S/PV.1593 Security Council

In accordance with previous decisions taken by the Council 1 shau, if there Y no objection, invite those delegatlons ParticiPating in this debate to take the places reserved for them in the Council Chamber. 2. 1 invite the representatives of Sudan, EdUopia, South Afria, Liberia, Guyana, Chad, Nigeria, Mauritius and Saudi hbia to take the places reserved for them in the Council Chamber, it being understood that they will be seated at the Council table when they are to speak. 3. I invite the President of the United Nations Councjl for Namibia to take a seat at the Council table. At the invitation of the President, Mr. E. 0. Ogbu, President of the Orited Nations Cauncil for Flantibia, took a place at the Couwil table; and Mr. C. F. G. V~II Hi&p berg (Sou th A frica) too k th e place reserved for him.

ne Council willl now continue its consideration of the item on the agenda. 5. 1 cal1 on the representative of the United Kingdom, who has asked for the floor on a point of order.

1 should like briefly to refer to the question Ambassador Farah asked at the very end of our latest meeting on this subject, on Wednesday, 6 October. He asked how my delegation interprets the principle of the right to selfdetermination, with particular reference to the unity of the Territory concerned. 7, 1 did in fact try to make this clear in my original intervention when 1 said, if 1 may be allowed to quote myself: “My Govemment agrees on the importance of the unity and territorial integrity of Natibia and deplores any measures that would tend to destroy them again& the wishes of the people.” / 1589th meeting, para. 62./ In other words, like the representative of France, we regard selfdetermination for the people of Narnibia-as for those of any other dependent Territory exercising the right Qf self-determination-as applying to a national framework. me modalities of the exercise of that right cari, as I also mentioned in my speech, take different forms, and it is the wishes of the people that must be paramount. But in the case of Namibia it follows from what I have said that the ascertainment of the wishes of the people should be carried out on a Territory-wide, not a partial, basis. 1 hope that answers the request for clarification that the representative of Somalia put to my delegation. 9. Because, in each of the items on our agenda we fïnd again the same elements of colonialism-its illegality, its aggressiveness, its defiance of human dignity. Everywhere we fïnd-even if under a different guise-the international ramifications and the de facto aid which enable it to maintain its domination, We see once again a philosophyalthough the use of that word undoubtedly is a mark of too much honour-that is refrograde, inspired simuItaneously by the coloniaIist precepts of the nineteenth Century and by those which have been universally condemned, of nazism of the twentieth Century. ‘fie cleverly orchestrated rumeurs about a “dialogue”, SO visibly being spread reluctantly and SO visibly under the pressure of extremely embarrassed allies, cannot caver up the truth, SO lucidly revealed by Mr. Muller, that for rhe colonialists and thc racists the real dialogue took place on thc battlefield, in southern Africa, in Guinea-Bissau; that is spilled over into Zambia, Casamance and Senegal, Conakry and the Republic of Cuinea-to speak only of matters on our agenda; that the Ianguage of the dialogue was only that of force and the concept of superiority. 10. We have Listened with the greatest attention to the statements made’tiy President Ould Daddah of Mauritanja and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalis and Chad. 11. In those statements we have noted above all the presentation and the tigorous defence of the iegitimate interests of the oppressed people of Namibia, whose fate, need we recall, is the incontestable responsibility of our Organization. 12. We have noted the denunciation and the condemnation of the continuing occupation and exploitation of Namibia by South Africa, and the latter’s obstinate refusa1 to heed the resolutions of the United Nations, including those of the Security Council, requiring South Africa ta withdraw from Namibia. 13. We have also noted the criticism-so justified-of the attitude of certain Western. Powers which, despite the inhuman po!.icy practiced by the South African régime, refuse to limit the assistance and aid they grant that régime and which oppose the adoption by the United Nations of measures which could practically put an end to this racist and colonialist policy. We have also heard the statement of Mr. Nujoma, Chairman of the South West Africa People’s Organization, who truthfully described to us the everyday life of the Namibian people under South Afiican domina- 14. Finaily, we have noted the urgent appeal to the Council by President Ould Daddah, who urged chat the Council: “ , . . employ aU necessary means of compelling the South African Government to bow to the unanimous Will of the international community and immediately withdraw its administration from Namibia.” /1583rci meeting, para 24./ 15. SO far as Poland is concemed, it has always adopted a very clear position on the subject. As we see it, the fundamental political decisions on the subject of Namibia, in conforrnity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations, were adopted long ago by the United Nations. They are contained in Generai Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), that is to say, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. They were further clariiîed in General, Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI), which cancelled the Mandate of South Africa which, because of its conduct in Namibia, conspicuously failed to attain the objectives of its Mandate or to comply with the principles of the United Nations Charter and of resolution 1514 (XV), to which 1 have just referred. Further confirmation was contained in Securily Council resolu tiens 264 (1969), 269 (1969) and 176 (1970), ordering the South African Republic to with. draw its administration from Namibia and declaring illegal the prcscnce of South African authorities in Namibia. 16, Numerous stipulations of the Security Councü and of the General Assembly subsequently developed those deci- : siens, requesting States Members of the United Nations to undertake effective action against the Government of South : Africa SO as to force it to withdraw its administration from ; Namibia. li 17. Poland has supported a11 those decisions without any 3 reservations. This attitude is in conformity with one of the ! fundsmental principles of its fore& policy: solidarity and ’ support for the struggle for national liberation, for the legitimate aspirations to freedom of peoples who are still cofonized. 18. The objective and the direction of United Nations action were always clear and unequivocal to us: the accession of the people of Namibia to freedom and independence. 19. We have gîven evidence of this attitude not only within the United Nations; we have done SO and continue SO to do in our policy towards the Covernment of South Africa, in our refusa1 to maintain with jt political, economic or other relations, in our condemnation of its policy, in the support we bave given the organizations of national liberation of Namibia. Thus, we have applied the resolutiens of the General Assembly and of the Security Council concerning bath the question of Namibia and the policy of aporthejd, practised by the leaders of the South African Repubiic. 21. Limiting itself, as it did, to an expression of opinion solely on the relations of States with the South African Governmcnt, which could imply a recognition of the illegal presence of South Afrlca in Namibia-1 refer here to paragraph 121--the Court notes, quite correctly, that the definition of the nature of the choice of measures to be adopted against South Africa, as well as their scope and the practical methods of their implementation, is a matter within the competence of the appropriate political organs of the United Nations and, in pàragraph 120 that: “. . . it is for the Security Council to determine any further measures conscquent upon the decisions already taken by it on the question of Namibia.” 32. T}~us, thc Court has confïrmed what my delegation and most of the other delegations around this table have alrcady stressed in the various debates on the Namibian problem: the absolute necessity and unquestionable priority for specific political action against the Government of South Africa, to ensure the withdrawal of its administration from Namibia. 