S/PV.1550 Security Council

Before opening the debate, I should like to call the attention of representatives to the fact that two draft resolutions have been submitted to the Council for consideration. The first is sponsored jointly by Burundi, Finland, Nepal, Sierra Leone and Zambia [S/9891], and the second is sponsored by Finland [S/9892].

Another slap in the face, like those the Pretoria rdgime has been constantly ‘giving the Security Council, forces us to meet again after a brief interval of barely one week. Twice in seven days, Mr. President, you have been called upon to preside over meetings dealing with the policies of apartheid. The militaristic voracity of the Government of South Africa is truly a source of a future world conflagration. Casual or indifferent observers may feel that the denunciation of the 7. Thirdly, the navy: 368 officers, 2,825 seamen and NCOs; over 35 units. On 19 April 1967, Mr. Botha, who is called the Minister of Defence but who should actually be called the Minister of War, announced that an order had been placed for three French seagoing submarines of the Daphne type. The price was R8 million. Each submarine has twelve torpedo tubes and is manned by six officers and thirty-nine men. The South African Government has begun the work of installing a radar-controlled navigation system 9. The Citizens’ Force, or militia, conscripts all men over seventeen years old who are physically fit to be called to the colours. In 1967 it numbered more than 12,000 men and the number of recruits is likely to increase by 50 per cent because of the compulsory drafting law. The commander&chief Hiemstra stated on 15 March 1967 that before another ten years have elapsed over 100,000 people will be mobilized by the Citizens’ Force. In 1966 the commandos had 60,000 men on their rolls. There are also the Air Force commandos, a special category composed of pilots operating private aircraft which may be requisitioned at will by the police State. Initially, this special category of commandos had,a total of 250 aircraft. 10. As for the budget of South Africa, it is astronomical as far as defence is concerned since, for the time being, it has been increased enormously; this can be very well established by the Council because in 1966 the budget was R44 million and was increased to R225 million for the years 1966.1967. 11. Police forces: The budget amounted to $40 million in 1960 and has benefited by an enormous increase which has recently boosted it to $100 million, 12. The partial figures and the incomplete data on the frightful arsenal and the armed forces at the disposal of the South African racists disclose a militaristic voracity which, as I said at the outset, can be regarded as the source of a future international conflagration. 13. In its capacity of guarantor of international peace the Security Council cannot, unless it fails to perform its function, minimize this danger. The obstinancy of the Vorster Government in wishing to absorb Namibia into the system of apartheid shows the malicious intentions of the racists who frustrate every attempt made to achieve sovereignty for that country, 14. The militaristic attitude of the Pretoria leaders prepares to go beyond the frontiers of the two countries which they have subjugated and to assume world proportions. This painful reality may, of course, be regarded as remote by certain circles which have so far chosen to arm South Africa to the teeth and which seem to be irrevocably determined to over-saturate it with armaments, as is shown by the unbridled competition foreseen with good reason in an article published by Philippe Ben in Le Soir and Le Monde on 25 July, from which I quote: “In United Nations circles there are grave doubts as to whether the adoption of this resolution”-reference is 15. It is notorious that the South African Aryans sre concentrating enormous armies whose principal and first targets are the indigenous peoples. It is equally true fist Namibia and South Africa also have been progressively turned into a base of aggression against the liberation movements in southern and central Africa. The third objective of the apartheid leaders comprises the in&. pendent African States which are situated within the immediate reach of the greedy talons of the South African vultures. 16. The complaints voiced against these States by the aacist leaders have multiplied lately. Sometimes they are accused of sheltering African nationalists, whom the cynical subtlety of the masters of Pretoria qualifies as terrorists, Sometimes they arouse the suspicions of the leaders cf apartheid because of their growing power which the usurpers see as a possible threat to the second cradle of nazism. 17. The massive war preparations carried out by the Whites in South Africa cover these three phases and tend to produce direct confrontation between the champions of racism and the rest of Africa. One does not have to be a prophet to realize that such confrontation is inevitable if we judge the situation by the mad manoeuvres ofPretoria. Despite ,the total mobilization of the Whites to defend racial supremacy, this fortress and the abundance of military means will prove to be powerless to stop the irreversible wave of liberation which has aroused the peoples of Africa. And since the independent States of our continent will no longer be able to tolerate the perpetual subjugation of the peoples who at present are subjected to the abominable practices of apartheid, the range of their oppressors will not delay in extending itself to the whole of Africa. 18. Thus the partners of Pretoria in various fieldscommercial, military, diplomatic, consular, political and economic-are deprived of pretexts for refusing to recognize that the Vorster Government has offensive objet. tives. 19. Indeed, it should be added that South Africa’s trading partners run the risk of becoming perpetual prey to their own wishful thinking. According to those who remain captives of these false expectations, the African States, overawed by the tremendous armament built up by Pretoria, will feel themselves doomed to acceptance of the status quo, which is as degrading as it is revolting. But it would be a serious mistake to believe that the whole cf Africa will indefinitely resign itself to submission tc the tyrannical diktat which condemns the people of Namibia and South Africa to perpetual dehumanization. 26. General Smuts was the one who proclaimed that the mandate system was to be entirely free of any pc&cy of annexation and thal: any mandate govercment should be based on the principle of the self-determinalion of peoples so that no State could possibIy profit throu.;$ ,the weakness of any such Territory in order to e:c@it it f0r it:: own benefit, This was the thesis nlltich. was slipported by General Smuts on the eve of and dluring the conference which event.ually created the League of Nations in 1918 and therefore it was, of course, the thesis of South Africa. 2. The reasoning which I have adopted in making this :atement leads me now to the draft resolution which ppears in document S/9891, published on 27 July and [ready distributed to the members of the Council. Repreintatives whom I am addressing will recall that all the lembers of the Security Council on 6 February last :corded me the honour of presiding over the ad hoc ub-Committee which was entrusted with the implelentation of resolution 276 (1970). That Sub-Committee, hose mandate was prolonged until 30 June, has performed )nsiderable work, the result of which is condensed in the rport contained in document S/9863 of 7 July 1970. 27. What trust, therefore, can statesmer; deserve who violate such formai commitlnents and sacred principles? The Governments wl&h trust Pretoria shtslrjd recall this stzrnrring change of attitude and therefore should accordingly control their propensity t.0 deal with that racist rdgime because, if those racis.&s deny the very principles they have .proclaiiled, as I have just shown, so much more probable is it that they will coolly betray their partners of today. 3. As shown clearly by the content of that report, it has :come necessary to emphasize the need to treat the lrious bilateral or multilateral relations which are cxoited by the Pretoria rigime to fan its racial rage. The jotation of the editorial of a very objective newspaper lpports this thesjs. I am referring to LeMonde and I wish 1 quote this editorial. It states: 2E. In view of the testimony of experts who were kind enoup,h to audress the ci-d hoc Sub-Committee, which was created by resolution 276 (1970) of the Security Council, certain cases have been communicated which desz~vc to be known with more detajls ‘by the Security Council., May I quote Mr. Sanl Mujoma, President of the South West Mica People’s Organizatjon (SWAPO), who spoke of coucentration camps in Namibia. He said: “It is true that in some European capitals an effort is being made to draw a distinction between defensive armaments, those that can be used only against an aggression, and the armaments which can be used for repressive purposes and. in the service of .the upar&ereid policy. But in fact the distinction is not always easy to draw. At any rate, the encouragements given to the Pretoria regime have the result of strengthening it not only militarily but also diplomatically. After his recent visit to Europe and the various contacts made in European capitals, Mr. Vorster can now boast that he has achieved a new success. Of course, the bitterness will be the greater in a large part of Africa.” ““At the present time the Soljth A.frh~ almy has over 4O,OUO men permanently stationed in Namibia, which are supported by commardos and a ~~anlerous militia. “The immense air-base in the eastern part of the Caprivi region is not exclusively used for the defence of Ihe territory, but it is also a threat to the independent African States because the jet fighters of South Africa can very weli proceed to at-t,zk ;+.ny park of %,a.mbia or of Katanga as well as the Democratic Republic 0f the lat is the editorial which appeared in Le MO&~ on 7 July. COIlgO." 1. The countries ‘which are competirg f6r military or onomic objectives on the South African market, there- Ire, act in a manner which is obviously incompatible with e friendship towards African States to which they pay j-service. Indeed, how is it possible to reconcile the verish eagerness to supply weapons to the champions of ~arhh’, who are unyielding foes of Africa, and on the her hand to offer a hand of friendship to the African ates which are so much detested by the racists of atoria? 29. Mr. Sea,n MacBride, Secre tary”Genera1 of the International Commission of Jurists, stated: “We arc Aready aware of the infant mortality rate in the whole of soilthern Africa. Out of 1,000 African children, 400 die before the age of two years, which is in striking contrast with twentyseven per thousand which is the ratio for the white population. It: would be interesting to know what afe the figures for N;Jmibia. If they are as high as one fears, this would raise the question of whether this is almost genocide because the complete neglect of health services is tantamouut to a deliberate extep mination of the African race. Economic sanctions are important because they shake the confidence of the South African Government and even if the countries i. The humiliating slaps in the face constantly given to e authority of the world Organization because of the lplacable refusal of Pretoria to restore Namibia certainly quire more energetic action on the part of this Orgatia- 3 1. WC rccognize thilt tl1C test IlOW prtp9scrl IlilS ccrtnin wcnknesses ttcriving froni (ho situation prevailing in tha Council. ‘I’hcrcforc it WoUkt hc Very tkSiKlhk if :I11 WI1 ~olleagt~~~ would undcrstilnd (1~ irl~pcrntive KIIS(9IIS (hilt IliIVC pmnptcd us to submit, in substnrlcc and in fmm, the proposals contained in this drilf(. ‘I’hc sp~91~~9rs OF resdntion 276 (1970)-~Finlnnd, Nepal, Sierra IAX~IW, Xdrin mi Burundi-arc GISO th SpWlSI9lTi Ot’ ttlC 1ilXft rtsotutiori ttlIlt is 110~ submitied for the c‘ouncit”s iIttenti(ln. It is (~1 behilif of the five sponsors tha( 1 introduce this tlr:ift rcsolutitm, which is inspired by the main tints of the rqmf of the nd hut Sub-Committee on Niullibi:I. ‘t’h~ sport itsctf is but iI reflection of il SitWtiOll ttlilt WElS studied Ii92 fiVC IllC9IlttlS I9y the Sub-Comniittec and it is the lOgiCill ml noriixtt conclusion of the laborious Cffirrts exerted by ill1 ttE mcrnbcrs of (he Council during the s:unC pcritjd, 32. To sum up, in the view of the spomors on whose behalf I am speaking the tmnitllc)us :ittoption of this dmf( resolution by the Council would bc a ctrnsistunt stop that would be the logicill crowning elf the COII~IWI~ endcuvour to which all ~ncrt~t~~s have jointly contributed.

