S/PV.160 Security Council

We will meet again at 3 p.m. today. HUNDRED AND SIXTIETH MEETING Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 17 July 1947, at 3 p.m. President: Mr. O. LANGE (Poland). Present: The representatives of the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chilla, Co- lombia, France, Poland, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. 225. Provisional agenda (document 5/418) 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. The Greek question: report of the Commis- sion of Investigation concerning Greek Fron- tier Incidents to the Security Council (docu- ment S/360).1 226. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. 227. Continuation of the discussion on the Greek question At the invitation of the President, Colonel Ke- renxhi, representative of Albania, Mr. Mevorah, representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Dendramis, rep- resentative of Greece, and Mr. Vilfan, repre- sentative of Yugoslavia, took their seats at the Council table. The PRESIDENT: We will now have the French translation of the speech delivered this morning by the representative of Yugoslavia. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de ranglais): Nous nous reunrrons de nouveau aujourd'hui a 15 heures. La seance esi levee a13 h. 30. CENT-SOIXANTIEME SEANCE Tenue aLake Success, New-York, le jeudi 17 juillet 1947, a15 heures. President: M. O. LANGE (Pologne). Presents: Les representants des pays suivants: . Australie, Belgique, Bresil, Chine, Colombie, Etats-Unis d'Amerique, France, Pologne, Royaume-Uni, Syrie, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques. 225. Ordre du iour provisoire (dl:.cument· S/418) 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour. 2.. La question grecque: rapport presente au Conseil de securite par la Commission cl'enquete sur les incidents survenus a la frontiere grecque (document 8/360)1. 226. Adoption de I'ordre du iour Vordre du jour est adopte. 227. Suite de la discussion sur la question grecque Sur l'invitation du President, le colonel Kerenxhi, representant de il'Albanie, M. M evo- rah, representant de la Bulgarie, M. Dendramis, representant de la Grece, et M. Vilfan, repre- sentant de la Y ougoslavie, prennent place ala table du Conseil. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de ranglais): Nous allons entendre maintenant l'interpretation en fran~ais du discours prononce ce matin par le representant de la Yougoslavie. La declaration faite en anglais par M. Vilfan, representant de la Y ougoslavie, au eours de lq, cent-cinquante-neuvieme seance du Conseil de securite est alars interpretee en frangais. In the first place, I should like to draw the Security Council's attention to the fact that we are discussing the report of a commission of in- vestigation and that we have had no such com- mission when we were considering other ques- tions. This is the Security Council's first experi-. ment iT! the field of investigating disputes which have arisen between Governments and have been brought to its knowledge. ' This fact obIlges us to consider the whole question with special care and attention and not allow decisions to be taken which would not be in conformity with ~e facts or the actual situation. The Security Council's decision on this report of the Commission of Investigation will, in one way or another, indubitably influence similar cases in the future. Whether or not we consider the experiment of this Commission's work as a precedent, this experiment will in fact constitute a precedent. I feel I can emphasize this fact be- cause, at the very outset of the consideration of the Commission's report, there was an obvious tendency to draw conclusions not consonant with the factual data contained in the Commission's report. The course of the discussion held in the Se- curity Council has merely confirmed the impres- sion received by the USSR delegation at the very beginning of the discussion of this question in the Security Council (I mean the discussion which took place after the Commission's report was received). The conclusions reached by the Commission and also the conclusions which, as a whole,. were endorsed by certain members of the· Security Council, do not correspond to the actual situation in Greece and on Greece's north- ern frontiers; nor do they correspond to the facts contained in the Commission's report. These conclusions, based on those drawn by the ma- . jority of the Commission, cannot be called ob- jective. How can we expect an objective approach to an investigation of tbe position on Greece's northern frontiers and to the situation in Greece from persons representing States in whose capi- tals voices have been heard passing judgment on Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, even at a time when the Commission was only beginning to investigate the facts? Obviously, no objective attitude to the investigation could be expected from the representatives of such countries, even if they arrived at the place where the investiga- I shall dwell briefly on the main provisions of the United States proposals based on the Com- mission's recommendations. Let me take recommendation A, which is ap- proved by the United States resolution. The fol- lowing proposal is contained ih that recommen- dation: "In the light of the situation investigated by it the Commission believes that, . . . in the area of its investigation, future cases of support of armed bands formed on the territory of one State and crossing into the territory of another State, or of refusal by a Government in spite of the demands of the State concerned to take all pos- sible measures on its own territory to deprive such bands of any aid or protection, should be considered by the Security Council as a threat to the peace within the meaning of the Charter of the United Nations." If we consider carefully the content of that recommendation, it is not difficult to see that the United States resolution recommends no more and no less than that we should acknowledge in advance that the future activities of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania-and no one knows which activities-shall be regarded as activities consti- tuting a threat to the peace. This proposal is absolutely unjustified, both from the point of view of the actual state of affairs on the spot·and from the point of view of the Charter. It is absolutely inadmissible. It may well be asked who is to decide, in the event of future incidents, if they take place, which of the countries is to blame? Who is to decide that question? Apparently-and this is the inference from the United States resolution-- the Commission will decide. Is it necessary to prove that such a method is in flagrant contra- diction with the United Nations Charter, which provides that, whenever a dispute is considered by the Security Council, the latter takes a deci~ sion following consideration of a concrete ques- tion-a dispute or a situation? Such a decision is taken by the Security Council. The Counci,l cannot, and has no right to, delegate its powers and functions to any subsidiary or auxiliary body whatsoever. Je m'arreterai brievement sur les dispositions