S/PV.158 Security Council

We have another meeting at 3p.m. The hour is now rather late and, consequently, we will have to adjourn this meeting. This afternoon the Security Council will continue its discussion of the Greek question. HUNDRED AND FIFTY-EIGHTH M£ETING Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 15 July 1947, at 3 p.m. President: Mr. O. LANGE (Poland). iif"""".,c""" ..~~",,~ Present: The representatives of the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, Colombia, France, Poland, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. 219. Provisional agenda (document 5/413) 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. The Greek question: report by the Commis- sion of Investigation concerning Greek Fron- tier Incidents to the Security Council (docu- ment S/360): 220. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. 221. Continuation of the discussion on the Greek question . Mr. PARODl (France) (transl....;,d from French): When we began the exami .ation of the Greek question a few weeks ago, we already appreciated its gravity-a gravity still further accentuated by the news contained in press Je voudrais dter un court passage de la resolution adoptee par le Conseil de securite en date du 13 fevrier 1947; il est ainsi libelle: ". . . de soumettre au Conseil de securite, le 30 avriI 1947 au plus tard, ses recommandations en ce qui concerne les prindpes fondamentaux qui doivent regir l'organisation de la force ' armee des Nations Unies 1". Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Nous avons une autre seance a 15 heures. II se fait tard, il nous faut donc lever la seance. Cet apres-midi, le Conseil de securite poursuivra la discussion de la question grecque. La seance est levee a13 h. 20. CENT-CINQUANTE-HunSEME SEANCE Tenue a Lake Success, New·York, le mardi 15 juiUet 1947, a 15 heures. President: M. O. LilNGE (Pologne). Presents: Les representants des pays suivants: Australie, Belgique, Bresil, Chine, Colombie, France, Pologne, Syrie, Union des Republiques soclalistes sovietiques, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Uni~ d'Amerique. 219. Ordre du iour prOVISOlre (document 5/413) 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour. 2. La question grecque: rapport presente au Conseil de securite par la Commission d'en- quete sur les incidents survenus a la frontiere grecque (document 8/360)". 220. Adoption de I'ordre du iour L'ordre du jour est adopte. 221. Suite de la discussion sur la question grecque M. PARODl (France): Lorsque nous avons commence, il y a queIques semaines, I'examen de la question grecque, nous en mesurions deja la gravite: elIe est davantage encore souIignee par les nouvelles que nous ont apportees les 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de secu- rite, Deuxieme Annee, No 13. We have to be objective, for the graver the situation the more imperative is the need to analyse and understand it exactly. It is the duty of the States concerned not to let their suscepti- bilities as sovereign nations take precedence of all else and not to give considerations of prestige pride of place above a concern for international order requisite to the maintenance of peace. We must have the will to maintain the authority of the United Nations in the eyes of the world, and not follow the course of weakness which in the past led to the collapse of the League of Nations. At the same time we ourselves should beware of becoming over-sensitive to considera- tions of prestige. Such considerations, even on the part of an international organization, seldom serve the cause of peace. Finally we should adhere to the course of action laid upon us by the Charter, namely to seek first of all to settle disputes by reconciling and harmonizing points of view, so that the graver and more complicated the question, the more careful should we be in tackling it and in approaching the nations concerned. Part I of the report submitted to us by the Commission of Investigation contains an analysis . or enumeration of the contradictory allegations made before the Commission, and of the testi- mony which the Commission gathered. Speakers in this debate have already pointed out what a confused impression is left by this P:'lft I of the report. The clearest idea which the reader· gathers is that of the extreme difficulty 6f the Commission's task in the face of testimony which ~ every case involved questions of reliability and mdependence. One may add, however, that this !estimony seems, in the last analysis, rather slight m content. My personal conviction that aid was given by !he nei&,hbours of Greece to the partisans fight- mg agamst her Government is based less on the testim?ny given to this effect than on a priori reasonmg from the frontier incidents. These in- c~~ents have, in the form of reciprocal accusa- tions, been admitted by all the countries con- c.erned. It seems to me quite unlikely that fron- tier guards who e.xchange shots so often would not, .a fortiori, wink at the operations of Greek p~rtlS~ns: or encourage them. But to say that this md v-:as actually given still leaves quite open the question of how substantial it was whether it involved the responsibility of the Go~ernments concerned more than did the frontier incidents It is very difficult, in a situation whose extreme complexity the Commission has rightly empha- sized, to formulate an opinion which does not lend itself to criticism. The French member of the Commission of Investigation and, with slight variations, two of his colleagues, have accord- ingly suggested' to the Commission another course. I notice that most of the members of the Security Council who have spoken have more or less adopted this other course. The United States resolution which has been circulated passes no verdict on what has happened, and the representative of the United Kingdom has also agreed that what was important was not to pass judgment on the past, but rather to find a remedy for the situation in the future. It is this line of action that I, too, would urge the Security Council to follow. It is quite certain-this can be deduced, with- out leaving room for doubt, from the Commis- sion's entire report-that a situation disquieting for world peace has developed on the northern frontier of Greece. We know from many exam- ples what a danger to peace domestic strife presents at a time when ideologies are so impas- sioned and extend so far beyond national fron- tiers. The internal situation in Greece creates a sort of low-pressure zone which cannot but be to her neighbours holding diametrically opposite views a constant temptation to intervene or to allow intervention by the refugees who are on their territory. The Security Council must face this situation squarely, weigh its dangers and appraise its complexity. I reciproque de refugies grecs chez ceux-ci, la violence et l'ampleur de la propagande. Peut-ctre serait-il legitime d'ajouter les carac- teres geographiques et historiques de cette region, avec ses melanges de populations, ses rivalites locales, ses souvenirs des luttes passees. Peut-ctre aussi la Commission aurait-elle pu attirer davan- tage rattention sur le phenomene de la Resis- tance, qui s'est retrouve avec tant de traits communs dans tous les pays occupes et qui me semble si difficile a apprecier et a comprendre exactement pour les pays qui n'ont pas connu I'occupation. 11 est trcs difficile, en presence d'une situation dont la Commission a ainsi, a juste titre, sou- ligne l'extrcme complexite, de formuler un juge- ment qui ne prete pas a la critique. Aussi, le membre fran~ais de la Commission d'enqucte, et, avec des nuances, deux de ses collegues, avaient-ils propose a la Commission une autre voie. Je relcve que la pIu part des membres du Conseil de securite qui ont pris la parole se sont plus ou moins engages clans cette autre voie. La resolution cles Etats-Unis, qui nous a ete distribuee, ne formule aucun jugement sur le passe et le representant du Royaume-Uni a repris a son compte l'idee que I'essentiel n'etait pas d'apprecier le passe, mais de remedier a la situation pour l'avenir. C'est dans cette direction qu'a mon tour je voudrais presser le Conseil de securite de s'engager. Il est tres certain - ceci se degage, sans lais- ser place au cloute, de tout le rapport de la Commission - qu'une sitl'.:ttion inquietante pour la paix du mande s'est formee a la fron- tiere nord de la Grccc. Nous savons, par assez d'exemples, quel danger les luttes interieures pre- sentent pour la paix a une epoque allies ideo- logies sont si passionnees et debordent si large- ment les fronticres. La situation interieure de la Grece cree une sorte de zone de basse pres- sion qui ne peut manquer d'ctre pour ses voisins, tenants d'une ideologie opposee, une tentation constante d'intervenir, ou de laisser intervenir les rCfugies qui se trouvent sur leur territoire. Le Conseil de securite doit regarder cette situa- tion en face, en mesurer les dangers et en apprecier la complexite. The statements made to the Council have indicated acceptance, by at least one of Greece's neighbours, of this part of the recommendations, and goodwill to carry them·out. I should like to see the other countries border- ing on Greece bringing us also something other than discussions of testimony, and I wish that, looking to the future rather than to the past, they might assure us that their Governments will do all in their power to implement this section of the recommendations of the Commission's report. In its role of conciliator, which I feel should be the essential function of the new body it is suggested to set up, it should have the greatest possible moral authority. The question arises whether it would not be to the advantage of this body to hav~ a smaller membership than that of the Commission whose report we are examining. This, moreover, was how the majority of the <?ommission conceived the body whose estab- hshment it recommended. My personal prefer- ence would have been the other alternative envisaged in the report, namely, that of a single co~missioner, did not the example of the nomi- nation of a governor for Trieste induce the fear that we should encounter the same interminable diffic~lties in reaching agreement on the choice of a smgle commissioner. Without wishing to take a final stand on this matter today, I think that the best solution would be to have a small commission. of from three to five members, for example. As to the Another debatable question is that of a head- quarters for the Commission. If the proposed agency is to play its part as conciliator 'to the full and in a \Fompletely calm atmosphere, it may be better ~or it to have its headquarters outside the trou;ble area. Moreover; the Commission may not need one permanent seati only. It is conceivable that its members ,might be convened for their first meet- ing in Geneva, for example, and that they might themselves de-cide how to move, as cur- rent negotiations required, to Athens, Belgrade, Sofia, Tirana, or Salonika. \ It goes without saying that the Commission, as I see it, should organize, and leave on the spot, observation units: joint or frontier commis- sions or frontier observers, liaison groups, etc. Whichever city might be chosen to be the Commission's headquarters, it would always be removed in time and space from most points on the frontier where the incidents occur. t;,..... One example will suffice: to travel from Salonika to Konitsa takes two hours by plane or several hours by automobile,assuming that weather conditions are favourable. I have stressed the conciliatory role of the Commission. It is, unfortunately, impossible to imagine-and recent reports only confirm us in this opinion-that we can dispense with a body which could carry out new investigations quickly. In my opinion the body to be set up should be invested in advance with the same powers as held by the Commission of Investigation whose report we are examining. Should another serious incident occur, it would itself decide what use to make of its powers in order to keep the Security Council exactly informed and enable the Council to intervene speedily as the situation required. I do not think that the establishment of such a body is open to the legal objections raised here by the representative of Bulgaria: The Security Council would be performing its most ordinary functions in lending its good offices, through this commission or body to be set up, to help in the w?rk of conciliating and I submit these views to the Security Council in the light of the information now available, in the hope that they may contribute to the re- establishment of order, and the dissipation of a grave threat to peace. Mr. HSIA (China): Under Article 34 of the Charter, the Security Council, on 19 December 1946, created a Commission of Investigation to study the frontier violations and disturbances between Greece on the one hand and Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on the other: The Commission went to the Balkans at the beginning of this year and spent several months studying the border conditions. Now the Com- mission has presented to the Security Council a well-documented, carefully worded, and ex- tremely useful report which contains no less than ~50,000 words. On behalf of the Chinese delega- tion, I wish to congratulate the Commission on the accomplishment of an exceedingly difficult and laborious task. The first volume of the report contains four parts. The first part is an analysis of the work of the Commission, and requires no comment. lu~iere des informatiOl~s dont nous disposons actuellement, avec le soud d'aider au retablisse- ment de I'ordre et de faire disparaltre une menace grave contre la paix. M. HSIA (Chine) (traduit de l'anglais): En application de I'Article 34 de la Charte, le Conseil de securite a, le 19 decembre 1946, etabli une Commission d'enquete chargee d'etu- dier les violations de frontiere et les troubles survenus entre la Grece d'une