S/PV.1605 Security Council

The frrst name on the list of speakers is that of the representative of Zambia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement. Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/l 605) 1. Adoption of the agenda.

Mr. President, I should like to thank you and all the members of the Security Council for granting my request to make a statement on behalf of the Government of Zambia on the all-important question of Southern Rhodesia. But first of all allow me to perform a very pleasant duty, that of conveying to you the warm congratulations of the delegation of Zambia on your assumption of the high office of President of the Security Council for the month of December. You have had a very distinguished career in your own country, having been a senior and respected Minister in the Government of Sierra Leone. During the short time you have been Permanent Representative to the United Nations, you have already proved to be a worthy representative of your great country, which has traditionally and historically maintained the most cordial of relations with mine. 2. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia : [a) Letter dated 24 November 1971 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/l 0396); (b] Fourth report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 2.53 (1968) (S/l 0229 and Add.1 and 2). Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia: (u) Letter dated 24 November 1971 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10396); (bj Fourth report of the Committee established in pursuante of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/10229 and Add.1 and 2)” 5. I would be failing in my duty if I did not express my gratitude and satisfaction to your outstanding predecessor, Ambassador Kulaga of Poland, for the outstanding qualities of leadership he displayed in, presiding over the deliberations of the Council during the month of November. he is a gentleman among gentlemen and a truly tine diplomat who represents the very best of everything that is good in our profession.

