S/PV.159 Security Council

I wish to inform the Council that the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs ,?f the Kingdom of Egypt has addressed a letter from Cairo, dated 8 July 1947, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which has been transmitted to this Council for consideration. The letter reads as follows: Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l~anglais): J'informe le Conseil que le Premier Ministre et Mi: nistre des Affaires etrangeres du Royaume d'Egypte a adresse du Caire une lettre au Secre':" taire general des Nations Unies, en date du 8 juillet 1947; cette lettre a ete transmise au . Conseil pour examen. Elle est con~ue comme suit: [Texte original ~n anglais] "Monsieur le Secretaire general, "Des troupes britanniques sont maintenues en territoire egyptien contre la volonte unanime du pays. La presence de troupes etrangeres sur le territoire d'un Etat Membre de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, en temps de paix et sans le [Original t~xt: English] "Mr. Secretary-General, "~ritish troops are maintained. in Egyptian terntories against the unanimous will of the peopie.. The presence of foreign troops within the terntory of a Member of the United Nations Organi~ation, in time of peace and without its 1 Voir pages 1343 a 1345. • Voir Ies Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securitl. Deuxieme Annee, Supplement special No 2. PROCES-VERB,AUX OFFICIELS CENr.CINQUANTE...NEUVIEME SEANCE Tenue aLake Success~ New-York~ le jeudi 17 juillet 1947~ a10 h. 30. President: M. O. LANGE (Pologne). Presents: Les representants des pays suivants: Aust.alie, BeIgique, Bresil, Chine, Colombie, Etats-Unis d'Arnerique, France, Pologne, Royaume-Uni, Syrie, Union des Republiques sociaIistes sovietiques. 222. Ordre du iour provisoire (document 5/4171 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour. 2. Lettre, en date du 8 juillet 1947, adressee au Secretaire general par le Premier Minic;tre et Ministre des Affaires etrangeres d'Egypte (document Si410) 1. 223. Adoption de I'ordre du iour "The unwarranted occupation of Egypt by British troops in 1882 and, as a consequence, their occupation of the southern part of the Nile Valley, the Sudan, have enabled the Government of the United Kingdom, since 1899, to force upon Egypt their partnership in the administration of the Sudan and subsequently to assume exclusive authority therein. Taking advantage of this situation, they have adopted a policy designed to sever 1-b.e Sudan from Egypt; discrediting Egypt anr1 the Egyptians; creating discord between them and the Sudanese, and dissension among the Sudanese themselves; instigating and encouraging 'artificial separatist movements. By this policy, the Government of the United Kingdom have endeavoured, and are endeavouring, to impair the unity of the Nile Valley, notwithstanding that this unitY, is urged by the common interest and aspirations of its people. "The occupation of the Nile Valley by the British armed forces and the pursuance of the aforesaid hostile policy, being unjustified threats to the liberty as well as to the unity of a free and ip.dependent nation, have given rise C to a dispute between the Egyptian Government and the Lovernment of the United Kingdom, the co:p.tinuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of·international peace and security. "In conformity with Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations Organization, and despite the fact that the presence of foreign troops is in itself incompatible with the freedom of negotiations, the Egyptian Government attempted with good faith to reach a fair settlement of this dispute by means of direct negotiations with the Government of the United Kingdom. These long and arduous negotiations having failed to achieve their end, the Government of the United Kingdom are striving to avail themselves of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 that cannot bind Egypt any longer, having outlived its purposes, besides being inconsistent with the Charter. "Consequently, the Egyptian Government bring their dispute with the Government of the United Kingdom to the Security Council under Articles 35 and 37 of the Charter, requesting the Security Council to direct: " (a) The total and immediate evacuation of British troops from Egypt, including the Sudan; " (b) The termination of the present administrative regime in the Sudan. "L'occupation de la vallee du Nil par les forces armees britanniques et la poursuite de la politlque hostile rappelee ci-dessus constituent une menace injustifiee tant a la liberte qu'a 1'unite d'une nation libre et independante, et ant provoque un differend entre le Gouvernement egyptien et le Gouvernement du Royanme-Uni, differend dont la persistance est susceptible de mettre en danger le maintien de la paix et de la securite internationales. "Conformement a l'Article 33 de la Charte des Nations Unies, et bien que la presence de troupes etrangeres soit en elle-meme incompatible avec la liberte des negociations, le Gauvernement egyptien a essaye de bonne foi d'arri· ver a un reglement equitable de ce differend, par des negociations directes avec le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni. Ces negociations longues et difficiles ayant echoue, le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni essaie de se prevaloir du traite anglo-egyptien de 1936, traite qui ne peut Her plus longtemps l'Egypte, puisqu'il n'a plus de, raison d'etre, independamment du fait qu~il est incompatible avec la Charte. "En consequence, le Gouvernement egyptien saisit le Conseil de securite, conformement aux Articles 35 et 37 de la Charte, de son differend avec le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni et lui dernandc de prescrire: "a) L'evacuation totale et immediate de 1'Egypte, y compris le Soudan, par les troupes britanniques; " b) La revocation du regime administratif actuellement en vigueur au Soudan. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): As we have the document before us both in English and French, it would hardly seem necessary to have the translation read.

If there is no objection on the part of the representatives of France and Belgium, we shall dispense with the translation. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): S'il n'y a pas d'objection de la part des representants de la France et de la Belgique, nous nous dispenserons de donner lecture de la traduction. Je sugghe que le Conseil passe maintenant a l'adoption de l'ordre du _jour, sous la reserve qu'en l'adoptant le Conseil ne s'engage pas necessairement adiscuter ces deux points aujourd'hui. I suggest that the Council should now proceed to the adoption of the agenda, with this reservation, that by adopting it the Council does not necessarily commit itself to discussing both points today. Sir Alexander CADOGAN' (United Kingdom): My Governm.ent has, of course, no objection whatever to the inclusion of the first item in the Council's agenda, but, if this is the appropriate moment, I should like to say a word on the question of when t;p.e Council should begin to discuss the item. Sir AIexandre CADOGAN .(Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): Man Gouvernement n'a evidemment aucune objection, quelle qu'elle soit, al'inscription du premier point a l'ordre du. jour du Conseil; cependant, si c'est le moment de le faire, je voudrais dire un mot sur la question de savoir quand le Conseil doit commencer a discuter ce point. Il est exact que mon Gouvemement n'ignorait pas que cette question serait tres probablement ,inscrite a l'ordre du jour. Toutt.!ois, cette question a ete inscrite il y a quelques jours seulement, et, jusqu'a cette date, mon Gouvemement ne pouvait pas savoir la forme exacte sous laquelle le Gouvernement egyptien se proposait de saisir le Conseil de I'afl'aire. Nou:; avons mainten&,t la Iettre du Premier Ministre d'Egypte qui montre plus ou moins la forme de l'accusation qu'il se propose de porter contre mon Gouvemement, et qu'il s'efl'orce actueIlement d'etablir. Dans une afl'aire aussi serieuse que celle qui nous occupe, mon Gouvernement voudrait avoir le temps de recueillir tous les faits et de presenter sa version, de convoquer des experts qui se trouvent actuellement en Egypte et au Soudan, de leur donner ses instructions a Londres et de les amener ici. Cela prendra p.ecessairement un certain temps. Toutefois, je pense que mon Gouvernement sera pret vers le 5 aout a exposer son point de vue au Conseil; par consequent, .si. le Conseil et les representants de l'Egypte n'y voient pas d'inconvenient, je demanderai au Conseil de " decider maintenant, du moins a titre provisoire, de ne pas commencer adiscuter la question avant le 5 aout. Although it is of course true that my Government was aware that it was highly probable that this matter would be put on the agenda, it was not put on until a few days ago, and until that date my Government had not seen the exact form in which the Government of Egypt proposed to put the matter before the Council. Now we have the letter from the Prime Minister of Egypt, which shows more or less the form of the case that he proposes to bring against my Government, and on which it is, of course, working. In a serious case of this kind my Government would like to have time to assemble all the facts and produce its case, to summon experts from Egypt and the Sudan, instruct them in London and bring them over here. That would necessarily take some time. However, I think it would be ready by about 5 August to present its case here, and therefore, if it would be agreeable to the Council and to the representatives of Egypt, I would ask the Council to decide now, provisionally at any rate, not to begin the discussion before 5 August.

