S/PV.150 Security Council

This is the second time in the history of the Security Council that the representative of Poland has been called upon, in accordance 'with our ·rules of procedure, to perlorm the honourable duty of serving as President. On this occasion-and I think I am speaking in the name of all the members of the Council-I should like to express my thanks to my predecessor, Mr. Parodi, who served as President last month. On each of the two occasions on which he has acted as President of the Council, he has performed his duties with. the same elegance, precision, and impartiality. I am sure that I express the sentiments of the entire Council when I convey my thanks to him. The month which .lies ahead of us will be a very busy one. Included among the matters with which we are seized and which we should con- CENT-CINQUANTIEME SEANCE T enue aLake. Success, New-York, le mardi 1er juillet 1947, a15 heur.es. President: M. O. LANGE·(Pologne). 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour. 196. Allocution du President 197. Adoption of the agenda 197. Adopfion de I'ordre du iour 198. Continuation of the discussion on the Greek question At the invitation of the PresidBnt, Colonel Kt:renxhi, representative of Albania, Mr. M evo- rah, representath;e of Bulgaria, Mr. Dendramis, representative of Greece, and Mr. Vilfan, repre- 198. S"ite de la discussion sur la question grecque Sur l'invitation du President, le colonel Ke- renxhi, representant de l'Albanie, lV!. kJevorah, representant de la Bulgarie, ,iV!. Dendramis, re- presentant de la Grece, et .L.. , Vilfan, represen- tant de la Yougoslavie, prennent place ala table du Conseil. s~ntative of Yugoslavia, took their seats at the Council table.

I caU upon the representative of YugoSlavia. Le PRESIDENT (tradeit de l'anglais): Je donne la parole au representant de la Yougoslavie. Mr. VILFAN (Yugoslavia): The Yugoslav Government is of the opinion that the report of the Commission of Investigation should be studied ill detail, with attention paid to part H of the report, which is entitled "Survey of evidence submitted to the Commission"; with more attention to part HI, called "Conclusions", which should be" derived from part II, from impartially registered evidence; and, finally, with attention to part IV, to the reco~mmendations, which should provide appropriate, measures, in accordance with the impartially established and appraised facts. M. VILFAN (Yougoslavie) (traduit de l'anglais): Le Gouvernement yougoslave est d'avis que le rapport de la Commission d'enquete devrait etre etudie en detail; qu'une attention particuliere devrait ctre accordee a la partie H de ce rapport intituIee: "Expose des temoignages presentes a la Commission"; une attention plus grande encore a la partie III du rapport intitulee "Conclusions", laquelle doit decouler de la partie 11, c'est-a-dire des temoignages enregistres impartialement; et enfin bne non moins grande attention a la partie IV, c'est-a-dire aux recommandations qui doivent prevoir des mesures appropriees repondant aux faits tels qu'ils ont ete etablis et juges impartialement. It is the seriousness of the matter which neCe::lsitates such procedure. Whateve~ our opinion of the situation which has been created in Greece and along its frontiers, and of the causes of that situation, an extraordinarily important precedent for the United Nations is in question, and the honour of three nations is at stake. The Greek Government charged Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria with having given aid in the civil war and, at the same time, with having provoked frontier incidents. Those three countries, on their part, submitted numerous charges against the Greek Government. Yugoslavia submitted to the Commission of Investigation evidence and witnesses regarding the systematic extermination of the Macedonian minority in Macedonia; about the gathering and using of war criminals,· traitors, and qu.islings for anti- Yugoslav and anti-democratic purposes; about systematic frQntier provocations by the Greek C'est la gravite de la question qui exige cette procedure. Quelle que soit notreopinion sur la situation creee en Grece et le long de ses frontieress ainsi que sur les causes de cet etat de choses, il s'agit la d'un precedent extremement important pour les Nations Unies, et d'autre part c'est l'honneur de trois nations qui est en jeu. Le Gouvernement grec a accuse la Yougoslavie, l'Albanie et la Bulgarie d'avoir pris parti dans la guerre civile et, simultanement, d'avoir provoque les incidents de frontiere. Ces trois pays, de leur cote, ont· presente de nombreux griefs contre le Gouvernement grec. La Yougoslavie a soumis a la Commission d'enquete des preuves et des temoignages tendant a etablir que la minorite macedonienne de Macedoine est I'objet d'une extermination systematique; que I'on rassemble des criminels de guerre, des traitres et des quislings et qu'on les emploie a des fins hostiles a la Yougoslavie et antidemocra- 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securite, Deuxieme Annee, Supplement special No 1. . 'Ibid., Supplement No 14, Annexe 37. C'est pourquoi, je dois le dire d'abord, nous avons entendu avec surprise la declaration du representant des Etats-Unis' a la cent-quaranteseptieme seance du Conseil selon laquelle les conclusions adoptees sans reserve par six membres - six seulement sur onze que-comprend la Commission d'enquete - ont ete adoptees integralement, avant que les pays les plus directement interesses aient pu se faire entendre; cette declaration prqposait egalement qu'aucun debat n'eut lieu, bien qu'en dernier ressort ce soit au Conseil de securite dans son ensemble de juger de la situation. For this reason, first of all, we listened with surprise to the statement of the United States represent:;i.tive' at the hundred and forty-seventh meeting of the Council, according to which conclusions drawn without reservation by only six of the eleven members of the Commission of Investigation were adopted in their entirety, before the countries most concerned were given the possibility of being heard, and in which statement it is suggested that no discussion should be held, although the last word regarding the appraisal of the situation belongs to the Security Council as a whqle. Lorsque de tels problemes sont en cause, il ne faut pas se hater, au detriment d'un examen approfondi. On risque de creer I'impression que les conClusions sont inspirees non de I'examen des faits, mais d'un jugement precon~u et d'interets particuliets. Je n.'ai pas besoin de souHgner combien une telle impression ferait de tort au prestige de I'Organisation des Nations Unies et ala confiance dont elle jouit. When such matters are in question as in this case, speed Ir..1Jst not be used at the expense of thorough consideration. The impression could be created that conclm;ions are drawn, not on the basis of consideration of facts, but on the basis of a judgment created in advance and of special interests. It is not necessary for me to emphasize how much such an impression could harm the prestige of the United Nations and the confidence it enjoys. For these reasons first of all, which are importantbecause they represent matters of principle, and which are far removed from being merely procedural questions, the statement of the United States representative provoked great astonishment and recalled to us the impression which the statement of Mr. Mark Ethridge, representative of the United States on the Com- C'est en premier lieu pour ces raisons - importantes parce qu'elles se referent a des questions de principe et qu'elles sont loin d'etre de simples questions de procedure - que la declaration du representant des Etats-Unis a provoque une profonde surprise; elle nous a rappele l'impression que nous avait laissee la declaration de M. Mark Ethridge, representant des Etats- Unis a la Commission d'enquete. Immediatement apres son retour aux Etats-Unis, M. Ethridge avait declare a la presse, entre autreschoses: "Il n'y a pour moi aueun doute: la Bulgarie, la Yougoslavie et l'Albanie sont en train d'armer, d'eIitramer et de ravitailler-des forces de partisans qui operent dans le nord de la Greee,. et de leUI' donner abri et refuge. Il est hors de doute que, sans l'intervention des Etats- Unis, la Grece passait aux mains de la minorite communiste." Acesujet, M. Kosanovic, Ambassadeur de Yougoslavie a Washington, a adresse au Secretaire general des Nations Vnies, M. Trygve I;ie, une lettre dans laquelle il ~ignale combien cette intervention est deplacee, et declare: mi~ion of Investigation, left upon us. Immediately after his return to the Unii-ed States, Mr. Ethridge declared to the press, among other things: "There is no question in my mind that Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania arc arming, training, supplying and giving hospitalization and refuge to guerrilla forces operating in northern Greece. There is no question that Greece would have gone over to the Communist minority had not the United States stepped in." On this occasion, Mr. Kosanovic, Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Washington, addressed a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Trygve Lie, in which he caned his attention to the impropriety of such an action and said: "His [Mr. Ethridge's] views, as expressed through the press, must throw a peculiar light on whatever proposals, acts, resolutions