S/PV.149 Security Council

If I have correctly understood the proposal which has just been made, article 18 should, according to the Military Staff Committee's reply, now read as follows: "Il ne peut, etre fait appel a tout ou partie des forces armees specmees dans les accords speciaux, pour les utiliser comme le prevoit l'Article 42 de la Charte, 'que sur decision du Conseil de securite. Lorsqu'il est ainsi fait appel aces forces, celles-cine peuvent etre utilisees par le Conseil de securite que durant la periode necessaire a l'execution des taches envisagecs a. l'Article 42 de la Charte." "The armed, forces specified in the special agreements may be called for, in whole or in p.art, only by the decision ofthe Security Council for employment under Article 42 of the Charter. When so called, they may be employed by the Security Council only for the periodnecessary for the fulfilment of the tasks envisaged in Article 42 of the Charter." Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet SoCialist Republics) .(translate1 from Russian): As regards the mentIOn of Article 51 'of the Charter in the last paragraph of the letter from the Chairman of the Military Staff Committee we shall decide about this when we reach ag:eement Ort the M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques sodalistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Pour ce qui est de l'Article 51 de la Charte, dont i1 est fait mention 'dans le dernier paragraphe de la lettre du President du Comite d'etat-major, nollS prendrons une decision a ce sujet lorsque nollS nous serons mis d'accord sur les propoaitionS soumises par les representants de la France et de la Chine all Comite d'etat-major. re1~vant proposals submitted by the French and Chinese representatives to the Military Staff Committee. ' -Those two paragraphs· are most important, and.we think they should be embodied in the prmdples governing· the employment· of these forces; otherwise, .they will appear only ina letter.to the Security Council. I· appreciate the point.raised by the USSR representative, and we.might have to defer· the question for t.'lat reasoR. But 1 should like to reserve the right to suggest that addition when we resolve. the pointconceming Article 51. If the United States proposal is accepted,··1 feel . we should bear in mind that we wish. to. consider the addition of that third paragraph along the lines indicated. . ~. JOHNSON (.Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'ringlais): J'apprecie lebien-fonde de la question soulevee par le representant de l'Au&- tralie. La delegation des 'Etats-Unis approuve entierement le texte de cette lettre, et si l'on proposait au G9nseil de securite d'exprimer soh approbation de cette lettre en tant que communication du Comite. d'etat-major, nous voterions en faveur de cette proposition. However, I cannot agree with the representa- Je ne sum cependant pas d'accord avec le retiveof Australia that this third paragraph presentant de l'Australie lorsqu'il voudrait inseshould be incorporated in the basic principles. rer le troisieme paragraphe dans l'expose des This paragraph is really an explanation of the principes fondamentaux. Ce paragraphe est en principles enunciated in the second paragraph realite une explication desprincipes enonces au and hardly has a place, it seems to me, in a deuxieme paragraphe et)ne saurait guere, amon statement of basic prmciples in a formal docuavis, trouver place dans· un expose de principes meqt. I did not suggest that we should adopt fondamentaux figurant. dans un document offi;. part ?f the language of the second paragraph as ciel. Je.JfID~pas propose d'adopter une partie substitute language for article 18 as~iL~·dutexie du demdeme paragraphe pour rempla- Mr~JoHNsoN (United Stat~ of America):' I appreciate the question raisedby the representative of Australia. The. United States delegation is in-entire agreement With this letter and would vote in the a~ativeif the proposal were made that the Security Council should exp~ss its approval of the letter as a communication from the Military Staff Committee. ~ta.tlds? sinG~ th~ le.tt~r wm~b~ha,ndled man- Tcer-Ie text~ a,ctu~l d~ l'~rticle 18? et~nt d.opn~ major~ no'Lls ne devons pas oublier, bien entendu, que nous aurons arevenir al'Article 51 au moment ounous dfucuterons les propositions faites par les representants chinois et fran~ais au Comite d'ctat-major. . Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): Ma delegation estime qu'il y a deux. prmcipes importants qUI··s'expriment dans le troisieme paragraphe de I'interpretation donnee" par le Comite d'etat-major. Il conviendrait donc, seIon nous, d'ajouter ce troisieme paragraphe au texte propose·pay le representant des Etats-Unis. Nousaurions ainsi le texte suivant: "Cet article ne.·peut s'interpreter comme portant atteinte au droit d'un Etat Merobre d'utiliser tout ou paitie'de ses forces armees aux tennes de l'Article 5i de la Charte; il ne peut s'interpreter non plus ..." Le paragraphe que je viens de lire pourrait tout au moins etr~ajoute, entre parentheses, ala suite du deuxieme paragraphe 'concernant l'article 18. . Cesdeux paragraphes sont ties importants et j'estime qu'il faut les inclure dans I'expose des prlncipes regissant l'emploi de ce..~ forces annees; car autrement ils ne figureront que dans une lettre au .Comeil de securit~. Je'comprends fort hien le point souleve par le representant de I'URSS, etil se peut que nous s~yons obliges. de renvoyer la question pour la raison qu'il signale. Mais je voudrais me reserver.le droit de proposer cette addition lorsque nous aurons a resoudre la difficulte concernant I'Article 51. Nousfievons, a mon sens, si la proposition des Etats-Unis est acceptee, ne pas perdre de vue que nous aVODS I'intention de prendre en 'consideration I'addition de ce troisieme paragraphe· de la maniere que je viens d'indiquer. ..' I do not· think the principle stated could be phralled any better than it is .here. For that reas()n, I suggested that we should adopt this pl1faseologyso as to avoid any further discussion about it. It is only incidental that this phraseology happens to be contained in the same letter as the third paragraph. I do not think the two paragraphs need be put together in a statement of basic principles, but they remain a permanent part of the record. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I think there isno need to substitute a new text for the existing text of article 18. We cannot automatically substitute' a. new text fe.· the old one, as the formulation of the letter fTOm the Military ·Staff Committee is not suitable as a text for article 18. The text of this, letter will have to be adapted to the general wording of the report before it can be l1lade an independ,ent article. If we take the text of the second paragraph of,the letter from the'Military Staff Cnmmittee, beginning. with the·words "Article g of the 'General Principles' ..." and continuing to the end, it will be found that it repeats the text contah.ed in the present article 18. I therefore see no need to replace one text with another, as .such substitution adds nothing. I need not mention the fact that we asked the Military Staff Committee to give an interpretation of article 18, n?t a new text; and this the Military Staff Comnnttee has done. liste~ sovietiques) (traduit du russe) : Il n'est pas necess~u-e, me semble-t-il, de remplacer le texte · del'anicle 18 par un texte nouveau. On ne saurait remplacer d'un~ fa~on automati'iue I'ancien texte par un autre,.car les termes .de la lettre du Comite d'etat-major ne sont pas teIs qu'ils puissent cr-nstituer le nouvea1.l texte de l'article 18. Il faudrait adapter cette lettre a la Tedaction generale du rapport pour qu'elle puisse y figurer a. titre d'adcle independant. Si nous examinons le deuxieme paragraphe de la lettre du Comite d'etat-major a partir des mots: "L'article 18 des ..." et jusqu'a la fin, nous verrons qu'il ne fait que repeter le textede I'article 18 dans sa redaction actuelle. C'est pourquoi je ne vom pas la necessite de substituer ce texte a l'autre, puisqu'un tel changement n'apporterait rien denouveau.. 11 n'est pas besoin de rappeler qIJe nous avonsdemande au Comite d'etat-major de nous ·foumir une interpretation de I'article 18, et non paS un texte nouveau de cet article,ct c'est bien ce qu'a fait ce Comite. . Quant au troisieme et dernierparagraphe' de la lettre du Comite d'etat-major, j'aideja dit que puisqu'il avait·trait a l'Article 51 de la Charte, nous examinerions cette question en abordant la discussion du p3int correspondant du rapport du Comite. Nous pouvons prendre acte de la lettre du Comite d'etat-major et decider que la question soulevee au dernier paragraphe de cette lettre, c'est-a.-dire la question d..: l'Article 51 de la Charte, sera examinee ulterieurement. Le PRESIDENT: Je ne crois pasqu'il y ait lieu de prolong~r cette discussion. With regard to the third and last paragraph of the letter from the Military Staff Committee I have already s&id that, in so far as it affec~ Article 51 of the Charter, we shall discuss this question when we reach the relevant point in the report of the Military Staff Committee. We can take note of the letter from .the Military Staff Committee, bearing in mind that we shall discuss later the question mentioned in the last paragraph of that letter, that is to say, the question of Article 51 of the Charter. The PRESIDENT (translated from French) : I do not think there is any need to prolong this discussion. I think w~ are all agreed on the second paragraph of the letter received from the Chairman of the Military Staff Committee: it is an in- En ce qui concerne le deuxieme paragraphe de la lettre du President du Comite d'etat-major, nous sommes tous d'accord: c'est un texte interpretant I'article 18 et dont la redaction a le meme sen.~ que la redaction initiale. 11 s'agit uniquement pour nous de savoir s'il y a lieu, comme le propose le representant deS Etats-Unis, de substituer l'interpretation au texte lui-meme, cette interpretation etant consideree comme offrant un texte meilleur. n s'agit done uniquement d'une question de redaction; en ce qui concerne le fond, il n'y a vraiment aucune difference. Aucun membre du Conseil n'a d'ailleurs souleve d'objection. terpr~tation of article 18 and conveys the game meanm.g as the original text. The only point for m, to decide :is whether the original text 'lhould be replaced with this new interpretation, as has.been suggested by the United States representatIve, on the ground that the latter is a bette~ text. It is therefore purely a question of drafting; as far as the substance is concerned there is no ~ifference. Moreover, no objec~ons have been raISed by any member of the Council. If there are no-objections to this procedure, I shaUput to a. vote the U~tedStatesrepr~ehta­ tive's proposal to ~ubstitute for the origin31 text of article 18 the part of ,the second paragraph of the' reply from the.Ohairman of the Military Staff Committee,- whi<:h'was read just now. , A v.ote was taken by show.ofhan:ds, and. the ,United States representative~sproposal, having failed to obtain the required number of votes, was rejected. Votes for: Brazil L China Colombia FraIlce United Kingdom Ul.uted·States of America_ Abstentions': Australia Belgium Poland Syria Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