23. The consistent and totally negative attitude of the South African Government toward the decisions of United Nations organs, including those of the Security Council, on tbe one hand, and the continuation by South Africa of its policy of annexation and economic exploitation of Namibia on the other, prove sufficiently that Security Council action cannot be confined to exhortations, moral con. demnations, persuasion, or proposals for a dialogue. 24. The statement made in the course of this debate by the representative of the South African Government has proved once again the lack of any desire on the part of South Africa to abide by the decisions of the United Nations or to accept the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice. Mr.Muller’s theses have been refuted by numerous speakers and 1 shall not revert to them. One factor in the South African legal and political argument, SO shocking in itself because it is placed within a context SO obsolete, SO wholly unacceptable, and rejected as such by the international community, is the contention 1 Le,qal Conseauences .for Srates of the Continued Presence of South “A Jrica in’ Nomibh fSouîh Wmt Africa) noth withstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970). Advisoty Opinion, 1.C.f. Rcports1971, p. 16. 25. Are the South African leaders really living in a world apart? Have they not noticed the unanimity of the Organization in condcmning and rejecting any attempt to annex Territories by the use of force, which is contrary ta the provisions of the Charter. 9 Do they not reaüze that, Iike Israel and Portugal, they stand alone to face the world? 26. TO quote Presidentl Ould Daddah of the Republic of Mauritania: “New is the time for courageous and concrete action” /ibid., para 261. This action, we are all aware, cannot be limited to professing faith, to expressing regrets at the vioIations of human rights, or utterlng platonic condemnations of the aparfbeid system transplanted lnto Namibia. Nor cari it be limited to theoretical support for the dccision to deprive South Africa of its Mandate for Namibia. _ 21. The leaders of South Africa turn a deaf ear to moral condemnations. They place their faith in their mifitary arsenal, which they develop ceaselessly. Nevertheless they know that within their country their racist Eldorado is built on a vokano. They know that, cxternally, they depend on the economic and commercial relations, the military and political assistance of those who remain their partners. The decisive importance of those relations for the maintenance and consolidation of colonial and racist domination has been sufficiently emphasized, SO 1 need not dwell upon it. Al1 the components of the Narnibian and South African dossier, militate in favour of breaking off those relations, and demand that “concrefe and courageous action” supplement moral condemnations. The results of our work Will show whether this will be the choice of those who bear SO great a share of responsibility for the situation in Namibia and southern Africa. 28, We do not forget that it is the duty of the Council to ensure the withdrawal of the South African administration from Namibia. Consequently it should adopt measures within its field of competence which could truly influence the Government of South Africa, which would constitute an adequate response to the challenge thrown at us in Narnibia, which would reflect the unanimous attitude of international public opinion as well as a Will to act on the part of Member States of the United Nations, with a view to assisting fhe Namibian people to lîberate themselves from racist and colonialist oppression. 29, T%e Polish delegation, in conformity with the position of principle which it has defined in this statement, has acted in thl direction in the Ad Hoc SubCommittee on Namibia, whose report is before you. It will continue to do SO in the process of prepadng of a draft resolution on the agenda item before us.

Mr. President, since this is my fïrst forma1 statement during the month of October, 1 should like to extend to you my warm, fraternal congratulations on your accession to the Presidency of the Security Council. The f 37. In brief, thc Court was asked for an adtisow opinion and complicd with that request. The spcific repty is containcd in paragraph 133, which unequivocally states: 3 1. 1 also wish to express my appreciation and congratulations to the represcntative of Japan, Ambassador Nakagawa, for the efficiency, skill and tact with which he guided thc debates of the Council during the month of September. 32. On 29 July 1970 the Security Council adopted its resolution 284 (1970) in which it decided to request an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the following question: “What are the Iegal conscquences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia notwithsranding Security Council resolution 276 (1970)? ” In reply, the Court issued an Advisory Opinion on 21 June 1971 signcd by its President, Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan. 33. WC have most carefully and attcntively studicd that Opinion. The delegation of Argentina wishcs here and now 38. Although it is not binding, no ont cari deny the legal and moral weight of this Advisory Opinion. On the basis of this antl thc othcr circutnstances surrounding the problem, it is JIOW for the Security Council, in the exercisc of its puwcrs, to dccide which is thc bcst course of action to follow. t0 express its most profound appreciation to thc learncd judges who signcd it, for thc substantial work performcd in producing thc irnprtant opinion rcquestcd of them. %‘c ah express our apprcciatioll to thc dislinguished jurists who with cqu:~lly wzight! arguments explaincd thcir dissenting votes. W!lntcver the individual stand takcn by counlrics herc repreucnlcd, i; is obvious that thc Advisory Opinion is an invaluablc document to guide us in our prcscnt and future work. Thc Council is therefore ex. tremely grateful, and we think this should be clearly stated when we take note of Advisory Opinion in the rcsolution wc are about to adopt y 39. The position of Argentina regarding Namibia is clear and definite. II is inspired by the same principles and folIows the same direction that we have always defended and upheld since our entry into this Organisation as a founding Member, one which is in favour of the ending of ail colonial situations without exception. We believe we bave contributed in our deeds and in our advocacy to the process of decolonization and to promoting accession to independence by the new sovcreign States which today are amongus. . 34. 1 shall not enter inta a detailed or even a BeneraI analysis of the extensive and scarching considerations of the Court contained in this voluminous document, We think it would be improper, even presumptuous, for the Security Council, which has the highest political and exccutive rcsponsibilities, to judgc the juridical value of an Opinion rendered by the highest Court in the international system. 40. Our attitude with regard to Namibia is wholly in accord wjth this fine of conduct and with the Advisory Opinion of the Court which I have quoted. What is more, even before the Opinion was given-as was recalled a few days ago by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Rcpublic of Argentina in the general debate-the Covemment of Argentina advised the Government of South Africa on 26 November 1970 that it did net recognize any authority by it in Namibia and that i.t considcred the presence of South Africa in Namibia illegal /,‘$/~0020/. This act, carried out in conformity with the provisions of Security Council resolution 283 (1970), gives proof of our Will to implemcnt any measure chat might reaffirm strengthen the authority of the United Nations in respect. 3.5. We realize that the interpretations of the scope of various provisions of thc Charter-for example, Articles 24, 25, 27 (3) and 32-may logically give risc to reservations among some Member States. We doubt, however, that this is the appropriate forum in which to debate them. On the other hand, and 1 need hardly add this, the opinions of the Court on these provisions, as weII as on the problem as a whole, are merely advisory and have no binding force, 36. T~US, it is not really in order to pursue thc legal aspects of the matter. All these aspects have already been duIy considered and covered in thc assenting or dissenting opinions of the Judges; and this includes the questions put 2 I&id., pp, 89-126 ad 158-219. “(1) that, thc continucd presencc of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is undcr obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the Territory; “(2) that States Members of the United Nations are under obligation to recognize thc illcgality of South Africa’s presence in Narnibia and the invalidity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia, and to refrain from any acts and in particular any dealings with the Government of South Africa implying recognition of the Icgafity of, or lending support or assistance to, such presence and administration; “(3) that it is incumbcnt upon States which arc not Members of the United Nations to give assistance, within thc scope of subparagraph (2) abovc, in the action which has been taken by Ihc IJnited Nations with regard to Namibia.” and this 42. No one with the slightest sense of EaGty cari fag t. reake that thc stage of colonial domination bas corne to an end. Whatcver title South Africa might c]dm to invoke, ]! ]s net Possible that i! should obstinateiy continue !o separate itsdf frOtll dity. WflakVtX might bave bMn & &C"mstances surrounding the granting of the Mandate over South Wes! Africa by thc League of Nations, it is obvious that the ‘hrtitory was nof nor could it have been-given to South Africa as a gift to be annexed finally and irrevocably to its own territory. 