or reports emanate from the Commission as a consequence of Mr. Ethridge's initiative. His conduct "Ses opinions [celles de M. Ethridge], telles qu'elles ontete communiquees a la presse, ne peuvent manquer de jeter une etrange lumiere sur les propositions, mesures, resolutions et rapports, quels qu'ils soient, qui emaneront de la 1 Voir Ies Proces-vubaux officiels du Conseil de securite, Deuxieme Annee, No 51. Mr. Ethridge, when asked for comment by the press, answered: "Nuts." We thirik the statement of the United States representative at the hundred and forty-seventh meeting did not in any way change the impression left by thisto say the least-laconic answer. , But our surprise was all the greater because we have, it is understood, thoroughly studied all of the material which the Commission of Investigation has amassed, and we have studied the conclusions of the majority in the light of that material. We consider that the Security Council should do. the same, but, unfortunately, the representative.of the United States has failed to do II y a pourtant quelques exemples qui, des l'abord, devraient ebranler la conviction que semble avoir le representant des Etats-Unis, asavoir que les conclusions de la majorite de la Commission d'enquete sont fondees et sont sans appel. Je voudrais attirer l'attention dll Conseil sur ces exemples. La Commission d'enquete a re!!ll pour mission d'elucider les l:auses et la nature cles violations de frontiere et des troubles. Elle s'appeIait "Commission d'enql'ete sur les incidents survenus ala frontiere grecque"; son rapport a ete publie sous le meme titre. Les incidents en question auraient dO constituer precisement, sinon le seul, du moins le principal objet de son enquete. S'il est exact que la Yougoslavie ait provoque une guerre civile en Grece, s'il est exact qu'dle ait entralne des forces de partisans grecs, leur ait fourni des armes et leur ait donne asile sur son territoire, les incidents de frontiere qu'auraient provoques ces initiatives devraient etre des manifestations concretes de la politique yougoslave. S'il est exact que la Yougoslavie pratique une politique de force par de sournoises methodes d'infiltration, d'intimidation et de subterfuge, les incidents de frontierc fournissent l'occasion de prendre la Yougoslavie en flagrant delit, car lis n'offrent aucune oossibilite de dissimulation. • S'il est exact, cl'autre part, comme I'affirme la Yougoslavie, que de teIs incidents, impliquant une aide donnee aux partisans grecs, n'existent pas, mais qu'il y a des violations d~ frl.lntiere provoquees par le Gouvernement grec, et qui sont la consequence de sa politique interieure et de sa politique exterieure d'agression, ce sont ces derniers incidents qui constituent aleur tour une question tres importante. Ce n'est certainement pas sans raison que la Commission a ete denommee "Commission d'enquete sur les incidents survenus ala frontiere grecque". On the other hand, if it is true, as Yugoslavia: states, that such incidents, as incidents involving aid to Greek guerrillas, do not exist, and ii there are border violations provoked by the Greek Government, which are the consequence of the internal policy of the Greek Government and of its aggressive foreign policy, then again the incidents constitute a very impurtant question. It. was indeed not without reason that the Commission was .called "Commission of Investigation concerning Greek Frontier Incidents". fran~ais), les incidents survenus a Aghia Paraskevi, a Sourmena, a Skra et a Idhomeni. Il y a une etrange disparite entre le nombre d'incidents signales et I'importance de ce probleme d'une part et, d'autre part, le nombr~ total des incidemlS etudies. Le second point qui ne peut manquer de retenir l'attentionest celui-ci: bien que la Yougoslavie ait accuse le Gouvemement grec d'avoir, durant la periode allant de mai 1945 adecembre 1946, provoque soixante-dix-neuf incidents de caractere militaire contre la Yougoslavie, et bien que I'agent de liaison de la Yougoslavie a la Commission d'enquete ait demande, dans sa lettre du 10 mars 1947 (document SjAC.4/ 115), en soulignant I'importance de la question, I'examen ~'au moins quatre de ces incidents, la Commission n'en a pas examine un seul de cet ordre. On constate donc, a l'egard de ces incidents, qui sont le centre de la question, une disposition nette et constante a conduire l'enquete conformement aux declarations d'une seule des parties. Le troisieme point qui retient I'attention est que, dans la partie la plus importante du rapport, les conclusions, une place exagerement reduite est accordee par la majorite a des incidents etudies, incidents impliquant une aide aux pa~ans grecs; une seule phrase leur est consacree et encore, incidemment, a titre d'illustration. En revanche, les incidents de caractere militaire intervenus avec la Yougoslavie, quin'ont pas fait I'objet d'une enquete, malgre I'insistance de l'agent de liaison yougoslave pour que cette enquete eut lieu, se voient consacrer trois pages entieres sur les quinze au total qu'occupent les conclusions du rapport. On en arrive ainsi ace resultat curieux: ce qui a fait l'objet d'une enquete ne figure pas dans les conclusions et ce qui, concemant la Yougoslavie, n'a pas fait l'objet d'une enqu;:'te, s'etale sur plusieurs pages. Tout cela n'a ete fait aussi. arbitrairement qu'afin de pouvoir formuler des conclusions favorables a la position du Gouvemement grec. Cette question est si delicate et si grave que je ne veux pas me bomer a des declarations generales, mais vais passer a un expose detaille. Les incidents cites a l'encontre de la Yougoslavie ne figurent qu'en un seul passage des conclusions. A la page 176, le paragraphe 2 c) de la section A du chapitre premier de la troisieme. partie du volume I contient la phrase Tile second point that strikes one is that, despite the fact that Yugoslavia has made the accusation that the Greek 80vernment, in the period from May 1945 to December 1946, provoked seventy-nine incidents of a military nature against Yugoslavia, and despite the fact that the Yugoslav liais01l representative on the Commission of Investig;......un, by his letter of 10 March 1947 (document S./AC.4/115) stressing the importance of this question, asked that at least four of the inddents should be examined, the Commission has not examined a single incident of this nature. There exists, therefore, in regard to the incidents-which constitute the central question-a clear and consistent conduct of the investigation in accordance with the statements of only one side. The third point that strikes one is that, in the most important part of the report, in the conclusions, disproportionately small space is given by the majority to the incidents investigatedthe incidents involving aid to Greek guerrillas; indeed, only one sentence is used, and that only incidentally, a:s an illustration. In contrast to this, incidents of a military nature in connexion with Yugoslavia which were not investigated at all, although the Yugoslav representative insisted that they should be investigated, were given three whole pages of a total of fifteen in the conclusions of the report. So an unexpected circumstance exists: that which is investigated is not mentioned in the conclusions, and that ~hich, in connexion with Yugoslavia, is not mvestigated at all, is elaborated upon in several pages. This was done in such an arbitrary way that it could result in a formulation in support of the Greek Government's position. This matter is so delicate and so serious that I do not wish to confine myself to general statements but will progress to detailed exposition. The incidents which are quoted against Yugoslavia are mentioned in only one place in the c~mclusions. Volume I, part Ill, chapter I, section A, paragraph 2(c), page 168, reads as follows: "According to the evidence, Yugoslav - In this way, only incidentally, the most important question is disposed of in the conclusions. Two investigated incidents are mentioned only incidentally, and the third and fourth are passed over tacitly. Does not this method of mentioning incidentally and passing over tacitly show that the Greek Government· could not succeed in proving its statements and that, therefore, we can conclude that there were no incidents at all? We must really arrive at this conclusion, if we look at the results of the investigation. I wish to review for you the four incidents. I pass to the incident of Idhomeni. According to Greek documents, an alleged partisan group of fifteen people, after an attack on the frontier post of Idhomeni, openly passed into Yugoslav territory (Greek White Book II, page 47, Item No: 9): In connexion with this incident, three witnesses appeared before the Commission: The witness Gioumourtazoglou (document S/AC.4/PV/57H) was not accepted by the Commission because, in the opinion of the United States representative himseH, the testimony of the witness was not of interest to the Commission. The witness Tsakiropoulos declared that the partis,uls awoke him and asked him to carry a wounded partisan, along with other partisans, to the .Yugoslav frontier, where they met tw') Yugoslav soldiers whom he allegedly recognized by their uniforms as Yugoslavs. The soldiers were in the dark, at a distance of five to seven metres from them. The witness Ghikoudis, together with the witness Tsakiropoulos, carried another wounded person to the same place, and he said that he