S/PV.1622 Security Council

Before calling on the first speaker, I wish to draw the attention of the Council to a note by the President of the Security Council which appears in document S/10470, dated 23 December 1971.

As members are aware, the question of Rhodesia was under active consideration by the Security Council in the days preceding the India-Pakistan conflict, but the question was overshadowed by the crisis on the Indian subcontinent. My delegation has asked the Council to resume consideration of the Rhodesian question at the present time rather than in January, as some members had suggested, because we understand from reports in the press that the Commission to carry out the test of acceptability of the proposed changes in the Rhodesian Constitution will be leaving shortly for Rhodesia. These reports have not been denied by the United Kingdom delegation, and we must presume that they are true. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia: L&ter dated 2; November 1971 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/l 0396); Fourth report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/10229 and Add.1 and 2);” Interim report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1368) (S/10408) 5. Obviously it is important that the Security Council, which has a direct involvement in the Rhodesian question, should make clear its view of recent developments in that country before the United Kingdom Government begins to implement the terms of settlement that have been worked out with the Smith rCgime [S/l 0405]. 1 6. My delegation, therefore, has taken the initiative in drawing up a working paper which we hope can form a basis for a resolution expressing the Council’s stand on a problem which is one of its gravest concerns and responsibilities. There has now been time for a careful and detailed examination of the agreement which has been

In accordance with the decisions taken previously by the Council [1602nd, 1603rd and 2604th meetin&, I invite the representatives of Saudi Arabia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia --- 7. We do not believe that there can be any satisfactory replies for the simple reason that the agreement fulfils neither the conditions for a just settlement, demanded by the United Nations, nor those to which the British Government had declared itself committed in the so-called five principles. My delegation, therefore, believes that the Security Council must express, in strong and unequivocal terms, its view that the agreement is not merely an unsatisfactory compromise but is irrelevant to the just aspirations of the African people of Southern Rhodesia. 8. The working paper which my delegation has drawn up has already been circulated to delegations, but I take this opportunity to introduce the paper officially so that it may go into the record. The working paper takes the form of an informal draft resolution and reads as follows: “The Security Council, ‘Having considered the ‘proposals for a. settlement’ agreed upon by the Government of the United Kingdom and the rebel regime in Southern Rhodesia on the political and constitutional future of the Territory, ‘%raving noted that these proposals were not. negotiated in consultation with the accredited political leaders of the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia, “Taking note of General Assembly resolution 2877 (XXVI), “Reaffirming Security Council resolution 288 (1970) of 17 November 1970, and in particular its paragraph 2 in which the Council called upon ‘the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as the administering Power, in the discharge of its responsibility, to take urgent: and effective measures to bring to an end the illegal rebellion in Southern Rhodesia and enable the people to exercise their right to self-determination, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 15 14 (XV) of 14 December 1960’, “A4irzdfuZ of the conditions necessary to permit the free expression of the right to self-determination, ‘Recalling Security Council resolution 202 (1965) of 6 May 196s which endorsed the request of the General Assembly, addressed to the United Kingdom, to obtain: “(a) The release of all political prisoners, detainees and restrictees, “Recognizing, without prejudice to the primary role of the administering Power, the special responsibilities of the United Nations towards the people of Southern Rhodesia in securing their inalienable rights, “1. Decides that the teims of these proposals do not fulfil the conditions necessary to ensure that all the people of Southern Rhodesia would be able to exercise freely and equally their right to self-determination; “2. Rejects the ‘proposals for a settlement’ as they do not recognize the inalienable rights of the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia; “3. Considers that the principle of universal adult suffrage for the people of Southern Rhodesia without regard to colour OK race must be the basis for any constitutional and political aKra.tIgementS for the Territo1y; “4. Urges the United Kingdom, pursuant to para. graph 3 above, not to accord any form of recognition to an independent State of Southern Rhodesia which isnot based on majority rule or on the will of the majority as determined by universal adult suffrage; “5. CWS upon the United Kingdom to ensure that in any exercise to ascertain the wishes of the people of Southern Rhodesia as to their political future, IlIe procedure to be followed will be by secret referendum on the basis of one man, one vote, without regard to race or colour OK to educational, property or income consid. erations; “6. Further caZZs upon the United Kingdom to facili. tate the participation of a United Nations team of observers during the preparation for, and in the actual conduct of, any exercise to ascertain the wishes of the people of Southern Rhodesia as to their political future; “7. Decides to continue with the imposition of polit. icd, diplomatic and economic sanctions on Southern Rhodesia until the rebellious regime in that territory is brought to an end; “8. Requests the Government of the United Kingdom not to transfer under any circumstances to its colony of Southern Rhodesia, as at present governed, any of the powers OK attributes of sovereignty, but to promote the country’s attainment of independence by a democrntic system of Government in accordance with the aspirations of the majority of the population.” 