S/PV.157 Security Council

I have taken note of the declaration of the representative of the United States. Toward the end of the week I shall make proposals with regard to next week's meetings. All the remai~iing meetings this week are concerned with the Greek question. I shall try to meet his wishes at"the end of the week, if there is no objection by any of the members. As there is no .objection to the adoption of the agenda, I shall consider it adopted.

Our discussion concerns article 11 of the proposals of the Military Staff Committee. If you remember, the representative of France suggested that the Military Staff Committee should be asked to elucidate some points: I believe he also put certain questions to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: The representative of Australia also made certain suggestions. The Council might look upon this as a convenient starting point. I invite the members of the Council to express their views on these suggestions and to make any other proposal they may deem fit. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): At the Security Council's last meeting, Mr. Parodi Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): J'ai pris acte de la declaration du representant des Etats-Unis. Je ferai, vers la Bn de la semaine, des propositions relatives aux seances de la semaine prochaine. Toutes les autres seances prevues pour la presente semaine seront consacrees a la question grecque. Je tacherai, a la fin de la semaine, de satisfaire aux vreu~ du representant des Etats-Unis, si aucun des membres du Conseil ne s'y oppose. Etant donne que personne ne souleve d'objection a I'adoption de l'ordre du jour, je le considere commc adopte. 218. Suite de la discussion sur 2es accords speciaux prevus a I'Article 43 de la Charte et sur I'organisation des for- ces armees des Nations Unies Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Notre discussion porte sur l'article 11 des propositions du Comite d'etat-major. Vous vous rappelez sans doute que le representant de la France a propose de prier le Comite d'etat-major d'eluci- der certains points 1 • Je crois qu'il a aussi pose certaines questions au representant de I'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques 1 • Le repre- ~entant de l'Australie a egalement formule cer- taines suggestions. Le Conseil jugera peut-etre pratique de pren- dre ces diverses propositions comme point de depart. J'invite donc les membres du Conseil a faire connaltre leurs vues sur ces suggestions et a presenter toute autre proposition qui leur paraitra appropriee. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques soda- listes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Au cours de la derniere seance du Conseil de securite, 1 Voir les Proc~s-verbaux offici.ls du CORseil de Ilcu- ritA, Deuxieme Annee, No 50. As regards the second question-the con- nexion between the principle of equal contribu- tions (the USSR representative's proposal) and the question of a general reduction in armaments and armed forces-I must say that these two questions are very closely allied. Assuming that a reduction of armaments and armed forces is actually put into effect, it will inevitably follow that the armaments and armed forces to be placed at the disposal of the Security Council by Members of the United Nations will be com- paratively small. That is the purpose of the United Nations' decision t') reduce armaments and armed forces, and the fact that the armed forces will be 'comparatively small will have a direct effect· on the size of the forces to be made available to the Security Council by agreement. As the armed forces of individual Members of the United Nations will be small, or, at any rate, considerably smaller than they are at present, the forces to be made available to the Security Council by agree- ment should, consequently, also be smaller. The USSR delegation has drawn one im- portant conclusion from this, which strengthens the proposal on the principle that contributions should be made on a basis of equality, i.e., that should one of the five permanent members of the Security Council be comparatively weak Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America): I should like to make a brief statement in an effort to explain the United States point of view with respect to article 11. It appears to our dele- gation that there has been some misunderstand- ing of the text of article 11, which was sup- ported by the United States representative on the'Military Staff Committee. Th.e"'.concept of comparable overall contribu- tions ap~'~ars to my delegation to have the fol- lowing characteristics: it relates solely to the total contribution of each of the permanent members, allowing complete flexibility among the various components. On this overall basis, the contributions of the permanent members would not be unduly disproportionate. We are willing to consider that the overall contributions of the permanent members should not be in great . disproportion, but in our view, it is impracticable to insist on exact equality of overall contribu- tions, let alone of all the components. It is the United States view that the principle of comparability will come closer to accomplish- ing this purpose of having the contributions of the five permanent members not unduly dis- proportionate than will the principle of equality with special exceptions, which is supported by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. For example, under the principle of compara- bility, a nation which is unable to supply any part of a particular component is able to com- pensate for this lack by contributing a larger proportionate share of another component. Under the equality principle, as I understand it, such compensation is not contemplated. The prestige and position of the five permanent mem- bers are therefore guarded more effectively, it seems to us, under the comparabilit.y formula than under the USSR proposal, if we assume that sufficient exceptions are allowed to permit the creation of an effective, well-balanced force. My colleague, Mr. Gromyko, has repeatedly stated that the comparability principle would result in a privileged position for certain nations. It is not clear to the United' States delegation what privilege Mr. Gromyko has in mind. In any case, even under the USSR formula, if excep- tions are permitted, as his proposal seems to envisage, certain nations would be making larger contributions than others, and thereby, accord- M. JOHNSo'N (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (tra- duit de l'anglais): Je desirerais faire une breve declaration pour tacher d'expliquer le point de vue des Etats-Unis en ce qui concerne l'articIe 11. De l'avis de nqtre delegation, on s'est mepris dans une certaine mesure sur le sens du texte de I'article 11 que le representant des Etats-Unis au Cornite d'etat-major a appuye. Il semble a ma delegation que le principe de l'equivalence de l'ensemble des contributions presente les caracteristiques suivantes: il a trait uniquement a l'ensemble de la contribution de chacun des membres permanents, ce qui laisse toute latitude pour amenager ies elemf'nts cons- titutifs. Sur ceUe base d'ensemble, les contri- butions des membres permanents ne seraient pas indi'iment disproportionnees. Nous sommes dis- poses aadmettre que les contributions d'ensemble des membres permanents ne doivent pas com- porter de grandes disproportions, mais, a notre avis, il n'est pas possible, au point de vue pra- tique, d'exiger l'egalite rigoureuse des contri- butions d'ensemble, et encore moins de leurs elements constitutifs. Les Etats-Unis sont d'avis que le principe de l'equivalence permettra, mieux que le principe de l'egalite avec derogations specia!es que recom- mande le representant de I'Union des Republi- ques socialistes sovietiques, d'eviter des dispro- portions exagerees entre les contributions des dnq membres permanents. Par exemple, d'apres le principe de l'equiva- lence, un Etat qui se trouve dans I'incapacite de foumir une partie quelconque d'un element particulier, peut compenser cette lacune en apportant, dans un autre domaine, une contri- bution proportionnellement plus grande. D'apres le principe de l'egalite, tel que je le comprends, on n'envisage pas de compensation de ce genre. Il nous semble done que I'on sauvegarde de fac;on plus efficace le prestige et la position des cinq membres permanents avec la formule de l'equivalence qu'avec la proposition de l'URSS, si toutefois 1'0n presume que l'on permettra assez d'exceptions pour pouvoir creer une force armee efficace et bien equiIibree. Mon collegue, M. Gromyko, a maintes fois declare que certaines nations jouiraient d'une position privilegiee si l'on appliquait le principe de I'equivalence. La delegation, des Etats-Unis ne voit pas tres bien a quel privilege pense M. Gromyko. De toute fac;on, meme en appli- quant la