I believe that the request made by the representative of the United Kingdom is justified. It goes without saying that if one of the Governments needs some time in .7'. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je crois que la demande du representant du Royaume- Uni est justifiee. Il va sans dire que si I'un des Gouvernements interesses a besoin d'un certain (Signe) Mahmoud Fahmy NOKRACHY Premier Ministre Ministre des Affaires e~rangeres du Royaume d'Egypte Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): Comme nous avons sous les yeux les textes anglais et fran~ais de ce document, il ne semble pas necessaire de donner lecture de la traduction. 2~.4. Continuation of the discussion on the Greek question

It seems that the representatives of all the member States on the Security Council have expressed their general views with regard to t.Ite question before us. Therefore, I should like the opportunity of presenting the views of the delegation and Government of Po- LAND on the subject. Unless there is any member who desires to speak at this time, I propose to present my statement now. The Security Council sent the Commission of Investigation concerning Greek Frontier Incidents to Greece. This Commission has submitted its report to us. I shall take this report as a basis for starting my discussion. The report consists of a survey of evidence submitted to the Commission, of conclusions which are supposed to be based on the evidence submitted and, finany, of proposals concerning the proper action to be taken. The first part, the survey of evidence, was unanimously approved by all the members of the Commission. This unanimity, however, was achieved at the cost of inconclusiveness. The survey of evidence lists charges and refutations without a critical examination of the material. This critical examination is supposed to be contained in the conclusions, which in turn are supposed to give the Commission's views concerning the degree to which the various charges are justified. In this matter the Commission has not been able to reach unanimity. We have two sets of conclusions: one subscribed to by the delegations of Australia, Bel- ' gium, Brazil, China, Colombia, Syria, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, 224. Suite de !a discus~ion sur la question grecque Sur l'invitation du President, le colonel Kerenxhi, representant!de I'Albanie, M. Mevo- rah, representant de la Bulgarie, M. Dendramis, representant de la Grece, et M. ViZfan, repre- sentant de la Yougoslavie: prennent place cl la table du Conseil. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Il me semble que les representants de tous les Etats membres du Conseil de securite ont expri.me leurs vues generales concernan,t la question qui nous est soumise. J'aimerais done avoir l'occasion d'exposer les vues de la delegation et du GClU- vemement de la POLOGNE sur la question. Si aucun membre ne desire prendre la par01e en ce moment, je propose de faire mon expose maintenant. Le Conseil de sccurite a envoye en Grece la Commission cl'enquete sur les incidents survenus a la frontiere grecque. Cette Commission ilOUS a soumis son rapport. Je prendrai ce rapport comme base de ma discussion. Ce rapport se compose de l'examen des temoignages soumis a la Commission, de conclusions censement fon- dees sur les temoignages soumis et, enfin, de propositions concernant les mesures qu'il con- viendrait de prendre. La premiere partie, c'est-a-dire l'examen des temoignages produits, a ete adoptee a l'unani- mite par tous les membres de la Commission. Toutefois, il a fallu sacrifier le caractere con- cluant de cette partie du rapport pour realis.er l'unanimite. L'examen des temoignages prodUlts comporte la liste des accusations formulees et des refutations avancees, mais ne constitue pas un examen critique des faits examines. Cet examen critique est cense se trouver dans les conclusions, qui elles-memes sont censees etre l'expression des vues de la Commission sur la mesure clans laquelle les diverses accusations forrrlttIees sont justifiees. La Commission n'a pu realiser l'unanimite sur ce dernier point. Nous avons deux series de conclusions: l'une qui a ete approuvee par les delegations. de l'Australie, de la Be1gique, du Bresil, de la Chine, de la Colombie, des Etats-Vnis d'Amerique,~ The conclusions should be based on a critical examination of the evidence which was submit- ted to the Commission. However, in reading the conclusions of the majority, I cannot find such a critical examination of the evidence. These condusions read more like a statement of opinion than like an analysis of the evidence submitted. There is very little logical connexion between the conclusions reached and the ample factual ma- terial which has been assembled by the Commis- sion. It is difficult to dismiss the impression that these conclusions are the result of preconceived ideas and political purposes rather than th,- re- sult of the investigation. For this reason the Polish delegation to the Commission found itself unable to support the conclusions of the ma- jority. On the other hand, the conclusions presented by the delegation of the Union of Soviet So- cialist Republics do contain a critIcal exarnir.a- ti:m of the evidence, an examination of the trust- worthiness of witnesses and of the documents. These conclusions are based on the critical ex- anIination of the factual material. For this rea- son the Polish ddegation gave its support to, them. You also will have noticed that the Polish delegation presented a declaration of its own, which will be found on pages 245, 245a and 245b of the report. I shall not repeat this de- claration here. Let us discuss the conclusions and proposals of the Commission in greater detail. First of all, I shall attempt to reduce the area of di'3agree- ment. There are certain points which· are quite irrelevant to the task which is before us, and there are other points on which all of us, as well as the parties concerned, are in agreement. Passons a la discussion plus detaillee des con- clusions et des propositions de la Commission. En premier lieu: je vais essayer de reduire la zone de desaccord. 11 y a certains points qui 11'ont absolumrnt rien a voir avec la tache qui nons incombe, et il y en a d'autres sur lesquels nous sommes tous d'accord, de meme que les parties interessees. Les points qui, a mon avis, n'ont aucun rap~ port avec la question sont les accusations formu- lees par le Gouvernement hellenique-, selon les- quelles l'Albanie, la Bulgarie et la Yougoslavie ont hospitalise des membres des bandes armees grecques 'ou leur ont donne asile. La question de savoir si ces accusations sont vraies ou fausses ne m'interesse pas, parce que le fait d'hospitaliser et de donner asile ne constitue pas une violation du droit international. Le droit de donner asile, qui va etre sanctionne par l'Organisation des Nations Unies, est un droit bien reconnu en droit internaticnal. Je rappelle aux membres du Conseil de securite que les Nations Unies preparent actuel- lement une declaration internationale des droits de I'homme. Un projet de declaration de ce genre a ete recemment adopte et sera soumis en temps voulu au Conseil economique et social et enfin a l'Assemblee generale. L'article 14 de ce The points which I consider irrelevant are the charges raised by the Greek Government that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have hospital- ized and given asylum to members of the Greek partisan forces. I am not interested in the ques- tion of whether these charges are true or false, because hospitalizing and giving asylum are not actions which would infringe upon international law. The right to give asylum is a well-estab- lis~ed right in international law, a right which is gomg to be sanctioned by the United Nations. I should like to remind the members of the Scu;ity Council that the United Nations is pre- parmg an international declaration 011 human rights. A draft of such a declaration has re- ~ently been adopted arid is going to be submitted m due time to the Economic and Social Council and, finally, to the General Assembly. Article 14 ~ D'autre part, les c.•nclusions presentees par la delegation de 1'Union efes Republiques socialistes sovi :ques contiennent reellement un examen critique des temoignages produits, un examen de la veracite ges temoins et des depositi0ns. Ces conclusions se fondent sur l'examen critique des faits. C'est pourquoi la delegation de la Pologne leur a donne son appui. VOilS aurez remarque aussi que la deI~gation de la Pologne a presente une deciaration separee qui figure aux pages 245, 245a et 245b du rapport. Je ne repeterai pas id les termes de cette declaration. As regards the charge of hospitalization, I a-tn ready to go even further. I consider hospitaliza- . tion not only a right but a duty. What if Al- bania, Bulgaria aDd Yugoslavia provided Greek refugees with hospitalization? I believe they would have defaulted in a fundamental principle . of humanity if they had refused to do so. Thus I refuse to discuss this question of whether the charges of hospitalization and asylum are true or false, because they are charges which are en- tirely irrelevant, and I am rather astonished that the Commission should have paid any attention to them. Then ther,. are points on which all agree. The most important of these is the relative unim- portance of pure frontier incidents. The Com- mission was established primarily in order to in- vestigate frontier incidents, as the very name of the Commission indicates. I remind you of the name, "The Commission of Investigation con- cerning Greek Frontier Incidents". The establishment of the Commission was a result of a complaint made by the Greek Govern- ment concerning frontier incidents. Let us see what the majority conclusions say about the fron- tier incidents. On page 174 of the report of the Commission, we read the following: "The inci- dents brought to the Commission's attention ranged from penetrations across the border, of a few yards, to sh~ep stealing, and exchanges of shots between frontier guards." Here are the final conclusions. You can read them on page 176: "... no evidence of proba- tive value Was introduced which tended to in- dicate that the frontier violations not connected with guerrilla activities were deliberately pro- voked either by the Governments of the northern neighbours or by that of Greece, or that there was any policy of systematic provocation on either side, or that the incidents themselves were evidence of the aggressive intentions of either country." This is the conclusion of the majority. It dis- poses of the main charge of the Greek Govern- ment that the northern neighbours of Greece were provoking frontier incidents. But it is true -and here I do agree with the conclusions of the majority-that however insignificant and un- 1 See Report of the Drafting Committee to the Commission on Human Rights, Annex F (document E/CN.4/21). 1 Voir le Rapport du ComiU de r6daction ala Com- mission des droits de l'homme, annexe F (document Ei'CN.4/21). With this task in view, a number of measures have been suggested which, I am glad again to be able to say, have been accepted by all the members of the Cc'mcil as well as by all the interested parties. One such measure is con- tained in the first part of point A of the pro- posals given on page 248 of the report. It is to "... recommend to the Governments of Greece on the one hand, and Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the other, to do their utmost to establish normal good neighbourly relations, to abstain from all action direct or indirect which is likely to increase or maintain the tension and unrest in the border areas, and rigorously to re- frain from any support, overt or covelt, of ele- ments in neighbouring countries aiming at the overthrow of the lawful Governments of those countries. Should subjects of. complaint arise these should be made not the object of propa- ganda campaigns, but referred either through diplomatic channels to the Government con- cerned, or should this resource fail, to the appro- priate organ of the United Nations". I'Or~anisatlbll des NatiollS Unies." L'autre mesure figure dallS le pomt B des pro- positiollS formulees. Elle recomm.ande "aux Gouvernements interesses de condure de nou- velles conventions etablies sur le modele de la COl1vention greco-bulgare de 1931, en tenant compte des necessites de la situation actuelle". Ces propositions ont ete acceptees par la ma- jorite des membres ~.