III .h~~unry this year Pir~tand joined with Burundi, Nctli\t, Sierr;\ LXXIC nntt Zambia in sponsoring Security Council rcsotu Lion 276 (1970), by which the ud ftoc SubX’ommi((ec tm Nmibiu wils cstabtishcd. WC cmph:~sizctt :lt (h:lt time tl\ilI this was to bc regarded (IS (1~ intcrinl step ttcsigncd to holt~ the Council to mukc mrc substclntint &&ions irz the months to come, It is logical (hrlt (hc mnc live detcgI1tioi1ri have now rcqucstcd the convening of this inccting of the Security Council to resume its considercltion of the ques. tion of Namibia and huvc rdso jointly spol1sored the dr:rft resolution /s/9891] which cmbodios most of the rccommendations of the nCr /XX Sub-Commi((cc. 34, At the time the Sub-Committee WRS set up (hcrc ~11s some scepticism about the riced for such n body. Now that we have its report before us (5/9SG’/ (hcrc cati bc no doubt, I think, that its work has been useful, It bus put forward practical and substantive rccortl~~~c(~ctn(i~)r~~ bnsed on wide agreement among its members ~11 on full and detailed information given by more ttz:m forty tsttlcr Governments a~ wolt as on suggestions and idcns subrnittod by experts. The USC of such sutl-ctrlnrni((ccs mrly be worth considering in conncxion with other questions bcforc the Security Council. It coutd welt be one mtzthod by which the work of the Council could bc made mm cff”cfectiVe. 35. I should like to take (his opportuni(y to pay (ributc to the reprcscntativc of Durundi, Arnb;lssador ‘rcrcncc, for (he n~anncr in which he conductcd the work of the Sub. Cornrnittcc and for his cornprchcnsivc presentation of (hc five-Power driift resolution, 40. Subtile, ilIt tld\~ist~ry rrpinitrn wa>utd &J be of value in defining more pracisrty the rights of Npmibians-tllo% staying in Ntmrihis as wctl QS ix~h:~hitti~tt~ of Namibia residinla, rtbroad, In this way it could perhaps nccord some mcasurc of” ad&d prtrtecticrn to Namibians whose basic hutnnn rights tire b&Q nupprcsscd (hruugh tha npplication of South African rcprcsivc tcgi&tion. 41. ‘Il~irdly, it is our cxt9ect:ItirrIl tfint :in advisory opinion of (hc lnterrrotitrnet C’cmrt uf JuXCct could undcrtinc (he fKt ttlilt !GMtt\ AfriCil t\Zi forfeit& its Mttndfitc over Soutll West Africa bcc:tuac of it6 viol:~(ion of (hc tams of the Montlatc itsctl: ~XXXI~IFX Struth Africa has a&d contrary (0 its irrtcrrmtiiirml tl\)li#Jti~~~l$, Ctllltr;lry lo (hc intcrna(ton~ status of the R!rri(t,rV ml ctmtrary icj intcrnntionat taw. It is iItlt9OrtilIlt, in I& view, tct expsc the fikie front Of tcgatity which South At’ricitrr :Ititheri(ics attcmpt to present to’ the world. This would http the United Nations and tlte 42. In addition to the arguments I have now mentioned, another more general argument suggests, itself. I have in mind the need to reactivate the International Court of justice itself. It is one of the principal organe of the United Nations, and the highest international authority on law. We in Finland consider that its role’ is essential for the development of a peaceful international order.’ We ,are therefore very much concerned about the present state of affairs. An organ which is left unused is in danger of atrophy. The decline in the authority of the Court is damaging to the interests of the United Nations system as a whole and to the structure of international law. The request for an advisory opinion on a que&on,df great interest to the international community would reactivate the Court at a particularly difficult time in its existence. ,’ ,,,I ‘. 43. Having taken the irrevbcable steh df terminating South Africa’s Mandate over South West Africa, the United Nations has assumed direct responsibility for the future of Namibia and its people. The Security Council must ccsntinue its search for practical and effective means by which this responsibility can be discharged, The two draft resolutions before the Council today-though far technical reasons presented separately-form together a programme of action which represents significant progress in our efforts to help the people of Namibia to achievti self&determination and independence to which they, like all other peoples, are entitled. 44. Mr, NICOL (Sierra Leone): Mr. President; under your wise and skilful direction the Council is once again convened to resume deliberation this time of the important question of Namibia begun in January last, As you are aware, the Council decided, in operative paragraph 9 of resolution 276(1970), “ , , . to resume consideration of the question of Namibia as soon as the recommendations of the Sub-Committee have been made available”, The ad hoc Sub-Committee has submitted its report, contained in document S/9863 of 7 July 1970, and as a result the Council is now convened for the purpose of resuming active consideration of the subject on the agenda, 45. l%~ delegation if Sierra Leone is a co-sponsor of draft resolution S/9891, presented this afternoon by the distinguished Permanent Representative of Burundi, who is also Chairman of the Sub-Committee. We congratulate him for his assiduity in supervising the efforts of the Sub- Committee towards fulfilling its difficult task and arriving at conclusions which deserve our praise. Our commendation also goes to Ambassadors Jakobson of Finland and Khatri of Nepal who, in their capacity as Vice-Chairmen, contributed significantly to the work of the Sub-Committee. 46. When the question of Namibia was discussed in January last my delegation drew the attention of the Council [152&h meeting] to the flagrant refusal of South Africa to heed world opiriion and relinquish its stifling hold over Namibia while there was yet time. We pointed to the international status of this Territory, a status guaranteed by 47. Last week [1549th meeting] this body pronounced itself on South Africa’s intransigent behaviour and, by a resounding majority, agreed to take far-reaching steps to strengthen the arms embargo against South Africa. 48. The ad hoc Sub-Committee, comprising all members of the Security Council, has now this afternoon submitted its report [S/9863/ for consideration by the Council. My delegation endorses its findings and subscribes fully to the view that the Sub-Committee should be allowed to study the replies submitted by various Governments to the Secretary-General, and to report further to the Council as appropriate. Such an approval is necessary to enable the Sub-Committee to conti?ue its work without interruption and to produce far-reaching and significant results. 49. My delegation would urge those delegations which have reservations on the report to support it, as its adoption will contribute to the solution of this troubling issue. We look forward to their assistance and support since every inch gained in the struggle of the people of Namibia against the forces of imperialism and colonialism is a victory gained for human dignity and self-respect. 50. Some delegations entertain genuine misgivings with regard to the draft resolution contained in document S/9892, which seeks to reopen the question of Namibia at the level of the International Court of Justice. After the decision handed down by the Court in July 1966l that it could not pronounce on the substantive issues of the case because Ethiopia and Liberia had “no legal interest” in it, my delegation can understand the basis of their doubts about the wisdom of this step. 51. But we must remember the view recently given by Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, the distinguished President of the International Cotirt of Justice, in an article in the United Nations Monthly Chronicle of July 1970, about the potential usefulness of his Court which has not been fully 1 South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 6. IllitIleIlt Court as the pmluct of 31 csccssivtl Imptmsity t0 IKlVC lX!COllTSL’ tU IilW. , . . In 1’10 CaSC did the I’CrIlli~IWllt Ctsurt have tu dccliric to give ali Opiniork on the ground thUt tt1C issue lilid hCibR it WitS IlOt il ICgaI question.” WC thcrcforc think ttlilt the preccdcnt Of the CiKC against SoUth Africa which \V;Is ptlt fOrWild by Ethiopia ilnd Liberia and which had 3 rcvcrsc decision ilg:IillSt it, is tm! which s]~ould not discourage us from procecditig fitrthcr on this matter ttr the International Court of Justice. 52. WC II~ldl?rStil11d the rcscrvatirms which IliIVC IXCn IllildC Of1 the report under discussion tutlay by the 1l~l~giltit~llS Of Poland, Syria ilIlt the lhiiim of Strvict Socialist IZcpuOIics atld WC N’C it1 COllSid~rilblC SyllI~Xlttly with tl1CHl iIS 10 tlte SlOWI1CSS, through crrdlcss discussions ilfld 1Il:IIlOCtIVr’CS. with which the whole matter of Nan~ibian i~idq~endcncc is being implcnmtcd. 53. We agree tllilt our support 01’ tllC r~~~tllllll~ll~liItitl~lS Of this report is based on the fcclitlg that their attention might lcad in smnc way towards ;I solution of this vexed situation. This is why we support the need for contirnkx1 study and further cffcctivc rccommer~tltttiotis 011 WilyS ;Hld ItlCil~lS h)l which the rclcvant resolutions of the (‘ouncil cm lx effectively implenientcd. 54. WC have llild occasion, as I rncntirmctl carlicr, to draw attcntiorl to the cxtcnsicm of the obnoxious doctrirics of’ uprthcid, ~hid1 11:tVe IYXXI esportcd by South Africa to Namibia, a Territory urrder the llnitetl Nations. Africans have very little opening for cinploynm t outside manu;rl work, arzd Namibia has been 11scd us a rcscrvoir for cllcaI> labour by South Africa, The highest stratum of education is that of teacher-training collcgcs, tlcsigncd lo product tcachcrs to work it1 schools opcratcd under the ljairtti education System, which is a travesty of true cducati~jri;d philosophy and practice, 55. Again, in a Territory which was lmdcr a sacred mandate and which is now under the lJriitctl Nations, WC have witncsscd forcible removals of citizens from thcjl ancestral IlOltlClillldS t0 tit ii1 with the I]aDt\]starl policy, again dcsijincd ttj confine Africans to the Ic:tst weiktttky ;lTCiIS Of their country, Efforts have been niadc by the SOuth Africarr Ck~vemrncnt to set one nOn-Whitc ct11i1. mnity against another 0Il ttrc 1XlSiS of tritx :tnti mixed ancestry, My dtlcgittion unrcscrvetlly ct~~~d~m~s t,ho,sc atrocities Of’ ttlc Ssotll AfriCilII (kmrnmnt. 