 of the agenda will be taken up only at this afternoon's meeting. We shall now pass on to the examination of item 3. Le PRESIDENT: Conformement· a la proposition que je viens de faire, nous n'examinerons ce point 2 de I'ordre du jour q~'a la seance de cet apres-midi, et nous allons passer immediatement a I'examen du point 3. 179. Continuation (if the discussion on the special agre';)ments under Article 43 of the Charter and the organization of fhe United Nations ar",ed forces 179. Suite de la discussion sur les accords speciaux prevu5 Ca l'Article 43 de la .Charte et sur I'organisation des forces armees des .Nations Unies

I will remind you that it was decided at our last meeting to ask the Military Staff Committee to Clarify articles 5 'and 6 of the report it submitted to us.1 Le PRESIDENT: Je vous rappelle qu'au cours de notre derniere seance, il avait ete decide de demander au Comite d'etat-major de vouloir bien eclaircir pour nous le sens des articles 5 et 6 du rapport qu'il nous a soumis1• I have consulted the Military Staff Committee on these points and have received from'its Chairman an answer to only one of the questions. That is the Australian representative's question which is recorded in the record of our hundred and forty-second meeting in the following terms: J'ai consulte le Comite d'etat-major sur ces points et j'ai re~u de son President une reponse concernant seulement 1'une des questions posees: il s'agit de la question du representant de l'Australie qui figure en ces termes au proces-verbal de notre cent-quarante-deuxieme seance: 1 Voici les textes des lettres ·adressees a re sujet au President du Comite d'etat-major par le President du Conseil de securite (document S(380) : [Texte original en franr;ais] Le 19juin 1947 Monsieur le President, A la demande du representant de rAustralie, le President du Conseil de securite prie le President du Comite d'etat-major de voulo~ bien lui faire connaitre dans les plus brefs deIais et si possible avant la prochaine seance du Conseil de securite (le vendredi 20 jtiin): 1. L'interpretation du Comite d'etat-major en ce qui concerne les articles 5 et 6 du rapport du Comite o'etatmajor au Conseil de securite relatifs a l'organisation des forces armees des Nations Unies; 2. L'activite actuelle du Comite d'etat-major relative a revaluation de la pUissance d'ensemble des forces armees mises a la disposition du Conseil de securite. 1 The following is the text of the relevant letters from the President of the Security Council to the Chairman of the Military Staff Committee (document S/380) : [Original text: French] 19 June 1947 Sir: At the request of the representative of Australia, the President of the Security Council begs the Chairman of the Military Staff Committee to let him know urgently, and if possible before the next meeting of the Security Council (Friday, 20 June): (1) The Military Staff Committee's interpretation of articles 5 and 6 of the report of the Military Staff Committee"to the Security Council on the organization of the armed forces of the United Nations; (2) .The action at present being taken by the Military Staff Committee in connexion with the estimate of the overall strength of the armed forces made available to the Security Council. . (Signed) A. PARODI President of the Security Council (SignC) A. PARODI President du Conseil de securitc [Original text: French] 19 June 1947 [Texte original en franr;ais] Le 19 juin 1947 Sir: I have the honour to communicate to you below an extract from the verbatim record of the hundred and forty.second meeting of the Security Council held at Lake Success on Wednesday, 18 June 1947 (S/P.V./142, 'page 92) : "The representative of AUSTRALIA: My quesuon is: is !he .Military Staff Committee giving consideration, or will It. gtv~ consideration to articles agreed to unless there is a dlfectlon from this Council? "The PRESIDENT: As I pointed out, the question has now been asked and a reply will be forthcoming, possibly at our next meeting." I should be obliged if you would let me have a reply to the questions of the representative of Australia as soon as possible, if possible by Friday, 20 June. Monsieur le President, rai l'honneur de vous communiquer ci-dessous un extrait du compte rendu de la cent-quarante·deuxieme reuniol1 du Conseil de securite, tenuea Lake Success le mercredi 18 juin 19~~7 [S/P.V./142, page 92 (texte anglais) ]. "Le representant de rAUSTRALIE: Ma question est la suivante: le Comite d'ctat-major examine-t'll, ou examinera-til de nouveau des articles qU'il a deja acceptes s'il ne re<;Qit pas d'instructions du Conseil de securite a cet effet? lLePRtsIDENT: I_a question a ete posee, et, comme je 1ai indique tout al'heure, il y sera repondu, si possible, a' notre procbaine reunion:' Je 'Vous serais' tres oblige de mefaire parvenir une reponse aux questions posees par le representant de I'Australie aussitOt que possible, et si possible le vendredi 20 juin. . (Signtf) A.PARODI President du Conseil de securitt! • Here is the reply from General McNarney, Chairman of the Military Staff Committee: 2 [Original text: English] 19 June 1947 "Sir: In reply to your letter of 19 June 1947, requesting a reply, to the question posed by the Australian delegation at the one hundred and forty-second meeting of the Security Council, 18 June 1947, as indicated in document S/P.V. 142, page 92, I have the honour to submit the following: "First, the Military Staff Committee is not now reconsidering the ~ording or meaning of articles of the general principles which have been agreed to; and, second, the Military Staff Committee has no present intention of reconsidering any of the articles of the general principles which have been agreed'to without s~cific direction to that effect from the Security Council." (Signed) Joseph T. McNARNEY, General, USAAF, Chairman, Military Staff Committee I have not yet received a reply to the other questions asked. At the present stage of our discussion, I could ask you either to continue the examination of articles 5 and 6 and, if possible, reach a decision, on them-I would point out that I have had no ~ motion to amend these articles-or ask you whether you thought we should, .on the other hand, wait .for' the Military Staff Committee's reply, in which case we could proceed to discuss the next· articles of the repdrt. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated .from French): I should like to make some additional obs,ervations on article 6, but these would not call for reconsideration by the Military Staff Committee.