In accordance with the decisions taken previously by the Council I invite the representatives of Saudi Arabia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia and Ghana to participate without the right to vote in the discussion of the present item. 6. The question of Southern Rhodesia is a matter of immediate concern to the people of Zambia because events in that rebel colony do have a direct bearing on them, On 25 November 1971[1602nd meeting/ the Security Council was given details of the so-called agreement which was reached In Salisbury between the British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, and the Rhodesian rebel leader, Ian Smith, guaranteeing Smith’s illegal independence and sealing the betrayal of the 5 million African people of Zambabwe. 2. In accordance with the usual practice of the Council and in view of the limited number of seats available at the Council table, I invite the representatives of Saudi Arabia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia and Ghana to take the places reserved for them in the Council 7. The British Permanent Representative, Sir Colin Crowe, who is a very fine gentleman indeed, did his best to explain October 1964: Harold Wilson, then Prime Minister of Britain, sends message to Smith warning him not to declare independence but promising to take no action against him if he does. November 1965 : Smith makes a unilateral declaration of independence. Security Council adopts re+olutions 202 (1965) of 6 May 1965 and 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965. The latter, among other things, ‘6 I . . calls upon the . . . United Kingdom to take all . . s appropriate measures which would prove affective in eliminating the authority of the usurpers and in bringing the minority rt?gime in Southern Rhodesia to an immediate end.” March 1966: British Navy stops a Greek oil tanker, Joanna V, from offloading oil for Rhodesia at Beira. Security Council adopts resolution 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966. December 1966: Wilson and Smith meet for settlement talks on board HMS Tiger off the coast of Malta. Smith rejects Wilson’s proposals for settlement. In the same month Britain imposes sanctions on Rhodesia. Wilson tells delegates to Lagos Commonwealth leaders’ conference that sanctions would bring the Smith r&ime down in weeks rather than months, and the Security Council adopts resolution 232 (f 966) of 16 December 1966, May 1968: The United Nations imposes comprehensive sanctions on Rhodesia. The Security Council adopts resolution 253 (1968). August 1968: Rhodesian Appeals Court rules that Smith’s rbgime has de facto but not de jure status. The High Court judge in the rebel colony endorses the legality of the regime when sentencing 32 Africans to death for possession of arms. October 1968: Wilson and Smith hold second settlement talks-this time aboard HMS Fearless off the coast of Gibraltar. Smith again turns down British proposals. June 1969: Smith wins landslide victory in referendum for apartheid.type Constitution and declaration of a republic, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, then British Governor of Rhodesia, resigns. July 1969: Last members of British diplomatic mission leave Salisbury. November 1969: Rhodesian Parliament gives final approval for declaration of an apartheid republic. June 1970: The Conservative Government takes power in Britain. July 1970: Smith warns that there will be no dramatic change in the new Government’s attitude towards Rho. desia. November 1970: Fifth anniversary of the unilateral declaration of independence. Smith announces that he will negotiate settlement from a position of power and will not compromise his “principles”, The Security Council adopts resolution 288 (1970) of 17 November 1970 which, <among other things, calls upon the United Kingdom as the administering Power in discharge of its responsibility “to take urgent and effective measures to bring to an end the illegal rebellion in Southern Rhodesia and enable the people to exercise their right to seIf-deter. mination, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) . . .“. February 1971: Secret discussions start between Salisbury and London. June 1971: British emissary Lord Goodman flies to Salisbury for talks with Smith regime. November 197 1: British Government votes to continue sanctions against Rhodesia. British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home flies to Salisbury for talks. General Assembly adopts a resolution calling on Britain not to grant independence before majority rule. Nevertheless, agreement is signed and announced in London and in Salisbury. 8. The Government and people of Zambia were shocked to hear the details of the agreement which was signed ifl Salisbury by Sir Alec and Smith.1 What shocked us is not that there was a cheap and shameful sell-out of the African people of Zimbabwe but the extent to which Her Majesty’s Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary went in appeasing the rebel leader Ian Smith. It once again demonstrated the British Government’s lack of concern and insensitivity for the welfare of, the 5 million African people of Zimbabwe. 9. We consider it the height of absurdity for Sir Alec to have begun his political career as Chamberlain’s Parlip mentary Private Secretary, with a shameful surrender st Munich in 1939 at the hands of none other than Adolf Hitler, and to end it with a shameful surrender at SaLisbaV in 1971 at the hands of none other than the rebel leader Ian First, a complicated electoral arrangement which casts grave doubts on the possibility of eventual majority rule; Second, no specific time-scale defined for movement of Africans towards parliamentary parity, let alone eventual majority rule; Third, commission appointed by Britain to assess views of all Rhodesia’s racial groups on acceptability of such socalled settlement proposals; First, that there will be no manipulation of the law and no constitutional changes made by the Smith regime; Second, that there will be an acceleration in the rate of growth of African secondary educational opportunities to the level rendering African school-leavers eligible for the African higher roll; Fourth, the rebel regime’s so-called intention to make progress towards ending racial discrimination by a review of existing legislation; Fifth, the so-called independent commission to study racial discrimination and make recommendations to the rebel r&$ne ; Third, that possession by all Africans with educational qualifications will have the requisite financial qualifications for the proposed franchise; Sixth, a development programme with aid up to $120 million over ten years to be provided to promote educational and job opportunities for Africans; Fourth, that there will be no rise ih the kvel of financial qualification-which is highly unlikeIy since the Constitution provides for automatic increases Proportionate to inflation; Seventh, no immediate change in the present status of Rhodesia or its illegal 1969 Constitution; Fifth, that every eligible African will register aa a voteiwhich again is highly unlikely;’ Eighth, the so-called new declaration of rights guaranteeing individual rights and’ freedoms, including access to the High Court for complainants; Sixth, that there will be no increase in the current net balance and rates of wtite’imrnigratiod to Rhodesiaagain highly unlikely given the Smith r@lme’s pig-headed determination to bring in as many white. immigrants as possible ; Mr-A, promise by the rebel regime not to evict Africans from certain white-designated areas pending a report by the commission; Seventh, that the current output and rates of increase of qualified white, Asian and Euro-African school-leavers will remain constant. Tenth, review of cases of all detainees and restricted persons; Eleventh, steps to enable more Africans to compete on equal terms with white Bhodesians in public service; 12. As regards the qualifications proposed in the White Paper, we are of the opinion that only the proposals for the African higher roll are significant in relation to the vital question of majority rule in Southern Rhodesia. The level of voting qualifications for the lower roll is irrelevant in that Africans already control the lower roll seats and this franchise, however narrow or broad, will not give Africans a larger number of seats in Parliament. For that reason the lower roll is therefore irrelevant to the question of majority rule. The African higher roll qualifications must therefore be considered crucial for the purpose of this mathematical exercise. Here it is disturbing to note that there has been no movement from the 1969 Electoral Act in the British- Rhodesian White Paper. When measured against the preunilateral declaration of independence position, the proposals contained in the White Paper are highly retrogressive, to say the least. The 1971 proposals as contained in the White Paper require applicants for enrolment as voters on the African higher roll to have an income of not less than Twelfth, the rebel regime’s “Wish” to revoke the state of emergency after sanctions have been lifted. 10. My very distinguished brother and colleague Ambassador Salim of Tanzania very ably and eloquently analysed the British White Paper entitled “Proposals for a Settlement” in great detail on 30 November [1603rd meeting] and explained why it is impossible for us to accept these proposals as falling within the so-called five principleswhich, in any case, we have never accepted. Our position on this matter has always been and continues to be that there should be no independence in Southern Rhodesia before majority rule. 11. I propose’ to deal with some of the points that I have just enumerated. Evaluation of the Rhodesian settlement 14. The economic prospects for the Africans in Rhodesia are still very bleak. In 1968 the annual average income of the 700,000 African workers‘ in Southern Rhodesia was $288 per annum. It is estimated that the four highest income groups of African workers are those in the fields of communications, banking, education and health. This is where most of the educated Africans are employed. It is estimated that this category of Africans earned in 1968 annual average salaries of $638, $620, $542 and $532 per annum respectively. This must be compared. with the annual average salaries of the 280,000 Africans employed in the agricultural industry, who in 1968 earned an average of $144 per annum. This figure should be compared with average incomes in 1968 of white workers’ in the same industry of $2,836 and $3,102 per annum. 15. In the 10 years before the unilateral declaration of independence African salaries rose from an average of $150 per annum to $256 per annum, representing an average increase of 7.06 per cent per annum. In the two years preceding the unilateral declaration of independence the rate slowed to 4.6 per cent. Although a consumer survey in 1970-based on a sample of 1,000 Africans) showed that 6 per cent of African households had a personal income of $1,320 per annum, this figure gives an exaggerated picture of African incomes for the purposes of the proposed franchise. It is exaggerated because it applies only to African urban households. It is exaggerated because it includes non-indigenous Africans who currently number 320,000 out of the total African labour force of 700,000 workers. It is exaggerated because it also includes all incomings and income of other members of the household which are not taken into account in assessing income for the purposes of the proposed franchise. 16. One of the most limiting factors in the proposed Constitution is undoubtedly the rate of educational pro- 17. We can only draw one conclusion from these prop sals, which is that African majority rule has been post indefinitely. It is likely on the most favourable assurnPt%z~ to take 55 years, that is, up to the year 2026, before thee are sufficient qualified Africans to achieve parity in rbf: Rhodesian Parliament. Then there will be a further five-ye~ period of delay before the last school-leavers meel r!z+z voting age requirement of 21 years. Thereafter if TV estimated that it will take four years before the machinP~ for the introduction of 10 common roll seats can eP: completed. This makes the year 2035 the earliest posaifi date for majority rule, assuming that there will be a IO pi cent annual increase in the African secondary school outp~ after British aid is ended, and also assuming that there a+%? be scrupulous honesty on the part of Ian Smith and h& successors, which is highly unlikely. 18. These figures could very well be disputed by tb,r Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, but b the absence of any official estimates as to how long it & going to take to achieve parity, let alone majority rule, under the proposed Constitution we are bound to accepr these figures as fair. Indeed, only last night Sir tit< Douglas-Home, the British Foreign Secretary, informed 15s House of Commons that he was not in a position ta a! how long it would take to achieve either parity or majori@ rule in Southern Rhodesia. As a matter of fact, at an earfief session he had said that he could not calculate the tinte @q the basis of the clock or the calendar but rather on the baais of what was going to be achieved. 19. Ian Smith, the rebel leader in Southern Rhodesia, told a British television audience last night that he knew that the Africans would not be able to take over power in Rhodesk today because they are not ready to govern themselves. tie said he knew that they would not be ready after ten Yeats. He added that he does not know, what is going to haPPen In one hundred or one thousand years because he will not b* alive to be able to tell. 20. ‘Ibis is the nature of the terms of the proposak the British Government intends to put to the People Of Rhodesia. In a country where the highest Courts oflswsrr being used to administer mock justice and to iubberstamp white oppression it does not console the Africans to knoa’ 26. Under the prevailing circumstances, the African people of Zimbabwe have no alternative but to take up arms and fight white oppression. This is the only honourable course left for them. We therefore urge the Security Council to make direct financial and military contributions to the people of Zimbabwe to enable them to continue their struggle against the racist thugs led by Ian Smith. The Home-Smith agreement does not guarantee independence before majority rule. It does not alter the status of the unilateral declaration of independence. It is a white man’s deal not worked out with the participation of the black majority. It is ridden with the most undisguised form of racism. It guarantees the continued oppression of the African people and it represents a total British surrender of constitutional responsibility for the rebel colony. 22. The Home-Smith agreement has placed the African people of Zimbabwe in perpetual bondage and at the mercy of white settlers for ever, Sir Alec has now awarded Ian Smith and his fellow white settlers a certificate of respectability while at the same time giving racism an international certificate of respectability which the white racists will fully make use of at the expense of the African majority. 27. For those and other reasons it is our considered judgement that this is a British act of betrayal and treachery. We firmly reject it, Finally and most importantly, I wish to state that messages smuggled out of Southern Rhodesia from Mr. Nkomo and the Reverend Sithole have requested the Zambian delegation to inform this Council that they totally reject the Anglo-Rhodesian agreement in no uncertain terms as a cheap sell-out. We are therefore sure that the people of Zimbabwe will accordingly reject this agreement with the contempt it deserves if and when it is put to a genuine test. 23. The test of acceptability needs to be looked at in its proper perspective. The public debate over the test of acceptability is going to be conducted in Rhodesia under the present state of emergency with the apparatus of a police state fully intact. The press is entirely controlled by the white racists, who obviously favour the proposed settlement. Radio and television time is to be allotted only to the parties now represented in the rebel Parliament, thus denying any opportunities to the two major African nationalist parties, the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). These two political parties, which are banned but

I thank the representative of Zambia, Mr. Mwaanga, for his kind remarks and warm words of welcome addressed to me and my country. 29. I invite the representative of Ghana to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement. wllicl~ genuinely represent African opinion, are therefore automatically excluded from mobilizing African public opinion. What this means in practical terms is that the great mass of Africans who live in the so-called tribal reserves will be paraded before the Pearce fact-finding commission at public meetings where their predictable role will be to applaud what is said in their name by their chiefs, who are paid agents of Ian Smith, and by their tribal councillors. What chance has any commission-no matter how trustworthy its credentials-of establishing the true feelings of the Africans under such carefully manipulated conditions? Given these conditions, the Commission’s report will not carry any semblance of conviction in the international community.