56. IIldllStIiillty, diillllt7~ltlS, copper ;111tl zinc I1i)Ve tlr[lWIl flCW investors to the country, in addition to the fl<ulrishiqj industry in hides and skins. Oilficltls have attracted internatimal investors. Dri tish ilt1tl SOlIll AfriCi111 coqx1I1icS have obtaincci large cunkssiais. 64. The joint draft resolution incorporates the recommendations made by the ad hoc Sub-Committee, except for those related to seeking an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, Those latter recommendations form the subject matter of a separate draft resolution [S/9892] introduced just now by the Ambassador of Finland on behalf of his delegation, 6.5. My delegation co-sponsored resolution 276 (1970), which was provisional in nature, in the belief that the report of the ad hoc Sub-Committee established in pursuance of it would provide a basis for more substantive action by the Security Council in respect of the Territory of Namibia, Referring to document S/9620 which subsequently became resolution 276 (1970), I stated [1528th meeting] that it sought to move the Security Council in its search for a solution of the question a little ahead of the dead centre in which the Council had been placed as a result of South Africa’s refusal to comply with United Nations decisions. 66. The ad hoc Sub-Committee discussed several proposals submitted to it. A few of those proposals have now come out in the shape of recommendations in the Sub- Committee’s report, Weakened by both the variety of reservations entered by a number of delegations and by the political necessity for reducing our conclusions to a lowest common denominator, the final set of recommendations contained in the report represents, none the less, a modicum of progress-and progress, however inadequate, is desired by all. ,67. The five-Power draft resolution is based on the most widely acceptable parts of the recommendations made by the Sub-Committee. It has been conceived in a spirit of co-operation and drafted with a view to securing the widest possible support in the Council. 68. My delegation is happy to be one of the co-sponsors of this draft resolution. I may point out, however, that some provisions in the draft resolution seem to make a distinction between resolutions adopted without the concurring votes of two permanent members and those adopted without the votes of three, or between resolutions adopted with the votes of all non-permanent members and those adopted with one or more abstentions on the part of those members. As far as the delegation of Nepal is concerned, it does not view with total satisfaction the increasing tendency among delegations, permanent as well as nonpermanent, to ascribe a scaling degree of validity to Security Council resolutions on such grounds. However, as I 70. Those provisions are largely based upon the steps taken’recently by the Government of the United States. At the 1496th meeting of the Security Council on 11 August last year, Ambassador Yost stated that a continued assertion by the Council of unequivocal condemnation of the violation of the Charter in Namibia, coupled with possible positive steps on the part of member States, represented a promising means of realizing our common objectives. However inadequate they may prove to be in the light of the over.all question of Namibia, the steps taken by the Government of the United States will have some practical ,effect, and we welcome them. We urge that other States, in particular South Africa’s major trading partners, follow the example set by the Government of the United States, which, we hope, will take more effective measures in the future. 71. The co-sponsors have also sought to provide for a detailed study and review of all bilateral and multilateral treaties to which South Africa is a party and which might be considered to apply to the Territory of Namibia, so that the results of the study might assist States-if indeed assistance were needed-in the implementation of United Nations resolutions on Namibia. 72. Another novel and significant feature of the joint draft resolution is that under it the Security Council would request the United Nations Council for Namibia to make available to the Security Council its study and proposals regarding not only passports and visas for Namibians for travel abroad but also regulations governing the travel to Namibia of the citizens of other States. It may be recalled that General Assembly resolution 2248 (S-V), which set up the United Nations Council for Namibia, did not receive the support of any one of the four permanent members. 73. Under paragraph 12 of the draft resolution, the Security Council would request the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session to set up a United Nations fund for Namibia to provide assistance to Namibians and to finance a comprehensive educational and training programme for them with particular regard to their future administrative responsibilities in the Territory, This is one positive element of the draft resolution which, we hope, will receive the support of even those States which are noted for their continued opposition to alI United Nations endeavours in Namibia. 75. The utf Ito(* Sub-Conuuittec, in its report, h:ls rccom Jllcrltlcd thilt the Sceurity Council rctiffirni its Cllll IJpOll ;I11 Stiltcs t0 CCilsc! forthwith the SillC iltld shipment of NJlIS, nmnnmition illld all types of niilitcq~ vehicles to SOJltll Africa, as WCII 3s materials for the mnnuf:lcturc ilIld maintcnancc of mu and ammunition in South Afrim “I’ht! Sub-Committee IlilS furlhcr reconrrnended that the Sccuritp Council rcqucst all StiltCS to take mrc stringrlt Jll(1i1SlIrCS tu give cffcct to the resolutions of the Security Council concerning the ilr1118 embargo. All thoSc recomnleildations ililvc ilhildy found expression in Security Council rcsoiution 232 (:1970), iltlO[>tL?d only J”W.X~~Lly. TllC J)rc:rmblo Of tbc prcscnt draft resolution JWlffirJU that rcsoltiticm. 70. In this coJlJiexion, I should like to express ilg:JiJl 0iiJ’ strong SCnSC Of diSSiltiSfilCtbr1 illId regret 3t tllC politics Of those States which have violated both the: spirit ant1 the Icttcr of rclev:uit Security Council resolutions hy supplyir~y, ilrIllS t0 South Africa. WC IlilVC rcjcctcd the distinction drawn by those States bctwcca arms for intcmal \ISC and thsc fur cxttmial defcllcc. We arc also Jlal at il11 cotrvinced by the argument of the present British Govcrnmnt regarding its need for 4 dcfcricc urrariperiient with Snuth AfriW-,-ill1 mangemc~lt which hi Jl0 iJ[TpliCiJtiOJl in the prcscnt iI@, 77. My ilclegalicm wishes to cmphusi~~e the signific;tncc t)f :lII Security Council resolutions cmlccrning the ilJ%lS cJib bqo, IXlrticulilrly resolution 282 ( 1070), :~~oinst the hackground of the rlucstian of Nt\n\il)ii~. Aircraft supplied to So\ith Africa, in violation of the embargo and ollcgcdly for extcml dcfctm, 3rc known to have bcctl used for iutcrnal repression. Submnrincs, similarly supplictl, hvc ptovctl vital in bolstering South Africa to JWiJltiliJl contraI owt Nmiihin. SWtll Africa’s rllilitil~ irlSti~ll~tiW$ in tllc Q7riVi strip arc helping ta cmurc its conthiucd prusencc in the iiitcriiation:~l Territory. Experts h;nc tcstificd al the meetings of the Sub-Committee to the cffcct thrlt St)uth hfrkil IlilS ikt IeXit OJlC opcrotio~~al military bnse ill N:mibi:t. ‘ill1 intcrnntimll Territory which is supp0sc~ to be UJ1 ilrJllS-frW %OJlC. 7X. M~ly States, -South Af&~‘s trading purtncrs ;ltrd Hlilitilry Cd1d~OKltOJYi ~IllOJlg thcril Si]y r+l?pe;ltctlly hut tllc ~~CSSUK c)f world public opinion should bc c()nstantly kq)t fOUlSed 011 the situation prevailing irl soutlle~m Africa. Yet, when intcrn:~tional movcmunt agiiimt the policies of South Africa giim JllOlJlCJlttJIfl illIll SWJttl AfriC;] fcigrrs 21larm, those very States collie to the resduc of South Africa 011 v3rious untcnnble pretexts, Those arc the St:ltcs which help SWlth Africa in breaking out of the stigm of intcrnati(m;t] is&tiors ilnd gairGng diplnmutic and political rcsJ)cot;ibility, I IlUVe stated before, and will state again, that supplyir~g 83. However, we have great respect for the institution of the International Court of Justice. It is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, and it should remain so. If, therefore, the draft resolution is to provide an opportunity for the International Court to redeem its impaired image, my delegation will only be too glad to support it. The scope of the question put to the world Court is restricted. My delegation would be surprised if the advisory opinion of the Court in this matter spurred the major trading partners and rtiilitary collaborators of South Africa into any positive effective actions, because, if they have so long resisted world opinion and neutralized the thrust of all positive United Nations endeavours on the question of Namibia, it is too much to expect that they will change their minds on the basis of the Court’s opinion, whose effect would only be advisory. Nevertheless, this recourse to the Court might result in the provision of highest legal guidance and assistance for many law-abiding States, which sincerely wish to implement the United Nations resolution on the subject.

