S/PV.153 Security Council
▶ This meeting at a glance
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Topics
UN Security Council discussions
War and military aggression
UN membership and Cold War
Cyprus–Turkey dispute
Officia: Records of the Security COUl.cil:
The meeting rosl at 12.50 p.m.
The first speaker asking for recognition is the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Security Council has again resumed discussion of the Greek question. We now have before us the Commission's report.l This contains a large amount of factual data collected by the Commission on the spot in accordance with the Council's instructions. This documentation relates both to frontier incidents as such, which was the question originally raised by the Greek Government, and a description of the situation in Greece, especially in its northern regions. Thus, the Council now has the opportunity of appraising the situation objectively and of discovering the real reasons for the strained relations which have arisen between Greece and its neighbours, including the reasons for the incidents on the northern Greek frontiers.
La seance est levee a12 h. 50.
CENT-CINQUANTE-TROISIEME SEANCE
Tenue aLake Success, New-York, le ma,di 8 juillet 1947, a15 heures.
President: M. O. LANGE (Pologne).
Presents: Les representants des pays suivants: Australie, Belgique, Bresil, Chine, Colombie, France, Pologne, Syrie, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, Royaume-UIli, Etats-Unis d'Amerique.
207. Suite de la discussion sur la question grecque Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Le pre- mier orateur qui demande la parole est le repre- sentant de l'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socia- listes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Le Conseil de securite a repris l'examen de la question grecque. Nous disposons maintenant du rapport de la Commissionl • Ce rapport contient un grand nombre de faits que la Commission, sur les instructions du Conseil de securite, a reunis sur les lieux. Cette documentation se rapporte d'une part aux incidents de frontiere proprement dits, question que le Gouvemement grec avait originalement soumise au Conseil de securite; elle contient d'autre part une description de la situation qui s'est developpee en Grece, notam- ment dans les regions septentrionales de ce pays. Le Conseil de securite a done maintenant la possibiliie d'apprecier la situation d'une maniere objective et de tirer au clair les causes reelles des relations tendues qui existent entre la Grece et ses voisins, et en particulier les causes des inci- dents qui se sont produits ala frontiere nord de la Grece. 1. FRONTffiR INCIDENTSl It is necessary, first of all, to get an idea of the so-called frontier incidents, to find out what kind of incidents they are and who, if they are actually occurring, is responsible for provoking them. We all know that this is th.e particular question the Greek Government raised before the Security Council - the question of frontier incidents - and that it was pr,ecisely in con- nexion with the consideration of this question that it was decided to set up a commission to investigate the incidents. I would remind you that, during an earlier discussion of this question in the Security Coun- cil, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania brought forward counter-charges against Greece and cited cases of frontier incidents being provoked by Greek militarists. The Governments of these countries repeatedly drew the Security Council's attention to instances of frontier incidents pro- voked by Grel1ce even whi!t;. the Commission of Investigation waS operating and informed the Security Council of new incidents. Having set up the Commission, the Security Council awaited its report and has until now abstained from considering.the question as to who was responsible for these incidents. Now that the Commission's report has been submitted, we should, as I have already pointed out, con- sider this whole matter of frontier incidents and draw conclusions· in conformity with the facts. As regards the incidents, it sho,uld first be borne in mind that most of them represent in- significant episodes which, in normal conditions, if normal relations prevailed between the coun- tries concerned, would have passed unnoticed or, in any case, could not have been a subject for consideration by the Security Council. A per- usal of the part of the report devoted to inci- dents confirms that most of them fall into that category. In most cases there have been no lives lost and comparatively little material damage suffered by either side. We all know that inci- --- 1 This and subsequent subheadings in Mr. Gromyko's statement are an integral part of his text. 1. INCIDENTS DE FRONTffiREl Tout d'abord, il faut voir clair dans ce qu'on appelle Ies incidents de frontiere. Il importe de savoir en quoi ils consistent et, s'il est vrai qu'ils •se produisent, qui sont ceux qui les provoquent. Ainsi que 1'0n sait, c'est precisement cette ques- tion des incidents que le Gouvernement grec a soumise au Conseil de securite, et c'est apropos de l'etude de cette question que le Conseil a decide de creer une commission chargee d'en- queter sur les incidents. Je vous rappe11erai qu'au cours de l'examen de cette question qui a eu lieu Iau Conseil de securite, la Yougoslavie, la Bulgarie et l'Albanie ont, a leur tour, accuse la Grece et ont cite des cas d'incidents de frontiere qui avaient ete pro- voques par les militaristes grecs. Les Gouverne-: ments de ces pays ont, a plusieu~ reprises, attire l'atttntion du Conseil de securite sur les inci- dents de frontiere provoques par la Grece alors meme que la Commission d'enquete poursuivait ses travaux, et ils ont informe le Conseil de securite de ces nouveaux incidents. Apres avoir cree cette Commission, et darn; l'attente de son rapport, le Conseil de secUlite s'est abstenu jusqu'a present d'examiner la ques- tion de savoir qui etait responsable de ces inci- dents. Maintenant que le rapport de la Com- mission nous a ete presente, nous devons, comn£e je l'ai deja fait remarquer, nous efforcer de voir clair dans toute cette question des incidents de frontiere et tirer de cet examen des conclusions . qui soient conformes aux faits. Quant aux incidents, il importe tout d'abord d'avoir present a l'esprit que la plupart d'entre eux sont des episodes insignifiants qui, dans des conditions normales, si les :relations entre ces pays etaient normales, auraient passe inaper~us et qui, en tout cas, n'auraient pu faire 1'0bjet d'un examen par le Conseil de securite. En prenant connaissance de la partie du rapport qui a trait aux incidents, on se rend compte que la plupart de ces incidents sont bien de cet ordre-Ia. La plu- part n'ont entralne ni pertes en vies humaines, ni degats materiels taut soit peu considerables 1 Ce sous-titre et les sous-titres suivants font partie integrante du texte de M. Gromyko. Let us, first of all, take the facts set out in the Commission's report and see to what extent the Greek Government's charges against Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania are well· founded. Ac- quaintance with the facts shows that there is absolutely no justification for the charges made by the Greek Government that people fleeing from Greece to other countries for shelter have been allowed to enter countries bordering on Greece. Tens of thousands of Greeks, who have fled from their country to escape police persecu- tion and arbitrary treatment at the hands of various kinds of bands, have indeed found shelter in these countries. But these people - men and women, old people and children - are fleeing from Greece to find shelter and refuge in neigh- bouring countries, in order to save their own lives. Are there any grounds for accusing or even reproaching the Governments of countries who give refuge to such people? Attempts to blame the Governments of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania for giving shelter to Greek refugees are quite unjustified. In giving shelter to such people these countries are acting in conformity with established and well-known principles of international law which civilized mankind has long respected. It may well be asked how the Greek Govern- ment thinks persons seeking shelter in neighbour- ing countries should be received? The Greek Government surely does not think that these peo- ple, who have had to leave their homes in Greece, should be welcomed at the frontier with machine-gun fire? Obviously, such a situation is inconceivable. If so, then the actions of Yugo- slavia, Bulgaria and Albania in giving shelter to Greek refugees are corect and, a<; I have already pointed out, they are in full conformity with the recognized norms of international law. 1. These witnesses usually gave confused and contradictory evidence. For instance, they men- tioned places which are not on the frontier. Very often the evidence of certain of these witnesses is refuted by that of others. Here are some typi- cal examples: The witness 'Mantzourakis stated that he passed through Khaskovo when crossing from Bulgaria to Greece, whereas this place is not on the route described by the witness. The witness Ciparigovski shifted the village Gobrovo, which is 40 kilometres away from the frontier, up to the frontier itself. Harismidis could not name the place where he allegedly was in Yugo- salvia and did not know at which point he en- tered Greece. The witness Papailias was not an eye-witness but merely heard that partisan units were crossing into Greece in the Dragos district. The witness Zahos revoked all his previous evi- dence as false, being, on his own admission, evi- dence given as a result of threats and beatings from the Greek gendarmerie. The witnesses Kostoudis, Atanasov and others completely refute the evidence of Greek Gov- ernment witnesses about partisans crossing from the neighbouring countries into Greece. 