part, l'Albanie, la Bulgarie et la Yougoslavie d'autre part'. La Commission s'est rendue dans les Balkans au debut de cette annee et a consacre plusieurs mois a l'etude des conditions existant le long des frontieres. La Commission a maintenant presente au Conseil de securite un rapport bien docu- mente, soigneusement redige et tTes utile, qui ne contient pas moins de 250.000 mots. Au nom de la delegation chinoise, je tiens a feliciter la Commission pour I'accomplissement d'une tache extremement difficile et ardue. Le premier volume de ce rapport est divise en quatre parties. La premiere partie constitue une analyse du travail de la Commission et n'appelle The third part of the report presents the con- clusions of the Commissiorl. From a survey of evidence, eight members of the Commission reached one set of conclusions, and two mem- bers reached another set. These two sets of con- clusions were diametrically opposed to each other. I shall not weary the Council by discussing in detail the conclusions. I shall merely say that China subscribed to the majority conclusions only after a careful examination of the evidence, and China still subscribes to them. The most valuable part of the report is part IV, in which nine members of the Commission have made a series of proposals and recom- mendations which are designed to reduce the tension in the border areas and, eventually, to restore normal relations among the countries concerned. I shall review briefly this series of five proposals: A. That the Gcvernments of Greece, Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia should abstain from all action which might increase or maintain the tension and unrest in the border areas, and speci~cally should rigorously refrain from any support, overt or covert, of elements in neigh- bourillg countries aiming at the overthrow of the lawful government of those countries. This is a reaffirmation of the provision in the pre- amble of the Charter in which all Members are enjoined "to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours". Furthermore, here we find a timely warning. I quote a passage from page 248 of the report: "In the light of the situatio.'1 investigated by it the Commission believes that, in the area of its investigation, future cases of support of armed bands formed on the territory of one State and crossing into the territory of another State, or of refusal by a Government in spite of the de- mands of the State concerned to take all possible measures on its own territory to deprive such bands of any aid or protection should be con- sidered by the Security Council as a threat to the peace within the meaning of the Charter of the United Nations." B. That with a view to providing effective machinery for the regulation and control of their common frontiers, the Governments concerned should enter into new (rontier conventions. This would revive a political device which was tried and found useful in settling'border disputes be- tween Greece and~Bulgaria. A. Que les Gouvernements de Grece, d'Alba- nie, de Bulgarie et de Yougoslavie s'abstiennent de toute action susceptible d'accroltre ou de maintenir la tension et les troubles dans les re- gions frontalieres et, plus precisement, qu'ils s'abstiennent rigoureusement de fournir ouver- tement ou en secret un appui quelconque aux elements des pays voisins qui cherchent a ren- verser le gouvernement legal de ces pays. Ceci constitue une nouvelle affirmation des disposi- tions du preambule de la Charte dans lequeI tous les Etats Membres s'engagent "a pratiquer la tolerance, a vivre en paix l'un avec l'autre dans un esprit de bon voisinage". En outre, nous nous trouvons ici en presence d'un avertissement opportun. Je cite un passage extrait de la page 258 du rapport: "A la lumiere de la situation examinee par e1Ie, la Commission croit que, dans la zone qui a fait l'objet de son enquete, le Conseil de secu- rite devrait considerer comme une menace a la p~ix dans l'acception de la Charte des Nations Unies les cas suivants: appui fourni dorenavant aux bandes armees formees sur le territoite cl'un Etat et penetrant dans le territoire d'un autre Etat, ou refus par un Gouvernement, en depit de demandes faites par l'Etat interesse, de prendre toutes les mesures possibles sur son propre terri- toire en vue de suspendre toute aide ou protec- tion a des bandes de ce genre." B. Que, en vue d'assurer une reglementation et un controle efficaces de !eurs frontieres com- munes, les Gouvernements interesses concluent de nouvelles conventions frontalieres. Ceci cons- tituerait une nouvelle application de la politique qui fut suivie et qui s'est revelee utile lors du reglement des differends de frontiere entre la Grece et la Bulgarie. D. That the Governments concerned should not permit refugees to indulge in any political or military activities. This is a duty every State owes to-its neighbours. E. That the Governments concerned should study the possible arrangements for the voluntary transfer of minorities. This measure, if carried out, would remove one of the basic causes of the tension and unrest in the Balkans. In the opinion of the Chinese delegation the proposals or recommendations of the majority of the Commission are wise, fair and construc- tive. The recommendations are wise arid pru- dent because they have as a premise the central fact that-I am quoting a passage from page 246 of the report-"... there is the present dis- turbed situation in Greece which is a heritage from the past and the causes of which are to be found in Greece's tragic experience during the war, in her occupation by the Italians, Ger- mans and Bulgarians, in the guerrilla warfare waged during the occupation and the political bitterness and economic difficulties to which this war gave rise". The recommendations are moderate and fair because they are not dependent upon the ques- tion of respective responsibility for the situation, and are quite uninfluenced and unprejudiced by whatever conclusions the Commission may have reached concerning the present unhappy state of affairs. The recommendations are practical and con- structive because they are based upon the simple and undeniable fact that relations between Greece Oh the one hand and Albania, Bulgaria and. Yugoslavia on the other, are very much stramed and there exists a situation highly dan- gerous and explosive. If not alleviated, it might lead to serious international consequences. The Chinese delegation favours and supports these proposals or recommendations because they represent an earnest endeavour on the part of the Security Council-and I quote again from page 246 of the report-"to alleviate and rem- edy" !he Balkan situation; they provide effective machmery that will assist in the establishment of good neighbourly relations and of order and tranquillity in the Balkans; they do not infringe upon the national sovereignty of these States ~d .do not affect matters which are essentially w~thm the domestic jurisdiction of these coun- tr~es; and they are made in strict conformity WIth the spirit and letter of the Charter. Finally, the Chinese delegation submits that the Security Council is completely competent D. Que les Gouvernements inteTesses n'auto- risent pas les refugies a se livrer a des activites politiques ou militaires. C'est la le devoir de tout Etat aI'egard de ses voisins. E. Que les Gouvernements interesses exami- nent la possibilite de prendre des dispositions pour le transfert volontaire des minorites. Cette mesure, si elle e~ait appliquee, ecarterait une des causes fondamentales de la tension et de la situa- tion trouble dans les Balkans. La delegation chinoise estime que les propo- sitions ou les. recommandations de la majorite de la Commission sont sages, justes et cons- tructives. Les recommandations sont sages et pru- dentes parce qu'elles ont pour premisse le fait essentiel que - je cife id un passage extrait de la page 256 du rapport - "... il y a la situation. troublee actuelle de la Grece. Cette situation est un heritage du passe. ElIe a pour cause la tra- gique experience que la Grece a faite pendant la guerre, son occupation par les Italiens, les Alle- mands et les Bulgares, la guerre de francs-tu'eurs pendant )'occupation, et les rancreurs politiques et les difficultes economiques, consequences de la guerre." Les recommandations sont moderees et justes parce qu'elles ne sont pas liees a la question des responsabilites respectivement encourues et qu'el- les ne sont ni I'echo ni le reflet des conclusions, queUes qu'elIes soient, auxquelles la Commission a pu aboutir au sujet de la malheureuse situation actuelle. Les recommandations sont pI atiques et cons- tructives parce qu'elles sont etablies sur le fait simple et indiscutable que les relations sont tres tendues entre la Grece d'une part, I'Albanie, la Bulgarie et la Yougoslavie d'autre part, et qu'il en resulte une situation extremement dangereuse et explosive. Si on n'y porte remede, cette situa- tion peut avoir de serieuses consequences inter- nationales. La delegation chinoise se declare favorable a ces propositions ou recommandations et les appuie parce qu'elles representent un effort sin- cere de la part du Conseil de securite - ainsi qu'il est dit en substance a la page 257 du rapport - pour detendre la situation dans les Balkans et la ramener a la normale; cIles pre- voient les reglementations efficaces qui facilite- ront le retablissement de relations de bon voisi- nage, de I'ordre et de la tranquillite dans les Balkans; cIles ne portent pas atteinte a la sou- verainete nationale de ces Etats et ne touchent pas aux questions qui relevent essentiellement de la competence nationale de ces pays; elles sont formulees en pleine conformite de l'esprit et de la lettre de la Charte. Enfin, la delegation chinoise estime qu'en' vertu de I'Article 36 de la Charte, le Conseil de Mr. LOPEz(Colombia): In the OpInIOn of the Colombian delegation, of all the matters of which the Security Council is seized, the so- called Greek question is perhaps the most im- portant-I mean, of course, at the present time. We have several other very important matters on our agenda, such as the international control of atomic energy, the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, or the report of the Military Staff Committee, but we all under- stand that months, perhaps years, will elapse before any plan is finally agreed upon, and that basic agreement among the major Powers will not come to fruition before the peace settlements with Austria, Germany and Japan have been made. The Security Council must take action on the report of the Commission of Investigation estab- lished by the resolution of 19 December 1946' this very week or the next. We are all keenly conscious of the fact that our decisions are bound to have far-reaching consequences, not only for the Balkan countries, but for the world at large. Unsettled conditions in the Near East continue to be a constant source of anxiety in Europe, and, as things go today, in other continents as well. M. LOPEz (Colombie) (traduit de l'ang1ais) : La delegation colombienne estime que ce qu'on appelle la question grecque est peut-etre la plus importante de toutes les questions dont le Conseil de securite est saisi - je parle, bien entendu, de I'heure presente. Un certain nombre d'autres questions tres importantes sont inscrites a notre ordre du jour, te! que le controle international de l'energie atomique, la reglementation et la reduction des armements et des forces armees ou le rapport du Comite d'etat-major, mais nous comprenons tous que des mois, peut-etre des annees s'ecouleront avant qu'aucun plan soit finalement adopte, et qu'un accord fonda- mental entre les grandes Puissances ne pourra etre mis en reuvre avant que les traites de paix aient pu etre conclus avec l'Autriche, l'Alle- magne et le Japon. Le Conseil de securite doit, cette semaine ou la semaine prochaine, prendre des mesures a la suite du rapport de la Commission d'enquete etablie par la resolution du 19 decembre 1946'. Nous avons tous conscience du fait que nos decisions auront necessairement des repercussions considerables, non seulement dans les pays bal- kaniques, mais dans le monde tout entier. L'ins- tabilite de la situation dans le Proche Orient con- tinue d'etre une source constante d'anxiete pour I'Europe, et, dans l'etat actuel des choses, pour les autres continents egalement. 