In connexion with the item that the Council has before it, and specifically with the draft resolutions submitted by Burundi, Finland, Nepal, Sierra Leone and Zambia fS/9891/, on the one hand, and *by Finland /s/9892/, on the other, I should like to say that my delegation is in basic agreement with these draft resolutions. 85. The Security Council has repeatedly considered this entire problem. The position of Colombia on this subject is contained in the statement made on 30 July 1969 by Ambassador Turbay Ayala in this Council f1492nd meeting/. He stated, inter alia: “As the representative of Colombia-a country with a long tradition of anti-colonialism, which has built its 3 International status of South West Apica, Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 128. 4 South West APica, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 6. 86. In view of the foregoing, I need now refer only very briefly to the fact that my delegation is anxious to see this problem settled. It does not affect us directly and materially. It is, however, of constant concern to my delegation. This statement may seem to be contradictory, but it is understandable when one considers that my delegation, as is true of other Latin American delegations in the Security Council, has a very clear-cut legal tradition that has always prompted us to defend the basic rights of human beings and particularly the principle of self-determination, without which genuine freedom could not exist. It would be quite wrong to think that simply because we do not have direct contact with the country we are indifferent to the problems of Namibia. The United Nations would not be truly universal if the interests of all countries, no matter how weak or remote, were not recognized and constantly protected by all Members of our Organization. 87, I should like to make just one comment on the draft resolution contained in document S/9891. It certainly seems appropriate that there should be close and if possible planned co-operation between the Security Council and the ad hoc Sub-Committee, whose existence is continued under paragraph 14, for this cannot fail to have a beneficial effect upon the work of both bodies. 88. Finally, Mr. President, may I ask you to consider having the next meeting of the Council take place next week, in view of the fact that on Friday, 31 July, all members of the mission dispatched by the TJnited Nations Council for Namibia will return to New York from Africa. Certainly it would seem to be desirable and useful to wait until the relevant information is received before closing debate on the draft resolution to which I have just referred. In this connexion, I would ask the Council to bear in mind paragraph 10 of the draft resolution contained in document S/9891. This paragraph contains a specific reference to the work of the United Nations Council for Namibia. 89. Mr, JOUEJATI (Syria): The Security Council is now engaged in the consideration of the report of the ad hoc Sub-Committee [S/9863] that it created on 30 January of this year for th& purpose of considering ways and means to implement the relevant United Nations resolutions on Namibia. The ad hoc Sub-Committee, under the able Chairmanship of the Ambassador of Burundi and with the valuable assistance of the two Vice-Presidents and the constant efforts of the Secretariat, has left no stone unturned in the examination of the various aspects of the situation and the search for its appropriate and acceptable solution. 90. At every juncture of its consideration the ud hoc Sub-Committee found itself faced with the intransigent attitude of the Government of South Africa, for what remains to be discussed when that Government heeds no 91. On the other hand, most of the members of the Sub-Committee realized how painful was the failure of the Security Council to apply the appropriate sanctions against tho Government of South Africa for its continued occupation of an African Territory that belongs to its peoplesanctions cl.early provided for in the Charter to meet such cases, but opposed by certain members without whose consent they would not be effective. Out of this sad realization, and for the sake of unanimity, the Sub- Committee recommended a gamut of measures designed to put material and moral pressure on the Government of South Africa to change its policies. 92. The representative of Burundi, at the beginning of this meeting of the Security Council, introduced a draft resolution (s/9391] which crystallizes these recom” mendations. The thoroughness with which the representative of Burundi, on behalf of the co-sponsors, explained the philosophy of the draft unraveled its numerous merits. In fact, it strengthens the attitude of non-recognition of South African authority in Namibia. It goes further by calling for an end to any commercial and ind.ustrial relations and links with South Africa as far as Namibia is concerned. It calls for an end to foreign investment in Namibia and opens the way for a thorough study of all bilateral treaties to which the Government of South Africa is a party, in order to assess any possible bearing on the status of Namibia. It provides for other measures also to strengthen the Namibians in their will to liberate -their territory. 93. My delegation does not belittle the scope of these measures and would, naturally, vote for them in solidarity with their authors, with whom it entertains the closest brotherly relations. But we believe that nothing short of drastic measures in the form of effective sanctions provided by the Charter would deter the Government of South Africa from its thrust into the political and human rights of the Africans and the territorial integrity of their lands. We wish the situation were different. But daily evidence, as rightly noted in the preamble to the draft resolution, points to (‘the continued flagrant refusal of the Government of South Africa to comply with the decisions of the Security Council demanding the immediate withdrawal of South Africa from the Territory”. This is indeed a challenge that the United Nations cannot ignore any longer; otherwise its efficacy as the instrument for peace and justice would be in jeopardy. 94. Whatever the odtcome of these measures may be, one cannot conclude without paying tribute to .the delegations 95. 1 come now to draft resolution S/9892 introduced this afternoon by the representative of Finland with his usud mastery rind precision. The legal implications of the continued presence of the authorities of South Africa h Namibia have indeed been dwelt upon at some length by the ad hoc Sub-Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 276 (1970). It was then esti. mated that the International Court of Justice might play a useful role in strengthening the will and the means of States to oppose this illegal act by South Africa perpetrated against a Territory that is now juridically under inter. national authority. My delegation wishes, therefore, to pay tribute to the representative of Finland for having em. bodied this desirability into a commendable draft resolu. tion. 96. The International Court of Justice, as we see from the draft resolution, is not asked to rule on the status of Namibia as such; rather it is requested to elicit. the scope of legal means at the disposal of States, which may erect a w&U. of legal opposition to the occupation of Namibia by the Government of South Africa. Accordingly, our under. standing of the draft is that it seeks to add a valuable element to the range of actions that can be taken by States in fulfilment of their obligations under the Charter and the resolutions of the Security Council. 97. Nor does the draft call for a suspension of the consideration -of the question of Namibia in the organs of the United Nations until the advisory opinion of the International Court has been obtained. For the United Nations to press unceasingly for the withdrawal of the South African a.dministration from Namibia is indeed an imperative duty that must be pursued assiduously. Once the advisory opinion of the Court is given, it will merely represent an element in forcing United Nations measures against the defiance of South Africa. 98. On the basis of such understanding, and within this scope, my delegation will cast its vote affirmatively on the draft resolution of Finland and wishes to reiterate its gratitude to the representative of Finland for the initiative that may prove useful in its consequences. 99. Mr, MWAANGA (Zambia): The Security Council is again seized with the ever burning question of Namibia* Only last week the Council adopted a far-reaching rescl@ tion prohibiting the sale of arms and spare parts to the South African apartheid regime. This meeting is therefore timely because Namibia has been a defenceless victim Of South African aggression, using weapons which have been supplied by Western imperialist Powers. 100. The position of the Zambian Government on *e report of the ad hoc Sub-Committee [S/9863/ was made 101. I would be less than candid if I did not confess that the ad hoc Sub-Committee operated under very difficult and sometimes strained circumstances, since Governments maintained their well known positions on all issues, However, all things considered, I think we could not have obtained better results under the circumstances, The report lists a number of measures which are within the reach of every Government to take in order to apply pressure on the South African Government to bring an end to its illegal occupation of Namibia. 102. The refusal of South Africa to comply with Security Council and General Assembly resolutions pertaining to the withdrawal of that country from Namibia, is probably the most serious threat ever posed to the very existence of the United Nations as an effective instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is becoming harder and harder to explain to African public opinion why the United Nations and the Security Council in particular have not been able to implement their numerous resolutions relating to Namibia. 103. The world, I am sure, knows by now that it is not the African people who are obstructing a settlement; it is not the Asian people who are obstructing a settlement; it is not the Socialist countries which are obstructing a se.ttlement; it is not the Latin Americans who are obstructing a settlement; it is not the silent Western European majority which are obstructing a settlement. It is the United States, the United Kingdom and France which are obstructing a settlement, by blocking measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, which are adequate to bring an end to the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa. They are providing South Africa with the moral, political and economic support which it badly needs to continue defying world opinion and also to continue subjecting the people of Namibia to the most barbaric and inhuman treatment. We ,have repeatedly stated that mere condemnations of apartheid do not impress anybody on the African continent. The Western major Powers are on the wrong side of the colour line, simply because they want to protect their narrow political and economic interests. While, of course, the racial and colonial policies pursued in southern Africa by South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal are as objectionable as those pursued by South Africa in Namibia, one would have hoped that it would be possible to secure a greater amount of support for measures to be taken to free Namibia by reason of the United Nations direct responsibility for Namibia. The freeing of Namibia is the direct responsibility of the United Nations and of all Member States; it is not solely an African concern. 105. The Western Powers by not identifying themselves with the cause of the majority in Africa are going to pay a very high price in terms of loss of influence, Time is not on their side. The primary objective of all countries which cherish freedom and justice for all men in southern Africa ought surely to be the freedom and welfare of all the peoples of the area. More specifically this means: first, preserving the political independence of neighbouring African States; second, promoting the economic develop ment of these States; third, supporting the principle of self.determination as the basis for independence throughout southern Africa; fourth, seeking to replace the present regimes in southern Africa with Governments based on majority rule; fifth, preparing the peoples of southern Africa to assume the responsibilities of self-government, 106. In pursuing these objectives a number of principles should obviously be borne in mind: (a) Southern Africa must be treated as a unit, The issues that divided the white communities in the past are less important than the ties that bind them today. Even the theoretical differences in approach to race are now eclipsed by the fact of a common pattern of white domination; (b) The privileged white minorities in southern Africa are not going to abdicate power voluntarily. Appeals to morality, reason or even self-interest will prove unavailing. Majority rule will therefore have to be imposed; (c) It is crucial to ensure that the responses of the West to the issues of southern Africa should be in terms of freedom rather than in terms of race; (d) It is important for the Western Powers to know that, whether they like or not, the ruling classes in southern Africa are their “kith and kin”; They cannot, therefore, escape being blamed for their behaviour. 107. The problems of southern Africa are increasingly intractable and solutions are becoming more difficult and dangerous as white solidarity and white supremacy grow. 108. Turning now to the draft resolution contained in document S/9892, which was introduced this afternoon by 120. In January this year, the Security Council decisively condemned the Republic of South Africa (resolution 276 (.Z9?0j] for its refusal to comply with the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on Namibia. Nevertheless, the South African racists are continuing their illegal acts in respect of Namibia, What are the reasons for the situation which has arisen? Why do the South African racists take the liberty of insolently defying the United Nations, the peoples of Africa and all freedom-loving peoples? The answers to these questions are now obvious to everyone. 121. The discussions in the Security Council and the General Assembly on questions relating to the situation in southern Africa do not leave a shadow of a doubt. In pursuing its policy, the South African regime is relying on the political, economic and military support of leading NATO Powers, which are endeavouring to maintain their economic, military and strategic positions in southern Africa. Obviously, there are some people who want to preserve forever the racist Pretoria regime, which is armed to the teeth, and to use it as a police truncheon to terrorize the African countries and suppress the national liberation movement in Africa. 122. This explains the policy and actions of the Western Powers in regard to the Republic of South Africa. During the discussion ‘on the question of apartheid at recent meetings of the Security Council, the representatives of African countries provided extensive information from documents of United Nations organs testifying to the development of economic, trade and military co-operation between the Western countries and the Republic of South Africa, and demonstrating the expansion of trade relations ‘-and the immense flow of investments from those countries to the South African economy. According to information given in the report circulated at the request of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, dated 18 June 19705-a report to which the Soviet delegation has already referred in its statement in the Security Cou~il on 21 July[1547th meeting]-the United States of America, the United King dom, West Germany, Italy, France, the Netherlands, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada and Australia are the prin: cipal trading partners of South Africa or the main investors in the South African economy. 123. Relying on economic and military co-operation with the Western Powers and also on their political support, the ‘South African racists are expanding their military and economic potential, enlarging their army and providing it with more weapons. The members of the Security Council are well aware of the purpases for which the armed might 5 Document A/AC.llS/L.276. 124. We are firmly convinced that the essential prerequisite for the granting of independence to the peopIe of Namibia is the expulsion from that country of the South African racists and the South African administration, troops and police. Since South Africa refuses to leave Namibia, it is essential to get the Western Powers to discontinue their political, economic and military aid to the Republic of South Africa, as a country which is violating the United Nations Charter. The Soviet Union has repeatedly stressed the need for the General Assembly and the Security Council to take effective measures to bring pressure to bear on South Africa, to force it to comply with the decisions of United Nations organs on the question of Namibia and to pave the way for a settlement of the Namibian problem in the interests of the people of Namibia. 125. Basing itself on this approach, the Soviet Union took part in the work of the ad hoc Sub-Committee of the Security Council on Namibia which was set up to study ways and means by which the relevant Security Council resolutions could be effectively implemented. 126. In our opinion, the Sub-Committee has done some useful work in this direction and has considered many proposals and ideas in accordance with its terms of reference. 127. In order to bring pressure to bear on South Africa and end its unlawful occupation of Namibia, the USSR delegation proposed in the Sub-Committee that the Security Council should be recommended to demand that all States comply strictly with the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly on Namibia and cease completely all economic, trade, transport and other relations with the Republic of South Africa. 128. Recent events confirm that this approach of the Soviet Union was correct. That is why-as the delegation of the USSR has already stated in the Sub-Committee-the recommendations made by the Sub-Committee in its report to the Security Council [S/9863/, and subsequently reflected in the draft resolutions submitted (S/9891 and S/9892], cannot in our view be regarded as entirely satisfactory. In order to fulfil the main requirement for the independence of Namibia-which is the expulsion of the South African racists and their administration and military and police forces from Namibia-it is essential to define and apply more effective measures than those proposed by the Sub-Committee and contained in the above-mentioned draft resolutions. 129. Nevertheless, since today’s discussion has made it clear that the representatives of the Afro-Asian countries members of the Security Council consider that the measures 130. At the same time, we should like to repeat the reservations regarding paragraphs 10 and 12 of this draft which the Soviet delegation expressed in the Sub- Committee. The Soviet delegation doubts the advisability of extending the terms of reference of the United Nations Council for Namibia to include, inter a&z, questions relating to the issuance of passports and visas, Quite apart from the fact that these questions fall strictly within the domestic competence of States Members of the United Nations, the extension of the activities of the Council for Namibia into this sphere would yield no appreciable or tangible results, would rather distract attention from urgent problems relating to the question of Namibia and might merely give rise to illusions in the minds of the Namibian people. This organ cannot make any progress in solving the problem of liberating the Narnibian people, as long as the South African racists continue to rely on the aid and protection of the Western Powers, which are in fact supporting South Africa’s domination of the Namibian people. 131. With regard to the recommendation in paragraph 12 of the draft, concerning the establishment of a United Nations fund for Namibia, the Soviet delegation sympathizes with the humanitarian aims of this proposal. As to the fmancing of the fund, however, the Soviet delegation considers that it should be financed exclusively from a special tax to be levied by States Members of the United Nations, particularly African States, on foreign companies operating both in the territories of these States and simultaneously in Namibia and South Africa. 132. The Soviet delegation wishes to express serious doubts concerning the draft resolulion [S/9892] requesting an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the question of Namibia. In our view, this proposal cannot be regarded as an effective measure which would help to drive the South African racists out of Namibia. Moreover, the adoption of such a decision would only delay the solution of the Namibian problem and create false illusions as to the possibility of solving it by legal means, rather than by serious political action on the part of the Security Council. The Soviet delegation will bear all these consid.erations in mind in determining its attitude to this draft resolution when it is put to the vote. 133, The Soviet Union has consistently advocated and still advocates the granting of independence to the people of Namibia without delay. Our country is strictly complying with the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on South Africa and does not maintain any political, economic or any other relations with the racist South African regime, 134. In conclusion, the Soviet delegation would like to stress once again that it is essential for the Security Council to adopt effective measures for the pr&icd implementation of decisions taken-by the United Nations to bring independence to Namibia. The Security Council should first of all demand the cessation of all aid and support for the