formule de I'URSS, si I'on admet des exceptions, ce que semble envisager la proposi- tion de M. Gromyko, certains Etats apporteront I que l'un des membres permanents ne pourra a.pporter de contribution dans ce domaine. En se conformant a la proposition de l'URSS, on arriverait a ce resultat; et si 1'0n admet des exceptions, comme le propose l'Union des Repu- bliques socialistes sovietiques, celles-ci risqueront de devenir la regIe pIutot que l'exception, etant donne la grande disparite - aussi bien quantita- tivement que qualitativement - qui existe entre certains elements indispensables. A notre sens, le principe de l'equivalence accorde des privileges exactement egaux a tous les membres permanents. Si toutefois il en est qui ne veulent ou ne peuvent assumer une charge necessaire pour permettre aux Nations Unies de disposer d'une force al'mee efficace, nous ne croyons pas que des raisons de prestige, ou des considerations politiques, doivent empe- cher les autres d'apporter les contributions neces- saires, et ce, a la date la plus rapprochee pos- sible. Enfin, je voudrais dire quelques mots sur la phase du desarmement que comporte cette ques- tion et que le representant de l'Union des Repu- bliques socialistes sovietiques, ainsi que certains autres membres du Conseil, a mentionnee. Les Etats-Unis ne croient pas' qu'en negociant ces accords speciaux, le Conseil de securite jette aucunement les bases des. contingents de desar- mement. C'est la, selon nous, une question entie- rement distincte, dont on traitera, esperons-nous, lorsque auro~t ete creees les forces armees que Under the USSR proposal, such would be the result, and, if exceptions are carried through, as proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Rf'- publics, the exceptions might become the rule rather than the exception, because of the great disparity-in fad, both quantitatively and quali- tatively-in certain necessary components. As we understand it, the principle of com- parability presents exactly equal privileges to all permanent members. If, however, they are un- willing or unable to undertake a burden which is necessary in order to enable the United Na- tions to have an effective armed force, we do not believe that reasons of prestige or political considerations should prevent others fro,m mak- ing the necessary contributions, and doing so at the earliest practicable date. Lastly, I should like to mention briefly the disarmament phase of this question, which has been referred to by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as well as by certain other members of the Council. The United States does not believe that in negotiating these special agreements, the Security Council is in any sense laying the basis for disarmament ratios or quotas. In our view, that is an entirely separate question which we hope will be dealt with after the forces called for by the Charter of the United Nations have been established. My delegation's view is that we should not allow the work we are doing now to become entangled with the disarmament question. If wc do, we shall certainly make our present task d~mande la Charte des Nations Unies. Ma delegation estime que nous ne devons I pas laisser la question du desarmement venir se meler aux travaux que nous poursuivons a , l'h~ur:" actuelle, sans quoi notre tache en sera I .. ~ee document 8/336. This quotation is from the °SrIglnal text as submitted, in mimeographed form, to the ecurity Council. J Voir le document 8/336. La citation est tiree du texte primitif, soumis dans sa forme roneotypee au Conseil de securite. Mr. PAROD! (France) (translated from French): First I wish to thank Mr. Gromyka for having answered the questions I put at the last meeting. 1 As a matter of fact there was some misunderstanding between us in regard to what Mr. Gromyko called my second question. My purpose in asking the question was to find out why our colleague felt some uneasiness lest the principle of the equivalence of forces should lead to the predominance of one of the five per- manent members. If I spoke of disarmament it was in the following connexion, if I remember rightly: I indicated that so long as we had not set up a disarmament plan-and in fact our studies have not progressed so far as to bring the risk or chance of its completion very near- I did not see how the fact of a country placing at the disposal of the United Nations under Article 43 a part of the forces which it was assumed to possess could in any way lessen the total forc~ at its disposal and thus alter the world balance of forces. In so far as certain forces are placed at the disposal of the United Nations by a country, they are in a sense im- mobilized, being thenceforward subject to United Nations control which, in my view, has the effect of decreasing rather than increasing the power of the country to which they belong. It was from that point of view that I referred to the question of disarmament. In any case, I thank the USSR 'representative for what he has said because I think his remarks (which I am glad to have elicited) in reply to what he called my first question, help to clarify the situation. For me they certainly do so. At the stage we have now reached, I think there are two ideas which all of us accept. The first is that the international force should be of a certain size, which we should determine ac- cording to the recommendations of the Military Staff Committee and which would correspond to our conception of the extent to which Article 43 should be applied. We must estimate the strength of the international force we consider necessary to enable the United Nations to perform its task effectively. It is obvious, of course, that in esti- mating what has been called the overall strength of the forces to be placed at the qisposal of the United Nations, there will be a certain margin of appreciation. We may 11e more or less liberal in our estimates. The second principle upon which 'I think we are all agreed and which, if I understood him rig!ttly, has just been confirmed by the United ~ Official Recordt of the Security Council, Second Year, No. 56, 154th meeting. M. PAROD! (France): Je remercie d'abord M. Gromyko d'avoir bien voulu repondre aux questions que j'avais posees lors de la derniere seance 1 • A vrai dire, il y a eu entre nous un cer- tain malentendu aprapas de ce que Mc Gromyko a appele ma seconde question. Dans mon esprit, ma question avait pour objet d'essayer de cla- rifier les raisons pour lesquelles notre collegue exprimait des inquietudes quant au risque que le principe de I'equivalence des forces put conduire a une situation predominante pour I'un des cinq membres permanents. Si j'ai parle du desar:ne- ment, ce fut, si je me rappelle bien, en l'occur- rence suivante: j'avais indique qu'aussi long- temps que nous n'avions pas mis sur pied un programme de desarmement, - et, a vrai dire, nos etudes ne sont pas si avancees a cet egard que le risque ou la chance d'une realisation puisse paraitre tres proche, - je ne voyais pas tres bien comment le fait, pour un pays, de mettre une partie des forces qu'il etait cense posseder ala disposition des Nations Unies, aux termes de l'Article 43, pouvait diminuer d'une maniere quelconque le total des forces dont il disposai.t, et, par consequent, changer l'equilibre des forces existantes dans le monde. Dans la mesure ou certaines forces sont mises a la dis- positions des Nations Unies par certains pays, . elles subissent meme une immobilisation; elles sont des lors soumises a un controle des Nations Unies qui a pour efIet de diminuer, me semble- t-il, la puissance de celui qui les possede plutot que de I'augmenter. C'est sous cet angle que je m'etais refere a la question du desarmement. De toute maniere, je remercie le representant de I'URSS, car, en ce qui concerne la reponse qu'il a faite a ce qu'il a appele ma premiere question, je crois que ses observations, que je suis heureux d'avoir provoquees, contribuent a rendre la situation plus claire. Pour moi, elles la rendent certainement plus claire. Je pense qu'au point ou nous sommes par- venus, deux idees se degagent qui sont admises par nous tous. La premiere, c'est que la force internationale doit avoir un certain Folume, que nous devrons determiner en nous fondant sur les avis du Comite d'etat-major, et qui corres- pondra a l'idee que nous nous faisons de la mesure ou I'application de l'Article 43 est neces- saire. Il nous faut evaluer I'importance de la force internationale qui nous parait necessaire pour permettre aux Nations Unies de remplir leur tache avec efficacite. Il est bien evident que, dans I'appreciation de ce qu'on a appeIe cette puissance d'ensemble des forces mises a la disposition des Nations Unies, une marge sub- siste. On peut voir plus ou moins grand. Le second principe, sur lequel nous sornmes, je crois, tous d'accord et que, si je I'ai bien com- pris, vient de confirmer le