There are six votes in favour of this text and five a.bstentions. The text is therefore not adopted, and article 18 will be retained in its original form. We must now reach a decision on the third paragraph of the letter. I think that the simplest.course would be to decide to leave. in abeyance the final adoption of article 18 until after the completion of the examination of the other articles of the report whicJt, as was. pointed out by the representative of the USSR, appear to refer to the third paragraph of the letter; we could then return to the consideration of article 18 in order to adopt it finally. We should then be ableto decide whether reference should be made to this third paragraph. . , Mr. GaOMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The fact that we are now deferring discussion of the question of Article 51 of the Charter, until a later, stage in the consideration of the' report of the Military Staff Committee, is no obstacle to the adoption of article 18. I think we can adopt article 18 now,' in .thefonn in which it was submitted by the Military Staff Committee, but the. question of Article 51 is an independent question.which is not touched upon ina.-ticIe 18. We shall ,discuss ·this question-we all seem to be agreed on this-when we discuss the relevant articles of the report of the Military Staff M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques sodalistes sovietiqueg) (trad'Uit du russe): L'a.journement de l'examen de la question relative al'Article 51' de la Charte a un stade ulterieur de la discussion du rapport du Comite d'etat-major ne doit pas nollS empecher d'adopter l'article 18. J'estime que des'maintenant, nous pouvons adopter l'article 18 tel qu'il nous a Cte presente par le Comite d'etat-major. Quant a la question de I'Article 51, c'est la une question independante,qui ne ,se pose pas a I'article.18. Nous l'examinerons - et je crois que tout le monde est d'accord sur ce point - au moment de la discussion' des articles correspondants du rap- Le vote a .lieu a main levee,' et la .propo, dtion du representant des Etats-Unis, n~ayant pas recueilli le nombre de voix necessaire, at rejetee,. Votent pour: Bresil Chine Colombie France Royaume"Uni Etats..Unis d'Amerique S'abstiennent: Australie Belgique Pologne Syrie Union ·des Republiques socialistes sovietiques Le PRESIDENT: Il ya doncsix voix en faveur de ce texte et cinq abstentions. Le texte n'est pas adopte, et nous conservons la redaction prImitive de l'article18. La <J.uestion se' pose maintenant de prendre une decision en ce qui concerne le troisieme paragraphe de la lettre. Je pense qu; le plus simple serait de decider que la question de radoption definitive de l'article 18 reste en suspens et que, lorsque nollS aurons examine les autres articles du rapport qui, comme le disait tout a I'heure le representaht de l'URSS, pa:r:aissent se referer au troisieme paragra,phe de' la lettre, nous pourroIlS revenir sur I'article 18 pour I'adopter definitivement. "Nous verrons alors s'il y a lieu ou non de faiie allusion ace troisieme paragraphe. l'interpret~tiondonnee par le Comite d'etat-majGT, ....les deux textes sont egalement c1airs. Cependant, j'estime .que le troisieme .paragraphe enonce un principe fondamental.. A noire.· avis, ce paragraphe n'est pasune mterpr~ation,mais contient deux re.seryev~sse.ntienes, deux declarations de· principe•essentielles. ' The main principle, as article 18 now sl<t.nds, Le principe general; ..se1on l'article 18· dans is that the armed forces of the United Nations son texte actuel, est que les forces armees de will be employed only by tne decision of the 11'Organisation des Nations U~iesne peuvent Security Council and only for a speci:6ed time etre utilisees que sur decision duConseilde seand a particular task. curiteet que pour une duree deterrninee, en vue de l'accomplissement d'une mis:510n precise. Il y a deux reserves importantes ace principe: en premier lieu, l'emploi de ces fo:rces armees ne peut s'interpreter comme port:mt at- , teinte au droit d'lID Etat Membre d'utiliser tout ou ,partie de ses proprea forces armees aux termes de l'Article 51 .de la Charie; en second lieu, et c'est la la reserve la plusimportant~,il ne pent s'interpreter. non plus comme· portant atteinte a l'exercice, par un Etat Membre, ·In commandement exclusif deses' forcesar.'~.§es jusqu'au moment ou le Conseil aura fait appel aces forces. A notreavis, il ne s'agit pas la du tout d'une interpretation. Ce sont deux reserves fondamen- , tales. Qu,e nousacceptions ou non le texte original de la proposition des Eta.ts-Unis, j'estime que ces deux reserves doivent sielles ne sontpas incorporees au texte meme dn paragraphe, y figurer du moins·sous forme de note aUt bas de la page ou _:~ntre parentheses. A moins qu'un vote precis n'Ll1tervienne en sens contraire, je propose que taus les membres aient le droit de reserver cettequestion jusqu'au moment ou le point particulier siguale par le repr&.entant de l'URSS sera discute. There are two important qualifications to that: first, the employment of those armed forces cannot impair the right of a Member State to use all or part of its armed forces under Article 51; secondly-and this is the most important·qualification-it cannot impair the exercise atexclusive command by a Member Stale over its arIn:ed forces until these are called up. In our opinion, that is not an interpretation at all. Those are two vital qualificatJ.ons. Irrespective of whether we adopted the original text of the ,proposal of the United States,we think that those two qualifications, if not inc()~J!0rated in the paragraph itself, should at least -be mserted as a footnote or in parenthesis. Uniess there is a definite vote to the contrary, I suggest that any member should have the right to reserve this question to a later date when the particular item referred to by the USSR representative is 'discussed, M. EL-KHOURI (Syrie) (traduit de I'anglais): Je n'ai pas vote en faveur du remplacement de l'artic1e 18 par le deuxieme paragraphe de l'mterpretation donnee par le Comite d'etatmajor. J'estime en diet que l'article 18 est assez clair et abien le sens exprime dans ce deuxieme paragraphe. Il n'est pas necessaire de proceder aune telle substitutIon de texte. - D'autre part, jeconsidere que le troisieme paragraphe souleve des questions importantes qui doivent etre discutees separement. Quelles sont les forces qui devront etre mises ala disposition du Conseil de securite? Comment en serat-il dispose? Les Etats Membres ont-lis la faculte d'utiliser ces forces lorsque le Conseil de securite ne les utilise pas lui-meme? Ces forces doiventelles ou non ~tre utiJisees en vertu de l'Article5 ~? J'estime que l'on devrait enoncer ces principes dans un article special a inserer da."1l:! le projet de reglement qui nous est soumis. II ne suffit pas que c~s principes figurent dans une interpretation; une telle question devrait ctre discutee d'une maniere approfondie, et il nous faudrait Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): I did not vote for replacing the present ttxt of article 1B with the sf,cond paragraph of the interpretation given by the Military Staff Committee because 1 consider that article 18 is clear enough and conveys the meaning of that second paragraph. There is no need for such a substitution. On the other hand, I consid~r that the third paragraph raises important qUt;stionc which should be discussed separately. What are the forces which are to be put at the disposal of the Security Council? How are they to be dealt with? Are the Member nations free to use those forces when they are not being used by the Security Council? Should those forces be used under Artide 51 or not? I think these points should be enunciated in a spe~ial article in the draft of the regulations which are before us. It is not sufficient to include these points in an interpretation because such questions ought tc be discussed thoroughly and we should know the position, attitude and , . bs

- Bearingin mind the remark made just now by our colleague, the representative of.the USSR, to the effect that paragraph 3 of the. letter from. the Military Staff Committee in reality concerns matters dealt with in'other articles, particularly article 17 which has not yet been examined, I suggest that we should hold over the examinati?~ of-the third paragraph of the letter fromtheMihtary Staff Committee, and consider it later at the same time as article 17, it being understuod that . the Council will then be free to decide whether the article should be re-drafted or whether any additions should be made to it. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): Should we meanwhile adopt the text of 'article 18 as it stands?