Mr. President, I thank you and the members of the Council for acceding to my request to be allowed to participate in this important debate on Southern Rhdoesia. I do so with more than satisfaction, seeing that the Council is meeting under the presidency of a distinguished son of Africa hailing from a neighbouring country, Sierra Leone, with which Ghana has the strongest ties of friendship and fraternal solidarity. Your presidency inspires us with the confidence that this Council will at last grapple with this problem of Rhodesia, which has vexed the African continent for so long, with foresight, resolution, humanity and a sense of commitment to the high purposes of this Organization. 24. Contrary to the apparent effort by Sir Colin Crowe in his statement on 25 November 1971 [IdUZnd meeting/ to belittle the value and importance of a referendum, we strongly feel that the true test of acceptability of these proposals would be the holding of a nation-wide referendum based on one-man-one-vote under the supervision of tlze United Nations. 31. There is one principle which must be established first and recognized by all when dealing with this problem of Southern Rhodesia in the United Nations: that is, United Nations responsibility in the solution of the problem. When the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom made his statement on Thursday, 25 November 1971, he seemed anxious to emphasize British responsibility as the first premise of his argument. But, of course, this was a 25. We demand the immediate and unconditional release of Mr. Joshua Nlcomo, President of ZAPU, and the Rever- 32. Serious United Nations involvement began in 1961 with the adoption of a constitution which gave rise to African opposition because of fears of independence under minority white rule. By resolution 1747 (XVI) of 1962, the General Assembly declared Southern Rhodesia a Non-Self- Governing Territory and requested the British Government, inter alia, to convene a constitutional conference in which all political parties could participate for the purpose of formulating a constitution for Southern Rhodesia in place of the Constitution of 1961 on the basis of “one man, one vote” and majority rule. Resolution 1755 (XVII) dealt with the situation in Southern Rhodesia and urged the speedy release of detained African leaders of ZAPU. Resolution 1760 (XVII) regretted British inaction on the Southern Rhodesian situation and made concrete proposals for the settlement of the issue. Since then, every session of the General Assembly has been seized of the question of Southern Rhodesia, and the Security Council became seized of the matter in 1963 when, on the initiative of Ghana, the Council was requested to prevent the transfer of sovereignty and of arms and military aircraft to the racist regime of Southern Rhodesia on the break-up of the Federation in 1963. That move was, of course, frustrated by the British veto. 33. The question whether the Security Council meeting in 3965 was called on British initiative to buttress British responsibility is a moot point. It is pertinent to recall that when the unilateral declaration of independence was made in November 1965 the General Assembly went into emergency session the same day and recommended urgent consideration of the matter by the Security Council. Requ.ests for a Security Council meeting also came from a number of African States. This Council meeting took place the following day. Thus, despite what the British call their “primary responsibility” in the matter, the whole logic and history of the development of the Rhadesian problem is a recognition of shared responsibility with the United Nations, particularly this Council. Indeed, it would be strange ta think that the British Government has submitted the so”called Home-Smith agreement to this Council merely for information purposes, for the Council to take it or leave it. Nor could the Council be invited to look on passively while the British settle agreements about Rhodesia on terms contrary to United Nations decisions and resolutions. It would be extremely odd for the British Government to take such an attitude, for it would be tantamount to the United Kingdom Government dictating to this Council and the United Nations. 34. We hold the view that unless British action is meant to be irresponsible and in flagrant defiance of the international community, that Government has an obligation to take into account the Council’s views on the proposed settlement with Ian Smith, and to abide by every decision and 35. Our belief that the United Nations has a joint responsibility in solving the Rhodesian problem makes ir pertinent to recall the principles which the United Nations, by overwhelming majorities in its various organs and Committees, has decided that a solution of the Southern Rhodesian problem should be based upon. On successhv occasions the United Nations has stated that there should be no independence without majority rule; that all detain& political leaders should be released; that there should be fu.Il freedom of movement and assembly to ensure norm&i political activity; that there should be a national convention of all political leaders to devise a freely acceptable constitution based on the principle. of one man, one vote; that lack of educational, economic or property qualit%+ tions should not be a barrier to the franchise; that aparrhtd legislation should be repealed and racial discriminatiorn ended. Above all, the General Assembly has called for r-d! moral and material support to the people of Zimbabwe in their legitimate struggle to overthrow the Smith regime. 36. Most of the above principles have also been adapted by the Organization of African Unity, a sister organization of the United Nations, in formal relations of co-operation with it and bearing special responsibility for the continent of Africa, and therefore for Rhodesia, a responsibility which none can deny. 37. Against these principles, what has the British Goverument proposed as its guidelines? First, it has sought to negotiate with a rebel and illegal regime which it has itself tried to bring down, consistent with a request of the General Assembly. 38. The so-called five principles have been repeatedly stated by successive British Governments as though they constituted an improvement in themselves upon the United Nations principles. Suffice it to say that these live principles have been rejected by the Organization of African Unity, in no uncertain terms, as inadequate and therefore unacceptable. Prime Minister Wilson introduced later a sixth principle to the effect that there should be no oppression of majority by minority or of minority by majority. This sixth principle was repudiated by successive Conservative Governments. The six principles formed the basis of the Tiger talks in ‘1966 and the Fearless talks in 1968. The principle of majority rule accepted at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in 1966, v/hen the application of “one man, one vote” to Southem Rhodesia was adopted, was subsequently, however, dropped by successive British Governments. The question might well be asked, why did the Conservatives reject Ilre sixth principle? The only answer is: they never contearplated a settlement that would ensure this most desirable guarantee. 40. What has been the response of Britain to these recommendations? First as regards the question of force, the British position has been the well-known racist theory of “kith and kin”. Britain’s defence of its position, as repeated by Sir Colin Crowe in his last statement, is that it was neither “feasible nor desirable” to use force against Southern Rhodesia. It was not feasible because, according to Sir Colin, “Rhodesia had been virtually self-governing and possessed its own forces for nearly half a century”, a fact which “would have required an invasion in the middle of a continent” [ibid., para. 91. Britain has been repeating that argument since the early 1960s on the basis of a so-called “parliamentary convention”. The claim that in 1923 the British Government signed away its power to control Southern Rhodesia is both historically and legally false, What happened in 1923 was that, on the strength of the pIebiscite voted on by the white minority, Britain “annexed” Southern Rhodesia to the British Crown and granted to its Legislative Assembly, elected on an exclusively settler basis, so-called powers of “self-government”. The British Government, however, reserved the right to veto any Southern Rhodesian legislation that adversely affected the interest of the African inhabitants, ran counter to Britain’s international obligations or affected the remaining rights of the British South African Company. 43. The Southern Rhodesian Government had in 1960 no armed forces under its control, so it was false to say that the British could not physically enforce their will. During the period of the Federation, the British Government built up a strong army and an air force in the Territory. In practice those forces were under the control of Britain, though in name they belonged to the Federation. In any case, when the break-up of the Federation took place in 1963 it was the British Government which, claiming to have no control over Southern Rhodesian armed forces, actually gave away the bulk of the Federation’s army and air force to the racist government of Southern Rhodesia, despite the efforts of Ghana and others in this Council to prevent this move. Thus, having armed the rebels, Britain then turned back to claim inability to control those it had armed. 41, Indeed, Southern Rhodesia in 1923 enjoyed the same kind of “self-government” that Ghana enjoyed in 1956, one year before independence. In the case of Ghana, however, the British Government made it absolutely clear that the new constitution that would come into force on independence would be the responsibility of the British Government. Further, the British insisted that a series of constitutional conferences should be held in an attempt to get universal agreement concerning the type of constitution that should be adopted. When there was no agreement concerning the future form of the State, the British Government insisted that an election should be held. Thus the British Government insisted first on a constitutional conference, and later an election was held on the basis of “one man, one vote”. The same line of conduct as was followed in Ghana has been followed in all other British African territories before they obtained independence. 44. In any case, even after the unilateral declaration of independence Britain still had the power to use force immediately to topple the regime if it had wanted to. This has been the imperial tactic of colonial Britain against other territories which were not white. No considerations of bloodshed or the so-called incalculable consequences of War or violence deterred the United Kingdom Government from taking military action in its erstwhile colonies of Kenya, Cyprus, British Guyana or little Anguilla. No consideration of the incalculable consequences of war deterred Britain from going to war against the Nazi racists. Ghana and 45. Nor is that attitude absent from the general position of the United Kingdom Government on the question of sanctions. Against the protestations of African and Asian States, Britain at first would accept only voluntary sanctions. Only when these failed, as the Africans had warned they would, did the United Kingdom agree to selective mandatory sanctions. Selective mandatory sanctions were also insisted upon for some time before comprehensive mandatory sanctions were accepted by the British. Even then the sanctions programme was not at all comprehensive, the so-called humanitarian exemptions being insisted upon. 46. But the Ghana delegation has consistently argued that sanctions could not possibly achieve anything unless the sanctions-busters were brought to book, unless the racist r@imes of Portugal and South Africa, which deliberately aided and abetted the sanctions-breaking, were themselves subjected to sanctions. To this day Britain remains opposed to that common-sense course, hiding behind a strange policy of ‘“Izo recognition, no force, no confrontation”. To this hide-bound policy was added a sanctions policy of too little, too late, till today we have the strange situation of a so-called boom in a supposedly sanctions-ridden economy. We are now told that although sanctions have bitten Rhodesia they have not bitten hard enough and they are hurting the poor Africans more than the whites. We are told that despite sanctions, or rather because of sanctions, apartheid is spreading faster and wider into Southern Rhodesia and that it is time now to rescue the Africans from apartheid. We are not told by Sir Colin that the reactionary business lobbies of Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States are the ones that want sanctions removed so that they can renew their profitable business interests in Southern Rhodesia. Nor are we told that it is the Western representatives on the Council that have aided and abetted these racist and reactionary business interests by their negative votes on this Council. We are not told by Sir Colin that it is Britain and France, permanent members of this Council, which have defied decisions of this Council by selling arms and amunition to the racist regime of South Africa, In about three or so places in Sir Colin’s statement, he pleads that Britain had no power to impose its will or prevent this or 47. Is it not a matter of interest that when Lord Home was negotiating with the rebel regime the United States Congress was passing legislation to end the sanctions on the importation of Rhodesian chrome? Of course, we are concerned that the legislation has received presidential signature even if its implementation will be delayed till there is a settlement of the Rhodesian question. We have noted the denial by Ambassador Bush of collusion between the British and Americans against the black people of Zimbabwe. But surely no one can fail to take note of the strange coincidence of American and British actions in this matter. Nor have we failed to notice that the relevant legislation was initiated and piloted in Congress by racists from the American South. 