43. Thcreforc the international communfty now cons!ituted in the United Nations claims for Namibia the same destjny which other colonies or T~U& Territories have had: independencc. 44. ‘I’his desire 113s been dgmfican!]y emphasized by the prescncc dtrring our debatcs of the hesident of Mauritania, Mr. Ould Daddnh, Presidcnt of the Organjzation of African Unity, BS well as of other eminent Foreign Ministers and stntesmcn of Africa. Thc just aspirations of that continent, which coincide with thc genera] fee]ing in the United Nations, ntust nut bc postponed once again. 45. In order to find a solution to this disturbing problem, the Ad Hue Sub-Committee on Namihia considered seti0\1~1y and thoughtfully at many meetings the V~~~OUS choices which it could submit to the Security Counci] in thc ligflt of the Advisory Opinion of the International Cour! of Justice. 1 think that it is appropriate to point out thut the Snb-Committec’s deliberations took place “in the light of’-as thc item always appeared on its agenda-and not “on” the Advisory Opinion. Thus the Sub-Committee corrcctly approached its task, by considering !he new prospects opened by the Advisory Opinion, but wjthout discussing its legal basis. 46. In an atmosphere of mutual co-operation and understanding in which WC are bound particularly to emphasize thc fruitfu] and intense participation of the Afro-Asian representatives as we]] as the excellent work done by the Secretariat, a report was prepared which appeared in document 5/10330 dated 23 September 1971, 47. Essentially this report offered three Proposa]s i* paragraphs 18, 19 and 20. The first of these, PartA, won dmost t.tnanjInous support in the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee. Jt is nove] and we]]-founded and offers concrete possibjlitjes for channeI]ing our immediate action. As we ~CC i!, because 0f the cornrnitments f! reaffirms, !Ire direction it takes and the sohttions it pursues, ad a1s,o because of the support jt won-and thés is no! negl]gib]@-rt cari constitute the basis for the decision *o be adoPted bY the Counci]. As regards part B we must reca]] thatt a’ we read in paragraph 16 of thc report, a number of delegations, 48. ‘fhe question Of Namibia has arrived at a stage where jt IqUires definite action. Since the ]ega] remedy of the ]ntemationa] COU~? of Justice has been e&rus!ed and ajnce the validity of the United Nations’ decisions bas been mtitïed bY that high tribunal, we now have very few choices open !o us. One of them, which is hypothetical of course, wou]d consist in adopting more serious resolutions which, white they rnight provide us with some dialectic satisfaction, in pnctice would only serve to make evjdent once again the limitations of every kind which our Organization encounters when it cornes to implementing our decisions. It is regrettable to have to recognize this, but it is !he truc situation. Until we are able to correct it, !he prestige and authority of the United Nations Will not be consolidated but will, on the contrary, deteriorate with the adoption of resolutions which cannot possibly be implemented. 49. Given this situation we must weigh very carefully what we do, because what is at stake ultimately is the fate of thc people of Narnibia, who are still subject to foreign domination. SO, The Minister for Fore@ Affairs of South Africa stated categorically here that his Government does no2 c]aim, and never has claimed, to possess !he Territory or !o extend its sovereignty to the country. Mr. M&er said: “our purpose is to guide each of the peoples of South West Afrjca along the road to selfdetermination according to its wishes and, by development in ah fiel& to bring it to full self-govemment and evemua] mdependence, if th.is is what It desires. For we know tha! omY by do@ th]s cari we ensure’ the peacefui development of !he Territory, which is essentiel for the peace and the s!aba!y of ah of southem Africa.” [1598rh ~e&Z para. 79.1 51. Tha! statement contains ah the e]emen!s whJch cari ]ead us !o a final solution: respect for the free]y expressed w~ of !he peôple, self-government and independence. Bu! it must be made perfectiy Cl!?~ !hat to attain the fmal objective, namely, independence, it is ind]spen~b]e--* epeat, indiSpen&le-to pC%XW at dl CoStS ad at ti tjmes the territond mtegrity of Namibia, and not !O star! thhking of parce]hng out the land, wh.ich wodd rePresent a new mockery of the United Nations and, wha! is even worse, of the Namibians themselves. 52. me the bas corne for South Africa to Provc jts goodwtB with tangible deeds and by hnP]ementing those purposes. Such action cannot be, nor sfiou]d i* bel the 53. In the statement which he made on 5 October, /158Bth meeting] the rcpresentative of France outlined an idea which deserves careful thought. Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet stated that once both South Africa and the Unitcd Nations by virtue of various considerations agree that the former Mandate no longer exists, the Government of South Africa has the obligation to negotiate a new international régime with the United Nations which Will enable the people concerned freely to choose their destiny. 54. Like him, we believe that this is not only a ,possible course, but perhaps the most appropriate one. If South Africa really is inspired by the desire to bring the people of Namibia to autonomy and independence, if it is true that with respect to the Territory it harbours no annexationist ambitions, it should take advantage of this opportunity, which is probably the last one that wîll be offered, and lmmediately undertake the necessary measures to reach an agreement for a trusteeship administration for Namibia in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XI1 of the Charter. In that agreement, as has been the case for other Trust Territorics, a contractual basis would be laid for bringing the people of Namibia gradually, but within a given time, to exercise self-government and finally 10 accede to independence. It would then be for the General Assembly, as laid down in Article 85 of the Charter, to approve the terms of that agreement, a procedure which would offer unimpeachable safeguards’as to thc scope and condition of the agrcement. We could in due course inctude the proposa1 made by South Africa to the International Court of Justice regarding the holding of a plebiscite among the peoples of Namibia. Naturally-and this goes without saying-the nature of the consultation and the details of its organization would have dlfo be part of the trusteeship agreement, and hence subject to United Nations supervision. “The Organization of African Unity is asking the Security Coüncil to go beyond mere declarations of principle, that have Little influence on the facts of the situation: it wants practical action on the spot to put an end to the occupation of this international Territory by a foreign Power.” [1583rcl meeting, para. 18.1 56. We believe that they have a solid foundation and that, with the goodwill of ail, cari be given concrete form in a short tirne. We appeal to South Africa to give its Cooperation with a realîstic approach and a vision of the future. It is only in this manner, as was recognized by Mr. Muller himself, that it cari contribute to ensuring peace and stability in southern Africa. We trust that political common sense will prevail in that country and that through understanding we shall remove one of the main causes of tension in that continent. 55. As we see it, these suggestions are in some ways implicit in the statements made in this debate by the representatives of Italy and Saudi Arabia. They are ah0 reflected in the report of the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on Namibia, part A, paragraph 10.