We are adopting it in the form originally proposed, reserving the right to modify it, if necessary, after the discussion of article 17. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): If we adopt article 18 as it stands, should we not modify the opening phrase in accordance with the suggesti.on made by the representative of BeJgium? Should it not read: "The armed forces specified in the special agreement and which are to be made available to the Security -Council on its call ..."? Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America) : I have no objection to voting on article 18 now as suggested by the USSR representative, provided that, if we vote on it in its present form, the Council also accepts affirmatively the explanation given by the Military Staff Committee in the second paragraph of its interpretation as the explanation officially adopted in our records. -That procedure would be entirely satisfactory.

I shall now ask the Council for its views on the two questions which have just been raised. We ·voted just now on the United States representative's proposal to replace article 18 with a new text. That proposal was rejected. The question which now arises is whether the whole of article 18 should be retained in its original form or whether, if I have correctly understood the discussion of this subject in the course of the last few meetings, we should word the beginning of the article as follows: "The armed forces made available to the Security Council on its call", that is to say, add to the present text the words "on its call".

I think that in the circumstances we should first state our views on the point raised by the United States representative, and then return to the amendment proposed by the Belgian representative. I suggest that we state our agreement on the interpretation contained in the second paragraph .of the letter from the Military Staff Committee. I even consider that we could decide to annex this text to the report, at least as far as the second paragraph is concerned, and reserve the question of the third paragraph. If there is no objection, I take it that we are agreed on this point, unless the Council asks for a vote. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): The main question is whether or not we are going to ",dopt the text of article 18. As regards the interpretation, everybody has agreed that it is the correct one. The Council now has to take a decision on the text of article 18, keeping in mind that we have accepted the second paragraph. of the interpretation given by the Military Staff Committee. Mr. HSIA (China): I recall that the Belgian amendment was not really accepted at the hund~ed .forty-fifth meeting: Many members found difficulty in accepting the Belgian amendment. Now the President reminds us of the United States amendment. That amendment may help to make the text clearer; at the same time it also presents difficulties. It requires a certai~ interpretation and may cause confusion in ·the mind of some members. Accordingly, may I suggest'the solution put forth by the representative of Syria, which may. Je vous propose d'admettre que nous sommes d'accord sur l'interpretation donnee dans le deuxieme paragraphe de la lettre du Comite d'etat-major. Je pense meme que nous pourrions decfder que ce texte figurerait en annexe au rapport, au moins en ce qui concerne le deuxieme paragraphe, la question du troisieme paragraphe etant reservee. S'il n'y a pas d'objection, je considererai que nous sommes d'accord sur ce point, amoins que le Conseil ne demande un vote. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiquesy (traduit de l'anglais): La question essentielle est de savoir si nous allons ou non adopter le texte de l'article 18. Pour ce qui est de son interpretation, tout le monde est d'accord pour reconnaitre qu'elle est correcte. n faut que le Conseil decide maintenant s'il accepte le texte de l'article 18, sans perdre de vue, que nous avons adopte le deuxieme.paragraphede l'interpretation donnee par le Comite d'etat-major. M. HSIA (Chine) (traduit de l'anglais): Je crois me souvenir que l'amendementdu representant de la Belgique n'a pas ete vraiment adopte a la cent-quarante-cinquieme seance 1 • Beaucoup de membres trouyaient qu'illeur·etait difficile de l'accepter. Le President nous rappelle maintenant l'amendement du representant des Etats-U.nis. Il est possible que cet amendement rende le texte plus clair; mais en meme temps aussi il souleve des difficultes. 11 requiert.une certaine interpretation et, dans l'esprit de ceitains membres, il peut preter a confusion. C'est pourquoi je vous suggere d'adopter la solut~on proposee par le representant de la Syrie, May 1 also make the reservation-I think that probably everybody will wish to make this reservation-that the text we adopt today is by no means the final one for a number of reasons. Fdr instance, in discussing certain other articles, we may find it necessary to return to this article again. Moreover, I think many members of the Council noticed that there were many places in the English version which required a little touching up in the drafting. 1£ we look back at articles 1, 2, or 3, the French draft seems to be more logical than the English. Some articles start with "These armed forces . . .", and others with "Armed forces ..." Sometimes there is in~erted the phrase "in accordance with Article 43", and at other times this phrase is omitted. Our examination of the articles could be made with that reservation.

We are in agreement on two points. Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America):, lam not entirely sure that all the members of the Council realize that the United States delegation no longer presses for any amendment to the text oi article 18. I have accepted the suggestion of the USSR representative that we should vote now on the origiI).al text. We shall give an affirmative vote, provided the Council accepts affirmatively the second paragraph of the interpretation which was unanimously reported to the Council by the Military Staff Committee. The Council will remember that the representative of Syria remarked that this would cover all the points in question, and I think it does.

I should like to say a few words before calling on the .Belgian representative. I think that we agree on two points. We agree with the interpretation of article 18 contained in the second paragraph of the Military Staff Committee's letter. :UP to the present, I have not heard any of the members of the Council say anything to the contrary. I therefore consider this· point as settled, and this will be stated in the record. In fact, I think that, in vie~ of the importance of the question, this interpretation should be included in the report of the Military Staff Committee, either as a note or in the form of an annex. e The second point on which we are agreed is the third paragraph of the letter under discussion, which it has been decided to hold over for examination with· article 17. In.this connexion, only one .point remains in abeyance, namely whether -We could, if necessary, return to article 18 in order to make an addition to it. But I do I ~ais semble plus logique que l'anglais. Tels articles commencent par "ces forces armees ...", tels autres par "les forces ai'mees ..." Quelquefois on trouve inseres'dans le texte les mots "conformement al'Article 43", d'autres fois ces mots sont omis. Avec la reserve que je viens de faire, nous pourrons examiner completement ces articles. Le PRESIDENT: Nous sommes d'accord sur deux points. M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais): Je ne suis pas sur que tous les membres du Conseil aient bien saiSi que la delegation des Etats-Unis n'insiste plus pour obtenir une modification de l'article 18. Nous avons accepte la proposition du representant de l'URSS qu'il soit procede maintenant au vote sur le texte prinritif. Nous voteronsen faveur de ce texte, a condition que le Conseil, par un vote affirmatif, adopte le deuxieme paragraphe de l'interpretation unanime soumise au Conseil par le Comite d'etat-major. Le representant de la Syrie a fait observer, si vaus vous en souvenez, que cette fa~on de faire tient compte de toutes les donnees du probleme, et c'est egalement mon avis. . . Le PRESIDENT: Avant de donner la parole au representant de la Belgique, j'aimerais dire c(ue1ques mots. Je· crois que nous sommes d'accord sur deux points. Nous sommes d'accord sur l'interpretation que donne de l'article 18, le deuXieme paragraphe de la lettre du Comite d'etat-major. En efIet, je n'ai, jusqu'ici, entendu aucunmembre du Conseil pader dans un autre sens. Je considere donc ce point comme acquis et il figurera au proces-verbal. Je crois meme qu'il y aurait lieu de decider que cette interpretation figure, en raison de l'importance de la question, soit en note, soit en annexe, au rapport du Comite d'etat-major. Le second point sur leque1 nous sommes d'accord est constitue par le troisieme paragraphe de la lettre dont il s'agit. nest entendu qu'il est reserve pour ~tre examine en liaison avec l'artiele 17. A cet egard, un seul. point demeure en suspens: c'est la question de savoir si nous pournons eventuellement revenir sur l'artide 18, draf~ing. It remains for us now to settle the question of '.the Belgian amendment. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated from French) : I should like to make a brief re- ·mark on this question. The Belgian amendments, which the Council was good enough to approve, were intended to remove a certain ~onfusion caused by the use, in the report, of the words "made available" to convey two different meanings, i.e., on the one hand to describe the forces simply heId in reserve, which the Council had not.yet called upon, and, on the other hand, forces for which a call had already been made by the Council. M. VAN LANGENHOVE (BeIgique): Je voudrais precisement presenter a ce sujet une breve remarque. Les alllendements beIges que le CCk'1Seil a bien voulu approuver avaient pOUT objet· d'elitniner une confusion resultant du fait que l'expression "mises a la disposition" etait tmployee dans le rapport en deux sens differents, d'une part, pour designer des forces qui etaient simplement en reserve et a l'egard desquelles leConseil n'avait pas encore lance soninvitation, et d'autre part, des forces a l'egard desquelles le Conseil avait; au contraire adresse une invitation. Les amendements se rapportaient d'ailleurs a des articles dont le senS montrait qu'il s'agissait de forces simplement en reserve. C'est pourquoi nous avions employel'expression: "les forces armees qui .doivent etre mises . . ."dans le futur " . . . sur son invitation a la disposition du Conseil de securite". A la lumiere des explications qui ont ete iGUt'- nies au sujet de l'article 18,. et tenant compte du fait que cet article .figure dans un chapitre intituJ.e: "Utilisation des forces armees", je considere qu'il s'agit bien id de forces a l'egard desquelles I'invitation du· Conseil a deja ete formulee. Dans ces conditions, on peut, pour plus de clarte, dire: "les forces annees mises a la disposition du Conseil de securite sur son invitation ..." mais cela ne me parait pas strictement indispensable. Moreover, the main object of this article 18 D'autre part, la porteeessentielle de cet arseems to be to determine the conditions under ticle 18 me semble etre celle de determiner dans which the armed forces made available to the quelles conditions les forces armees niises a la Security Council shall be employed; and that is disposition du Conseil de securite· pourront etre a conception somewhat different from the one utilisees; c'est done la une notion un peu diffeimplied by the term "made available to the Serente de celle qu'impliquent les termes "mises curity Council" suggested in the BeIgian amenda la disposition du Conseil de securite"propo... ment. ses dans l'amendement beIge. . Moreover, these amendments referred to articles which clearly referred to forces simply held in reserve. That is why we used the expression: "armed forces to be made available ..." in the future "to the Security Council on its call". In the light of the explanations supplied on article 18, and bearing in mind that this article appears in a chapter entitled "Employment of Armed Forces", I consider that we are here concerned with forces already called for by the Security Council. In view of this, we might say in the interest of clarity: "the armed forces made available to the Security Countil on its call ..." but I do not consider this absolutely indispensable. Mr. LANGE (Poland): Of course, we are free M. LANGE (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglais): to consider and, if necessary, vote upon the Nous sommes evidemment libres d'examiIler et, Belgian amendment, but I should rather urge au besoin, de voter l'amendement beIge, mais the Council to adopt now the text in its original je demanderais· plutot que le Conseil adopte form. . maintenant le texte sous sa forme originale. .1 wish to recall that I, myself, proposed cer- Je voudrais vous rappeler que j'ai moi-meme tarn changes to .meet the points of the Belgian propose certaines modificationspourtenir compte amendment, but that was before we had rede certains points de l'9.mendement belge, mais ceived the interpretation of the Military Staff nous n'avions pas alors re~u l'interpretation du Committee. We specifically asked for that in- Comite d'etat-major. C'est precisement pour terpretation in order to avoid any possible -ms-eviter tout malentendu possible que ilous avions un~erstandings. I now think that purpu,,;e is demande· cette interpretation. Je crois mainteachIeved, and we can proceed with the old nant que nQUS avons satisfaction et que nous formulation. pouvons adopter l'aneienne formule. The PRESIDENT (translated ft'om French): l\e PRESIDENT: Je demanderai au represen- I should like to ask the Belgian representative tant de la Belgique s'il insiste pour que son whether he insists on his amendment being put amendement soit mis aux voix, ou queIql'm ."the vote;. or does anyone else insist upon it? I d'autre insiste-t-il sur ce point?