was vis-a-vis the soldiers, but, as it was dark, he could not see their uniforms. His written deposition was given to the Commission with the comment that it was made under oath. When asked about it, he denied it, and to the question if he would swear another oath, he answered: "No, I cannot" (document S/AC.4/PV/57H). The whole commotion about the border incident at Idhomeni is hereby finished. The whole story of the open crossing of partisan troops into Yugoslav territory is reduced to the very indefinite and contradictory deposition of two peasants 1 Document presented by the Greek Government under the title Incidents on the Greek Frontier from January 1 to December 31,1946, listed by the Commission as document SIAC.4/17. document~ grecs, un groupe d'une quinzaine de pretendus partisans aurait passe ouvertement, apres llne attaque du poste frontiere d'Idhomeni, m territoire yougoslave (Livre blanc grec II, page 47, point 9 du texte anglais) 1. Au sujet de cet incident, trois temoins se sont presentes devallt la Commission: La Commission a recuse le temoin Gioumourtazogl011 (document S/AC.4/PV/57H) parce que, de l'avis du representant des Etats-Unis lui-meme, son temoignage etait sans interet pour la Commission. Le temoin Tsakiropoulos a declare que les partisans l'avaient eveille et lui a:vaient demande de transporter un partisan blesse, avec que1ques autres partisans, jusqu'a la frontiere yougoslave, ou ils avaient rencontre deux soldats yougoslaves, qu'il pretend avoir reconnus a. leurs uniformes comme etant yougoslaves. Les soldats etaient dans I'obscurite, a. environ cinq ?-i sept metres d'eux. Le temoin Ghikoudis, en compagnie du temoin Tsakiropoulos, a transporte un autre blesse au meme endroit et a declare qu'il s'etait trouve vis-a.-vis de soldats, mais, qu'etant donne l'obscurite, il n'a pu voir leurs uniformes. Sa deposition ecrite a ete remise a la Commission avec l'indication qu'elle avait ete faite sous serment. Interroge a. ce sujet, il a nie, et, lorsqu'on lui a demande s'il voulait preter serment unc nouvelle fois, il arepondu: "Non, je ne peux pas" (document S/AC.4/PV/57H). C'est ainsi que prend fin toute l'emotion causee par l'incident de frontiere d'Idhomeni. Toute cette histoire de passage de partisans en territoire yougoslave, fait ouvertement, se reduit a. la deposition des plu& vagues et des plus contradic- 1 Voir Incidents a la frontieT8 hellenique, du 1er janvier au 31 decembre 1946, docu7Ilent publili par le Gouvernement grec et catalogue par la Commission sous la cote SIAC.4/17. I pass to the incident at Sourmena. This incident allegedly cons'sts of the following: partisans came from Yugoslavia on 16 September 1946 and attacked the Greek garri..son in Sourmen~. The partisans, after the battle, retired to Yugoslav territory, when they were called and gestured at by the Yugoslav fron+ier guard; the Yugoslav frontier guard covered under fire the retreat of the partisans into Yugoslav territory, and Yugoslav soldiers entered Greek territory tc protect the partisans (see Greek White Book II, page 49, Item No. 2). . In the Greek document submitted to the Security Council,' the accusation was even stronger, and it is said that the partisans retired into the Yugoslav frontier post itself (at point 1695). This alleged incident was the subject of a diplomatic excrange. The Yugoslav Government, knowing that, at that time and in that place, ther~ had been no incident at all, refused the note of the Greek Government. The attitude of the Yugoslav Government that there had been no mcidents was confirmed by the official cornmunique of the Third Army Corps of the Greek army, which communique appeared in the Greek press on 22 September 1946. It is probable that in Greece there were various rumours, even as there are today, so that headquarters considered it necessary to publish the following communique: "The mopping-up operations undertaken against anarchist groups in the Doiran sector (confluence of the three borders) ended on 20 September (morning) when the above anarchists fled towards the Yugoslav border. Some of the figures published are exaggerated. The Yugoslav frontier guards did not open fire on Greek units. The population must keep calm." ce moment-la et a cet endroit-Ia, au!;un incident du tout, n'accepta pas la note du Gouvernement g.rec. L'attitudf: du Gouvernement yougoslave, affirmant qu'il n'y avait pas eu d'incident, a trouve sa confinnation dans le communique officiel_ du UIeme Corps d'armee de l'annee grecque, paru dans la presse grecque le 22 septembre 1946. Sans cloute courait-il en Grece divers bruits, comme il en court aujourd'hui encore, et le quartier general jugea-t-il necessaire de publier le communique suivant: "Les operations de nettoyage entreprises contre les groupes anarchistes dans le secteur de Doiran, au point de contact des trois frontieres,. se sont terminees, le 20 sf';:>tembre a,!l matin, quand les susdits anarchistes se sont enfuis vers la frontiere yougoslave. Certains des chiffres qui ont ete publies sont excLdsifs. Les gardes frontieces yougoslaves n'ont pas ouvert le feu sur les unites grecques. La population doit conserver son calme." Neanmoins, l'agent de liaison de la Grece a demande une enquete sur cet incident et la Commission, bien qu'elle cut connaissance du dementi, a accepte cette suggestion. Sa-chant parfaitement qu'une enquete sur un tel incident etait absurde, le representant grec prepara en toute ha.te, le jour meme de l'enquete, un expose intituIe "L'incident de Sourmena", seIon lequel neuf pretendus incidents, sans aucun lien entre eux, devaient etre reconnus comme ayant eu lieu et faire l'objet d'une enquete. Il est clair que cette manreuvre .tendait a empecher une The peasant Antoniadis, who, according to Greek White Book r (page 152), was a guide for that group of Greek soldiers which gave the most information; The Greek soldier Gheorgios Soumanis, who allegedly was captured by the partisans, was kept for four days and then escaped. He was the most important witness regarding the question in which direction the partisans went after the flight; The Greek soldier, Periklis Soumanis, a member of a most important military group, consisting of thirty soldiers, which allegedly came into contact with the Yugoslav frontier guards; Lieutenant Jardiniadis, who was the first to give a report of the whole event, which report, along with other depositions, WdS cited before the Security Council in December 1946 as the sole evidence. , Not one of these key witnesses appeared before the Commission. It is very strange that all eye-witnesses, without exception, were concealed from the Commission of Investigation, although their depositions were sent to the Security Council in December as the sole evidence of the occurrence of the incident. Therefore, it is clear why the Greek delegation tried to avoid a detailed and thorough investigation of this incident by creating a story of eight other incidents. It is all the clearer why such ridiculous contradictions arose among the new Greek witnesses, Captain Nikitas, Lieutenant Berovalis, Private Sotirios A. Balis, and the peasant Hadjopoulos. The worst of it is that the· Greek officers, Captain Nikitas and Lieutenant Berovalis, declared and confirmed before the Commission of 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securite, Premiere Annee, Deuxieme Serie, No 25, et Supplement No 12, Annexe 23. • Voir Temoignages presentes a l'appui de la plainte grecque au Conseil de securite, document publie par le Gouvernement grec et catalogue par la Commission sous la cote 5/AC.4/15. The third incident is the incident at Skra. In this alleged incident, the partisans supposedly came from Yugoslavia and launched an attack upon Skra, and the Greek General Ioannou declared before the Commission that Yugoslavs also took part in the attack. Furthermore, the Greek Government asserts that the pa.rtisans, after the action, allegedly left for Yugoslavia, while General Ioannou declared before the Commission that the partisans retreated to a "hill over Skra". The document handed to the Commission by Greece even contained the allegation that Yugoslav officers commanded the operations. Before the Commission, nobody was able to say anything about the arrival of Yugoslav soldiers. The witness Kouris himself challenged the allegation concerning the participation of Yugoslav soldiers. As to the commanding of the operations, Lieutenant Kouris declared that was only his personal opinion, because only Yugoslav officers could have organized such a good operation. As to the arrival of partisans from Yugoslavia, not a single witness of the Greek Government was able to say anything. In the S'lIlle way, ~ot a single witness confirmed the retreat of partlSan units to Yugoslavia. In connexion with this incident, the witnesses Lieutenant Kouris and Andreadis were heard. Lieutenant Kouris not only failed to confirm the Greek allegations, but, as a matter of fact, challenged them. The third witness heard in this connexion was Tsembis, who was on that occasion allegedly taken up to the frontier by the partisans anj kept for four days in Greek territory, and nothing else. The last incident is the incident of Ayia Paraskevi. This incident appears in the second part of the report under the names Ayia Paraskevi and Kato Klinai. According to Greek allegations, this incident consisted of an attack from Yugoslav territory on 24 July 1946 with