1 should like to thank the representative of Argentina for the

The importance of this meeting and the potential impact of its far-reaching results on international relations as well as on the credibility and effîciency of our Organization, and indeed on the entire situation in southern Africa, need hardly be emphasized. That is why 1 feel it necessary at the very outset to stress in unequivocal terms the context of our deliberations on Namibia, SO as to relate it to the realities of the situation under discussion, for at one time the issue seemed to be submcrged in legal discussions revolving around the respective powers of the General AssembIy and the Security Council, the approval or disapproval of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice and of Articles 24 and 25 of the United Nations Charter. 59. 1 by no means wish to minimize the importance of such legal aspects of our deliberations or their great relcvance and usefulness to ail of us; but 1 do not want either that they should supersede, cloud and confuse the basic issue, which is the item on the agenda. TO us this is primarily the hideous racist policy of upwtheid as applied by brutal force, tyranny and oppression against a whole Al’rican pcople, the people of Namibia. 60. The note of urgency and dctermination was best expressed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity. In their rcsolution of 23 June 1971, they explicitly and unequivocally requested the Security Council to uphold the principles and purposes of the Charter and to discharge the responsibilities entrusted to it by the United Nations. 61, Mr. Ould Daddah, President of the Islamîc Republic of Mauritania, eloquently conveyed to us this sense of urgency when he stated: 62. In the letter dated 17 September 1971 /S/10326], signed by the overwhelming majority of the representatives of the African States Members of the United Nations, we were reminded once more of the obligations and the duties of the Secuiity Council vis-à-vis the hopes of the entire continent of Africa-that is to say, the duty of the Security Council to take action in its search for a just solution that would fulffi the aspirations of the people of Natibia in accordance with relevant United Nations resolutions, in particular General Assembly resolution 15 14 (xv), which contains the historic Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 64. The position of the Secretary-General, U Thant on the sit UatiOrl in Namibia coincides with that of the l-ieads of Statc and Covernment of the 0rgani;ration of African UnitY. In the introduction to his report on the work ofthe Orgirnization, U Thant states: “1 nlust report with particular regret that the question of Namibia, a Tcrritory for which the United Nations has a specinl rcsponsibility. is still the abject of comp]ete dcadlock dcspite repeated resolutions of the General Aswnbly and the Security Council and a recent advisory opinion delivered by the International Court of Justice at tk request of the Security Counci]. Once more, I appeal to tire Member States, especially to those vcsted with special responsibilities by the Charter, to undertake the steps well within their scope which Will put an end to this intolcrablc situation.“3 65. The dclegation of the Syrian Arab Republic would thcrcforc be guided in this debate by the following considerations. 66. First, thc indcpcndence of Namibia shall remain the ultimatc objective of the United Nations, and hand in hand with ~Iris goes thc right to self-determination as upheld in Article 1 (2), of the United Nations Charter and specifïcally stated in the International Covenant on Civil and Politica] Iiights and in the International Covenant on Economie, Social and Cultural Rights, part 1, Article 1, of which reads: “Ail peoples have the right of self-determination. BY virtue of that right they freely determine their pohtica] status and freely pursuc their economic, social and cultura] development .” And SO unti] independence is achieved, Member States-individually and collectively, and in aB circumstances-are in duty bound to preserve the unitY and territorial intcgrity of the people of Namibia. 67. Second, that the continued occupation of Namibia would çonstitute an act of aggression, in addition to being a threat to peace and security. 68. Third, that Member States are under the Iegal obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa’s Presence in Namibia and, therefore, to refrain from anY acts imP]Ying recognition of Iegality or lending support and assistance to such presence and administration. 69. Fourth, that unless the Security COUnd takes effettive rneasures against South Africa witl~n the meamng Of the relevant provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter there seems to be no hope that South Africa Will comply with General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, by whjch, as is well known, the United Nations 3 offi&/ Records of thc &?netal AsseIdlY, i%entJ’-sUtth Session, Supplement No. IA, para. 56. 70. it was upon these premises that the delegltion of the SYnan Amb Republic presented, expounded and defended its views during the meetings of the Ad Ifoc Sub.(Jommittee on Namibia entrusted by resolution 283 (1970) to study further recommendations on ways and means to impiement effectively the relevant resolutions of the Security Counci]. 71. While Part A in paragraph 18 of the Ad HOC Sub-Committee’s report {S/I0330 und Comlj demonstrates that there indeed exists, a broad consensus on some of these “ways and means” among the members of that Sub-Committee, Part B in paragraph 19 summarizes the position taken by four Afro-Asian delegations, namely, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Somalis and the Syrian Arab RepuHic. These recommendations were net formulated with a desire to precipitate a situation divorced from reality. On the contrary, they stem from a realistic and objective analysis of the situation in Namibia and are a response to the challenge posed by South Africa’s continued illegal occupation of Namibia and its refusai to withdraw , 72. The basic concepts behind our recommendations revolve around the identification of the parties responsiblc for the continued illegal occupation of Namibia and. thereafter, the determination of the obligation of States in their collective or individual capacity to terminale an iilega] situation. 73. In the light of this analysis, the four Afro-Asian delegations reached the following conclusions. 74. Fi&, that t.he national liberation movement in Namibia is entitled to wage its struggle by aU av&b]e means to att& independence in accordance with General Assentbly resolution 1514 (XV). 75. Second, that South Africa’s continued illegal occupation of Namibia rests on the mere use of force and, therefore, al] States must SCrUpUbUSlY aPP]Y Secunty Counci] resolution 282 (1970) of 23 J~IY 1970 on the arms embargo and must also refrain from supplying any arms or dtary equipment to the Government of South Africa on whatever pretext. 76. Thbd, that any further refusa] On the Part of So”th ~~~~ t. withdraw from Namibia would Condtute an act of aggresaion and a threat to international peace and securBy within the context of Chapter Vi] of the Charter. 