~ la Commission. Elles figurent dans la resolution que nous a soumise le representant des Etats-Unis1 aillSi que dans la resolution soumise par le representant de l'URSS2• Les representants de la Bulgarie et de la Yougoslavie, qui siegent en ce moment a la table du Conseil, ont dedare qu'ils etaient dis- poses a accepter ces propositions. Je declare au Conseil que je fais miennes ces propoSitiollS au nom de la delegatio;n de la Pologne. Nous avollS ainsi realise l'entente sur un pro- bleme important - a savoir, celui des incidents de frontiere et des mesures qui devrflient etre prises en vue de supprimer la tellSion exi~tant entre la Grece et ses voisins du Nord. Je desire souligner cette entente; je desire la souligner parce qu'il y a une tendance acreel' l'impression qu'il y a entre les membres de la Commission un desaccord total et que toutes les propositiollS concretes sont rejetees par un seul groupe des The other measure is contained in point B of the proposals. It recommends "to the Govern- ments concerned that they enter into new con- ventions along the lines of the Greco-Bulgarian CCJnvention of 1931, taking into account the needs of the present situation". These proposals have been subscribed to by the majority of the members of the Commission. They are included in the resolution presented te us by the representative of the United StateR1 and also in the resolution presented by the USSR representative.2 The representatives of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia who are sitting at our Council table have declar~d their willingness to accept these proposals. I wish to express here the en- dorsement of these proposals in the name of the Polish delegation. Thus we have reached agreement on a sub- stantial issue-namely, that of frontier incidents and of the measures which should be undertaken in order to remove the tension between Greece ~nd her northern neighbours. I want to empha- SIze this agreement-I want to emphasize it be- c.ause there is a tendency to create the impres- SIOn that no agreement whatever exists, and that ~ll positive proposa18 are being rejected by one SIde of the parties concerned. This impression is wro~g and undermines the prestige of the United- Nations. For this reason I want to make it clear that agreement on an important point does exist, -parli~s interessees. Cette impression est fausse et nuit au prestige des Nations Unies. C'e-st pour- quoi je desire preciser que l'entente existe sur un point important et qu'il y a un certain nombre de propositiollS concretes que nous sommes tous disposes a accepter. an~ that there are a nur.lber of positive proposals whIch all of us are ready to accept. 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securiM, Deuxieme Annee, No 51, 147eme seance. , Ibid., Deuxieme Annee, No 55, 153eme seance. .As the charges of hospitalization and asylum have been disposed of as irrelevant and the ques- tion of frontier incidents has been reduced to its true proportions, I come now to the basic issue. The basic issue is the charge that Albania, Bul- garia and Yugoslavia interfere in the internal affairs of Greece by giving assistance to the partisan forces engaged in operations against the forces of the Greek Government. The majority of the Commission believes that these charges are justified. How was this conclusion reached? Well, I shall read to you the full passage in the report which purports to establish this conclu- sion. You will find it on page 167. It reads as follows: "The charge by the Greek Government that its northern neighbours were supporting the guerrilla warfare in Greece was directed jointly against Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The evidence submitted, however, related primarily to Yugoslav intervention in this regard, and only to a lesser degree to that of Albania and Bul- garia. Although the liaison representatives re- peatedly denied these charges, and attacked the credibility of the witnesses who testified in their support, little direct evidence was brought for- ward to disprove them. On the basis of the facts ascertained by the Commission, it is its conclusion that Yugoslavia and, .to a lesser ex- tent, Albania and Bulgaria, have supported the guerrilla warfare in Greece." I should like to examine this passage. It states that the Greek Government made certain charges; that liaison representatives of the other countries, against which these charges were made, denied them; and it then states that "little' direct evidence was brought forward to disprove them". Indeed, when I read this passage, I found it difficult to believe my eyes. However, I assure you that this sentence is in the text, and that it is on this sentence that the conclusion abput the alleged support gi.....en to the Greek partisans by Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria is based. Yes, it is based on the fact that the I do not know how many of, the members of the Security Council are trained lawyers. How- ever, even a layman knows that under any modern legal system charges must be proved. A verdict of guilty cannot be based on the mere inability to disprove charges. I really do not know how the Commission, which certainly has many able and eminent men among its members, was able to base a conclusion on argumentation of such a level. My only explanation is that the members of the Commission, for some extrane- ~us reasons, were compelled to establish a verdict of guilty against the northern neighbours of Greece in spite of their inability to prove it. The evidence brought forward in support of the Greek charges consists of statements by wit- nesses and of the military instruction manual al- legedly used in the refugee camp at Bulkes. A critical examination of this evidence is contained in the conclusions submitted by the USSR repre- sentative, which were supported by the repre- ser.tative of Poland. I therefore shill not repeat th~ details. I should like to mention only that the trustworthiness of the witnesses was chal- lenged, because of their character and because of the internal contradictions in their statements. Some witnesses were common criminals; others were former collaborators with the Axis and irrec- oncilable enemies of the present Governments of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia; still others were under sentence of death and were reprieved for the specific purpose of testifying against Greece's northern neighbourS. As regards the military instruction manual allegedly used in Bulkes, it has no cover page, so that its nature and origin are not established. Furthermore, its contents show that it refers to large-scale military operations of a kind not possible for partisan forces. The inconclusiveness of this evidence was im- plicitly admitted by the majority of the members of t~e Commission when they based their con- cIusI.ons, not on proof of the charges regarding partISans, but on the fact that "little direct evi- dence was brought" forward to disprove them". O~ :hat flimsy basis, some members of the Com- lI1ISSlon reached the conclusion that Albania and Bulgaria interfered in the internal affairs of Greece. We are all deeply concerned about the dis- turbances taking place in Greece. We need not look for outside interference to explain these dis- turbances, because we find their full explanation in the internal conditions in Greece. Greek par- tisan activities are not confined to northern Greece; they take place also in central and southern Greece-for instance, in the Pe1opon- Jlesus. I need o~y remind you of the seizure of Sparta for a short while by the partisan forces. Such activities take place even in Crete. By no stretch of the imagination can the partisan war- fare in the Pe1oponnesus or in Crete be con- strued as due to Yugoslav interference. The fact that partisan activities have spread over the whole of Greece is sufficient proof that the real causes of the disturbances in Greece have to be sought in the internal political conditions of that country. This has been admitted by the majority of the Commission. It has also been pointed out by representatives of Greek political parties. Thus, as we find on page 228 of the report, Mr. Tsiri- mokos, General Secretary of the Socialist Party of' Greece, stated to the Commission on 18 February: "The disorders taking place through- out the country were the result of internal causes and were not instigated by any of the neighbour- ing countries." On the same day, General Grigo- riadis, representing the Liberal Party, stated be- fore the Commission that "the persecution of the democratic elements had led the Greek people to desperation and had brought about an exceed- ingly tense situation, which existed throughout t..lJe whole territory of Greece." A few days ago we read in the papers about the arrests of almost 3,000 people in Athens and its surrounding areas. I do not want to discuss here'the reasons which led to the arrests and the different versions given about them. However, the very fact that such mass arrests were made shows that the internal situation in Greece is far from healthy. And this happened in Athens, not at the Yugoslav or Albanian border. It is true that the situation in northern Greece is more acute than in the other parts of the country. This is due' to the policy of persecution of national minorities, a fact which the majority of the Commission had to acknowledge. On Nous sommes tous tres preoccupes des inci- dents qui se produisent actuellement en Grece. Nous n'avons pas a rechercher une jngerence de l'exterieur pour expliquer ces incidents, car nous trouvons leur explication dans les conditions qui existent a l'interieur de la Grece. Les activites des bandes armees grecques ne se bornent pas au nord de la Grece; eUes se deroulent egalement dans la partie centrale et meridionale de la Grece, par exemple dans le Peloponnese. 11 me suffit de vous rappe1er que des bandes armees se sont emparees de Sparte pendant un certain temps. De teUes activites se deroulent meme en Crete. Meme en donnant libre cours a l'imagiila- tion, on ne peut concevoir que les activites des . bandes armees dans le Peloponnese ou en Crete soient dues a l'ingerence de la Yougoslavie. Le fait que les activites des bandes armees se sont etendues a toute la Grece suffit a prouver qu'il faut chercher les motifs des incidents survenus en Grece dans les conditions politiques existant a l'interieur meme de ce pays. Ceci a ete reconnu par la majorite des mem- bres de la Commission et a ete egalement soull- gne par les representants des partis politiques grecs. C'est ainsi que, comme on le voit a la page 235 du rapport, M. Tsirimokos, Secretaire general du parti socialiste grec, a declare a la Commission le 18 fevrier: "Les desordres qui se produisent a travers tout le pays sont dus a des causes interieures et ne sont pas fomentes par run que1conque des pays voisins." Le meme jour, le general Grigoriadis, representant du parti liberal, a declare a la Commission que "la per- secution des elements democratiques avait accuIe le peuple grec au desespoir,. et cree dans tout le territoire de la Grece une situation extremement tendue". 11 y a que1ques jours, les journaux ont signale l'arrestation de presque 3.000 personnes a Athenes et dans les regions environnantes. Ce n'est pas ici le lieu de discuter les motifs qui ont provoque ces arrestations, ni les differentes ver- sions qui en ont ete donnees. Toutefois, le fait meme qu'il a ete procede aces arrestations en masse montre que la situation interieure en Grece est loin d'etre saine. Et ceci s'est produit a Athenes, et non pas a la frontiere yougoslave ou albanaise. I1 est vrai que la situation en Grece du Nord est plus grave que dans les autres parties du pays. Cet etat de choses est du a la politique de persecution dont les minorites nationales sont victimes; c'est la un fait que la majorite des .