S/PV.15 Security Council

1 think that this rnight possibly be a sudtable moment for us to adjoum. What time would the Council like to reassemble? It has been suggested to me that 3.30 p.m. would be a suitable time.· 1 would suggest that we endeavour to undertake our duties punctually at half-past three this afternoon. The Council rose at 1.40 p.m. FIFTEENTH MEETING Held at Church House, Westminster, London, on Sunday, 10 February 1!'46, at 3.30 p.m. , President: Mr. N. J. O. MAKIN (Australia). Present: The representatives of the following countries: Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt, France, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. 61. Continuation of discussion of the letter from the Head of the Ukrainian SSR delegation1 Mr. RIAz .(Egypt) (translated from French) : The question now before us has two qudte dis- First of all, there is the presence of British troops in Indonesia. Undoubtedly, the British tioops are there in accordance with the agreement between the Allies and in com; "i~ce with an order, known as OrderNo. 1, \.>.. 'he Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces. They are there for a very definite purpose, which is to receive the surrender of the Japanese troops. Another pùrpose, and a quite natural one, has been added to the mst, namely, to bring relief to the internees in the concentration camps. Nobody disputes this first point. We can discuss the way in which the operations were carried out. Even in this country there have been discussions on that subject. But any military operation,... whatever its nature, is Iikely to be criticized. No doubt th~ normal operation has been complicated' by the difIiculties arising out of.the second aspect, which 1 shall call the political aspect of the question. But 1 think·everybody agrees that the sole purposes for the presence of British troops in Indonesia are those 1 have indicated. Mr. Vyshinsky lilinself said this morning that this task had not yet been finished and that it must be finished., Neverthèless, I.wonder whether the .purposes 1 have just mentioned were properly understood by the leaders of the Indonesian national movement. If they .. had been made to understand these purposes and their Iimited extent, J think that the British troops would noth~ve encountered so-many difIiculties in accomplishing their mission. : . • But be~ides this purely militarY'. aspect, there is another which arises out of the Indonesian national' movemellt. The latter has nothing to do with the presence of British·troops, It existed even befol'e their arrival. . In this connexion,' 1 mustcongratulate Mr. v:an Kleffens on. the very eloquent and ludd statement that he. made yesterday. These con.. gratwations re1aten()t only ta the form. but also to the substance of·' bis statement.. He displayed a very liberal spirit. ,While statinghis point of view very cIearly, he showed great liberalism in regard ta the realization of Indonesian.national aspirations. HenotolÛY did not dispute the legitimacy of thes.e aspiratîons,bllthe even,said: G'It .woulcl.hea,n abnoÎmal people,indeed, who did. not at one time or' another of theit existence 'havee'the ciaViiig for au~onomy and seIf-govem;. ment. We wantta reckon with that to the full, as events, 1 hope; will ghow in a veryfew days.m Thisstatement does honour to Mr. van KIeffens, lVIM?~ ,has responsibilities.towards both sides and ,.takes av:ery broad-n".incl~dview ofthem. ~ --....-- Mr. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands): On a point of order, 1 want to know whether we are talking about the action waged by British troops or about the internal conditions in the Netherlands Indies. Mr. RIAz (Egypt-)-;-ithink. the translation should first he finished and then we might deal with the point of order.