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de secu- rite, Deuxieme Annee, No 51, 147eme seance. "Ibid., Premiere Annee, Seconde Serie, No 28, 87eme seance. This is not indeed an easy task, however stimulating it may be for detached observers or spectators of the political drama that has been rapidly unfolding in the Near East since the United Kingdom decided to withdraw her mili- tary and financial assistance from Greece. It is considerably more difficult for the major Powers, whose political and eC{)nomic interests are heavily involved. But we realize that if we suc- ceed. in inviting the Security Council to con- sider some aspects of the Greek question which have apparently escaped the eye of its most experienced members, we shall have made a posi- tive contribution to the peace-keeping work of the United Nations. . We are inclined to believe that we may have over-stressed in our discussions the importance of appraising responsibilities for the present situa- tion in Greece, and that in doing so we have greatly reduced our chances of reaching a com- mon ground of understanding as to the action that the Security Council should now take. We believe, in other words, that we are more apt to find a satisfactory solution of the Greek problem if we discuss it from a broader standpoint, plac- ing more emphasis on the need for future co- operation among the Balkan countries than on the origin of their disputes during the last twelve months, whether we examine and pass judgment on them in the light of recent developments or as an outcome of the German invasion and its after-effects. To be sure, the fact that Greece has become the declared or accepted frontier between the West and the East in an ideological war lends ~dded importance to every aspect of· the ques- h.on. Outside the chamber of the Security Coun- cil, the frontier incidents, which until a few days ago had been the subject of our discussions, Ce n'est evidemment pas une tache aisee, bien qu'elle soit passionnante pour des observateurs ou des spectateurs objectifs du drame politique qui s'est developpe rapidement dans le Proche Orient depuis la decision du Royaume-Uni de retirer son aide militaire et financiere a la Grece. Cette tache est beaucoup plus difficile encore pour les grandes Puissances, dont les interets politiques et economiques sont conside~ rablement engages. Mais nous nous rendons compte que, si nous reussissons a inviter le Conseil de securite a considerer certains aspects de la question grecque qui ont apparemment echappe a l'attention de ses membres les plus experimentes, nous aurons apporte une contri- bution positive a I'reuvre du maintien de la paix entreprise par Ies Nations Unies. Nous sommes tentes de croire que nous avons pu exagerer, au cours de nos discussions, le sou- ci de peser les responsabilites de la situation actuelle en Grece et que, en 3.gissant de la sorte, nous avons considerablement reduit nos chances d'aboutir a un terrain d'entente pour l'examen des mesures que le Conseil de securite devrait prendre maintenant. Nous croyons, en d'autres termes, qu'il nous serait plus aise de trouver une solution satisfaisante au probleme grec si nous l'examinions d'un point de vue plus large, en mettant davantage l'accent sur la necessite d'une cooperation ulterieure entre les pays balkaniques plut6t que sur I'origine de leurs differends au cours des douze derniers mois, examines et juges a la lumiere des derni~rs developpements, ou bien consideres comme les resultats de l'invasion alle- mande et de ses contre-coups. A coup sur, le fait que la Grece est devenue la frontiere declaree ou acceptee entre l'Ouest et I'Est, dans une guerre ideologique, augmente l'importance de chacun des aspects de la ques- tion. En dehors de la salle du Conseil de securite, les incidents de frontiere qui, jusqu'a ces der- niers jours, ont ete l'objet de nos discussions, ne constituent pas "la question grecque" apropos de laquelle nous lisons dans la presse et enten~ We all know that prompt and effective action by the Security Council is required in order to restore good neighbourly relations among the nations of the Balkan peninsula. The report leaves no doubt in our minds that there exists a situation, the continuance of which is, in fact, likely to endanger the maintenance of interna- tional peace and security. It appears to the Colombian delegation that the first step to be taken by the Security Council at this stage of the dispute should be of a con- ciliatory nature in accordance with Article 37, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Na- tions. We should expect such steps to accomplish their avowed purpose if not only the Govern- ments concerned but also the major Powers which are more directly interested in this situa- tion corroborated by action their oft-repeated declarations of willingness to co-operate with the Security Council. Moreover, in carrying out the recommendations of the Council, the major Powers would have a favourable opportunity to exchange ideas in a cordial atmosphere, with a view to ensuring peace and security in the Balkans. But let us for a moment assume that their co- operation is not forthcoming, and that, on the contrary, the Security Council should find that its efforts are being deliberately thwarted. How would such obstruction to the Council's clear-cut recommendations, entirely free from any taint of recrimination or antagonism, look to the world? Would it enable the Council to know when to take enforcement measures,' sooner or later? Would not then such measures be more readily adopted, even if they were more drastic? The Security Council should recommend to the Governments concerned to renew old fron- tier conventions or to enter into new ones pro- viding for the pacific settlement of frontier in- cidents and disputes. As the presence of refugees in any of the four countries is a disturbing factor, the Security Council should recommend to the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia to remove such refugees as far from the region from which they came as it is practically possible; to segregate them in camps or otherwise; to take effective measures to prevent their participation in any political or military activity. Such camps should be placed under the supervision of the International Refugee Organization or any other body designated by the United Nations. The Security Council should further recom- mend to the Governments of Greece on the one hand, and Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the other, the conclusion of conventions in ord ~r to facilitate the voluntary transfer of minorities and refugees. No one, we think, can seriously object to these provisions. If anything, they fall short of the re- quirements of a comprehensive Balkan conven- tion, such as the Colombian delegation envisaged in my statement of 18 April.' Objections arise, however, to the establishment of a commiss;on for the purpose of helping to carry out these recommendations and of bringing about good neighbourly relations between Greece on the one hand, and Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the other. Opinions differ more widely as to the composition and terms of reference of the com- mission. There seems to be hardly any room for dis- agreement as to the functions of the commission, once the Security Council has decided to estab- lish it. Those functions should be: 1. To use its good offices to assist the Balkan Governments concerned in the negotiation and conclusion of the frontier conventions recom- mended by the Security Council; Le Conseil de securite devrait recorrimander aux Gouvernements interei':ses de renouveler .les anciennes conventions frontalieres ou d'en conclure de nouvelles tendant au reglement pad- fique des incidents et des differends de frontiere. Puisque la presence de re£ugies clans l'un ou l'autre des quatre pays est un facteur de trouble, le Conseil de securite devrait recommander aux Gouvernements de l'AIbanie, de la Bulgarie, de la Grece et de la Y9ugoslavie d'eloigner autant que possible ces refugies de la region dont ils sont originaires, de les rassembler dans des camps ou ailleurs et de pre~dre des mesures efficaces pour empecher leur participation a des activites politiques ou militaires. De tels camps devraient etre places sous la surveillance de I'Organisation internationale pour les re£ugies ou de tout autre organisme designe par les Nations Unies. Le Conseil de securite devrait en outre recom- mander au Gouvernement de la Grece, d'une part, et aux Gouvernements de l'Albanie, de la Bulgarie et de la Yougoslavie, cl'autre part, de conclure des conventions aGn de faciIiter le transfert volontaire des minorites et des re£ugies. Nul ne peut, anotre avis; presenter des objec- tions serieuses a ces dispositions. Si on peut leur reprocher quelque chose, c'est d'etre insuffisantes pour repondre aux necessites d'une convention pour l'ensemble des Balkans, telle que I'envisa- geait la delegation de la Colombie, dont j'ai fait connaitre I'avis dans mon expose du 18 avril'. Toutefois, des objections ont ete formulees relativement a la creation d'une commission destinee a faciliter la mise en application de ces recommandations et a creer des relations de bon voisinage entre la Grece, d'une part, et l'AI- banie, la Bulgarie et la Yougoslavie, d'autre part. Les avis sont plus partages encore au sujet de la composition et du mandat de la commission. n semble que les fQnctions de la commission pourront a peine fournir matiere a desaccord lorsque le Conseil de securite aura decide de la creer. Voici quelles devraient etre ces fonctions: 1. Offrir ses bons offices pour assister les Gou- vernements des pays balkaniques interesses dans I'elaboration et la conclusion des conventions frontalieres recommandees par le Conseii de securite; 3. To use its good offices for the settlement, by the means mentioned in Article 33 of the Char- ter, of: (a) Controversies arising from frontier viola- tions; (b) Controversies directly connected with the application of the frontier conventions recom- mended by the Security Council to the four Gov- ernments concerned; (c) Complaints regarding conditions on the border which may be brought to the attention of the commission by one Government against another; 4. Last, but not least, to assist the Govern- ments concerned in the negotiation and conclu- sion of arrangements for the tl'ansfer of refugees and minorities, if called upon by any of them to supervise the execution of such arrangements, and to act as registration authority for any per- sons desiring to emigrate. It is obvious that for the proper performance of its functions the commission should be ac- credited as an organ of the Security Council to the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia, with tht" right of direct access to them; and, furthermore, that the commission should be empowered to act on either side of the border with the co-operation of the officials and nationals of the four Governments. However, we are not quite convinced that the commission should make its headquarters at Salonika, as it has been suggested. We respect- fully :"ubrnit that the headquarters of the com- mission should be established in a neutral coun- try, in Switzerland, preferably in Geneva. The Colombian delegation is more in favour of hav- ing the commission located outside the territory of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia, if it is to be provided with the staff necessary to fulfil its duties, including border 01_servers. A more debatable question 1::; the membership of the commission itself. It would seem that a commission composed of a representative of each of the States members of the Security Council, whichever they may be at any particular time, would have more authority and that its decision would be more readily accepted; but we are not sure that it would not prove to be too cumber- some for the most effective and speedy conclu- sion of its tasks. We have every reason to suppose that a large membership would tend to retard the work and movements of the commission, 3. Offrir ses bons offices pour regler, en usant des moyens mentionnes a I'Article 33 de la Charte: a) .,Les difficultes provenant des violations de fro!luere; b) Les difficultes reliees directement aI'appli- cation des conventions de frontiere recomman- dees par le Conseil de securite aux quatre Gou- vernements interesses; c) Les plaintes portant sur la situation le long de la frontiere, qui pourraient etre soumises a I'attention de la commission par un Gouverne- ment contre un autre; 4. Enfin, - derniere tache mais non la moins utile, - assister les Gouvernements interesses dans I'elaboration et la conclusion d'accords sur le transfert des refugies et des minorites, si un Gouvernement faisait appel ala commission pOUf controler I'application de ces accords, et fonc- tionner comme bureau cl'4nregistrement aI'us"ge des personnes qui desircnt emigrer. Il est ev:dent que, pour remplir correctement ses fonctions; la commission devrait etre accre- ditee en tant qu'organe officiel du Conseil de securite aupres des Gouvernements de l'Albanie, de la Bulgarie, de la Grece et de la Yougoslavie, et posseder le droit de s'adresser a ceux-ci direc- tement; il est egalement evident que la commis- sion devrait etre autorisee a fonctionner de cha- que cote de la frontiere avec la cooperation des fonctionnaires et des nationaux des quatre Gou- vernements. Nous ne sommes pas entierement convaincus, neanmoins, que la commission doive etablir son siege a Salonique, comme cela a ete propose. Nous nous permettons de suggerer que le siege de la commission devrait etre etabli dans un pays neutre, en Suisse, et de preferenr.e a Geneve. La delegation de la Colombie envisage plus volontiers I'etablissement de la commission en dehors du territoire de I'Albanie, de la Bul- garie, de la Grece et de la Yougoslavie, si cette commission dispose du personnel necessaire pour accomplir ses fonctions, y compris les observa- teurs sur la frontiere. Il existe. une question qui suscitera de plus amples discussions: c'est celle de la composition de la commission elIe-meme. Il semblerait qu'une commission composee d'un representant de cha- cun des Etats membres du Conseil de securite, quels qu'ils soient a une epoque determinee, aurait plus d'influence, et ses decisions seraient plue aisement acceptees. Nous ne sommes pas certains, toutefois, que cette composition ne cons- tituerait pas un obstacle a I'accomplissement le plus efficace et le plus rapide de sa tache. Nous avons toutes raisons de supposer qu'un nombre Last April, when the establishment of the Subsidiary Group of the Commission of Investi- gation was being discussed, we ventured to recommend that a Balkan commission consisting of four permanent and thz:ee non-permanent members of the Security Council should be set up for the purpose of helping. to negotiate a Balkan convention.' We should now like to sug- gest that the new commission should consist of three permanent and four non-permanent mem- bers of the Security Council, and we respectfully ask our colleagues to stop to consider the rela£ve advantages and disadvantages of the large and small memberships. We have decidedly more confidence in the succ£ss of a commission of seven members with headquarters at Geneva than in the success of one of eleven members located in Salonika; and we believe that in case of failure, the smaller commission would more quickly enable the Council to determine the causes of that failure, to foresee the course of immediate