2. The moral qualities of the witnesses who testified in favour of the Greek authorities are such that they cannot inspire confidence, since these witnesses were usually recruited by the Greek police and gendarmerie either from crim- inal elements, or from persons sentenced to death by the Greek authorities and bribed by promises that their lives would be spared if they testified in favour of the Greek authorities. Later on I shall take up separately the evalua- tion of the testimony of witnesses. I shall merely point out now that the evidence of the witnesses recommended by the Greek authorities, alleging that there had been cases of groups of Greek partisans crossing the frontiers between Greece and Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, cannot be taken seriously for the above reasons. Can any significance be attached to the testi- mony of, for instance, the witnesses Kontopanos, Zafiris and Gatsios, who alleged that a special manual for the military instruction of Greek par- tisans had been published in refugee camps on the territories of Yugoslavia. and Albania? These persons were muddled in their evidence and could not reply to such elementary question as, for example, where and when this ,manual was published. A number of other contradictions and ab- surdities could be cited in the evidence of such witnesses on this question, to say nothing of the fact that, apparently, this notorious manual dealt not so much with the art·of partisan war- fare as with the operations of regular troops. One might well ask whether this manual was not printed in Athens and whether it was not in- tended for instruction in fighting Greek par- tisans. The Greek Government's accusations that Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania were arming Greek partisan units are equally unfounded. Here again the Greek authorities used the same sources as proof. No facts were adduced in sup- port of this charge. For instance, it is really im- possible to take seriously the testimony of Val- tadoros, who was under sentence of death, that he went to a point ne~r the Yugoslav frontier, to fetch arms, while in the same breath he de- clared that there were no arms there. The same may be said of the evidence of the witness Vas- siliou, who declared that he had received a rifle from some man named Lazaros, that is to say, a Greek. Not a single witness testified that he had been armed by the Yugoslav, Bulgarian or Albanian authorities. And yet this is the very question about which the G1'eek Government is kicking up most fuss. So much for the charges levelled by the Greek Government against the neighbouring countries to the effect that these countries are arming anrl, training groups of Greek partisans and are help. ing them to cross from their own territory into Greece. There is, however, one class of incidents which deserves attention and to which, for some reason or other, proper importance is not attached here. I means the incidents provoked by the Greek authorities and the Greek military clique. There Les accusations portees par le Gouvernement grec contre la Yougoslavie, la Bulgarie et l'Alba- nie, et selon lesquelles ces pays auraient arme des detachements de partisans grecs, sont aussi peu fondees. La encore, les autorites grecques en quete de preuves ont puise a la meme source. Mais aueun fait confirmant ces accusations n'a ete produit. En effet, on ne saurait prendre au serieux les depositions du condamne amort Val- tadoros, qui a declare qu'il s'etait rendu en un certain endroit, pres de la frontiere yougoslave, pour y prendre livraison d'armes, mais qu'il n'y avait pas trouve d'armes. On poun'ait en dire de meme de la deposition du temoin Vassiliou, qui a declare avoir re~u un fusil d'un certain L~zaros, c'est-a-dire d'un Grec. Aucun temoin n'a dit avoir ete arme par les autorites yougo- slaves, bulgares ou albanaises. Et pourtant, c'est autour de cette question que le Gouvernement gre, fait le plus de bruit. Les choses en sont donc la pour ce qui est des accusations portees par le Gouvernement grec contre les pays limitrophes de la Grece, selon lesquelles ces pays armeraient et entrameraient des groupes de partisans grecs et les aideraient a franchir la frontiere pour penetrer en Grece. 11 y a cependant une categorie d'incidents qui merite d'etre etudiee mais a laquelle, je ne sais trop pourquoi, on n'attache pas ici assez d'im- portance. Je veux parler des incidents provoques par les autorites grecques et par les militair~ The incident of 7 July 1946 at Radat Kakavia (Skipis) consisted of an incursion by a group of Greek soldiers into Albanian territory, which led to a lively exchange of firing. The Albanian wit- ness Nikolaos Tsamis confirmed that the Greek authorities organized a series of provocative at- tacks in the Skipis district, which lasted a whole week. The captured Greek soldier Iotakis di- rectly stated in his testimony that the incident was provoked on the initiative of the Greek mili- tary authorities. In the Likojani region a de- tachment of Greek soldiers crossed the frontier on 2 June 1946 and attacked an Albanian fron- tier patrol. This was confirmed by eye-witnesses, who stated that the Greeks systematically organ- ized provocations in that district. An even larger nl1mber of similar examples could be cited, including those which took place in 1947. Incidents are still being provoked on the Albanian frontier by the Greek military clique. The Albanian representative told the Commission on 7 May of ten incidents which occurred in only the first half of 194'7, and in which Greek soldiers fired on Albanian territory and Greek aeroplanes flew over Albanian terri- tory. On 22 May Prime Minister Enver Hoxna informed the Security Council that on 21 May, without any reason, three Greek aeroplanes machine-gunned two Albanian villages, killing two of the inhabitants and wounding eight.1 Of the 36 incidents provoked by Greek mili- tarists on the Greek-Yugoslav frontier in 1946, 30 relate to firing on Yugoslav territory and the crossing of the Yugoslav frontier by Greek sol- diers. There were many case of flights by Greek aeroplanes over Yugoslav territory, and simul- taneously shots were fired at Yugoslav frontier posts. Unfortunately, the Commission for some reason ot other did not investigate a single one of the incidents proposed by the Yugoslavs, but On notera que panni les incidents provoques par les Grecs, beaucoup avaient ete prepares d'avance. Voici quelques exemples: sur les 172 incidents provoques par les Grecs entre le 15 fevrier 1945 et le ler janvier 1947 ala frontiere albanaise, il y a eu echange de coups de feu et franchissement de la frontiere albanaise par des soldats grecs dans 81 cas; clans 33 cas, le terri- toire albanais a essuye le feu de postes grecs; dans 27 cas, des avions grecs ant survoIe le ter- ritoire albanais. Sur le chiffre total des incidents, quatre seulement ant fait l'objet d'une enquete de la Commission, et il a ete constate que dans chacun de ces cas l'initiative venait du cote grec. Au cours de l'incident de Radat Kakavia (Skipis), qui s'est produit le 7 juillet 1946, un groupe de soldats grecs a penetre en territoire albanais; il en a resulte un vif echange de coups de feu. Le temoin albanais Nikolaos Tsamis a confirme que les autorites grecques avaient or- ganise pendant toute une semaine, dans la region de Skipis, une serie d'actes de provocation. L~ soldat grec Iotakis, qui avait ete fait prisonnier, a declare nettement que cet incident avait ete provoque par les autorites militaires grecques. Le 2 juin 1946, un detachement de soldats grecs a franchi la frontiere albanaise dans la region de Likojani et a attaque une patrouille alba- naise. Cela a ete confirme par des temoins GCU- laires qui ant declare egalement que, dans cette region, les Grecs se livraient systematiquement a des actes de provocation. On pourrait citer d'autres exemples encore, e~ notamment les incidents qui se sont produits en 1947. Les militaristes grecs continuent a provo- quer des incidents a la frontiere albanaise. Le 7 mai, le representant albanais a porte a la con- naissance de la Commission dix incidents qui s'etaient produits dans la premiere moitie de 1947 et au cours desquels le territoire albanais a essuye le feu des Grecs et a ete survo!e par des avions grecs. Le 22 mai, le Premier Ministre Enver Hoxha a informe le Conseil de securite que, le 21 mai, trois avions grecs avaient mi- traille sans aucune raison deux villages albanais, tuant deux habitants et en blessant huit1• Parmi les 36 incidents provoques en 1946 par des militaires grecs a la frontiere greco-yougo- slave, il y en a eu 30 ou le territoire yougoslave a essuye le feu des Grecs et ou ia fron.tiere yougoslave a ete franchie par des soldats grecs. Il y a eu de nombreux cas de survol du territoire yougoslave par des avions grecs; au cours de ces survols, les postes frontieres yougoslaves ant ete mitrailles. Mais, on ne sait trap pourquoi, la Commission n'a enqu€te sur aucun des incidents Incidents on the Yugoslav frontier are con- tinuing up to the present day. Thus, on 13 June a Greek aeroplane fired without any reason, on the Yugoslav frontier post Number 130, near Lake Doiran, with the result that a Yugoslav officer was killed and two frontier guards wounded. Provocation by Greek militarists on the Bul- garian frontier has taken the form of flights across *e Bulgarian frontier by Greek aero- planes, firing on Bulgarian territory and, finally, the despatch of diversion units, according to the testimony of the witnesses Mustafoff and Uru- chef!. The Bulgarian Government informed the Allied Control Commission of all these incidents and the relevant documents are in the control Commission's possession. . I think I should point out that of the 284 inci- dents with ~hich Greece is charged, only three were investigated, and in all these cases the guilt of the Greek military authorities was confirmed. Of the 197 frontier incidents with which Greece charged the neighbouring countries, eight were investigated. The investigation of these incidents showed that in every case they were nothing but operations by Greek Government troops against partisans on Greek territory. Not a single Greek witness was able to prove that the partisans had retreated to the neighbouring countries. The witnesses expressed merely their conjectures. For instance, the investigation of the Sourmena inci- dent, which took place on 20, September 1946, showed that there was no such incident but that Greek troops were conducting operat:'ons against the partisans on that day. True, the Greek wit- ness, Captain Berovalis, stated that he himself ordered his men to open fire on a Yugoslav fron- tier post. It was ascertained that the whole in- cident amounted to this, that the Greeks asked the Yugoslav frontier guards to let them enter Yugoslav territory in order to take the Greek partisans, who were on Greek territory, from the rear, which the Yugoslav authorities refused to do. Only 47 of the 197 incidents are connected with alleged crossings by partisans from Greece into neighbouring countries. With regard to crossings by partisans from the neighbouring countries into Greece, which is the charge made by the latter against its neighbours, the Greek representative himself quoted only twelve cases, and not one of them was confirmed by any evi- dence which could be considered more or less convincing. Is it not ridiculous, for instance, for the Greeks to accuse Bulgaria of sending armed partisan bands into Greek territory? The Greek repre- sentative himself could only point to one case of Les actes de provocation commis par les mi- litaires grecs a la frontiere bulgare ont consiste en survols de la frontiere bulgare par des avions grecs, en coups de feu essuyes par le territoire bulgarc, et enfin en expeditions de diversion, ainsi que l'ont declare les temoins Moustafoff et Ouroutchetf. Le Gouvernement bulgare a parte taus ces incidents a la connaissance de la Com- mission de contrOle interalliee, qui dispose de toute la documentation. J'estime necessaire de vous faire observer que sur les 284 incidents imputes a la Grece, trois seulement ont fait l'objet d'une enquete et que dans tous ces cas la culpabilite des autorites militaires grecques a ete etablie. Sur les 