automatic arms upon Greek frontier post 55, and of an attack of the partisans on the same night upon the gendarmerie station in Kato KIinai and Ayia Paraskevi. The partisans allegedly then retreated to Yugoslavia and were received and assisted by Yugoslav frontier guards. Furthermore, during the night of 7 August 1946, thirty partisans with the assistance of Yugoslav frontier guards allegedly fired upon Greek frontier post 55, attacked the gendarmerie station in Kato Klinai and Ayia Paraskevi, and then openly retreated to Yugoslav territory. Lieutenant Stefanidis and sqldier Tsirigos were the only witnesses produced to prove the Greek charge. Neither of them confirmed with a single word the Greek allegations or even mentioned that Greek frontier post 55 was attacked from Yugoslav territory, that the Greek partisans, after. the battle of 24 July 1946, retreated to Yugoslavia with the help of the Yugoslav frontier guard, or that groups of partisans, after th,.; attack of 7 August 1946, retreated to Yugoslavia. The witness Tsirigos concretely stated: "It was night. I saw people approaching; I shouted 'Halt'. I did not know who they were. Perhaps they were civilians working in the fields." In reply to the question whether they were in uniform, he answered: "How could I see whether they were in uniform or not?" In reply to the question whether he knew the place where the partisans crossed the frontier, he answered: "Frontier guard 55 could tell you that." Unfortunately-I do not know whether by chance or not-the Greek representative did not invite anyone from that frontier post in order to inform the Commission, nor did he take the members of the Commission to see the frontier post. Is not this avoidance of hearing eyewitnesses strange? Le troisieme temoin entendu sur ce sujet a ete Tsembis; il aurait en cette occurrence ete emmene a la frontiere par les partisans, et garde quatre jours en territoire grec, et rien d'autre. Le dernier incident est celui d'Aghia Paraskevi. Il figure dans la seconde partie du rapport sous les noms d'Aghia Paraskevi et de Kato KIinai. Selon des allegations grecques, cet incident a consiste en une attaque menee, en partant du territoireyougoslave, le 24 juillet 1946, avec des armes automatiques, sur le poste frontiere grec No 55, et en une attaque de partisans, la meme nuit, contre le poste de gendarmerie de Kato Klinai et d'Aghia Paraskevi. Les partisans auraient ensuite fait retraite vel'S la Yougoslavie oil ils auraient ete re~us et secourus par les gardes frontieres yougoslaves. En outre, au cours de la nuit du 7 aoilt 1946, trente partisans, assistes de gardes frontieres yov.goslaves, auraient, pretend-on, ouvert le feu sur le poste frontiere grec No 55, attaque le poste de gendarmerie de Kato KIinai et d'Aghia Paraskevi, puis se seraient ouvertement retires en territoire yougoslave. Le lieutenant Stefanidis et le soldat Tsirigos ont ete les seuls temoins produits a l'appui des accusations grecques, Ni l'un ni l'a-utre n'ont, d'un seul mot, confirme ces allegations. Ils n'ont meme pas mentionne une attaque du poste frontiere grec No 55 partant du territoire yougoslave; ni la retraite de partisans grecs vel'S la Yougoslavie, avec l'aide du garde frontiere yougoslave, apres la bataille du 24 juillet 1946; ni la retraite vel'S la Yougoslavie de groupes de partisans apres l'attaque du 7 aoilt 1946. Le temoin Tsirigos a declare textuellement: "Il faisait nuit. J'ai vu des gens approcher. J'ai crie: "Halte." Je ne savais pas qui c'etait. C'etaient peut-etre des civils qui travaillaient dans les champs." A la question de savoir s'ils etaient en uniforme, il a repondu: "Comment pouvais-je voir s'ils etaient en uniforme ou non?" A la question de savoir s'il connaissait l'endroit ou les partisans auraient franchi la frontiere, il a repondu: "Le garde frontiere No 55 pourrait vous le dire." Malheureusement - je ne sais si le fait est dil au hasard ou non - le representant grec n'a fait comparaitre personne de ce poste frontiere pour venir renseigner la Commission, et n'a pas non plus emmene les membres de la Commission visiter ce poste frontiere. N'est-il pas etrange d'eviter ainsi l'audition de temoins oculaires? That is all, literally all that the key Greek witness was able to say of this incident. May I still stress that he is also the only so-called direct witness and eye-witness of this incident? The second witness, Stefanidis, was only able to say that, at the moment of the retreat of the partisans, he heard one rifle-shot from their side, and, immediately following, one shot from the side of the Yugoslav frontier post. This is the most important and the only thing in connexion with this incident that this witness was able to tell the Commission of Investigation. However, the question of the incident of Ayia Paraskevi and Kato Klinai is not terminated simply with the 'fact that the investigation actually belied the Greek allegation. There is another side to the picture, which is of prime interest for the explanation of the real character and background of the whole action of the Greek Government with regard to socalled border incidents: a considerable number of witnesses who were either in Greek prisonsor, if not in prisons, living under conditions which no doubt impart to their declarations the greatest value-I repeat, a considerable number of those witnesses produced upon their own initiative before the Commission of Investigation data as to how Greek military and police authorities organized raids. The role of the British viceconsul in Florina, Mr. Hill, and of the personnel of the consulate will be seen in subsequent expositions. These Greek authorities organized, through armed Balists (Albanian fascists and notorious collaborators) and Chetniks, systematic terroristic raids against the democratic population in the district of Florina and along the Greek-Yugoslav frontier, exactly at the times and places when and where the Greek-alleged incidents of Ayia Paraskevi and Kato Klinai were occurring. The interned Greek citizens Ifantis and Apostolos Vitaniotis handed the group of the Commission of Investigation 0':"1 20 February 1947 in Ikaria a memorandum containing the following data: "Armed Balists who crossed the frontier were received by the Greek authorities. The authorities did not disarm them. They walk, armed with revolvers, through the city and squares of Florina. Armed Chetniks, coming from Yugoslavia, often cross the border. They regularly walk freely, in groups, and bearing ~rms . . . These Jroups participated in controlling the district in co-operation with the gendarmes." In another part of this memorandum It IS stated: "On the Greek-Yugoslav frontier in Ayia Pa;askevi, there are gendarmes, together • ~Itt!..a:~,,",?~~~, they started to fire on the vil- C'est tout, absolument tout ce que le principal temoin grec a pu dire de cet incident. Permettezmoi de souligner qu'il en etait egalement le seul temoin soi-disant direct et oculaire. Le second temoin, Stefanidis, a seulement ete en mesure de dire qu'au moment de la retraite des partisans, il avait entendu un coup de fusil provenant de leur cote et immediatement apres, un coup de fusil provenant du cote du poste frontiere yougoslave. C'est la chose la plus importante et la seule relative a cet incident que le temoin ait ete en mesure de declarer a la Commission d'enquete. Neanmoins, la question de l'incident d'Aghia Paraskevi n'est pas close du seul fait que l'enquete a effectivement dementi les allegations grecques. Elle a un autre aspect, d'un interet primordial pour expliquer le vrai caractere de l'attitude du Gouvernement grec a l'egard des pretendus incidents de frontiere, et ce qu'il y a derriere cette attitude: un nombre considerable de temoins etaient, ou detenus dans les prisons grecques, ou, s'ils ll'etaient pas en prison, i1s vivaient du moins dans des conditions qui donnent, sans aucun doute, une grande valeur aleurs declarations. Je le repete: un nombre considerable de ces temoins ont, de leur propte chef, presente a la Commission d'enquete des indications sur la fa~on dont les autorites de l'armee et de la police grecques organisent des raids. Le role du vice-consul britannique a Florina, M. Hill, et celui du personnel du consulat, apparaltront dans la suite de cet expose. Ces autorites grecques ont organise, grace a des Balistes armes (fascistes albanais et collaborateurs notoires) et a des Tchetniks, des raids terroristes systematiques contre la population democratique du district de Florina et le long de la frontiere greco-yougoslave, exactement .aux endroits et. aux moments ou, selon les Grecs, se seraient produits des incidents a Aghia Paraskevi et a Kato Klinai. Les citoyens grecs internes, Ifantis et Apostolos Vitaniotis, ont remis a la Commission d'enquete a Nikania, le 20fevrierl947, une note contenant les donnees suivantes: "Des Balistes armes qui avaient franchi la frontiere ont ete re~us par les autorites grecques. Les autorites ne les ont pas desarmes. lIs se promenent, armes de revolvers, a travers la ville et les places publiques de Florina. Des Tchetniks armes venant de Yougoslavie franchissent souvent la frontiere. Ils se promenent en toute liberte, en groupes et portant leurs armes . . • Ces groupes ont participe a la surveillance du district, de concert avec les gendarmes." Une autre partie de cette note declare: "Sur la frontiere greco-yougoslave, a Aghia Paraskevi, il y a, ensemble, des