This being the case, I think we should ask the representative of Belgium to submit his observations immediately. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated from French) : The observations I should like to offer are intended to make what I said at the last. meeting rather clearer and will not, as I have just stated, involve referring this question back to the Military Staff Committee. It is, I . think, for the Security Council itself to judge of their relevance. My remarks aim at making the Void la reponse du general McNamey, Pre. sident du Comite d'etat-major2: ' [Texte original en anglais] Le 19 juin 1947 "Monsieur le President, "En l'eponse avotre lettre en date du 19 join 1947, dans laquelle vous me demandez une re· ponse au~ questions posees par le representant de l'Australie au cours de la cent-quarante. deuxieme seance du Conseil de securite, tenue le 18 juin 1947, et qui figurent au document S/P.V. 142, pages 21 et 22, j'ai I'honneur de vous faire part de ce qui suit: "En premier lleu, le Comite d'etat-major ne procede pas, pOUf le moment, a un nouvel exa· men.du texte ou du sens des articles ayant trait aux principes generaux et qui ont ete acceptesj en second lieu, le Comite d'etat-major n'a pas actuellement l'intention d'examiner a nouveau l'un quelconque des articles ayant trait aux principes generaux et qui ont ete acceptes, sans avoir, au prealable, re~u du Conseil de securite d'instructions precises a cet eUet." (Signe) Joseph T. McNARNEY General de l'armee de l'air des Etats-Unis, President du ComiM d'etat-major Je n'ai pas encore re~u de reponse aux autres questions posees. Au point ou en est notre discussion je puis, soit vous demander de continuer l'examen des articles 5 et 6 pour arriver, si possible; a une decision en ce qui les concerne - je ferai remarn quer que je n'ai ete saisi d'aucune proposition tendant a. modifier ces articles -, soit voUB demander si vous estinlez qu'au contraire DOUB devons attendre la reponse du Comite d'etat· major, et, dans ce cas, passer a l'examen des articles suivants du rapport. M. VAN LANGENHOVE (Bt:1gique): Je sou· haiterais pouvoir presenter des remarques compIementaires ausujet de l'article 6, m~ ces remarques ne necessitent pas de reexamen par le Comite d'etat-tnajor. , Le PRtsIDEJ\lT:Dans ces conditions, il me semble que nous devons demander au repre. sentant de la Belgique de nous presenter imme- 'diatement ses observations. M. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgique): Les remarques que je voudrais presenter, et qui tendent a apporter un peu plus de clarte sur celles que j'ai deja formuIees a. la seance precCdente, ne comportent pas, comme je viens de le dire, un renvoi au Comitc.d'etat-major. C'est, en effet, au Conseil de securite lui-meme qu'il appar~ tient, a mon avis, d'en apprecier la pertinence. 1 Voir les Proces-verba"" officiels du Conseil de st!eurilt!, Deuxieme ann~J No 47. According to Article 43 of the Charter, it is the Security Council~~ duty to take "the initiative" in negotiating spedal agreements between itself and the Member States. I stress the word initiative, which is the one used in the Charter. Under these agreements, the Members of the United Nations will have to hold certain armed forces in reserve, which they thus undertake to make available to the. Security Council "on its call," that is, in a clearly defined hypothetical situation, Such a hypothetical situation would arise when the Council called for the armed forces and facilities compulsorily held in reserve for that purpose under the special agreements. The Council could make such a call only "in accordance with special agreements" duly concluded. Therefore, the obligation to make armed forces available to the Security Council pr~supposes ,not only the conclusion of special agreements but also a call from the Security Council. Unti! such a call is made, there are within the meaning of the Charter no armed forces "made available to the Council;" there are only armed forces which have to be held in reserve in anticipation of the possibility-which might never arise-that the Security Council would call on Member States to make them actually available. SeIon l'Article 43 de la Charte, il incombe au Conseil de' securite de prendre "l'initiative" de la negociation d'accords speciaux a conclure entre lui et les Etats Mcmbres. J~ souligne le mot initiative, q ..d est celui qu'on emploie dans la Charte. En vertu de ces accords, les Membres des Nations Unies auront l'obligation de tenir en reserve certaines forces armees, qu'ils se seront engages a mettre a la disposition du Conseil "sur son invitation", c'est-a-dire dans une hypothese bien determinee. Cette hypothese se realise lorsque le Conseil formule l'invitation a mettre a sa di(;pdsition les forces armees et facilites obligatoirement tenues en reserve a cette fin en vertu des accords speciaux. Le Consei! ne peut faire' cette invitation que "conformement a des accords speciaux" qui se trouvent avoir ete dument conclus. L'obligation de mettre des forces armees ala disposition . du Conseil presuppose donc, non seulement la conclusion d'accords speciaux, mais en outre une invitation du Conseil de securite. Tant que cette invitation n'a pas eu lieu, il n'y a pas, ausens de la .Charte, de forces armees "mises a la disposition du Conseil"; il n'y a que des forces armees tenues obligatoirement en reserve, en llrevision du cas, qui pourrait ne jamais se prol'uire, ou le Conseil inviterait des Etats·Membres a les mettre effectivement a. sa disposition. This distinction is one of practical importance. Before a call is made by the Security Council, the armed forces envisaged in the special agreements remain under the orders of the country to which they beyong; they can come under the Security Council's authority only after the latter has asked for them to be made available. That is merely one of the effects of this distinction; there may conceivably be others at least equally important. La distinction est pratiquement importante: avant l'invitatioIl du Consei1, les forces armees visees par les accords speciaux restent sous le commandement des Etats dont elles relevent; elles ne peuvent passer sous l'autorite du Consell de secufite qu'apres que celui-cl a requis leur mise a sa disposition. Ce n'est la qu'une des consequences de cette distinction; on peut en concevoir d'autres, au moins aussi importantes. In a word, the distinction between these two phases, the one that precedes the "call" of the Council, and the one which follows that call, is one that should be respected, particularly in a document such as the Military Staff Committee's report, on the various parts of which we have to decide. . . Bref, la distinction entre les deux phrases,·celle qui precede "l'invitation" du Conseil et celle qui suit cette invitation, vaut d'etre respectee. Elle doit surtout l'etre dans un document te1 que le rapport du Comite d'etat-major, SuI' les dif£erentes parties duquel nous avons anous prononcer. ' Or, dans certains articles du rapport, l'expression "forces armees mises a la disposition' du . Con,,,:il de securite" est employee pour designer desces qui ne seAlt pas a 'la disposition du Conseil de securite, mais qui nesont encore que tenues obligatoirement en reserve en vue de cette hypothese. C'est apparemment le cas pourl'article 6 dont le Conseil discute en ce moment. n y est, en e£fet, question de prevair urie force suffisante' pour permettre au Conseil d'agir "en tout point du glolJe", c'est-a-dire pour lui permettre de faire face, si elle se produit, a une eventuaIite concrete, ou qu'elle se produhe. n s'a~t donc de forces a tenir obligatoirement en .reserve a cet The expression "armed forces made available to th~ Security Council" is used in certain articles of the report to describe forces which are not at the Security Council's disposal, but which are still only compulsorily held in reserve in case of such a possibility. This apparently is the position with regard to article 6, which the Council is now discussing. The reference there is to providing. a force of sufficient strength to enable the Council to take action "in any part' of the world," that is, to enable it to cope when necessary with any concrete situation wherever it may arise. The reference is, therefore, ttl forces compulsorily held in b\ "'The armed forces specified in the special agreements'and'which are to be made available to the Security Council at its request by the Members of the United Nations shall he of a .strength sufficient ..." The rest of the text stands. I reserVe. the right to subqlit similar amend~ ments to other articles of the report, as they come up for examination by the Council. I feel sure that the Council will appreciate that it is better not to use the same expression in the report to convey two different meanings, one of which is not the sense in which it is used in the Charter.. The PRESIDENT: (translated from French) : I should like to thank the Belgian representative for having clarified and enlarged his earlierob~ serva,!ion, the exact meaning of which, I must confess, had escaped me. The point which he raised appears to me to' be the most interesting and important of all the points discussed during the consideration of articles 5 and 6 of the re~ port; it certainly merits our serious considera~ tion. I do not know whether you feel you can discuss .it ..forthwith. In any case, I should like to hear any observations which members of the Council may want to make on the Belgian representative's statement. ., The Belgian representative has submitted his proposal in the form of a definite amendment, which I shall read again. He wants article 6 to be' redrafted as follows: "The armed forces specified in the special agreements and which are to be made available' to the Security Council at its request by the Member nations of the United Nations shall be of a strength sufficient to enable the .Security Council to take prompt action in any part of the world for the maintenance or the restoration of international peace and security as envisaged in Article 42 of the Charter." . " Mr. GRO:MYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Re~ publics) (translated from Russian): I am not clear as to the intention of the Belgian amendment, and the explanations given do not help to make it any clearer. Article ~ as approved by the Military Staff Committee seems to me'to be clear.