48. Those who in this day and age still dream of the superiority of the white man, of the so-called mission of Western white civilization, would do well to stop and think before they plunge Africa into racial hatred and conflagration. Those in positions of leadersllip should ponder in which direction they seek to use their power. It is strange that Sir Colin Crowe believes that the Home-Smith proposals are a serious attempt to halt the deterioration in Southern Rhodesia and provide a solution in terms of Security Council resolution 288 (1970). That resolution calls on Britain: “to take urgent and effective measures to end the ilZega1 rebellion . . . and enable the people to exercise their d&t to self-determination, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)“. What an irony to claim that the Home-Smith proposals meet the requirements of that resolution. To this irony is added blackmail when Sir Colin Crowe claims that this is “probably ,the last chance”. There is no last chance till self-determination and independence based on majority nlle is achieved, no matter what settlements are arranged behirnl the backs of the people of Zimbabwe. 49. But let us first see how the proposals meet the so-called five principles set by the British themselves. Let me repeat that the United Nations and the Orgamzation ef African Unity have not accepted these principles. 50. First when we examine the manner in which the Home-S&h proposals have been negotiated there is ne escaping the fact that these have been negotiated with the rebel regime. It is known that the Reverend Sithole, one ef the nationalist leaders, as well as several others at Present under detention or serving sentences, were denied access te Lord Home. Hence, it cannot be said that tms is an 57. The creation of a higher African roll and the automatic increase of members elected to the point where parity is reached is only a disguised mechanism for actual indefinite delay of the anival of parity. We know that the Southern Rhodesian Government has been strenuously recruiting white immigrants into the Territory, and there is every reason to expect that the rate of immigration will be stepped up in the future. On this basis, when will the expected increase of registered voters on the higher African roll ever reach the 6 per cent of the European roll to attract the automatic increase? Secondly, the stringent income and property qualifications for both the higher African roll and the lower roll make it almost unbelievable that this parity will ever be reached in the foreseeable future. 5.1. Secondly, concerning the test of acceptability we are informed that a commission will be appointed to carry out this test, We submit that the responsibility for explaining the terms of the settlement to the people of Rhodesia as a whole is not the proper function of such a commission. It is the function of the political leaders of the people. One cannot exclude the possibility of the commission conducting a propaganda campaign, under the guise of explaining the proposals to the people, designed to get the people to accept an otherwise unacceptable settlement. 52. In this respect the delegation of Ghana notes with dissatisfaction that only political parties “represented in the House of Assembly” will be given radio and television time. Persons in detention or under restriction will be allowed to express their views only to the commission, not to the people of Zimbabwe. Further, political detainees and restrictees will not be Considered for release till after the test of acceptability. The claim, therefore, that “before and during the test of acceptability normal political activities will be permitted” is false. 58. In any case how is such a provision reconciled with the principles of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) that neither economic, nor educational nor property quahfications should stand in the way of the exercise of the inalienable right of people to self-determination and independence? And how does the British Government guarantee that there will be no retrogressive change in the electoral provisions or even in the whole Constitution to accord with the wishes of the white Rhodesian minority? An independent and sovereign country is free to do what it likes even with its own Constitution and many countries have in fact exercised this right soon after independence. Can it be claimed by any representatives here that voters in their countries are subjected to such income and property qualifications as have been accepted by the British Government for Southern Rhodesia? Can it be denied that in places like the southern States of this country these criteria are often used only as stratagems to deny voting rights to black Americans? 53. It is further claimed that the test of acceptability will be under the control of the British Government. In this respect the question put by the Ambassador of Somalia whether the British. Government will be in control of law and order enforcement agencies is pertinent and vital to a full, free and fair ascertainment. Is there any guarantee of such British control? 54. To judge from the complicated nature of the proposals, a time-table of the conduct of the test of acceptability seems called for. How, much time will be allowed for normal political activities before the test? And how long will the test last? In our view, nothing useful will be gained by limiting the time allowed for these undertakings. The very method agreed upon of testing acceptability falls far short of the only democratic process acceptable to civilized men in expressing their views, that is, through a vote on the basis of “one man, one vote”. 59. Moreover, the proposals provide that before the additional 10 seats are created to advance beyond parity to majority rule an independent commission will have to decide whether the creation of such seats is acceptable to the Rhodesian people as a whole or what other alternatives are acceptable. It is thought that by making a decision not to create these 10 seats tantamount to a constitutional amendment a sufficient guarantee has been won. But, as already stated, any sovereign Government can amend its Constitution or change it completely. There is therefore no guarantee against what the Rhodesian racists can do. 55. Further, who will constitute the commission to test the acceptability of the proposals? So far we have been told only of a British Lord who will be chairman, two vice-chairmen and a number of commissioners whose experience and independence of the Rhodesian authorities can be relied upon. In view of press reports that the composition of the commission will be heavily weighted against the black Africans in Zimbabwe, the international community must know who the commissioners would be, and how many there would be, before satisfaction can be f& about their experience and independence. It cannot be ignored that in the present circumstances hardly any white Rhodesian can be found who can be sufficiently independent of the racist regime. 60. What is more serious, legal provision has been created to enable ,the advance from parity to majority rule to be blocked by allowing for so-called alternatives. What could be justifiable alternatives to the creation of these additional seats if there is a determination to move towards majority rule from parity? It is clear that the racists will use this when the time comes to prevent the creation of the 10 common-roll seats. Thus the first principle of unimpeded 62. Nor are the provisions relating to the review of racially discriminating laws and land settlement in keeping with the relevant portions of the fourth British principle. There is to be no review of already existing laws, only future ones. The so-called review of the Land Tenure Act by which virtually half of the land is given to 5 million Africans and half to only 25,000 whites, is hedged with so many contingencies as not to deceive anyone as to its true import. One would have expected the British to insist on an immediate repeal of this law. Instead the Africans are promised a commission which will scrutinize the law and make recommendations which are not even binding on the Government. A spurious land board is also envisaged to preside over the long-term resolution of land problems. 63. We have taken note of a proposed development programme that will be financed from a British subsidy of %5 million a year for 10 years to be matched by a contribution from the Southern Rhodesian Government. How much matching the Southern Rhodesian Government will contribute is not stated. Judging from the niggardly provision that that Government has so far made for expenditure on African development and education, how can it be guaranteed that its matching will be substantial? Moreover, who will administer this fund? Does the British Government have the confidence that people who have stated flatly that power will never pass to Africans in their lifetime can honestly administer this fund for the benefit of Africans? We do not share such confidence and it were better that the administration of such development fund were entrusted to an unofficial body in Rhodesia with an African majority. 64. Indeed a careful analysis of the settlement terms seems only to convince the impartial that they not only do not conform in any way to consistently asserted United Nations principles, but are not even reconcilable in any significant way to the five principles set by the British Government itself. Not only has progress to majority rule been impaired, 65. Even the British sense of justice and fair play seems tc have been outraged by the proposals, judging fram press comments and editorials which have appeared recently b-r Britain, and here I quote from a recent issue of the Dr3i& Mail: “The new terms will be guaranteed neither by Britaip nor by any mtemational body. They will work only if the Rhodesian Government wants to make them work. in our heart of hearts we cannot be happy about a deal which ir so fragile and depends so much on the goodwill of the leaders of the Rhodesian front.” 66. In fact, the settlement is a sell-out of Zimbabwe. Xc wonder Mr. Smith was so happy at the conclusion of lht agreement. Surely the British must have worked out an approximate time-table by which, under the Home-Smith proposals, the people of Zimbabwe can attain independence by a certain date, other things being equal, We have heard statements made recently ‘by Lord Home that he cannot calculate either by the clock or by the calendar. But surely there must have been some kind of approximate calculations as to how long it was going to take the Africans to reach majorityrule, if there had been the British detertin. tion to see them advance fowards the stage where the5 would exercise majority rule. What is the time-table-or are the British afraid to tell us? The Ghana delegation & gravely concerned at the prospects for Zimbabwe. Indeed it is our belief that, far from the settlement leading to the dawn of hope, it will rather lead to frustration and despair and constitute therefore an invitation to violence and revolution. 67. In the light of this conclusion, and as I indicated at the beginning of my statement, there is a clear and inescapable duty on the part of this Council not to endorse or accept the settlement proposals nor recommend their acceptance to the people of Zimbabwe. The duty of the United Nations is to maintain sanctions, to strengthen and widen sanctions and to apply them effectively against pcru@l and South Africa, to isolate’the racist regime of Ian Smith and never to recognize any granting of independence to that Government on the basis of the HomeSmith PrcP@ sals. To do that would be to condone apartheid and iiS spread and to face the prospect of admitting Yet another apartheid-ridden State into the ranks of this Gr!ganizanon* 68. Consistency forbids us to envisage the admission of another legalized racist State such as Southern Rhodesia would be. We should hold firm to the principle of NIBMAR-no independence before majority rule-renew our dedication to the brave freedom-fighters of Zimbabwe, and mobilize support both moral and material for their legitimate struggle. However long and arduous the road, our commitment, as a world Organization, is not to the weak and self-seeking Government of the United Kingdom, which is undoubtedly anxious to scuttle Rhodesian freedom on any terms, but to the true independence of Zimbabwe in accordance with the ideals of the United Nations. 76. Resolution 217 (1965) of the Security Council, recognizing that the United Kingdom as the administering Power, considered the unilateral declaration of independence as an act of rebellion, reaffirmed its resolution 216 (196S), condemned the ‘unilateral declaration of independence, called upon all States not to recognize Smith’s illegal racist minority r&irne; reaffirmed General AsssmbIy resolution 1514 (XV) on the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, called on Britain to quell the rebellion of the racist minority; called on the British Government to take all other appropriate measures which would prove effective in eliminating the authority of the usurpers, also called upon the British Government to take immediate measures in order to allow the people of Southern Rhodesia to determine their own future consistent with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and called upon the Organization of African Unity to do all in its power to assist in the implementation of the present resolution, in conformity with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations.