gendarmes et des Balistes. Une fois, i1s ont ouvert le feu sur les villages. The District Committee of NOF for the same district: in a memorandum handed to the Commission of Investigation, says literally: "In July and August 1946 in Kaimakchalan, there was a frontier post in which were placed twenty-two Balists. They used to cross to Yugoslav terri-' tory and terrorize the population of the village of Akhladha, who fled to the mountains. In the village.of Kato Klinai, Balists, together with Greek gendarmes, carried out night patrols and terrorized the population. In the village of Krateron,. there was a group of Balists for the purpose of assisting Hill's agents in crossing the border and assisting refugees from Yugoslavia." These facts were fully confirmed by the testimony of Dr. Efthymios Ioannidis, who was recently executed by the Greek authorities for just such testimony. These facts were confirmed from the prison of Saloniki in a letter dated 14 March 1947 ad- . dressed to public opinion and to the Commission of Investigation by the imprisoned teacher Mihail Servinis. These same facts were confirmed by the witness Pashalis Papadopoulos, a Greek refugee in Buljkes, in his memorandum addressed to the Commission of Investigation. The same facts are confirmed by the testimony of the witness Nazmi Emini Azemi and by the testimony of other witnesses heard by the Commission of Investigation in Yugoslavia. In this analysis of the situation, one has to bear in mind that the Greek Government selected and proposed for the investigation the most important and the biggest incidents, so that the results of the investigation of these incidents, presented as typical incidents, would be generally applied to all ot4er alleged incidents which were not investigated. As a matter of fact, the Commission of Investigation conceived the problem in that manner. Meanwhile, we saw the result of the investigation of these selected incidents: the investigation showed that there were no incidents. We must conclude therefrom that there were no inciden~, either, in the alleged cases which were not examined. We have asserted,. from the very first, tha.t all these incidents were invented by the Greek Government. r~ison de ce temoignage, confirme entihement ces faits. Ces memes faits ont ete confirmes par l'instituteur Mihail Servinis, emprisonne, dans une lettre du 14 mars 1947 adressee de la prison de Salonique a l'opinion publique et a la Commission d'enquete. Ces memes faits ont ete confirmes par le temoin Pashalis Papadopoulos, refugie grec de Buljkes, dans le memorandum qu'il a adresse a la Commission d'enquete. Ces memes faits sont confirmes par la deposition du temoin Nazmi Emini Azemi et par celle d'autres temoins entendus par la Commission d'enquete en Yougoslavie. Dans cette analyse de la situation, il ne faut pas oublier que le Gouvemement grec a choisi et propose, pour faire l'objet d'une enquete, les incidents les plus importants, les plus gros, de fa<;on que les conclusions de l'enquete sur ces incidents, presentes comme des incidents types, fussentappliquees d'une manihe generale a tous les autres pretendus incidents qui n'ont pas fait l'objet d'une enquete. En fait, c'est bien de cette fa<;on que la Commission d'enquete concevait le probleme. Mais nous avons vu entre temps a quoi a abouti l'enquete sur ces incidents selectionnes: elle a montre qu'il n'y avait pas eu d'incidents. Nous devons en conclure qu'il n'y a pas eu non plus d'incidents dans les pretendus cas qui n'ontpas fait l'objet d'une enquete. Des le debut, nous avons affirme que tous ces incidents avaient ete inventes de toutes pieces par le Gouvernement grec. It was asserted before the Commission, in reg;l.rd to the witnesses, that they were systematically instructed as to what to say; that they were exposed to physical torture and moral pressure; that the majority of the witnesses were recruited among persons who had been in the hands of the Greek police force or under trial. It was asserted. that some witnesses were professional murderers, that among them were war criminals, traitors, quislings, etc. Therefore, it is quite natural that, during the work of the Commission of Investigation, it should have been established that a great number of written depositions submitted were false and fabricated by the Greek authorities. The remaining depositions were full of contradictions, obviously false statements, and absurdities. Let us return to the main problem and sum up. It is a fact that the conclusions of the majority of the Commission avoided the central question of the investigation, namely, incidents involving aid to Greek guerrillas. How is this to be explained? There is only one possible explanation. This is an indirect admission by the majority that it had nothing to say concerning this" question after the results of the investigation. That means that there is no problem of incidents involving aid to Greek guerrillas, as such incidents never oc'curred. Our conviction is supported by the fact that the majority of the Commission of Investigation also quotes in its conclusions all fifty-seven incidents announced by the Greek Government in the category of mere Inilitary frontier incidents and not in the category of incidents involving aid' to Greek guerrillas. One is unable· to explain in any Other way the space devoted to this problem in the conclusions of the majority. We naturally should have no objection to the attitude adopted by the majority of the Commission in its conclusions if the majority had been consistent.' However, the majority was not consistent. It would have been consistent if at st it had not spoken of such incidents at all. However, it mentions them incidentally, as though aid to Greek guerrillas were accorded through incidents, which is contrary to its tacit and objective admission that such incidents did not occur at all. . In addition to the category of incidents with which we have been dealing until now, the Commission of Investigation was faced with a problem concerning incidents of another category. These were military border provocations by the Greek Government against Yugoslavia 3. The attack by machine-guns on the Yugoslav frontier post of the mountain of Kozuh by the Greek air force on 20 November 1946; , 4. The attack by machine-gun and bombs on another Yugoslav frontier post on the mountain of KozOO by the Kreek air force on 20 November 1946. On the Greek side, not a single incident was presented as such or proposed for investigation. The'Commission of Investigation did not accept the Yugoslav request for the investigation of a single one of the incidents which had been proposed for investigation. Therefore, as regards the Yugoslav-Greek border, this problem was brought up only by Yugoslavia but was not investigated. Nevertheless, let us examine the conclusions reached on this question. Volume I, part Ill, chapter I, section C, under the heading "Frontier violations not involving aid to Greek guerrillas" reads (document S/360, page 174): "The Greek Government charged that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were deliberately provoking incidents on their common frontier. In turn, Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia made accusations against Greece. In each case a substantial number of witnesses were heard by the Commission, as well as extensive documentation in support of the charges." The majority of the Commission asserts, first, that Greece accused Yugoslavia of provoking incidents of a military nature and, secondly, that the Commission investigated such incidents. With respect to Yugoslavia, however, as appears from what I have said, neither statement is true. Mter this error, the majority of the Commission quite naturally ~ommitted another error, even more serious. Without having received any Greek charges in this respect and without having considered any of the Yugoslav requests, although seventy-nine incidents were enumerated and a request was made for investigation of at least four of them, and without having heard any of the witnesses, the Commission asserts (document S/360, page 176): "... no evidence of probative value was introduced which tended to indicate that the frontier violations not con- La: majorite de la Commission pretend, tout d'abord, que la Grece a accuse la Yougoslavie de provoquer des incidents de caractere militaire et, ensuite, que la Commission a examine ces incidents. En ce qui concerne la Yougoslavie toutefois, il ressort de ce que j'ai dit qu'aucune de ces affirmations n'est exacte. Apres cette erreur, la majorite de la Commission en a tout naturellement commis une autre, encore plus grave. Sans avoir re~u aucune accusation grecque a cet egard, sans avoir examine aucune des requetes yougoslaves - bien qu'elle eut enumere soixante-dix-neuf incidents et qu'une enquete eut ete demandee pour au moins quatre d'entre elles - sans avoir entendu aucun temoin, la Commission pretend (document S/360, page 184): "... on n'a pu trouver aucune preuve concluante indiquant que les violations de fronli~li sur les incidents suivants: 1. Les tentatives de passage en force de Yougoslavie en Grece par un groupe de quinze Tchetniks, le 18 mai 1946, sur la montagne de Belasica; 2. L'embuscade dressee contre une patrouille yougoslave par huit soldats grecs, le 23 juillet 1946, sur les pentes du mont Kozuh; 3. L'attaque a la mitrailleuse du poste frontiere yougoslave du mont