(translated from French) : , If I have correctly understood-the Belgian repre- . sentative's amendment, he has, firstly, offered a particular interpretation of Article 43 of the Charter; and, secondly, on the basis of this in~ terpretation he has pointed out that, in the case "Les forces armees designees dans les accords speciaux et quidoivent etre mises, sur son invi. tation,a. la &~position du Conseil. de securite par les Etats ~J.embres des Nations Urees seroilt suffisantes •.." . Le reste du texte n'est pas modifi6. Je me reserve de presenter des amendemllnts de meme nature concernant d'autres articles du rapport, a. mesure que le Conseil abordera leur examen. Le Conseil reconnaitra, j'en suis sur, l'interet qu'il y a a. ne· pas employer dans le rapport une meme expression dans deux sens.differents, dont l'un ne correspond pas a. celui dans lequel cette expression est u~ee dans la Charte. . Le PRESIDENT: Je remercie le ,representant p,e la :aelgique cl'avoir bien voulu preciser et developper une observation qu'il avait deja. presentee et dont-- jedois le reconnaitre et je m'en excuse - le st;ns exact m'avait. un peu echappe. Le point qu'il souleve me parait etre le plus interessant et le plus important de tous ceux sur Ifsquels notre attention ait ete appeIee au co'urs de la discussion des articles 5 et 6 du rapport; il merite certainement· d'etre serieusement exa- . rnli.e. Je ne sais si vous estimerez etre en etatde le discuter des aujourd'hui. Je souhaiterais, en· tout cas, entendre les observations que' la declaration du representant de la Be1gique peut inspireraux membres du Conseil. ' Le representant de la Belgique a donne a.sa proposition la forme d"un amendement preciS dont je vais donner de nouveau lecture. n demande que l'article 6 soit redige comme su~t: "Les forces armees designees dans les accords speciaux et qui doivent etre mises, .sur' son invitation, a. la disposition du Conseil.de securite par les Etats Membres des Nations Unies seront suffisantes .pour permettre au Conseil d'entreprendre une action rapide en tout point du globe pour le maintien pll le retablissement de la paix et de la securite internationales, comme prevu a. l'Article 42 de la Charte." M. GROMYKO (Union des'RepubliquessoCia- Iistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Je ne comprends pas tres bien le sens de l'amendement beIge; les explications qu'on nous a fourniesne contribuent pas' a. en prec~er le sens. Il me semble que l'artide 6, te1 qu'il a ete adopte par le Comite d'etat-major, est parfaitenient clair. Le PRESIDENT: .Si j~ai bien compris l'amendement soumis par le representant de la Belgique, il a, d'une part, presente une cettaine interpretation de l'Article 43 de la Charte; d'autre , part, s'appuyant sur cette interpretation, il a souligne qu'en ce qui concerne les troupes mises ~ Comme je I'ai indique tout a I'heure, mon impression est que la remarque qui a ete faite , A<.;I have just stated, I feel that both the remarks and the amendment submitted by the, Belgian representative deserve careful study by Ul! and. perhaps longer reflection. I think therefore that, in order to allow mo~e time for reflection, and possibly to, allow some of us to consult our country's representatives on the Military Staff Committee, I should not put this amendment to the vote now..Therefore, if no objection is raised, I shall hold over the vote on this question. , .. ~t I'amendement qui a ete propose par le representant de la Belgique meritentune etudeattentive'de notre part et plus longue reflexion. Dans ces conditio11&, je pense que pour vous permettre d'y reflechir davantage et, peut-etre, pour certains d'entre nous, d'en discuter avec les representants de nos pays au Comite d'etat-major, il ne convient pas que je mette cet amendement aux voiximmediatement. Done, si vous n'y avez pas d'objection, j'ajoumerai le vote sur ce point. Mr. VAN UNGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated from French) : I have, of course, no objection to this adjournment, and I am at my colleagues' disposal for any additional explanations they may desire. ' M. VAN UNGENHOVE (BeIgique): Je n'ai, bien entendu, aucune objection a faire a .cet ajournement et je me tiens a la disposition de mes collegues qui souhaiteraient des eclaircissements complementaires. I should, however, like to suggest a small correction to the English text of the proposal, which has just been circulated, which would bring it into line with the Charter. The words at its refjuestin the text should be J:'eplaced by the expression at its call, which reproduces the term of the Charter. q J'aimeraiS cependant signaler que l~ teXte anglais de ma proposition, qui vient d'etredistribue,appelle une petite rectification pour mettre ses termes" en harmonie avec ceux de la Charte..En effet, i1 y aurait lieu de remplacer l'expression at its· request par les mots at its call, pour reprendre les termes de la Charte.