developments in the Balkan countries, and to adopt without delay the appropriate measures for any emer- gency. But, first of all, the Colombian delegation thinks that, given the terms of reference already outlined, the commission should seem to be more concerned with the arrangements contemplated between Greece and her neighbours than with frontier surveillance; and that while it should have, in case of need, the same powers as the Commission of Investigation, it should not be expected to have to have recourse to them. We imagine that in carrying out the recommenda- tions of the Council, the commission would have to travel to the Balkan capitals or to invite the representatives of the Balkan countries to come to its headquarters; but the commission would delegate the task of acting as border observers and reporting on the state of the frontier area and such matters. Otherwise, we are afraid that the position of the commission might appear more confused in the,minds of many people who, ~rom the start, have been labouring under the nusapprehension that the United Nations is playing a subordinate role in this situation. We prefer to suggest this fresh approach to the Greek question, considering how closely con- nected it is to the whole European situation and mo~e concretely to all the matters that are en- ~agmg the attention of the Security Council. tante permettrait plus rapidement au Conseil de determiner les causes de cet echec, de prevoir le cours du developpement immediat des eve- nements dans les pays balkaniques, et de decider sans retad des mesures appropriees a prendre en cas de besoin. En premier lieu, la delegation de la Colombie estime neanmoins qu'etant donne son mandat, deja sommairement indique, la commission de- vrait s'occuper des futurs accords entre la Grece et ses voisins plutot que des questions de surveil- lance de frontiere; nous estimons egakment que tout en etant dotee, en cas de b~soin, des memes pouvoirs que la CommL'lsion d'enquete, elle ne devrait pz.s en. principe etre appe1ee a y avoir recours. Il nous semble que, pour veiller a l'application des recommandations du Conseil, la commission devrait se rendre dans les capi- tales des Etats balkaniques ou inviter les repre- sentants de ces Etats ase rendre a son siege; en revanche, la commission se dechargerait sur des observateurs de la tache de surveiller les fron- tieres, de fournir des rapports sur la condition des zones frontalieres, et d'autres questions ana- logues. S'il en etait autrement, nous craindrions que la position de la commission ne put paraitre moins claire a l'esprit "de nombreuses personnes qui, des l'abord, vivaient dans la supposition erronee que les Nations Unies jouaient un role secondaire dans cette question. Nous pre£erons proposer cette nouvelle ma- niere d'aborder la question grecque, compte tenu de la maniere etroite dont eIle est reliee a la situation generale de l'Europe et, d'une fa~on plus concrete, a tous les problemes qUI retien- nent l'attention du Conseil de securite. But this makes it all the more important that nothing should in the meantime impair our abil- ity to carry our tasks to a successful conclusion. We must admit that we have been strongly impressed by the possibilities of friction and misunderstanding which the Greek situation is making increasingly evident. The desire to co- operate in avoiding or overcoming them has encouraged us to present our views, without, however, giving them adequate form as an alternative proposal, or elaborating an argument in their support. Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America): I have been very much impressed by the una- nimity on the themes which have run through all the expositions by the various delegations to which we have listened in the last few days. Representatives may differ in their opinions, and differ legitimately, as regards the causes of the present situation or the relative weight to be attached to the various causes, since there is prob- ably no single cause. There is, however, a singular unanimity on the fact that a situation, potentially dangerous and likely to endanger and menace international peace and security, exists along the Greek frontier. That being the case, we can hardly escape the conclusion that the members e;{ this Council feel a personal responsibility for this situation. The primary responsibility of the Security Coun- cil is to watch over and maintain international peace and security. In following our duty to obey that mandate of the Charter, it is not necessary for us to assess the blame when a situation which we all admit is a dangerous one and a menace I See Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during the second part of its first session, pages 6.5 to 67. M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (tra- duit de l'anglais): J'ai ete tres frappe de l'una- nimite dans I'expression des pensees qui ont ete exposees par les orateurs des differentes delega- tions que nous avons entendus au cours des derniers jours. Les representants peuvent avoir des opinions differentes en ce qui concerne les causes de la situation actuelle ou peuvent attri- buer une valeur relative aces differentes causes, car il n'y a probablement pas qu'une seule cause. Il existe neanmoins une singuliere convergence d'opinions relativement au fait qu'une situation virtuellement dangereuse et susceptible de mettre en peril et de menacer la paix et la securite inter- nationales, existe le long de la frontiere grecque. Dans ces conditions, nous pouvons difficile- ment eviter de concIure que les membres de ce Conseil sentent que leur responsabilite person- nelle est engagee dans cette situation. La respon- sabilite prindpale du Conseil de securite est de garder et de maintenir la paix et la securite internationales. En exer~ant ce mandat que nouS a confie la Charte, il n'est pas necessaire que nous rejetions le blame sur tel ou tel, alors qu'une 1 Voir les Resolutions adoptees par l'AssemblBe gene- rale pendant la seconde partie de sa premiere session, pages 65 a 67. This afternoon the representative of Colombia expressed, in eloquent and feeling terms, views which are probably shared by all the small States represented on this Council. They want to help towards achieving a peaceful world and finding solutions whic:'} will lessen the friction among the major Powers. How are we going to accomplish tills purpose? How can the Security Council take the various steps necessary to effect the end we all seek? The United States delegation thinks that, first of all, we must deal with the situation as it is. That situation is becoming increasingly patent each day. The events of the last forty-eight hours, though not yet confirmed by a report of the Subsidiary Group, are nevertheless sufficient to indicate that a situation is developing danger- ously along the Albanian-Gr~ek frontier, and may burst into an explosion at any, time. The resolution which the United States dele- gation has placed before the Security Council is, in our opinion, imbued with the spirit of con- ciliation. The United States delegation, like every other delegation on the Security Council, prob- ably has its own private views as to the merits of this situation. We have, however, endeavoured in this resolution carefully to avoid giving any expression to our personal views. We have not asked the Council in this resolution t.o apportion blame to anyone. We have asked the Council to set up a commission which would have the dual functions of conciliation, which are of great im- portance and which have been eloquently de- scribed by the representative of Colombia this afternoon, and of investigation, which, as long as the disturbed conditions exist in this region, are indispensable to the effective functioning of the commission. The representatives of the northern countries, who are opposed to Greece on this issue, have advanced at this Council table some of the best arguments heard since this case started for the creation of a commission with the kind of terms of reference we suggest. The representatives do not want the commission-lam not criticizing th.at-but they have all described and borne WItness to the existence of a situation which is like.ly to endanger international peace and se- cunty. Les representants des Etats du Nord, qui s'opposent a la Grece en cette matiere, ont pre- sente devant ce Conseil quelques-uns des meil- leurs arguments qui aient ete entendus, depuis que l'affaire est soulevee, en faveur de la creation d'une commission possedant le genre de mandat que nous avons propose. Sans doute ces repre- sentants ne veulent-ils pas de commissio.a, - et ce n'est pas cela que je critique, - mais ils ont tous demontre et allegue l'existence d'une situation qui const:"'ue tres probablement un danger pour la paix CL la securite internationales. Whatever subsequent events may be or what- ever action the United Nations may subsequently have ~o take, I think it is indispensable for the Quels que soient les evenements qui peuvent se produire a l'avenir ou quelles que soient les mesures que les Nations Unies peuvent etre appelees a prendre par la suite, j'estime qu'il est indispensable pour le Conseil de securite lui- meme, dans l'accomplissement de s~ tach~ t;! Secu~Ity Council itself, in pursuance of its duty a?? III accordance with its corporate responsi- bIlitIes, to set up a commission in the troubled Cet apres-midi, le representant de la Colombie a exprime en termes eloquents 'et expressifs un point de vue qui est probablement aussi celui de tous les petits Etats representes a ce Conseil. Ils veulent collaborer a l'edification d'un monde pacifique et ala recherche de solutions qui dimi- nueront la tension parmi les grandes Puissances. Comment allons-nous atteindre ce but? Com- ment le Conseil de securite pourra+i! prendre les differentes mesures qui s'imposent pour abou- tir au resultat que nous recherchons? La dele- gation des Etats-Unis estime en premier lieu que nous devons nous occuper de la situation comme elle se presente..Celle-ci devient chaque jour de plus en plus nette. Les evenements des dernieres quarante-huit heures, bien qu'ils n'aient pas encore ete confirmes par un rapport du Groupe subsidiaire, n'en suffisent pas moins a indiquer qu'une situation se developpe dange- reusement le long de la frontiere greco-albanaise, qui peut, a tout moment, provoquer une explo- sion. La resolution que la delegation des Etats-Unis a presentee au Conseil de securite est, a notre avis, entierement inspiree de l'esprit de concilia- tion. La delegation des Etats-Unis, comme tou- tes les autres delegations du Conseil de securite, a, sans doute, ses propres opinions en ce qui concerne la valeur des donnees relatives a cette situation. Nous n'en avons pas moins tente dans cette resolution d'eviter soigneusement de laisser apparaitre nos vues personnelles. Nous n'avons pas demande au Conseil de rejeter ~e blame sur quiconque. Nous lui avons demande de creer une cOITLmission qui aurait une double mission: mission de conciliation, d'une part (ce qui est d'une grande importance, comme l'a demontre avec eloquence cet apres-midi le repre- sentant de la Colombie), et, d'autre part, mission d'enquete (tache, elIe aussi, indispensable au fonctionnement efficace de la commission aussi longtemps qu'une situation troublee existera dans cette region). The reason why the United States delcegation has proposed that the commission should be com- posed of all the members of the Security Coun- cil is not that in theory a smaller commission might not be preferable, more mobile, or easier to handle; but we feel that the responsibility of the Security Council as the principal guardian of the peace in the United Nations is such that it should be represented in this region not merely by a group of countries selected to be its agents, but by a commission representing each member of the Council as it exists. My delegation thinks that there is a genuine moral point in-having the entire Council represented in this region. The work of the proposed comnussIOn will not be apopular type of work. It is not going to be an assignment that any individual man would seek or that any country would seek. The com- mission is going to find itself between two groups of people whose feelings have been exacerbated and whose pride is being carried on their sleeves. It will be a thankless task. It seems to me that whatever opprobrium or personal inconvenience might result from having to serve on the com- mission should be borne, along with the duty imposed on the Council, by the Security Coun- cil, by each member of the Security Council, and by countries that are represented on the com- mission because they are in the Security Coun- cil, and not for any other reason. I think that it would give, I repeat, an added weight to the status of that commission. Furthermore, on the question of locality, I think that much of the commission's effective- ness would be lost if it were to be resident out- side the troubled region. Its very presence at Salonika, as a representative of the Security Council-not of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Poland, China, Brazil, Colombia, or any other country- would be of the utmost value in deterring sub- versive elements in that region and in putting a spirit of caution into all of the four Govern- ments. It would likewise facilitate in some meas- ure the accomplishment of its functions of con:- .