In this statement, my delegation wishes to confine itself to the documents that have been submitted to the Council: the report of the ad hoc Sub-Committee [S/9863] established under resolution 276 (1970) prepared under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Terence of Burundi; and the two draft resolutions [S/9891 and S/9892], which are a reflection of the long and difficult negotiations that took place in the SubXommittee. 136. It goes without saying that, as regards the substance of the problem of Namibia, we continue to maintain the position we have always maintained here in the Council and in our foreign policy: to put into effect the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, that is to say to grant freedom and independence to Namibia. 137. The main obstacle to the achievement of ‘that objective continues to be the policy of aggression and expansion of the Republic of South Africa, a policy that we have so frequently denounced, One of the principa1 bulwarks of that policy is the economic, political and military assistance and co-operation provided to the Republic of South Africa by a number of Western Powers. I wished to mention these few guiding principles here, so that the following comments may be more readily understood. 138. The delegation of Poland will vote in favour of the draft resolution contained in document S/9891. We recog nize the new elements which it introduces and which the representative of Syria, in particular, mentioned in the course of his statement. We shall vote in favour of that draft resolution despite the hesitations which other provisions of the draft call forth. In particular, we are mindful of the fact that the draft resolution concentrates its recommendations solely on the Territory of Namibia, To confine the question to those limits may be, technically speaking, defensible, but politically it is not, 139. We have always considered that it was impossible to deal with Namibia independently from the Republic of South Africa, the occupying Power, and that it is illusory to deal with the question of the economic relations rnaintained by many States with Namibia while at the same time disregarding their relations with the Republic of South Africa. It is as if one wished to do away with the hydra by paralyzing one of its tentacles while generously feeding the hydra itself. In fact, the impracticability of such an operation is amply demonstrated by the responses of certain States that continue to recognize the legal sovereignty of South Africa over Namibia in disregard of the United Nations decisions, States that do not even draw a distinction between economic relations with South Africa and those with Namibia and do not even keep separate statistics. 140. First and foremost, then, we question the effectiveness of the measures envisaged in a draft resolution the 141. I shall not comment in detail on the other provisions of the text; we did so in the course of the meetings of the Sub-Committee, There are, however, two additional comments that I think might be in order. The first concerns the possible creation of a United Nations fund for Namibia. We have noted the fact that the Council for Namibia and many delegations as well have said that they favoured financing such a programme through the collection of a levy on the investments of foreign companies operating, in particular, in Namibia. We share that view, We for our part have provided and shall continue to provide the people of Namibia with direct assistance, including, among other things, scholarships, a form of assistance the effectiveness of which has been stressed by representatives of SWAPO. 147. We have also borne in mind the statement by the President of SWAPO, Mr. Nujoma, and the questions which he raised in the Sub-Committee as regards the usefulness of measures that would only give the appearance of genuine action. Likewise, we have borne in mind the experience we gained as a result of the last request that was sent to the International Court of Justice, and the many years of debate which resulted in the ruling that was so severely and so justly criticized by many Governments, including the Government of Poland. In view of these reasons which we have most sincerely set forth, we shall abstain in the vote on the Finnish draft resolution.