(translated from French) : As no objection has been raised,to the procedure I have suggested, we shall now proceed to examine the next articles ofthe report. Le PRfSIDENT: Aucune observation n'etant formulee quant a la methode de travail que j'ai proposee, nous alIons passer maintenant a I'examen des articles suivants du rapport. In accordance with the procedure hitherto adopted, I propose to pass over articles 7 and 8 of chapter HI, on which the Military Staff Committee failed to agree. En ce qui conceme le chapitre Ill, et conformement a la procedure suivie jusqu'a present, je laisserai de cote les articles 7 et 8, au sujet desquels l'accord n'a pas ete realise au sein du Comite d'etat-major. Colonel HODGSON (Au~tralia): D,oes that mean that you are reserving article 5 as well? Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): Voulez-vous dire que VOllS reservez aussi l'article 5? The .PRESIDENT:. (translated from French) : Yes, that is so. LePRfsIDENT: Oui, i1 en est bien ainsi. Chapter IV deals with the contribution of armed forces by Member nations; it contains six articles on which agreement was reached in the Military Staff Committee and three articles which are not agreed to. . The President read articles 9, 10, 12, 13, 14 . and 15, upon which agreement had been reached by the Military Staff Committee. He reminded the Council that no agreement had been reached on articles 11, 16 and 17. ~also to articles 10 and 13, which we are now' discussing. The expression "armed forces made available to the Security Council" is again used in a sense different from that given it in the Charter. In the latter, I repeat, this expression implies a call by the Council. This is not the case in articles 10 and 13. The -PRESIDENT: (translated from French) -: The remark we have just heard links up with the one made about article 6. Articles 10 and 13 should, therefore, be reserved since they deal with the same question. 1 shall ask the Belgian representative-to submit at one of our next meetings the written text of his amendments to articles 10 and 13 corresponding to the amendment he proposed to 2rticle 6. Are there any other remarks? As there is no response, I consider the articles which have been read to have been adopted by the Security Council, subject to any consl1quential effect which the decision on the Belgian amendment to, articl~ 6 may have on articles 10 and 13. , The PRESIDENT: (translated from French): I shall now take up chapter V, which deals with the employment of armed forces. The President read articles 18, and 19 (chapter V); he pointed out that no agreement had been reached on articles 20 and 21.

(translated from French): As there are no remarks, I consider articles 18 and 19 adopted. Chapter VJ deals with the degree of readiness of armed forces. , The President then read articles 22,.23 and' 24; he pointed out that no agreement had been reached on article 25, which concerns air force contingents.

(translated from French) : Are there allY observations? Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated from French): My earlier remarks apply to article 22 as well.

(translated from French): If there are no further remarks, articles 22, 23 and 24 are adopted with the reservation made , by the Belgian delegation, which will be discussed later. The Australian representative has just asked to be allowed to speak, so I call upon him. Le PRESIDENT:'La remarque qui vient d'etre faite se rattache a celle qu'on a presentee en ce qui conceme l'article 6. Les deux articles -10 et 13 doivent done etre reserves, puisque c'est la meme question qui est soulevee. Je prierai le representant de la Belgiquede bienvouloir redi. ger, pour une prochaine seance, les ,modifications qu'il y aurait lieu d'apporter a ces arti. cles 10 et 13 en relation avec l'amendement a l'article 6 qu'il a presente. Y a-t-il d'autres observations? Aucune remarque n'etant presentee, jeconsidere les articles dont il a ete donne lecture comrrie adoptes par le Conseil de securite, sous r~ervl ~ de la reper- 'cussion qu'aurait sur lesarticles 1C) et 13 la decision prise con~emant l'amendement beIge a l'article 6. Aveccette reserve,les articles 9, 10, 12, 13, ,14 et 15 _du rapport sont adoptes. , Le PRESIDENT: Je passe au chapitre V, qui traite de l'utilisation des forces armees. Le President donne lecture des -articles 18 et 19 (chapitre V); il indique que les articles 20 et 21 n'ont pas donne lieu aun accord, Le PRESIDENT: En l'absence d'observations, je considere les articles 18 et 19 comme adoptes. Le chapitre VI conceme le degre de preparation des forces armees. Le President donne lecture des articles 22, 23 et 24; il indique que l'article 25 qui concerne les_forces aeriennes n;a pas donne lieu a un accord. Le PRESIDENT: Y a-t-il des observations? • . t ' M. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgique) ~ Mes remarques anterieures s'appliquent egalement a l'article 22. Le PRESIDENT: S'il n'y a pas d'autres obse~· vations, les articles 22, 23 et 24 seront COnslderes comme adoptes,avec la reserve faite par la delegation beIge, qui fera l'objet d'un examenulterieur. Mais le repr~entant de l'Australie vient de me demander la parole, et je la lui donne. ~....1