representant des Etats- 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de secu- rile, Deuxieme Annee, No 56, 154eme seance. The fears expressed by the USSR representa- tive seem to me very closely connected with the question of the size of the forces. If we u.;cide that the size of the international forces must be fixed at a certain level, a moderate one, we shall be able to get much nearer to the principle d equality than we could with very large forces. It is therefore a matter of degree, of quantities, and that seems to m~ an essential point in the agreement which I hope will be reached between us. I tain niveau, un niveau modere, nous pourrons I nous rapprocher bien plus du principe de l'egalite qu'il ne serait possible de le faire avec des forces cxtrerrlcment elevees. C'est done une question de mesure qui intervient, une question de plus ou de moins, et elle me parmt un element essentiel de l'accord qui se fera, je l'espere, entre nous. Ceci me ramene au point de vue que j'ai plusieurs fois exprime, - je m'excuse de me repeter, mais le ferai aussi longtemps qu'il ne me sera pas demontre que je fais fausse route, - a savoir, que c'est dans la voie d'un travail pratique et concret, sur des chiffres precis, que nous devons essentiellement chercher a orienter notre discussion. A cet egard, je rappelle avoir fait, il y a quelque jom's, une autre sugge3tion en ce qui concerne des questions qu'on pOllVait utilement poser, a mon avis, au Comite d'etat-major, et je souhaiterais que la discussion s'orientat sur ma proposition, qui conserve a mes yeux son interet apres ce qui a ete dit. Le representant de l'Australie avait fait une suggestion tres voisine de la mienne et en tout cas susceptible de se combiner tres facilement avec elle. Je pense qu'il serait utile que nous exarninions ces deux propositions. That brings me back to the point of view I have expressed several times-I apologize for repeating it, but I shall continue to do so as long as it is not preved that I am mistaken-namely, that we should seek to pursue our discussion mainly along the lines of practical concrete work, with specific figures. ' In this connexion, I would remind you of an- other suggestion which I made a few days ago co.ncerning questions which, in my opinion, ~~ght usefully be put to the Military Staff COIn- mtttee; I should like to see our discussion pro- c~ed on the lines of my suggestion, which still seems to me of use after what has been said. . The Australian representative made a sugges- tron very similar to my own, one which at any ~ate .could easily be combined with mine. I think It nught be a good idea if we were to examine these two proposals. . C~lonel HODGSON (Australia): My delega- hon accepts the suggestion of the representative of France. I propose, therefore, to speak purely Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de lJanglais): Ma delegation accepte la proposition du representant de la France. Je ne parlerai It has been suggested that the question of re- duction of armaments, or disarmament, is largely going to solve this problem and make the principle advanced by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics workable. However, in the event of any scheme for dis- armament being agreed upon, it is clear that disarmament will be effected by some kind of ratio, some proportion, some quota of existing strengths of naval, military or air units, and not by the complete elimination of any element or of any type just because a Member or par- ticular Members of the United Nations do not have that particular type or element of armed forces necessary to make any task force an effi- cient and'effective machine. Therefore, after disarmament, or a reduction of armaments, we arrive at the same relative- position as we did before; it is still necessary to have a balanced and effective United Nations armed force. Therefore, my delegation cannot accept the viewpoint that a reduction of arma- ments is going to affect our discussion on the principle on which we must agree. We have asked the Military Staff Committee to draw up a table showing these United Nations forces, and the four members who advanced their principle-that is, the principle of com- parable contribution-were able to do so. My Government says that the other principle is en- tirely unrealistic in the present condition of the am1ed forces of the world; the four other mem- bers say that the USSR principle is unworkable. It is referred to as a principle. We can all define the word "principle" in various ways. I should say that a principle could be defined as a fundamental truth proved by experience and true as to time, place and circumstance. The principle of comparable contributions ad- vanced by the delegations of China, France the United Kingdom and the United States is a ~rin­ ciple because it has been proved by experience as far back as the Crusades and through the Napoleonic Wars, the First World War and the Second World War. Had we adopted the USSR principle, we should have lost those wars in- cluding the last war, or we would stili be fighting. To our minds, this so-called principle has never been true as to any time, place or circum- Mr. Gromyko has suggested that his repre- sentatives could not work out the table produced by the other four representatives because we had not agreed on the principles. Let us accept them for the time being and test them out because those who devised that notion or so-called. prin- ciple must have some practical idea of how it can be put into effect. Therefore, I repeat the proposal I made previously and I hope that this time it will not be rejected. If it is rejected, it will reinforce my view and the view of my dele- gation that the United Nations force cannot be worked out on that principle. One would think, prima facie, that a bal- anced and effective force worked out on the USSR system could only be worked out by a series of exceptions, or, to use the USSR term, a series of deviations from that principle which would have to be agreed to by the Security Council. All those exceptions or deviations would bring it down, in essence, to the principle ad- vanced by the other four nations; that is, the principle of comparability. That is only a view- point, and it may be that the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics can, in practice, produce a force based on their prin- ciple. If they can, we have an open mind on the subject and, as suggested by the representative of France, there is no reason why we should not harmonize the two texts, If the force cannot be produced or if the offer is refused, then, speaking for our own delegation, we would wish to pro- ceed to a vote, witho'lt further delay, on the two texts which are before us. It is my suggestion that the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Military Staff Committee should be invited to draw up a table of the United Nations forces based on the USSR principle of equality of contribution as to overall strength and the com- position of the forces.

Does any other representative wish to speak? We have a proposal from the representative of France which reads as follows: Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais); Un autre representant desire-t-il prendre la parole? Nous avons une proposition du representant de la France dont le texte est le suivant: ."To ask the Military Staff Committee, first usmg the lowest estimate as a basis, i.e., that of the United Kingdom and Chinese delegations, to "Demander au Comite d'etat-major, en prenant d'abord pour base la plus faible des evaluations proposees, c'est-a-dire celle des delegations britannique et chinoise, de faire, partant de cette hypothese, le travail consistant a rechercher quelles derogations il faudrait apporter a la regIe de 1'egalite pour arriver a un projet realisable. 11 lui serait egalement demande, prenant d'autre part 1'evaluation la plus elevee, c'est-adire 1'evaluation des Etats-Unis, de nous dire, asc~rt~in on the basis of this hypothesis what deVIatIOns from the rule of equality would be necessary to arrive at a practicable plan. It should at the same time. be asked to indicate, grosso ';lodo, and on the basis of the highest estim~te~ t.e., that of the United States, how the prmclple of comparability lJlight be applied on Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I have already stated the views of the USSR delegation on this point several times. My delegation considers that no estimates can be made until agreement has been reached on the general principles on which these estimates can be based, since they would be devoid of any foundation. :Nobody can say whether they are right or wrong, suitable or unsuitable, or whether they answer the Security Council's requirements or not. I cannot therefore agree to any proposals which call for such estimates, unless there is some basis upon which these estimates can be founded.