~ The disturbed inte nal situation in Greece and the persecution of national minorities in the northern parts of t}...at country are entirely suffi- cient to explain the guerrilla warfare which, to our great regret, is going on in that country. There is no need to search for outside interfer- ence as an explanation. The theory of outside interference is not only entirely unsubstantiated, as I have already shown, but it is also harmful. It serves to cover the ineptitude of the present Greek Government in the matter of solving the internal situation in its country. By accepting this theory, we merely encourage a continuation of the conditions which led to the disturbances taking place in Greece. If we are truly con- cerned with helping the Greek people to solve their internal problems, which are admittedly difficult, and to regain their national unity, we must discard an unsubstantiated theory which directs attention away from the real problems of the Greek people. " For the reasons indicated, our delegation must reject some of the proposals mad.e by the ma- jority of the Commission. First of all we must reject the recommendation which is contained in the last part of proposal A, and which reads: ". . . in the area of its investigation future cases of support of armed bands formed on the terri- tory of one State and crossing into·the territory of another State, or of refusal by a Government, in spite of the demands of the State concerned, to take all possible measures on its own territory to deprive such bands of any aid or protection, should be considered by the Security Council as a threat to the peace within the meaning of the Charter of the United Nations." The majority of the Commissin:- :.: ..., proposed the establishment of a commission, which would have very far-reaching powers over the four Balkan countries and which would remain in existence for two years. Its powers would include direct access to the territories of the four States and the right to undertake any functions of in- vestigation and control. We are unable to sup- port such a proposal. There are several motives which lead us to -this position. First of all, not all means of direct negotiation, conciliation and arbitration between the parties, as provided for in Article 33 of the Charter, have been exhausted. We believe that the usual procedure of the Charter requires that such means should be tried first. I have already suggested, in connexion with my discussion of frontier incidents, measures along these lines, and I believe that such measures should be tried first. There are however more weighty considera- tions which affect our position. The commission to be established has been proposed in conjunc- tion with a declaration of ,the guilt of Greece's northern neighbours. Such a declaration is con- tained in the conclusions of a majority of the Commission of Investigatiol! concerning Greek Frontier Incidents, and also in the speech by the representative of the United States, ,who has proposed a resolution that would establish such a commission. The commission appears to be a consequence of the verdict of guilt pronounced upon Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. As such a consequence, it seems to be a punitive measure against the northern neighbours of Greece. The fact that the proposed commission, in conjunc- tion with the declaration of guilt, constitutes a punitive measure has been correctly recognized by the representative of France in his statement printed on page 241 of the report of the Com- mission of Investigation. As we reject the verdict of guilt as unsubstantiated and unproved by evi- dence, we must also reject anything which may appear as a punitive measure based on such a verdict. Furthermore, the powers given to the com- mission would place the four Balkan countries, Greece included, under a kind of United Nations trusteeship. I do believe that the United Nations 'can and should act drastically wherever the preservation of peace requires it, but I do not believe that any of the Balkan countries-and this also holds true for Greece-deserves to be treated in this way when other means are avail- Mais il y a des considerations plus impor- tantes qui determinent notre attitude. La crea- tion de la Commission a ete proposee a la suite d'une declaration proclamant la culpabilite des pays qui bordent la Grece au Nord. Cette declaration figure dans les conclusions de la majorite des membres de la Commission d'en- quete sur les incidents survenus a la frontiere grecque ainsi que dans le discours du represen- tant des Etats-Unis, qui a propose dans sa resO- lution de creer une telle commission. La creatiOIl de celle-ci semble resulter du verdict de culpa- bilite prononce contre l'Albanie, la Bulgarie et la Yougoslavie. De ce fait, elle apparait comme une mesure punitive contre les voisins septen- trionaux de la Grece. Le representant de la France, dans sa declaration qui figure a la page 250 du rapport de la Commission d'enquete, a reconnu que la creation de la commission pro- jetee, en liaison avec la declaration de culpabilite, constituait une mesure de caractere punitif. Du fait que nous rejetons le verdict de culpabilite comme n'etant pas fonde et prouve par les temoignages, nous devons egalement rejeter tout ce qui risque d'apparaitre comme une mesure de caractere punitif fondee sur ce verdict.. De plus, les pouvoirs donnes a la commission mettraient en quelque sorte les pays balkaniques, .y compris la Grece, sous la tutelle des Nations Unies. J'estime que l'Organisation des Nations Unies peut et doit prendre des mesures energi- ques chaque fois que I'exige le maintien de la paix, mais je ne crois pas qu'aucun des pays balkaniques (et ceci est vrai egalement pour la Grece) merite d'etre traite de cette maniere, These measures have been proposed by many Greek leaders and many Greek political organ- izations, not only by those of the EAM. Most of these measures refer to Greece's internal condi- tions, and as such, are beyond the jurisdiction of the Security Council. But there is one thing strictly connected with the "internal situation in Greece, in connexion with which the Security Council is competent to make a recommanda- tion: that is the withdrawal .of foreign troops and foreign military personnel from Greece. We are all well aware of the role which foreign military intervention played in the deterioration of the internal conditions in Greece. We are also aware of the extent to which the Greek people have become the victims of the tensions and con- flicts of international power politics. For the sake of the Greek pe()ple, as well as for the sake of the peace of the world, it is imperative that Greece should be extricated from the network of international power politics. A proposal to that effect has been presented by the Greek par- ties taking part in the coalition of the EAM, in a memorandum submitted on 17 February to the Commission of Investigation, and in a mem- orandum of 9 June addressed to the Secretary- General of the Dnited Nations. Among the measures recommended to rp.store national unity among the Greek people is what is there termed the neutrality of Greece. The· measure envisages that all foreign armed forces and foreign military advisers should be with- drawn immediately from the territories of Greece, that the Greek Government should pro- claim that no foreign armed forces will ever be allowed to stay on or to pass through Greek territory, and that no foreign power will be al- ~~•• It is well within the jurisdiction of the Security Council to recommend these measures. By doing so, we should contribute toward the restoration of national unity among the Greek people; and we should help to extricate that unfortunate coun- try, Greece, from the web of international power rivalries; and we should restore to the Greek people the freedom to determine their own fate. I recognize the representative of Yugoslavia. Mr. JOHNSON (Un}.~ed States of America): I know that Tuesday you informed us that the representative of Yugoslavia was going to make a statement today. However, I also had the impression Tuesday-it may be an incorrect one -that you had indicated that the general dis- cussion was closed. The Yugoslav representative has already spoken at great length. He is now going to speak again. I should just like to know whether this general debate is to be unlimitftd, and whether we are going into a second round. If you have in mind closing the general debate and could give some indication as to when that might take place, I would appreciate it.

I did not intend to close the general debate in the expectation that we would automatically begin a detailed discussion of the various points of' the resolution. I did not ask the representative of Yugoslavia exactly what the content of his statement was going to be or how much consideration he was going to giv.e to the points of the resolution. I will ask him to give an explanation now. t Mr. VILFAN (Yugoslavia) (translated from French): It will perhaps be a second round, as the United States representative puts it. I do not think it any the less' necessary on that account because we have so far received no reply to the questions raised in our first statement. These replies are necessary not only to us, but also to the Security Council. My remarks today will be brief, but I must naturally give some details to illustrate them. If I am prevented from speaking and discussing the findings of the majority of the Commission of Investigation, this might convey the impression that an attempt is being made to stifle discussion ~nd impose solutions without advancing any arguments to support them. If you will allow me, Mr. President, I should like to begin my statement. Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America) : M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (tra- Just a moment ago, Mr. President, you seemed duit de I'anglais): Il y a un instant, Monsieur le to indicate that there was no clear line of divi- President, j'ai cru vous entendre dire qu'il etait sion as regards the time when the general disimpossible d'indiquer exactement le moment ou M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais): Je sais que vous nous avez informes mardi dernier que le representant de la Yougoslavie ferait aujourd'hui une declaration. J'ai cru cependant ce jour-la - peut-etre a tort - vous entendre dire que la discussion generale sur la question quinous occupe etait close. Or, le representant de la Yougoslavie s'est deja exprime longuement. Il va prendre la parole une fois encore. Je voudrais simplement savoir si ce debat general doit prendre fin et si nous allons passer au deuxieme round. Je vous serais reconnaissant de nous dire si vous avez l'intention de clore le debat general et si vous pouvez nous indiquer a que! moment vous pensez le faire. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je n'ai pas eu l'intention de clore le debat general dans le but d'entamer automatiquement l'examen detaille des divers points de la resolution. Je n'ai pas demande au representant de la Yougoslavie de me dire exactement sur quoi allait porter sa declaration ou quelle attention il pensait accorder aux differents points de la resolution. Je vais lui demander de s'expliquer maintenant. M. VILFAN (Yougoslavie): Ce sera peut-etre, en effet, un deuxieme round, comme l'a dit le representant des Etats-Unis. Je ne l'en crois pas moins necessaire, parce que nous n'avons jusqu'ici pas re~u de reponse aux questions posees dans notre premier expose. Or, ces :-eponses sont necessaires, non seulement pour nous, mais aussi pour le Conseil de securite. Bien que brievement formule, mon expose d'aujourd'hui sera, naturellement, illustre de details. Si on m'empeche de parler et de discuter les conclusions de la majorite de la Commission d'enquete, l'impression pourrait etre donnee que l'on ne veut pas qu'une telle discussion s'institue et que l'on veut imposer des solutions sans les fonder sur des arguments. Si vous le permettez, Monsieur le President, je voudrais commencer mon expose. I have no desire to stifle the wish of anyone to speak if he has something to say which has not been said before. However, it would be helpful to know just what moment marks the division of the two parts of the debate on this case.