(translated from French) : The dbservation applies specifically to the English text· it does not affect the French text, to which I p~ona11y have no objections. Le PRESIDENT: L'observation vise sp~dale;' ment le texte anglais; eUe ne s'applique pas, par voie de consequence, au texte fran~ais, lequel ne me choque pas personnellement. SirAlexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): I suggest that it would at least make better English if that article read: ". . . should be maintained at a level whith will enable these forces to act in good time with a view to the fulfilment ..." That, according to my understanding, conveys the sense which is inten.de~. If that wor~g is acceptable, it. would certainly look nicer in an EngliSh text. Sir AlexanderCADoGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglazs): Il me semble qu'on ameliorerait le texte en disant: ". .. sera maintenu a un niveau tel qu'il permettra aces fcJrces de prendre des mesures en temps opportuD.,en vue de l'accomplissement ..." Cette redaction. respecte, a man avis, le sens de la phrase. Si vous l'acceptez, vous aurez certainement ameliore la redaction du texte anglais.

(translated from French) : Is this proposal agreeable to our Australia:p. colleague? Le PRESIDENT: Notre collegue australien' accepte-t-il cette proposition?, Colonel HODGSON (Australia) : Yes, Mr. President. Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): Qui, Monsieur le President. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Russian text of this article is perfectly clear and cannot be misunderstood. If you think it useful, we could translate the Russian text into English. If the English and Russian versions w(:re brought into line, the agreed text would read as follows: "To start in good time to fulfil the Security Council's measures, etc." M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques sodalistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Le texte russe de cet article est parfaitemerit clair et ne donne lieu a aucun malentendu. Sic'etait utile, on pourrait traduire cet article du 'russe en anglais. 'Si on'faisait ,concorder le texte anglais et le texte russe, l'article se lirait comme suit: To start in good time to fulfil the Security Council's measures, etc. ' . . Colonel HODGSON (Australia) : That wording Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de is quite acceptable to me. l'anglais) : Je trouve ce texte parfaitement acceptable. .

(translated from French) : We have before us two proposals to amend this text, both of which are acceptable to the Australian representative. If there is no objection, I would suggest retaining the Russian modification, which corresponds exactly to the French translation of the text. But if Sir Alexander Cadogan so desires, I shall put his modification to the vote. Le PRESIDENT: Nous sommes saisis de deux propositwns en vue d'ameliorer Cl';: texte, l'une et l'autre acceptees par le representant de l'Aus-" tralie. S'il n'y a pas d'opposition, je proposerai de retenir la modification russe, laquelle corres:' pond exactement au texte de la traduction en fran~ais. Mais \si Sir Alexander Cadogan le desire, je mettrai aux voix la modification qu'il a lui-meme proposee. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : No, sir. I slightly prefer my wording but, since that proposed by the USSR rep~'esentativebrings the two texts exactly into ac<::ord~and that is a . Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): Non, Monsieur le President, je marquerais une Iegere preference·pour la redaction que j'ai proposee, mais puisque celle qu'a presentee le representant de l'URSS assure une parfaite concordance avec le texte, gr~at virtue-I agree to the text he suggested. fran~ais - ce qui est.un grand avantage - je suis dispose al'accepter.

(translated from Fre~ch):' Le PRESIDENT: La modification suggeree par The ame.ndment suggested by the representative lIe representant de I'URSS sera done inscrite dans _ of the USSR will therefore-be inserted in the text. le texte. b_......__ Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated from French): I only wished to point out that the Australian representative's proposal wouldbring the English text exactly into line with the French text. The PRESIDF,1\1T: (translated from French) : I should greatly welcome such conformity, but if I may make a remark about the English tex4 I should like to point out that the word should appears in other articles in. this chapter. I draw the Australian representative's attention to this point, as I cannot myself say what exactly should be done. Shall we accept shall or should? Colonel HODGSON (Australia): I noticed that discrepancy myself and that is why I asked the reason for it in this particular article. It appears to my delegation that this is one of the cases where the text should read shall.

(translated from French): So we agree to use the word shall. Articles 22, 23 and 24 were adopted, with the suggested modification, the word shall replacing the word should in the English text.

(translated from French): We shall now take chapter VII,'which deals with the provision of assistance and facilities; including rights of passage, for armed forces. As there is no article in chapter VII which has been agreed upon, we shall pass on to chapter VIII, which deals with the logistic support of the armed forces. The President read articles 29 and 30, pointingout that no agreement had been reached on article 31. The PRESIDENT: (translated from French): May we consider articles 29 and 30 as adopted? Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated from French): The only remark I have to make is on a point of wording. The expression sur sa demande1 appears in the French text, whereas the Charter uses the words sur son invitation. I think it would be better to bring the te~t before us into line with that of the Charter. I should also like to take this opportunity to point out that the expression "placed ... at the disposal of the Security Council" is used here in the same sense as in the Charter, which is not the case in the articles previously mentioned ~y me. fran~ais. Le PRESIDENT: Je me rejouiraisparticulie. rement de cette conformite, mais, si je me per. mets d'intervenir en ce qui concerne le texte anglais, c'est pour signaler que le terme shou,ld se retrouve dans d'autres articles du meme cha· pitre. J'appelle sw' ce point l'attention du repre. sentant de l'Australie, car je suis .incapable d'apprecier exactement ce qu'il cOllvient de faire. Accepterons-nous shall ou should? Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): J'ai egalement remarque cette con, tradiction, et c'est pourquoi j'en ai demande la raison en ce qui concerne l'article en question. n semble it ma delegation que c'est la un des cas ou I'on devrait employer shall. Le PRESIDENT: Alors, Messieurs, je crois que ce sera le mot shall qui sera employe. Les articles 22, 23 et 24 sont adoptes avec la modification de forme proposee, le mot shall remplafant le mot should dans le texte anglais de {,'es articles. Le PRESIDENT: Le chapitre VII, qui traite de l'assistanceet des facilites, y compris les droits de passage, pour les forces armees, ne contient aucun article sur leque1 l'accord ait ete realise, Je passe donc au chapitre VIII, qui traite des besoins logistiques des forces armees. Le President donne lecture des articles 29 et 30; il indique que l'article 31 n'a pas donne lieu a un accord. Le PRESIDENT: Puis-je considerer les articles 2~ et 30 commeadoptes? M. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgique): La remarque que j'ai it presenter est de pure forme. Dans le texte fran~ais est employee l'expression "sur sa demande1", alors que I'expression employee dans la Charte est "sur son invitation". Je crois qu'il serait preferable de mettre le texte qui noUS est soumis en harmonie avec celui de la Charte. D'autre part, je profite de cette occasion pour sigI?aler que I'expression "placee it la dispo: sition du ConseU de securite" est employee iCl conformement au sens qu'elle a dans la Chart~, contrairement it ce qui est le cas pour les artIcles que j'ai mentionnes precedemment. Articles 29 and 30 were adopted with the correction called for in the French text.