197 in- cidents de frontiere que la Grece avait reproches aux pays voisins, huit ant fait l'objet d'une en- quete. Ces enquetes ant montre que dans tous ces cas, il ne s'agissait pas d'autre chose que d'operations menees en territoire grec par les troupes du Gouvernement grec contre les parti- sans. Aucun temoin grec n'a pu montrer que les partisans se repliaient sur le t~rritoire des pays voisins. Les temoins n'ont fait qu'exprimer des suppositions. L'enquete menee au sujet de l'incident de Sourmena qui s'etait produit le ?O septembre 1946, a montre, par exemple, qu'il n'y avait pas la d'incident, mais que, ce jour-la, les troupes grecques operaient contre les parti- sans. Il est vrai qu'un temoin grec, le capitaine Berovalis, a declare qu'il avait lui-meme donne l'ordre d'ouvrir le feu sur un poste frontiere yougoslave. Il est apparu plus tard que l'incident se recluisait a ceci: les Grecs avaient demande aux gardes frontiere yougoslaves de les laisser entrer en territoire YOllgoslave pour prendre a revers les partisans grecs qui se trouvaient en territoire grec; les autorites yougoslaves avaient refuse; C'est seulement dans 47 cas, sur un total de 197 incidents, qu'il y aurait eu franchissement des frontieres par des partisans venus de Grece. Quant aUA cas de passage en Grece de partisans. venant des pays limitrophes, que la Grece re- proche a ses voisins, le representant grec lui- meme n'a pu en citer que douze et pour aucun d'entre eux il n'a ete presente de preuves tant. soit peu convaincantes. Les accusations grecques selon lesqueUes la: Bulgarie, par exemple, aurait envoye en terri- toire grec des detachements de partisans armeS' ne sont-eUes pas ridicules? Pour toute l'annee Apparently, the Greek military clique's aim in provoking frontier incidents is to reinforce the present Greek Government's official policy of hostility towards neighbouring countries. It is common knowledge that this Government con- ducts unceasing propaganda against the terri- torial integrity of Albania and Bulgaria and does not conceal its aggressive designs against these countries. In this connexion it is particularly noteworthy that the Greek Government still con- siders itself to be in a state of war with Albania, although the Albanian Government has repeat- erly· expressed its wish to establish normal and friendly relations with Greece in the interests of both countries. It may be said that the territorial claims cher- ished by Greek governing circles against neigh- bouring countries are but empty dreams and that it is not worth while taking any notice of the authors of such plans. It is true that such dreams are empty. That does not mean, however, that the hostile policy pursued by the Greek Govern~ ment towards the neighbouring countries cannot do serious harm, as it poisons relations between these countries and Greece and thereby harms the maintenance of peace in the Balkans. This is shown by the very fact that the question of these relations is being considered by the Security Council. It follows, therefore, that if the Security Coun- cil wishes to mend matters and improve the re- lations between Greece and its neighbours, it should take steps to stop the Greek Government behaving in a hostile manner towards the neigh- bouring countries and should recommend that it establish friendly relations with those States, which wish to establish such relations with Greece. Of course, regardless of how soon the Greek Government comes to understand that the policy it is now pursuing towards its neighbours is in- ~on, il contribue en fait a provoquer ces inci- dents. Par consequent, le Gouvernement grec porte necessairement la responsabilite de ces in- cidents. Si les militaires grecs s'emploient a provoqucr des incidents de frontiere, c'est evidemment parce qu'ils veulent appuyer la politique offi- delle d'hostilite que le Gouvernement grec actuel a adoptee a l'egard des pays voisins, On sait que ce Gouvernement mene sans cesse une pro- pagande dirigee contre l'integrite territoriale de l'Albanie et de la Bulgarie, a l'egard desquelles il ne cache pas ses intentions agressives. A ce propos, il est particulierement important de no- ter que le Gouvernement grec se considere tou- jours en etat de guerre avec l'Albanie, bien que le Gouvernement albanais ait exprime a plu- sieurs reprises le desir de retablir des relations normales et amicales avec la Grece, dans l'inte- ret des deux pays. On peut dire que ces reves d'agrandissement territorial aux depens des pays voisins, que nour- rissent les dirigeants grecs, sont vains et que les auteurs de ces projets ne mcritent pas de retenir notre attention. I1 est exact que ces reves sont vains, mais cela ne signifie pas que la politique d'hostilite adoptee par le Gouvernement grec a l'egard des pays voisins ne puisse faire beaucoup de mal, etant donne qu'elle envenime les rela- tions entre ces pays et la Grece et nuit ainsi au maintien de la paix dans les Balkans. Ceci est d'ailleurs evident du seul fait que le Conseil de securite est saisi de la question des relations entre ces pays.. Par consequent, si le Conseil veut redresser la situation et obtenir une amelioration des rela- tions entre la Grece et ses voisins, il doit prendre des mesures en vue de mettre fin a la politique d'hostilite que le Gouvernement grec mene a l'egard de ses voisins et il doit recommander a ce Gouvernement d'etablir des relations amicales avec ces Etats, qui desirent entretenir de telles relations avec la Grece. I1 est evident que, quel que soit le temps que mettra le Gouvernement grec a comprendre que la politique qu'il poursuit en ce moment al'e- The provocation of incidents by the Greek military clique is evidently a method of distract- ing the attention of world public opinion from the internal conditions in Greece which have arisen since that country's liberation from fascist occupation, and to lay the blame for Greece's internal situation on the neighbouring States, or at least create the impression that Greece's neigh- bours are responsible for all the misdemeanours of the Greek ruling circles and of their foreign protectors. There can be no doubt, however, that world public opinion cannot be deceived indefinitely about the real reasons for the present situation in Greece and the reasons for the strained rela- tions between Greece and its neighbours. Sooner or later public opinion will get to know the facts and appraise them at their proper value and draw the correct conclusions. H. MACEDONIA AND ALBANIAN MINORITIES The Commission's report deals at considerable length with the problem of Aegean Macedonia and the position of the Macedonian and Al- banian minorities in Greece. The Greek Gov- ernment has accused Yugoslavia and Bulgaria of being responsible for the existence of the partisan movement in that area. In addition, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria are said to be planning virtually to wrest this area from Greece. A study of the facts collected by the Commission and of a large nUIllber of depositions of witnesses from among the local population '-'uestioned on the spot in Macedonia shows, however, that these charges too are unfounded. Indeed, what arguments do the representa- tives of the Greek Government bring forward to prove the accuracy of the charges they have levelled? In substance, the principal argument adduced for this purpose consists of reference to statements in certain Yugoslav papers expressing sympathy with the position of the Macedonian population residing in Aegean Macedonia. The Greek representatives adduced no other facts that merit attention. As this question was discussed by the Com- mission and mentioned in the report, we should study it here too and separate the truth from un- founded assertions and fabrications. In this con- nexion the question arises as to what is really going on. A knowledge of the facts shows that one of the reasons why the partisan movement in northern Greece has acquired a more intensive character compared with other regions is the present Greek regime's persecution of the na- tional minorities dwelling in northern Greece - the Macedonians and Chams. The terror perpe- H. LES MINORITES MACEDONIENNE ET ALBANAISE Une grande partie du rapport de la Commis- sion est consacree a la question de la Macedoine egeenne et a la situation des minorites macedo- nienne et albanaise en Grece. Le Gouvernement grec a accuse la Yougoslavie et la Bulgarie d'etre responsables de l'existence d'un mouvement de partisans dans cette region. En meme temps, on attribue a la Yougoslavie et a la Bulgarie des: plans qui iraient jusqu'a arracher cette region a la Grece. Cependant, l'etude des faits rassembIes: par la Commission et celle des nombreuses depo- sitions de temoins pris dans la population locale' et interroges en Macedoine meme, montre que ces accusations sont denuees de tout fondement. En effet, quels sont les arguments dont use le- Gouvernement grec pour demontrer le bien- fonde de ses accusations? En fait, l'argument principal invoque par les autoritc5s grecques, ce' sont les declarations de certains journaux yougo- slaves qui expriment de la sympathie pour la: population macedonienne en raison de la situa- tion Oll elle se trouve en Macedoine egeenne. En dehors de cela les representants grecs n'ont pas' cite de fait qui merite de retenir notre attention. Puisque cette question a ete discutee par la Commission et qu'il en est fait mention dans le' rapport, nous devrons, nous aussi, Hkher d'y voir- clair et de separer la verite de ce qui n'est qu'af- firmation non fondee ou invention. A ce propos, il y a lieu de se demander: Que se passe-t-il en' realite? L'etude des faits montre que si le mouve- ment partisan a pris dans le nord de la Grece une- intensite plus grande que dans les autres regions du pays, l'une des raisons en est que le regime grec actuel persecute les minorites nationales qui habitent la Grece du Nord: les Macedoniens; ..... If you read the testimony of Macedonian wit- nesses, you will see that the Greek authorities have not only proclaimed a campaign against Macedonian national culture, have not only closed down all Macedonian schools and forbid- den Macedonians to speak in their mother tongue, but they are also carrying out a policy of extermination against the Macedonian popu- lation of Greece, which numbers more than 250,000. The Macedonian minority is a population with deep-rooted national traditions, with its own language and with its own ancient culture. It demands the acknowledgment of certain na- tional rights as regards the use of its own lan- guage and culture. But what is actually happen- ing? It is known that Greek soldiers and gend- armes, in coEabortion with right-wing or so- called "nationalist" bands, completely devastated and burned down anumber of Macedonian vil- lages last year (Katerini, Xirovrisi and Stefa- nina) . It is also known that, with the same aim of extirpating the Macedonian minority, the Greek Government, through its own official agencies and also with the help of right-wing bands, un- leashed such a terror on the Macedonian minor- ity that, in order to escape murder, torture and violence, the Macedonians were forced to flee by the thousands to the neighbouring countries. More than 20,000 Macedonians fled to Yugo- slavia and about 10,000 to Bulgaria. The Greek Government calls all these people partisans and, furthermore, blames the neighbouring countrL... for the fact that these people have found refuge on their territories.