principales des propositions des Etats-Unis, fon- dees elles-memes sur les recommandations de la Commission. Prenons la recommandation A, qui est approuvee par la resolution des Etats-Unis. Cetterecommandation contient la proposition suivante: "A la lumiere de la situation examinee par elle, la Commission croit que, dans la zone qui a fait 1'0bjet de son enquete, le Conseil de securite devrait considerer comme une menace a la paix dans l'acception de la Charte des Nations Unies les cas suivants: appui fourni dorenavant aux bandes armees formees sur le territoire d'un Etat et penetrant dans le. territoire d'un autre Etat, ou refus par un Gouvernement, en depit de demandes faites par I'Etat interesse, de prendre toutes les mesures possibles sur son propre tem- toire en vue de suspendre toute aide ou protec- tion a des bandes de ce genre:' Si 1'0n etudie attentivement le contenu de cette recommandation, on voit aisement que la resolution des Etats-Unis nous recommande purement et simplement d'admettre par. avance que les activites futures de la Yougoslavie, de la Bulgarie et de I'Albanie - sans qu'on sache lesquelles - constitueront une menace contre la paix. Cctte proposition n'est absolument pas fondee, soit qu'o;n la considere du point de vue de la situation reelle sur les lieux ou du point de vue de la Charte. Elle est absolument inadmissible. Vne question se pose alors: en cas de nou- veaux incidents, s'il s'en produit a l'avenir, qui determine~aquel est le pays coupable? Qui tran- chera cette question? Ce sera evidemment, et cela decoule de la resolution des Etats-Unis, la Commission. Est-iJ besoin de demontrer que cette methode est en contradiction formelle avec la Charte des Nations "{T- ;~s, laquelle prevoit que, lorsqu'un differend quelconque est examine par le Conseil de securite, c'est ce dernier qui prend une decision apres avoir examine la ques- tion dont il est saisi, differend ou situation? C'est le Conseil de securite qui prend une decision. 11 ne peut deIeguer ses pouvoirs ct ses droits a que1que organe subsidiaire ou auxiliaire; il n'en a pas le droit. I might remind you that when the question arose whether a definition of a breach of the peace should be included in the United Nations Charter, the representatives of the United States, and also the representatives of the United King- dom and of the USSR, agreed that this was im- possible and that the Security Council should consider specific situations or specific disputes and take decisions .accordingly. In this connexion I should also like to recall that the proposal made by the representatives of China at Dumbarton Oaks was :Qot accepted by the other Powers for the reasons which I have stated..At the San Francisco Conference, when the Charter of the United Nations was drawn up on' the basis of, the proposals adopted at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, it was also not considered possible to include any definition of a breach of the peace in the United Nations Charter, or, consequently, to lay down any pre- established standard for defining the existence of a threat to the peace or a bre~ch of the peace. The decision which was finally taken when the Charter was drawn up, namely th,at the Security Council be given the right to decide such a ques- tion with reference to a specific situation, is the only correct decision. It constitutes the law of the United Nations and of the Security Council. A ce propos, je rappellerai egalement que la proposition faite al'epoque par les representants de la Chine ala Conference de Dumbarton Oaks n'a pas ete acceptee par les autres Puissances pour les raisons que j'ai indiquees. En preparant la Charte des Nations Unies sur la base des propositions approuvees par la Conference de Dumbarton Oaks, la Conference de San-Fran- cisco n'a pas non plus cru possible de donner dans la Charte des Nations Unies une definition de la rupture de la paix ni, par consequent, de poser al'avance un critere pour de:finir l'existence d'une menace contre la paix ou d'une rupture de la paix. La decision a laquelle on s'est arrete finalement lors des travaux preparatoires de la Charte - decision qui donne au Conseil de securite le droit de trancher cette question d'apres la situation dont il est saisi - est la seule correcte. Elle fait loi pour l'Organisation des Nations Unies et pour le Conseil de securite. Hence, any standards which, in addition, Pour cette raison, tout critere qui permettrait, would enable subsidiary bodies to decide the au surplus, a des organes subsidiaires de deter- question of the existence of a threat to the peace miner s'il y a une menace contre la paix est can only be regarded as inadmissible and such purement et simplement inadmissible,. et il y a proposals should be rejected. We have no right lieu de repousser les propositions qui ont ~te to deviate from the Charter of the United faites dans ce sens. Nous n'avons pas le droit de Nations. nous ecarter de la Charte des Nations Unies. The United States resolution contains another La resolution des Etats-Unis contient une important section in which the functions of the autre partie importante, ou sont enumerees les commission are enumerated. The f1Jnctions of fonctions de la commission. Comme elles sont the cOTYlm1ssion, as presented in the United States presentees dans cette resolution, ces fonctions resoluvc,n, are such that, firstly, they go beyond sont telles que, prima, elles sortent du cadre the limits of the functions and powers assigned des droits et des pouvoirs conferes au Conseil to the Security Council and, secondly, they are de securite et, secundo, elles sont contraires contrary to those provisions of the Charter which aux dispositions de la Charte qui sauvegardent protect the sovereign rights of States Members les droits souverains des Etats Membres de of the United Nations. For instance, if we take l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Prenons, par its functions with regard to frontier incidents, exemple, les fonctions qui se rapportent aux we shall see that, according to this proposal, the Lrlcidents de frontiere et nous verrons que, Security Council is to set up its own frontier ob- d'apres cette proposition, le Conseil de securite servers along the Greek frontier, on Greek, Al- devrait installer ses propres observateurs le long banian, Yugoslav and Bulgarian territories. Such 'de la frontiere, sur le territoire de la Grece, de , a proposal is unjustifiable both from the point l'Albanie, de la Yougoslavie et de la Bulgarie. ," Je vous rappellerai que lorsque s'est posee la question de savoir si une definition de la rupture de la paix devait figurer dans la Charte des NationS Unies, les representants des Etats-Unis ainsi que les representants du Royaume-Uni et ceux de l'URSS sont tombes d'accord pour dire que c'etait impossible et que le Conseil de securite devrait examiner le differend ou la situation qui se presenterait, et prendre une decision en consequence. It is also impossible to adopt such a proposal from the point of view of the nature of the situa- tion under discussion. We are considering a dis- pute which falls under Chapter VI, relating to the pacific settlement of disputes. What the