Yes. Mr. RIAz (Egypt) (translated trom French) : 1 apologize in my turn for quoting the press. 1 have before me a copy of The Times of 9 February. It prints an objective article from its special correspondent in Java, ~d ~ think ~~t it aptlye~presses what 1 have ID mmd. This 18 the English text: "Three hundred years of Dutch rule, marked by an economicand political tutelage which contributed much to the material development of the island, but' sternly repressed any expression of national sentiment ..." On the other hand, Mr. van Kleffens made a distinction behNeen nationalistsand terrorists. 1 think there are always excesses in revolutionary movements. 1 do not in the least wish ta defend terrorists or approve of their excesses; like everybody eIse, 1 want the responsible parties to be punished and severe1y punished. 1 do say, hewever, that it is difficult, in such a case, to dis· criminate. 1 quote again from The Times: ' "In short, there are indications of .such excesses as usually accompany a popularrising." 1 would point out thatthe Indonesians are not here to explain or defend themselves. Mr. Bevin, '{or his part~ said there were fascists in the country and that the Jap:mese had left sympathizers behind. Nobody h:,;','t' Niil speak up for those who·'have adopted fasL':<"~ "f' nazi methods, but.l would remind you t'bat when a pêople is striving for its freedom, it .snatches...at anything that· cornes to hand and uses anything that it thinks may'help it in its struggle. 1 think that the way to end these excesses, caUed "fascist"and "terrorist", is not simply to declare them beyond the pale of the law, but to put them clown on the onè hand, .whllst on the other conduèting sound propaganda. It is not by agreeing here as to what happened over there~ that we •can arrive at an exact judgment. Foohlotes 1 and • in the opposite column comprise translati.ons ÏntcFrench of the. quotations from Th. • Tims~ whichappear in th.· sixthand eighih paragraphs on this paao. "Whena party of Bri~h) American and French journalists recently visited Jogjakarta they were escorted by TKB guards on the train, but saw no signs of hostility throughout the trip. On the contrary, people everywhere were frienrlly and gr~eted us with the uplifted palm : salute and cries of 'Merkeda' (which .tneans freedom). Around Jogjakarta conditions appeared peaceful and fairly normal." These same journalists, representing different countries,. visited the internment camps. The Times says in this connexion: "The internees all said they -were being well looked after-they certainly looked fit-and that t1ne 11.ldonesians were 'sympathetic'." l think, therefore, that matters should not be exaggerated; the situation is not so black as it seemed to us. With the very liberal spirit which Ml'. van KlefIens has shown, goad will on bo$ sides and the clpening of negotiations, which has been promised, 1 think that we may hope for a speedy and nonnal solution. One question arises, however, and it has been raised: Have we theright to deal with this problem? The competence of the Security·Council in this matter has, in fact, been questioned. 1 contend, for my part, that we are fully entitled to deal ,,:ith it. In the fust place there is Article 1, paragraph 2 of tlle Charter, which Mr. Vyshinsky read this morning. 1 will not repeat it. This Article recognizes the right ofseH-determination.of peoples, The Charter .. even includes a special chapter, :Chapter.XI, which deals with Non'-Self-Governing Territories, and lays down that the United Nations "recognize the principle that theinterests of thei11habitants of these territories arepal'amùunt.". If weare not entitled to deal with this question, what is the value of Article 1 and of Chapter XI· cf the Charter? . The Charter imposes notonly an-obligatic')ll c.=~,~onBtatesa,dministering such territories, butalso a more. general obligation..pn aIl the Members of the -United~âtions. How canthe. Organizationdischarge such an obligaticm? ] am.speaking ..here in the 'abstract, ~lnd Iamnot referringto any'particlllar case. Suppose that thereare populations subjected to l'callY tyran.nic?t oppression. Arewe ta look ..on Footnotes· 1· .and •i in·the. opposite ·cohunn comprise q-anslation(l .. into French. of . thé. quotations from. .T.he Timeswhichappear in the second .andfourth paragràphSCllthis p~ge. . l'Organisation que y tonomes mité. de populations mêmes sont d'une importance vitale pour et diale:.", Vous .est responsable de Conseil Royaume-Uni,· étaient présents lorsque cette résolution fut votée, reconnaissant ainsi le lien entre de tels problèmes et la paix. théorique. Voyons pes se siens l'autre, sur N'est-ce tions .peut purement But this is no mere theoretical hypothesis. Let us .see what would happen if British troops, having completed their task, were withdrawn from Indonesia: . Onthe.onehand, there· filIe cightythôusand Indonesians·in possession of modern equipment; on the .other hand, there is a Dutch arrny which isbeing made ready, and which is preparing ;to go and fight. them. ·Is that not waJr? Furt'..hermore, 1 wonder what complications are likely to follow from this state of affairs. .,Purely civilwars have already nearly led to gentt . . _ 'See Pcage 194. • ~ee. R~solutidn$adof1tlld.