Kozuh par l'aviation grecque, le 20 novembre 1946; 4. L'attaque a la mitrailleuse et par bombardement d'un autre poste frontiere yougoslave du mont Kozuh par l'aviation grecque, le 20 novembre 1946. Du cote grec, pas un seul incident de cet ordre n'a ete signale comme devant faire l'objet d'une enquete. La Commission d'enquete n'a pas accepte la demande yougoslave d'enquete pour un seul des incidents signales comme devant faire l'objet d'une investigation. Aussi, en ce qui concerne la frontiere greco-yougoslave, ce probleme n'a-t-il ete signale que par la Yougoslavie, mais n'a pas fait l'objet d'une enquete. Neanmoins, voyons a quelles conclusions on a abouti sur cette question. On lit dans la section C du chapitre premier de la troisieme partie du volume I, sous le titre: "Cas ou la frontiere a ete vioIee sans qu'on ait donne une aide aux francs-tire_urs" (document S/360, page 182): "Le Gouvernement grec_ a accuse I'Albanie, la Bulgarie et la Yougoslavie de provoquer deliberement des incidents a leur frontiere commune avec la Grece. L'Albanie, la BuIgarie et la Yougoslavie ont, a leur tour, formule des accusations analogues contre la Grece. La Commission a entendu, dans chaque cas, un grand nombre de temoins et a examine une 00- portante documentation presentee a l'appui '~;s accusations." The only aim of the whole exposition of the Commission of Investigation, occupying three full pages-an unfounded exposition, and one which is full of serious contradictions-is to becloud and confuse the issue and to save the Greek Government from the justified accusation made by its·northern neighbours. It therefore goes without saying that the following conclusion emanates: the treatment of this subject is not yet finished. The conclusions cannot be accepted so lightly, particularly as we have reason to state that the examples of superficial and incorrect examiI\ation which we have cited were not exceptional. The conclusions of the majority are, as a whole, of such character. For the purpose of better illustrating this assertion, I cite one more example of unfounded conclusions by the majority of the Commission. 11. va sans dire que la conclusion suivante se degage: le reglement de cette affaire n'est pas termine. Les conclusions ne peuvent etre acceptees ainsi a. la legere, d'autant moins que nous avons des raisons de declarer que les exemples d'enquetes superficielles et inexactes que nous avons cites ne constituent pas une exception. Les conclusions de la majorite, dans leur ensemble, sont de cette nature. Pour mieux illustrer notre assertion, je vais citer encore un exemple de conclusions denuees de fondement auxquelles a abouti la majorite de la Commission. Le paragraphe 2 a) de la section A, chapitre premier de la troisieme partie du volume I, pretend que les partisans grecs ont ete armes en Yougoslavie. La meme assertion reapparait au paragraphe 2 c). 11 n'est pas necessaire de gaspiller un grand nombre de mots pour soulign~r l'importance de ce probleme. 8i 1'0n pretend que la Yougoslavie a provoque la guerre civile en Grece et que les combats qui s'etendent maintenant a. des regions entieres de la Grece sont une consequence de l'ingerence yougoslave, la question de savoir si la Yougoslavie a fourni des armes aux partisans grecs est une des questions essentielles. Qu'est-ce qu'a etabli la Commission ace sujet? Le paragraphe 15 a) iii) de la section C du chapitre premier, deuxieme partie, du volume I, declare: "Fourniture d'armes. Le temoin Filippos Vassiliou a declare qu'il a re~u, en Yougoslavie, une mitraillette 8ten d'un certain Lazaros, avant de penetrer en territoire grec (Livre Blanc grec I, pages 104 et 105 du texte anglais) et il a refait la meme deposition devant I'Equipe lA a. Florina, le 11 mars. Valtadoros a declare que lorsqu'il se trouvait en territoire grec, "le commandant de son groupe lui a conseille de se rendre au poste yougoslave le plus proche et de se procurer des munitions". Le temoin n'a pas suivi ce conseil, mais il a ajoute qu'un autre chef du groupe, "Prossos, lui avait dit qu'il se rendait frequemment aux postes frontieres yougoslaves et qu'il s'y procurait des munitions". Le ressortissant yougoslave Kosta Cuparikov a declare que "le chef de sa propre brigade transportait des munitions en Grece" (document 8/360, page 68). Je voudrais completer ces allegations en rappelant que Vassiliou, d'apres ses propres decla- Volume I, part Ill, chapter I, section A, paragraph 2 (a ) alleges that Greek guerrillas were being supplied with arms in Yugoslavia. The same assertion is repeated in paragraph 2 (c). It is not necessary to waste too many words in explaining the importance of this problem. If it is asserted that Yugoslavia provoked the . civil war in Greece and that the battles which now mvolve whole regions of Greece are a consequence of Yugoslavia's interference, the question of whether Yugoslavia supplied Greek guerrillas with arms is one of the main questions. What did the Commission bring out in this respect? Volume I, part II, chapter I, section C, paragraph 15 (a) (iii)' states: "Supply of arms. The witness Filippos Vassiliou stated that he had been issued a 8ten gun in Yugoslavia by a certain Lazaros before entering Greece (Greek White Book I, pages 104-105) and this evidence was restated before Team lA at Florina on 11 March. Valtadoros stated that when he was on Greek territory, 'the commander of his group proposed that the witness should go to the nearest Yugoslav post and get ammunition'. This proposal· was not carried out, but the witness added that another group leader, 'Prossos, told him that many times he used to go to the Yugoslav frontier posts and get ammunition there'. The Yugoslav national, Kosta Cuparikov, stated that 'the chief of his own brigade was transportingmunitions into Greece' (document 8/360, page 63)." We consider that we are fully justified in making the final conclusion that, on the part of Yugoslavia, there were no border incidents and no activity whatsoever in connexion with the arming of the Greek partisan movement on the Greek-Yugoslav frontier. We are most deeply convinced that anybody who would endeavour to study the material and the report of the Commission of Investigation would come to this natural and simple conclusion. We now have to refer to the last statement of the United States representative on this question. On the one hand, he has literally repeated, on the most important question, Just those formulations from the conclusions of the majority which we proved today were not founded in the least degree. Suffice it to refer to the passage regarding the arming of Greek partisans by Yugoslavia. On the other hand, in the speech of the United States representative, we encounter the same attitude towards the central question of the investigation-and I mean towards the question of incidents in general-which we find in the conclusions of the majority of the Commission, and which we have discussed at such length in our statement of today. This is manifested in the speech of the United States representative, even when he quotes the name and the tasks of the Commission of Investigation. For instance, he does not quote that, according to the resolution of the Security Council, the first task of the Commission was "to elucidate the causes and nature of the . . . border violations and disturbances".' On the contrary, he. inaccurately asserts that the Oommission was entrusted with the task "to ascertain the facts relating to the situation complained of by the Greek Government".~ He for- Who among the Yugoslavs, except traitors, quislings and war criminals, infiltrated during the last two years into Greece from Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria? It is a well known fact that there is still today intensive infiltration from other 'sides into the whole structure of Greek life, which fact even the Commission of Investigation has noted. We agree that most recently there have existed in international relations methods of intimidation-not only concealed intimidation, as stated by the representative of the United States, but even open intimidation. In any event, Yugoslavia is the last country that could be accused of intimidation. But as to intimidation, the Balkan countries can tell much. By such vague formulations, to which subterfuge belongs, the basic facts which we have outlined cannot be concealed. These and other formulations of this kind only confirm that on the Yugoslav side there were no frontier incidents nor were supplies given to guerrillas. There is, in additio:n, one more reason why we consider it so essential that a thorough and conscientious analysis of the report of the Commission should be made by discussing each questi011 separately, in order to establish a complete and unequivocal picture of the true state of affairs. The interest of peace, the prestige of the United Nations and the honour of my country demand it. . Therefore, we submit to the Security Council a formal proposal to institute a discussion in that sense. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated from French) : The United States representative suggested, at the hundred and forty-seventh meeting on 27 June: that the Security Council should immediately begin examining the recom- ~en~ations made by the Commission of InvestigatIOn. Puisqu'on n'a pu trouver trace ni cl'incidents de frontiere, ni de foumiture d'armes, le representant des Etats-Unis etait contraint de donner une autre definition de l'idee de I'emploi de la force contre l'integrite territoriale d'un Etat, idee differente de celle qui a ete generalement acceptee jusqu'a present. n a trouve la formule d'infiltration, d'intimidation et de subterfuge. Qui, des Yougoslaves, sauf les traitres, les quislings et les criminels de guerre, s'est infiltre en Grece, au cours des deux dernieres annees, venant de Yougoslavie, d'Albanie et de.Bulgarie? C'est un fait bien connu qu'il y a encore aujourd'hui une infiltration intense, partie d'autres sources, dans toute la structure de la vie grecque, fait que meme la Commission d'enquete a enregistre. Nous sommes d'accord pour reconnaitre que, depuis une date tout a fait recente, il existe, dans les relations internationales, des methodes d'intimidation, non seulement d'intimidation voilee, comme le declare le representant des Etats-Unis, mais meme d'intimidation ouverte. En tout etat de cause, la Yougoslavie est le dernier pays que I'on puisse accuser d'intimidation. Mais en ce qui concerne l'intimidation, les pays balkaniques pourraient en dire long. Des formules vagues de cet ordre, qui relevent du subterfuge, ne sauraient dissimuler les faits esseJitiels que nous venons de mettre en relief. Ces formules et d'autres du meme ordre ne font que confirmer le fait que, du cote yougoslave, il n'y a eu ni incidents de frontiere, ni fourniture d'armes aux partisans. n y a encore une autre raison pour que nous estimions si essentiel de faire une analyse approfondie et consciencieuse du rapport de la Commission en discutant les questions une par une, de fa~on a composer un tableau complet et sans equivoque de la situation reelle. Cette raison est que I'interet de la paix, le prestige des Nations Unies et I'honneur de mon pays le demandent. En consequence nous soumettons au Conseil . de securite une proposition formelle tendant a instituer une discussion de cette nature. M. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgique): Le representant des Etats-Unis, au cours de la centquarante-septieme seance, le 27 juint, a suggere que le Conseil de securite abordat sans delai l'examen des recommandations formulees par la Commission d'enquete. 2. That, in particular, the Governments concerned should conclude mutual agreements permitting the settlement of frontier questions and, if necessary, of certain questions concerning minorities; 3. That, lastly, the parties support the establishment by the Security Council of a bodywhich might take the form of a Commissionwhich, acting as an impartial investigator, conciliator and adviser, and subject to the Council's authority, would help them reach a solution of the above-mentioned problems, including the problem of the treatment of refugees. These recommendations have aroused objections which the Belgian delegation has carefully examined. Before defining my position as regards the. substance of this question, I must try to dispel the misunderstandings as apparently revealed .by the objections raised to the recommendations and given in part IV, chapter 2 of . the report. These have been mentioned in the course of this debate, and jt is worth while studying them in order to anticipate any misunderstanding as to the methods of settlement open in this case to the Security Council. The first objection which has been expressed arises from the belief that the proposed recommendations are based not on impartial data, but on statements emanating exclusively from one of the Governments concerned. A study of the various sections of the report will enable Council members to decide whether this charge of partiality is justified, But I must point out at the outset that there is nothing in these recommendations to warrant a belief that they seek to treat particular Governments unfavourably in relation to certain other Governments. On the contrary, the recommendations make no distinction whatever; they are directed equally to all the parties to the dispute, inviting each to adapt its conduct to the same principles and ::0 submit to the same restrictions. From the point of view of method, therefore, I am bound to conclude that recommendations conceived in the spirit of those before us cannot be criticized as sanctioning inequality. The second type of objection considers the establishment of a frontier commission, acting under authority of the Security Council, to be contrary to the sovereignty of the States concerned, and in particular to their sovereign right of freely regulating their mutual relations. The n~ment regulier; que, d'une maniere generale, elles s'attachent a regler directement leurs difficultes par la voie diplomatique et que, faut.e d'y parvenir en procedant ainsi, eIIes en referent a l'autorite competente des Nations Unies. 2. Qu'en particulier les Gouverneme~t') interesses conc1uent entre eux des accords propres a regler les questions de frontieres et, eventuelIement, certaines questions interessant les minorites; 3. Qu'enfin les parties se pretent al'etablissement, par le Conseil de securite, d'un organe - qui pourrait etre une commission - et qui, agissant en enqueteur impartial, en conciliateur et en conseiller, leur preterait son assistance, sous l'autorite du Conseil, en vue de la solution des problemes ci-dessus evoques, y compris ceIui du traitement des refugies. Ces recommandations ont suscite des objections que la delegation beIge a soumises a un examen approfondi. Avant de definir ma position sur le fond, je crois devoir tenter de dissiper les nialentendus que paraissent manifester les objections auxquelles les recommandations ont donne lieu. Ces objections sont reproduites au chapitre 2 de la quatrieme partie du rapport. n en a ete fait etat au cours de ce debat; il semble utile de les examiner, afin de prevenir toute meprise sur les methodes de reglement qui s'offrent all. Conseil de securite en l'occurrence. Dne premiere objection, qui a ete ainsi formulee, s'inspire de I'idee que les recommandations proposees procedent, non pas de donnees impartiales, mais d'assertions emanant exc1usivement de l'un des Gouvernements en presence. L'etude des diverses parties du rapport permettra aux membres du Conseil de determiner si cette imputation de partialite est fondee. 11 me faut, toutefois, constater des maintenant qu'il n'est rien dans ces recommandations qui donne lieu de penser qu'elIes visent a traiter defavorablement certains Gouvernements par rapport a certains autres. Au contraire, les recommandations ne font aucune distinction; eIles s'adressent egalement a toutes les parties au differend, chacune d'elIes etant invitee a conformer sa conduite aux memes principes, a se soumettre aux memes limitations. Par consequent, du point de vue de la methode, je me trouve amene a conc1ure que des recommandations con~ues dans l'esprit de celles qui nous sont soumises ne sauraient preter a la critique de consacrer des inegalites. Selon un deuxieme ordre d'objections, l'etabliSsement d'une commission de frontiere, agissant sous I'autorite du Conseil de securite, serait contraire ala souverainete des Etats interesses et, notamment, a leur droit souverain de regler librement leurs rapports reciproques. Serait ~ois pas, pour ma part, en quoi pareille circonstance pourrait empecher le jeu d'un mecanisme tel que celui qu'envisage dans ses propositions la Commission d'enquete. En effet, les pays en presence sont tous assujettis aux obligations de la Charte, qu'ils soient parties a ceIle-ci ou qu'ils aient assume ces obligations pour les besoins du differend. Des lors, pas plus que les autres Membres des Nations Dnies, ils ne sont foudes a invoquer l'etat de leurs relations diplomatiques pour s'opposer au fonctionnement du systeme de la Charte. CeIle-ci, en effet, resterait lettre morte si eIle ne comportait pas pour les Etats Membres - qu'ils aient entI'e. eux ou non des relations diplomatiques - l'obligation de maintenir .les moyens de contact necessaires a leurs rappotts statutaires reciproques. L'experience du passe demontre d'ailleurs que les Gouvernements peuvent entretenir de tels rapports statutaires sans avoir entre eux de relations diplomatiques. Reste une quatrieme objection, selon laqueIle les recommandations proposees seraient inefficaces. Cette objection me suggere deux observations. D'une part, des recommandations dont l'ua des buts est de faire.la lumiere sur la situation ne sauraient, a mon avis, etre qualifiees d'inefficaces, surtout par ceux qui 3,ttendent leur justification de l'eclat de la verite. D'autre part, on ne peut, dans le cadre des Nations Unies, presumer l'inefficacite de procedes de conciliation mis en reuvre conformement aux dispositions du Chapitre VI de la Charte. Il n'en serait autrement que si le differend devait revetir un degre Lastly, there is a fourth objection, which claims that the proposed recommendations would be ineffective. This objection prompts me to make two comments. The first is that recommendations which have as one of the:r aims to clarify the situation cannot, in my view, be described as ineffective, especially by those who expect the light of truth to prove their case. The second is that one cannot, within the framework 0.£ the United Nations, assume that the conciliat~on procedures set in motion under the provi- Such are the general eonsiderations of method which I should like to submit to the Council on the subject of the Investigation Conimission's recommendations.