' If I have understood correctly, nobody insists upon this amendment being put to the vote. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated from French): I do not insist, Mr. President. 'The PRESIDENT (translated from French): , Is there any objection to paragraph 2 of the letter from the Military Staff Committee appearing, as a note or an annex to the report? Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Re- .publics): In what report? We are not going to send a report to anyone. The explanation should just be added in the records. The PR;ESIDENT(translated from French): We have been discussing at several meetings the report of the Military Staff Committee,upon which we are taking decisions. We are now con-. cemed with an annex to this report. I do not know what other name to give this document. If there are no objections, the second paragraph of the letter will appear either as a note or as an annex, with a reference to article 18. ,The Presiden~Jsproposal was accepted. It was further understood that the third paragraph of the letter from the Military Staff Committee would be held in abeyance and examined in connexion with article 17. Mr. JOHNSON (United States of AmeriCa): I should like to ask a simple questicn. I am a little confused about the procedure with regard to the adoption of the Military Staff Commit- .tee's interpretation. As I understand it, this interpretation will be put in either a footnote or an annex, with the express statement that the Council has adopted it as its own, and not simply quoted as an interpretation of 'the Military Stl!f.' Committee.

It is understood that this interpretation will be .considered as accepted by the Security Council. If there are no objections, I shall regard this as car-ried.' ' M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques soda- listes sovietiques) (traduit de lJanglais): Dans que! rapport? Nous .n'allons envoyer de rapport a personne. L'explication devrait figurer simple- ment au proces-verbal. Le PRESIDENT: Nous discutons depuis un certaIn nombre de seances le rapport du Comite d'etat-major sur lequel nous prenons des deci- sions. I1 s'agit d'une annexe a ce rapport.•Je ne sais pas comment je dois baptiser ce document. S'il n'y a pas d'objections, le deuxieme para- graphe de la lettre figurera, soit e.n note, soit en annexe, avec une reference a l'article 18. La proposition du President est approuv8e. Il est dJautre part decide que le-troisieme para- graphe de la lettre du ComiU dJetat-major est reserve et sera examine ulterieurementJ en mOme temps que l'article 17 du rapport. M. JOHNSON' (Etats-Unis d'Ameriqtie) (tra- duitde l'anglais): Je voudrais poser une simple question. Jen'ai pas tres bien saisi la procedure que nous alIons suivre pour adopter l'interpre- tation du Comite d'etat-major. Il s'agit bien, a ce que je comprends, d'inserer l'explication soit dans une note de bas de page, soit dans une annexe, avec une declaration expresse disant que le Conseil a fait sienne cette interpretation, et non pas de se contenter de la mentionner comme une interpretation du Comite d'etat-major. Le PRESIDENT: Il est entendu que cette inter- pretation sera consideree comme etant admise par le Conseil de see;urite. S'il n'y a pas d'ob- jections, il en sera ainsi decide.

I have received a reply to this letter, accompanied by cl report. This reply from the Chairman of the Military Staff Committee, together with the report, was circulated to you at the beginning of this meeting; I think the best thing would be to ask the Assistant Secretary-General to read it. . Mr. Kerno, Assistant Secretary-General, then read in French the text of the reply from the Chairman of the Military Staff Committee.'