· The witnesses Maria Slav! and Prose Zega in- formed the Commission that Greek gendarmes burned·down the Macedonian village of Skra. The inhabitants of this village, fearing further persecution by the authorities, were forced to flee to Yugoslavia. Three hundred inhabitants of this village who had fled to Yugoslavia gave the Commission a memorandum describing the per- secutions they had suffered and the tragic lot of the Macedonian population in Greece generally. This memorandum states that, after more than ninety per cent of the population of that village had voted for a republic in the March 1946 elections, on 13 November gendarmes and ban- dits attacked the village on the pretext that partisans were hiding there, killed 33 people and :t::(i';; La minorite macedonienne constitue une po- pulation qui a des traditions nationales aux- quelles elle est profondement attachee, une langue qui lui est propre et une vieille culture. Cette minorite demande qu'on lui reconnaisse certains droits nationaWl; en ce qui concerne sa langue et sa culture. Mais dans la realite, que se passe-t-il? On sait que I'an dernier des soldats et des gendarmes grecs, aides par des bandes de droite, qu'on appelle aussi "nationalistes", ont entierement detruit et brl1le une serie de villages macedoniens (Katerini, Xirovrisi et Stefanina). Toujours avec I'intention d'aneantir la mino- rite macedonienne, le Gouvernement grec, on le sait egalement, par ses agents et avec I'aide aussi des bandes de droite, a soumis cette mhlOrite a une terreur telle que, pour echapper aux assas- sinats, aux tortures et aux violences, les Mace- doniens ont ete contraints de se refugier par mil- liers dans les pays vaisins de la Grece. Plus de 20.000 Macedoniens se sont refugies en Yougo~ slavie, et environ 10.000 en Bulgarie. Tous ces gens, le Gouvernement grec les appelle des par- tisans et il va jusqu'a mettre en accusation ses voisins parce que ces refugies ont trouve asile sur leur territoire. Les temoins Maria Slavi et Prose Zega ont declare a la Commission que des gendarmes grecs avaient brl1le le village macedonien de Skra. Craignant de nouvelles persecutions par les autorites, les habitants de ce village ont dll se refugier en Yougoslavie. Trois cents des habi- tants de ce village, refugies en Yougoslavie, ont presente a la Commission un memorandum qui decrit les persecutions dont ils ont ete victimes et le sort tragique de la poput'tion macedo- nienne de Grece en general. Il est dit dans ce memorandum que lors des elections du mois de: mars en 1946, plus de 90 pour 100 de la popu- lation de ce village avaient vote en faveur de 'la republique; a la suite de quoi, le 13 novembre, dit le memorandum, des gendarmes et des ban-· The witness Djordje Atanasov testified that right-wing bands and the gendarmerie were ter- rorizing the Macedonian population and were assaulting, killing and torturing Macedonians. The Macedonian witness Ioannis Nikolaidis, in- terrogated in the Poligheros prison, testified that the terror of the Greek authorities agaiTlSt the Macedonians "is obliging some, of them to go into the lllIls and others to take refuge in neigh- bouring countries". The position of the Albanian national minor- ity, the Chams, is no less difficult. Between June 1944 and March 1945 the Greek Government carried out a regular campaign to exterminate this minority. Military units were, sent to the areas bordering on Albania inhabited by Chams and began to plunder and burn down Cham vil- lages wholesale and to murder the population. As a result of this campaign, 2,877 people were killed, 5,800 houses were burned down and a total of 69 villages suffered. It was pointed out in the memorandum of the Anti-Fascist Com- mittee of Cham Refugees now living in Albania that this campaign was the tragic culmination of the thirty-two year old story of the sufferings of the Cham papulation. The Greek authorities have now managed to "clear" Chamuria of Chams. According to the witness Nusrat Ali, there are now no more than 16 Cham families in Greece; the remainder have either been ex- terminated or have fled to Albania. There are 23,000 Cham refugees in Albania. In this connexion, it may not be superfluous to recall also the statement of a British Member of Parliament, Mr. Hutchinson, who reported as follows: "During my stay in Albania I had the oppor- tunity to talk to a good number of refugees who came from Chamuria. I mean the 25,000 Chams who were driven from their homes by Greek terrorist bands under the command of General Zervas." This statement by Mr. Hutchinson was pub- lished on 9 November 1945 in the newspaper Hertford Times. Such is the picture with regard to the situation of the national minorities in Greece. Anyone wishing to do so may consult the relevant documents supplied us by the Com- mission. Thus, it is the Greek Government, and not other countries, that is responsible for the situa- tion which has arisen with regard to the Mace- donian and Albanian national minorities in Greece. This conclusion merits special attention if '.ve bear in mind that Aegean Macedonia and Chamuria, which is where the Albanian minority lives, are frontier regions, a fact which makes the situation in those regions one of special sig- nificance. "Pendant mon sejouf en Albanie, j'ai eu l'oc- casion de m'entretenir avec un grand nombre de refugies venant de Tchamourie. Il s'agit de 25.000 personnes qui ont ete chassees de leurs foyers par les bandes terroristes grecques com- mandees par le general Zervas." Cette declaration de M. Hutchinson a paru le 9 novembre 1945 dans le Hertford Times. Telle est done la situation des minorites natio- nales en Grece. Tous ceux qui le desireraient peuvent prendre connaissance de la documenta- tion qui nous a ete fournie a ce sujet par la Commission. Ce ne sont done pas les autres pays, mais bien le Gouvernement grec qui est responsable de la situation des minorites macedonienne et albanaise en Grece. Cette conclusion merite d'autant plus de retenir notre attention que la Macedoine egeenne et la Tchamourie OU habite la minorite albanaise sont des regions frontieres . et que, par consequent, la situation dans ces re- gions a une importance particuliere. I Ill. EVIDENCE AND WITNESSES A' good deal of space is given in the Commis- sion's report to the evidence of witnesses. This is understandable. In ascertaining the actual situation on the spot, the Commission could not fail to use the evidence of living persons. The witnesses may be divided basically into two cate- gories: 1. Those who testified against the Greek Government; 2. Those who testified in defence of the Greek Government. The first category comprises the many wit- nesses representing the Greek people. It includes representatives of democratic parties and organ- iza"tions, among them representatives of the EAM coalition and representatives of the Greek Labour Confederation, and also a large numbe,r of private citizens. All these witnesses gave the Commission facts and conveyed the thoughts and aspirations of the Greek people. They all told of the acts of terror perpetrated against all the, democratic parties and organizations in the country, against all persons suspectd of acting for or thinking of the defence of democracy. They spoke of the wanton behaviour of fascist· bands such as the "Hitos" and Surlas bands and others. Among these witnesses are a leading EAM politician, Mr. Kyrkes, a representative of the Greek Socialist Party, Mr. Tsirimokos, a repre- sentative of the 'Left Liberal Party, Mr. Gri- goriadis, a representative of the Greek Labour Confederation, Mr. Paparigas, and others. ~onnes d'agir, ou de vouloir agir, pour la de- fense de la democratie. Ils ont decrit les exces des bandes fascistes des "Hitos", des bandes de Sourlas et autres. Parmi ces temoins, on remarque une person- nalite politique marquante de I'EAM, M. Kir- kes; le representant du parti socialiste grec, M. Tsirimokos; le representant du parti liberal de gauche, M. Grigoriadis; le representant de la Confederation grecque du travail, M. Paparigas, etc. La tres grande majorite de ces temoins ne sont pas des communistes. Pourtant, ils sont unanim~s adeclarer qu'ils luttent cote a. cote avec les com- munistes pour la defense des droits democra- tiques du peuple grec. Les communistes, et les vrais democrates parmi les non-communistes, agissent de concert parce qu'ils luttent pour de- fendre les libertes democratiques du peuple grec, qui a merite que 1'0n tienne compte de sa vo- lonte. 'The charge constantly made by the Greek Les accusations constamment formuIees par Government and its foreign protectors that all le Gouvernement grec et ses protecteurs etran- who are opposed to the Greek Government are gers, et seIon lesquelles tous ceux qui s'opposent ~mIllunists does not correspond with reality. In I au Gouvernement seraient des communistes,' ne The overwhelming majority of these witnesses are not Communists, but they all with one voice declare that they are fighting shoulder to shoul- der with the Communists for the democ':"atic rights of the Greek people. Communists and genuine democrats who are not Communists act in unison, because they are fighting for the democratic liberties of the Greek people, who have earned the right to be reckoned with. Ill. LES DEPOSITIONS ET LES TEMOINS Les depositions des temoins occupent dans le rapport de la Commission une place conside- rable. Ce!a est tout a. fait nature!. Pour eclaircir sur place la situation reelle, la Commission ne pouvait faire autrement que d'entendre tous les temoignages de premiere main. Tous les temoins peuvent se classer, en substance, en deux cate- gories: 1. Ceux qui ont temoigne contre le Gouver- nement grec; 2. Ceux qui ont temoigne en faveur du Gou- vernement grec. De nombreux temoins, representant le peuple de Grece, appartiennent a. la premiere categorie. Celle-ci comprend des representants des partis et des organisations democratiques, y compris la coalition de I'EAM, et de la Confederation grecque du travail, ainsi qu'un grand nombre de personnes privees. Tous ces temoins ont ec1aire la Commission sur la situation, les opinions et les aspirations du peuple grec. Tous ont decrit la terreur dirigee contre tous les partis et organisations democra- tiques du pays, contre tous ceux qui sont soup- 1 ; ..• ' ";~\Of' COlOurs. 