9. 1 ask members to consider first the second preambuhr paragraph of the working paper, which notes that the proposals were not negotiated in consultation with the know, however, from the memorandum smuggled out by Mr. Sithole and the clandestine interview held by Mr. Nkomo with a journalist from the London newspaper me Obwver, accounts of which have appeared in the press in many countries, that both these leaders have rejected the agreement, stand by their demand for immediate majority rule and continue to insist that there should be no independence before majority rule. 16. 77ze Times of London of 22 December quotes the Agence France Presse on a report being privately circulated in Rhodesia, which will be made available to the Pearce Commission. The report describes official pressure on African chiefs to accept the agreement and the intimidation of Africans by policemen where the question of organizing meetings to discuss the terms of the proposal is concerned. 10. Mr. Nkomo echoed the views of several other African nationalist leaders in exile when he said that there could be no settlement of the Rhodesian problem when it involved only discussions between two groups of white people, and that since Africans were not invited to the conference table, the settlement could not be anything else but a sell-out. 11. My delegation submits that the validity of the agreement is immediately undermined by the fact that it is not an agreement between the British Government and the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia, but an agreement between the British Government and the rebel white minority r6gime. 17. My delegation is not suggesting that every newspaper report can be taken as a firm source of proof, but the fact remains that neither the climate nor the conditions which might prevent such occurrences have been changed. 18. The last preambular paragraph of the working paper recognizes the special responsibilities of the United Nations towards the people of Southern Rhodesia in securing t%eir inalienable rights. The United Nations has long accepted its responsibilities towards Southern Rhodesia, as it has done in the case of other colonial Territories. Those responsibilities stem from the Charter and are spelled out in greater detail in three resolutions of the General Assembly: resolution 1514 (XV), on the granting of self-determination to colonial countries and peoples; resolution 2734 (XXV), on the strengthening of international security and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations [resolution 2625 (XXV)l. 12. The third, fourth, fifth and sixth preambular paragraphs of the working paper all concern positions of principle which the United Nations has taken with regard to the situation in Southern Rhodesia. The General Assembly, for example, uncompromisingly rejected the proposed agreement during the recently concluded twenty-sixth Session, on the ground that there should be no independence before majority rule [resolution 2377 (XXVI)J. Certainly, the agreement is not in accord with Security Council resolution 288 (1970) of November 1970 which gained the unanimous approval of this Council, including the approval of the delegation of the United Kingdom. The agreement does not have the effect of bringing to an end the illegal rebellion in Southern Rhodesia, as that resolution called on the United Kingdom Government to do, and it does not enable the people of Southern Rhodesia to exercise their right to self-determination, in accordance with the Charter and in conformity with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1.514 (XV). 19. The active involvement of the Security Council began, of course, in 1965, when the administering Power, the United Kingdom, itself called for international action to help it put down the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia. The involvement of the international community in the question entailed considerable economic sacrifice for some countries. l3ut there was more at stake than helping an administering Power to maintain order, Various principles the United Nations is committt?d to upholding were at stake; the fundamental human rights of five million people were at stake. 13. The United Nations has also made specific commitmen ts with regard to the establishment of conditions for the free expression of the will of the people. As far back as May 1965 this Council, in its resolution 202 (1965), recognized that the first step towards the re-establishment of normal political conditions would he the release of political prisoners and detainees, the repeal of all repressive and discriminatory legislation and the removal of all resfrictions on political activity. 20. With those facts in mind we must ask ourselves whether the terms of settlement have vindicated the pogiition taken by the international community at the request of the administering Power and whether they protect and promote the rights of the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia. These questions lead us to the operative part of the working paper. 