That, gentlemen, is the document just submitted to us by the Military Staff Committee. It undoubtedly forms a very important contribution to our work. This document will require considerable thought on the part of those members of the Council who are represented on the Military Staff Committee, as well as those who are not. I feel, however, that we should hear, at this meeting, the observations which some of you may like to make on this text. I therefore invite your views on the manner in which this document should be used. Have you any observations t~ make in this respect? Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): At the previous.meeting of the Security Council devoted to this question" I pointed out that in the view Le PRESIDENT: A cette lettre, j'ai re~u une reponse . accompagnee d'un rapport. Cette re- ponse du President du Comite d'etat-major et le rapport qui l'accompagne vous ont ete distri- bues au moment de I'entree en seance; je pense done que la meilleure procedure est de deman;. der au Secretaire general adjoint de nous en donner.lecture. M. Kerno, Secretaire gen~ral adjoint, donne lecture, en frangais, de la reponse du President du Comite d'etat-major'. Le PRESIDltNT: Voila done, Messieurs, le document qui vient de nous etre foumi par I.e Comite d'etat-major. Il constitue certainement une tres importante contribution a nos travaux. Ce document necessitera des reflexions de la part des membres du Conseil, aussi bien de ceux representes' au sem du Comite d'etat-majorque de ceux qui n'y sont pas representes. Je pense, cependant, que nous devrions, des la presente seance, recueillir les observations que certains d'entre vous pourraient avoir ,a presenter sur ce texte. Jevous demand~ done votre opinion quant a la maniere dont nous devons utiliser ce docu- ment. Avez-vous a ce sujet des observations a presenter? . M. GROMYKO (Union des RepubIiques socia- listes sovietiques) (traduit du russe) : J'ai expose le point de vue de la delegation de l'URSS au cours de la demiere seance du Canseil de secu- rite consacree a cette question". Notre delegation In these circumstances the USSR delegati()n thinks it impossible to' work· out any estimates, . - either for the overall strength of the armed forces to be placed at the disposal of the Security Council, or for the composition of those armed forces. The USSR representatives on the Mili- tary Staff Committee also took this view. Thus, the estimates·submitted to the Security Council ~e estimates made by individual delegations: by the United States delegation, the United King- dom delegation and the French delegation to the Military Staff Committee; they are not estimates of the Military Staff Committee as a whole. The USSR delegation to the Military Staff . Committee stated that the estimates of the over- all strength of the armed forces to be placed at the disposal of the Security Council would after all require some time to prepare,even if we had principles agreed upon. The Military Staff CoIDlllitteewas given an impossible task. Firstly, it was asked to draw up estimates with the gen- eral principles·lacking; secondly, it was asked to draw up the estimates, if I am not mistaken, in the space of three days. Is it surprising that the Military Staff Committee shotlld have been un-, able, even from this point of view,to carry out its instructions? Is it surprising that even the in- dividual delegations, in submitting their own individual estimates, shotlld have submitted these estimates not as representing views of their Governments, not as official opinions, but as preliminary, unofficial estimates? In these circumstances, I can pass no judg- ment either on the figures submitted by the United .States delegation, or those submitted by the Unit~d Kingdom delegation, or those sub- mitted by the French delegation, as these esti- mates do Q.ot represent the views of the Govern- 'ments of .'those States. The Security Council, however, IS an official organ, and I cannot see how we can discuss proposals which are not Je regrette de constater qu'en ce qui concerne ces principes generaux, il subsiste encore des divergences de Vues sur un certain nombre de points important!;. Je me garderai bien de faire des pronostics qllant aux restlltats de nos debats sur ces .questions litigieuses; je me bornerai a exprimer l'espoir que nous reussirons en fin de compte a tr0l;lver le moyen de tomber d'accord sur les questions sur lesquelles l'entente n'apu se faire jusqu'a present. Toutefois, nous ne de- vons pas oublier aujourd'hui que nous n'avons pas pu nous entendre sur un certain nombre de points importants relatifs a r etablissement des principes generaux regissant rorganisation des forces armees mises a la disposition du Conseil de securite, et que toute une seriede questions de la plus haute importance n'ont pas ete reso- lues. La delegation de l'URSS estime que, dans ces conditions, il est impossible de faire une estima- tion quelconque de rimportance numerique to- tale des forces armees mises a la disposition du Conseil de securite, ou de donner des precisions sur la composition de ces forces armees. Telle a ete egalement rattitude des representants de rup SS au Comite d'etat-major. C'est pourquoi les estimations qui ant ete presentees au Conseil de securite sont les estimations de certaines dele- gations, asavoir: les'delegations des Etats-Unis, du Royaume-Uni et de la France, et non pas celles du Comite d'etat-major dans son en- semble. La delegation de rURSS a declare au Comite d'etat-rn.ajor qu'il faudrait du temps - meme si nous pouvions nous entendre sur les principes generaux .- pour evaluer l'importance nume- rique totale des forces armees mises ala dispo- sition du Conseil de securite. Quant au Comite "il'etat-major, on lui a confie une tache impos- sible: il devait preparer des 'evalmi.tions sans pouvoir s'appuyer sur des principesgeneraux, et, .de .plus, il devait accomplir cette tache dans un delai de trois jours, si je ne me trompe. Com- merit done s'etormer que le Comite d'etat-major n'ait pas reussi, dans ces conditions, a accomplir la tache qui lui avait ete eonfiee? Comment s'etonner que meme les delegations qui ont juge possible de presenter des evaluations ~e l'aient fait qu'a titre officieux et provisoire, et sans en- gager la responsabilite de leurs Gouvernements? Dans ces conditions, je ne puis me prononcer ni sur les chiffres presentes par la delegation des Etats-Unis, ni sur ceux de la delegation britan- nique, ni enfi~ sur les evaluations de la delega- tion fran~aise, etant donne qu'aucune de ces evaluations n'exprime le point de vue des Gou- 'vernements en question. Le Conseil de securite est un organe officieI. Je ne vois pas comment nous pourrions examiner des propositions quhll If the Security Council wishes to be logical and consistent in this matter, it must arrange for an informal and unofficial· discussion of this question, and if it decides to take any decisions, these will also be unofficial. c~tte decision ait egalement un caractere offi- Cleux. En outre, j'ai deja dit que meme si nous etions'·· saisis· de propositions officielles, nous ne pour- rions pas examiner la question de I'importance numerique des forces armees mises a la disposi- tion du Conseil de securite, puisque nous n'avons pas encore reussi a nous mettre d'accord sur les principes generaux. Comment peut-on dans ces conditions.. demander au Comite d'etat-major de presenter dans un delai de trois jaurs des pro- positions sur une question aussi grave? Je m'ex- cuse de la comparaison, mais cela ressemble un peu a une scene tel1e qu'on pourrait la jouer au theatre: ..ces chiffres n'ont ete examines qu'au cours d'une seule seance du Comite d'etat-major. Jugez-en: est-il possible de trancher de telles questions au cours d'une·seule seance, en deux ou trois heures? Je crois qu'il est impossible de le faire. Ce sont Et des questions qui meritent d'etre etudiees et meditees avec som. n faut savoir distinguer entre une solution ha- tive mais injustifiable, etune decision rapide certes, . mais raisonnable. La delegation de I'URSS est aussi d'avis qU'il faut accelerer l'exa- men de la question, mais a condition de· ne pas le faire au detriment de la qualite de notre tra- vail; il faut suivre une methode normale et saine. Nous aurons ainsi plus de chances d'arriver a un resultat positif. La rnethode que nous avons choisie n'est pas tres heureuse. J'estime meme qu'elle n'est pas justifiee. n faudrait d'abord examiner les prin- cipes fondamentaux et prendre des decisions a leur sujet. Ensuite, nous pourrions charger le Comite d'etat-major, en tant qu'organe consti- tue, de presenter ses recommandations. J'ai. en vue - je le repete -'non pas des propositions officieuses, mais des recommandations .offici~lles du Comite d'etat-major. Ce n'est qu'alors que nous nous trouverons sur un terrain solide. Pour l'instant, il n'en est rien. C'est potirquoi j'estime qu'il est impossible de nous engager des mainte- nant dans une discussion sur le point de savoir si ·les propositions soumises au Conseil de secu- rite par differents membres du Comite d'etat- major sont ou non justifiees et repondent aux exigences diI Conseil de securite ainsi qu'aux in- Moreover, even if we had official proposals ill this connexion, as I have alrtady pointed out, we cannot consider the question of the numerical strength of the; armed forces to be placed at the disposal of the Security Council in the absence of general principles agreed upon. Can the Mili- tary Staff Committee really be asked to submit proposals on such a serious matter in such cir- cumstances and, in addition, in the space .of three days? I apologize, but it rather r~minds one of a scene in a play. That is why these figures have, in fac.t, been discussed only at one meeting of the Military Staff Committee. Judge for yourselves: can such questions be decided at. a single meeting in the space of two or three hours? I think it is impossible. Such proposals require careful sturly and reflection. We have to differentiate between unjustifiable haste and a really prompt but sound decision on a question. The USSR delegation also thinb that the consideration of this question should be expedited, not at the cost of quality, though, but by the adoption ofa normal and correct pro- cedure. We shall then have more chance of teaching positive "results. The procedure we have now chosen is un- fortunate; more than that, I consider it is wrong. We should discuss fundamental principles and take definite decisions and then instruct the Mili- tary Staff Committee as a body to submit its :ecommendations. I repeat, it is not a case of mformal proposals, but of official, formal recom- mendations by the Military Staff Committee. Only then shall we have solid ground under our ~eet, w!Uch so far we have not got. I consider it ImpOSSIble therefore to enter into a discussion o~ .the question whether the proposals of in- dlVldu~ representatives on the Military Staff COmmIttee, as now submitted for the Security Council's consideration, are correct or in con- formitr with the. requirements of the Security Council and the mterests of the maintenance of peace. We cannot prove whether they are t.·_ .. ~_ In this connexion, I should like to remind the Security .Council· that certain proposals were made in the Military Staff Committee about the conditions to be taken into account in estimating the overall strength of the armed forces required by the Security Council. Such proposals were made, for instance, by the French delega1:ion and certain other delegations, but the conditions mentioned in those proposals have not yet been tonsidered in substance. Yet, it is on them that the estimates should be based. In such circum- stances when. the Military Staff Committee has no proposals agreed upon by its members on the factors which must form the basis of, and be taken into consideration in, these estimates, can any concrete recommendations be made? I think it .is impossible. The MiJitary Staff Committee has been set an impossible task and therefore - could not accomplish it. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): Je voudrais seulement faire une ou deux rerrtarques. Contrairement au representant de I'URSS, j'estime que la procedure suivie par le Conseil et le travail accompli a la demande du Conseil par le Comite d'etat-major ont une certaine valeur. We were engaged in a long argument on the Nous etions engages dans une longue discus- general principles which arise under article 11 sion sur les principes generaux evoques par l'ar- of the report of the Military Staff Committee, ticle 11 ,du rapport du Comite d'etat-major. Au- and no agreement on that seemed to be in view.. cun accord ne semblait en vue. C'est pourquoi For that reason, the Security Council reversed le Conseil de securite a adopte la procedure in- the procedure and asked Lhe Military Staff Com- verse et a demande au Conlite d'etat-major mittee to see whether it could not submit an d'examiner s'il ne pourrait pas fournir une eva- estimate of the overall strength of the armed 1uation de la p~issance'd'ensemble des forces ar- forces which should be made available to the. mees a mettre a la disposition du Conseil de Council, without waiting for the solution ofthe securite, sans attendre que £O.t resolue la diffi- difficulty which aro.se in connexion with culte soulevee par l'article 11. article 11. , If agreement could be reached on the overall strength and its apportionment in practice among the five permanent members, that in itself would automatically solve the problem of prin- ci1?le posed by article 11. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): I wish to make only one or two remarks. Unlike the USSR representative, I consider that the procedure followed by the Council and the work accomplished at the Council's request by the Military Staff Committee is of some value. Si l'on pouvait se mettre d'accord sur la puis- sance globale des forces armees et sur leur re- partition pratique entre les cinq membres per- manents, la question de principe soulevee par l'article 11 se trouverait automatiquement reso- . lue. Le representant de I'URSS dit qu'il est impos- sible de procedel' a revaluation de la puissance globale avant que 1'0n ne se soit inis d'acco.rd sur les principes generaux - voulant dire par la, je pense, surtout les principes qui sont a la base , de l'article 11. Je me demande si c'estbien vrai. Par exemple, asupposeI' que nous nous mettions d'accord pour adopter la these du representant de I'URSS en ce qui concerne I'article 11, a The USSR representative says it is impossible to ~ake an assessment of the overall strength until we have agreed on the general principles, meaning, I think, the principles underlying chiefly article 11. I am wondering whether that is true. For instance, assuming that we reached agreement on article 11 in the sense desired by the USSR. representative, namely, that the con- tributions of the five permanent members should be equal, we shotlld be no nearer knowin~ what It seems to me that the assessment of the over- all strength is entirely separate from the question of article 11. That is one point I wish to makL Moreover, the facts rather belie what the USSR representative has said; indeed~ the Mili- tary Staff Committee has made a great effort and has produced some figures. I admit those are preliminary figures, perhaps produced hastily. They are .provisional figures, not official ones, but they represent an initial effort. They constitute a basis for discussion of the question of the overall strength and do not show such very wide divergencies. I should hape that the estimate submitted by the Military Staff Committee might be taken as a basL"l on which the Governments, either through their representatives Oil the Committee or through their rep:t:esentatives at this table, might discuss those figures, examine them, and arrive at a mean figure on which we could all agree. . I think there is no harm in the fact that the proposals submitted to us by the MiJ,itary Staff Committee are merely those of experts and not of Governments. Many far-reaching inter-gov- ernmental agreements have, I suppose, origi- nated with proposals by experts. They form' a perfectlY500d basis for the consideration of this question. Therefore, I hope we shall not abandon the procedure which we have adopted. I think it will yield useful results. I think it will bring us down to realities, and I believe we shall succeed. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): The USSR representative's conception of the functions of the Military Staff Comrn::~ce is different from that of my delegation. As we see it, the Military Staff Committee, according to the Charter, is to assist and advise the Council and, if the Council so requests, accomplish a particular task. This was a task where we obviously called on the Committee as a body of experts. We knew that the task of submitting an answer by today would make it impossible for the members of the Committee to consult their Governments and produce what has been referred to as an "official" view. Four ll?embers compli~d with the request of the Coun- c~, and we ~hink. t~ey did a remarkable job in VIew of the tIme-hffilt and the circumstances. The USSR representative said that the task was impossible for reasons with which we can- not agree. He stated that first of all the Council must lay down general principles. In the first p.lace, had we agreed to accept either the prin- CIple of comparable contribution or that of tr- We do not ask at this stage what those as- s~ptions are or what are the hypotheses on which the Committee based its eStimates. The fact is that four representatives have produced tables showing a certain task force required for a particular objective, following a decision by the Security Council. Let us assume that we accept th~ principle ,advocated by the USSR representative. We sug- gest that it cannot be applied to anyone of those tables, because the result would be-and we must be' realistic-·-that we would have a force without strategic bombers, probably with- out the latest jet-fighters, without armoured divisions, battleships, and aircraft earners. Yet this force is supposed to be sufficient and effective and to have a great moral weight. Can yeu imagine a force without the elements I have mentioned, deterring a would-be aggressor? Consequently, whether or not the USSR dele- gation maintains that the Military Staff Com- mittee cannot determin.e, without principles agreed upon, the size ofa force, its nature, or its composition, we can {Dnly condude that we should probably arrive at the same result, irre- spective of the principles. Having reached that result, we obviously see that the contributions of the five permanent members cannot possibly be identical as to the nature, type, and number of either sea, land, or air forces. Therefore, even on the basis· of this estimate, it is confirmed more than ever that the only reasonable and logical principle to adopt is the principle of comparable contr:butions, bearing in mind that the comparable initial overall con- tributions will be identical but will vary widely as to the strength of the separate components.. I should like to make one further observation on a question regarding which there is some confusion in my mind and which none of the five permanent members has yet clarified. The members will recall that I indicated there was clearly a confusion of thought in' the Military Staff Committee as to what article 11 referred to. The original Chinese, French, United King- . dom, and United States texts refer to compar- able initial contributions, whereas the USSR text obviously refers to overall permanent contribu- I principes, de determiner l'importance des forces armees, leUf nature ou leur composition; pour nous, la' seuJe conclusion possible est que nous n'en aboutirions pas moins au meme resultat, que1s que soient ces principes de base. Ceci dit, il devient evident pour nous que les contribu- tions "militaires des cinq membres permanents ne peuvent etre identiques, ni eri nature d'armes, ni en types de materiel, nien numbre, qu'il s'agisse de forces terrestres, navales ou aeriennes. Aussi, meme en nous fondant sur ces evalua- tions, nous apparalt-i;! plus vrai que jamais que le seul principe raisonnable et logique que nous puissions adopter' est celui de l'equivalence; ce- la, Sans perdre de vue que la valeur comparative d'ensemble des contributions militaires initiales sera identique, roais qu'il y aura de tres grandes differences dans la puissance des elements cons-, titutifs. J'aimerais faire une autre observation sur une question qui ne me paralt pas tres claire et sur laquelle les cinq membres permanents n'ont pas encore apporte de lumiere. J'ai signale, vous vous en souvenez, qu'il y avait une confusion certaine de.pensee au sein du Comitc d'etat- major, quant au domaine d'application de l'ar- ticle 11. . Le texte original des declarations faites par les delegations de la Chine, de~ Etats-Unis, de la France et du Royaume-Uni parle d'une con- tribution initiale comparable, alors que le textJ~. stI I Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): There were two re- M. EL-J.{HOURI (Syrie) (traduit de Can.. quests made of the Milltary Staff Committee. glais): Deux deinandes ont ete adressees au The first request was that the Military Staff Comite d'etat-major. Nous lui demandions Committee should· submit an estimate of the d'abord de nous soumettre une evaluation de la overall. strength of the armed forces which puissance d'ensemble des forces armees qui de- should be made available to the Security Coun- vraient etre·mises a la disposition duConseil de cil. I do not believe that th~ Committee, in securite. Je ne crois pas. qu'en faisant .cette making that estimate, studied the .principles on ,evaluation le Comite ait etudie les principes se- which these forces would be contributed:. Ion lesquels ces forces devraient etre mises a namely, whether the contributions would be notre disposition, c'est-a-dire si ces contributions made in accordance with the principle of devraient se faire suivantle principcde l'egalite equality or in accordance with the principle of ou suivant le principe de la capacite des Etats. capacity. That question has nothing to do with Cette q\1.estion n'a rien a voir avec l'evaluation an estimate of the overall forces which it is de la puissance d'ensemblequ'il est necessam necessary to put at the disposal of the.Security de mettre a la disposition du Conseil de secu- Council. rite. When the military staff organization of any Lorsqu'on demande a l'etat-major d'unpays, country, or of the United Nations, is asked to ou des Nations Unies, de soumettre une evalua- submit an estimate of this sort, it has to take tion de cette sorte, il lui faut prendre en consi- other factors into consideration. It does not care deration d'autres fact~urs. n ne sesoucie pas de how the forces are to be levied. It determines la maniere dont on levera cea' forces. Il deter- with whom these forces are to cope, the duties mine a qui elles auront a faire face, les devoirs or tasks to be assigned to them, and the objec- et les taches qui leur seront assignes et(es objec- tives to be reached. In other words, it must tifs qu'-elles devront atteindre..Autrern.e, lt dit, il take into consideration the rival against which doit prendre en consideration l'adversaire que these forces are going to fight. ces forces auront acombattre. What is the duty of the forces envisaged here? QueUe sera la mission des forces ainsi envi- Their duty is_to suppress aggression and restore sagees? Reprimer·l'agression et retablir la pm peace anywhere in the world. To suppress ag- dans toutes les parties du monde. L'agression de gression on whose part? On the part of any qui? De n'importe quel Etat agresseur, nous dit- aggressor, it is said. What, then, are the forces on. Quelles sont done les forces de cet agresseur? of that aggressor? How are we to cope with Comment allons-nous leur faire face et quelle them, and what force would be sufficient for the puissance militaire sera requise? Telles sont. les purpose? Those are the questions which have to questions que nous devons prendre en con- be taken into consideration when making an sideration lorsque nous faisons une evaluation estimate of this Sort. I believe the Military Staff de cette sorte. Je crois que ~.e Comite d'etat-ma- ~ommittee did take those questions. into con- jor a effectivement tenu compte de ces questions slderation before studying the question of the avant meme d'etudier le probleme de la base sur basis on which contributions should be made. laquelle ces contributions devraient etre fournies. . That question would come afterwards and Cette question-la ne vient qu'apres et releve du would fall within the province of the Security Conseil de securite, non du Comite d'etat-major. Council, not the Military Staff Committee. If the Military Staff Committee has taken as the basis of its estimate the factors I have ~aise indique nettemEnt qu'il y a une distinc- tion a faire etpade d'une puissance initiale dO!1t 75 pour 100 devraient etre fournispar les>cinq membres permanents. Ce n'est la qu'un point secondaire, je le recunnais, mais.il n'en reste pas moms qu'il regne unecertaine confusion quant a la signification reelle de l'article 11; cet arti·· cle, censement, traitc:l.de la contribution initiale des membres permanents,et pourtant nous cons- tatons que les-deIegationsont a l'esprit la contri-; bution d'ensemble de toutes les nations unies. I am' very pleased to note that the figures ,given here present another indication regarding the reduction of armainents"and the,regulation of the' armed forces for all nations. That is -the principle to be taken into consideration and not the method of contribution. whether it is to be on the basis of equality or -that of capacity. The figures which have, been given are only provisional. However, since they are submitted by competent officials who are in a position to make'recomDlendations not only to the Security Oouncil butlo their respective Governmentscon~ cerning questions such as those which we put to them, I consider those figures to be very valu- able. Although they may be modified in the future under different conditions, they have great value, and we must take them into con- sideration and rely upon them, as long as they are not replaced with other figures. As they con- stitute the only figures we have before us, we must consider them as reliable for, the purpose of study and evaluation. Mr.LANGE (Poland): I thought it was clearly understood that the estimates presented to liS were of a purely experimental character and had no final significance whatever. Conse- quently, we may some day be confronted with figures which are either considerably higher or lower than these. M.•LANGE (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglais) : Il a ete clairement entendu, je crais, que les evaluations presentees ici avaient un caractere purement experimental et n'avaient aucune si- gnification definitive. Nous pou'vons donc, un' jour ou l'a,utre, nous trouver devant des chiffres considerablement superieurs ou considerable- ment inferleurs. ges evaluations n'avaient, je crois, qu'un seul but, celui de nous permettre de decider si le principe de l'egalite etait pratique ou non. Cer- taines delegations ont pretendu que le principe de l'egalite n'etait pas 'pratique,. parce qu'il re- duirait Ies forces armees mises a la disposition du Conseil de securite au potentiel le plus bas de chacundes membres permanents du Conseil de securite. As I understand it, these estimates were given with one purpose in mind, namely, to present a basis for concluding whether or not the principle of equality was practical. It has been argued by some delegations that the principle of equality is impractical because it would reduce the armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council to the 10weI:t potential which can be represented by one of the perman,em nembers of the Security Council. Therefore, it is with that thought in mind that I read the estimates submitted. I am rather uneasy because I find, some contradiction be- tween the estimates submitted and the con- clusions ,drawn by two of the delegati01is, on 'the basiS of these estimates, that the principle of equality is impractical. Actually,' the C'est avec cette pensee presente a l'esprit que j'ai lu les evaluations qui nous sont presentees. Ce qui me gene un peu, c'est que je trouve des contradictions entre les evaluations qw nous sont 50umises et les conclusions qu'en tirent deux delegations, lesquelles pretendent y voir que le principe de l'egalite n'est pas pratique. Leur con~ For example, we have estimates on air forces.· . They vary from approximately 1,20o--the French and United Kingdom estimates--:-to 3,800, as given by the United States. If we divide these figures by 5, according to one esti- mate, we arrive at a figure of 240 planes, and according to· the other estimate, 760 planes. I do not believe that any of the major Powers cannot. contribute these totals. We then come to the matter of ground forces, which vary from 8 to 20 divisions; Dividing these figures by 5, we arrive at approximately 2 to 4 divisions. Are there any permanent mem- bers of the SecUrity Council who cannot submit 4 divisions, not to· mention the figure of 2 divisions? There may be som.e doubt in the case of naval forces, although I think even here the diffi- c1.llties are not as vague as they may first aRpear to be. The first category we have is that of bat- . tleships, which range from 2 to 3; this would mean. approximately one battleship to be sup., plied by each of the permanent members of the Council. The next category is that of carri~rs, which range from 4 to 6; this would again mean one carrier to be supplied by each of the per- manent members. The estimate for cruisers ranges from 6 to· 15, which would necessitate the contribution of one to three cruisers by each permanent member. I do not wish to go through all these figures. However, I just mention some where the diffi- culties might seem to be outstanding. For in- stance, the estimate for destroyers submitted by the United Kingdom is 24, while that submitted by the United States is 84, which would result in figures of 5 and 17 when divided by 5. With respect to submarines, the Frel•.::h and the United Kingdom estimates are 12, whereas the United States estimate is 90, which would amol;lnt to 3 submarines according to one esti- mate and 18 according to the other. I am rather surprised, therefore. how the con- clusion can be drawn from thes~ figures-and there may be others-that the principle of e.quality is impracticable and inapplicable, par- !lcularly if we allow for certain minor exceptions m one or two cases.