-iliation. A group of eleven members representing the Security Council would, by its very numbers, have more reasonable mobility than a smaller group. It would be possible for the cow..mission to organize itself in such a way that it might divide and visit more than O'1e capital· at the same time, with each part working for the same ends on its missions of conciliation. A small La raison pour laquelle la delegation des Etats-Unis a propose que la commission se com- pose de tous les membres du Conseil de securite n'est pas qu'une commission moins importante ne serait pas preferable et plus facile a deplacer ou adiriger en principe; mais nous estimons que la responsabilite du Conseil de securite, en tant que principal gardien de la paix des Nations Unies, est si grande qu'il doit etre represente dans cette region, non pas- seulement par un groupe de pays designes comme devant etre ses agents, mais par une commission representant chaque membre du Conseil tel que celui-ci est actuellement constitue. Ma delegation estime qu'il y a obligation morale pour le Conseil tout entier d'etre represente dans la region en cause. Le travail de la future commission ne sera pas bien vu. Ce ne sera pas un poste que recherche- ront des individus ou des pays. La commission se trouvera placee entre deux groupes de popula- tion dont les sentiments sont exarcerbes et dont I'orgueil est a vif.- Ce sera une tache ingrate. Mais il me semble que tout opprobre ou tout inconvenient personnel qui pourraient resulter de l'obligation de servir au sein de cette cominission doivent etre supportes, comme partie integrante du fardeau qui incombe au Consf':il de securite, par chacun des membres de ce Conseil et par les pays representes a la commission en tant que membres de ce Conseil, et non pour d'autres raisons. Je le repete, cela donnerait a man avis plus de poids au statut de cette commission. J'estime, de plus, qu'en ce qui concerne la question du siege de la commission, celle-ci per- drait beaucoup en efficacite si elle devait ne pas se trouver dans la region ou existent les troubles. Sa presence meme a Salonique, en tant que representant du Conseil de securite - et non pas en tant que representant des Etats-Unis, de l'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, de la Pologne, de la Chine, du Bresil, de la Colombie ou de tout autre Etat - contribuerait grandement a decourager les elements subver- sifs qui se trouvent dans cette region et ainspirer la prudence aux quatre Gouvernements. Cela faci!iterait egalement clans une certaine mesure I'accomplissement des fonctions de conciliation de la commission. Un groupe compose de onze membres repre- sentant le Conseil de securite serait logiquement plus mobile, a cause de son effectif meme, qu'un groupe de moindre importance. Il se:r:ait possible a la commission de s'organiser de maniere a pouvoir Se subdiviser et visiter plus a'une capitale a la fois, et chaque sous-commission, dans sa mission de conciliation, travaillerait aux mem~ Whatever the ultimate fact" may prove to be, the events·of the last four days indicate that the situation has worsened since the receipt of the report. The situation .has not improved. The United States delegation would therefore like to urge the Council to proceed with all possible dispatch to set up this commission and to take action which would continue the existence of the Subsidiary Group until it has completed the in- vestigations undertaken before this new com- mission takes over the permanent job. We hope that the Council will also agree that the situation is sufficiently urgent to justify con- tinuous meetings of the Council until it has dis- posed of this case. I should like to ask the Presi- dent to place before the Council the possibility of our meeting twice tomorrow in addition to the other two meetings on the Greek question scheduled for this week. With the desire to reach a constructive solution which, I feel sure, ani~ mates the Council, it may be possible for us to complete this work during the present week. The United States delegation would like to see its resolution put to a vote as soon as possible. Our only desire is to see the Council take action which is constructive and which will really help the unhappy countries in that part of the world, particularly Greece, which has suffered more than any of the other countries. There are certain parts of our resolution which we consider fundamental in carrying out the recommendations of our Commission and in meeting the situation of fact. We have no pride of authorship, however, in the exact balance of the elements of this resolution. It has been sug- gested, for instance, that the recommendations contained in paragraphs A, B, D and E' of the Commission's report should be carefully written ?ut.in the resolution. Not only have we no ob- Jection to that, but we enthusiastically agree that It should be done. We are quite willing also that the functions of conciliation should be given first place in the resolution. We should gladly accept an~ a?1endments to effect these changes if the maJonty of the Council so desires. With r\?g-ard tQ the substance of the matter and the tenn~ of reference of the commission, the United States w<?uld have to maintain its original position, but we have no desire to retard the setting up of an Quelle que soit en fin de compte la nature des faits, les evenements des quatre derni"l1l jours montrent que la situation a empire depuis que le rapport est parvenu. La situation ne s'est pas amelioree. C'est pour cette raison que la delegation des Etats-Unis desire .insister aupres du Conseil afin qu'il prenne le plus rapidement possible des mesures -pour etablir cette commis- sion, ainsi que les mesures destinees a assurer I'existence du Groupe subsidiaire jusqu'a ce que celui-ci ait termine I'enquete qu'il a entreprise, avant que la future commission ne le remplace dans ce travail permanent. Nous esperons que le Conseil reconnaitra ega- lement que la situation est suffisamment urgente pour justifier des reunions continuelles du Con- seil jusqu'a ce que cette question ait ete resolue. J'aimerais demander au President de proposer au Conseil de lui donner la faculte de se reunir deux fois demain, en sus des deux autres seances consacrees a la question de Grece, qui sont deja prevues pour cette semaine. Mus par le desir d'arnver a une solution positive, qui, j'en suis sur, anime les. membres de ce Conseil, nous pourrions peut-etre ainsi t~rminer le travail au cours de la presente semaine. La delegation des Etats-Unis aimerait que la resolution qu'elle presente soit mise aux voix aussitot que possible. Notre seul desir est de voir le Conseil prendre des mesures efficaces, propres a aider effectivement les pays infortunes de cette partie du monde, et particulierement la Grece, qui a souffert plus qu'aucun autre pays. Nous considerons que certaines parties de la resolution que nous presentons sont fondamen- tales pour la mise en application des recomman- dations de la Commission et pour faire face a la situation de fait. Nous n'avons, cependant, aucun amour-propre d'auteur en ce qui con- ceme le dosage des elements qui constituent cette resolution. Il a ete suggere par exemple que les recommandations qui figurent aux paragraphes A, B, D et E du rapport de la Commission soient soigneusement transcrites dans la resolution. Non seulement nous ne nous y opposons pas, mais encore nous y consentons avec enthousiasme. De meme, n~.:.lS acceptons volontiers que les fonctions de conciliation soient particulierement soulignees dans la resolution. Nous accepterons avec plaisir toute modification sanctionnant ces changements si tel est le desir du Conseil. Relativement au fond de la question, ainsi qu'au mandat de la commission, les Etats-Unis se verront dans I'obli- If necessary, I should be glad to move that we have two meetings on this case tomorrow, unless the President would care to handle it in another way by making a suggestion or proposal to the Council ~mself. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria) : When I read the re- port of the Commission of Investigation for the first time, before any meeting of the Security Council had been held on this subjec:t, I thought that the task of the Security Council would be very easy. I thought that the four Balkan States concerned in this matter would come to the first meeting of the Security Council and declare that they acquiesced in the recommendations of the Commission, inasmuch as these recommenda- tions did not discriminate against or assess any responsibility to any of them. The report simply recognizes that the situa- tion in the Balkan States is not normal. Nobody can deny the fact that the situation is not nor- mal. The relations between these States are not as they should be. All the Balkan States con- fessed here that there are many things between them which make the situation so critical. I thought at the same time that these Balkan States would be ready to consider the great im- portance of the responsibility which they may have to bear before the whole world for dis- turbing the peace and security, and for causing the spark which may set off an explosion that would extend over and injure t~e whole world, especially the small nations who are unable to defend themselves from being used as battle- fields. . Nobody can deny that the' actual situation in the Balkans is critical and threatening to inter- national peace and security. The Balkan States ought to consider their great responsibility in allowing this situation to continue to be aggra- vated from day to day. The recommendations proposed by the Commission are simply the pro- visions and precepts of the Charter. They are in conformity with Article'33 of the Charter, in that they invite the States concerned to readjust their relations among themselves and to negotiate in a conciliatory way. At the same time they propose to help those States to attain a favourable solu- tion of their problem through an organ repre- senting the Security Council in the name of the United Nations. There is nothing in these recommendations that would affect the prestige, the national pride or the sovereignty of the States. They should therefore welcome such a proposition and accept it with pleasure and gratitude. I still believe that ultimately the four States concerned will declare before the Security Coun- cil that they accept this proposition and will adhere to it. As long as they are pledged to loyalty to the provisions of the Charter and as long as they appreciate and evaluate the great M. EL-KHOURI (Syrie) (traduit de l'anglais) : Lorsque j'ai lu le rapport de la Commission d'enquete pour la premiere fois, avant qu'aucune seance ait ete tenue sur cette question, j'ai pense que la tache du Conseil de securite serait fort aisee. J'ai pense que les ,quatre Etats balkani- ques interesses se presenteraient a la premiere seance du Conseil de securite et feraient savoir qu'ils approuvaient les recommandations de la Commission, d'autant plus que ces recom- mandations ne rejetaient le blame et la respon- sabilite sur personne. Le rapport recOnnait simplement que la situa- tion existant dans les Etat5 balkaniques n'est pas normale. Nul ne peut nier le fait que la situation n'est pas normale. Les relations entre ces Etats ne sont pas ce q~'elles devraient etre. Tous les Etats balkaniques ont reconnu ici qu'il existait entre eux de nombreuses divergences qui rendaient la situation aussi critique. J'ai pense alors que ces Etats balkaniques se- raient prets a reflechir a l'enorme responsabilite qu'ils peuvent etre appeIes a porter aux yeux du monde en troublant la paix et la securite et en creant l'incident susceptible de faire eclater un conflit qui s'etendrait au monde entier, le mutilerait, et atteindrait en particulier les petites nations incapables d'empecher qu'elles ne soient utilisees comme champs de bataille. As regards the draft .resolution prel?ented .by lhe delegation of the UnIted States, It also aVOIds assessing responsibility to any of the States, but puts them all on the same footing. There are no grounds for any complaints. I am very·glad to know that the delegation of the United States is ready to define carefully paragraphs A, B, D and E of the recommendations. The other objections to this draft resolution which we have heard should be discussed later. When the general discllSsion which was opened by th~ President of the Security Council is closed, the next step would be to discuss the draft reso- lutions which have been presented. In that case, they would be studied here paragraph by para- graph, and amendments would be accepted by the President, discussed by the members, and voted upon. The different points on which cer- tain comments have been made, such as the headquarters or the composition of the com- mission, may be discllSsed and ameliorated or amended according to the wish of the appropri- ate majority of the Security Council. We have been discussing for some time the report drawn up by the majority of the Com- mission of Investigation. The Commission whose report is now before us is fully representative. It represents all the members of the Security Coun- cil. Its individuals were selected by their Gov- ernments with confidence and were entitled to study the situation on the spot and to present their views. I do not think we are in a position, here in the Security Council, to analyse the back- ground and evidence on the basis of which the Commission arrived at its proposals and con- clusions, unless there are some absurdities or irregularities, or unless some points are out of order or contrary to the terms of reference. In such a case, as in similar cases in the reports of courts or bodies like commissions of inquiry, there would be reason to reconsider the report. But as long as there is nothing in Jhe report of the nature described, as long as we do not find any irregularity or absurdity in the Com- mission's work, and cannot find that it went beyond its terms of reference, I do not see how we .can withdraw the confidence which we gave to It and reject the report which it has made, esp~ci~y since it does not include anything whIch IS unacceptable to the four parties con- cerned. I think that the President should close the general debate on this matter now. All the mem- bers have presented their views, and we can go on to the draft resolutions which have been given to us to be studied, amendec! '\nd voted upon. pla~aient en eIles; elles ont ete autorisees a exa- miner la