77. The Jast point is undoubtedly the most important conclusion reached by the four Afro-Asian delegations in the Ad ~~~ fjub-Committee on Namibia, despite the fact that we knew beforehand that some Permanent members of he Secu,+ty Council were not at all inclined to take any measures agabst South Africa under Chapter VI] Of the 78. South Africa itself admits that its “right to admjnister the Tertitory” is derived not from the Mandate but from ditary conquest. in the proceedings of the Court tbe representative Of South Africa maintained on 15 March 1971, as reported in paragraph 82 of the Advisory Opinion: << . . . if it is accepted that the Mandate has lapsed, the SOuth African Government would havc the r@t to administer the Territory by reason of a combination of factors, being (a) its original conquest; (b/ its long oc. cupation; (c) the continuation of the sacred trust basis agreed upon in 1920; and, finally /dl because jts adminjs. tration is to the benefit of the inhabitants of the Territory and is desired by them. In these circumstances the South African Government cannot accept that any State or organization cari have a better title to the Territory.” Morcovcr, during the same proceedings the representative of South Africa said, as reported in paragraph 83 of the Advisory Opinion: “it is the view of the South African Governmenl that no legal provision prcvents its annexing South West Africa”, thus defying in the clearest terms Security Council resolution 276 (1970), which declared the continued prescnce of South Africa in Namibia to be illegal and called upon States to act accordingly. 79. The deliberations of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression have revealed that there exists a strong body of lega! opinion that regards the occupation of a country or part thereof by another country as an act of aggression. ‘?his opinion is shared by Asjan, African, Latin American and socialist jurists and also by a number of Western jurists. It is clear by now that South Africa’s physical control of Namîbia has no legal standing: it is but an act of usurpation bY force. In its Advkw Opinion, the Court confirmed the illegality Of the occupation of Namibia by South Africa, and in one of jts conclusions appeating in paragraph 111, it added: “. . . the qualification of a situation as illegal does net by itself put an end to it. It cari onIy be the first, necessary step in an endeavour to bring the illegal situation to an end.” 80. Here we corne to some aspects of the duties of Member States with regard to this grave situation. ManY speakers bave referred to the military, financial and other relations undertaken by various States, especiaflY ~JI Westem Europe, with South Africa, thus enabling it to carrY on its racist apartheid policy. However, there are two faces to apartheid, and few-jndeed vety feW--PaY attention to this: fie one in South Affica and the other in the Middle East, in lsmel, me CO-operation between the two is carried on at ail levels and spings from the same false racial PhJosophy. Racism is net an acquired trait of either South Afrka or the 81. If we consider that the time has corne when enforcement measures are necessary to put an end to the aggression against the Territory of Namibia, that is to say, against a Territory which is temporarily placed under the jurisdiction of the United Nations and de jwc is considered SO by international legislation, this would in no way imply that present resolutions of the Security Council are Lvvoid of any binding force. We fully endorsc the conclusion of the Court, as 1 have already stated in prcvious discussions, in its Advisory Opinion to the effect that Article 25 of the Charter does not only apply to enforcement measures adopted under Chapter VII. If Member Statcs were to abide by that conclusion, enforcement measures would not have to be resorted to; but, unfortunately, those who maintain close relations with South Africa have. by their pecuiiar interpretation of Articles 24 and 25 of the Charter, seriously hampered the ability of the Member States-in fact, even the ability of the United Nations itself-to resort to means short of asking the Security Councü to use its coercive powers against South Afkca. 82. However, doubts about the mandatory character of Secunty Council resoluti 111s on Namibia were once and for & dispeued hy virtue of the following conchIsion in paragraph 11 S-of the Adtisory Opinion: “Tbe Court bas therefore reached the conclusion that the decisjons made by the Security Council in paragraphs 2 and 5 of resolutions 276 (1970), as related to paragraph 3 of resolution 264 (1969) and paragraph 5 of resolution 269 (1969), were adopted in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter ami in accordance with its Articles 24 and 25. The decisions are consequently binding on al.l States Members of the Un.ited Nations, w]&h are thus under obligation to aCCept and carry them out.” me conclusions which the Security Council should draw from the AdGsory Opinion are the fofiowing: First, that ail Secudty Councd resolutions on Namibia are mandatory and bin&ng in respect of South Africa as well as in respect of the obfigations those reSohtiOnS place On StateS. ne moSt effective ob@tjon of States would be chat of abstaining “We hope that this special responsibility Will remain 83. In conclusion let me remark that any meaningfu] progress towards terminating the illegal occupation of uppermost . . .“. [1583rd meeting, paras. 2 7 and 28.j Namibia should take into considention that any support or assistance to South Africa would contribute to the en. 88. The PRESIDENT (irzterpretatiol~ fiom Spanish): 1 trenchment of South Africa’s occupation of Namibia. Since now call on the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia. it is diffïcult to definc what kind of assistance to or support of South Africa would or would not affect Natibia, the economic and military prohibitions of Secutity Council 89. Mr. OGBU (President, United Nations Council for resolution 283 (1970) and previous resolutions should be Namibia): I am grateful for this opportunity to intervene enforced vis-à-vis South Africa irrespectivc of their destinaagain, in exercise of the right of reply, in the course of the debate on Namibia, still in my capacity as current President tion. Otherwise, how could we possibly determine their of the United Nations Council for Namibia. J look forward destination? to other opportunities, when 1 shall speak on the issue in other organs or committees of the United Nations as the 84. 