1I .' .J::.,,1ii~'" :Many of the witnesses are private individuals, relatives of persons deported to the islands and imprisoned by the Greek autilOrities. Amongst them there are not a few democratic leaders who distinguished themselves in the struggle against the occupationists. There are hundreds of such witnesses. The oral and written evidence given by these people, as well as the evidence of out- standing representatives of democratic parties and organizations, disdoses to us a grim picture of the conditions which at present prevail in Greece and reveals the abyss into which the pres- ent Greek rulers have hurled the country. The voice of these persons is the voice of the Greek people. The Security Council should listen to it. There is also another ca~egory of oral and written evidenl:e. This is the evidence of per- sons recommended by the Greek Government. These witnesses may be divided into three basic groups: 1. Witnesses from the ranks of the Greek military (frontier) authorities; 2. Criminals, sentenced at various times by the Greek authorities, and quislings who have fled from other countries into Greece and whose services have proved useful to the Greek Gov- ,~mment; 3. Persons sentenced to death or various terms of imprisonment by the Greek authorities. What could be expected from the evidence of the Greek military authorities? They have tried in every possible way to calumniate the neigh- bouring countries. Persons belonging to the second group are in large part amoral elements with no political convictions, who have sold themselves to the police authorities, or elements which collabo- rated with the enemy during the occupation of Greece's neighbours by fascist troops and which found shelter in Greece. Here are some such witnesses: In the Greek White Bookl mention is made of 2.n ex-colonel of the Bulgarian Army, Ivan Gc:oganoff, sentenced to death by a Bulgarian court for serious crimes against the Bulgarian people. Kotsinako, a wit- ness against Albania, is a criminal who stole 3,500 United States dollars from the State Treas- ury in Tirana and fled from Albania to escape 1 The document referred to in the report of the Com- mission of Investigation concerning Greek Frontier Inci- dents as "Greek White Book I" (listed by the Commission as document S/ACA/15) is a publication of the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs, entitled Evidence in Sup- port of the Creek Appeal to the Security Council (Athens, 1947) • 3. Personnes condamnees a la peine de mort ou a differentes peines de prison par les autorites grecques. Que pouvait-on attendl"e du temoignage des autorites militaires grecques? Elles ont cherch€ par tous les moyens a calomnier les pays voisins. Les personnes appartenant au deuxieme groupe sont en grande partie des individus sans moralite, denues de convictions politiques, ven- dus a la police, ou encore des individus qui ont collabore avec l'ennemi dans les pays voisins de la Grece, occupes par les fascistes et qui depuis ont trouv€ refuge en Grece. Voici quelques-uns de ces temoins: le Livre blanc grecl cite Ivan Gologanoff, ex-colonel de l'arm€e bulgare, condamne a mort par un tri- bunal bulgare pour ses crimes contre le peuple bulgare. Le temoin Kotsinako, qui a depose contre l'Albanie, est un criminel de droit com- mun et a vole a Tirana 3.~00 dollars des Etats- Unis appartenant au Tresor, puis s'est enfui 1 Le document dont il est question dans le rapport de la Commission d'enquete sur les incidents survenus le long de la frontiere grecque, sous le nom de "Livre blanc grec I" (document S/AC.4/15 de la Commission) a ete publie par le Ministere grec des Affaires etrangeres, sous le titre Temoignages a l'appui de l'appel dll la Crece au Conseil de securite (Athenes, 1947). The Greek representative in a letter of 25 February insisted on the interrogation of the witness Hristos Vlahos. It was this same Hristos Vlahos who, at the instigation of the Greek gendarmerie, murdered Zevgos, a former min- ister and a member of the Central Committee of EAM, on 20 March 1947, in a street in Saloniki. Zevgos was sent by the Central Com- mittee of EAM to establish relations with the Security Council's Commission, which was work- ing in Saloniki at that time. The chief Greek witness, Fotios Kontopanos, whose name figures in the Commission's report in dozens of places, is an agent provocateur. Kontopanos' own "brothers exposed him as a person of no morals and an agent provocateur. Another Greek witness, Zahos, admitted before the Commission that his own evidence was a forgery. It is not accidental that the evidence of a number of such persons was ignored by the Commission, since the devices to which the per- sons who supplied these witnesses had resorted were too obvious. Apparently, it was difficult to find more suitable persons. With regard to the third group of witnesses, it is ~qually impossible to regard their evidence as trustworthy. How can one trust the evidence of persons who, a few days before their interro- gation, sent written statements to the Commis- sion expressing the wish to testify against the Greek Government, yet, on meeting the repre- sentatives of the Commission, testified to the contrary and defended the activities of the Greek authorities, having obviously been bribed as a result of threats and the application of force on the part of the police and gendarmerie? It is obvious that these people were saving their skins and were the victims of coercion and bribery. In this category, for instance, we may place the witness Bobtsis, who was dismissed by the Commission as a perjurer, but whose evidence is nevertheless mentioned in the report, and also the witnees Valtadoros, who had been sentenced to death by a Greek court. Four people sen- tenced to death together with Valtadoros were executed in October 1946, whereas Valtadoros was not executed in order to keep him to give evidence against the neighbouring countries, as he himself said later. The prisoners Zervas and Petsas stated during their interrogation that Val- tadoros was tortured for three days until he gave false evidence about the alleged support which Yugoslavia was giving to Greek partisans. Dans cette categorie, on pent ranger le te- moin Bobtsis, que la Commission avait rejete comme etant un faux temoin, mais dont les de- positions sont neanmoins citees dans le rapport, et de meme le temoin Valtadoros qu'un tribunal grec avait condamne a la peine de mort. Quatre personnes condamnees a mort en meme temps que Valtadoros ont ete executees en octobre 1946 alors que Valtadoros a ete epargne, pour pouvoir, ainsi qu'il l'a declare lui-meme, temoi- gner contre les pays voisins de la Grece. Les de- tenus Zervas et Petsas ont declare, lors de leur interrogatoire, que Valtadoros avait ete torture pendant trois jours, jusqu'au moment ou il avait fait une deposition mensongere, tendant a iDoIi;. trer que la Yougoslavie soutient les partisans The following section of part III and the whole of part IV of Mr. Gromyko's speech were not given an· English interpretation during the meeting. . The witnesses Kentros and Tsipis, when inter- rogated by a CoIIlIlli$sion team at Yannina stated that they were on Albanian territory to- gether with the leader of a partisan unit, Raptis. On the other hand, Raptis stated at a court tx:ial in Yannina on 6 September 1946 that he had never been in Albania. Hence, the evidence of Kentros and Tsipis is false. Raptis was executed and Kentros and Tsipis saved their lives by their false evidence. Gheorgios Krinakis, a twenty- year-old member of the Greek youth organiza- tion EPON, under sentence of death, stated when he was interrogated by the team that he had been severely beaten and instructed to give false evidence against Yugoslavi~, Bulgaria and Albania. Krinakis had refused to give such evi- dence and was sentenced to death. Another witness, loannis Patis, who had been sentenced to death, also stated that he was in- structed to give false evidence regarding the help given by the northern neighbours to the partisans. He refused to .~ve such evidence and was subjected to beatL.'lg and torture. With regard to the depositions in the notori,. ousWhite Book, which is so often mentioned by the Greek representatives, according to the state·· ments of the Greek witnesses themselves, this evidence i" falsified: One of the chief Greek witnesses, Gatsios, stated: "I deny my evidence because it was false." Zahos declared that he "did not give the evidence which is written down in the White Book." The witness Ikonom- off told the Commission that his deposition in the White Book was not true and that he gave evidence of alleged help by Bulgaria to Greek partisans as a result of beatings which lasted for several days. Such is the real situation. From these few examples it may be seen quite clearly, unless we consciously close our eyes to these facts, that the A ce point de l'i'1terpretation anglaise de son discours ala seance du Conseil de securite, M. Gromyko a fait la declaration suivante (traduit du russe): J'accepte qu'on continue l'interpretation an- glaise a partir de la section V: "L'intervention etrangere dans les affaires interieures de la Grece." Quant au reste, je prierais le Secretariat de preparer une traduction officielle. Nous pour- rions done passer maintenant a la section V. Ce qui suit de la troisieme partie, ainsi que toute la quatrieme partie du discours de M. Gromyko, n'a pas etC interprete en anglais au cours de la seance. Les temoins Kentros et Tsipis, qui ont com- paru a lanina devant un groupe de la Commis- sion, ont declare qu'ils avaient ete en territoire albanais avec un certain Raptis, chef d'un groupe de partisans. Or, ce meme Raptis a de- clare, au cours de son proces a lanina, le 6 sep- tembre 1946, qu'il n'avaitjamais ete en Albanie. Par consequent,' les temoignages de Kentros et Tsipis sont faux. Raptis a ete execute, alors que Kentros et Tsipis ont sauve leur vie au prix d'un faux temoignage. Le denomme Georgios Krika- nis; age de 20 ans, membre de I'organisation de la jeunesse grecque EPON, et condamne amort, a declare devant le groupe de la Commission qu'on I'avait roue de coups pour lui faire faire une deposition mensongere contre la Yougosla- vie, la Bulgarie et l'Albanie. Krinakis a refuse de faire cette deposition, et il a ete condamne a mort. Un autre temoin condamne a mort, loannis Patis, a declare egalement qu'on lui avait de- mande un faux temoignage attestant que les voisins septentrionaux de la Grece aidaient les partisans. 