I thank the representative of Ghana for the kind remarks which he addressed to me. 70. I invite the representative of Kenya to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement,

Mr. President, permit me to thank you and the members of the Council for allowing me to participate in this debate on a subject of vital concern to Africa and to my country. Under your able and distinguished guidance, as a true son of Africa and as representative of a country that for long has been anxious about the future of Africans in Southern Rhodesia, my delegation is confident that, with the support of the Council, you will steer this debate to a successful conclusion , 77. Security Council resolution 232 (1966) recognized the United Kingdom as the administering Power and, among other things, reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence in accsrdance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1.514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and recognized the legitimacy of their struggle to secure enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. 72. Before taking part in the debate may I, on behalf of my delegation, express Kenya’s satisfaction at seeing representatives of the People’s Republic of China assume their rightful place in this august Council? 73. During his speech in the Security Council last Thursday, 25 November, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, Sir Colin Crowe, set out the terms that have since been distributed as a White Paper entitled “Rhodesia: Proposals for a Settlement” which were accepted yesterday by the British Parliament. He described the Douglas-Home-Smith agreement at Salisbury as an “honourable solution” to the problems of Southern Rhodesia . 78. Security Council resolution 2.53 (1968) of 29 May 1968 reaffirmed all previous resolutions, reading in part as follows: “‘Affirming the primary responsibility of the United Kingdom to enable the people of Southern Rhodesia to achieve self-determination and independence , . . 74. The Kenya Government considers that the proposals contained in the White Paper are not only totally unacceptable, but that they constitute a shameful betrayal of the people of Zimbabwe and a flagrant violation of resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly and of the principles and obligations of the Charter of the United Nations. “Recognizing the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Southern Rhodesia to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, “Reuffirming its determination that the present situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security, 75. Although Sir Colin Crowe took pains to excuse the refusal of the British Government to topple the illegal racist minority regime at Salisbury by force, my delegation is “Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, “ . . . 79. As late as 18 March 1970, this Council, in its resolution 277 (1970), noted with grave concern that: “the situation in Southern Rhodesia continues to deteriorate as a result of the introduction by the illegal regime of new measures, including the purported assumption of republican status, aimed at repressing the African people in violation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). . . “Reaffirming that the present situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security, ‘Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, “1. Condemns the illegal proclamation of republican status . . . by the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia;“. It called upon Member States not to recognize the illegal r&ime, and urged the British Government, as the administering Power, to discharge its responsibility to enable the .people of Zimbabwe to exercise their right to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and urged Member States “to increase moral and material assistance to the people of Southern Rhodesia in their . . . struggle to achieve freedom and independence”, 80. All Security Council resolutions on Southern Rhodesia-from resolution 216 (1965) of 12 November 1965 right up to resolution 277 (1970) of 18 March 1970-were voluntarily and affirmatively endorsed by the British Government and, under Article 25 of the United Nations Charter, must be held to be binding on the United Kingdom. If the United Kingdom had chosen not to be bound by any of those resolutions the remedy was simple: it could have vetoed them and they would not have come down to US as Security Council resolutions. 81, I have not referred to the relevant General Assembly resolutions, which are in fact more far-reaching than the Security Council resolutions. These are also interesting and leave no doubt in anybody’s mind what the world community and nations think about Southern Rhodesia. Read along with Security Council resolutions, they have consistently maintained the following principles: (a) That Smith’s regime is illegal and that Member States should not recognize it or have any dealings with it; (b) That the people of Zimbabwe have an inalienable right to self-determination and independence, on the basis of one man, dne vote, now and not in the vague, undetermined future; (d/ That Britain, having brought about the existing situation in Southern Rhodesia, has a duty and responsibility-in temls of Security Council resolution 217 (1965), which has never been rescinded, and all the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions-to eliminate the authority of the usurpers and to take immediate measures to allow the people of Southern Rhodesia to determine their own future, in accordance with the terms of the Charter of the United Nations and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). 82. The secret negotiations between the emissaries of the British Government and the illegal racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia were held in total disregard of the wishes of the United Nations as expressed long ago in General Assembly resolution 2138 (XXI) of 22 October 1966, and as recently as 22 November 1971 in resolution 2769 (XXVI). The British Government could not have been in any doubt that what fts emissaries were doing was contrary to its obligation under the Charter of the United Nations. 83. The British Foreign Secretary, having decided-again, contrary to the wishes of the United Nations-to hold talks with the illegal racist minority rigime at Salisbury, must be left in no doubt whatsoever that the United Nations would not recognize any settlement not based on the principle of no independence before majority African rule, or concluded otherwise than with majority African nationalist leaders. 84. On those grounds, my delegation finds the terms of the so-called negotiated settlement unacceptable. As my Minister said on 26 November 1971, the acceptance of those terms by the Foreign Secretary constitutes “capitula. tion to the wishes of the rebel leaders”. I regard this as a privilege-if I may so call it-not accorded to any other rebel in British colonial history. 85. The objections of my Government to the proposals contained in the British White Paper-that is, Command Paper 4835-entitled “Rhodesia: Proposal for a Settlement” can be summarlzed as follows. 86. First, the negotiations, both secret and otherwise, between the British Government and the Southern Rhode- Sian rebels must be considered null and void, having been in violation of all relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. 87. Second, although the British Foreign Secretary received a delegation of Africans who put their views to him at Salisbury, and although he saw Mr. Joshua Nkomc and received a smuggled document from imprisoned Reverend Sithole, it cannot be held that there was the fullest consultation between the British Foreign Secretary and ati nationalist leaders within the terms of General Assembly resolution 2769 (XXVI). 89. Fourth, the socalled guarantees embodied in the proposals of the White Paper are illusory and worthless for the following reasons: (a) It is unrealistic to expect a European majority of two-thirds to be restrained from abrogating any provision of a constitution in the same manner in which unilateral independence was declared in 1965; (b) The proposed constitution does not guarantee the abolition of racial discrimination or the repeal of existing discriminatory legislation now or in the foreseeable future; 94. The Permanent Representative ofthe United Kingdom aho gave this Council the impression that, in deciding to capitulate to the traitor, Smith, the British Government was motivated by concern over the plight of the African people of Zimbabwe who, according to the British Government, do not know what is good for them. This pretended solicitude over the interests of Zimbabwe Africans by the British Government is an insult to the African people of Zimbabwe and to the intelligence of representatives in this Council. Instead of shedding crocodiletears at the prospect of Africans in Zimbabwe coming under the hated regime of apartheid, the British delegation should have been straightforward and admitted to the pressures of the ruling Conservative Party interest concerned with economic costs of sanctions to Britain. (c) The power to detain without trial is allowed in the proposed constitution, and that makes a mockery of the right of personal liberty and means that all or any opposition members can be detained; {d) The freedoms of assembly, association and expression are qualified by the so-called interests of defence, public safety and public order-of course, those will be determined by rebel Smith and his henchmen; (e] Freedom from arbitrary search or entry is also qualified by the so-called interests of defence, public safety and public order; and 95, The Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom tried to convince this Council that the terms of the Douglas-Home-Smith agreement were in conformity with the so-called five principles invented by the British. My delegation wishes to reaffirm most categorically that the Kenya Government rejects and has never accepted the five principles. In any case, my delegation maintains that the Douglas-Home proposals do not stand the test even of the five principles. (fl Forced or communal labour is retained under the pretext of “normal communal or other civic obligations”. 90. Since the Security Council recognizes the situation in Rhodesia as a threat to world peace and security, the British Government could easily have obtained access to Southern Rhodesia through the co-operation of Zambia and other African countries. Zambia has at all times expressed its readiness to make a base in its territory available for the use of any British forces on their way to Southern Rhodesia. The British Government, having refused to establish a physical presence in Southern Rhodesia, is not now in a position to ensure that the terms of any settlement will be implemented after sanctions have been lifted and the racist minority regime given independence. 96. I shall now turn to each of the so-called principles. The first principle relates to unimpeded progress towards majority rule. The socalled principle of progress towards majority rule is not satisfied by the Douglas-Home proposals. Progress in this connexion is so intertwined with so many checks and balances as well as delaying tactics that every impediment has been placed in the way of African majority rule. The voting system has been made unnecessarily complicated to ensure that parity between Africans and white Rhodesian members of the House of the Assembly is reached only after an arduous and lengthy process. According to the London Sunday lTmes of 28 November 1971, experts estimate that assuming the agreement is implemented in good faith by Smith and his gang, it may take 64 years or more to achieve only a small African majority. Even this estimate may be upset if Smith embarks on a large scale white immigration policy. The Douglas- Home-Smith proposals, therefore, cannot be regarded in any way as guaranteeing unimpeded progress towards majority rule and, having regard to all other circumstances, cannot be regarded as just or equitable. 91. Security Council resolution 217 (1965) and all relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions require the British Government to reestablish a physical presence in Southern Rhodesia. 92. My delegation, therefore, considers that the proposals contained in the White Paper not only violate, but have no bearing .whatsoever on, Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. As far as the question of whether the proposals meet the test of the so-called five principles is concerned, the views of my Government on these are Well known. And as the Security Council is aware, these so-called five principles are a unilateral creation of the 98. The third principle relates to the immediate improvement in African political status. The idea that the “settlement” provides for the immediate improvement of the African political status is an illusion. British propagandists use the so-called 1969 Constitution as a yardstick and yet the British Government got the Security Council in 1965 to declare that the world community did not recognize that illegal racist Smith rkgime and in 1969 the Security Council declared that it did not recognize Smith’s declaration of,a republic. How can an illegal act be used as a yardstick to measure anything? The fact is that there has been no change in the status of the African in Southern Rhodesia, His status still remains one of inferiority in his own country. He is still not trusted to decide as an individual what he wants or what is good for him. He is not considered civilized. The whole basis of the so-called settlement is that the African is not an equal of the European in dignity and worth and will never be in the foreseeable future. Yet the African, already unequal in political, administrative and economic terms, is expected to be nursed by his oppressor to acquire equality of status. Could anything be so remote when measured against reality? 99. I shall now take the fourth principle, progress towards ending racial discrimination. Unless possible marking time can be regarded as progress, there, is no$ing in the agreement which guarantees where even a start on the actual ending of discrimination will be made. In fact ‘the Land Tenure Act, which is ntanifestly discriminatory, is not to be repealed forthwith but will merely be reviewed by a commission whose recommendations will not be binding. The so-called bill of rights will not affect the existing administrative or legislative measures that are racially discriminatory. In fact, the proposed new section 84 B reads as follows: “No court shall declare any provision of an Act enacted or statutory instrument made before the futed date as defined in paragraph 14 of the Declaration of Rights to be uItra vires on the grounds that the provision is inconsistent with the provisions of the Declaration of Rights set out in Chapter VI of the Constitution of Rhodesia, 1961, or Chapter VII of the Constitution of Rhodesia, 1965, as the case may be.” “If the evidence-which will be fully, freely and fairly collected-is to the effect that the Rhodesian people as a whole do not accept these proposals, then they will have been made in vain” [1602nd meeting, para. 541. 101. The phrase “‘the Rhodesian people as a whole”, if it is meant to be a genuine test, should have read ‘acceptable to the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia” or “acceptable to the majority of all sections of the popula. tion of Southern Rhodesia” -under a referendum basedon one man, one vote. The Commission which it is proposed would look into the question of acceptability is virtdly given a mandate to sell the proposals to the people of Southern Rhodesia on the pretext of explaining them, This commission is in fact virtually being encouraged to ignore any views the British Government may find embarrassing. As the Nairobi newspaper Lily N&ion stated on 27 November 1971, “Let the agreement be put to the people in the country with ‘one man to one vote’ applied. White Rhodesians and the British Government know what the outcome of this would be and what they are really telling us right now is that they dread the verdict of the majority.” My delegation therefore submits that the so-called test of acceptability is but mere window-dressing to camouflage blackmail. 102. In today’s New York ZJ’mes Smith is reported to have said in a television interview that black Africans will not be in power in Rhodesia for at least 10 years and to have added that he believes they will not be fit to be in control. That was Smith’s attitude yesterday, and we have no reason to believe it has changed. As long as Smith holds power in Rhodesia the Africans do not stand a chance of ensuring their rights to govern the country. 103. I am sure the British Government is aware of this. In view of this, my delegation cannot avoid drawing the conclusion that the so-called settlement is nothing but a sell-out. 104. At the commencement of the debate my colleague Ambassador M&k of the USSR put forward the suggestion that the detained national leaders Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole be invited to appear before this Council to give evidence. I am happy to note that that suggestion has been accepted by the British delegation. My delegation hop@ that the arrival of these two nationalists will now be speeded up so that within the next week or so we can sit here and listen to them. 105. It is impossible for us to take comfort in the British White Paper and the arrangements the British have worked out with the rebel Smith. There is enough evidence to indicate that the so-called arrangements are merely a se&.% 5. That is what my delegation stands for and those are : views of my country. 113. On Tuesday, 16 November, he saw 10 members of African businessmen’s associations; 3 members of African teachers’ association; 5 African journalists; 7 from the Rhodesian Asian Association; 8 indirectly elected Members of Parliament-that is all of them; 6 from the National Association of Coloured Peoples; 4 from the medical profession; 2 from the National Peoples’ Union; 2 from the Christian Council of Rhodesia; 6 from the Centre Party; that is a total of 53 for Tuesday, the 16th.