United States resolution proposes is action which goes further than the pacific settlement of dis- putes. I would ask: What is, the Security Coun- cil to do, if its recommendations to some State prove unacceptable (and the Security Council's decisions under Chapter VI cannot be considered as other than recommendations)? The United States representative deliberately mentioned in his speech-I mean his first' speech-Chapter VII of the Charter, which provides for compul- sory action to be taken. This was done because the trend of the recommendations contaL.lled in the United States resolution shows that these recommendations go further than the provisions of Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. Or let us take the recommendation on the settlement of the question of displaced persons and refugees. Here again we are confronted with the same tendency. Here again the sove- reign rights of States are flagrantly ignored. Here again it is proposed to impose a form of settle- mept of this problem which cannot be justified either by the actual situation on the spot or by the Charter of the United Nations. Should this recommendation be adopted, it would mean that the so-called International Refugee Organiza- tion which is being set up would control the refugee camps in the countries whose conneJPon with the alleged frontier incidents we are dis- cussing, although some of these countries, realiz- ing what an extremely unfortunate experience this Organization has had and that it is designed to complicate rather than to facilitate the solu- tion of the problem of displaced persons, have not joined the International Refugee Organ- ization. There are several other recommendations in the United States resolution wlllch it is quite impossible to accept. Bearing this in mind,what view can we in general tflke of the proposal for the establishment of a commission of the type provided for in the United States resolution? Any unbiased person can only draw one con- clusion, namely, that the purpose of setting up this commission is not so much to secure a peace- ful settlement of the friction which has arisen between Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania on the one hand, and Greece on the other, as to _c. La nature de la situation soumise a notre examen ne nous permet pas non plus d'accepter cette proposition. Nous sommes en train d'examiner un differend qui releve du Chapitre VI, relatif au reglement padfique des differend". Mais ce que nous propose la resolution des Etats-Unis, ce sont des mesures qui vont plus loin que le reglement pacifique des differends. Et alors la question suivante se pose: si les recommandations du Conseil de securite sont inacceptables pour un Etat - et les decisions que le Conseil de securite prend en vertu du Chapitre VI ne peuvent etre considerees que comme des recommandations - que devra faire le Conseil de securite? Ce n'est pas par hasard que le representant des Etats-Unis a mentionne dans son discours - je veux pader de sa pre- mi.ere intervention - le Chapitre VII de la Charte qui prevoit des mesures de coercition. Il 1'a fait parce que la tendance generale des recommandations contenues dans la resolution des Etats-Unis montre que ces recommandations vont plus loin que ne le prevoient les dispositions du Chapitre VI de la Charte des Nations Unies. Prenons maintenant la recommandation qui se rapporte au reglement de la question des personnes deplacees et des refugies. Id encore, nous trouvons la meme tendance. Ici encore on meconnait gravement les droits souverains des Etats. Id encore, on veut imposer un mode de solution de ce probleme que ne peuvent justifier ni la situation qui existe sur les lieux, ni la Charte des Nations Unies. Si cette recommanda- tion etait acceptee, nous verrions ce qu'on appelle I'Organisation internationale pour les refugies regir les camps de refugies qui se trou- vent dans les pays dont nous examinons 1'attitude a 1'egard des pretendus· incidents de frontiere, alors que certains de ces pays n'ont pas accede a 1'Organisation internationale pour les refugies, en raison de, la deplorable activite passee de cette Organisation, destinee a compliquer la solution de la question des personnes deplacees plutot qu'a la faciliter. La resolution des Etats-Unis contient un certain nombre d'autres recommandations avec lesquelles on ne peut en aucun cas se declarer d'accord. Pour ces raisons, on peutse demander ce qu'il faut penser en general de la proposition de Creel' une cor.lmission, sous la forme prevue par la resolution des Etats-Unis. Que1qu'un qui pense de fa<;on objective ne peut aboutir qu'a une seule conclusion: en creant cette commission on ne cherche pas tant a regler pacifiquement les difficultes qui se sont produites entre la Yougo- slavie, la Bulgarie et l'Albanie, d'une part, et la What I have said does not me~n that there are no problems to be settled between Yugo- slavia, Bulgaria and Albania on the one hand, and Greece on the other. Such problems do exist.. They are enumerated in the USSR resolu- tion. They include, for instance, the problem of conventions. This problem is self-evident, as the representatives of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Al- bania have already expressed positive views on it. The Greek Government, however, stubbornly refuses to fall in with these proposals. This is deliberate. If the Greek Government really wished to settle the existing misunderstandings, it. could not refuse to fall in with proposals for the conclusion of new frontier conventions or the reVival of old conventions. The Greek Gov- ernment says nothing. We have heard no state- ment on this subject from the Greek representa- tive. He listens calmly to the proposals regarding conventions and says nothing, although this is a matter affecting the settlement of the frontier questions, frontier friction and misunderstand- ings which are going on. The question of refugees requires solution. In Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania there are tens of thousands of refugees; people who have found refuge in these countries from persecution by the Greek police and gendarmerie and bands of all kinds. In Greece there are refugees from Yugo- slavia, Bulgaria and Albania, a large number of whom are traitors to their country and quislings. This question also requires to be settled. Why should the Council not address an appeal to these countries, to all the countries concerned, to Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania, for a settlement of the refugee problem in such a spirit as to establish friendly relations between these States? The USSR resolution contains a proposal to that effect. This has been mentioned by the representatives of Yugoslavia, 'Bulgaria and Al- bania. The Greek representative, however, calmly listens to the representatives of these three countries expressing their willingness to settle this problem, but says not a single word about Greece being agreeable to settle the problem by immediate discussions between the countries con- cerned with a view to establishing friendly rela- tions between them. Instead of this, plans are being proposed to us for setting up a special