If there·are no further observations I should like· to speak on behalf of the del~gation of FRANCE before I declare the meeting closed. .I think that 1.11 asking the Military Staff Comlhittee the question to which it has just replied, we adopted the only method which perha.ps might, and indeed must, lead to results. . It s~enis to me evident that if we keep to our d~ fournir une telle contribution. Venons-en maintenant aux forces terrestres, qui varient de· 8 a 20 divisions. Si l'on divise encore par 5, on arrive a un resultat de 2 a 4 divisions. Y a-t-il un membre permanent du Conseil de securite qui ne puisse fournir 4 et a plus forte raison 2 divisions? . Le cas des forces navales est peut-etre un peu' plus douteux, bi~n que, a mon avis, iciencore, les difficultes soient plus nettes qu'il ne le semble au premier abord. La prelniere categorie est celle des.cuirasses, qui doivent etreau nombrede 2 ou 3, ce qui represente approximativement un cuirasse par membre permanent du Conseil. La categorie suivanteest.celle des porte-:a\jons, au nombre de 4 a 6, ce qui represente un porteavioIlS par membre permanent. Pour les croiseurs, on nousparle de 6a 15 unites, ce qui representerait de la part de chaque membre permanent une contribution de un a trois croiseurs. Je ne veux pas discuter a fond tous ces chiffres. Je voudrais cependant en signaler. que'- ques-uns qui presentent une exceptioJ:¥lelle difficulte. Par exemple l'evaluation soumise par le Royaume-Uni en ce qui concerne les destroyers est de 24 navires, alors que les Etats-Unis parlent de 84, ce qui, divise par 5, donnerait, dans le premier cas, 5 navireset,dans le deu~eme cas, 17 navires. En ce qui concerne Ies sousmarins, les evaluations de la France et du Royaume-Uni sont de 12, celle des Etats-Unis de 90, ce qui donnerait 3 sous-marins suivant les premieres evaluations et 18 suivant I'autre. Je suis donc un peu etonne que 1'0n puisse tirer de ces cbiffres (et il peut y en avoir encore d'autres) la conclusion que le principe de l'egalite n'est pas pratique et n'est pas applicable, surtout si nous admettons certaines exceptions mineures, dans un ou deux cas. Le PRESIDENT: S'il n'est pas presente d'autres observations, je voudrais, avant de lever la seance, prendre la parole au nom de la delegation de la FRANCE. Je crois qu'en posant au Comite d'etat-major la question a laquelle il yient de repondre, nous avons adopte la seule maniere de travailler qui puisse peut-etre nous conduire a des resultats"; qui, .je crois, ddit nous conduire aces.resultats. ;Il me parait evident que si nous· nous en te~ nons a nos methodes de dialectique un peu metaphysique consista,nt a v9ulo4- ~~er d'~bqr<:l le§ , I repeat this is not clear; it is possible that there is little difference, .but this question cannot be profitably discussed, unless we first attach a clear and precise meaning to the words we are using. I believe, as indeed certain members of the Security Council have also pointed out, that the estimates which have been submitted to us will considerably assist the progress of our work, the more so--and this, too, has already been stressed -in view of the astonishing degree of concordance between these estimates. I feel that we should continue to work on these lines. That is all I have to say this evening, but I reserve the right to make some further c0D:.- crete proposals on my country's behalf, regarding our method of work, at a later meeting. There is, however, a point which we could try to clear "up this evening: it is the question raised by the Australian representative. He reminded us that at a previous meeting he had asked for an explanation of the words· "initial contribution", which appear in several of the texts. I think, indeed, that there is some ambiguity in this respect, since the word "initial" seems to have one meaning in article 10, while it appears to be used in another sense in article "11. The "initial contribution" might be understood to mean the contribution which will have to be' made und~r the agreements which will be concluded: In the event of international difficulties, further forces would be added to this" initial contribution under new special agreements. I admit that this word is used in a somewhat different sense in article 10, and that the "initial contribution" seems to mean the one made by the permanent members, with a possible further contribution on the part of other Members.of the United.Nations. The question raised by the Australian represeI}.tative ought to be settled. There are two ways in which we could try to do this; either by agreeingon an interpretation, or by again questioning fran~aise comprend les mots "equivalence" et "egalite" assortie de "derogations". Encore une fois tout ceci n'est pas clair; il est possible qu'il y ait peu de difference~ mais nous ne pourrons discuter utilement que si nous arrivons a attacher aux mots des sens clairs et pre- CIS. Je crois, comme d'ailleurs certains memhres du Conseil de securite 1'0nt egalement indi.:.Lue, que les estimations qui nous sont presentees sont de nature a faire progresser considerablement notre travail; d'autant plus, et cela egalement a deja ete souligne, qU'il y a entre ces evaluations une assez remarquable concordance. Je pense que nous devons continuer a travailler dans cette voie. Je m'en tiendrai la pour la seance de ce soir et me reserve" de faire, a une autre seance, comme representant de mon pays, des propositions plus concretes quant a la maniere dont nous pourrions continuer a travailler. Cependant, il 'Cst un point que nous pourrions essayer d'elucider des ce sair; il concerne la question poseepar le representant de l'Australie. Celui-ci a rappele qu'il avait pose a une precedente seance une question 'Concernant le sens des mots "contribution initiale" qui figurent dans un certain nombre de textes. Je crois, en effet, qu'a cet egard, il y a une equivoque, car dans l'artic1e 10, le mot "initiale" parrot avoir un certain sens, et dans l'artic1e 11 je crois bien qu'il est pris dans un sens different." On pent concevoir que la "contribution initiale" est celle qui sera foumie en vertu des accords qui seront conc1us. A cette contribution initiale .s'ajouteraient, en cas de difficultes internationales, des forces compIementaires, en vertu de nouveaux accords speciaux. Je reconnais que dans l'article 10, le mot parrot etre pris dans un sens un peu different, et que la "contribution initiale" parait etre celle qui serait foumie par les membres permanents, a laquelle s'ajouteraient, le cas echeant, les contributionsd'autres nations faisant partie des Nations_ Unies. La question posee par 'le" representant de I'Australie vaut d'etre tranchee. Nous pourrions essayer de la resoudre de deux manieres: soit en nous mett&nt d'&ccord sur une interpretation, 7< Is it your wish to refer this question to the Military Staff Committee? Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The President's remarks do not apply to me, as USSR representative, as the lTSSR proposal on article 11 does not refer to initial contributions, bu~ to contributions in general. . •