Chapter IX·deals with the generallocatiqn of the armed forces. No agreement was reached on articles 32, 33 and· 34. Only article 35 was unanimously' adopted by the Military Staff ,Committee. The President read article 35 of chapter IX, replacing the word demande in the French text by the word invitation, as was done in the case of article 29; and article 35 was adopted as amended.

Chapter X deals with the strategic direction and command of the armed forces; articl~ 41 was not unanimously approved. The President read articles 36 to 40, which were adopted.

We have thus concluded the first reading of the Military Staff Committee's report and have adopted the articles which presented no difficv~ty. Decision on two of these have been reserved,and two or three others have also been put aside because of the decision that has· to be taken on the Belgian amendment to article 6. I have just received an answer from the Chair- -man of the Military Staff Committee to the other questions he was asked. ThLe; letter will now be read to you: 1 [Original text: English] 20 June 1947 "Sir: "In reply to yourletter of 19 June 1947, I have the honour to inform you that at the forty-seventh meeting of the Military Staff Committee, on 20 June 1947, the Chinese, French, United Kingdom, and United States delegations agreed to the following replies to your two questions: " (a) 1. Article 5 is an article pertaining to the overall strength of all the forces to be made available to the Security Council in the special agreements, and not to the sizeof any forces that may be called upon for action in 'any specific operation. It must be considered in connexion with the other articles in chapter HI dealing with the overall strength of the armed forc;es. Actually, this article states but one of the factors which the Military Staff Committee believes should be taken into consideration in estimating the overall strength of the forces which should be made available to the Security Council by. Member - 1 Document S/380• . ---~ Les articles 29 et 30 sont adoptes, avec la. rectif~cation qui a ete demandee pour le texte franfats. Le PRESIDENT:Le chapitre IX conceme l'eIIlplacement general des forces armees. n n'y a pas eu accord en ce qui conceme les articles 32, 33 et 34. Seul, I'article 35 a ete propose unanimement par le Comite d"etat-major. Le President donne lecture de l'article 35, en remplafant dans le texte fran~ais le mot ~.demande" par le mot "invitation", ainsi qu'il a ete fait pour l'article 29. L'article 35, ainsi modifM, est adopte. Le PRESIDENT: Le chapitre X traite de la direction strategique et du commandement des forces armees. L'article 41 n'a pas ete propose d'une maniere unanime. Le President do,!!,ne lecture des articles 36 a 40, qui sont adoptes. Le 'PRESIDENT: Nous avons ainsi termine certe premiere lecture du rapport du Comite d'etat-major et adopte les articles qui ne pretaient pas a difficulte. Parmi ceux-ci, deUx ont ete reserves, deux ou trois autres l'ont ete egalement par'suite de la decision a prendre en ce qui concerne l'amendement belge a I'article 6. Je re~ois a l'instant la reponse du President du Comite d'etat-major aux autres questions qui lui avaient ete posees. Voici le texte de cette lettre, qui va vons ctre donne en lecture1 : [Texte original en anglais] Le 20 juin 1947 "Monsieur le President, "Repondant a votre lettre du 19 juin 1947, j'ai l'honneur de vous informer qu'a la quaranteseptieme reuaion du Comite d'etat-major, le 20 juin 1947, les delegations de la Chine, de la France, du Royaume-Uni et des Etats-Unis se sont mises d'accord pour repondre comme suit a vos deux questions: "a) 1. L'article 5 est un article qui se refere a la puissance d'ensemble de toutes les forces qui doivent etre mises a la disposition du Conseil de securite en vertu des accords speciaux, et non pas a I'importance des forces qui peuvent etre appeJees a intervenir en vue d'une operation particuliere. Cet article doit etre pris en consideration en liaison avec les aun CB articles du chapitreIII, qui a trait a la puissance d'ensem- . ble des forces armees. En fait, cet article n'enonce que run des facteurs dont le Comite cl'etatmajor estime qu'il y a lieu de tenir· compte pour evaluer la puissance d'ensemble des forces qui "(b) The Military Staff Committee's Sub- Committee on Overall Strengt.h and Composition has been conducting informal discussions for approximately three weeks. During these discussions, tw,p methods of approaching the problem of estimating overall strength and composition have been suggested. These methods are presently under consideration by the several delegations. The Suh-ComnUttee on Overall Strength and Composition, in.its terms of reference from the Military Staff Committee, was directed to report its progress to the Military -Staff Committee by 30 June 1947. "The USSR delegation was not prepared to take part in the discussions at which the above answers were agreed to by the other four delegatioP..5, since the USSR delegation stated that it did not consider that yow: letter was conveying decisions of the Security Council as a whole, which they regarded as essential. "The other four delegations accepted the rul- ' ing of the Chairman that the matter was one of procedure ~d not of substance and therefore that c&..;assion should proceed. The USSR delegation. thereupon. withdrew." (Signed) Joseph T. McNARNEY General, USAAF, Chairman, Mili~ary Staff Committee The PRESIDENT (translated from French):. Two of our colleagues have asked to speak. They are the Australian representative and the USSR representative. As agreed, we shall meet again this. aftenoon in private session, and one member has asked that the aftemoon meeting should terminate by 5 p. m. Accordingly, I would.propose to adjourn any discussion we may have of the. letter you have just heard read and of the Belgian amend- ~ent until we meet again to discuss the Mili~ary Staff Committee's report; that should be next week. If you all agree, I propose to follow this course. tions~ Aux termes du manuat qu'~l a rc~u du Comite d'etat-major, le Sous-Comite pour la puissance d'ensemble et la composition a ete invite a rendre compte au Comite d'etat-major: . le 30 juin 1947, de l'etat de ses travaux. "La delegation de l'URSS n'a pas ete en mesure de prendre p¥! a la discussion au cours de laquelle les reponses ci-dessus ont recueilli l'accord des quatre autres delegations; la delegation de I'URSS a en effet declare qu'elle n'estimait pas que votre lettre notifiait des de,..;~ions· du Conseil de securite en tant que corps constitue, ce que la delegation de I'URSS estimait essentiel. "Les quatre autres delegations ont accepte la decision du President, decision selon laquelle la question est une question de procedure et non pas .. une question de substance, et que, par consequent, la discussion devait se poursuivre. La delegation de I'URSS s'est alors retiree." (Signe) Joseph T. ¥cNARNEY General de l'armee de l'air des Etats-Unis, President du Comite d'etat-major Le PRESIDENT: Deux de nos collegues ont demande. la parole: le representant de l'Australieet le representant de I'URSS. Nous devons nous reunir de nouveau eet apres-midi en seance'privee, comme nous venons de le decider, et l'un de nos collegues m'a demande que la reunion de cet apres-midi ne se prolongeat pas au deIa de 17 heures. Mon intention serait, "dans ces conditions, d~ajoumer la discussion eventuelle de la lettre dont il vient de vous ctre donne lecture et de l'amendement beIge a la' prochaine reUnion que nous tiendrons sur la discussion du rapport .du Comite d'etat-major, celle-ci devant avoir lieu la semaine prochaine. Si vous n'y voyez pas d'meonvenients, c'est ainsi que je procedcrai.