in- ternational agency which would assume control over all displaced persons in the territories of Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania and would become an administrative and financial organization dealing with questions of migration. The Securi'. :ouncil can use its influence and its authority and can make recommendations to the countries concerped on these questions3 but it is not proposed that we should do so. More than that.1. the authors of the proposals (I mean the United States resolution) are, in fact, evad- ing this question altogether and, in doing so, are actually encouraging the irresponsible policy of the present Greek Government, which still de- clares that it is in a stllte of war with Albania and does so in order to .1ave a freer hand, appar- ently thinking that it Dlay thus bear less responsi- bility for its actions. That is a wrong assump- tion. I repeat that we might, if we desired, improve the situation in this connexion too by using the authority and influence of the Security Council. The USSR delegation does not think that a commission of the kind proposed by the United States representative can lead to improvement in the relations between the four countries. It can only cause additional friction between these countries. This is not in the interests of the United Nations. The commission, in the form in which it is proposed by the United States representative, can only aggravate the situation and make it still more strained. I say nothing of the fact that the adoption of the resolution estab- lishing such a commission would, in a sense, mean encou!"aging the activities of the present Greek Government, which have led to the situa- tion which has now arisen in the relations be- tween Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, on the one hand, and Greece on the other. What I have said is confirmed also by the past experience of the Commission of Investigation. We know that, while the Commission was at work, it did not in every respect promote the settlement of relations between these countries; often it merely- aggravated the tenseness of these relations. What I have said is especially con- firmed if we bear in mind the experience of the so-called Subsidiary Group, which is behaving clumsily, ineptly and tactlessly, is needlessly and unnecessarily putting an increased strain on the relations between these countries and is thus fur- ther complicating the situation. In this con- Ce que je viens de dire est confirme par l'experience que nous avons faite avec la Commission d'enquete. Au cours de ses travaux, nous le savons, la Commission a ete loin de contribuer dans aucun domaine a l'amelioration des relations entre ces pays; eUe n'a fait souvent qu'aggraver la tension qui existe entre eux. Ce que je viens de dire est confirme en particulier par l'experience que nous avons faite avec ce qu'on appelle le Groupe .3ubsidiaire de la Commission; ce dernier fait preuve de . maladresse, d'ineptie et de manque de tact; sans nul besoin, il rend encore plus tendues les rela- Le Conseil de securite peut user de son influence et de son -autorite pour faire des recommandations sur ces questions aux pays interesses, mais ce n'est pas la ce qu'on nous propose de faire. Bien au contraire, les auteurs des propositions dont je parle (je veux dire la resolution des Etats-Unis) passent, en fait, com- pletement acote de ces questions, et par la-meme encouragent effectivement la politique irrespon- sable du Gouvernement grec actuel, qui continue a declarer qu'il se trouve en etat de guerre avec l'Albanie;il le fait pour avoir les mains plus libres, croyant sans doute pouvoir se soustraire ainsi, en partie, a la responsabilite de ses actes. En quoi il se trompe. Id encore, je le repete, nous pourrions, si nous le voulions, redresser la situation en employant l'autorite et l'influence du Conseil de securite. La delegation de l'URSS ne pense pas qu'une commission du genre propose par le representant des Etats-Unis puisse contribuer a ameliorer les relations entre les quatre pays. ERe ne peut que creer des difIicultes supplementaires entre ces pays; ce n'est pas la l'interet de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Sous la forme que propose le representant des Etats-Unis, cette commission ne peut qu'aggraver la situation et la rendre encore plus tendue. Je n'insisterai pas davantage sur le fait qu'en adoptant la resolution de creer cette commission, nous encouragerions dans une cer- taine mesure les activites du Gouvernementgrec actuel, qui ont precisement cree la situation presente dans les relations entre la Yougoslavie, la BUlgarie, et l'Albanie cl'une part, et la Grece de l'autre. Both the experience of the Commission of Investigation which has existed hitherto and the experience of the Subsidiary Group lead us to th~ conclusion that the commission2 ,in the form in which it is proposed by the United States representative~ would not promote any improve- ment in the relations between these countries but, on the contrary, might further complicate the relations between them. For these reasonS, the USSR delegation cannot agree with the pro- posals for the establishment of a commission. The USSR is interested in seeing the relations between these countries made normal. To achieve this it is necessary to use normal ways and means for their settlement. In the first place, it is essential for these countries, which are directly concerned, to settle a number of the problems which have arisen by immediate and direct discussions. In the course of our debates the prestige of the SeCurity Council is often mentioned, and, in this case, when it is men- tioned, it is usually pointed out that it is abso- lutely essential, if the Security Council's prestige is to be preserved and kept at its proper level, to adopt the United States resolution, or else the Council's prestige will, it is said, be under- mined. It is extremely characteristic that statements about the necessity to maintain the prestige and authority of the Security Council emanate mainly from the representatives of those coun- tries which, as experience has shown, have least regard for the presti~e and authority of the Security Council and, more often than not,' ignore it. Evidently words are one thing and deeds are another. In these circumstances talk of prestige and the phrases which are often used in the course of our debates regarding the Se- curity Council's prestige lose their meaning and become banal, empty phrases. In order to maintain the prestige and au- thority of the Security Council at their proper level it is essential to be guided not by the inter- ests of the individual countries, but.by our com- mon interests and the desire to settle relations between Greece, on the one hand, and Yugo- slavia, Bulgaria and Albania on the other, and not to take decisions which would involve put- ting a greater strain on these relations. The Se- curity Council should use its influence to facili- L'experience que nous avons faite avec la Commission d'enquete qui a existe jusqu'a ce jour, aussi bien qu'avec le Groupe subsidiaire, nous permet de conclure que la commission qu'on veut creer, sous la forme proposee par le