situation sur place et a exprimer leur opinion. Je ne peme pas que nous soyons id, au sein de ce Conseil, a meme d'analyser la docu- mentation et les temoignages qui ont servi de base aux propositions et aux conclusions emises par la Commission, a moins qu'il n'existe des absurdites ou des irregularites ou que quelques points soient en dehors de la question ou non conformes au mandat. En pareil cas, de meme que cela se fait pour les rapports des tribunaux ou d'organismes tels que les commissions d'enquete, il y aurait lieu cl'examiner a nouveau le rapport. Mais du moment que le rapport ne contient element de la nature indiquee, que nous ne rencontrons aucune irregularite ni absurdite dans le travail de la Commission, et que nollS ne pouvons pas trouver qu'elle ait outrepasse son mandat, je ne vois pas comment nous pouvons lui retirer la confiance que nous lui avons ac- cordee et ne pas accepter le rapport qu'elle a redige, d'autant que ce rapport ne contient rien qui ne soit acceptable aux quatre parties interessees. J'estime que le President devrait clore main- tenant la discussion generale de cette question. Tous les representants ont fait connaitre leurs points de vue et nous pouvons passeI' aux projets de resolutions qui nous ont ete remis, afin de les etudier, de.Ies modifier et de les voter. Colonel KERENXHI (Albania) (translated from French): After repeated attacks by Greece against our country, we are now accused of having invaded Greece. This is not the first time, Mr. President, that you have had to deal with base provocations levelled by Greece against our country. Now they would have you believe that the wolf has just been attacked by the lamb, though statements have been made by the instigators of this provocation campaign (due to the pres- sure of public opinion) casting doubt on the accuracy of the shrill reports spread about the so-called "international brigade" and its in- vasion of Greece. No one will fail to· realize that this is simply a case of provocation which has been going on for some months already. On 27 May last Mr. Kirou, Greek liaison officer, commenting on part In of the report, lightly dismissed the alleged peril which the foreign legions constitute. . A few days later, Mr. Tsaldaris, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, himself raised cries of alarm concerning an alleged "sizable con- centration of anarchist forces on the northern frontier of Greece". These cries of alarm caused a great stir in the Greek Press and aroused public opinion. On 11 June Mr. Tsaldaris was obliged to admit that this statement (about an interna- tional brigade preparing to invade Greece) -was perhaps not accurate, and that in any event the report was intended for circulation abroad, not in Greece. He added that in the national interest it was often necessary to circulate such reports abroad while at the same time taking care that they were not spread inside the country. Un- fortunately, he declared, some journalists dis- seminated such reports all over the country to the detriment of Greek interests (see Elephteria, Greek newspaper of the Centre) .. It is clear what we are dealing with here, and we are conscious of the premeditated provoca- tion. This new provocation is not the first, nor will it be the last. Greek governmental circles have repeatedly resorted to such provocations, all of them patently absurd. All the Greek charges made before the Security Council since Decem- ber 1946 have been nothing more than a series of provocations directeC: against the other t~ree Le colonel KERENXHI (Albanie): Apres tant d'attaques perpetrees par la Grece contre notre pays, nous voici maintenant accuses d'avoir envahi la Grece. Ce n'est pas la premiere fois, Monsieur le President, que vous vous trouvez en face de provocations ignobles dirigees par la Grece contre notre pays. Maintenant, on veut faire croire que le loup vient d'etre attaque par l'agneau, bien que, meme du cote des instigateurs de cette campa- gne de provocations, rendue necessaire par la pression de l'opinion publique, des declarations aient ete faites mettant en doute la veracite des informations tapageuses relatives a la pre- tcndue brigade internationale et a son inv3.sion de la Grece. Personne n'ignore qu'on est tout simplement en presence d'une provocation qui date de que!- ques mois deja. Le 27 mai demier, en faisant, devant la Com- mission sa declaration verbale sur la troisieme partie du rapport, M. Kirou, l'agent de liaison grec, a pade d'une fa~on legere du pretendu peril que constituent les legions etrangeres. Quelques jours plus tard, ce fut le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres de Grece lui-meme, M. Tsal- daris, qui lan~a des cris d'alarme au sujet d'une' pretendue "concentration d'importantes forces anarchistes aux frontieres nord de la Grece". Ces cris d'alarme firent grand bruit dans la presse grecque et emurent l'opinion publique. Le 11 juin, M. Tsaldaris etait oblige d'admettre qu'il etait possible que cette declaration (au sujet de la brigade internationale se preparant a penetrer en Grece) ne correspondit pas a la realite, mais qu'en tous les cas elle etait destinee a l'etranger et non a la Grece. 11 ajouta que maintes fois, dans l'interet de la nation, il est necessaire de propager de tels bruits hors du pays, tout en prenant soin qu'ils ne soient pas repandus a l'interieur de celui-ci. Malheureuse- ment, declarait-il, certains journalistes s'empres- sent de propager ces informations dans tout le pays au detriment de la Grece (voir le journal grec du centre, Elephteria). On voit clairement a quoi l'on a affaire et on sent bien les provocations premeditees. Cette nouvelle provocation n'est pas la pre- miere et ne sera pas la derniere. Les milieux gou- vernementaux grecs s'y sont livres a maintes reprises, toutes marquees au signe du ridicule. Toutes les accusations grecques formulees devant le Conseil de securite depuis decembre 1946 ne constituent pas autre chose qu'un ensemble...~ What is one to think of these fresh reports from Greek sources "intended for circulation abroad" (as Mr. Tsaldaris said) according to which the Cham refugees are being mobilized in Albania and concentrated on the frontier, while other groups, led by a certain Nuri Dino Bey, are already engaged in fighting inside Greece? What is one to think of reports from Greek sources, "intended for circulation abroad", ac- cording to which Albania, by means of this alleged invasion, is seeking to seize Greek terri- tory, to seize Macedonia? Have the Greek authorities already forgotten that the extermination by the military authorities of the Albanian minority in Greece, the assassina- tion of 2,877 Chams, and the burning of thou- sands of homes, are facts well known to every- one? Have they forgct.ten the finding of the Commission of Investigation that national mi- norities have been subjected to harsh reprisals in Greece, that Nuri Dino is a war criminal and collaborator who fled to Italy after Albania's liberation, and that our Government, quite re- cently in applications made to the British and United States Governments, repeated its demand for the extradition of criminals now in zones under British and American control? Do the Greek authorities also wish to forget so soon that, in that part of the Commission of Investigation's report dealing with the accusa- tions that her northern neighbours were trying to detach from Greece certain parts of her terri- tory, the name of Albania is not even men- tioned? No one is unaware of these facts, and the false and tendentious reports from Greek sources intended for circulation abroad cannot be sub- stantiated for a single instant. Since its liberation our country has been the vict?n of hundreds of provocative operations or- gamzed by the Greek authorities. Not for a moment have these authorities ceased to attack in various ways our peaceful little country. It may be observed, however, that during this period of continual attack there were times when !he Greek authorities were more busily engaged ill p~ovocation.These periods of intensified prov- OCa!lOn against our country coincided with those dunng which political problems affecting the two countries were most acute. The purpose was to e~ert the greatest possible pressure on the dis- CUSSIon of these problems. . During the Peace Conference the intensifica- tion of armed provocation and other types simi- lar to the recent provocation was evident. Que peut-on penser des nouvelles informations de source grecque "destinees a l'etranger" (com- me l'a dit M. Tsaldaris), et selon lesquelles les refugies tchamouriotes seraient mobilises en Albanie, concentres sur les frontieres, tandis que d'autres groupes, ayant a leur tete le nomme Nuri Dino Bey, prendraient deja part a des combats a l'interieur de la Grece? Que peut-on penser des informations de source grecque "destinees a l'etranger" selon lesquelles l'Albanie, au moyen de cette pretendue invasion, chercherait as'emparer des territoires grecs, de la Macedoine? Les milieux gouvernementaux grecs ont-ils deja oublie que l'extermination de la minorite alba- naise en Grece par les autorites militaires, l'assassinat de 2.877 Tchamouriotes. et la des- truction par l'incendie de milliers de maisons, sont des faits bien connus de tout le monde? Ou- blie-t-on que la Commission d'enquete a cons- tate que les minorites nationales ont ete soumises a de dures represailles en Grece, que le nomme Nuri Dino est un criminel de guerre et un colla- borateur qui s'est enfui en Italie apres la libe- ration de l'Albanie, et que notre Gouvemement, tout dernierement encore, en s'adressant ~ux Gouvernements du Royaume-Uni et des Etats- Unis, ~ reitere sa demand:; concernant l'extra- dition des criminels qui se trouvent dans les zones sous controle britannique et americain? Les milieux gouvernementaux grecs veulent- ils egalement oublier si vite que, dans la partie du rapport de la Commission d'enquete relative aux accusations selon lesquelles les voisins du Nord chercheraient a detacher de la Grece cer- taines partie3 de son territoire, le nom de I'Albanie ne figure meme pas? Mais personne n'ignore cela et les informations mensongeres et tendancieuses de source grecque, destinees a l'etranger, ne sauraient etre soutenues un seul instant. Depuis la liberation, notre pays a ete victime de centaines de provocations organisees par les milieux gouvernementaux grecs. Pas un instant ces milieux n'ont cesse d'attaquer notre paisible petit pays par diverses methodes. Mais durant cette periode d'attaques continuelles, on pouvait cependant remarquer des moments OU les gou- vernants grecs se sont montres plus actifs dans leur besogne de provocations. Ces moments, caracterises par l'intensification des provocations dirigees contre notre pays, coincidaient avec ceux ou des problemes politiques concernant les deux pays se posaient de maniere plus aigue. Le but en etait d'exercer la plus grande pression possible sur la discussion de ces problemes. Pendant la Conference de la pai", l'intensi- fication des provocations armees, et d'autres appartenant a la meme famille que la recent~ provocation, fut evident~, The same technique is being used now that the Security Council is discussing the Commis- sion of Investigation's report. . But the aims of this new provocation are much broader. The Greek authorities now want: 1. To justify the necessity of creating a per- manent commission as proposed to the Security Council by the representative of the United States; 2. To justify the existence and continued maintenance in Greece of foreign troops and military personnel; 3. To justify the unspeakable and incessant terror now raging in Greece, a feature of which recently has been the thousands of arrests and hundreds of death sentences and executions for the crime of participation in the alleged "move- ment organized by northern neighbours, de- signed to overthrow the Government"; 4. To justify Greek policy which consists in that country's considering itself to be in a state of war with Albania, and thus convince public opinion that not only does Greece consider her- self to be in a state of war with Albania, but that Albania likewise considers herself to be in a state of war with Greece; 5. To influence the work of the Security Council so that no favourable decision may be reached for the repatriation of refugees, the restoration of all their property with compensa- tion for losses sustained, and so to compromise the refugees as people w.ho, if they were repatri- ated to Greece, would further aggravate the dis- turbances. Such is the real purpose of this new form of provocation which has a disturbing effect even though it is not based on any document, not even on a communication from the Subsidiary Group. For our part, we have come before the Security Council to prove the inanity of the Greek accusations that support is being given to the Greek partisan movement; we reveal the aim of such accusations, while at the same time we emphasize our desire to live at peace with every one, particularly our neighbQurs. The Greeks, on 1. Justifier la necessite de la creation de la commission permanente proposee au Conseil de securite par la delegation des Etats-Unis; 2. Justifier la presence en Grece de troupes etrangeres et de personnel militaire etranger, ainsi que la prolongation du stationnement de ces troupes; 3. Justifier la terreur inouie et incessante qui sevit en Grece, terreur caracterisee, ces jours derniers, par des milliers d'arrestations et par des centaine3 de condamnations amort suivies d'exe- cutions, sous l'inculpation de partic:pation au pretendu "mouvement organise par les voisins du Nord, tendant arenverser le Gouvernement"; 4. Justifier la politique de la Grece, qui con- siste pour ce pays a se considerer en etat de guerre avec l'Albanie; convaincre ainsi l'opinion publique que non seulement la Grece se considere en etat de guerre avec l'Albanie, mais egalement que cette derniere se considere en etat de