I now call upon the USSR representative, and ask him to speak first on the question of adjourning the meeting. Le PRESIDENT: Je vais donner la parole au . representant de I'URSS, en lui demandant de bien vOuloir d'abord donner son avis sur la question de l'ajournement de ~a seance. 11.5 r.!n~,r..,.Y.~ (Um"--- ..3__ n ~ Ll: ·s-~:~ .ioU•• ,-,nu...J.",r.u un ue;, ~'-'CPUOllqUe;, U\;IC2,- listes sovietiques) (traduit du russe) : II faudrait, me semble-t-il, nous entendre sur l'ordre dans lequel nous nous adresserons au Comite djetatmajor. Je crois qu~il s'est produit un,malentendu. Nous n'avons charge le Comite d'etat-major d'aucune mission. Le represen,tant de l'Australie a pose un certain nombre de questions. Ces questions n'etaient pas tout a. fait c1aires, et il etait difficile de comprendre ce que lerepresentant de I'Australie· voulait au 'j~te. En tout cas, les. questions adressees au Comite d'etatmajor emanaient du repr~..sentant de l'Australie et non du Conseil de securite.Le Comite d'etatmajor, en tantqu'organe constitue, tl'availle conformement aux instructions du Conseil. C'est au Cons~, en tant qu'organe constitue~ je le repete, que le Comite doit accorder son aide et donner les conseils necessaires. Le Conseil de securite n'a pris aucune decision en vue de demander l'avis du Comite d'etat-major; Cequi a ete communique au .Comite, c'etaient les questions que le representant de l'Australie avait formulees au cours de son intervention; ce n'etaient pas des questions adressees par le Ccinseil de securite, en tant que Conseil, au Comite d'etatmajor, en tant que Comite. ~Jf.. (21)'''....V17''' (TJn;nn nf Sn,';"" Sn";.,.l;,,.. 12 "_ ;,I.,........ _ ...""li.a. ... ~_ .....&..1._...... _.&. __ ii.i._,., __""...~" .&.~_ publics) (translated from Russian): I think we ought to agree on how: we are to apply to the Military Staff Committee. I feel that there .is some misunderstanding. We gave'no instructionsto the Military Staff Committee. The Australian representative put a number of questions. These questions were not altogether clear, and it was difficult to understand what the Australian representative wanted. In any case, these were \ questions put to the Military Staff Committee by the Australian representative, and not questions put by the Security Council. The Military Staff Committee, as a body, works under the direction of the Security Council, and shl.luld help and give any necessary advice to the Security Council as a body. I want to stress that. The Security Council did not adopt any decision to ¥k the Military Staff Committee's opinion; what was referred to the Committee were the Australian representative's questions as formulated· in his speech; they Iwere not questions referred by the Security Council as a body to the Military Staff Committee as a body. Le Comite'd'etat-major n'avait doncriena. examiner, car il n'avait sur ce point aucune instruction ni aucune requete du Conseil de securite. Les representants de I'URSS au Comite d'etat-ml:!,jor ont declare a. ce propos: "Quand nous aurons une requete du Conseil de securite, nous l'etudierons et nous accomplirons la tache qui nous aura ete confiee. Jusqu'a px:esent; le . Comite d'etat-major n'a re~u du Conseil de .securite aucune requete, a. l'e~ception des questions du representant de l'Australie." Peut-etre ces There was, therefore, nothing for the Military Staff. Committee to examine, since it had no instructions or inquiries from the Security Council. There was, therefore, Liotlllng for the Military Military Staff Committee said: "When we receive an inquiry from the Security Council, w(: shall study it and carry out our task,' but so far no inquiries have.been received from the Security ~ouncil apart from the Australian representative's questions." Possibly these questions merit .' consideration, but the Security Council sho.uld ttr, The USSR representatives on the Military Staff Committee are, of course, not bmmd by the answer given by the delegations of other countries to the Australian representative's questions.