11 avait refuse de temoigner dans ce sens et c'est pourquoi il avait ete torture et roue de coups. . Quant aux depositions contenues dans le fa- meux Livre blanc auquel les representants grecs se referent si souvent, elIes ont ete falsifiees de I'aveu des temoins grecs eux-memes. L'un des principaux temoins grecs, Gatsios, a declare: "Je retracte ma deposition parce qu'elle etait fausse." Zahos a declare qu'il "n'avait pas fait la depo- sition consignee dans le Livre blanc". Le temoin Ikonomoff a declare devant la Commission que son temoignage, tel qu'il figure dans le Livre blanc, ne cox:respond pas ala realite et qu'il n'a- vait fait sa deposition concernant l'aide que la Bulgarie aurait accordee at.1x partisans grecs que parce qu'il avait.ete hattu pendant plusieurs jours. Telle est la realite. Ces quelques exemples nous suffisent pour voir de fac,;on parfaitement claire, si nous ne voulons pas sciemment fermer ..... Is it not clear that the Security Council cannot fail to take into account the nature of the wit- nesses and their statements? IV. THE INTERNAL .SITUATION IN GREECE IV. LA SITUATION INTERIEURE DE LA GdCE It would be incorrect for us to consider the question of the so-called frontier incidents separ- ately from the general situation which has arisen in Greece since her liberation from fascist occu- pation. It is not accidental that the Security Council's Commission gave considerable atten- tion to facts relating to the internal situation in the country. By doing so the Commission recog- nized that the question of incidents cannot be considered apart from the whole situation which has arisen in Greece and that this situation has directly influenced the relations between the present political regime in Greece and the neigh- bouring States. It is true that the interest taken by certain representatives on the Commission in the situation prevailing in Greece diminished somewhat during the last stage of the Commis- sion's work. But this fact affords still stronger confirmation of the correctness of the above conclusion. In this case too, as in that of the position of the Macedonian and Albanian minorities in Greece, I shall touch upon the internal situation in Greece only from one specific point of view, namely, that of the extent to which the relations which have grown up between Greece, on the one hand, and Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and ,Al- bania, on the other, are determined by this in- ternal situation. En examinant la question de ce qu'on appelle les incidents de frontiere, nous aurions tort de laisser de cote l'ensemble de la situation qui s'est creee en Grece, apres sa liberation des occupants fascistes. Ce n'est pas par hasard que la Com- mission du Conseil de securite a etudie avec une attention particuliere les faits qui se rapportent a la situation interieure de ce·pays. La Commis- sion a reconnu par la qu'on ne saurait isoler la question des incidents de frontiere de l'ensemble de la situation qui existe en Grece, et que cette situation affecte directement les relations entre le regime actuel grec et les pays voisins de la Grece. Il est vrai que, vers la fin des travaux de la Commission, ceItains de ses membres ont montre moins d'interet pour la situation qui existe err Grece, mais cela ne fait que confirmer davantage l'exactitude de la remarque que je viens de faire. De meme que je l'avais fait a propos de la situation des minorites macedonienne et alba- naise de Grece, je ne traiterai de la situation interieure de la Grece que sous un angle deter- mine: je me bornerai a examiner jusqu'a quel point la situation interieure de la Grece affecte les relations entre ce pays, d'une part, et la Yougoslavie, la Bulgarie et l'Albanie, d'autre part. Donc, que se passe-t-il en Grece? Qu'est-ce qui a provoque des relations si tendues entre la Grece et ses voisins? Depuis plus de deux ans, la Grece presente parmi les Etats liberes de l'en- nemi, ce cas presque unique d'un pays ou il n'y a pas d'ordre, ou les interets de la grande majo- rite de la population sont meconnus et ou 1'0n manifeste ouvertement des intentions agressives a l'egard des nations voisines. La Grece est le theatre d'une lutte violente entre les forces de- mocratiques d'une part et, d'autre part, les forces antidemocratiques, groupees autour du Gouver- nement grec actuel. En efIet, on ne saurait nier qu'au premier rang des elements antidemocra- tiques on trouve des personnes compromises par leur collaboration avec l'ennemi, les bandf."-s fas- cistes des "Hitos" et leurs emules qui terrorisent la population. What, then, is going on in Greece? What has led to such strained relations between Greece and the neighbouring countries? For more than two years now, Greece is almost the only country liberated from the enemy where there is no or- der, where the interests of the overwhelming majority of the people are ignored and where aggressive designs against neighbouring States are openly discussed. It is the scene of an acute conflict between democratic forces, on the one hand and on the other hand, the anti-demo- cratic forces grouped around the present Greek Government. It cannct, after all, be denied that prominent among the latter are elements which co~promised themselves in the past by collabo- ratIon with the enemy, fascist "Hitos" bands and the like, who are terrorizing the population. Vn representant du parti socialiste (ELD) a declare devant la Commission que les autorites grecques menent des expeditions punitives de grande envergure contre les elements democra- tiques de la population; ce qui aboutit souvent a- la destruction de villages entiers, et que ces memes autorites s'appuient sur les bandes de droite. composees d'individus ayant collabore avec les occupants. Les temoins Vitaniotis, Tsen- gos, Batis, Atanasov, Lambros, Zogas, Skembis et b~aucoupd'autres encore ont declare la meme chose au moment d'etre interroges par la Com- mission. Actuellement, loin de s'ameliorer, la situation empire sensiblement. Les cours martiales grec- ques ont commence a prononcer des condamna- tions a mort a un rythme accelere. De mars a- . juin dernier, il y a eu 214 condarnnations a- mort; 150 personnes, dont 6 femmes, ont ete executees. On a meme execute le Dr Efthymios Ioannidis, un des temoins qui ont depose devant la Commission au sujet des persecutions aux- quelles le Gouvernement grec soumet la mino- rite macedonienne de Grece. At the present time the situation has not only not improved but, on the comrary, has notice- ably deteriorated. Greek courts martial hav~ begun to pass se!1tences of death at a particu- larly fast rate. Between March and June this year, 214 death sentences were pa&ed, ard 150 people have already been executed, among them 6 women. One of the witnesses, Dr. Efthymios Ioannidis, who testified before the Commission on the Greek Government's persecution of the Macedonian minority in Greece, has been exe- cuted. According to the recent information from Greece, only a few days ago another 17 people, formerly members of the national liberation movement in Greece, were executed. Character- istically, ~.e execution of these persons coincided D'apres les dernieres informations rec;ues de Grece, 17 personnes, anciens membres du mou- vement grec de liberation nationale, ont ete exe- cutees tout recemment. C'est un fait caracteris- tique que ces executions ont coincide avec la Is it surprising that in such circumstances thousands and tens of thousands of the Greek people have left for the mountains, preferring to fight actively for recognition of their rights than to put themselves at the disposal of Surlas' butchers and the like? If you read the testimony of the partisans and their leaders you will see what forced these people to go to the mountains. You will see that they did so because it is the .only way left to them, the only way in which they can defend the honour, liberty and inde- pendence of the Greek people. The only alterna- tive would be to bow their heads before the right-wing "Ritos" bands, the Sulars's, Manga- nostes and the like. ~t de ses emules? Lisez les depositions des parti- sans et de leurs chefs, et vous comprendrez ce qui les a fait fuir dans la montagne. Vous verrez que, s'ils ont choisi cette voie, c'est parce que c'etait la seule qui leur restat pour defendre l'hcnneur, la liberte et l'independance du peuple grec. Sinon, il ne restait qu'a s'incliner devant les bandes de droite des "Hitos", des Sourlas, des Manganos et de leurs emules. Is it surprising, either, that in such circum- stances thousands and tens of thousands of the Quoi d'etonnant aussi que dans ces conditions des milliers, des dizaines de milliers d~ Grecs preferent se refu~ier dans les pays voisins pour echapper aux gendarmes, a la police et aux bandes fascistes? Les temoins Nicolaos Terzo~ poulos (du parti agraire), Panaistis Konstanti- nopoulos (du parti democrate), le general Ba- kirdzis, Loulis et autres, qui ont ete interroges par un groupe de la Commission dans l'ile d'Ica- rie - qui constitue l'un des plus grands camps de concentration de la Grece - ont declare que c'etaient les persecutions qui poussaient le peuple grec a se refugier dans la montagne et dans les pays voisins. Le partisan Zogas a dit que Jes gendarmes et les bandes de droite"operaient de concert pour tuer,·piller, ruiner la Grece". Un representant du parti liberal de gauche, le general Grigoriadis, a declare devant la Com- mission que "des le mois d'aoiit 1945, son parti avait prevu que les persecutions dirigees contre la democratie en Grece rCduiraient le peuple grec au desespoir et aboutiraient a des consequences in~abitants of Greece prefer to find refuge in .neIghbouring countries to avoid falling into the hands of the gendarmes, police and fascist bands? The witnesses Nikolaos Terzopoulos (Agrarian Party), Panaistis Konstantinoupoulos (Democratic Party), General Bakirdzis, Loulis and others who were interrogated by a team of the Commission on the island of lkaria, one of the largest concentration camps in Greece, said that the persecutions forced Greeks to flee to the mountains or to neighbouring countries. The ~artisan Zogas declared that the gendarmes and ?ght-wing bands "are together killing, plunder- mg and ruining Greece". General Grigoriadis, a representative of the L~ft Liberal Party, told the Commission that the LIberal Party "as early as August 1945 foresaw that the persecution of democracy would plunge cne Greek people into despair and would lead to The connexion between the internal situation in Greece and the so-called frontier incidents for which the Greek Goverment is attempting to blame the neighbouring countries is an obvious fact. Whatever the efforts of the Greek Govern- ment to present the position so as to show that Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania are organizing these incidents, it cannot be done. The provoca- tive behaviour of the Greek authorities towards the neighbouring countries is too obvious. V. FOREICN INTERFERENCE IN GREEK INTERNAL AFFAIRS We should not be behaving objectively if we overlooked one of the essential aspects of the question under discussion and failed to point out that the difficult internal situation in Greece, which has spoiled the relations between Greece, on the one hand, and Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania on the other, is largely the result of for- eign interference in the internal affairs of Greece. The tragedy of Greece would doubtless have been averted at the outset, immediately after the liberation of Greece from the invaders, had it not been for foreign interference. This has made it more difficult to establish a political regime con- sonant with the interests of the vast majority of the people. It has also made it more difficult to establish friendly relations between Greece and its neighbours. In earlier discussions of the Greek question, the USSR delegation to the Security Council has repeatedly pointed out the inadmissibility of the continuation of foreign interference in Greek in- ternal affairs and the inadmissibility of external pressure on the internal situation