Mr. President, please excuse me for taking the floor again, but I should like to speak on the draft resolution presented by Finland /S/9892]. 142. Another thought comes to our minds regarding certain provisions of the draft resolution, particularly paragraphs 1 and 2 thereof. In paragraph 1 the Security Council: 149. It is true that the advisory opinion contemplated in this draft is due to the initiative of the Finnish delegation and in a wider context this initiative would be a corollary to the other resolution already adopted. ‘Requests all States to refrain from any relations -diplomatic, consular or otherwise-with South Africa implying recognition of the authority of the South African Government over the territory of Nambia”. 150. However, it would not be correct to minimize the doubts and apprehensions held in African and other circles abroad which can be attributed to the very bitter disappointment so justly felt by the members of the Organiza- ’ tion of African Unity as a result of the fate of the Namibian submission in 1966. Those apprehensions are fully justified in view of the fear felt in Africa and within the United Nations that this second submission may repeat the experience of the first. However, the International Court of Justice is now sitting in different circumstances. The advisory opinion requested by the Security Council is related to aspects which are not necessarily ide’ntical to those raised a few years ago. In that regard it would be proper to stress that the International Court of Justice, whose prestige was impaired by the partiality of some of its members in 1966, would gain in prestige by adopting a new attitude which would rehabilitate the Court and the United Nations as a whole. Paragraph 2 appears in the draft resolution, and I will not quote it. 143. We should not like to have those provisions interpreted by the Republic of South Africa as constituting even an indirect disavowal of the position taken by a large number of delegations in the United Nations that have called for a severance of economic and military relations with the Republic of South Africa itself. We are convinced that that is not the intention of the sponsors of the draft resolution. This at least is our interpretation. 144. I have mentioned some of the reasons why the Polish delegation would have preferred a stronger draft resolution. We are, however, very grateful to the sponsors of the draft and we appreciate the fact that it represents a step forward towards the foal goal of the United Nations, that is the freedom and independence of Namibia. Wb shall therefore vote in favour of that draft resolution. 151. In any case, a unanimous adoption of this measure by the Security Council would stimulate the deliberations of the Judges at The Hague. Of course at the present stage it would be premature to prejudge or try to foresee with any degree of mathematical accuracy the turn that the deliberations of that court might take. If the information available to the Security Council does not make it possible to foresee a favourable or an unfavourable result for this action, there is, however, always the hope that an impartial judgement, which would be in conformity with .the inalienable rights of the Namibian people, would serve the twofold purpose of rehabilitating the International Court before the world opinion, which was so bitterly disenchanted, and also of harmonizing the position of the Court with the position taken by the General Assembly in putting an end to South Africa’s Mandate over Namibia. 145. We have also very carefully considered the draft resolution presented by the delegation of Finland [S/9892]. We believe we understand the intentions of the Finnish delegation and its desire to bring out all aspects of the situation in Namibia. We have no objection to addressing a request to the International Court of Justice, although we have not forgotten the ruling which it handed down in July 1966-a ruling which Poland resolutely opposed. 146. We would, however, like to stress that as far as we are concerned the essential element for the achievement of the United Nations objectives in Namibia is action-political action in the broadest sense of the term, based on a