representant des Etats-Unis, ne contribuerait pas a ameliorer les relations entre ces pays, mais les rendrait au contraire encore plus di£ficiles. Pour ces raisons, la de1<~gation de l'URSS ne peut accepter les propositions tendant a creer une commission. Il'est de l'interet de l'URSS que les relations entre ces pays deviennent normales. Pour cela, il faut employer les voies et methodes normales pour ameliorer ces relations. n faut en premier lieu que les pays directement interesses reglent les questions qui se posent entre eux au moyen de negociations directes. Au cours de nos debats, on parle souvent du prestige du Conseil de securite; dans le cas present, on ajoute d'habitude que, pour maintenir dument. le prestige du Conseil de securite, ,il faut obliga- toirement adopter la resolution ,des Etats-Unis, sinOl.'l le prestige du Conseil de securite s'en trouverait, dit-on, compromis. C'est un fait caracteristique que les declara- tions sur la necessite de maintenir le prestige et l'autorite du Conseil de securite emanent surtout des representants des pays qui, l'experience l'a prouve, montrent le moins de respect pour le prestige et l'autorite du Conseil de securite et tiennent le moins compte de son existence. Evidemment, les actes sont une chose, les paroles en sont une autre. Dans ces conditions, ces allu- sions au prestige et ces phrases, si frequentes au cours de nos debats, au sujet du prestige du Conseil de securite perdent leur signification et deviennent banales, vides de sens. Pour mairltenir comme il coilvient le prestige et l'autorite du Conseil de securite, nous devons nous laisser guider, non par les interets de tel ou tel pays, mais par nos interets communs et par le souci d'ameliorer les relations entre la Grece d'une part, et la Yougoslavie, la Bulgarie et l'Albanie de l'autre; nous ne devons pas prendre de decisions qui rendraient leurs relations encore plus tendues. Le Conseil de securite doit user de son influence pour faciliter une entente directe Finally, I should like to draw the Security Council's attention to a point which was inci- dentally raised in the course of the discussion: How are we to evaluate the Council's decision on this matter? It is clear that any decision on this question is a decision taken in conformity with Chapter VI of the Charter, relating to the pacific settlement of disputes. This means that any decision we may take in the Council on this question will be in the nature of a recommenda- tion and will have nothing in common with the decisions provided for in Article 25 -of the Char- ter. I think it advisable to emphasize this idea, mainly in connexion with the elucidation given at the last meeting of the Council by the United States representative. In his reply to the repre- sentative of Bulgaria the United States repre- senta~ive gave an explanation which was at vari- ance with the Charter. In connexion with the Trieste question, in the matter of appointing a governor for Trieste, the United States representative attempted to prove that the powers and functions of the Security Council are not confined only to the chapters referred to in Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations, in which the functions and powers of the Council are defined. I should like to draw your attention to the fact that the question which arose in connexion with the dis- cussion of the appointmevt of a governor for Trieste is the problem not of the nature of the Security Council's decisions, but of the extent of the Security Council's powers. This puts the matter on an absolutely different plane and .the reference to a memorandum of the Secretary- General, Mr. Trygve Lie, offers no confirmation, as this memorandum deals with an absolutely different question, the question of the extent and scope of the Security Council's powers, and not with the nature of the Security Council's de- cisions. I have thought it necessary to give these addi- tional explanations in order to stress once more that the USSR delegation is anxious to see the dispute which has arisen between Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, on the one hand, and Greece on the other, settled in the interests of the United Nations and also in the interests of these four States. The USSR delegation could not, of course, be guided by any other interests in considering this question. The U~SR delegation Dans ma premiere d';clarationl, j'ai deja indique ou resident les causes fondamentales de la situation qui s'est creee en Grece, ainsi que des pretendus incidents de frontiere. EIles resident dans une intervention de l'etranger, mais il faut la chercher ailleurs, pas la OU les auteurs de la resolution des Etats-Unis s'efforcent de la trouver. Pour conclure, je voudrais attirer l'attention du Conseil de securite sur un point qui a ete aborde en passant au cours de ces debats: comment qualifier la decision que le Conseil prendra sur ceite question? 11 est clair que toute decision sur cette question sera une decision prise conformement au Chapitre VI de la Charte, relatif au reglement pacifique des differends. Cela signifie que toute decision que nous pouvons prendre au Conseil sur cette question aura le caractere d'une recommandation, et n'aura rien de commun avec les decisions mentionnees a I'Article 25 de la Charte. I'ai crn bon de sou- ligner ce point, en raison surtout de l'explication que nous a donnee le representant des Etats- Unis a la precedente seance du Conseil. En repondantau representant de la Bulgarie, le representant des Etats-Unis a donne une expli-- cation non conforme a la Charte. En parlant de la question de Trieste et au sujet de la nomination d'un gouverneur, le repre- sentant des Etats-Unis a tente de demontr~r que les droits et pouvoirs du Conseil dr.; securite n'etaient pas restreints a ceux qui sont definis dans les chapitres cites a l'Article 24 de la Charte des Nations Unies, a propos de l'enume- ration des droits et pOlivoirs du Conseil. Je voudrais faire remarquer que la question qui s'est posee au cours de la discussion sur la nomi- nation du gouverneur de Trieste concernait, non pas la nature des decisions du Conseil de securite, mais l'etendue de ses pouvoirs. EIle se posait donc sur' un tout autre plan et, en se referant au memorandum du Secretaire general, M. Trygve Lie, on ne prouve rien du tout, etant donne que ce memorandum traite, non de la nature des decisions du Conseil de securite, mais d'une tout autre question: ceIle de l'etendue et de la portee de ses pouvoirs. I'ai crn necessaire de presenter ces explications compIementaires afin de souligner encore une fois que la delegation de I'URSS s'attache a ce que le differend qui a surgi entre la Yougoslavie, la Bulgarie, et l'Albanie d'une part, et la Grece de l'autre, sait regIe dans l'interet des Nations Unies aussi bien que dans celui de ces quatre Etats. La delegation de l'URSS, cela va de so; ne peut se laisser guider par aucun autre intel'~t dans l'examen de cette question. La delegation Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): I should not have asked leave to speak at this time, and I do not wish to make a long state- ment on all the varied points which have arisen in the course of