14. These conditions have not been established. Popular leaders of the people are still detained for political reasons, or have been removed from the political scene and sent to prison on trumped-up charges, and the main African 22. Operative paragraph 3 brings us to the heart of the matter because it sets forth the basis for the practical expression of the principles relevant to the Rhodesian situation, That basis is universal adult suffrage for the people of Southern Rhodesia without regard to colour and race. “One man. one vote’: is a principle we accept as a norm for ourselves. Are we prepared to deny that principle to others? 23. During the last thirty years more than forty countries which were formerly dependencies of colonial Powers seated at this table, including the United Kingdom, have been brought to independence on the basis of majority rule, on the basis of “one man, one vote”. One may well ask, “Why the difference in Rho&sia? ” The answer is, of course, tha 1. in Rhodesia there i:: a ra(..ist lninvtity which insists on maintaining its power and privileges, and the administering Power has not chosen to exercise to the fullest either its moral or its practic:ll authority. That is a path the United Nations must not tbllow. 24. The United Kingdom has reneged even on its moderate goal of unimpeded progress towards majority rule. By no stretch of the imagination can ,the agreement be said to provide such progre!:s. My delegation has already commented on the educational and economic hurdles that have been set up on tltc obstacle course to majority rule. I should like at this point to comment on a purely political aspect of the proprlqed arrangement which illustrates its fundamental dislions:sty It is contended that political parity brtweofl bla& and white will he reached when there are 50 !il:~:k ,~ntI $0 white Members of l’arliament in Rhodesia. %I! i’!:.,: 5 not the case. When there are 50 African McLrlbers, only 26 of those will be popularly elected Memhr~ : a:ld !.hrt others will be appointed African Members. Whenever the term “parity” is used, the fact is conveniently ignored that almost ha1.r “he African Members will be nominees who tlepcnd on the white minority regime for tlicir position and must therefore be considered as under settler control, The so-called parity is more likely to represent 26 African votes and 74 white or white-controlled votes. 25. But the most fundamenta1 defect of the proposal, and perhaps its most dishonest aspect, lies in its deliberate postponement of majority ruIe for an indeterminate period. 26. The time-scale of the proposal has been analysed by Dr. Claire Palley, a professor of politics at Queens University, Belfast, and the analysis was pubIished in detail in The Stlndav Times of 28 November 1971. After an exhaustive 27. The United Nations cannot renege on its undertaking, an undertaking spelled out in various resolutions of both the General Assembly and the Security CounciI, to make every effort to bring about majority rule in Soufhem Rhodesia, so that all the people of the Territory may have the opportanity to benefit from its resources and to p]a~ their part in determining its future. 28. Operative paragraph 4 of the working paper recognizes and seeks to uphold the principle of “no independenec wjthout nlajori ty rule:“. ‘rhis is a c,ardinal principle of t]le political leaders of the Afric;rn majority in Southern Rhodesia; it is a principle which has the unanimous support of the Organization of African Unity; and it formed the basis for the General Assembly resolution on Rhodesia of 22 November, which was adopted by a vote of 102 it1 favour [resolution 2769 (XXVI)]. Why is this principle so important to all who seriously seek a just solution to tile Rhodesian problem? It is important because without t&s principle there is a grave danger of the entrenchment of the political, economic and social disabilities of the African majority. In the view of my delegation, that danger has been brought a step nearer by the proposed agreement between the British Government and the Smith rkgime. To grant independence to Soutbcrn Rhodesia while it is still under the control of the racist minority regime and while the African majority is still denied its rightful place in the life of the country is to play into the hands of the rebels and to betray the African majority. In a recent letter to Lie Observa; the distinguished predecessor of the current permanent representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Caradon, whose wide and varied experience of colonial situations cannnt be questioned, deplored ‘I I . . proposals by which the Smith regime woutd wia the permanent prize of independence and freedom of action by an expenditure of minimum concessions, aad by which the Africans, after many decades still in the political wilderness, would, if they ever emerged from it, be saddled for ever with a weighted, divisive and undemocratic constitution”. 