As far as I can ascertain, the rules of procedure do not give the President power to restrict the discussion. However, I shall make a request of all the members of the Council -only a request, nothing more, and the members are free to disregard it if they wish-to attempt to concentrate the discussion more on the specific points of the resolution rather than on the general issues which we have debated. Of course, I understand that the representatives of Greece, Albania, Bulgaria aFld Yugoslavia, whose interests are directly involved, are in a somewhat special position and may still wish to make some general statements. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): A ~e que je crois, le reglement interieur ne donne' pas au President le pouvoir de limiter la discussion. Cependant, je demanderai a tous les membres . du Conseil (il ne s'agit que d'une demande que mes collegues sont libres d'ecar1:er s'ils le desirent) d'essayer de faire porter davantage la discussion sur les points precis' de la resolution plutot que sur les problemes d'ordre general que nous avons examines. Bien entendu, je crois comprendre que les representants de la Grece, de rAlbanie, de la Bulgarie et de la Yougoslavie, dont les interets sont directement en jeu, se trouvent dans une position assez particuliere et desirent peut-etre encore faire quelques declarationS d'ordre general. Je donne la parole maintenant au representant de la Yougoslavie. I recognize at this time the representative of Yugoslavia. Mr. VILFAN (Yugoslavia): In our statement of 1 July,! we proposed that a detailed discussion should be held on the report of the Conmission of Investigation, chapter by chapter. In proposing this, we were, first of all and quite naturally, guided by the desire that the question which is under consideration should be elucidated and studied as thoroughly as possible. Moreover, we were guided by the conviction that a complete discussion was in accordance with the provisions of Article 34 of the Charter, which stipulates that the investigation should provide only the material for a solution. Finally, we made this proposal because we were impressed by the conclusions of the majority of the Commission of Investigation. On a specific question, the problem of frontier incidents, we have stated -and not only stated, but in our opinion proved by quotations from and an analysis of the material-that the majority conclusions contain serious mistakes. The least we can say about them is that they show that the majority of the Commission had approached the problem with preconceived ideas. M. VILFAN (Yougoslavie) (traduit de l'anglais): Nous avons propose dans notre declaration du 1er juillet1 de soumettre a une discussion detaillee le rapport de'la Commission d'enquete, chapitre par chapitre. En agissant ainsi, nous avons obei a plusieurs motifs et, en premier lieu, au desir tout nature! de mettre en lumihe et d'etudieI le plus minutieusement pOSSIble la question qui nous occupe. Nous avions egalement la conviction qu'une discussion complete serait conforme aux dispositions de l'Article 34 de la Charte, qui stipule que I'enquete doit se borner a rassembler les documents necessaires a une solution. Enfin, nous avons ete impressionnes par les conclusions de la majorite des membres de la Commission d'enquete. Sur un point precis, celui des incidents de frontiere, nous avons declare que les conclusions de la majorite contenaient de graves e.rreurs: non seulement nous 1'avons declare, mais nous 1'avons meme, anotre sens, prouve, a l'aide de citations et d'analyses des documents. Le moins que 1'on puisse dire au sujet de ces conclusions, c'est qu'elles montrent que la majorite' de la Commission a aborde le probleme avec des idees preconc;ues. Bien entendu, nous estimons aussi que les travaux du Conseil de securite ne peuvent et ne doivent pas faire double emploi avec ceux de la Commission d'enquete; mais nous sommes d'avis que les conClusions de la Commissio:{l doivent etre convaincantes, non seulement par le nombre des suffrages exprimes en leur faveur, mais Naturally, we too are of the opinion that the Security Council cannot and should not duplicate the work of the Commission of Investigation. But we are of the opinion that the conclusions of the Commission should be convincing not onlybecause of the number of votes in their favour, but also because of the accuracy and re- We are of the opinion that we have raised such objections, and that, in the course of the present discussion,theyhavenotbeenrefuted. If,inthecase of our charges against Greece concerning frontier incidents we have stated that none of them was investigated and no witnesses were heard, and if the reply given by the United Kingdom and Australian representatives was that, in the course of the whole in'-'t:stigation and with reference to all'questions, such and such a number of witnesses were heard, so many on the proposal of one side, and so many on the proposal of the other~ then our precise allegation has not been refuted at all. With regard to the objection of the Australian representative that the investigation was not thorough only because Yugoslavia impeded it, this objection has no foundation, because the Australian representative was mistaken in the basis for his allegations regarding the visit of a team of the Commission to Bitolj. The visit to Bitolj was cancelled with the agreement of the entire Commission, because, although the Yugoslav representative was prepared to facilitate it, it was not possible within the time which the team had at its disposal, and which had been . allocated to it by the Commission. Therefore, we shall proceed to an analysis of the conclusions. We shall begin with the appraisal of the situation in Greece given in the conclusions of the majority of the Commission. On page 178, point (c), it is said: "The evidence presented to the Commission revealed that the great majority of the clashes between the guerrillas and the forces of the Greek Government had occurred in the northern Greek provinces of Epirus, Macedonia and Thrace. Of the estimates submitted to the Commission, one showed that 707 out of 922 clashes had occurred in the three northern provinces of Greece and the other 769 out of 1,338 had taken place there. A sufficient number of incidents were recorded in central and southern Greece, however, to impress the Commission that while conditions in northern Greece were far more acutely disturbed than elsewhere there was a general condition of unrest in Greece as a whole. The Commission does not find, however, that this condition amounts to a state of civil war." It is true that there exists no strict definition according to which a clear distinction could be made between civil war and a "general condition of unrest". But, if, plainly speaking, civil war in a country is that state in which, in the larger part of the country, during a long period of time, armed struggles develop between the State's armed forces and organized and armed people, and show a tendency permanently to increase and to become more intense-then that is the present state of affairs in, Greece. Besides, when the Greek press and the officials of the present Greek regime speak of the situation in their country, they do not hesitate to characterize it as war. As an instance, we cite the following statement made by Mr. Tsaldaris in the Parliament during the discussion of the struggle against the partisans in the Peloponnesus: "1 have stated on several occasions that there exists no question of public order. There exists a state of war which faces the Government (Messager d'Athenes, 6 July 1947)." We cannot understand why the majority of the Commission is reluctant to use the expression which was used by the Vice-President and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Greek Government, in his statement before Parliament. d'Athene~, 6 juillet 1947)." Nous ne voyons pas pourquoi la majorite de la Commission hesite a employer l'expression dont s'est servi le Vice- President du Conseil et Ministre des affaires etrangeres du Gouvernement grec dans sa declaration devant le Parlement. Il convient, a notre avis, de tenir compte de cette hesitation quand on examine les conclusions de la majorite sur la situation interieure en Grece. La majorite a declare (page 187 du rapport) - c'est, je crois, le passage qu'a lu le President au cours de la seance: "De I'ensemble de ces temoignages, il apparait que les groupements politiques de l'opposition en Grece We think that it is in the light of that reluctance that we must 'view the further conclusions of the majority in regard to the internal situation in Greece. The majority stated (page 179 of the report)-and this is, 1 believe, the passage which was read by the President earlier ill the meeting: "This body of evidence was to the effect that opposition political groups in Greece had been The picture which the majority of the Commission itself has given in these few dry sentences is quite terrible, It must be said that this weakly worded, presentation is only a pale reflection of the reality which the Commission saw in Greece and whick> was exposed to the Commission in its true colours by the Greek people in more than three thousand memoranda, petitions and delegations, and by the representatives of EAM, the Party of Left Liberals, the Socialist Party, the all-Greek Federation of Democratic Associations, the General Confederation of Labour, the Union of the Democratic Youth of Greece, and others. However, it is not because of the weak wording that we ~riticize the majority of the Commission. 'What we criticize and consider as an indication of preconceived ideas is that the majority, after stating the truth, did not want to draw the natural conclusion: that the so-called abnormal conditions in northern Greece are an intrinsic, organic part of the larger abnormal situation which exists in Greece as a whole, and that all the abnormalities along the Greek frontiers and in relations between Greece and her neighbours could arise solely from such an abnormal situation. How serious this omission by the majority is can be seen from the following statements of the majority, which precede its picture of the internal situation. On page 178 of the ,report we read: "Furthermore, the experience of the Commission in Greece, especially in Athens and Salonika, showed that there existed a considerable degree of political freedom, freedom of speech, press, and assembly, despite disturbed conditions. Indeed, of the four countries visited by the Commission,only in Greece did it hear witnesses who criticized the policies of their government or receive delegations from free organizations which presented it with evidence against the Government." It is difficult to understand how both paragraphs could have been written by the same people.. We cannot find any connexion between the conclusion of the first paragraph quoted, namely, that persecutions, arrests, internments, beatings and other brutalities were committed, 11 est difficile de concevoir que les' deux paragraphes' aient pu etre rediges par les memes . personnes, car nous ne trouvons aucun rapport entre les conclusions qu'ils formulent. Le premier paragraphe cite declare en effet que des persecutions, des arrestations, des internements, deS' ~ Here we must point out a fact which is well known to the majority of the Commission: only two days after the Commission left Athens for Salonika, 670 reputable democratic citizens were arrested there; and quite openly, during the time that the Commission was working in Salonika, a former Minister and a leader of the democratic movement in Greece, Zevgos, was killed in that city by a witness who had testified on behalf of the Greek Government. In this situation, the majority of the Commission considered it a special sign of democracy in Greece that numerous Greek organizations and citizens with their own lives at stake, had the courage to charge before the Commission and the whole world that the ruling circles in Greece and their foreign protectors were solely and completely responsible for the present tragedy of the Greek people, and all its consequences. It is true that only in Greece did a tremendous number of citizens and civic leaders consider the Commission a democratic tribunal to which they could and should submit complaints against terror and denial of civil rights, against the destruction of their independence by foreign intervention, and against the presence of foreign troops. This, I say, is true, and it redounds to the credit of those Greeks and to the people as a whole. Nevertheless, the majority of the Commission should not have gone so far as to declare all this, too, a sign of democracy. In our opinion, the Commission had a great obligation to stress in its conclusions the great·courage of the Greek citizens and their loyalty to democracy and to the independence of Greece, and not to describe the struggle of the Greek people against the present regime as proof of that regime's democracy. These conclusions of the majority of the Commission in connexion with the substance of the Greek question, which deal with