guerre avec la Grece; 5. Influencer les travaux du Conseil de secu- rite pour que n'intervienne pas une decision favo- rable au rapatriem~nt des refugies tchamouriotes dans leurs foyers, a la restitution de tous leurs biens et a l'indemnisation des pertes qu'ils ont subies; compromettre ainsi les refugies tchamou- riotes en les faisant considerer comme des gens qui, au cas ou ils seraient rapatries en Grece, contribueraient ay aggraver les troubles. Telle est la vraie portee de cette nouvelle pro- vocation qui tend a agit(;r les esprits, bien qu'elle ne soit fondee sur aucun document, pas meme sur une communication emanant du Groupe subsidiaire. De notre cote, nous venons prouver devant le Conseil de securite l'inanite des accusations grecques relatives a un soutien donne au mouvement partisan grec; nous en demontrons le but, tout en soulignant notre desir de vivre en paix avec tout le monde, et en particulier avec nos voisins. Du cote gre~ On behalf of my Government I strongly pro- test against these provocations, and emphasize once more our demand that they be stopped and that we be left in peace to rebuild our country so horribly ravaged by war. Mr. VILFAN (Yugoslavia) (translated from French): My brief statement will bear on the same subject as that dealt with in the Albanian representative's speech; but I shall confine my remarks to a single aspect of the question. If I am not mistaken, all the speakers this afternoon have mentioned the aggravation of the Balkan situation; they have alluded to what has happened in the past forty-eight hours. Naturally they have been thinking of the famous international brigade, and of the invasion being prepared in Albania. . First of all, I am sorry that they have failed to mention also the latest reports. In the lobbies I have heard, even from official Greek sources, that these occurrences have been seriously exag- gerated. Again, I am sorry that speakers have omitted to say that, according to the latest re- ports, things are not so serious as was reporter{. I should like to draw your attention, however, to a parallel situation. In December 1946, at the height of the dis- cussion of the Greek question, the Greek Gov- ernment brought forward new witnesses and fresh testimony, the latter of a sensational nature. It was difficult to avoid the impression that there was a connexion between this exact stage in the discussion and the Greek action. And what is the upshot of it all? Not one-I repeat, not one-of these witnesses mentioned by the Greek Government in its statement of 12 December 1946: was heard by the Commission. The Greek Government had obtained the dt:,· sired effect and then had forgotten about its witnesses. . I firmly believe that this situation will now be repeated, and that once again a connexion has Je suis tout afait convaincu que cette situation se repetera maintenant; et l'on est force de voir un lien, cette fois encore, entre le stade auquel est parvenu le Conseil de securite dans sa. discus- sion de la question grecqu(. et les nouvelles qui sont maintenant repandues par Athenes. Je suis sur que l'enquete meme du Groupe subsidiaire demontrera que ces notiveIles sont sans fonde- ment. Quel sera le r~sultat de tout cela? Je crois que n011S assretons maintenant aune coincidence similaire. Pourquoi s'obstiner, pour ainsi dire, a repousser la proposition de la Yougoslavie, qui voudrait que 1'on demandat a la majorite de la Commission pourquoi les temoins presentes le 12 decembre par le Gouvernement grec, et ensuite ~o be discerned between the stage now reached ID. the Security Council's discussion of the Greek question and the reports now being circulated ~Y Athens. I am sure that the actual investiga- tIon of the Subsidiary Group will prove that these reports are unfounded. Naturally, I have not exhausted the entire question in the course of this brief comment, but I also wanted to call the Security Council's at- tention to it fer another reason. Fortunately, the situation is not so difficult as the representatives who have spoken today seem to believe when they lay stress on these facts to justify the need for keeping a permanent commission in the Balkans. Mr. DENDRAMIS (Greece) (translated from French): I have no intention of engaging in a controversy with the representatives of neigh- bouring countries and of thereby losing precious time by distracting attention from the funda- mental question which is the Commission's re- port and tre need for urgent action by the Coun- cil. . One of the representatives of a neighbouring country has denied certain facts which are common knowledge, For two days regular battles have been going on near the Albanian frontier following invasions by large forces from Al- banian territory. If this representative had wanted his allegations to be given any credence, he had but to advise his Government to co- operate with the Subsidiary Group and allow it to enter his Government's territory to verify the facts. In view of the facts established by the Com- mission of Investigation and the accusations made by the high parties to the dispute there is no valid reason why the members of the Council should not vote in favour of the Commission's recommendations, nor is there any plausible reason for further delay in voting on the United States resolution. Of the various measures provided for in the Charter to establish and maintain peace the majority report of the Commission, as well as the United States resolution, proposes the adop- tion of one of the mildest and most conciliatory, namely, the creation of another '.3ommission which would folIo.\' up the situation on the Council's behalf and offer its good offices to facilitate agreements between the parties. Greece had expressed doubts as to the efficacy of such feeble action even before her fears were con- firmed by the events of the last few days. There would nevertheless seem to be no doubt that the feeble measures proposed by the Commis- sion are essential. Thatwa:o, and continues v., ~'\ clear. Leavmg recent events out of the qucftkm and 'Setting aside the present serious aggraV?tllfLl of an already danp'erous situation, one cannot fail to realize that the creation of the commission recommended is essential and absolutely urgent. M. DENDRAMIS (Grece): Je n'ai pas l'inten- tion d'entrer en polemique avec les representants des pays voisins et de faire perdre ainsi un temps precieux en distrayant l'attention de la question fondamentale, qui est le rapport de la Comm~­ sion et la necessite d'une action urgente de la part du Conseil. Un des representants des pays VOlSms a nie certains faits qui sont de notoriete publique. De vraies batailles se deroulent depuis deux jours r","es de la frontiere albanaise, a la suite d'inva- SlOns de forces importantes venant du territoire albanais. Si ce representant voulait que 1'0n accordat un peu de foi a ses allegations, il n'au- rait eu, pOUf eela, qu'a recommander a son Gouvernement de cooperer avec le Groupe sub- sidiaire et de lui permettre de se rendre sur son territoire pour verifier les faits. D'apres les faits etablis par la Commission d'enquete et les accusations portees par les hau- tes parties au differend, il n'y a pas de raison valable pour que les membres du Conse!l ne votent. pas en faveur des recommandations de la Commission; il n'y a pas non plus de raison plau- sible pour retarder davantage le vote sur la reso- lution des Etats-Unis. Parmi les diverses mesures prevues par la Charte pour etablir et maintenir la paix, le rap- port de la majorite de la Commission ainsi que la resolution des Etats-Unis proposent l'adoption d'une des plus faibles et des plus condliatrices, a savoir 1" creation d'une autre commission qui suivrait la situation pour le compte du Conseil et offrirait ses bons offices dans le but de faciliter des accords entre les parties. La Grece a exprim~ ses doutes quant al'efficacite d'une mesure aUSSl faible, meme avant que ses craintes fussent con- firmees par les evenements de ces derniers jours. Il apparait neanmoins, sans aucun doute, que les faibles mesures proposees par la Commission i sont eR'ientielles. Ceci etait et continue d'etre ! el,jrJwt. Abstraction faite des evenements plus rec:nts, et laissant de cote l'aggravation serieuse actuelle d'une situation deja dangereuse, on ne peut que reconnaitre que la creation de la com- mission recommandee s'impose comme etant d'une necessite extreme. .... ,~

I should like to adjourn the meeting at this time. However, the representative of France has asked to speak. I shall allow him to speak but, in view of the late hour, I should appreciate it if he would be brief. Mr. PARODl (France) (translated from French): I shall be very brief. I shall make three observations on the statements which we have just heard, in particular that made by the representative of Yugoslavia. In the first place, the representative of Yegoslavia seemed upset that in the statements made here today we have referred to reports concerning recent events in Greece. I am a little surprised by this reaction on his part for, given the responsibilities which are ours, if we failed to pay some attention to reports'of this nature, we should be unworthy of our office. In my earlier statement--and the representative of the United States has spoken with equal caution-I reserved judgment on these reports pendhlg their confirmation. My second observation is that, if the reports we have been reading in the newspapers for the past two days were nut correct, this fact would, in my opinion, be the best proof of the value of our having on the spot observers capable of ascertaining the true facts promptly. My third observation is, in one sense, of a slightly different nature. I feel that, in view of certain contradictions in the reports reaching us, we ought not to speed up the discussion as much as the representative of the United States wanted, but that we should await clarification of these reports. I do not ask that we should delay our entire discussion, but I wondt:r whether it would be wise to hurry matters and deliberate under the impression of reports which, for the moment, have not been clearly confirmed. We have in Greece observers who, we are informed, have gone to the localities involved. Personally, I. should prefer to await their reports t'lnd contmue our discussions at their normal pace, thereby allowing time for the reports to reach us. ~r. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I feel that we.should carry on our work normally. We have ~ tIme-table for tomorrow, which includes meetmgs of the appropriate committees of the Atomic Energy Commission. If I am not mistaken, the Security Council was to meet the day aher tomorrow. I can see no reason for changing this Le FRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je voudrais maintenant lever la seance. Toutefois, le representant de la France a demande la parole. Je la lui donne, mais puisqu'il est tard deja, je lui serais reconnaissant d'etre bref. M. PARODl (France): Mes remarques seront tres breves. Je ferai sur les declarations que nous venons d'entendre, en particulier de la part du representant de la Yougoslavie, trois observations. Tout d'abord, le representant de la Yougoslavie a paru emu que, dans les declarations que nous avons faites ici aujourd'hui, nous nous soyons referes·aux nouvelles concernant les evenements de Grece de ces derniers jours. Je suis un peu etonne de cette emotion du representant de la Yougoslavie, car, etant donne les responsabilites qui sont les notres, si vraiment nous ne pretions pas quelque attention aux nouvelles de cet ordre, nous serions peu dignes de nos fonctions. Dans la declaration que j'ai faite tout a I'heure - et le representant des Etats-Unis a parle avec la meme prudence - nous avons reserve notre opinion sur ces nouvelles jusqu'a ce qu'eIles soient confirmees. Ma seconde observation est que, si les nouvelles que nous avons lues dans les journaux depuis deux jours n'etaient pas exactes, ce serait la meilleure preuve, me semble-t-il, de l'utilite pour nous d'a"oir sur place des observateurs en mesure de relablir rapidement l'exactitude des faits. Ma troisieme observation est, en un sens, un peu differente. Je crois, en effet, que nous devons maintenant, en presence de certaines contradictions dans les nouvelles qui nous parviennent, ne pas presser la discussion autant que le representant des Etats-Unis le souhaitait et attendre que soient tirees au clair les nouvelles de ces derniers jours. Je ne demande pas que nous retardions toute notre discussion. Mais je me demande s'il serait bon de presser les choses et de deliberer sous le coup de nouvelles qui, pour l'instant, ne sont pas nettement etablies. Nous avons en Grece des observateurs, clont on nous dit qu'ils se 80nt rendus sur les lieux. Je souhaiterais, pour ma part, que nous attendions les nOlivelles qu'ils nous enverront et que nous gardions a nos deliberations un rythme normal; afin de permettre aces nouvelles de nous parvenir. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republique~ sodalistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Il me sem- .ble que nous devons effectuer notre travail de fa~on normale. Nous avons un programme pour demain. C'est demain que doivent travailler les comites de la Commission de l'energie atornique. Si je ne me trumpe, une seance du CO!')Eeil de securite est prevue pour apres-demain. Je ne vois aucune raison de modifier l'ordre etabli. 11 vaudrait mieux n'etablir. aucun programme- I see no reason why the Security Council should blindly follow the Greeks, who make an extra hubbub for a specific purpose, or why our Council meetings should imitate sessions on the stock exchange. The Council is not a stock exchange; it is an international body which has to give dose, careful and cool consideration to the questions before it. If, at times, huckstering is indulged in on the stock exchange, that does not mean there should be huckstering in the Security Council.