the discussion as far as it has gone, but there is one point I wish to make tllli: evening. It relates to a passage in your speech of this morning,l Mr. President. You read from the conclusions of the Commission of Investiga- tion and drew attention to a particular passage. You said-and I quote from the copy which I have here: "I should like to examine tllis passage. It states that the Greek Government made certain charges; that liaison representatives of the other countries against which these charges were made, denied them; and it then states that 'little direct evidence was brought forward to disprove them'." You went on: "Indeed, when I read this passage, I found it difficult to believe my eyes. However, I assw'e you that that sentence is in the text, and that it is on that sentence that the conclusion about the alleged support given to the Greek guerrillas by Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria is based. Yes, it is based on the fact that the majority of the Commission be- lieved, and was unable to disprove, the charges. I repeat that the conclusion is based on inability to disprove the charges, not on ability to prove them." What I wanted to say was that I think it would have been only fair if you had given equal emphasis to the sentence which you quoted originally, which follows from that sentence to which you drew particular attention. The sen- tence which followed was: "On the basis of the facts ascertained by the Commission, it is its con- clusion that Yugoslavia, and to Cl. lesser extent Albania and Bulgaria, have supported the guer- rilla warfare in Greece." A perusal of the rest of the conclusion.:; would show quite clearly that it is on the basis of positive evidence that eight of the eleven members of the Commission reached their conclusions. After the passage which you quoted, they deal with Yugoslavia, and there you will find passages, on page 168 for instance,2 as follows: "The evidence indicated that during the spring and at least through the summer of 1946 actual training in partisan warfare was given . . ." and so on. In the following para- graph they referred to "evidence indicating". In paragraph (d) on page 168 they say: cc••• the Sir Alexandre CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): Je n'avais pas l'intention de demander la parole maintenant et je ne desire pas faire une longue declaration sur les diffe- rentes questions qui ont ete soulevees au cours de la discussion, mais il y a un point que je tiens a regler des ce soir. I1 s'agit d'un passage de votre discours de ce matin\ Monsieur le President. Vous avez cite certaines parties des conclusions de la Commission d'enquete et vous avez attire l'attention du Conseil sur un passage particulier. Vous avez dit (je cite d'apres l'exemplaire que j'ai en main) : "Je voudrais examiner ce passage. I1 etablit que le Gouverne nent grec a formu16 certaines accusations; que les agents de liaison des autres pays, contre lesquels etaient portees ces accusa- tions les ont deniees; et il declare ensuite qu' "on a produit peu de temoignages directs qui en infirment le bien-fonde". Vous avez poursuivi par ces mots: "Vraiment, en lisant ce passage, je trouve bien difficile d'en croire mes yeux. Toutefois, je vous assure que cette phrase figure dans le texte, et que c'est dIe qui sert de fonde- ment a la conclusion concernant l'appui que l'Albanie, la Yougoslavie et la Bulgarie auraient accorde aux bandes annees grecques. Qui, elle se fonde sur le fait que la majorite des mcmbres de la Commission a crn a cette accusation et n'a, pu la refuter. Je repete que cette conc1usio~ est fondee sur le fait que la Commission n'a pu refuter les accusations portees et non sur le fait qu'elle en a fait le preuve." Ce que je voulais dire, c'est que, a mon avis, il aurait ete honnete de votre part d'insister egalement sur la phrase que vous avez citee an debut et sur celle qui venait immCdiatement apres la phrase sur laquelle vous avez attire l'attention du Conseil. Cette phrase est la suivante: "La Commisison conc1ut, d'apres les faits qu'elle a etablis, que la YO'lgoslavie et, dans une moindre mesure, l'fJbanie et la Bul- garie, ont soutenu la guerilla de Grece." En parcourant la suite du texte des conclusions, iJ apparalt nettement que c'est en se fondant sur des preuves positives que huit des onze membres de la Commission sont arrives a ces conclusions. A la Imite du passage que vous avez cite, le rapport parle de la Yougoslavie. Vous trouverez certains passages, page 176, par exemole2 : "Les temoignages recueillis indiquent qu'au cours du printemps et,. en tout cas, de l'ete cie 1946, un efIectif choisi parmi les re£ugies ... a bel et bien re~u une instruction militaire . . . " Dans le para" graphe suivan'.. il est question de "temoignages 1 Voir page 1350. • Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securiM, Deuxieme Annee, 3upplernent special No 2, troisieme • partie, chapitre I, section A-I. Therefore, it is unfair to try to represent, as the passage I have quoted from your speech appears to do, that the Commission pronounced a verdict of guilty because the charges were not disproved. They based their verdict of guilty, as they say themselves, on "the . . . facts ascer- tained by the Commission". You went on shortly afterwards, Mr. Presi- dent, if you will allow me to read again from your speech: "I do not know how many of the members of the Security Council are trained lawyers. However, even a layman knows that under any modern legal system charges must be proved. A verdict of guilty cannot be based on the mere inability to disprove charges. I really do not know how the Commission, which certainly has many able and eminent men among its members, was able to base a conclusion on such a level of argumentation. My only ex- planation is that the members of the Commis- sion, for some extraneous reasons, were com- pelled to establish a verdict of guilty against the northern neighbours of Greece in spite of their inability to prove it." I admit, Mr. President, that you are entitled to say that eight out of the eleven members of :\'.e Commission were misled by the evidence; fOU are equally entitled yourself not to accept that evidence, but I do submit, with all respect, that you are not entitled to say that eight of the eleven members of the Commission were, "for some extraneous reasons", compelled to give a particular judgment. I hope that, after reflecting on this passage in your remarks, you may agree with me that unless it were corrected, and corrected this evening, it might give a wrong and very unfortunate im- pression. There must, of course, on occasions be a majority opinion and a minority opinion on any given question. That is always unfortunate, but it cannot be helped; it is a matter of an honest difference of opinion. What is to be deprecated, it seems to mc, is that either the majority or the minority should accuse the other of arriving at a judgment "for extraneous rea- sons". Such an accusation does not come well from any member of this Council, and it seems to me particularly unfortunate if it comes from one who, by the hazard of the ~;Jpl;3.i:Jet, ll; .1t the same time occupying the Chair.