the causes and character of the abnormal conditions in Greece and the abnormal conditions in the northern part of Greece and on its frontiers, represent the fundamental weakness and the fundamental mistake of all the conclusions reached by the majority of the Commission. All conclusions regarding other questions that were investigated, which follow from the basic conclusions, have the same failings. On what basis does the majority of the Commission draw such a conclusion? On the basis of the fact that it was met by thousands of Greek refugees in Yugoslavia who, like the Greek people in Greece, demanded justice; they asked to be given the possibility of returning to their homes, to a free life in their own country. It is difficult to suppose that the Commission, which had seen and investigated the horrors before which the refugees had fled by tb.:- thousands, could expect to find them expressing gratitude to their persecutors. Even less can we understand that this very natural bitterness and protest should be defined as political activity, and that there should be an attempt to charge the Yugoslav authorities with responsibility for this alleged 'political activity. An entirely different stand was taken by the majority of the Commission in regard to the YugosJav allegations and charges against Greece. The difference will be illustrated by the following example. Yugoslavia has alleged that the Greek regime welcomed Yugoslav traitors, collaborationists and war criminals, and that it not only tolerated, but also encouraged, their antidemocratic and anti-Yugoslav activities. Even in Athens, the Commission was presented with depositions of witnesses in that connexion, and with original letters written from Greece by such refugees. In Belgrade, the Commission heard the witnesses Bajram Bajraktari, Emini Azemi and Dr. Trencev; in Skoplje, it heard K. Iskenderi, R. Apostolov, Teskov and T. Djavedski. Besides, the Commission heard some of those refugees in Greece-for i...'"1Stance, Ali Nivica, K. Tasic, M. Maksimovic, Ljuan Gas, and others, who more or less confirmed that cur thesis was correct and well-founded. Furthermore, the Commission gathered evidence to the same effect from various popular organizations and citizens-for instance, memoranda from the EAM District Committee of Florina and fr~m the NOF District Committee of Florina. It also received' memorandum from A. Witaniotis and Ifantie, deportees on the island of Ikaria, to the effect that as e.arly as the summer and autumn of 1946, the Greek auth,orities kept and collaborated with, in the district of Florina in the north of Greece, armed bands of Yugoslav and Albanian war criminals and collaborationists, through whom they terrorized the population of northern Greece After all the above, what do the conclusions of the majority of the Commission say in this respect? On page 180 of the report we read: ". . . A team of the Commission visited a number of places where these refugees were held, and although there was some testimony indicating political activities on the part of the internees, directed against Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, the Commission does not feel that the Greek Government itself had encouraged it." In spite of numerous data collected and witnesses heard, in spite of the depositions of Greek citizens which are of special value because the~' were given voluntarily and under par-J.cularly difficult conditions, the majority of the Commission sLmply ignored the depositions, facts and documents. If we compare the reaction of .the Commission, to the question of Greek refugees in Yugoslavia with their reaction to the question of Yugoslav refugees in Grp,ece, then we cannot avoid the impression that the majority formulated their conclusions on the basis of preconceived ideas. The next problem, the problem of the Macedonian minority in Greece, is a serious one, and a comparatively thorough investigation was carried out regarding it. But the conclusions of the majority of the Commission on this point also reveal the same error. Immediately after the end of the war, organs of the Greek authorities, mostly collaborators with the Germans, initiated the persecution of national minorities-in this particular case, the Macedonian minority. Desirdus that this After such an investigation the majority of the Commission reached the following conclusions, which are given on page 180 of the report: ". . . The Commission received sufficient evidence, however, to warrant the conclusion that immediately after the liberation of Greece, the small Slav-speaking and Chamuriot minorities in Greek Macedonia and Epirus had been the victims of retaliatory excess ..." But it seems that here too the majority considered that such a statement, which however gives another pale picture of the reality, was too great a concession to the Yugoslav thesis, and was too harsh on the Greek side. Therdore, the majority went on to say: ". . . In reply, the Greek Government asserted that the acts in question were committed before it had re-established control of the areas concerned, and that members of these minority groups had collaborated with the Axis occupying forces during the war." What was the intention of the majority of the Commission in bringing forth, in this place, these allegations of the Greek representative, which had not been investigated, as a sufficient and reliable explanation and justification of such a policy towards national minorities? That is our question. All the more does this question demand an answer, as the Commission has collected sufficient documents, depositions and facts to show that Greece is one of the few countries in the world which does not bring to justice either small or great collaborationists and quislings, the largest part of whom occupy in Greece at present the highest positions in the military and administrative machinery of the State; that members of the Macedonian minority participated en m~nt de documents, de depositions et de faits pour etablir que la Grece est un des rares pays du monde qui ne livre a la justice ni les petits ni les grands collaborateurs et quislings, dont la plupart occupent actuellement en Grece les plus hautes fonctions dans l'administration militaire et civile de l'Etat; que les membres de la minorite macedonienne participerent en masse aux mou·· Therefore, we repeat, it is not sufficiently clear why the allegations of the Greek representative were accorded such a documentary value and such moral and political importance that after all the above, and in spite of it, they were included in this important document, and thereby practically adopted by the majority of the Commission. In this case, as well ,as in all former cases, the question is self-evident: How can we explain that the majority of the Commission formulated its conclusions in such a way, and submitted them to the Security Council? We cannot rid ourselves of the conviction that the majority of the Commission was led by certain preconceived ideas or by special conceptions which we cannot understand. In addition to the facts cited above, there are a few other instances which led us to this conviction. The majority of the Commission, for example, completely ignored the question of the role and influence of foreign troops and foreign representatives in the development of Greece from the end of the war to the present. On the basis of evidence furnished by numerous witness~s and documents, the Commission had sufficient grounds for recognizing the danger and consequences of the presence of foreign troops in Greece anet the intervention of foreign representatives in all aspects of Greek life. From the same sources, it could be established that this question is directly and indirectly connected with the causes and character of the abnormal conditio:;)s in northern Greece and on the northern Greek frontiers. The majority of the Commission should have stated its opinion in its conclusions, notwithstanding the fact that it mayor may not have been positive. This omission, without justification, and the fact that competent statements, depositions and documents were overlooked, obviously cannot weaken our conviction that preconceived id'eas existed in the minds of the majority of the Commission. . The Yugoslav representative on the Commission, in his letter of 26 February 1947, submitted to the Commission data regarding blackmail and terror practised by the Greek authorities on Yugoslav citizens in Greece. Team No. 1 commen~a exactement au moment de la reinstallation des autorites grecques et que, depuis ce moment, elle s'est progressivement accrue. Par consequent, nous le repetons, il n'apparait pas avec assez de clarte pourquoi une telle valeur documentaire, une telle importance morale et politique ont ete attach6es aux allegations du representant grec; pourquoi en consequence, nonobstant tout ce qui vient d'etre dit, ces allegations ont ete introduites dans cet important document qu'est le rapport et, de ce fait, pratiquement adoptees par la majorite de la Commission. Dans ce cas, comme dans tous les cas precedents, la question est evidente en soi. Comment pouvonS-ilOUS expliquer que la majorite de la Commission ait formuIe ainsi ses conclusions et les ait soumises au Conseil de securite? Nous ne pouvons nous defaire de la conviction que la majorite de. la Commission a ete influencee par certaines idees precon~ues ou par certaines conceptions particulieres que nous ne pouvons comprendre. Outre les faits mentionnes ci-dessus, il y a d'autres exemples qui confirment notre conviction. La majorite de la Commission, par exemple, a completement ignore la question du role et de l'influence de troupes et de representants etrangers dans le developpement de la situation en Grece, depuis la fin de la guerre jusqu'a present. En prenant pour bases les elements fournis par de nombreux temoins et documents, la Commission disposait de moyens suffisants pour reconnaitre les dangereuses consequences de la presence en Grece de troupes etrangeres et de l'intervention de representants etrangers dans toutes les phases de la vie grecque. Il pouvait etre etabli, d'apres les memes sources, que cette question est directoment et indirectement liee aux causes et au caractere de la situation anormale dans le nord de la Grece et sur les frontieres septentrionales de la Grece. La majorite de la Commission aurait du, dans ses conclusions, exprimer son opinion, qu'elle fUt ou non positive. Cette omission absolument injustifiee, et le fait que des declarations emanant de personnes competentes, des depositions et des documents ont ete negliges, ne sont evidemment pas de nature a ebranle.r notre conviction que des idees precon~ues existaient dans l'esprit de la majorite de la Commission. Dans sa lettre du 26 fevrier 1947, le representant yougoslave a la Commission lui a soumis des renseignements concernant le chantage et la terreur exerces par 108 autorites grecques a l'egard des citoyens yougoslaves en Grece. Furthermore, we consider an important omission the fact that there is no appraisal of the findings in the conclusions of the majority. The appraisal-that is, the explanation of why one believes one piece of evidence and not anothermust be a basic part of any investigation. In drafting its plan for Geneva, and 'taJcing into consideration such a procedure, the Commission provided for such an appraisal. However, contrary to this decision of the Commission, the majority omitted it. We shall demonstrate, with a few instances, what a loss this repr~ents for the conclusions of the majority. In the Greek documentation submitted to the Security Council on 10 December 1946,1 there are depositions of eight eye-witnesses in regard to frontier, incidents, as well as in regard to the question of alleged anti-Greek activity of refugees in Yugoslavia. We stress that they were eye-witnesses to important events, whose depositions were considered so important that die Greek Government e'ven sent them to the Security Council. However, not one of them appeared before the Commission, although they could have given valuable support to the Greek thesis at the time those questions to which they I had been eye-witnesses were investigated. The majority of the Commission not only did not consider that this weakened the Greek thesis and failed to mention this strange procedure, but, on ~he contrary, the majority sanctioned such a procedure, citing these witnesses in the report and basing their conclusions on them. As regards one of the most important Greek witnesses, George Gatsios, it was established before the Commission that a deposition submitted to the Security Council, in his name, was completely at variance with his actual deposition. It was established that he expressly denied the ex-' istence of.any military school or military activity The deposition of the witness Zahos is considered especially valuable to Greek evidence. According to the Greek White Book, he was not only an eye-witness to the military training of refugees in Yugoslavia, but he was even a teacher in such a military school. By hiS own admission, and by examination of his former deposition, it