I am reading the French proposal as an informal one, wishing to have the opinion of the Security Council as to whether a question of this nature could be asked of the Military Staff Committee without the Security Council taking a vote on it. I find that there is an objection and, consequently, I wish to ask the representative of France whether he wants to present a formal motion which, of course, I would have to submit to a vote. Mr. PARODl (France) (translated from French) : When I spoke on 10 July, I submitted a suggestion rather than a formal proposal, in order that the members of the Council might think it over and, if necessary, consult their representatives on the Military Staff Committee. An objection has just been raised by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Quite frankly, I cannot agree; I cannot accept this objection. If we decide that we must first have all the questions of principle settled before we can frame any kind of estimate, this would mean adopting a method contrary to the one I recommended, which was to take one of the proposed estimates as a hypothetical case and on that basis try to work out something concrete and thus make the meaning of the discussion on principles more intelli6-ible. The Military Staff Committee has once before been consulted on this point and has informed us, through the majority of its representativesincluding the French delegation-that it could give no reply to the question asked until it had some figures to go on; I really do not see why we cannot put this question to the Military Staff Committee again, this time giving the figures which might be taken as a hypothetical basis. I repeat my view that these figures should, in any case, represent the lowest estimate, and, perhaps, .the highest estimate also. I must admit that I do not quite understand what Mr. Gromyko's objection is. Why should we not take as a basis one of the estimates M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): J'ai deja expose plusieurs fois les vues de la delegation de l'URSS sur cette question. D'apres nous, il n'est possible de faire aucune estimation sans s'ctre entendu au prealable sur les principes fondamentaux qui regiraient les calculs; autrement ceux-ci seraient depourvus de toute base. Personne ne pourrait dire si les evalu3.tions sont ou non correctes et justifiees, si elles repondent ou non aux besoins -iu Conseil de securite. Par consequent, je ne puis accepter aucune proposition qui prevoit ces evaluations tant que nous ne disposerons pas d'un critere pour les calculs. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je soumets officieusement la proposition fran<;aise et j'aimerais savoir si le COJ;lseil de securite estime que 1'0n peut soumettre une question de cet ordre au Comite d'etat-major sans que le Conseil de securite procede aun vote. Je constate qu'une objection vient d'ctre soulevee; je demanderai au representant de la France s'il desire presenter une motion formelle, qu'il faudra natureIlement que je mette aux voix. M. PARODl (France): Lorsque j'ai pris la parole le 10 juillet, j'ai presente plutot une suggestion qu'une proposition formelle, afin que les membres du Conseil puissent y reflechir et, le cas echeant, consulter leurs representants au Comite d'etat-major. Une objection vient d'ctre formulee par le representant de l'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques. Tres franchement, je ne puis, en ce qui me concerne, m'y arrcter; je ne puis admettre cette objection. Si nous decidons que nous devons d'abord avoir tranche toutes les questions de principe avant de pouvoir etablir une evaluation quelconque, c'est adopter une methode opposee acelle que je recommandais, et qui consistait a admettre, a titre d'hypothese, l'une des evaluations proposees, et a essayer de faire sur oette base un travail concret afin de rendre la discussion de principes plus sensible. Deja consulte dans le meme sens, le Comite d'etat-major nous avait fait savoir, par la bouche de la plupart des representants des delegations - y compris la delegation fran<;aise - qu'il ne pouvait repondre a la question posee tant qu'il n'aurait pas de chiffres comme base; je ne vois vraiment pas pourquoi nous ne pourrions pas lui poser a nouveau cette question en indiquant cette fois les chiffres qui pourraient ctre pris pour base a titre d'hypothese; dans ma pensee, je le repete, ces chiffres devraient ctre, en tout cas, ceux de l'estimation la plus basse, peut-ctre aussi ceux de l'estimation la plus elevee. Je ne comprends pas tres bien, je l'avoue, pourquoi M. Gromyko fait objection a ce que, prenant pour base l'une des estimations four- Perhaps we might, if Mr. Gromyko prefers, go no further than this simple question, leaving aside for the moment the hypothesis of the highest estimate and confining ourselves to taking the lowest estimate as a basis and to determining what exceptions there should be to the principle of equality in this case to make this plan workable. If no other remarks are made, I shall reserve the right to put my question in a more formal way than I did last time, but I should like to know if my suggestion, which, for the time being, remains a suggestion, meets with any objections. The PRESIDEN'.c: If I understand' the representative of France correctly, he is ready to modify somewhat his proposal in asking for a reply only on the lowest estimate, as presented by the representatives of the United Kingdom and China. Am I correct? Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Si je comprends bien les paroles du representant de la France, il serait dispose a modifier quelque peu sa proposition, et a ne demander de reponse qu'au sujet des estimations les plus faibles, telles qu'elles ont ete presentees par les representants du Royaume-Uni et de la Chine. En est-il bien ainsi? Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): Je vois parfaitement le poids et la logique de la suggestion de la France. Le Conseil de securite se rappellera peut-etre d'ailleurs que c'est moi-meme, je crois, qui ai le premier propose de reSOUdle cette difficulte en en venant aux chiffres au lieu de partir des principes. Je ne peux me rallier au point de vue de M. Gromyko qui pretend qu'on ne peut arriver, ni aune evaluation globale des forces armees, ni a toute. autre evaluation, avant d'avoir tranche les questions de principe. J'avais propose, a l'origine, que le Comite d'etat-m~jor s'effon;at de faire une evaluation globale de l'ensemble des forces armees des Nations Unies. Pour fixer un tel chiffre, il faut peut-etre s'appuyer sur certains principes ou sur certains criteres, mais il n'est certainement pas'necessaire d'avoir resolu la difficulte que presente l'article 11; en effet, cet article prevoit la repartiti.:m de ces forces entre les cinq membres permanents, ce qui est tout autre chose que l'estimation des forces totales qui devront etre a la disposition du Conseil de securite. Au Comite d'etat-major, quatre delegations sur cinq ont soumis des chiffres. Je voudrais que le Conseil de securite demande officiellement au Comite d'etat-major de s'efforcer de formuler, dans un certain delai, une evaluation globale qui Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): I quite see the force and logic of the French suggestion. In fact, the Security Council may remember that it was I, I think, who first suggested that the way to solve this difficulty was to get down to figures instead of starting from principles. I cannot accept the position of Mr. Gromyko, who says that one could not make an estimate of overall forces or any other estimate until the questions of principle had been solved. What I had suggested originally was that the Military Staff Committee should attempt to arrive at an overall estimate of the overall strength of the United Nations force. In order to arrive at such a figure, one may have to have certain principles or standards, but one certainly does not necessarily have to have a solution of the difficulty presented by article 11, because article 11 deals with the distribution of those forces a~ong the five permanent members, which is q~lte a different thing from the total force which will be required to be at the service of the Security Council. Four delegations out of five in the Military Staff Committee have submitted figures. I shou1~ like to see a formal request from the SecurIty Council to the Military Staff Committee to make an effort to arrive at an agreed overall Therefore, I should like to propose that the Security Council· ask the Military Staff Committee to attempt to agree on the total overall figure within a fortnight or three weeks. Mr. PARODI (France) (translated from French): I am very anxious that my proposalwhich I reserve the right to resubmit latershould not interfere with the order of the working programme that the Military Staff Committee itself considers most logical. The French representative on the Military Staff 90mmittee thought these questions might be raised now, but he told me that other delegations to the Staff Committee preferred a different, rather more cautious method. I think that is the meaning of the remark just made by the United Kingdom representative. In these circumstances I would support his proposal and would merely reserve the right to re-submit the question later. I note also that Sir Alexander Cadogan agrees that it would be useful to ask these questions when the occasion offers.