in Greece, and indicated the necessity of providing the Greek peopl~ with the opportunity to decide for itself the question of the political form of its Govern- ment. This people, which has suffered severely from the fascist occupation, deserves to have its voice heard, not only at home, but also abroad. In any case it has earned the right to be given the opportunity to settle its internal affairs for itself. Yet it is being deprived of this opportunity and the arsenal of methods used for this purpose is, as is known, becoming more and more varied. V. L'INTERVENTION ETRANG~RE DANS LES AFFAIRES INTERIEURES DE LA GR~CE Nous manquerions d'objectivite si nous pas- sions sous silence I'un des aspects principaux de la question que nous etudiohs et si nous ne di~ sions pas que la situation interieure difficile qui s'est creee en Grece et la tension des relations entre ce pays, d'une part, et la Yougoslavie, la Bulgarie et l'Albanie, cl'autre part, sont dans une grande me'lure la consequence de l'intervention etrangere dans les affaires interieures de la Grece. Certainement, s'il n'y avait pas eu d'in- tervention etrangere, on aurait pu prevenir des le debut, des apres la liberation, la tragedie que la Grece a vecue depuis. Cette intervention a rendu plus difficile l'instauration dans ce pays d'un ordre politique conforme aux interets de la grande majorite de la population. Elle a ren· du plus difficile l'etablissement de relations ami· cales entre la Grece et ses voisins. Au cours des seances du Conseil consacrees a l'examen de la question grecque, la delegation sovietique a deja indique a plusieurs reprises qu'il etait inadmissible que des pays etrangers continuent a intervenir dans les affaires inte· rieure~, de la Grece, qu'il etait inadmissible qu'une pression exterieure s'exerce sur la situao tion interieure de la Grece. Notre delegation a dit qu'il etait necessaire de permettre au peuple grec de decider lui-rneme du regime politique de son pays. Cc peuple, qui a tellement souffert de l'occupation fasciste, merite qu'on ecoute sa voix non seulement a l'interieur, mais aussi a l'etranger. En tout cas, il merite qu'on lui per· mette de decider luiomeme de ses affaires inte· rieures. Or, on le lui refuse, et pour cela on se sert, comme chacun sait, de moyens de plus en plus varies. A l'intervention directe que constit'.le la pre- sence de troupes etrangeres, sont venues s'ajouter ....... The establishment of a commission cannot but be appraised by fair-minded people as a move to set up a screen to conceal the activities of cer- tain Powers in meddling in the internal affairs of Greece. Such a conclusion suggests itself par- ticularly if we bear in mind that the sponsors of the proposal to set up a commission disagreed with the proposal that a Security Council com- mission should be set up to ensure that foreign assistance to Greece would be used only in the interests of the Greek people. Ceux qui reflechissent d'une fa~on objecti"e ne sauraient voir dans la creation de cette com- mission qu'une manreuvre tendant a cacher l'ac- tion de certaines Puissances qui se traduit par l'intervention dans les affaires interieures de la Grece. C'est la une conclusion qui s'impose tout particulierement, si nous r:.cus souvenons que ceux qui defendent la proposition de creer une commission se sont opposes precedemment a la creation d'une commission du Conseil de secu- rite chargee de veiller a ce que l'aide exterieure accordee a la Grece soit utilisee exclusivement dans l'interet du peuple grec. Certes, les relations de la Grece avec la Yougo- slavie, la Bulgarie et l'Albanie soulevent un cer- tain nombre de questions qui doivent etre re- glCes; et, bien entendu, il faut absolument que les autorites grecques cessent de provoquer des 'incidents de frontiere. Mais ces questions pour- raient etre rep:lees sans qu'il y ait de commission, au moyen de negociations directes entre les quatre pays interesses, ce qui n'exclut pas la possibilite pour le Conseil de securite d'adresser a ces pays un appel les invitant a regler ces questions dans un esprit de comprehension mu- tuelle et a etablir entre eux des relations ami- cales. Une de ces questions est celle des conventions frontalieres. Les representants des Gouverne- ments yougoslave, bulgare et albanais, on le sait, se sont montres favorables au renouvellement de ces conventions ou a la conclusion de conven- tions nouvelles, alors que nous n'avons entendu rien de semblable de la bouche du representant grec. Bien plus, le Gouvernement grec n'a pas repondu a l'invitation de la Bulgarie, par exemple, qui lui a propose la remise en vigueur de l'accord anterieur sur le reglement des inci- dents de frontiere. La commission proposee par le representant des Etats-Unis peut provoquer de nouveIles fric- tions, de nouveaux malentendus dans le5 rela- tions entre ces pays; eIle risque de compromettre son autorite par ses actions, comme le montrent certains aspects peu brillants des travaux de la Commission dont nous examinons en ce moment Of course, there are several problems con- nected with the relations between Greece, on the one hand, and Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Al- bania, on the other, which call for settlement, quite apart from the absolute necessity for the Greek ~Lut~orities to stop provoking frontier inci- dents. Such problems, however, might have been settled without a commission, by appropri- ate negotiations between the four countries con- cerned; this does not exclude the possibility of an appeal by the Security Council to these coun- tries to settle such questions in a spirit of mutual understanding and to establish friendly relations between them. One of these questions is that of frontier con- ventions. As is known, the representatives of the Governments of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Al- bania took a positive stand on the question of the need for renewing old conventions or concluding new ones-but no such affirmation has been heard from the representative of Greece. More- over, tlle Greek Government did not, for in- stance, respond to Bulgaria's request to revive an earlier agreement for settlement of frontier in- cidents. The commission proposed by the United States representative can become a source of f?rther friction and misunderstanding in the rela- ti~ns between these countries and can compro- ~llse .itself by its activities, especi3Jly if we bear In mmd the far from brilliant experience of the work of the Commission whose report we are I do not conceal a certain surprise at the light- hearted way in which the United States repre- sentative has passed sentence on these countries. The conclusions proffered by the United States representative, however shrilly they may have been voiced, still prove nothing. This is not the first time that we witness United States representatives arriving with ready-made resolu- tions in their despatch cases at the very first meeting devoted to the Greek question and sub- mitting such resolutions even before the question has been discussed in the Security Council. The tabling by the United States representative of a resolution, even before the Commission's report was discussed in the Security Council, can only be interpreted as showing disregard for the Se- curity Council. The angry tone in which he spoke does not change the situation. . The United States representative went even further than the proposal to establish a commis- sion. In proposing the adoption of the artificial, far-fetched and ill-founded wording of the pro- posals approved by certain members of the Com- mission, namely, that the future action of Yugo- slavia, Bulgaria and Albania (what kind of action no one knows) should be described as a threat to the peace, he is thereby imitating those who, as experience has shown, lose all sense of p;:oportion in their attempts to accuse these countries. With regard to the statement on the possibility of applying to these countries Chapter VII of. the Charter, which provides for compul- sory measures, that can be answered by the well- knoW!' ltussian proverb: "Don't say 'hup' before you ju.~.;.p.·' Does it need to be proved that the Security Council must consider all questions to which its attention is drawn by any State? The Council cannot and has no right, without considering a concrete question, a concrete dispute or a con- crete situation, to give a general authority to any commission whatsoever to decide whether a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace exists The following conclusions are implicit in what I have said: 1. The Commission's report and the f, ctual data which it has collected confirm that the Greek authorities are responsible for the inci- dents which have taken place on the frontiers of Greece with Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania. 2. Yugos!<:.via, Bulgaria and Albania, in re- ceiving Greek refugees seeking shelter on their territories, are acting in accordance with estab- lished and generally accepted norIns of inter- national law. 3. The Greek Government's charge that Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania are provoking frontier incidents is unfounded and contradicts the facts. Such a charge can onlybe considered as an attempt on the part of the Greek Government to distract the attention of world public opinion from the difficult and steadily worsening intemal situation which has arisen in Greece since that country's liberation from the fascist occupation and to create the impression that the situation prevailing in Greece is the result of interference by the neighbouring countries in the internal af- fairs of Greece. 4. The fundamental reason for all the com- plications in the relations between Greece, on. the one hand, and Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Al- bania, on the other, may be found in the internal conditions in Greece, which are characterized by a d.::bauch of terror against the democratic par- ties and organizations and, above all, against the forces which in the past led the struggle of the Greek people against the occupation forces. This terror is accompanied by the lawlessness and violence of various fascist bands and groups, which collaborated with the enemy during the occupation of Greece. 5. One of the fundamental reasons which have produced the tense situation in Greece, and have in fact brought the country to a state of civil war, and which are aggravating relations between Greece and its neighbours, is the per- sisting foreign interference in Greek internal affairs which, however, is not ascribable to neighbouring countries. . 6. A number of quesions conne~ted with the relations of Greece with Yugoslavia, Bulgaria ~nd Albania, including the question of prolong- ~g existing or concluding new frontier conven~ t~ox:s, must and can be settled by direct nego- tiations .and agreements between the countries concerned. . 