was established that he neither knew anything about it, nor stated anything about military training or a military school, and even less about teaching in a military school. In the Greek White Book, in a conspicuous place, there is the statement of the witness, Evangelos Karayannir), against Yugoslavia. But one day the same Evangelos Karayannis wrote a letter from the prison at Salonika and stated that the Greek attthorities had put pressure on him to make a statement against Yugoslavia. He stated that he had never agreed to such a thing. Consequently, it is obvious that his name is attached to a certain statement in the Greek White Book in an inexplicable manner. The Yugoslav representative asked the Commission to examine this interesting witness. The Team of General Delvoie looked for him in the prisons of Salonika, where he had been when he wrote the letter, but, strangely enough, he had disappeared. In this way, we could enumerate dozens of similar instances, and I ask you to consider whether it is a question of the weak memory of illiterate witnesses, as is believed by the Australian delegate, and of minor contradictions. It is clearly a question of something quite different. On the basis of the foregoing analysis of the Greek evidence, our representative, while he was still in Athens, drew the formal conclusion 'that the Greek evidence had been falsified. He then put a formal request that, before the investigation on the basis of such evidence was begun, its authenticity should be verified in detail. The request was flot taken into consideration by the Commission. Now, disregarding dozens of estab· . lished falsifications such as those mentioned above, the majority of the Commission did not consider it necessary to touch upon this question with even a single sentence. We are deeply convinced that, in its conclusions, the majority should have asked the question: "Why did the Greek Government need falsifications?" We also think that the majority should have given some answer to the question. To illustrate what serious charges were left unresolved-questions which some time ago had at least a temporary effect and which probably even . today have a certain effect here and there-I shall give another example before I turn to a consideration of the recommendations. On 12 December 1946, the Greek representative submitted to the Security Council, among other things, the deposition in extenso of E. Papaghianni, stating that thousands of Greeks were taken to Yugoslavia and held there by Yugoslavia as hostages.2 In view of the way in which the Greek news on the so-called invasion and international brigades is received these days, I can easily imagine what effect this deposition had in December 1946, amidst a discussion on whether or not to send a commission of investigation. At the meeting of the Commission on 3 February 1947 in Athens, the Greek representative supported this allegation, quoting that 2,000 people, amongst whom were intellectuals, workers, women and children, were allegedly taken hostage in December 1944 by ELAS, and were helped now by Yugoslavia. Simultaneously, he submitted a list of these alleged hostages. With this repeated allegation, which was intended to do serious harm to the reputation of our country, the question was closed for the Greek representative and the majority of the Commission. The desired effect had been achieved. Immediately after, the Greek representative withdrew the only witness who had been originally submitted in support of this allegation, and failed to return to the question again, although the Yugoslav representative stated that he was able to present lists of the Judicial Medical Service of Athens, from which it appeared that the Greek list of alleged hostages included dozens and dozens of names of people who had been killed in Athens in the 1 Il en reste toujours quelque chose. • Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securite, Premiere Annee, Deuxieme Serie, Supplement No 12, annexe 23. We cannot consider such conclusions of the majority of the Commission to be a solid basis and starting point for legally based, just and useful recommendations. It is our deep conviction that to draw upon such conclusions or to proceed from them in elaborating recommendations would inevitably lead to recommendations which were predestined to failure, and which would contribute neither to the normalization of the situation in Greece, nor to the prestige of the Security Council. We take this view of the recommendations of the majority of the Commission, which were supported without reservations by the represe.l1tative of the United States, all the more so because it was permitted that these recommendations should also include elements of intimidation, and because an important part of them is in direct violation of the Charter of,the United Nations. It is necessary to go along a direct road, to proceed without complications, in order that the recommendations should be just and useful. In order to arrive at recommendations for normalizing a situation that has been investigated, we must proceed from the following facts: The post-war development in Greece and in its foreign relations, under the influence of the policy of the post-war Greek regimes and the presence of foreign troops in Greece, creates the causes and conditions for civil war in the country and for abnormal relations with Greece's democratic neighbours. Therefore, the first and prmcipal recommendation should e}~press the effort of the Security Council to remove the causes of such an abnormal internal and ex- ~ In this respect, the recommendation of the majority for a transfer of the Macedonian and Albanian minorities, although it was suggested as a voluntary one, is particularly unacceptable. Having in mind the terrorism to which t~ese minorities have been subjected, we cannot but consider the adoption of such a recommendation as the legalization of the extermination policy pursued by the Greek regime. On the question of refugees, the only saneand logical recommendation would be, as is provided for.in the USSR draft resolution, for a solution in the spirit of mutual understanding and for establishment of friendly relations between the l:Ountries concerned. But we are of the opinion that this recommendation should be concrete. First of all, it should take into account the fact , that Greek refugees in Yugoslavia are mostly people who were persecuted because of their democratic beliefs and their activities in the Resistance during the occupation, whereas the refugees from Yugoslavia in Greece are mostly traitors, collaborationists, and war criminals. Therefore, we are of the opinion that it should be recommended to the Greek Government that Greek citizens of Macedonian and Albanian nationality who fled should be enabled to return, and should be compensated fully for their material losses caused by terrorism, discriminatory measures, and the necessity for leaving their homes involuntarily. A<.: l::::gards traitors, quislings and war criminals, the Greek Government should be reminded of the recommendations of the General Assembly of the United Nations made on 13 February ~946.1 th~ connexion, it should be borne in mind that the Yugoslav Government, by its Note No. 2080 of 19 August ~946, had accepted a previous proposal of the Greek Government to resume the frontier agreement which existed before the war. The Greek Government did not accept such a solution, but, on the contrary, refused it. Finally, I should like to add a few words about the proposal of the majority of the Commission of Investigation for the establishment of a commission to put into effect the recommendations of the Security Council. Aside from the fact that such a commission would be practically futile, we consider that it is, in itself, contrary to the Charter. The Bulgarian representative has already indicated the contradictions between, on the one hand the method of establishing the commission and its competence, as provided for in the United States resolution, and on the other hand the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter.l I do not therefore consider it necessary to insist upon that point further; but I consider that it would be valuable to refer to two things in this connexion. First of all, it is a fact that at the time of the establishment of the Commission, and even more so at the time the Subsidiary Group was set up, tendencies to expand the competence of the Security Council in contradiction to the Charter were already manifested. This question should be considered in more detail. The second thing which I should like to rn."nti6n is the legal opinion of the Secretary- General, to which the representative of the United States referred at the hundred and fiftysixth meeting.2 The representative of the United States cited it in support of his thesis, but we, on the contrary, are of the opinion that it confirms our point of view. The question which was put to the Secretary- General, when abstractly formulated, would read as follows: Can the Security Council, in addition to the specific powers stipulated in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII,of the Charter, exercise other rights and assumeother responsibilities? To this question, and only to this question, did the Secretary-General reply affirmatively. The question thus was not whether or not the Security Council may expand the specific powers provided for in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII, or whether or not it may exercise these specific powers without regard to provisions En second lieu, je voudrais faire mention de l'opinion juridique du Secretaire general, a laquelle le representant des Eta:ts-Unis a fait allusion lors de la cent-cinquante-sixieme seance2• Le representant des Etats-Unis l'a citee a l'appui de sa these, mais nous estimons, au contraire, que cette opinion :i'enforce notre point de vue. FornmIee dans l'abstrait, la question qui a ete posee au Secretaire general serait la suivante: outre les pouvoirs specifiques definis par les Chapitres VI, VII, VIII et XII de la Charte, le Conseil de securite peut-il exercer d'autres droits et assumer d'autres responsabilites? A cette question, et a cette question seulement, le Secretaire general a repondu par l'affirmative. La question qui se posait 'n'etait done pas cene de savoir si le Conseil de securite peut ou non elargir les pouvoirs specifiques prevus aux Chapitres VI, VII, VIII et XII, ou s'il peut ou non exercer ces pouvoirs specifiques sans tenir compte 1 Voir les Proces-verbawc officiels du Conseil de sicuriU. Deuxieme Annee, No 57. A correct interpretation of the legal opinion to which the representative of the United States referred shows not only that it does correspond to the provisions of the Charter, but also in our opinion, that a commission, as it is conceived in the United States resolution, is legally not per., mitted. I repeat, our opinion is not in contradiction to the practice established in the Security Council. We are conv~cedthat putting in effect such a resolution and such recommendations . would not represent a strength~ning, but a weakening of the United Nationll, because the strengthening and developing of the United Nations is possible only within the fl'amework of the Charter. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de [Janglais) : En raison de l'heure tardive, il faut que nous remettions la traduction des obseI'Vations presentees par le representant de la Yougoslavie a la seance de cet apres-midi. Puisque nous devons lever la seance maintenant et que la traduction risque de retarder l'intervention de l'orateur suivant, je propose, si les repregentants de la Belgique et de la France trouvent cette suggestion acceptable, de distribuer la traduction ecrite plutat que de la faire donner verbalement a la seance de 1'apres-midi. 11 est bien entendu,

The lateness of the hour necessitates that we postpone the interpretation of the remarks made by the representative of Yugoslavia until the afternoon session. As it is necessary to break up the meeting in this manner and some time will elapse between speakers because of the interpretation, I shouid like to make the suggestion, if it is agreeable to the representatives of Belgium and France, that instead of having the interpretation given orally during the afternoon session, we should distribute it in writing. It is understood, of course, that no May I add that rule 53 of the provisional rules of procedure for the General Assembly is exactly the same. Up to the. present time, we have not had any precedent in the Security Council for the procedure suggested by the President. However, there were precedents in the General Assembly, in exceptional cases such as the one we are confronted with at this time, where a statement was rather lengthy and was concluded at 1 p.m., and thus it was necessary that the interpretation should be postponed until the afternoon. In such a case the General Assembly consented to have the interpretation distributed in writing and not given orally. I merely place this information before the members of the Security Council.