I have before me a formal proposal submitted in writing by the representative of Australia. The proposal reads as follows: "That the USSR representative on the MilItary Staff Committee· be invited to draw up a table of the United Nations armed force based on the USSR principle of equality of contribution as to overall strength and the composition of the force." I wish to recall that the same proposal was made in an informal way by the representative of Australia at the last meeting of the Council which dealt with the report of the Military Staff .Committee.' At that meeting, the USSR representative declared that his representative on the Military Staff Committee would be unable to present such a table at this stage. M. PARODI (France); J'ai le grand souci que la proposition que j'avais faite - et que .ie me reserve de reprendre le moment venu - n'ait pas pour consequence de gener l'ordre du progra."nme de travail que le Comite d'etat-major estimerait lui-meme le plus logique. Le representant de la France au Comite d'etatmajor estimait que ces questions pouvaient etre posees clCs maintenant, mais il m'avait indique que d'autres delegations au sein du Comite d'etat-major jugeaient preferable une methode differente, un peu plus prudente. C'est, je crois, le sens de I'observation que vient de faire le representant du Royaume-Uni. Dans ces conditions, j'appuie la proposition qu'il a formulee et me reserve simplement le droit de poser la question a nouveau un peu plus tard. Je releve d'ailleurs le fait que Sir Alexander Cadogan est d'accord sur l'utilite de poser ces questions, quand le moment en sera venu. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Nous sommes saisis officiellement d'une proposition ecrite emanant du representant de l'Australie. En voici le texte: "Que le representant de l'URSS au Comite d'etat-major soit invite a etablir un etat des forces armees des Nations Unies base sur le principe, avance par l'URSS, de l'egalite de contribution en ce qui concerne l'effectif total et la composition des forces armees." Je tiens arappeler que cette meme proposition a ete presentee officieusement par le representant de l'Australie au cours de la derniere reunion du Conseil de securite a laquelle a ete examine le rapport du Comite d'etat-major'. A cette seance, le representant de l'URSS a declare que son representant au Comite d'etat-major ne serait pas en mesure de dresser un td etat a l'heure actuelle. Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais) : Voici comment je con~ois la situation actuelle: il ne serait possible de mettre a execution la proposition fran~aise que si le representant de l'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques etait dispose a accepter l'invitation contenue dans la proposition australienne, puisque la proposition du representaIlt de la France parle de rechercher queUes derogations il faudrait apporter aux evaluations minima et maxima presentees par les quatre autres representants au Comite d'etat-major. En consequence, si nous ne pouvons escompter que soit etabli un etat analogue a celui qu'indique la proposition de la delegation australienne - et le representant de I'URSS a declare que tel etait le cas - je tiens a faire remarquer que la proposition de la delegation australienne se fonde sur un postulat tres net: l'acceptation par le Conseil des principes formules par la delegation de l'URSS. Nous ne pouvons alors qu'aboutir a la meme conclusion qu'ont atteint, des le debut, il y a quatorze mois, les quatre autres representants au sein du Comite d'etat-major, a savoir que c'est la chose impossible. Toutefois, etant donne que le representant de la France a differe la soumission de sa proposition, je ne peux que reserver la mienne pour un examen ulterieur si celui-ci est juge opportun et souhaitable. En attendant, ma delegation appuiera la proposition du representant du Royaume-Uni. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): As I understand it, the proposal of the representative of France could be worked out only if the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were ready to accept the invitation set out in the proposal of the Australian delegation, for the proposal of th,:: representative of France speaks of determining the deviation from the minimum and maximum tables as submitted by the four other representatives on the Military Staff Committee. Therefore, if a table such as the table indicated in the proposal of the Australian delegation is not forthcoming-and the USSR representative has declared that it will not be forthcoming-I should then point out that the proposal of the Australian delegation was based on a very clear assumption: that the Council had agreed to and accepted the principles enunciated by the USSR delegation. Consequently, we can only reach the same conclusion which was reached by the four other representatives on the Military Staff Committee from the very start, fourteen months ago-namely, that it cannot be done. However, as the representative of France has deferred his proposal, I have no option but to defer my proposal for later consideration, if it is deemed appropriate and fitting. In the meantime, my delegation will support the proposal of the United Kingdom delegation. Mr. MUNIZ (Brazil): The representative of France has put forward a very ingenious suggestion which I, at least, thought might satisfy the USSR representative. Mr. Gromyko has insisted on several occasions that consideration of the size of the armed forces is impossible until the Security Council settles the question of the principle of contributions. M. MUNIZ (Bresil) (traduit de l'anglais): Le representant de la France a presente une suggestion tres ingenieuse qui paraissait, a mon avis tout au moins, devoir donner satisfaction au representant de l'URSS. M. Gromyko a souligne a plusieurs reprises que 1'0n ne pouvait aborder la question des effectifs des forces armees avant que le Conseil de securite eut regIe ceUe du principe a appliquer aux contributions. M. Parodi a accepte provisoirement ce point de vue et a propose de soumettre theoriquement ces principes a l'epreuve, en tenant compte de l'evaluation la plus basse. Je ne vois vraiment pas queUe objection le representant de l'URSS pourrait soulever a l'encontre de la suggestion de M. Parodi, mais, puisque cette derniere n'a nas reussi a modifier le point de vue du repre- '1tant de I'URSS, je ~e vois d'autre solution pour le Conseil que d'adopter la proposition presentee par Sir Alexander Cadogan. J'estime qu'il faut absolument que nous sortions de l'impasse actuelle ou nous a engages la discussion de l'article 11. En insistant sur la necessite d'aboutir a un accord sur la question des contributions des membre~ permanents, le Conseil perd un temps precieux sans avancer dans ses travaux. La meilleure solution, a mon avis, est, selon la suggestion de Sir Alexander Cadogan, d'inviter le Comite d'etat-major a proceder a une evaluation de l'ensemble des Mr. Parodi has provisionally accepted that point of view, and proposed to make a hypothetical test of the principle, taking into consideration the lowest estimate. I do not really perceive what objection the USSR representative might cntertain to that suggestion by Mr. Parodi, but in view of the fact that that suggestion has not succeeded in reconciling the point of view of the USSR representative, I think the only way out for the Council is to accept the proposal made by Sir Alexander Cadogan. . I think it is imperative to get out of the present unpasse into which the discussion of article 11 has led us. The Council, in insisting upon an agreement on the question of the contributions of. the permanent members, is wasting much time WIthout making any progress. To my mind the best. course to follow is, according to the suggestIo~ .of Sir Alexander Caclogan, to instruct t~e MIlItary Staff Committee to make an evaluatIon of overall land, sea and air forces, and the After all, the most essential part of our work is to arrive at an evaluation of the size of the force needed in the present situation. That estimate of the overall force, once obtained, might even facilitate our task of reaching a consensus of opinion on the matter of contributions. It also seems more logical to ascertain in the first place the size of the force before taking a decision on how this force shall be procured. I therefore support the proposal made by the representative of the United Kingd.om. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Re- M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques sociapublics) (translated from Russian): The prolistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): La propoposal tabled by the United Kingdom representasition que nous a soumise le representant du tive is similar to that made by the French repre- Royaume-Uni est de meme nature que celle du sentative. The only difference is that the United representant de la France. Elle n'en differe que Kingdom proposal is somewhat more constricted. Ipar son cadre plus etroit. Ce que j'ai dit de la Therefore my statement on the French proposal proposition fran~aise s'applique done egalement also applies to the United Kingdom proposal. a celle du representant du Royaume-Uni. Nous We must not use hypothetical figures, make up ne devrions pas operer avec des chiffres hypohypothetical estimates, based on hypothetical thetiques, pour faire des ca1culs hypothetiques, conditions, thus arriving at hypothetical results. fondes sur des conditions hypothetiques et qui I cannot see how agreement can 'be reached if aboutiraient a des resultats hypothetiques. Je the whole thing is based on a hypothesis. Armed ne vois pas comment nous pouvons parvenir a forces are a reality, not a hypothesis. No progress un accord si nous batissons tout sur des hypocan be made on the basis of hypotheses only theses. Les forces armees constituent une realite unless agreement is first reached on the general et n'ont rien d'hypothetique. Si nous ne nous principles. entendons pas sur les principes fondamentaux, si nous nous basons uniquement sur des hypotheses, nous ne pourrons pas aller de l'avant. Je voudrais ajouter quelques mots. Dans un certains sens, la proposition britannique va plus loin que celle du representant de la France, bien que son cadre soit plus etroi.t. Cette proposition prevoit les memes recommandations du Comite d'etat-major au Conseil de securite. Mais comment peut-on, je vous le demande, elaborer ces recommandations sans que l'accord se soit fait sur les principes fondamentaux? Je ne vois pas tres bien comment, dans ces conditions, le Comite d'etat-major pourrait preparer des recommandations. I should like to add a few words. Although the United Kingdom proposal is more constricted than the French one, in some ways it goes further. It provides for the same recommendations to be made by the Military Staff Committee to the Security Council. I should like to know how such recommendations can 'be produced without agreement on the basic principles having first been reached. I cannot understand how, in such circumstances, the Military Staff Committee can prepare recommendations. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) To that I would only say, so far as I can under- (traduit de l'anglais): Je n'ai sur ce point stand it, that even assuming we had agreed on qu'une seule chosearepondre: c'est que meme en article 11, it does not make it any easier to supposant que nous nous soyons mis d'accord arrive at a total overall figure, and that is somesur l'article 11, cela ne nous aiderait aucunement thing we have to arrive at one day. Article 11 a fixer le chiffre total des forces armees, ce qu'il deals with the apportionment of the total overall faudra bien faire un jour. L'article 11 traite de la figure among the five permanent members. repartition du total entre les cinq membres per- Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : The reason for which I presented this proposal was that difficulty had been caused by the fact that the suggestion of the French representative went a little too far and too fast. It attempted to settle the allocation of the forces among the five permanent members. I thought that we ought to proceed by stages, and that the first stage would be to attempt to get a united single figure recommended by the Military Staff Committee, four members of which have made provisional estimates already. I think that if we could get that first, it would be easier to get on to the next stage; indeed, I think it would be logical first to get the total figure before we try to find a solution to the problem of how that total force should be allocated among the five permanent members. I definitely meant to go only as far as the first step. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): J'ai presente cette proposition parce que celle du representant de la France avait cree des difficultes en allant un peu trop loin et trop rapidement. Elle tendait a resoudre la question de la repartition des forces armees entres les cinq membres permanents. Je pensais qu'il convenait de proceder par etapes et que la premiere etape serait d'essayer d'aboutir a un seul chiffre, recommande par le Comite d'etat-major; dont quatre membres ont deja etabli des evaluations provisoires. Il me semble que si nous pouvions trancher cette question en premier lieu, nous passerions plus aisement au stade suivant; d'autre part, il me parait logique d'arreter le chiffre total avant d'essayer de resoudre le probleme de la repartition de l'ensemble des forces armees entre les cinq membres permanents. Je n'ai jamais eu l'intention d'aller au dela de la premiere etape.