1 know of a very clear case herc in the United States in which billions of dollars are going to the State of Israe] duly accredited representative of my country, when my approach and tone of voice may be different. under the guise of charity and thc tax-deductibility Jaw, whcn it bas been proved in the United States Senate itse]f 90. The justification which South Africa has presented that those dollars are going to colonize Arab territories and throughout the history of the United Nations involvement to arm thc Statc of Isracl. with the case of Namibia in defence of its intransigence and defïance bas been that the Organization’s position is not 85. SO long as State capabilities arc measured in economic based on legal grounds. and military terms it Will be an exercise in futility to try to distinguish bctwccn those dealings that are made on behalf 91. The Security Counci] need not be lectured here as to of Namibia and thosc that are not made on behalf of that thc powers of the various United Nations organs. WC know Tcrritory. Any assistance to or support for South Afiica that the United Nations is not a world Government, will release corresponding resources that wifl incvitably aItho@ we do bclieve it could bc were there unanimity of cntrench South Africa’s occupation OF Namibia. Will and purpose on the part of Members. Even South Africa knows that. Where South Africa parts company with 86. Moreover, those who preceded me spoke of increasing the rest of mankind, however, is on what the United the responsibilities of the United Nations towards Namibia. Nations is and what it stands for. The majority of mankind The question now is whether the United Nations Council believes that the Organization and its decisions-regardless for Namibia should be empowered to assume additional of whether they are termed dedsions, resolutions or responsibilities to ensure a more effective protection of the recommendations-are reflections of the desires of mankind rights of Namibians at the interna1 and international levels. for self-deterrnination, freedom and the independence of The Secretary of State of Somalia, Mr. Omar Arteh Ghalib, subjugated people. Therefore no arguments, or what has rightly said: correctly been termed the legal pyrotechnies employed by South Africa, cari succeed in beclouding that reflection. ft I‘ . . . it is not sufficient for the United Nations to stand is understood, therefore, that South Africa Will go to any by its resolution 2145 (XXI) without taking any step to length-and J stress the word “any”-to argue for its own give that declaratjon tangible and realistic form. Jt is selfish motives that its case is right and that of the rest of certainly wrong that after five years the United Nations mankind is wrong. cannot agree upon an appropriate organ for the administration of Namibia”. (1584th meeting, paru. 2OO./ 92. The position of South Africa in this international mmmunity reminds me of the story OF the proud mother 87. 1 cannot close my statement without referring once who went to watch her only son graduate from a military more to the words of the leader of the Jslarnic Republic of establishment , At the parade her son was completely out of Mauritania, President Ould Daddah, who on 27 September step with the rest of bis col]eagues, but the mother g]eefully conveyed to us in the most cordial and friendly but also remarked ta the person next to her: Y+-% mY son, how most straightforward terms the message of the whole smzt]y he marches; he is the only one in step. AJl the continent of Africa to the Security Council. He said: others are out of step.” By its actions and expressions South Africa clajms it is right and the rest of the world is “It is the duty of the Security Counci] to assume its wrong. TO that end, through its Foreign Minister, it has responsibilities without the least procrastination. But it is mndemned and criticized the actions of the General above au the permanent members of the Security Assembly and the Security Council, as well as the Advisory Councif-the United States of America, the Soviet Union, Opinion of the International Court of .hStiCe. The reSpon- France and the United Kingdom-on which Africa today sibility of the members of the Security CounCil SeWral~y caus to put an immediate end to the martyrdom of the and joint]y is simple but has far-reaching consequences. ]t is 93. h~h111 k I~I! ordcr of tire day. A decade ag0 very few South Africa’s occupation, that régime, at best, cari OnIY ~CO$C wt1uld bave bclievcd that [he IJnlted S[a[cs of Iefer ta sub-professional cadres of nurses in genera] [ergs, Amcrica \kr(dd Lake [he stand lt bas [aken [oday Or1 [he as a]feged by apparently well-hosted newspaper reporters. The Fore@ Ministcr of South Afrjca was unable to give the question of C’h111a in [he United Nations. lt is important for thiS a11g11St htrdY t0 tic fll]]Y ccaflscious Of what [hc w(Jr]d SccuritY Council any specific numbers of Namibian medical CS~WCIS ttt’ it. ~II C%IH~~]C [If such cxpec[a[]dn is contained doctors, engineers, lawyers, architects, agricuhurlsts, OI in a ]~l1l~liciI[itlll er1ti[lc4l /hr fJttilc~a%r~j~~rr itr r/rc lp7t& a even PrOfCSSiOna] mine& traincd by [he régime during [bis van of nearly half a Century. Yet a liberation movemcnt, stratcpy for a llfllc~l~~ crd in [he affairs of nations, bcing a ~!ptlrt tbl’ :l Il3tItlfliII po]icy Pane] established by [hc I]nl[ed IabOuring under great handicaps, in a relativety short time bas becn able to train undcr its auspices doctors, Iawyers, N;ltirrtrs hsscu.kcli~tll of’ thc [!nitcd Stntcs of AInerica, under engineers, and others, as the Council was informed by lhc distiriguisficd Chü~rni~nstrip of Mr, Nicolas Ratrenbach, fornicrly A[lorr1ey.(;c11eri11 and llnder-Secretary »f S[a[c of Mr. Nujorna. This goes to prove that Namibians are definilely bcttcr teachers than thc South African Government. th Ihiitcd States. Ilndcr tf1e heading “I)cc]sion-Maklng In the Security C%uriçil”, [fie rr].~1rt states On page 21 : 96. We have al] heard the old colonial argument before, narnely: the Territory will be prepared for independence in due course. It is unfortunate that old colanialists never C’hartcr rvlc in thc United Nations efforts to maintain learn; they just have to be klcked away. Experience should intcrt1alitrnal pracc and seçurity. In our view, growlh in have [aught South Africa that they Will stand to gain “If is rsacntiol Ihat [hc Securhy Counci] p]ay ][s major tilt! rcsponsitrility efltl iiutlmity of thc &curity CoufKA is invcstmcnt-wise should they decide now to hand over to crvUr:Il IO tht rh~~drrp~~r~t of the strcngthencd IJrtited the international community their so-called responsibility Naticrns UV hclicve ncccsmry for surviva] in [hc decadcs to preparc Namibians for indcpendence. :I hall .” 97. A cursory exarnlnation of thc South Afric- Foreign l‘hc rqic1rt ,olltiuues: Ministcr’s othcr futile attempts to [ry to convince [he Counci] by bis words that South Africa is doing SO much “‘l‘r~ II:, [hcre a]‘]n*ar tu bc scvcral nrcans of incrcasing for the Namibian people, their economic deveiopment and [ht* t1scl’ulness ut” thc ScçurilY Coui1cil. Wc arc ctrnccrncd [l1e]r guidance towards indepcndence, shows bow farcical [bat crises and disl~utes now rccrivc Security Gounci] c]aims are. Should we believe South Africa’s outlandish at ten1ic1rr on]Y whcn [hcy approach or cross tl1e tt1r~~shold claim that it ploughs more wealth into Namibia than it Ul” ilrIiltid violcncc. If‘ the Securily C’tsuncil is t0 scrvc a [akes Ou[? 