I should not wish to create a precedent or even to suggest forming any gen~ eral rule on the subject. I referred only to the special situation arising today. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): Why should we consider this special?

So as not to create a precedent. Mr. PARODI (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, under the circumstances in which you offered your suggestion, I find it acceptable. I understand that we shall receive a written French translation of the statement of the representative of Yugoslavia. If it is agreed that we are not hereby establishing a precedent, and in view of the fact that we are about to adjourn, I approve this procedure, provided the delegate of Belgium has no objection to it. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated from French): I associate myself with what the representative of France has just said. Mr. VILFAN (Yugoslavia) (translated from French): This question must, of course, be decided by the members of the Security Counc.il, but our country is directly concerned in it. If I may make a suggestion, I would ask you, Mr. President, not to in'list that the translation should be done in this way, i.e., that only the French text of my speech should be circulated. Our delegation Has only prepared the English text, the French translation is not ready, so persons who can only understand the French text Permettez-moi d'ajouter que l'artic1e 53 du reglement interieur provisoire de J'Assemblee generale est redige exactement de la meme maniere. Jusqu'a present, naus n'avons eu aucun precedent au Conseil de securite de la procedure proposee par le President. Toutefois, il y a eu des precedents a l'Assemblee generale en des cas exceptionnels, tels que celui qui se. presente en ce moment, ou une declaration assez longue prenait fin a 13 heures; il etait alors necessaire de renvoyer la traduction a l'apres-midi. Dans tin cas de ce genre, l'Ass~mblee g-enerale a consenti a ce que la traduction £Ut 'distribuee par ecrit et ne flit pas donnee verbalement. Je desire simplement donner ce renseignement aux membres du Conseil de securite. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je ne voudrais pas Creel' de precedent, ni meme proposer d'etablir une regIe generale a ce sujet. Je faisais seulement allusion a la situation speciale qui se presente aujourd'hui. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit de l'anglais): Pourquoi considererions-nous cette situation comme speciale? Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Min de ne pas Creel' de precedent. M. PARODI (France): Monsieur le President, dans les conditions ou vous venez de faire cette proposition, je puis l'accepter. Je comprends que nous aurons par ecrit la traduction franc;;aise de la declaration du representant de la Yougoslavie. Etant entendu que ceci ne constitue pas un precedent, et en raison du fait que· nous devons lever la seance, je donne mon accord a cette procedure, si le representant de la Belgique n'y voit pas d'inconvenient. M. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgique): Je m'assacie a la declaration du representant de la France. M. VILFAN (Yougoslavie): Cette question doit evidemment etre· resolue par les membres du Conseil de securite, mais notre pays y est directement interesse. Si je puis me p.ermettre de faire une suggestion, je vous demariderais, Monsieur le President, de ne pas insister pour que la traduction 30it faite de cette fac;;on, c'est-a-dire que l'on procede seulement a la distribution du texte franc;;ais de mon discours. Notre delegation n'en a prepare que le texte anglais; la traduction franc;;aise n'est

I fully appreciate the point raised by the representative of Yugoslavia. However, in view of the urgency of this question. which is before us and in view of the fact that we still expect quite a long debate, I definitely would prefer the arrangement which I have proposed. I wish to express my thanks to the representatives of France ancl Belgium for their consent. I again want to underline that this proposal was made simply to cover the present urgent situation and is, therefore, only a temporary arrangement which will not set any precedent or establish any principle. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socia:Iist Republics) (translated from Russian): If the Yugoslav representative had agreed to his speech not being interpreted into French, and to an English translation only being given-that would be one matter. However, this is not acceptable to -the Yugos~av representative, and I think we cannot but bow to this. I feel that it would be tactless not to meet the request for this speech to be interpreted into French, if the sp~aker considers it necessary and useful. I cannot Sl;:e why innovations should suddenly be made in the rules of procedure wliich we ourselves have adopted. If we do not respect our own rules of procedure, it may well be asked, who will? I fail to see what the special situation here is. This is no special situation; it is a very ordinary one. Mr. KERNO (Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Legal Affairs): I should like to place before the members of the Security Council some additional infQmlation about the procedure followed by the General Assembly. A few momnts ago I said that in the Assembly, quite exceptionally, it was decided to have the translation distributed and not have th~ ora interr~etatioll. However, if I remember correctly, that was always done with the consent of the speaker.

I am informed by' the Secretariat that the written French translation cannot be ready today. I think this changes somewhat the situation, and since the speaker wishes to have his speech interpreted into French orally, we sI: JI have the French interpretation this afternoon. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je comprends parfaitement l'objection soulevee par le representant de la Yougoslavie. Toutefois, en raison de l'urgence de la question soumise a notre examen, et etant donne que nous nous attendons a de tres longs debats, je prefererais nettement l'arrangement que j'ai propose. Je tiens a remer::.ier les representants de la France et de la BeIgique d'avoir consenti a l'accepter. Dne fois de plus, je desire souligner que je n'ai fait cette proposition que pOUf repondre aux besoins de la situati.on actuelle et gagner du temps; il ne s'agit done que d'un arrangement provisoire qui ne creerait aucun precedent et n'etablirait aucun principe. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) .rtraduit du russe) : Ce serait tout autre chose si le representant de la Yougoslavie avait accepte qi..l.c son discours ne fUt pas interprete en fran~ais et s'il s'etait contente d'une interpretation en anglais. Mais il ne l'a pas accepte, et il me semble que nous ne pouvons que nous incliner. A mon avis, nous manquerions de tact si nous ne satisfaisions pas l'orateur qui demande l'interpretation de son discours en fran~ais, puisqu'il estime que cela est necessaire et utile. Je ne vois pas pourquoi nous devrions, en passant et a la M.te, introduire des innovations dans un reglement interieur que nous avons adopte nous-memes. Si nous ne respectons pas notre reglement interieur, qui est-ce qui le respectera? Je ne vois -pas ce que la situation actuelle a de special. 11 n'existe aucune situation speciale; c'est une situation des plus normales. M. KERNO (Secretaire general adjoint charge des affaires juridiques) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je voudrais foumir aux membres du Conseil de securite quelques renseignements suppIementaires au sujet de la procedure suivie par l'AssembIee generale. 11 y a quelques instants, j'ai clit que l'AssembIee, tout a fait exceptionnellement, a decide de faire distribuer la traduction et de ne pas faire donner d'interpretation verbale. Toutefois, si mes souvenirs sont exacts, cette decision etait toujours prise avec le consen~ement de l'orateur. Le PRESIDENT (traduJt de l'anglais): Le Secretariat m'avise que la traduction fran- ~aise ecrite ne peut pas etre prete aujourd'hui. Je pense que ceci change quelque peu la situation et, puisque l'orateur desire que son discours soit traduit oralement, l'interpretation en fran~ais aura lieu cet apres-midi.

We will meet again at 3 p.m. today. HUNDRED AND SIXTIETH MEETING Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 17 July 1947, at 3 p.m. President: Mr. O. LANGE (Poland). Present: The representatives of the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chilla, Co- lombia, France, Poland, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. 225. Provisional agenda (document 5/418) 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. The Greek question: report of the Commis- sion of Investigation concerning Greek Fron- tier Incidents to the Security Council (docu- ment S/360).1 226. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. 227. Continuation of the discussion on the Greek question At the invitation of the President, Colonel Ke- renxhi, representative of Albania, Mr. Mevorah, representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Dendramis, rep- resentative of Greece, and Mr. Vilfan, repre- sentative of Yugoslavia, took their seats at the Council table. The PRESIDENT: We will now have the French translation of the speech delivered this morning by the representative of Yugoslavia. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de ranglais): Nous nous reunrrons de nouveau aujourd'hui a 15 heures. La seance esi levee a13 h. 30. CENT-SOIXANTIEME SEANCE Tenue aLake Success, New-York, le jeudi 17 juillet 1947, a15 heures. President: M. O. LANGE (Pologne). Presents: Les representants des pays suivants: . Australie, Belgique, Bresil, Chine, Colombie, Etats-Unis d'Amerique, France, Pologne, Royaume-Uni, Syrie, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques. 225. Ordre du iour provisoire (dl:.cument· S/418) 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour. 2.. La question grecque: rapport presente au Conseil de securite par la Commission cl'enquete sur les incidents survenus a la frontiere grecque (document 8/360)1. 226. Adoption de I'ordre du iour Vordre du jour est adopte. 227. Suite de la discussion sur la question grecque Sur l'invitation du President, le colonel Kerenxhi, representant de il'Albanie, M. M evo- rah, representant de la Bulgarie, M. Dendramis, representant de la Grece, et M. Vilfan, repre- sentant de la Y ougoslavie, prennent place ala table du Conseil. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de ranglais): Nous allons entendre maintenant l'interpretation en fran~ais du discours prononce ce matin par le representant de la Yougoslavie. La declaration faite en anglais par M. Vilfan, representant de la Y ougoslavie, au eours de lq, cent-cinquante-neuvieme seance du Conseil de securite est alars interpretee en frangais. Austtalia-Australie Egypt-Egypte Norway-Norvege H. A. Goddard Pty. Ltd. Librairie "La Renaissance Norsk Bokimport AjS 255a George Street d'Egypte" Edv. Storms Gate 1 SYDNEY, N. S. W. 9 Sh. Adly Pasha OSLO CAIRO Belgium-Belgique Finland--Finlmzde Philippines Agence et Messageries de la D. P. Perez Co. Presse, S. A. 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