As the representative of POLAND, I should like to put a question to the representative of the United Kingdom with a view to clearing up one point in my mind. At the last meeting, I expressed my sympathy. with' the suggestion of the representative of France, and, at an earlier stage, I supported another suggestion by the representative of the United Kingdom. In both cases I understood-I think all of us understood because it was made rather explicit-that any figures submitted would be of a purely tentative character so that what we did would really be experimental. There were certain criticisms made that the principle of equality is impracticable, and, for purely experimental purposes, we wanted to see how far such criticism was justified. Reading the proposal submitted in writing by the representative of the United Kingdom, I have doubts whether it does not really go much further, and I should like to Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : En qualite de representant de la POLOGNE, je desirerais poser une questic-" au representant du Royaume- Uniafin d'elucider un certain point. A la seance precedente, j'ai exprime ma sympathie pour la proposition du representant de la France; pre, cedemment, j'avais appuye une autre proposition soumise par le representant du Royaume-Uni. Dans l'un et l'autre cas, j'ai compris - comme nous l'avons, je crois, tous fait, etant donne que c'etait assez explicite - que les chillres proposes n'auraient qu'un caractere provisoire, ce qui revient a dire que nous nous livrerions en realite a une experience. Des critiques avaient ete formuIees contre le principe de l'egalite qui, disaiton, etait impossible a appliquer; a simple titre d'experience, nous voulions savoir jusqu'a que! point ces critiques etaient fondees. Je me demande, en'lisant la proposition soumise par ecrit par le representant du Royaume-Uni, si cette dermere ne va pas en realite beaucoup plus loin, et je voudrais savoir si mon interpretation est exacte. A mon avis, on pourrait en deduire - et ce serait la une interpretation raisonnable du texte - que nous demandons bien davantage au Comite d'etat-major, que nous lui demandons en fait de formuler une recomman- ~now if my interpretation is correct. As I see it, It could be read, and it could be the normal inter~retation of the wording to say that we are a!!~mg the Military Staff Committee for sometlimg much more; namely, to make a definite and binding recommendation that such and such should be the overall strength and composition ,I'1'f.....',•."" Mr. PARODI (France) (translated from French): I should like to speak before the United Kingdom representative, for what I have to say reftrs to the statement just made by the President. Indeed, the latter has expressed, more clearly than I did myself just now, my hesitation as regards the text of the United Kingdom proposal. I wonder if it is not this proposal that goes a little further and a little faster, perhaps a little too far and a little too fast. As I see it, we should keep within the borders of the discussion of article 11 regarding the principles of comparability and equality-I have not lost hope of seeing the Security Council reach agreement in this discussion on principles-and I feel it would be useful to make, purely hypothetically, an experiment and a study of one concrete case, i.e.} one of the estimates provided, and then revert to article 11 and try to reach agreement. If we came to an agreement, the question would be referred to the Military Staff Committee, in order that the latter might, -in the light of our decisions on principles, succeed in drawing up an estimate. If, however, we ask the Military Staff Committee to determine the figures, I do not see how we could subsequently retum to article 11. How can we, in order to get closer to equality and comparability, amend an estimate which has been agreed upon in the Military Staff Committee? I put this question to the United Kingdom representative. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): Perhaps I did not express myself very well on paper and, perhaps, my proposal in writing is a little optimistic. What I wished to do was to suggest that the Council should convey a request or an instruction to the members of the Military Sta!f Committee that they pursue the discussion amongst themselves on the question of the total overall strength which can be estimated and has been estimated, provisionally, by four delegations, without reference to the principle of article 11. I thought that if we could obtain a suggested figure from the Military Staff Committee, that might be the first step towards agreement on the actual allocation of the forces amongst the five permanent members. If that has given rise to any misunderstanding, I might say I have used the expression "overall strength and composition" in the text I submitted and, by "composition", I meant simply the overall land, sea and air strength to be given certain figures. I did not intend "composition" to indicate at all the manner in which the composition should be allocated among the five permanent members. If any change in wording would make this easier of acceptance, we could, no doubt, find a formula. All I meant was that M. PARODI (France): Je desire parler avant le representant du Royaume-Uni, car ce que j'ai a dire se refere a la declaration que vient de faire le President. Ce demier, en effet, a exprime plus clairement que je ne l'avais fait moi-meme tout a l'heure l'hesitation que j'eprouve devant le texte de la proposition britannique. Je me demande si ce n'est pas cette proposition qui va un peu plus loin et un peu plus vite, et, peutetre, un peu trop loin et un peu trop vite. Dans ma pensee, nous restions dans le cadre de la discussion de l'article 11 portant sur les principes d'equivalence et d'egalite - je n'ai nullement renonce a l'espoir de voir le Conseil de securite aboutir a un accord dans cette discussion de principes - et il me semblait utile de faire a titre purement hypothetique une experience, un travail sur un cas concret, c'est-a-dire sur l'une des estimations foumies, pour ensuite revenir a l'article 11 et essayer de nous mettre d'accord. Si nous nous etions mis d'accord, la question aurait ete renvoyee au Comite d'etat-major pour que ce dernier, a la lumiere de nos decisions sur les principes, put aboutir a l'etabIissement d'une estimation. Mais si nous donnons pour tache au Comite d'etat-major d'arreter des chiffres, je ne vois pas comment nous pourrons ensuite revenir a -I'article 11. D'autre part, comment pourronsnous, pour nous rapprocher de l'egaIite et de l'equivalence, corriger une evaluation qui aura obtenu un accord au Comite d'etat-major? Je soumets la question au representant du Royaume-Uni. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de fanglais): Il se peut que ma proposition ne soit pas tres bien redigee, ou que, sous forme ecrite, elle soit un peu trop optimiste. Mon . intention etait de suggerer au ConseiI d'inciter les membres du Comite d'etat-major a poursuivre la discussion sur la question de l'effectif total qu'il est possible d'evaluer, qui a ete evalue a titre provisoire par quatre delegations, sans tenir compte du principe enonce a l'articIe 11. Je pensais que si le Comite d'etat-major pouvait nous proposer un chiffre, ce serait peutetre la un premier pas vers un accord .sur la repartition effective des forces armees entre les cinq membres permanents. S'il en est decoule· quelque malentendu, c'est peut-etre parce que je me suis servi dans le texte que j'ai soumis de l'expression "effectif total et composition", mais par "composition", je n'avais en vue que la fixation de certains chiffres concemant l'effectif d'ensemble des forces terrestres, ~avales et aeriennes. Je n'entendais pas, en employant le terme "composition" indiquer aucunement le mode de repartition de cette composition entre les cinq membres permanents. I Si une modification de redaction pouvait faci- I really wonder if an instruction to the Military Staff Committee to make every effort to reach an agreement on an estimate-it is all it would be since no recommendation would be binding-would not help the subsequent discussion. I do not know whether an instruction to the Military Staff Committee to endeavour to submit an agreed estimate of the figure would be easier or not.