I should first like to say a few words, as the representative of POLAND, con"" cerning the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom. As I read the conclusions of the majority of the members of the Commission, I am fully aware of the fact, which was mentioned by the representative of the United KingdoD' that the conclusions do enumerate the differ,-__t charges, do enumerate briefly the evidence and counter-evidence which was brought forward, and finally present certain' concluding sentences. However, I find that the method of argummt, so to speak, is laid down in the introdut:tioll; and, as I interpret the text of the conclUsions, it seems to me that every reader of this text must gain, at least at first sight, the same impression which I gained, namely, that the method, used in reaching the conclusions seems to be to find that there is no disproof of the charges. If the majority of the Commission believed it acted on the basis~of a different method, I am,. of course, very gl~d to take note that such was the belief of the majority of 'the members of the CommisSIon. ,: 'In regard to the last point made by the representative of the United Kingdom, which was also mentioned by the representative of Australia, I should like to make the following observations. First of all, if the representative of Australia and the representative of the United Kingdom so desire, I shall be very glad to have that particular sentence struck from the record. However, I should like to state the followinJ-alld I now speak personally, for myself, and not for my Government-I have the impression that the interpretation of the evidence by the majority of the Cornrnission was based on certain general ideas and general views as to what the :;ituation is. It seems to me, and this is a fact which I regret, that these general ideas and gneral views rather prevailed over dle study of the detailed facts. That is of course, my personal opinion. I shall go on to say that in the speech which was made by the representative of Australia on 11 July,! he stated that, in so far as the views of Le PR~SIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je desire tout d'abord prononcer quelques mots, en tant que representant de la POLOGNE, relativement a la declaration du representant du Royaume-Uni. En lisant les conciusions de la majorite des membres de la Commission, je reconnais que, comme l'a dit le representant du Royaume-Uni, ces conclusions enumercnt les differentes accusations, donnent un compte rendu sommaire des preuves et refutations qui leur ont ete apportees et se terminent par un certain npmbre de phrases de conclusion proprement dite. Mais la methode de raisonnement, pour ainsi dire, est exposee dans l'introduction; et, en interpretant le texte des conclusions, il me semble que tout lecteur de ce texte doit avoir, tout au moins a premiere vue, la meme impression que fai eue en le lisant, a savoir que'la methode suivie pour aboutir aux conclusions :lC'.mble etre d'etablir que les accusations n'ont pas ete refutees. Si In. majorite des membt".s de la COIllinission est persuadee qu'elle a suivi une methoC'e differente, je suis evidemment tres heureux de prendre acte de cette conviction. En ce qui concerne la demiere remarque du representant du Royaume-Uni, remarque faite egalement par le representant de l'Australie, je desire faire les observations suivantes. Tout d'abord, si le representant de l'Australie et le representant du Royaume-Uni le desirent, je ferai volontiers supprimer du compte rendu la phrase en questio<l. Mais je tiens a declarer que - je parle maintenant en mon nom personnel et non en celui de mon Gouvemement-j'ai l'impressl0n que la majorite des membres de la Commission a interprete les temoignages tn partant de certaines idees generales et d'une certaine vue d'ensemble de la situation. Il me semble, et je le regrette, que ces idees generales et Cf;.i:t~ 'i,,"e d'ensf''IDble l'ont emporte sur l'ctude deu;,me~ ;ki; i".its. Ceci n'est evidemment que moT" ..: ["Jm01t ;.:er.sonnelle. Je poursuiVrai en citant le discours que le representant de l'Australie a prononce le '11 i tliUet1 et dans lequel il a declare que pour ce . Mr. JOHNSOr-J (United States of America): The exposition made·this afternoon by the USSR representative really began, as he stated, a discussion of the United States resolution. May I ~quire whether the general debate is now closed and whether we shall proceed with a detailed discussion of the United States resolution tomorrow?

The rules of procedure do Le PRESIDENT (traduit de Fanglais): not give the President the power to close ~ de- Le reglement interieur n'accorde pas au Presibate, and I would be unable to prevent a speaker dent le pouvoir de clore une discussion et il m'est from discussing the general subject. However, impossible d'interdire a un orateur de discuter I should like to make a personal request of all le projet general. Toutefois, en mon nom members to avoid expounding their general personnel, jed~mande a tous Ies membres du views which~ I think, have already been ex- Conseil d'eviter de prendre la parole pour pressed, and to concentrate on the specific issues exposer des considerations generales deja expriof the resolution which are before us. ' mees et de limiter la discussion aux points particuliers de la resolution qui nous est soumise. Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America): Would it be consistent with our rules for general debate to be interp6b.ted between discussions on the resolution, or is it possible under our rules to maintain a certain order and to exclude general debate when the resolution is being considered? The Council may not agree with me, _ in which case I would have nothing more to say, but perhaps the Council may be asked if it would agree that general debate is now closed. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I think that if no ~ne expresses a wish to speak in the general debate before tomorrow's meeting, the general debate will automatically be closerl and we shall proceed to consider the concrete resolutions. I think this problem settles itself.