I thank the representative of nya for the kind remarks he addressed to me. 3, Sir Colin CROWE (United Kingdom): As I menned this morning, I do not want to interrupt the broad :ep of this debate, still less to interrupt the expression of ws by other delegations on the agreed proposals and the newhat lengthy exposition I gave of them in the Council : week. I shall not at this stage, therefore, attempt to wer each and every point that has been raised so -even though some of them represent misunderstandings ich have been given currency but which have been rected elsewhere. The answers to some of them can in t already be found in the text of the proposals, and some Lers are unanswerable-for example, because they conn the very nature of the responsibilities which everyone ees are primarily a matter for the British Government. some points I still await information from my Governnt. But there are some questions I can answer now, and as the representative of Somalia suggested at the until’s meeting on 30 November [1603rd meeting], it uld help the debate to proceed, I can give one or two rifications, particularly about the test of acceptability, 114. On Wednesday, the 17th, he saw 2 from sport organizations; 2 from the University of Rhodesia; 4 exdetainees-Mr, Edison Sithole, Josiah Chinamo, Cephas Msipa, and Michael Maweme; 1 trade union representative; 3 from the African Student Board; 10 Senators; and 3 wives of detainees-Mrs. Stella Madzimbamute, Mrs. Nyandoro and Mrs. Mutasa, a total of 36 for that day. 115. On Friday, 19 November, he saw 7 citizens of Salisbury, including the President of the YWCA, the Chairman of the Harare,-which is a township-Advisory Board, a hostel director and business men. And on Saturday the 2Oth, he saw Mr. Joshua Nkomo for an hour and a half. That is a grand total of 97. 116. A further question was whether it was our intention to make available the written and other communications received during these contacts? The answer to that is no. These discussions were confidential and they did not constitute the test of acceptability. The range of opinions expressed in them was a wide one. It included at one extreme the view that Britain ought to have used force and that force was still the only answer. At the other extreme it included the views of some Europeans who said they wished to retain the right to use additional discrimination and to perpetuate minority rule. As the proposals show, Sir Alec Douglas-Home rejected each of these extreme views. But these opinions were submitted to Her Majesty’s Government and we could not make them individually available without the agreement of those who submitted them. The fact that some of the information found its way into the press obviously does not alter this, in the interests of the people concerned. 9. On the test of acceptability, the specific point raised Ambassador Farah in this connexion was whether it was firm intention of the United Kingdom Government to ahead with the test of acceptability. I confirm that this 0. 3. Then we were asked, “What if the answer to the test acceptability is ‘no’? ” What would we do if the test of :eptability demonstrated that the people of Rhodesia :cted the settlement? That, I am afraid, is a good ample of an unanswerable question, because we cannot ke commitments about hypothetical situations. I. We have also been asked ab0u.t the timing of the test acceptability. On that I can say that the Commission has :n appointed and has already started organizing itself :h a view to starting work in Rhodesia as soon as Gsible. The chairman, as I informed the Council last ek, is Lord Pearce. In answer to the representative of ana I can add that the two additional commissioners so named are Lord Harlech, who was known to many here ne years ago as Mr. Ormsby-Gore when he was Minister State in the Foreign Office, and Sir Maurice Dorman, a mer Governor-General of your own country, Mr. Presi- It I The commissioners will take whatever period of time :y need to do the job to their satisfaction, Their first task 117, Then the Ambassador of Burundi asked the question, which was subsequently repeated by others, whether there were any guarantees that the development funds to be provided by the British Government would in fact be used in accordance with the decisions contained in the agreement? The answer is that there will be comprehensive discussions with the Rhodesians about the development