I should like to make an observation that should not be interpreted as a criticism of the proposal presented by the representative of the United Kingdom, but merely as an appraisal of its consequences concerning our procedure. Until now we have been discussing the report of the Military Staff Committee which contained the general principles governing the organization of the armed forces to be made available to the Security Council. I think it was tacitly understood that the procedure of the Security Council and of the Military Staff Committee would be this: that we first agree on the general principles and, after that, go on to the next stage, the determination of figures of overall contributions, special apportionment among different Member States, and so on. I should like to add that all former estimates given, and the one proposed now by the representative of France, were all of a tentative character in order to help us to reach an agreement and to make up our minds on these general principles. Now it seems that the adoption of the proposal presented by the representative of the United Kingdom would imply a change of this procedure; that is, before we had reached agreement on these principles, we would ask the Military Staff Committee to make decisions on the overall strength. I want to make it quite clear that this is not a statement in favour of or aga!nst the proposal of the representative of the Umted Kingdom; this statement is merely to make clear to the Council what the implications of the suggested procedure are. Mr. HSIA (China): I am in favour of the prop?sal made by Sir Alexander Cadogan for the slll1ple reason that, as he has explained, since we have already adopted articles 5 and 6, we are really in a position where we can ask for overall figures. . Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je voudrais presenter une obs~rvation qu'on ne doit pas interpreter comme une critique de la proposition soumise par le representant du Royaume- Dni, mais plutot comme une appreciation des consequences que cette proposition peut avoir 'd J ,. , sur notre proce ure. usqu a present, nous avons discute le rapport du Comite d'etat-major qui contenait les principes generaux regissant l'organisation des forces armees qui doivent etre mises a la disposition du Conseil de securite. Je crois qu'il etait tacitement entendu que le Conseil de securite ei le Comite d'etat-major adopteraient la procedure suivante: aboutir d'abord a un accord sur les principes generaux et, au cours d'une etape ulterieure, fixer le chiffre des contributions totales, la repartition entre les differents Etats Membres, et ainsi de suite. Je voudrais egalement indiquer que toutes les evaluations anterieures, ainsi que celle que vient de soumettre le representant de la France, presentaient toutes un caractere provisoire et etaient destinees a nous aider a realiser un accord et a prendre une decision au sujet des principes generaux en question. L'adoption de la proposition soumise par le representant du Royaume-Uni impliquerait une modification de cette procedure, car, avant meme d'avoir abouti a un accord sur ces principes, nous demanderions deja au Comite d'etat-major de prendre des decisions concernant l'effectif total. Je tiens a preciser que je ne parle ni pour ni contre la proposition du representant du Royaume-Uni; je me borne simplement a indiquer au Conseil quelles peuvent etre les consequences de la procedure proposee. M. HSIA (Chine) (traduit de l'anglais): Je me prononce en faveur de la proposition presentee par Sir Alexander Cadogan, et ceci, comme il l'a indique lui-meme, pour la simpleraison qu'ayant deja adopte les articles 5 et 6 nous pouvons maintenant effectivement demander qu'un chiffre total nous soit foumi. The Military Staff Committee may give us five different answers, or it may present a majority report and a minority report. If it. presented figures on which it had agreed, that would be fine. All we are thinking of is the final figure, but we may not get that. However, we may receive a report which will give us some useful indication. Some of the members of the Council are concerned over the fact that the Military Staff Committee ma,y not present a final figure. It is possible, however, that the Military Staff Committee may be in a position to agree on a figure. In that case, we should probably allow a little more time. It is my feeling that 5 August would be too soon; that is a suggestion which I should like to make. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated from French): I shall be very brief. The United Kingdom representative's proposal reproduces, in almost identical terms, the text of the first of the two questions put by the Security Council to the Military Staff Committee on 26 June.' I interpret this proposal as an invitation to the Military Staff Committee to make a fresh effort to reach agreement in framing this estimate. On 26 June we asked the Military Staff Committee to give us its reply by the 30th of the same month. We are now fixing the date at 5 August. This reply may show agreement, or, perhaps, the disagreement will persist; in either case, I think we could then adopt the very sensible proposal made by the representative of France. Mr. PARODI (France) (translated from French): I agree with the interpretation given by the Belgian representative to the question concerned, if Sir Alexander Cadogan also agrees to interpret it in this fashion. Accordingly, the Staff Committee will again be asked the question which was put to it about a fortnight ago and will be given a little more time to try to reach agreement. It will be understood, however, that the estimate submitted to us will not represent a definite figure, but will merely be a working basis for us, not binding on the Military Staff Committeeitself. In these circumstances I feel we Le Comite d'etat-major peut nous donner cinq reponses differentes, il peut aussi nous presenter un rapport de majorite et un rapport de minorite. Si le Comite d'etat-major nous soumet des chiffres sur lesquels il s'est mis d'accord, tant mieux. Nous ne pensons qu'au chiffre definitif; or il n'est pas certain qu'on nous le fournisse. Mais il se peut que nous recevions un rapport qui nous donne des indications utiles. Certains membres du Conseil craignent que le Comite d'etat-major ne soumette pas de chiffre definitif. 11 est possible, toutefois, que le Comite d'etat-major soit en mesure de se mettre d'accord sur un chiffre. Dans ce cas, il y aurait probablement lieu de iui laisser un delai un peu plus long. Le 5 aout me parait une date trop rapprochee. Telle est la suggestion que je voulais formuler. M. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgique): Je serai tres bref. La proposition du representant du Royaume-Uni reprend, a peu pres dans les memes termes, le texte de la premiere des deux questions que le Conseil de securite avait posces au Comite d'etat-major le 26 juin'. J'interprete cette proposition comme tendant a inviter le Comite d'etat-major a faire un nouvel effort pour se mettre d'accord en vue d'etablir cette estimation. Le 26 juin, nous avions demande au Comite d'etat-major de nous donner sa reponse pour le 30 du meme mois. Maintenant, nous lui fixons la date du 5 aout. Cette reponse pourra manifester un accord ou, peut-etre, laissera subsister un desaccord; dans I'une ou l'autre hypothese, nous pourrons, me semble-toil, reprendre alors la tres utile proposition formulee par le representant de la France. M. PARODI (France): Je suis d'accord avec l'interpretation donnee par le representant de la Belgique a la question posee, si Sir Alexander Cadogan est, lui aussi, bien d'accord pour l'interpreter de cette mmiiere. Il s'agit done de poser a nouveau au Comite d'etat-major la question qui lui avait deja ete soumise il y a une quinzaine de jours, et de lui laisser un peu plus de temps pour essayer de se met~re d'accord. Mais il serait alors entendu que I'evaluation qui nous serait fournie ne constituerait pas un chiffre definitif, mais seulement, pour nous, une base de travail qui ne lierait pas le Comite d'etat- If the Military Staff Committee failed to agree to take a single estimate as a basis of work, I think we should then ask it-and in saying this I come back completely to my previous proposal -to take as a hypothesis the lowest and the highest of the estimates provided. In the case of the lowest estimate, the Committee would tell us how the principle of equality with exceptions would work. In the case of the highest, it would tell us how the principle of comparability would work. I agree that in this form the question would be a longer one to draft. Perhaps we might leave the question undecided today and briefly revert to it at a forthcoming meeting, after we have tried to reach preliminary agreement on the exact wording of the question, one which would take account of the observations made this morning. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I have already pointed out that, in some ways, the United Kingdom proposal goes further than the French proposal, as it envisages a recommendation from the Military Staff Committee to the Security Council, which, as matters stand, the Military Staff Committee cannot make. I should further like to point out to the Council that the procedure envisaged in this proposal is contrary to that so far adopted by the Security Council. So far we have worked on the assumption that the Security Council would consider the question of general principles, and that any instructions given to the Military Staff Committee would refer to matters of general principle and not to any other questions. The Security Council instructed the Military Staff Committee to submit a report on its proposals regarding the general principles, whereas the p~esent resolution, submitted by the United Kmgdom representative, involves a radical change in the procedure hitherto followed. This resolution recommends us to start our work from the end. I do not think that such serious matters s?~uld be approached so lightly. We took a de- CISIon in principle, and in accordance with.that decision the Military Staff Committee submitted a repo~t on the general principles, and now we are. bemg. invited to consider another question, s:ttmg asIde the question of the general prin- CIples. This is considered a method which will lead to agreement. In fact it is just the opposite M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du l'usse): J'ai deja dit qu'a un certain point de vue la proposition britannique allait plus loin que celle du representant de la France, car dIe prevoit que le Comite d'etat-major devra presenter des recommandations au Conseil de securite, ce qu'il est incapable de faire dans les circonstances actuelles. En outre, je voudrais faire observer au Conseil de securite que la methode preconisee dans cette proposition n'est pas compatible avec celle que le Conseil a suivie jusqu'a present. Jusqu'ici il etait entendu que le Conseil de securite examinerait la EJuestion des principes fondamentaux; aussi les instructions qu'il donnait au Comite d'etat-major concernaient ces principes, et rien d'autre. Le Conseil de securite avait charge le Comite d'etat-major de lui soumettre un rapport sur les propositions que celui-ci avait a faire au sujet des principes fondamentaux, et voici que maintenant la resolution presentee par le representant britannique prevoit un changement radical dans la methode que nous avion~ suivie jusqu'a present. Dans cette resolution, on nous propose de commencer notre travail par la fin. Nous ne pouvons,· il me semble, traiter de questions aussi graves avec tant de Iegerete. Nous avons pris une decision de principe, et c'est conformement a cette decision que le Comite d'etat-major a prepi.re un rapport sur les principes fondamentaux; or, on nous propose maintenant d'examiner une autre question, en mettant de cote la question des principes fon": damentaux. On pretend que c'est la une me- 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securite, Deuxieme Annee, Supplement No 13, Annexe 36. I wish to quote a brief passage from the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 13 February 1947. It reads as follows: ". . . to submit to the Security Council not later than 13 April 1947 its recommendations with regard to the basic principles which should govern the organization of the United Nations Armed Forces:"

We have another meeting at 3p.m. The hour is now rather late and, consequently, we will have to adjourn this meeting. This afternoon the Security Council will continue its discussion of the Greek question. HUNDRED AND FIFTY-EIGHTH M£ETING Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 15 July 1947, at 3 p.m. President: Mr. O. LANGE (Poland). iif"""".,c""" ..~~",,~ Present: The representatives of the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, Colombia, France, Poland, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. 219. Provisional agenda (document 5/413) 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. The Greek question: report by the Commis- sion of Investigation concerning Greek Fron- tier Incidents to the Security Council (docu- ment S/360): 220. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. 221. Continuation of the discussion on the Greek question . Mr. PARODl (France) (transl....;,d from French): When we began the exami .ation of the Greek question a few weeks ago, we already appreciated its gravity-a gravity still further accentuated by the news contained in press Je voudrais dter un court passage de la resolution adoptee par le Conseil de securite en date du 13 fevrier 1947; il est ainsi libelle: ". . . de soumettre au Conseil de securite, le 30 avriI 1947 au plus tard, ses recommandations en ce qui concerne les prindpes fondamentaux qui doivent regir l'organisation de la force ' armee des Nations Unies 1". Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Nous avons une autre seance a 15 heures. II se fait tard, il nous faut donc lever la seance. Cet apres-midi, le Conseil de securite poursuivra la discussion de la question grecque. La seance est levee a13 h. 20. CENT-CINQUANTE-HunSEME SEANCE Tenue a Lake Success, New·York, le mardi 15 juiUet 1947, a 15 heures. President: M. O. LilNGE (Pologne). Presents: Les representants des pays suivants: Australie, Belgique, Bresil, Chine, Colombie, France, Pologne, Syrie, Union des Republiques soclalistes sovietiques, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Uni~ d'Amerique. 219. Ordre du iour prOVISOlre (document 5/413) 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour. 2. La question grecque: rapport presente au Conseil de securite par la Commission d'en- quete sur les incidents survenus a la frontiere grecque (document 8/360)". 220. Adoption de I'ordre du iour L'ordre du jour est adopte. 221. Suite de la discussion sur la question grecque M. PARODl (France): Lorsque nous avons commence, il y a queIques semaines, I'examen de la question grecque, nous en mesurions deja la gravite: elIe est davantage encore souIignee par les nouvelles que nous ont apportees les 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de secu- rite, Deuxieme Annee, No 13. Australia-Australie H. A. Goddard Pty. Ltd. 255a George Street SYDNEY, N. S. W. Philippines D. P. Perez Co. 132 Riverside SAN JUAN Sweden-Suede A.-B. C. E. Fritzes KungI. HofbokhandeI Fredsgatan 2 STOCKHOLM Switzerland-Suisse Librairie Payot S. A. Belgium-Belgique Agence et Messageries de la Presse, S. A. 14-22 rue du Persil BRUXELLES Finland-Finlande Akateeminen Kirjakauppa 2, Keskuskatu HELSINKI France Editions A. Pedone 13, rue SoufHot PARIS, Ve Bolivia-Bolivie Librena CientHica y Literaria Avenida 16 de JuIio, 216 CasiIla 972 LA PAZ Greece-Grece "Eleftheroudakis" Librairie internationale Place de la Constitution ATHENES LAUSANNE,GENEVE,VEVE~ MONTREUX, NEUCHATEL, BERNE, BASEL Hans Raunhardt Kirchgasse 17 ZURICH I Syria-Syrie Librairie universeIIe DAMAS Turkey-Turquie Librairie Hachette 469 Istiklal Caddesi BEYOGLU-IsTANBUL Canada The Ryerson Press 299 Queen Street West TORONTO Guatemala Jose Goubaud Goubaud & CIa Ltda. Sucesor 5a Av. Sur No. 6 y 9a C. P. GUATEMALA Haiti-Haiti Max Bouchereau Librairie "A la Caravelle" BOlte postale 111-B PORT-Au-PRINcE Chile-Chili Edmundo Pizarro Merced 846 SANTIAGO China-Chine The Commercial Press Ltd. 211 Honan Road SHANGHAI Union of South Africa Union Sud-Africaine Central News Agency Ltd. Commissioner & Rissik Sts. JOHANNESBURG, CAPETOWN, DURBAN (:osta Rica-Costa-Rica Trejos Hermanos Apartado 1313 SAN JOSE India-lnde Oxford Book & Stationery Co. Scindia House NEW DELHI Cuba La Casa Belga Rene de Smedt O'ReiIly· 455 LA lIABANA Iran Bongahe Piaderow 731 Shah Avenue TEHERAN Iraq-lf'ak Mackenzie & Mackenzie The Bookshop BAGHDAD United Kingdom Royaume-Uni H.M. Stationery Office P.O. Box 569 LONDON, S.E. 1 and at H.M.S.O. Shops at LONDON, EDINBURGH, MANCHESTER, CARDIFF, BELFAST and BRISTOL Czechoslovakia Tchecoslovaquie F. Topic Narodni Trida 9 PRAHA 1 Lebanon-Liban Librairie universeIIe BEYROUTH United States of America Etats-Unis d'Amerique International Documents Service Columbia University Press 2960 Broadway NEW YORK 27, N. Y. Yugoslavia-Yougoslavie Drzavno Preduzece Jugoslovenska Knjiga Moskovska UI. 36 BEOGRAD Denmark-Danemark Einar Munskgaard Norregade 6 KJOBENHAVN Luxembourg Librairie J. Schummer Place GuiIIaume LUXEMI30URG .Dominican Republic Republique DomitJ,;caine Librerla Dominicana Calle Mercedes No. 49 Apartado 656 CIUDAD TRUJILLO Netherla.nds-Pays-Bas N. V. Martinus Nijhoff Lange Voorhout 9 S'GruWENHAGE