·by .thllGllftllralAssembly dunngthe first parto~lts ~st session, page ~3,No.1. peJ:ldant page,13, To sum up: With regard to the presence of British troops in Indonesia (and on this poînt there is no disagreement) They were sent by virtue of an agree·· ment between allies and for a very definite purpose. The Security Coun.eil is in no way concerned with that, and 1 consider that a commission of inquiry would serve no useful purpose. It could only exaniir.e certain individual cases, question a few individuals who have committed offences or taken part in excesses; it might perhaps throw some light on certain specific happenings, but, could throw no light on the issue itself. These are questions wlùch concern military discipline and it is for the authoritiès of each army (in this particular case, the British military authorities) to see that this discipline is enforced. It is not for us to intervene, since as yet there is no question of a conflict of an international character. With regard to the political aspect of the question, we must place reliance upon the statements of the Netherlands' reoreseüî:âtÎve. He has told us that negotiatio~will. begin forthwith. If we were faced with a real international conflict,the fust thingwe should do wouldbe to ask the parties concemed to negotiate. That is what has been done, as Mr. van Kleffens has aIso stated that Dr. Soekarno was ready to negotiate. We .can hope that in these circumstances the parties will arrive at a satisfactoryconclusion. 1 think, however, that we should ask ta be .kept informed of the ~ubsequent course of these IJegotiations. Let us defer action on our part, shouldany be called for, until a laterdate..

During thé translation, the representative of the Netherlands raised a point of order regarding ceI1ain references that have heen made. by the representative of Egypt.. r woulci.like to say that 1 didnot think that the -references made .by·the ·representative of Egypt to intemalmatters could be clearly separated from the generalcontentions of the representative of the Ukrainian SSR. 1 cou1d not rule such a·matter out oforderin the warin which it.was referredto by the representative of Egypt. . . Mr. BEVIN (Unîted :l(ingdom): 1 do not proposeto take up much of the Council's tiIne becatIseI.think. th~forensic abilitYJh~tl1.asPeC!l displaye(f"fu"tlJJS. giScUsSlonmUst have -wearied us'. Neither sha.lL:I .1Dake another joke.about the press, in case i~ upsets anyone. 'rhis.discussionhas. goneentirely wide of the 'Jetter. sent .to.the Council by the. representative pfth~Ukraine. .Iam notgomgtoenter<into a • prolonged. argument about .the Articles .of the Charter, because Ifind· in .this Organization ..:. In the arguments put forth by the representative of the Ukraine, he did not make the claim that peace and security were eD.~angered, and only by inference this moming was it made by , the representative of the Soviet Government, because he ended by saying that he did not want the British troops withdrawn. Therefore, 1 make my protest-and the only way in wmch 1 can do it is by resisting the comriüssion-a protest against a great State putting charges on the ager ' l, with the inference that these charges contain, and· then, being unable to substantiate them,' asking for a commission. 1 have been told that Article 1, paragraph 2 deals with .the situation. What does it say? Article 1, paragraph 2 says that the. United Nations must "develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for.the principle of equal'rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take :>ther appropriatemeasures tostrengthen universal peace". But .that is not what is in the letter. That is not meiltioned. If there were a charge against the Dutch Govemment, that would be a different matter. But that is not what is in the letter, and we ~re'wandering about aIl over Indonesia and the l'est of the world, but we are not .dealing with the letter. .. If it is argued that the Netherlands Government. is a repressive government, and thereby endangering pëacC, that 6ught tobe in the ch~ge, and not the matter of the British troops gomg. to accept the sUrI'endei' of the Japanese. 1 thmk thatis.a sound argument and •a logical ?ne, and.1 am not going ta bea party to allowmg all kinds of~fe~ences, unchallenged, to be thrown at .the British soldier, who has had this unpleasant job ta "do. Wehave had the testimony of Mr.. van Kleffensthat, if he has acomplaintagainstus, it is that weh~ve•been.