Bearing in mind special circumstances to which members of the Council have drawn my attention, I withdraw my request for postponement of action on the draft resolutions submitted to the Council today.

Speaking as representative of NICARAGUA, I am very pleased to say that I shall vote in favour of the draft resolutions which have been considered this afternoon by the Council. 155. Speaking as PRESIDENT, I see that there are no further speakers on my list. If no other representatives wish to take the floor at this time, I shall put to the vote the joint draft resolution sponsored by Burundi, Finland, Nepal, Sierra Leone and Zambia (S/9891]. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Burundi, China, Colombia, Finland, Nepal, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Spain, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America, Zambia. Against: None. Abstaining: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The draft resolution was adopted by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions. 6

.We shall now proceed to vote on the draft resolution submitted by Finland [S/9892] I 157, Mr. BOUQUIN (France) (interpretation from French): I have asked for the floor on a point of order, My delegation wishes to request a separate vote on the last phrase of paragraph 1 of the draft resolution submitted by Finland, reading as follows: “ . , , notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970)“. The request of my delegation is based on rule 32 of the rules of procedure, If the representative of Finland, the sponsor of the draft resolution does not object, I should be very grateful if the passage that I read out were put to the vote first.

I am pleased to say that the Finnish delegation will have no objection to the request 6 See resolution 283 (1970).

The representative of France has asked for a separate vote on the last phrase of .the request to the International Court of Justice in paragraph 1 of the draft resolution contained in document S/9892. The Council would be voting separately on the following phrase: “ . . . notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970)“. The representative of Finland has said that he is not opposed to a separate vote on this phrase. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Burundi, China, Colombia, Finland, Nepal, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Spain, Syria, United States of America, Zambia. Against: None. Abstaining: France, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. By 11 votes to none, with 4 abstentions, the phrase “ulotwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970)” was adopted.

I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document S/9892 as a whole. A vote was taken by show of hands. in favour: Burundi, China, Colombia, Finland, France, Nepal, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Spain, Syria, United States of America, Zambia. Against: None. Abstaining: Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The draft resolution was adopted by 12 votes td none, with 3 abstentions. 1

I now call on those representatives who have asked t;o be allowed to explain their vote.