01~ would ask, in return for what? Is it SOuth mort cffcctivc rolc, it shtruld seck mrthods of assisting Africa’s love for black Namlbians, or diamonds, or gold? [hc parlies to a dispute 10 rcach nn agrccd solution long l]umanltarian charity, or the joy of bearing the divine yOkc hcfore [hc ncar cCrtain[y of violence forces tt1e problem of co]onial]sm? Thc record of the Pretoria régime and its [0 [hc forcfrrrnt of irifern;jltionel attention. To wait until a pollcy of q~~rtireid is clear, and 1 need say no more On thls. crisis rcachrs such intensity beforc the Council üttcnl]~ts to dcfusc it is tw wait until emotions hnve reachcd their 98. The Foreign Minister of South Africa reveah, perhaps pcak and a hrgc nrrtnbcr of Possible alternative solutions madvertently but definitely in a pathetic way, bis GOVernhsvc bccn foreeloscd by the rush of cvcnts. Moreovcr, ment’s contempt for the people of Namibia. He assumes therc has bccn a pernicious [cndoncy tu avoid difficult []]a[ [he people of Namibia might not even want indepensolutions of disputes when [hcy are relatively quiesccnt, dence and freëdom. Freedom is an inalienable right of all and thcrl tu freczc ttte stntus quo if violence breaks out, peop]cs. The people of Namibia have as much ri@ as the This is a ccrt& fkrmula for the pcrpetuation of Pop]e of any Member State, including South Africa, [O UII~CSU~VC~ ulld dangerdus conflicts.” indcpen&nce and rnembership of this GrganlDt]On in accardance w][h [he provisions of the United Nations 94. Wllcn I flrst addressed this Council 1 indicated inter Charter. Are we to believe that Chief ClemenCe Rapuuo of aha ht : the Hereros, whose letter of 3 September 1 [ransmitted [o [Ile Securlty Counci~, is a bar? Are we to assume [bat the “By acceding to thc rcquest of [he Council for Nnmibia Rcverend Michael Scott, the man who bas piven some to bc allowed 10 participate in this dcbate, the Sccurity 2omodd ycars of bis life to fighting for the cause of the Council 1~1s [akcn a stcp which further ndvances the enslaved people of South Africa and Namlbia, is out for position of thc orgnn over which 1 have the privllege of persona1 gain and ~IV. ? Gr Miss Barbara Rogers, a Young prcsiding at prcsent ,” [158#th nwcthtg, para. 74.1 ]ady Of great courage and idealism, who gave UP her position in the service of her own Government because she 95. The Security Council, in its infinite wisdom, subsecould nO[ reconche her principles and personal beliefs in a luently granted audience to Mr. SanI Nujoma, a Namibian just cause with her officia1 responsibilities, are we to 3f rcpute, thus furthcr enhancing the confidence and conslder her a Bar?- Are these people, [he churchmen as 99. The facts are simply that South Africa is carrying out a systematic policy of exploitation, suppression, apartheid and fragmentation of a people and doing ail this as an indication of a definite plan of annexation of the Territory by that Government without fear, shame or conscience. 100. I would be shirking my responsibilities to my colleagues in the Council for Namibia if 1 as much as address myself to the socalled proposa1 of a plebiscite. Suffice it to say that South Africa is in no position to make such a proposa]. If South Africa is really honestly as innocent a victim of concerted international misunderstanding as it claims to be, let it get out of thc Territory-and fast. Why should it continue to be there against a11 odds of fieavy investment without adequate retums as it claims? South Africa should learn from the experience of past colonial masters. It is better for it to withdraw gracefully now and maintain some semblance of goodwill on both sides for future mutual co-operation than to be chased out in shame. It has been warned and it should. see the writing on the wall. The United Nations is both willing and able to rnake sure that thc Namibians decide their future in accordancc with accepted international norms. Ah that the Llnited Nations Council for Namibia needs is the will by the Security Council to act in unison whiçh will leave no doubt in the minds of South Africa that this Organization means business. 101, 1 listened with keen attention to the members of this Council. 1 am pleased that members of the Organization of African Unity team, the Foreign Ministers of Africa, some of them eminently qualified lawyers in their own right, bave taken tare of the legal paints that have been raised during this debate. 1 cannot help, however, getting the impression that some legalistic arguments raised by at least two members of the Security Council-the permanent representatives of the United Kingdom and of France, respectively-sound, in my opinion, like exact summaries of the dlssentlng opinions of their respective judges at the International Court of Justice. 1 humbly submit that the time for legal argument ended when the International Court of Justice rendered its opinion on 21 June 1971. This is the time for positive political action. On behalf of the Council for Namibia, I should Iike to express appreciation to the Member States whose representatives either here or in the p]enary bave indicated acceptance of the Advisory Opinion. I’hese include the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Italy, Japan, Poland, Argentina and Jordan. 102. I was particularly struck by the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom who, among other things, said: “And, as a matter of law, my Covernment considers that the Security Council cari take decisions generally bin&ng on Member States only when the Security I hope that the Government of the United Kingdom was following the debate recently ended on the complaint by Zambia to the Security Council regarding South Africa’s violations of Zambia’s sovereignty, airspace and territoriaI integrity-the case in point being, of course, the events of 5 October 1971 when it was alleged that South Afi-& was chasing freedomQJrters from Namibia into Zambian territory. 103. It was to precisely such a situation, as envisaged by the United Nations Association of the United States of America, that the quotation 1 made carlier applied. 1 am glad, however, that the United Kingdom voted for the resolution on Zambia’s complaint against South Africa. 104. The Unlted Nations had delegated its responsibilities for Namibia to the United Nations Councü for Namibia. Because, as the Foreign Minister of South Africa rightly asserted, the establishment of that Council derives from the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XV), South Africa will not allow members to visit the Territory and satisfy themsclves as to the true facts of the situation. He also enumerated a number of persans or bodies that had been invited-some more, some less, connected with the United Nations. This seems odd, for if, as he said, South Africa has “nothing to hide” the logic of the situation would be that the organ specifically charged with concern for the Territory should be the first to enter it to see things for itself. What really matters is whether the United Nations representative, the Council for Namibia, or some other organ will be able to proceed to the Territory to discuss the modalities of the peaceful transfer of authority from those who now exercjse it de facto to those who exercise it de jure-the Namibian people themselves eventually. The South African Pore@ Minister refers to the Council for Namibia as if it were some outside body. Lest it be forgotten, the United Nations Council for Namibia comprises eleven Member States, namely, Chile, Colombia, Guyana, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Zambia. These countries remain committed to the ideals of the United Nations and are prepared to serve the cause of the United Nations in ensuring that the Territory of Namibla gains its independence through the democratic process. They have no other particular axe’to grind. Will the Security Council disappoint the worfd and fall short of its expectations? Mr.President, under your distinguished and memorable Presidency, 1 hope not.