7. The proposal to establish a Security Coun- cil commission with rights and powers, as sug- gested in the T]nited States representative's draft ~ Liz'.....c _ A la lumiere de ce que je viens de dire, les conclusions suivantes s'imposent: 1. Le rapport de la Commission et les don- nees de fait reunies par celle-ci confirmentque ce sont les autorites grecques qui portent la res- ponsabilite des incidents qui se sont produits aux frontieres greco-yougoslave, greco-bulgare et greco-albanaise. 2. En accueillant les refugies grecs qui cher- chent asUe sur leur territoire, la Yougoslavie, la Bulgarie et l'Albanie agissent en conformite des normes etablies et universellement acceptees du droit international. 3. L'accusation portee par le Gouvemement grec contre la Yougoslavie, la Bulgarie et l'Al- banie et selon laquelle ces pays provoqueraient des incidents de frontiere est sans fondement et contraire aux faits. On ne saurait envisager une pareille accusation autrement que comme une tentative faite par le Gouvemement grec pour detourner l'attention de l'opinion mondiale de la situation interieure qui s'est creee en Grece apres sa liberation de l'occupant fasciste, et dont la gravite ne fait que croitre, et pour donner l'impression que cette situation est la conse- quence de l'intervention des pays limitrophes dans les affaires interieures de la Grece. 4. La cause principale de toutes les difficul- tes dans les relations entre la Grece, d'une part, et la Yougoslavie, la Bulgarie et l'Albanie, d'autre part, doit etre recherchee dans la situa- tion interieure de la Grece qui est caracterisee par la terreur dechainee contre les partis et or- ganisations democratiques, et surtout contre les groupes qui avaient dirige la lutte du peuple grec contre les occupants. Cette terreur s'accom- pagne d'actes de banditisme et de violence per- petres par divers groupes et bandes fascistes, qui ont collabore avec l'enneIni pendant l'occupation de la Grece. 5. L'une des causes principales qui ont pro- voque la tension en Grece, qui ont cree, en fait, un etat de guerre civile dans ce pays et qui con- tribuent aux mauvaises relations entre la Grece et ses voisins, c'est l'intervention etrangere dans les affaires interieures de la Grece, intervention qui se poursuit, mais qui n'est pas le fait des pays limitrophes de la Grece. 6. Des questions ayant trait aux relations entre la Grece, d'une part, et la Yougoslavie, la Bulgarie et l'Albanie, d'autre part, et notam- ment la question de la prolongation des conven- tions frontalieres ou de la conclusion de nou- velles conventions, r~uvent et doivent etre re- glees au moyen de negociations directes et d'ac- cords entre les pays interesses. 7. La proposition tendant a creer une com- mission du Conseil de securite investie des droits et pouvoirs mentionnes dans le projet de resolu- 8. The proposal that future incidents on Greece's frontiers with Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania should be defined as constituting a threat to the peace is unfounded and inad- missible. In the light of the foregoing, I think it essen- tial to submit, for the consideration of the Se- curity Council, the following proposals in the form of a resolution: "Having considered the report of the Security Council Commission of Investigation concerning Greek Frontier Incidents, "The Security Council considers it to be est,ab- blished: "1. That the Greek authorities are to blame for the incidents which have occurred on the frontiers of Greece with Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania. The investigation of the situation on the spot conducted by the Commission has confirmed the connexion between the incidents and the general hostile policy pursued by the present Greek Government towards Greece's neighbours; "2. That the internal situation in Greece, as can be seen from the report, characterized as it is by an exacerbation of the conflict between the Greek people a.nd the anti-democratic forces grouped around the present Greek Government, is the fundamental factor responsible for the strained situation in the northern frontier areas of Greece also, of which Greek militarists have taken advantage to engage in provocative acts against Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria. The present Greek Government has not only failed to check these acts but, on the contrary, ha" encouraged and justified them. "3. That the state of affairs prevailing in Greece, including its northern areas, is to a con- siderable extent the result of foreign interven- tion in the internal affairs of Greece. This for- eign intervention is exploited by anti-democratic circles in Greece, among which a prominent in- fluence is exercised by elements previously com- promised by collaboration with the fascist occu- pation forces, and it is one of the causes of the further aggravation of the Greek situation. That intervention complicates the possibility of estab- lishing normal relations between Greece and the neighbouring countries. "With a view to settling the relations between Greece, on the one hand, and Yugoslavia, Bul- garia and Albania, on the other, "2. Que la situation interieure de la Grece, telle qu'elle ressort du rapport, et qui est carac- terisee par l'intensite croissante de la lutte entre le peuple grec et les forces antidemocratiques groupees autour du Gouvernement grec actuel, constitue, dans les regions frontieres du nord de la Grece egalement, la cause essentielle de la tension que la clique militaire grecque utilise pour susciter des actes de provocation a 1'egard de la Yougoslavie, de l'Albanie et de la Bulga.rie. Non seulement le Gouvernement grec actuel ne fait rien pour arreter ces actes de provocation: il les encourage au contraire, et cherche ales justifier. "3. Que la situation qui regne en Grece, et notamment dans le nord de ce pays, est dans une grande mesure la consequence de 1'interven- tion etrangere dans les affaires interieures de la Grece. Cette intervention est exploitee par les milieux antidemocratiques grecs, dans lesquels des elements compromis par leur collaboration passee avec les occupants fascistes sont particu- lierement influents, et elle constitue 1'une des causes de l'aggravation croissante de la situation du pays. Cette intervention entrave l'etablisse- ment de relations normales entre la Grece et les Etats limitrophes. "En vue d'un reglement des relations entre la Grece, d'une part, et la Yougoslavie, la Bulgarie et I'Albanie, d'autre part, "2. That normal diplomatic relations be es- tablished between Greece, on the one hand, and Bulgaria and Albania, on the other, and that diplomatic relations between Greece and Yugo- slavia be restored to normal; "3. That the Governments of Greece, Yugo- slavia, Bulgaria and Albania renew previously operative, or conclude new, bilateral frontier conventions, providing for the settlement of fron- tier incidents; "4. That the Greek Government, on the one hand, and the Governments of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, on the other, settle the question of refugees in a spirit of mutual un- derstanding with the desire to establish friendly relations between their countries; "5. That the Greek Government put through the necessary measures guaranteeing the elimina- tion of all discrimination against citizens belong- ing to the Macedonian and Albanian ethnic groups on Greek territory, the aim being to afford t!lem facilities to use their native language and develop their national culture; "6. That the Governments of Albania, Bul- garia, Yugoslavia and Greece report to the Se- curity Council at the end of three months on the execution of the recommendations contained in the Council's present resolution. "With a view to improving the internal poli- tical situation in Greece, creating conditions for the formation of an independent democratic Greek State and bettering relations between Greece and the neighbouring countries, "The Security Council Recommends: "That foreign troops and foreign military per- sonnel be recalled from Greece. "To ensure the proper use of the foreign eco- nomic assistance extended to Greece, "The Security Council resolves: "To set up a special commission which by ap- propriate supervision would ensure that such assistance is used only in the interests of the Greek people." The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform the Council about the programme for the remainder of the week. I intend to caU two meetings on Thursday and one meeting on Friday morning. The Thursday meetings will be devoted in the morning to the report of the Military Staff Com- mittee, and in the afternoon I propose to hold a closed meeting on the governorship of Trieste. The meeting on Friday will be devoted again to the Greek question. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : As I suggested at the last meeting, if you receive Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): Comme je I'ai suggere a I do not believe that the Council wishes to devote the whole afternoon to the Trieste ques- tion. I hope we may be able to take it a stage would be ready, to consider discussing this ques- tion. I hope we may be able to take it a stage further, but I do not believe we shall reach any final deciskm on Thursday, and I should not anticipate that that meeting would last more than a half-hour or so. At the pace we are going, discussion of the Greek question may continue for a very long time, which I think is dangerous. Therefore I ask you, if you have any names of speakers who would be ready, to consider discussing this ques- tion on Thursday afternoon as well as on Friday morning. That would mean two meetings or one and a half meetings devoted to the Greek ques- tion.
Sur l'invitation du President, les representants de l'Albanie, de la Bulgarie, de la Grece et de la Yougoslavie prennent place .a la table du Conseil.
I am quite ready to accept the proposal of the United Kingdom representative, provided there will be speakers. At this mo~ ment there are two speakers on my list, one of whom asked to speak on Friday. I shall make some inquiries among the representatives, and if there are several speakers, I shall then place the Greek question as the next point of the agenda after the issue of Trieste.
The next meeting will take place on Thursday at 10.30 a.m.
The meeting rose at 7.42 p.m.
Au train dont nous alIons, la discussion de la question grecque peut continuer tres longtemps, ce qui, a mon sens, est un danger. Je vous demande done d'envisager de discuter cette question des jeudi apres-midi aussi bien .que vendredi matin s'il y a des orateurs inscrits qui soient prets a prendre la parole. Cela ferait ainsi deux seances ou une seance et demie qui seraient consacrees a la question grecque.
Le- PREsIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je suis tout dispose a accepter la proposition du representant du Royaume-Uni, a condition qu'il y ait des orateurs. En ce moment, j'ai deux orateurs inscrits dont l'un a demande a parler vendredi... Je m'informerai aupres des representants, ets'il y a plusieurs orateurs je mettrai la question grecque a l'ordre du jour comme second point, apres la question de Trieste.
j La prochaine seance aura lieu jeudi a 10 h. 30..1 j
La seance est levee a19 h. 42.
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