Originally, the next meeting to be devoted to this question was scheduled for Thursday at 3 p. m. The representative of the United States has proposed to hold a meeting tomorrow morning. Objections have been formulated by the l'epresentatives of France and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and I should like to know whether, in view of the objections, the United States wi'3hes to press its proposal. If so, I shall immediately submit the proposal to a vote. I think I should mention that tomorrow morning there is a meeting of Committee 2 of the Atomic Energy Commission. Of course, if we decide to meet, we shall have to ask the Chairman of that Committee to postpone his meeting. Mr. JOHNSON (United Stares): The United States delegation thinks that consideration of this question should be accelerated within the limits of reason. I had originally suggested that we should have two meetings tomorrow. I am pe!'· fecdy willing to reduce that to one meeting tomorrow, and then have the other meetings we have already scheduled for this week. I think the events of the last twenty-four hours have not proved anything. We are waiting to hear the results nf the Subsidiary Group's jnvestigations, and what official information may come from our various missions in Greece. There is, however, sufficient j"-,,dkation that there is a situation which is disquir.tingand of which it is this Council's, duty to take cognizance. That is an observation alre;:tdy rnad~, by the representative of France. Je ne vois pas pourquoi le Conseil de securite devrait suivre aveuglement les Grecs, lorsqu'ils font du bruit dans une intention precise, et transformer nos reunions en seances de Bourse. Le Conseil n'est pas une Bourse, mais un organe international; il doit etudier avec soin, attention et sang-froid les questions qui lui sont soumises. L'agiotage peut se justifier a la Bourse; il est deplace au sein du Conseil de securite. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): A I'ongine, la prochaine seance devant etre consacree a cette question etait fixee pour jeudi a 15 heures. Le representant des Etats-Unis a propose de tenir une seance demain matin. Des objections ont ete formulees par les representants de la France et de I'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, et je voudrais savoir si, a la suite de ces objections, le representant des Etats-Unis persiste dans sa proposition. Dans I'affirmative, je vais mettre cette proposition aux voix, sans delai. Je crois devoir signaler qu'il y a demain matin une seance du Comite 2 de la Commission de I'energie atomique. 11 va de soi que si nous decidons de nous reunir, il nous faudra demander au P'resident de ce Comite d'ajourner sa seance. M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique)' (traduit de l'anglais): La delegation des Etats-Unis estime que. l'examen de la question dont nous sommes saisis devrait etre hate dans des limites raisonnables. J'avais propose, au debut, que nous nous reunissions deux fois demain. Je suis tout a fait dispose a reduire ces deux seances de demain a une seule et a m'en tenir aux autres seances qui ont deja ete fixees pour cette semaine. J'estime que les evenements des dernieres vingtquatre heures n'ont rien prouve. Nous attendons de recevoir les resultats des enquetes du Groupe subsidiaire et les renseignements officiels qui peuvent nous parvenir de nos differentes missions en Grece. Cela est neanmoins un indice suffisant d'une situation inquietante, clont ce Conseil a le devoir de connaitre. Le representant de la France a deja fait une remarque semblable. ",..c4.d8 Mr. HOnGSON (Australia): It is not a question of this Council's being stampeded, or, as has been suggested, of its blindly following the noise of Greece, We think that it is a matter of some urgency that we should' reach a decision on the resolutions before the Council. I fully support what the representative of France has said. As far as my delegation is concerned, we have not made up our minds at all as to the recent incidents, but we have our Subsidiary Group there, and from it we shall be able to ascertain the facts. You will recall that in my statement the other day I said that the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had approached this problem with preconceived notions: It should not be for me, the representative of a small country, to remind him that he is representing here not the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics only, but the whole of the United Nations; that being so, we have to reach a just and impartial decision in the light of all the facts. So far, we have none of those facts; yet he has decided ahead of those facts, and I just want to indicate that we feel that that is a wrong approach to the problem.

I want -to ask one question of the representative of the United States. We have a meeting of Committee 2 of the Atomic Energy Commission tomorrow morning and a meeting of the Commission for Conventio.la! Armaments in the afternoon. I think it will be somewhat inconvenient to call off these meetings. I wonder whetller it .vould not be just as well for us to hold two meetings on Thursday. Meetings would also have to be called off on Thursday, but at least those participating would h.ave one day's notice in advance. Mr. ]OHNSON (United States of America): My delegation would prefer to have one meeting t~mo.rrow and one meeting on Thursday. The meetmg tomorrow afternoon of the Commission Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): Il ne s'agit pas pour le Conseil, comme on I'a fait remarquer, de se laisser bousculer ou mener aveuglement par les evenements de Grece. Nous estimons qu'il est urgent d'aboutir a une decision en ce qui concerne les resolutions qui sont presentees au Conseil. J'appuie sans reserve les declarations du representant de la France. En ce qui concerne ma delegation, nous n'avons pas defini notre attitude relativement aux recen~ incidents, mais notre Groupe subsidiaire se trouve la-bas et, grace a lui, nous serons a meme de verifier les faits. Je me permets de vous rappeler que, dans mon intervention de l'autre jour, j'ai declare que le representant de I'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques avait aborde ce probleme avec des idees precon~uesl. Ce ne devrait pas etre a moi, representant cl'un petit Etat, de lui rappeler qu'il represente ici, non pas I'Union des Republiyues socialistes sovietiques uniquement, mais l'ensemble des Nations Unies; dans ces conditions, nous devons arriver a une decision equitable et impartiale, a la lumiere de tous les faits. Jusqu'a maintenant nous ne somme saisis d'aucun fait, et cependant il a pris une decision anticipee; je veux seulement signaler que c'est a notre avis une mauvaise maniere d'aborder ce probleme. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Je desire poser une question au representant des Etats- Unis. Le Comite 2 de la Commission de l'energie atomique se reunit demain matin et la. Commission des armements de type classique se reunit I'apres-midi. II me semble qu'il est difficile d'annuler ces seances. Je me demande s'il ne serait pas tout aussi bien pour nous de tenir deux seances jeudi. II faudrait egalement annuler d'autres seances jeudi, mais ceux qui doivent y sieger seront, au moins, prevenus un jour d'avance. M.-, \lSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit c.<f ;:anglais) : Ma delegation pre£ererait que nous tenions une seance demain et une seance jeudi. II n'y aurait certainement aucun inconve- Mr. HSIA (China): I wish to support what the President and Mr. Parodi suggested. I think we should have two meetings on Thursday instead of a meeting tomorrow, because tomorrow afternoon I have called a meeting of the Commission for Conventional Armaments. I could not very well call off the meeting without good reason. I do not think that a difference of eighteen or twenty-four hours is so very important. The PRESIDENT: Before I grant the floor to th~ representati,:e of the United Kingdom, J might also mentIOn that tI1ere is an alternath..- possibility of having two meetings on Frid,,<,- There is only one meeting scheduled for Fridav ~orning, and we could have another meetilig m the afternoon. That would not call anything off, because there are no other committee or commission meetings planned for that time. M. LOPEZ (Colombie) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je n'ai pas la moindre objection a. ce qLe nous nous reunissions de nouveau demain apres-midi pOUf discuter de la question de Grece; mais il est douteux que nous soyons en possession, demain apres-midi, des renseignements que nous devons avoir. S'il n'est pas certain que nous possedions ces renseignements, je ne vois vraiment pas quel avantage il y a a ce que nous I modifions notre emploi du temps. C'est la, a mon avis, le point important. J'accepte tres volontiers, pour ma part, que nous nous reunissions demain, soit dans la matinee, soit dans l'apres-midi, pourvu que nous soyons assures d'avoir les renseignements. M. HSIA (Chine) (traduit de l'anglais): Je desire appuyer les propositions du President et de M. Parodi. Je pense que nous devrions tenir deux seances jeudi au lieu de tenir une seance demain, car j'ai convoque pour demaln apresmidi une reunion de la Commission des armements de type classique. Il me serait difficile d'annuler cette reunion sans motif valable. Il ne me semble pas qu'une difference de dix-huit ou de vingt-quatre heures soit tellement importante. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Avant de donner la parole au representant du Royaumc-Unl, je puis aussi vous signaler qu'il existe :.lDC: CiHtre solution consistant a. tenir deux seancc,> ";'endredi. Il n'y a qu'une seance prevue pour ~ c ,;iredi matin et nous pourrions nous reunir de nouveau dans l'apres-midi. Il ne serait pas necessaire d'annuler une seance quekonque, etant donne qu'il n'y a pas d'autre comite au commission qui doive se reunir a. cette heure-Ia. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni), (trad1,lit de l'anglais): J'en reviens a. ce qu'a But apart from that, it seems to me extremely dangerous, and invites all kinds of trouble and disorder, for the Council to suspend its discussion of the main question because incidents are reported, and we are waiting to hear from the Subsidiary Group in regard to the matter. I think we ought to go straight ahead with the work in which we are involved. The PRESIDENT: The question of a meeting tomorrow has already been decided negatively by a vote of the Council. Tne question now is whether we should ha-ve two meetings on Thursday or two meetings on Friday. I do not think it makes any difference; the only difference is a technical one in that certain other meetings would not have to be shifted if we met twice on Friday. The question of accelerating our debate, which was mentioned by the representative of the United States, would be taken care of either way. Unless there is any objection by the Council, I shall call one meeting on Thursday and two meetin.gs on Friday; this has the advantage of not disturbing any of the arrangements which have already been made. Mr. LOPEZ (Colombia): The suggestion is quite agreeable to me. However, I wonder whether we might not follow the precedent established during the meetings of the previous weeks and have two meetings on Thursday and one meeting on Friday morning. The PRESIDENT: If that is the desire of the Council, I am perfectly ready to grant it. Therefore, we shall have two meetings of the Council on Thursday and one meeting of the Council on Friday, all devoted to the Greek question. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Re- ~ublics) (translated from Russian): I should like to remind you that one of the committees of ~he Ator,nic Energy Commission is due to hold Its meetmg on Thursday. If that meeting is to ~e postponed until Friday I shall raise no objectio~. If it is not postponed, it will be inconvenIent. The PRESIDENT: I shall request the Chairman of the Working Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission to transfer his meeting scheduled for Thursday morning to Friday afternoon. I am sure he will accept this request. Consequently~ we are all agreed upon our schedule; two rneetmgs of the Council on Thursday and ?ne meeting on Friday morning. The next meetmg of the Council is Thursday at 10.30 a.m. A moins que le Conseil ne formule des objections, nous tiendrons une seance jeudi et deux seances vendredi; cela presente l'avantage de ne contrarier aucune des dispositions qui ont deja ete prises. M. LOPEZ (Colombie) (traduit de l'anglais): Cette proposition me semble fort acceptable. Toutefois, je me demande si nous ne pourrions pas nous inspirer du precedent cree au cours des seances des semaines preceden~es, et nous reunir deux fois jeudi et une fois vendredi matin. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Si le Conseil pre£ere cette solution, je suis tout a fait dispose a l'accepter. Dans ces conditions, nous tiendrons deux seances jeudi et une seance vendredi, consacrees toutes trois a la question grecque. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traditit du russe): Je voudrais faire remarquer que l'un des comites de la Commission de l'energie atomique doit se reunir jeudi. Si cette seance est renvoyee a vendredi, je n'aurai pas d'objection a soulever. Si elle ne l'est pas, cela creera des difficultes. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'a,nglais) : Je prierai le President du Comite de travail de la Commission de l'energie atomique de remdtre a vendredi apres-midi la seance que ce Comite doit tenir jeudi matin. Je suis certain qu'i! acceptera. Nous sommes donc bien d'accord sur notre emploi du temps: le Conseil tiendra deux sean~' ces jeudi et une seance vendredi matin. La prochaine seance aura lieu jeudi a 10 h. 30. 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