~toQ restrained. There has been a total disregard· of It was suggested that if Sir Archibald Clark Kerr can go there, why cannat other nations go there? But Sir Archibald Olark Kerr is not conducting any negotiations. He is ooly rendering assistance as a pc.litical adviser, becauseBritish troops are there, in order to see that the thing is carried out in a proper manner, and, to render any assistance he can, so that there will he no abuse of the presence of British troops during the conduct of the negotiations; and that is all. Let me make this point: the example was cited of the investigationinto Greece, namely the supervision of the elections. But·we did not 'impose it on the Greek Government. ,We were there at the invitation of the Greeks. 1 do not think the situation referred to in Poland has any relation to this at all. Then there were two governments, the Lublin Government and the London Government. There was a great conflict between Allies; and to end that conflict between themselves as to which 'Government should be recognized or whether a new Government should be created, they' quite properly appointed people to go to look into it. It was just the same with regard toRoumania the other day. It "las a conflict not somuch with the Roumanians but as to whetherthe Rou- 'manian Governmentshould b';"r€cogniZed.' The conflict was betweenthree Allies, and they devised means to go and settle that. But it has nothing to do with tbis particular case. 1 would say to the Soviet and Ukrainian dele.. ga.tions that inneithercase didwechargethé Soviet Government Mthelldangering peace or charge thatthe ,presenC6 of,their troopswas endangering peace..la none of the cliscussioÏlSdo 1 remember that "le saidone "lord about the Red Army, or about ,the commanders, or any'" tlûngelse. It wasapoliticaldifficulty ineach case. " , ,,' This .isa reflectionupon theconduct of His 'Majesty's Govermnent, its c0ItlIllandersand its soldiers. Iamnot going ta wade further tbrough ..We did have quite innocent troops going up to get those people out of concentration camps, and they were attacked on 29 October. In another case, unfortunately, they had to make a forced landing; they were not attacking anybody but just landing, doing an errand of mercy, and twenty-two men were hacked to pieces in front of the public. Those are not very pleasant ind· dents and may be called excessèS. But itis the kind of thing that does occur in civil wars. 1 say to the Ukrainian representative: neither now nor in the future when charges like this are made, without evidence and without previous communication with the British Government, will 1 be a party to having a commission investigating conduct in this way. 1 do not want' to enter into a legal argument, but as 1 read the Article quotEd by the Egyptian representative, it is real1y on trusteeship. That inay be an argument or it may not, but thatis howit reads to me. As he is a lawyer, and as my friend on my right is a lawyer, 1 am much too .modest to take on the two of them as to the interpretation of the Charter. 1 leave it to the jurists to enjoy the~e1ves with it. But that is how ît looked to me. As far as we are concerned, with regard to Article 1, paragraph 2,·,the Netherlands Government is doing its best to carry out t.hat Article in the spirit of the Charter; and as fa!: as we can render assistance'we are ready to render that assistance. But weare not going to interfere fi any decisions that are taken. That re§ts between the Netherlands Government and, thé people in Indonesia. AlI 1 am' concerned about is this reflectiorion our troops and this charge that in doingwhat we are doing we" are endangering peace. His Majesty's Governmeht will not take that, either by inference or directIy. We are as much a peaceloving nation as any nation in the world. We shall not submit te this kind of charge which is hurled at us. , !VIr. RIAz(Egypt) (translated fromFrench): Wlth regard to the Articles of the Charter to Ml'. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands): Iam not sure that 1 would ask again to he heard were it not that it means to me that in what Ml'. Vyshinsky 'and aIso the Egyptian representative said there Were questions of considerable importance involved in regard to the true construction of the Charter. The interpretation given by t.'te,representative of the Soviet Union, ofwhat coristitutes interference in the internai affairs of a country and what doesnot, seern.s to me on the dangerous side, to say the least of it. That interpretation seemed to me to whittle away completelY Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, andI should like to see wha:, for instance,the International . Court of Justice would have to say with regard to that point. , The representative of Egypt, if 1 understood mm correctIy, seemed to suggest that it would be enough to justify intervention by the' Security Council if, in a given country, twogl'oupswere involved in trouble, ifthese two.groups belonged to two different races. If 1 misunderstood the representative ,of Egypt, perhaps he would be good enough to correct me~ Mr. RrAz(Egypt) (transiated trom French): Provided there is a threat to international peace as a resultof the conflict. When 1 referred to civil war; 1 was thinking of Spain. Mr. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands) : Of course, if intenlal trouble, overstepped, by cÏrcunistance, tlle borders of purely internal affairs, thereis a'possibility thatthe Councilmight do so; but1 have denied aIl along thatthereis a threat topeace as' a ,consequence..of whatever circumstances now exist in Indonesia. As a,matter o~Jact,if there were'that war ,about'which' Mr. Vyshîhsky has been talking to us this morning,'Vould itbeconceivable that the responsible bon«!'.fide leaders of that national, movement would atthis very m()ment be negotiating with us? 1 do not think sofor a moment. Now,at the riskof becoming tedious byrepecition, ,1 must repeat. th~t.we •do not deny,.nor has. the,BritÏ$b ,representaqve denied, that there hasbeenmilitary action; butwhat we. dodeny isthatthis actiol1 was directed ~gainst the Indonesian rhovementas 'such., Again,,the "fact that we arenegotiating with these gentlemen Ï&, 1 There has been sorne question of Dutch troops being sent there: a-l1d 1 think il: may be useful that 1 shouldexplain in a very few words why Dutch troops should be sent there. The clay before yesterday, in the course of our :fust meeting on this subject, 1 said that the presence of British troops there was something in the nature of an anomaly, and 1 made it clear how and why that anomaly had arisen. Such troops as we are now going to send there are primafJy intended to relieve British troops. 1 think that is normal; that is in the natural order of things. We hope they will never have to be used. 1 can .promise .here and now that they will no more be used againstthe bona fide national movement than suchtroops as we have there already; but they will be used, if need be, against these un~ ruly e1ements and hooligans of whom there ar.e stiIJ. far too many. Mr. Sjahrir, the very able leader of tlùs nationalist movement, said in a press conference yesterday that the nationalists· still had little control over gangs of extremists ;nvolved in almost dàily attacks on British patroIs in the Soerabaya district. He also conceded that the proposed removal· of Dutch intexnees from eXtremist-controlled areas in the interior has temporarily broken down-l add in my own words, with all the risks and dangers resulting therefrom to these internees. About the character of the. presence of Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, 1 propose to say nothing, because that has beenconclusivelydealt with, 1 think, .by my friend Mr. Bevin. What Ishould like tô say-and upon this note·1 should like ta conèlude-is that Mt. Vyshinsky said that there was alarm to public opinion. 1 believe that that state of alarmexists •. only inhis own imagination.. lthink thatin the Dutch East Inilles there is a curtain rising.over a scene wmch justifies 1 think that is all 1 have to say. 1 could go further into the facts, but 1 do not think that would be conducive to a desirable outcome of this debate. Thè PRESIDENT: It is essential now for the Counci! to adjcurn, owing to' the meeting of the plenary session of the Assenlbly. 1 would suggest to the Council that we should meet tomorrow at 5 p.m. Since there are no objections, 1 will declare that adopted. SIXTEENTH· MEETING Held at Cltur~h House, Westminster, London, on Mondqy, 11 February 1946, at 5 p.m. President::Mr. N. J. O. MAKIN (Australia). Present: The representatives of the following . countries: Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt, France, .Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Dnionof Soviet Socialist Republics, .United. Kingdom, United States of America. • 62. Provisional agenda 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. Letter from the Head of the Ukrainian SSR de!egation to the' President of the Secudty Council dated 21 January 1946. 1 3. Letter frem the Head of the YugoSlav delegation. ta the Executive Secretary {un- dated).ll 4. Letterfl'om the Heads of the Lebanese and Syrian' delegationsto the Secretary-Gen- eraldated 4 Februan· 1946 {document S/5).1 5. Report by the Chairman of theCommittee of Experts.on.thealterations made by the Conunitteein the provisional rules of pro- cedt~Ie of the Security Council .(document S/6)." 1 SeeOfficial R,cordsof the Security Council, First ~YeaJ', First Series, Supplement :N;Q. 1, Annex.4. 1 Ibid., Annex 5. 'Ibid:, Annex 9r > . "1biiL, ~~upPIement No: ~; Annex10.