I had asked the representative· of the USSR to speak primarily on the adjournment of the meeting. If there are no remarks, we will adjourn the discussion to a meeting to be held next week, the date of which will be announced later. The CoUncil will meet this afternoon in private session at 3 p. m. in Conference Room No. 5. HUNDRED AND FORTY.FOURTH MEETING Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 20 June 1947, at· 3 p.m. President: Mr. A. PARODl (France). Present: The representatives of the following co~ntries: Australia, Belgium,' Brazil, China, Colombia, France, Poland, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. 180. Official communique The following communique was issued by the Security Council after the 'meeting: . The Security Council held a private meeting today at 3 p.m. to discuss the question of the appointment of the governor of the :Free Terri- tory· of Trieste. The members of the Council exchanged views and decided to meet on that matter in a few days. • The meeting rose at 5 p.m. Le PRESIDENT: J'avais demande au represen- tant de I'URSS de vouloir bien s'exprimer de preference sur l'ajournement de la seance. S'il n'y a: pas d'observations, la suite de la dis- cussion sera renvoyee a une seance qui se tien~ dra la semaine prochaine et dont la date serll indiquee ~rieurement. Le Conseil se reunira cet apres-midi en seance privee a 15 heures, dans la salle de conference. No 5. La seance est levee a13 h. 30. CENT·QUARANTE.QUATRIEME SEANCE Tenue a Lake Success, New-York, le vendredi20 juin 1947, a 15 heures; President: M. A. PAROD! (France). Presents: Les representants des pays suivants: .Australie, Belgique, Bresil, Chine, Colombie, France, Pologne, Syrie, Union des Republique~ socialis~es sovietiques, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. 180. Communique officiel Le Conseil de securite s'est reuni aUjourd'hui a 15 heures,en seance privee, pour discuter de la nomination d'un gouvemeur pour le Territoire 'libre de Trieste. Apres avoir procede a un echange de wes, les membres du Conseil ont decide d'examiner de notlveau la question dans que1qu.es jours. La seance est levee a17 heures. Argentina-Argentine Editorial Sudamericana S.A. Alsina 500 BUENOS AmEs Ecuador-Equateur Muiioz Hermanos y Cia Nueve de Octubre 703 Casilla 10-24 GUAYAQUIL Australia-Australie H. A. Goddard Pty. Ltd. 255a George Street SYDNEY Egypt-Egypte Librairie "La Renaissance d'Egypte" 9 Sh. Adly Pasha CAIRO Belgium-Belgique Agence et Messageries de la Presse 14-22 rue du Persil BRUXELLES Finland-Finlande Akateeminen Kirjakauppa 2, Keskuskatu HELSINKI Bolivia-Bolivie Librerla Cientffica y Literaria Avenida 16 de Julio, 216 Casilla 972 LA PAZ France Editions A. Pedone 13, rue SoufHot PARIS, Ve Greece-Grece "Eleftheroudakis" Librairie internationale Place de la Constitution ATHh;ES Canada The Ryerson Press 299 Queen Street West TORONTO Chile-ChiU Edmundo Pizarro Merced 846 SANTIAGO Guatemala Jose Gouba1.ld Goubaud & Cia Ltda. Sucesor. 5a Av. Sur No. 6 y 9a C. P. GUATEMALA China-Chine The Commercial Press Ltd. 211 Honan Road SHANGHAI Haiti-Haiti Max Bouchereau Librame "A la CaraveIIe" Boite postale 111-B PORT-AU-PRINCE Costa Rica-Costa-Rica Trejos HermaL JS Apartado 1313 SAN JOSE India-lnde Oxford Book & Stationery Co. Scindia House NEW DELHI Cuba La Casa Belga Rene de Smedt O'Reilly 455 LA HABANA Iran Bangahe Piaderow 731 Shah Avenue TEHERAN Czechoslovakia Tchecoslovaquie F. Topic Narodni Trida 9 PRAHA 1 Iraq-lrak Mackenzie & Mackenzie The Bookshop BAGHDAD Denmark-Danemark Einar Munskgaard ~orregade 6 KJOBENHAVN Lebanon-Lihan Librairie universeIIe BEYROUTH Dominican Republic RepuhUque Dominicaine Yugoslavia-Yougoslavie Librerla Dominicana Netherlands-Pays-Bas Drzavno Preduzece CaII~ Mercedes No. 49 N. V. Martinus Nijhoff Jugoslovenska Knjiga r Apartado 656 Lange Voorhout 9 Moskovska UI. 36 CIUDAD TRUJILLO S'GRAVENHAGE BEOGRAD Printed in the U. S. A. Price in the United States: 20 cents 4 February 1948 New Zealand N ouvelle-Zelande Gordon & Gotch Waring Taylor Street ;WELUNGTON Norway-Norvege Norsk Bokimport AjS Edv. 'Storms Gate 1 OSLO Philippines D. P. Perez Co. 132 Riverside SAN JUAN , Sweden-Suede AB C. E. Fritzes Kungl Hofbokhandel FredsgataJrl 2 STOCKHOLM Switzerland-Suisse Librairie Payot S. A. LAusANNE,GENEVE, VEVEY MONTP.EUX, NEUCl<4TELj BERNE, BASEL Hans Raunhardt Kirchgasse i 7 ZURICH I Syria-Syrie Libl'airie universelle DAMAS Union of South Africa Union Sud-Africaine Central News Agency Ltd. Commissioner & Rissik Sts. JOHANNESBURG United Kingdom Royaume-Uni H.M. Stationery Office P.O. Box 569 LONDON, S.E. 1 . and 'at H.M.S.O. Shops at LONDON, EDINBURGH, MANCHESTER, CARDIFF, BELFAST and BRISTOL United States of America Etats-Unis it'Amerique International Documents Service Columbia University Press· 2960 Broadway NEW YOI}K 27, N. Y.