I want to know whether any other member wishes to speak today. If not, I would suggest that we adjourn. Before doing so, I should like to devote just a few words to the programme of our meetings of next week" We shall have one more meeting this week, namely, on Thursday afternoon. The agenda will contain a continuation of the discussion of the Greek question. I propose for next week- I do not want to commit myself definitely at this moment-roughly the following programme. We must discuss the Greek problem; we must devote one meeting to the report of the Military Staff Committee and one meeting to the report of the Commission for Conventional Armaments. Perhaps the latter item may not exhaust the whole meeting, but I do not know. I think we should also have a closed meeting on the question of the governorship of Trieste. We have quite a number of matters to discuss, and I therefore suggest that we should hold six meetings next week, twice in the afternoon, and two days in the morning and afternoon. That wculd give us four working days and leave two days in the week free. I do not think there is much point in discussing these proposals at this moment,. It might be too early to discuss them now. I should rather strongly urge the members of this Council to be prepared for these six meetings next week, otherwise we shall not be able to cover our programme. This programme will then give us three meetings devoted to the Greek question and three meetings on other questions. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): I was just wondering ~ lout the meeting called for the coming Thursday. Why is it being called in the afternoon and not in the morning? Personally, I am not going away, so I can speak freely. I gather, however, that many other people ar.e trying to leave for the long week-end, and this certainly applies to the Secretariat, the interpreters and quite a few members of the staff. I am wondering if there is any reason for call- Je me trouve, en conclusion, amene a exprimer la conviction que des recommandations de la nature de cellesqui nous sont soumises rentre;. raient dans le cadre des mesures que le Conseil de securite prend normalement sur la base du Chapitre VI de la Charte. I1 s'agit, en efIet, d'enquete, de mediation, de conciliation, de bans offices, de procedures d'ajustement. I1 s'agit, en outre - je le rappelle en passant - de mesures s'adressant, dans les memes conditions, a taus les Etats en cause. Telles sont les considerations de caractere general relatives a la methode que je crois devoir soumettre au Conseil au sujet des recommandations de la Commission d'enquete. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je voudrais savoir si que1que autre membre demande la parole aujourd'hui. Dans la negative, je proposerai., ll~ lever la seance. Avant de le fake, je voudrais consacrer que1ques mats au programme de nos seancer. de la semaine prochaine. Nous aurons encore une reunion cette semaine, jeudi apres-:midi. L'ordre du jour parte la suite de la discussion de la question grecque. Pour la semaine prochaine, je propose en gros le programme suivant, sans m'engager toutefois encore definitivement. Nous aurons a discuter la question grecque; nous devrons consacrer une seance au rapportdu Comite d'etat-major et une autre au rapport de la Commission des armements de type classique. Peut-etre .ce dernier point n'occupera-t-il pas toute la seance, mais je l'ignore. Je crois que nous devrons tenir aussi une seance privee sur la.question du gouverneur de Trieste. Nous avons un grand nombre de questions a examiner. Je suggere donc de tenir la semaine prochaine six seances, deux l'apres-midi, et, durant deux jours, une le matin et une I'apresmidi. Nous aurions ainsi dans la semaine quatre jours de travail et deux jours disponibles. Je ne pense pas qu'il y ait lieu de discuter maintenant ce programme. I1 est peut-etre trop tot. Je voudrais inviter assez instamment les membres du Conseil a se preparer aux six seances de la semaine prochaine, sinon nous ne serons pas a meme de mener a bien tout notre programme. D'apres ce programme, trois seances seront encore consacrees a la question grecque et trois a d'autres questions. Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): Je voudrais simplement poser une question au sujet de la seance prevue pour jeudi prochain. Pourquoi la fixer al'apres-midi et non au matin? Personnellemep.t, je ne dais pas m'absenter, j'ai donc toute liberte d'en pader. Mais j'imagine qu'un grand nombre de personnes voudraient s'abstenter pour ce long week-end, ce qui est certainement le cas du Secretariat, des }nterpretes et d'un.e grande partie du personnel. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): I think we - -'ve to co-ordinate the meetings of the Security 00uncil with those of the Atomic Energy Commission. I do not know whether you have at your disposal the schedule of meetings of the committees of the Atomic Energy Commission. At any rate, meetings of the Security Council should not coincide with meetings of the Atomic Energy Commission or its committees, as some of the members of the Security Council also attend those meetings. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): I agree with the representative of Australia about the meeting of the Security Council on Thursday. We are all free in the morning, and I think we can meet in the morning.

I miderstand there is no Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): J'apmeeting of the Atomic Energy Commission on prends qu'il n'y a aucune seance de la Commis- Thursday. sion de l'energie atomique jeudi. Colonel HOnGSON (Australia): Not on I Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de Thursday morning. l'anglais): Pas jeudi matin.

In view of that, I think it Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Alors, may be a good suggestion to hold our Thursday c'est une excellente idee, je crois, de tenir la reumeeting in the morning. Unless there are any nion de jeudi le matin. S'il n'y a pas d'objections, objections, I shall call the next meeting for je convoquerai la prochaine seance pour jeudi Thursday at 10.30 a.m. matin, 10 h. 30. The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m. La seance est levee a17 h. 55. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit de l'anglais) : J'estime que nous avons a coordonner les seances du Conseil de securite et celles de la Commission de l'energie atomique. Je ne sais si vous avez sous les yeux le programme des seances des comites de la Commission de l'energie atomique. De toute fa~on, les seances du Conseil de securite ne sauraient coincider avec celles de la Commission de l'energie atomique ou de ses comites, puisque certains des membres du Conseil de securite assistent egalement aux autres seances. M. EL-KHOURI (Syrie) (traduit de l'anglais): Je suis d'accord avec le representant de l'Australie au sujet de la date de jeudi prochain pour h reunion du Conseil de securite. Nous sommes tous libres le matin et je pense que nous pouvons nous reunir le matin. Egypt Librairie "La Renaissance d'Egypte" 9 Sh. Adly Pasha CAIRO ,Finland Akateeininen Kirjakauppa 2, Keskuskatu HELSINKI Australia H. A. Goddard Pty. Ltd: 255a George Street SYDNEY, N. S. W. Belgium Agence et Messageries de la Presse, S. A. 14-22 rue du Persil BRUXELLES France Editions A. Pedone 13, rue Souffiot PARIS, ve Bolivia Libreria Cientifica y Literaria Avenida 16 de Julio, 216 Casilla 972 L.'\ PAZ Greece "Eleftheroudakis" Librairie internationale Place de la Constitution ATHENES Canada The Ryerson Press 299 Queen Street West TORONTO Guatemala Jose Goubaud Goubaiid & Cia Ltda. Sucesor 5a Av. Sur No. 6 y 9a C. P. GUATEMALA Chile Edmundo Pizarro Merced 846 SANTIAGO Haiti Max Bouchereau Librairie ~'A la Caravelle" BOlte postde ll1-B PORT-Au-PlUNcE China The Commercial Press Ltd. 211 Honan Road SHANGI!AI India Oxford Book & Stationery Co. Scindia House NEW DELHI Iran Bongahe Piaderow 731 Shah Avenue TEiIERAN Iraq Mackenzie & Mackenzie The Bookshop BAGHDAD Costa Rica Trejos Hermanos Apartado 1313 SAN JOSE Cuba La Casa Belga Rene de Smedt O'Reilly 455 LA HABANA Czechoslovakia F. Topic Narodni Trida 9 PRAHA 1 Lebanon Librairi~ universelle BEYROUTH Denmark Einar Munskgaard -..... Norregade 5 KJOBENHAVN Luxembourg Librairie J. Schummer Place Guillaume LUXEMBOURG Dominican Republic Libreria Dominicana Calle Mercedes No. 49 Apartado 656 CIUDAD TRUJILLO Netherlands N. V. Martinus Nijhoff Lange Voorhout 9 S'GRAVENHAGE Norway Norsk Bokimport A/S Edv. Storms Gate 1 OSLO Philippines D. P. Perez Co. 132 Riverside S~N JUAN Sweden A-B. C. E. Pritzes Kungl. Hofbokhandel Fredsgatan 2 STOCKHOLM Switzerland Librairie Payot S. A. LAUSANNE, GENEVE, VEVEY, MONTREUX, NEUCHATEL, BERNE, BASEL Hans Raunhardt Kirchgasse 17 ZURICH I Syria Librairie universeIle DAMAS. Turkey Librairie Hachette 469 Istiklal Caddee; BEYOGLU-IsTANBUL Union of South Africa "- ,Central News Agency Ltd. COIpmissioner &Rissik Sts. JOHANNESBURG, CAPETOWN, DURBAN United Kingdom H.M. Stationery Office P.O. Box 569 LONDON, S.E. 1 and at H:M.S.O. Shops at LONDON, EDINBURGH, :MANCHESTER, CARDJFF, BELFAST and BRISTOL . United States of America International Documents Service Columbia University Press 2960 Broadway NEW YORK 2:1', N. Y. Yugoslavia Dlozavno Preduzece Jugoslovenska Knjiga