In accordance with usual practice, may I be permitted to read a short statement? Although comment has already been made on it by the representative of the United Kingdom, perhaps other representatives may wish to say something now-or perhaps wait until after consultation. But may I crave the Council’s indulgence to read this statement: “Members of the Council will recall that in the course of his statement made earlier this morning the representative of Somalia proposed that the Declaration of Rights contained in the United Kingdom White Paper on Rhodesia be referred to the Legal Counsel of the United Nations for examination and evaluation as to whether the provisions of the Declaration of Rights are fair and equitable and provide those safeguards necessary for preserving human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis for all the inhabitants of the Territory, regardless of race and colour, and whether those provisions compare favourably with the standards set in this field by the United Nations. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic supported this application,” Unless representatives wish to speak further on this statement, may I suggest that an adjournment be taken to allow for further consultation before another meeting some time next week? 121. I have still not received a reply. I should like to reiterate that proposal and return once again to the question: it would be very important to the Security Council to be aware of the contents of those memoranda in order that it should have an idea of the opinion which the representatives of two Southern Rhodesian political parties which are well known throughout the world have of ihc Smith-Home agreement. 122. The reference to the fact that the British side is unable to do this does not convince the Security Council. If such documents exist, why does the British side consider it possible to present to the Security Council, in both spoken and written form, documents signed by Home and Smith, and why should the memoranda presented to Home by the representatives of Southern Rhodesian parties be concealed from the Security Council and remain secret? Such an approach to the consideration of such an important problem in the Security Council cannot be regarded as normal. For that reason, I, for my part, insist that the British side should reflect once again on this problem and not leave the Security Council in ignorance.