The rules of procedure make no provision with regard to this question. There is no point mentioned in eonnexion with the closure of the debate. However, I think it is a good and normal practice that the general debate should come to an end at some time, and then the concrete resolutions can be taken up. I think this practice has been followed more or less in the past, and I trust that the members of the Council will automatically adjust themselves to it in this case. bo.... M. JOHNSON (Etats,.Ul1is d'Amerique) (traduit de l~anglais): L'expose fait eet apres,.midi par ~e representant de I'TlRSS a en fait entame, comme ill'a declare, la discussion de la resolution presentee par les Etats-Unis. Puis-je demander si la discussion generale est maintenant terminee et si nous procederons demain a la discussion point par peint de la resolution des Etats-Unis? M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais): Notre reglement permet-il qu'une discussion geneide interrompe la discussion d'une resolution, ou bien est-il possible, selon notre reglement, d'obliger le Conseil a suivre un ordre determine et d'interdire la discussion generale pendant l'exam~n d'une resolution? Il est possible que le Conseil n'accepte pas mon point de vue. Dans ce cas, je ne dirai plus rien, mais il serait peut-etre possible de demander au Conseil s'il accepte de clore maintenant la discussion generale. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovi6tiques) .(traduit du russe): Il me semble que si cl'id demain personne n'exprime le desir de prendr.e la·parole dans le cadre de la discussion generale, celle-ci S~ trouvera par le fait meme terminee et que nous pourrons passer a l'examen des resolutions concretes. Ce probleme, me semble-t-il, se resout de lui-meme. Le .PRESIDENT (traduit' de l'anglais): Le reglement interieur ne prevoit pas cette situation. Aucun article ne mentionne la cl8ture des debats.·Toutefois, j'estime qu'il serait parfois souhaitable de clof(~ les debats au bout d'tm certain. temps et d'aborder ensuite I'etude des reSOlutions concretes. Je pense que le Conseil a plus ou moins suivi cette pratique jusqu'a maintenant et je presume que les m.embres du Conseil voudront bien s'y conformer clans le cas present.

I think that the proposal of the representative of France is entirely within the framework of the rules of procedure, and I propose to follow it. I shall therefore ask tomorrow morning whether anybody desires to .speak on the general debate, and, if there are no speakers, I shall declare the general debate closed. The next meeting of the Security Council will be held tomorrow morning at 10.30 a.m. We shall then consider the programme of meetings for the following week. The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): J'estime que la proposition du representant de la France est parfaitement conforme n'esprit du reglement interieur et je propose au Conseil de la suivre. En consequence, je demandeiai demain matin si quelqu'un desire parler dans le cadre de la discussion generale et% si auenn orateur ne demande la parole, je declarerai close la discussion generale. La prochaine seance du Conseil de securite aura lieu demain matin a 10 h. 30. Nous etudierons le programme des seances pour la semaine suivante. La seance est levee a18 h. 25. Austtalia-Australie Egypt-Egypte Norway-Norvege H. A. Goddard Pty. Ltd. Librairie "La Renaissance Norsk Bokimport AjS 255a George Street d'Egypte" Edv. Storms Gate 1 SYDNEY, N. S. W. 9 Sh. Adly Pasha OSLO CAIRO Belgium-Belgique Finland--Finlmzde Philippines Agence et Messageries de la D. P. Perez Co. Presse, S. A. Akateerninen Kirjakauppa 132 Riverside 14-22 rue du Persil 2, Keskuskatu SAN JUAN BRUXELLES HELSINKI Sweden--Suede Bolivia-BoUvie France A.-B. C. E. Fritzes Kungl. Librerla Cie~tificay Editions A. Pedone Hofbokhandel 13, rue SoufHot Fredsgatan 2 Literaria PA..lUS, ve STOCKHOLM Avenida 16 de Julio, 216 Switzerland-Suisse Casilla 972 Greece--Grece LA PAZ "Eleftheroudakis" Librairie Payot S. A. Librairie internationale LAUSANNE, GENEVE, VEVEY, Canada Place de la Constitution MONTREUX, NEUCHATEL, The Ryerson Press ATHENES BERNE, BASEL 299 Queen Street West Guatemala Hans Raunhardt TORONTO Kirchgasse 17 Jose Goubaud ZURICH I Chile--Chili Goubaud & Cla Ltda. Syria-Syrie Edmundo Pizarro Sucesor Merced 846 5a Av. Sur No. 6 y 9a C. P. Librairie universelle SANTIAGO GUATEMALA DAMAS Ch$a--Chine Haiti-Haiti Turkey-Turquie Max Bouchereau Librairie Hachette The Commercial Press Ltd. Librairie "A la Caravelle" 469 Istiklal Caddesi 211 Honan Road Boite postale 111-B BEYOGLU-IsTANBUL .<':-: SHANGHAI 10sta ii~a-Costa-Rica PORT-AU-PRINCE Union of South Africa I India-Inde Union Sud-Africaine / Trejos Hennanos Oxford Book & Stationery Central News Agency Ltd. J Apartado 1313 Co. Commissioner & Rissik Sts. SAN JOSE Scindia House JOHANNESBURG, CAPETOWN, Cuba NEW DELHI DURBAN La Casa Be1ga Iran United Kingdom Relll~ de Smedt Bongahe Piaderow Royaume-Uni O'Reilly 455 731 Shah Avenue H.M. Stationery Office LA HABANA TEHERAN p.a. Box 569 Czechoslovakia Iraq-Irak LONDON, S.E. 1 and at H.M.S.O. Shops at Tchecoslovaquie Mackenzie & Mackenzie LONDON, EDINBURGH, F. Topic The Bookshop MANCHESTER, CARDIFF, Narodni Trida 9 BAGHDAD BELFAST and BRISTOL PRAHA 1 Lebanon-Liban United States of America Denmark-Danemark Librairie universelle Etats-Unis d'Ameriqtte Einar Munskgaard BEYROUTH International Documents Norregade 6 Luxembourg Service Columbia University Press h.JOBENHAVN Librairie J. Schummer 2960 Broadway Dominican Republic Place Guillaume NEW YORK 27, N. Y. LUXEMBOURG Republique Dominicaine Netherlands-Pays-Bas Yugoslavia-Yougoslavie Libreria Dominicana Drzavno Preduzece Calle Mercedes No. 49 N. V. Martinus Nijhoff Jugoslovenska Knjiga Apartado 656 Langc Voor-hout 9 Moskovska UI. 36 CIUDAD TRUJILLO S'GHAVENHAGE BEOGRAD