My delegation wishes to thank the representative of the United Kingdom for bis statement at the beginning of this meeting Clarifying bis Covernment’s interpretation of the right to self-determination withm the context of the situation prevailing in thc Unjted Nations-protected Territory of Namibia. 106. At our 1588th meeting the representative of France gave us the interpretation of his Covernment, which was that France interprets the principle of the ri@ to 107. 1 wishcd to cal1 attention to this aspect because when I first raiscd this question 1 cxpresscd thc hopc that perhaps when Mr. Mullcr ncxt took the floor hc would cxpand upon bis Govcrnmcnt’s concept of thc principlc of thc right to ~lf.tlctern~ill;Iljtrn. Ilnfortunatcly, WC havc net had an opportunity of henring his vicwpoint. It would thercfore rtot bc out of context 10 cal1 attention to the vicws held by the pcople of Si>uth Wcst Africa on sclf.determination. II Will bc recnllcd that af a prcvious meeting 1 drew thc attention of this Council to a statcment which had bcen issued by a distinguished pancl of African churchmcn in Windhoek on 30 June compiaining about thc ha& and unjust conditions to which the people of Namibie werc bCing SuhjCCtCd. Foflowing that statemcnt, Prime Minister Vorstcr went tci Windhoek and hcld discussions with this pancI of churchmcn and alter that meeting l3ishop Auala foulld it ncçcssary 01 issue aitother slatcment, in which he slid: “WC h:~vc rcad thp ncwspapers, and wc havc sccn thnt thc whifcs arc VC~S rli!;*,.ltisfied with IJS. ‘I‘h~y do net :~grcc with US. But WC’ I‘ld tlilt our noa-&~tIiiC ccjnprcgal ions lmdcrst:m.l us ~~11, bcçausc we bave referTed tu thc truc I;icts. ‘I’he ncwspapcrs ar~d other whites ~ay th:lI thc churchcs müy not talk this w;ty. Our uwn people who cxperirncc thc iJCtU~il condit itms evcry day arc grateful tllat thc church courEils bave intervcnctl orI thcir bChalf. WC car], thcreforc, only stand by thc words which WC havc rclcmd.” The stotcment went on fi say: “In our lettcr WC said that South West Africa should rcmain a unit and that it must bccomc independent. Thc Government also wishcs this indcpcndcnce. But it wishes this for 811 indcpcndcnt Ovamboland, and indepcndent K~WJI~O, IIereraland, Damaraland, Nilmaland, etc. ‘rhe pupuIation of south wcst Africa is small in numbcr and Will thus be dividcd, evcn though it wishes to StSY togcther. We ca11 do no more than to sce South West Africa with a11 ils cthnic groups as a unit. Thcrefore, we have said that thc South African GOVernmCnt, in COoperation with the ?Jnited Nations, should make the whole country with a11 its pcoples independent. WC must a11 of LIS togcthcr be independent in me country. This is what WC nsked of thc Govcrnmcnt. “Our main points arc the inferior position to which our people are aubjcctcd through the policy lnws ~~CI through the treatmcnt which they experience. WC are fully adult peuple . . . and WC wjsh to bc recognizcd as such. This is what WC plcad for.” Contrast that with thc statcmcnt made by Mr. Mullcr when he addresscd this Cou&l: of’ South West Africa along the road to self.dctermination according to its wishes and, by dcvelopment in a11 fields, to bring il to full self-government and cventual independence, if this is wflat it desires.” /1589th meeting, para. 79.j f08. 1 have said in gencral how the people of South Wcst Africa conccive of their vital self-detcrmination, and 1 am glad that this agrees largely with the views expresscd by the rcprcsentativcs of France, the Unitcd Kingdom and a11 of us hcrc. But how cari such self-determination take place’! This was made clcar by thc Sou th Wcst Africa Pcople’s Organizatiori in a communication of 29 January 1971 addressed to thc Secretary-General. 1 wish to read out thc relevant parts: “1. A generat climate of pcecc, harmony and free political activities must prevail throughout the COUII~~~ to ensure the participation of all Namibians irrespective of race, creed or colour in a plebiscite. “2. Noting that Namibia is presently under South Africnn rnilitary occupation, a genuine plebiscite cari only be carried out if all the South African troops and police arc withdrawn fron Namibian territory. “3. Thc unconditional release of a11 Namibian political prisoncrs currently imprisoned in South Africa as well as thvsr now bcing held in Namibia. “4. Thc rcturn fo thcir own country of a11 %unibians çurrcntly in e: ilc wjthout risk of arrest, detention, inlimirlalicm or imprisonment I “5. The dismantling of all Bantustans which aim at dividing the people on an cthnic basis and that such a plcbiscitc be conductcd on the principle of ‘one man one VOk’. “6, That SUC~ a plebiscite be conducted under the joint supervision of thc United Nations committee on decolonization,” the United Nations Council for Namibia and the Organizafion of African Unity.” 109. Of course WC at the United Nations, whether mcmbers of this Council or of other bodies, have already affirmed thc Princip)e of the rigbt of peoples to self. determination; this was elaborated upon and adopted unanimously at the twentyafifth session of the General ..” Assembly in rcsolution 2625 (XXV), wkich ww 8 “bel++ .’ ;-’ ration on Principles of International Liw COnCeJTM& ,, Frjendly Relations and Co-operation among States in ..;“.‘ ;:’ accordance with the Charter of the United Nationa”. Th& :,,!i’.~,-i~ was an unanimously adopted declaration to which even tif ,,.:~;:3,:~~, South African delegation did not make reservationdl. @#: ‘i,$& bave two other, eq&y hpXtant resolutions, f 514 o$i$9ii and 1541 (XV). .,::bJ; “;;# ,j, ! f ;T, ,; ., fIj : _’ .: 4” ‘,: 112. I believe it would be useful, at a timc whcn we are discussing among ourselves possible solutions and future resolutions, to give some clarification to my colleaguc of our ideas on the subject. 113. 1 must say that the objective is the same for a11 of us: to give the people of Namibia an opportunity to express themselves freely on their destiny. W’here we differ, obviously, is in regard to the means of achieving that objective, and our assessment of the difficulties. But since the idea which we submitted has been taken up and mentioned by several colleagues and has even been taken over in various forms by some of them--1 listened with very great interest this morning to the extremely interesting suggestions made by the Ambassador of Argentinashould like to statc here specifïcally what we have in mind SO that all mcmbcrs may think it over. 114. We have in mind a resolution whercby the Security Council would invite in the most pressing terms the Government of South Africa to contact the Secretary- General of the United Nations SO as to negotiate an agreement for a provisional international régime which would enable the population concerned-within 3 reasonable time, of course-t0 exercise its right to selfdetermination. As we see it, that right to selfdetermination-and I shall not go back to the clarification that 1 gave the last time-means the chance for a people freely to choose whatever solution it deems best, including, of 116. Final&, we cannot hide from ouwelves the fact that it would be extremely difficult to persuade South Africa, but it would be more difficult to use force. We couid see this moming how resolutions tended to pile up and how many resolutions, evcn the harshest are becoming increasingly unenforccable. 117. We believe, then, that if some hope remains to end the present deadlock it resides in collective pressure brought by the United Nations and, in particular, by the Powers that are most iikely to be heard. Such pressure would perhaps influence South Africa to accept a solution which, beyond any legal pplemics, would go straight to what we consider to be essential on the moral as ~41 3s the political level, namely, an opportunity for the people concerned to determine its own destiny. 118. That is the clarification 1 wished to give in reply to the question put to me by the Ambassador of Somalis.

My delegation has listened with interest to the views put forward by the representative of France. 1 am sure that they Will be given the consideration they deserve by ail members of the African Croup. 120. l’he PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): The next meeting of the Security Council will be held tomorrow at 3.30 p.m., when WC shall continue our debate on the question of Namibia. It is possibIe that a draft resolution on the item may be presented at that meeting. The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m,