If the representative of the Soviet Union had listened to what I had to say, I did in fact arswer the question and gave the reasons why these memoranda cannot be made available. But I shall not weary the Council by repeating what I said.

I should like to thank the representative of the United Kingdom for the information which he has imparted to the Council. I must confess that I am not happy with the information which he has given us. 1 would have felt that in an exercise of this dimension the very least that the British Government could do would be to let the people of Southern Rhodesia know the altewatives, so that they would know what to do. If they S&Y “yes”, the White Paper clearly sets out the course they wilt travel. But if they say “no”, then naturally the United Kingdom should be in a position to let them know what the Government would decide to do then. 125. I trust that the United Kingdom Government will, in due course perhaps, ponder a little further on this point and not proceed with what appears to my delegation to be indecent haste, in trying to get this test of acceptability launched without effecting and implementing the necessary preparations for such an important exercise. One would have thought that if a Government had decided to send a commission of this importance to a Territory with such crucial and delicate problems, it would have set a time.tabla for its work. 13 1. The PRESIDENT: There are no more names on the list of speakers. Unless some other representative wishes to speak at this stage, I propose to adjourn the meeting.

Mr. President, you did refer to my proposal and you mentioned that the representative of Syria had supported it. I am wondering whether, if there is no serious objection to it, we could consider it acceptable. 127. As I pointed out this morning, it would be wrong to think that a commission composed entirely of expatriates, without a knowledge of the language of the people of the Territory, could be expected to perform, in a matter of weeks, or maybe two months or three months at the most, the task of trying to explain a paper to an illiterate population of 5 million persons scattered over a large area, predominantly rural, or to think that it would be able to acquit its task properly without the aid of the recognized political leaders of the Territory.

Does any other member of the Council wish to comment on that question at this stage?

Mr. President, I thought you had suggested that there was going to be an adjournment, that we were going to consult about this. I shall have to get instructions from my Government on this matter. 128. I would have thought that it would be possible for the representative of the United Kingdom to let us know exactly what part will be played by the African political Ieaders of Southern Rhodesia, those who are currently interned or prevented by law from contacting their own people.

Naturally, we proceed by consultations, and my delegation would have no objection to that course of action on this particular proposal. However, in view of the haste with which the United Kingdom Government intends to dispatch this commission to Rhodesia, I hope that the consultations will not be unduly prolonged, nor that the Oftlce of Legal Affairs of the United Nations will find itself unable to conduct such an assessment before the test of acceptability is actually under way. 129. The representative of the United Kingdom spoke about my proposal of an examination of the declaration of rights or bill of rights, whatever one calls it. Rather than have 15 different assessments of the paper, I suggest that the legal experts of the United Nations-in whom all of us have the greatest confidence-should be asked to perform this task on our behalf, so at least we will have an idea as to how badly or how well the provisions of the bill of rights compare to the standards which the United Kingdom has been trying to enunciate and which, indeed, have found expression in the Constitutions of many countries since the acceptance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In the circumstances, I would propose to hold the usual consultations with representatives without delay in order to ascertain their view. After the usual consultations, it appears that there is no objection to our holding the next meeting on Monday next, 6 December, at 3.30 p.m. I30, But in this case, the position is unique, because we are dealing now with a problem placed within a framework l’he meeting roxe at 6.20 p.m. HOW TO OBTAlN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Notions, Sales Section, New York or Geneva. COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES Ler publications des Nations Unies sent en vente dons ler librairier et ler agencsr deporitaires du monde entier. loformer.vous aupres de votre librairie ou adresrez-vour 8: Nations Unier, Section des ventes, New York ou Geneve. KAK llOJlYL(IITb MSfiAHMFl OPTAHM3A4HW OKbE#lHEHHblX HAqHti ~h~illiilJI oj~ri~lllWll[ll~ bhl'~IIllCllIlldS IkiI[lIfi ~IOXillO IiYlJIlTh I3 1illlI;iillldS WlraJllllaX II :Il'CIITl'TltaS 110 N'L'S pAilOllaS Wlpa. IIallOXnTC Ulpalllill 06 ll:l~allIlJlX ll IlaUIPII lillllilillOM raramlc ml IIIIUI~IT~ 110 n~prcy : Oprallnaaqw 0+be~n11c111lli~s IIal~llil, Cwiwiti no npo~axic rlo,3,allnir, IIbdIop mn SKellena. COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS Las publicocioner de las Naciones Unidor estdn en vento en libreriar y cosos distriboidoros en todor partes del mundo. Conrulte a su librero o dirfjose o: Nociones Unidos, Section de Ventor, Nuevo York o Ginebro. Litho in United Nations, New York Price: $U.S. l.OO,(or equivalent in other currencies) 35214-October 1973-350