The United States was pleased to vote in favour of the two resolutions just adopted by the Council. The substantial ’ support which was accorded them is, we believe, a fitting tribute to the ad hoc Sub-Committee, whose work they endorse. We should like to make our congratulations to that Sub-Committee a matter of record, 163. On 20 May of this year my Government announced new policy steps which it intended to take to discourage 7 See resolution 284 (1970). 164. In explaining our vote, I must recall that the United States did not vote in favour of resolution 282 (1970) and therefore cannot join in its reaffirmation, as provided in preambular paragraph 6. 165. With respect to operative paragraphs 2, 10 and 12, the positions taken previously by my Government on the matters of substance dealt with in those paragraphs remain unchanged. 166. As for operative paragraph 2, my Government continues to maintain that Member Governments must be free to take appropriate action to protect their own citizens and to assist the people of Namibia. 167. On operative paragraph 10, I would merely say that my Government’s position on General Assembly resolution 2248 (S-V) is well known, 168. Finally, I should reiterate what has already been said in the Sub-Committee, namely, that our support for operative paragraph 12 constitutes no undertaking on our part to contribute to a special fund for Namibia in the event such a fund is established, 169. My Government particularly welcomes the adoption of the resolution contained in document S/9892, which requests an advisory opinion of the International,Court of Justice. This is the very first time that the Security Council has availed itself of the procedures contained in Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter, and we are most pleased at this historic development, which is consistent completely with the recommendations made by our own Secretary of State in a statement in New York last April,’ advocating greater use of this major organ of the United Nations. We believe that 2he international community has indeed a serious need for impartial and authoritative legal advice on the question of Namibia. 1’70. We recall that the Court, in its advisory opinions of 1950,g 19551° and 1956,l’ has already provided useful guidance to the Assembly on legal issues concerning Namibia, and we believe that the Court can and should now give the Council the benefit of its impartial and authori- 8 Made before the American Society of International Law on 25 April 1970. 9 International status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion: I.&J. Reports 1950, p. 128. 10 South West Africa - Voting procedure, Advisory Opinion of June ?th, 19% I.C.J. Reports 1955, p. 67. 11 Admissibility of hearings of petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa, Advisory Opinion of June Ist, 1956: I.C.J. Reports 19.56, p. 23. 171. My delegation harbours no illusions that the two resolutions we have adopted today will solve the problem of Namibia, but we do believe that both of them, embodying as they do peaceful and practical steps, make a useful contribution to furthering our efforts to find a solution. Again, we congratulate the ad hoc Sub-Committee for its effective work and we look forward to further constructive suggestions from that Committee. 172. For its part, the United States will continue its efforts bilaterally to persuade South Africa to acknowledge United Nations responsibility for Namibia and we hope that other Members will do likewise.

My delegation wishes to explain its vote on the two draft resolutions which the Security Council had before it on the initiative of five Powers [S/9891] and of Finland [S/9892/, following the submission of the report [5’/9c263/ of the ad hoc Sub-Committee which was created under resolution 276 (1970) of the Security Council. 174. At the 17th meeting of the Sub-Committee our representative, while reassuring the authors that he was grateful for their work, set forth the reservations which he had on the recommendations of the ad hoc Sub-Committee and expressed once again the doubts of the French delegation which had already been expressed a few months earlier [1529th meeting] when resolution 276 (1970) was adopted. 175. The position of my Government on the important problem which the Council has once again considered today is in fact very well known. On many occasions the French Government has voiced its disapproval of the extension of a discriminatory and repressive policy to a Territory with international status. 176. Our traditions and our record show that France i;s opposed to these policies. We consider further that they are contrary to the spirit of the Mandate, for South Africa had an obligation to ensure “the material and moral well being” of the people over which it had authority and to lead them to self-determination. It is for this reason that, with the same clarity, my Government expressed its opposition to any initiative by Pretoria arbitrarily to divide the Territory or to incorporate it in the Republic of South Africa, 177. We are among those who believe that the international status did not come to an end with the disappearance of the League of Nations and cannot unilaterally be modified by the administering Power, and that it is only when the people exercise their right to self-determination that, this will come to an end. On the other hand, it is doubtful that the United Nations, heir to the League of Nations, can claim to have powers exceeding those which 179. It is, then, because we consider that it would make it possible for the International Court of Justice to clarify the legal position as regards the legality of the revocation that we have decided none the less to support the text. 180. Howeve; this may be, there can be nd doubt that the mandatory Power disregarded its obligations and that the measures which it is planning to adopt, or has adopted, are in contradiction to the commitments flowing from Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Agreement signed on 17 December 1920 at Geneva. 18 1. The Security Council should bring the very serious matter of these wrongdoings to the attention of the authorities who are responsible and urge them to take a sounder view of their obligations. It would seem preferable in this difficult and complex matter, and in view of the legal position the soundness of which does not seem to have been established unquestionably, not to engage the authority of the United Nations in a course of action which in the past has proved likely to lead to an impasse. 182. Such initiatives, it must be confessed, have not helped to strengthen the prestige of the Organization. We are all aware that steps taken in the past in similar circumstances have hardly led to a solution of this irritating and difficult problem, The problem has in fact become even more serious due to the furtherance in the Territory of a policy which is deliberately contrary to the spirit of the Mandate and which we deplore and would like to see come to an end. 183. No matter how shocking the situation may be there is reason to fear that the first victims of this pointless series of actions and counteractions might well be the people themselves whose material and moral well-being was the objective of the Mandate because, above and beyond all controversies and procedures, we should be concerned with the fate of the people involved. 184. These are the considerations which have prompted 190. my Government to take the position which it has adopted. The question before us does not appear to do this. It While my delegation was not able for these reasons to vote is based on certain assumptions about the legal status of in favour of the text presented by the five Powers, it was South West Africa which, in the opinion of my Governnevertheless in a position after expressing its reservations by merit, ought themselves to be examined by the Court. abstaining in the separate vote on the question put to the These assumptions are not expressly stated in the’question Court, to vote in favour of the draft resolution put forward itself but they do clearly emerge from some speeches of the by Finland. sponsors made in the ad hoc Sub-Committee and also today, 187. To those resolutions which caused us difficulty has now been added, in the case of the main resolution which has been voted on today, a reaffirmation of Security Council resolution 282 (1970) on which we abstained last week [1549th meetirzgl. 188. I have also had occasion to point out the practical considerations that have to be faced and the need for the United Nations to act within its capabilities. I am very well aware that these views are not shared by all, but it must be admitted that none of the factors to which I have drawn attention in the past has changed since, and the Council will, I believe, understand that our reservations, therefore, remain with them, It is for these reasons that my Government has abstained today on the longer of the two draft resolutions. 189. As is known, my Government has doubts about the legal status of South West Africa; at the same time, as every speaker today has noted and deplored, South Africa is in fact controlling the territory of South West Africa. It is, of course, our view that full examination and clarification of the legal position would be desirable and helpfu1. In the ad hoc Sub-Committee the United Kingdom representative made it clear that my Government was quite willing to consider a request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. I-Ie did, however, add that our support for this’depended upon the submission to the International Court of the issue of the status of South West Africa as a whole. 192. In the second place, if it were established that the General Assembly was so competent to terminate the Mandate, there would remain a question whether it was entitled to vest in the United Nations responsibility for the Territory. 195. We should like to thank the Sub-Committee presided over by the representative of Burundi for the very careful work it did so unselfishly, I wish to convey an expression of our thanks to the Vice-Chairmen, the Ambassadors of Finland and Nepal, and to the other members on the Committee. I also should like to thank all members of the Security Council for their co-operation during the deliberations in the Security Council this afternoon. Since I have no further speakers listed and if no other representative wishes to take the floor, I propose to adjourn the meeting. 193. These questions pose complicated legal issues which have not hitherto been the subject of any decision or advisory opinion of the International Court. My Government regrets that the question which it is now proposed to submit to the Court is constructed in such a fashion that the Court might feel itself inhibited from pronouncing on the more fundamental issues concerning the present status of South West Africa. It is for these reasons that my Government has abstained on the request for an advisory opinion as expressed in the shorter draft resolution. The meeting rose at 7.5 p.m