Only those who used the word "initial" will be asked this question.' Is the proposed procedure agreeable to the Australian representative? Colonel HODGSON (Australia) : My delegation would prefer that course, in view of the comments made in the last few minutes, including the explanation of the President; my delegation is certaL11ly not clear as to t..i],e meaning of the term. When the Military Staff Committee speaks about the overall strength, does it mean the contributions of the permanent members of the Security Council or the contributions of all the Members of the United Nations under the special agreements? I think we should know exactly what the Committee has in mind. As the USSR representative says, he does not have anything at all in mind like "initial contribution" by the permanent members. I gather then that his text means a contribution by all Members, not only the five permanent members of the Security Council. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian) : I said nothing of the ki..lld. I did not say what the Australian representative attributes to me. The USSR proposal refers to the contributions of the permanent members of the Security Council, not the initial contributions, but contributions in general.

If the other members of the Council, especially those who are represented on the Military Staff Committee, do not object to this question being asked, I shall regard the proposal as carried. No objection having been raised, this question will be asked. The Council will meet again tomorrow afternoon to resume consideration of the Greek question. ' d'~tat-major a probablement ete d'accord; il suffirait qu'il nous l'indique. Nous pourrions done essayer de tirer au clair ce point particulier. Pensez-vous que .la question doive etre soumise au Comite d'etat-major? M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe) : Les paroles du President ne s'adressent certainement pas au representant de l'URSS. En effet, ce n'est pas de contributions initiales, mais bien de contributions en general qu'il s'agit dans la proposition de l'URSS relative a l'article 11. Le PRESIDENT: La question sera posee aux representants qui ont employe le mot "initiale". Le representant de l'Australie serait-il d'accord sur la procedure que j'ai suggeree? Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit, de l'anglais): Ma delegation prefere cette maniere de faire en raison des commentaires qui viennent d'etre presentes au cmirs de ces dernieres rr'Jnutes, et· de·l~explication dOluJ.ee pal le:··Presi~­ dent. A mon avis, lesens de ce terme· n'est certainement pas clair. Lorsque le Comite d'etatmajor parle de la puissance d'ensemble, veut-il parler d~s contributions militaires des membre~ permanents du Conseil de securite ou bien des contributions de tous 'les Membres des Nations Unies, aux termes des accords speciaux? J'estime qu'il nous faudrait connaltre exactement la pensee du Comite. Le representant de l'URSS nous dit qu'il ne pense nullement a une "centribution initiale" assuree par les membres permanents. Je pense doncque son texte signifie que la contribution doit etre assuree par tous les Membres et non pas seulement par les cinq membres permanents du Conseil de securite. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (tradui.t du Tusse): le n'ai rien dit de pareil. Je n'ai pas prononce les paro~ les que me prete le representant de l'Australie. Il est question dans la proposition de l'URSS des contributions des membres permanents. n ne s'agit donc pas de contributions initiales, mais de contributions en general. Le PRESIDENT: Si les autres membres du Conseil, en particulier ceuxqui sont representes au Comite d'etat-major, ne font pas d'objection a ce que la question soit posee, il en sera ainsi decide. Puisqu'il n'y a pas d'objection, la question sera posee. Le Conseil se reunira .de nouveau demain apres-midi pour reprendre l'examen de la question grecque. Bolivia-Bolivie France. Editions A. Pedone Librerla Cientlfica y 13, rue Souffiot Literaria: PARIS, Ve Avenida 16 de Julio, 216 Casilla 972 Cireece-(;rece LA PAZ "Eleftheroudaki~" Canada Librairie internationale Place de la Constitution The Ryerson Press ATHENES 299 Queen Street West Ciuatemala TORONTO ChiIe-ChiU Jose Goubaud Goubaud & CIa Ltda. Edmundo Pizarro Sucesor Merced 846 5a Av. Sur No. 6 y 9a C. P. SANTIAGO GUATEMALA China-Chine Haiti-Haiti The Commercial-Press Ltd. Max Bouchereau Librairie "A la Caravelle" 211 Honan Road Bmte postale I11-B SHANGHAI PORT-AU-PRINCE Costa Rica~Costa-Rica India-Inde Trejos Herma:nos Oxford Book & Stationery Apartado 1313 - Co. SAN JOSE Scindia House Cuba NEW DELHI La Casa Belga Iran Rene de· Smedt Bongahe Piaderow O'Reilly 455 731 Shah Avenue LA HABANA TEHERAN Czechoslovakia Iraq-Irak Tchecoslovaquie Mackenzie & Mackenzie F. Topic The Bookshop Narodni Trida 9 BAGHDAD PRAHA 1 Lebanon-Liban Denmark-Danemark Librairie universelle Einar 'Munskgaard BEYROUTH Norregade 6 Luxembourg KJOBENHAVN Librairie J. Schummer Dominican Republic Place Guillaume Republique Doininicaine LUXEMBOURG Librerla Dominic~na NetherIands-Pays-Bas Calle Mercedes No. 49 N. V. Martinus Nijhoff Apartado 656 Lange Voorhout 9 CIUDAD TRUIILLO _ S'GRAVENHAGE Philippines D. P. Perez Co. 132 Riverside SAN JUAN Sweden-S·.,ede A.-B. q. E. Fritzes Kungl. Hofbokhandel Fredsgatan 2 STOCKHOLM Switzerland-S11isse Librairie Payot S. A. LAUSANNE, GENEVE, VEVEY, MONTREUX, NEUCHATEL, BERNE, BASEL Hans Raunhardt :Kirchgasse 17 ZURICH I Syria-Syrie Librairie universelle DAMAS Turkey-Turquie Librairie Hachette 469 Istiklal Caddesi BEYOGLU-IsTANBUL Union of South Ml'ica Union Sud-Africaine Central News Agency Ltd. Commissioner & Rissik Sts. JOHANNESBURG, CAPETOWN, DURBAN United Kingdom Royaume-Uni . H.M. Stationery Office p.a. Box 569 LONDON, S.E. 1 and at H.M.S.O. Shops at LONDON, EDINBURGH, MANCHESTER, CARDIFF, BELFAST'and BRI~TOL United States of America Etats-Unis d'Amerique International Documents Service Columbia :University Press 2960 Broadway NEW YORK 27, N. Y. Yugoslavia-Y ougoslavie Drzavno Preduzece Jugoslovenska Knjiga Moskovska Ul. 36 BEOGRAD 23 March 1948