29. In the view of my delegation, the United Nations cannot approve of a settlement which would allow the rebel : regime to remove itself completely from the authority of the administering Power and legalize its existence, while there is no safeguard for the rights of the African majority beyond the hope that the white minority will change its racism overnight. The only safeguard for the rights of the African majority is for that majority to be able to exercise immediately the political power which is its due. As matters stand, the political rights of the African majority can be postponed indefinitely and racial discrimination can con, tinue to operate-as it does in the voting arrangements, in the Land Tenure Act, and in other facets of Rhodesian lirt: ,-lvitit no more effective checks than the recommenda. tions of ;+ commission which the Smith rigime is at liberty 34. In an earlier statement on the Rhodesian question /160&h meeting] my delegation called on the United Kingdom Government to continue to act in concert with the world community and on the basis of the objectives established by this Organization; to continue to apply the force of moral, political and economic pressure agaiIlst the rebel regime; and to remain committed to the proposition that the only sure guarantee of justice for the African people of Southern Rhodesia lies in their being able to control their destiny through the full exercise of their political and human rights. My delegation repcats that call and hopes that other Member States will join with us in our appeal. 3 1. Operative paragraph 6 is the practical expression of the preambular paragraph of the working paper, which ernphasizes the responsibilities and the obligations of the tl&ed Nations towards the Territory and people of Southern Rhodesia. My delegation does not believe that the Urlited Kingdom can, with propriety, call on the United Nations for assistance on the Rhodesian question at one time and ignore the involvement of the United Nations in this problem when it chooses to do so. Certainly the presence and the co-operation of the United Nations ensured, in many colonial situations, that just and impartial exercises to ascertain the wishes of former colonial peoples were carried out, and it seems important to my delegation tllat the United Nations should establish at this time both its interest and its duty to participate in any such exercise. 35. Finally, my delegation w&d note that the yuestion of the repeal or continuation of sanctions is one that depends not on the outcome of the arrangements agreed upon between the British Government and the rebel regime but on the decision of the Security Council, arrived at aftcl’ due consideration of the best interests of all the people of Southern Rhodesia. 36. It is in these words and in this spirit that my delegation trusts that the working paper, which it has had the privilege of introducing and explaining, will be conddered by all delegations and that as a result of consultations to be carried on during the remainder of this day it will be possible for a draft resolution to be officially submitted tomorrow morning so that the Council can act upon it before the close of this year and before the Commission leaves London for Southern Rhodesia. 32. I: had been claimed by the Government of the United Kingdom that the proposals we are now discussing are the best that could be obtained under the circumstances and are a reflection of the realities of the situation. The realities which the Somali Government recognizes were clearly described in its policy st.atement on Southern Rhodesia adopted earlier this month. The Government of the Somali Democratic Republic has rejected the so.called settlement because it does not entail any fundamental retreat from the provisions of the racist 1969 Constitution of the rebel regime; because the cardinal principle of “no independence before majority rule” has been ignored; because in the absence of a referendum for ascertaining the aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe, the so-called acceptability test would be meaningless; because the implementation of the terms of settlement, bad as they are, is left to the goodwill of the Smith rBgime, which has already demonstrated its disregard for human rights and international public opinion; because the terms of the settlement were concluded behind the backs of the African population and their legitimate representatives; and finally, because the British Government, in accommodating the rebel rigirne, is seeking a face-saving means of lifting sanctions and conferring legal independence on the minority regime, in defiance of the IJnj ted Nations, the Orgsnization of African Unity, world

The delegation of Argentina has followed with the greatest interest the consideration of item 2 (n) of our agenda for today, which is directly related to a serious problem that the United Nations has faced for some time. 38. The question of Southern Rhodesia has been the subject of prolonged and intense debates in this Council and in the General Assembly which have been reflected in resolutions intended to find a way for a just outcome for the people of Zimbabwe, within the framework of the statute of our 0rg:mization. This very Council decided to establish a Committee to supervise the implementation of the sanctions imposed on the illegal regime of Ian Smith, being confident that that procedure would lead to a correct solution. 39. Argentina has at all times supported action by the Organization in this field. We have endeavoured to COoperate within the margin of our possibilities in this joint endeavour. Our endeavour ever since we have had a seat on the Council has been marked by the desire to obtain ‘Renjfirnzing the primary responsibility of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to enable the people of Southern Rhodesia to achieve self-determination and independence, and in particular their responsibility of bringing the illegal declaration of independence to an end.” 40. We therefore acknowledged and welcomed the attitude of the United Kingdom in informing this Council about the talks held in Salisbury. We believe that the burden of that difficult responsibility has been an important motive in inducing that Government to seek a negotiated solution which would allow it to settle the difficult and reprehensible situation created by the illegal rdgime of Ian Smith. 41. We believe that action should be assessed in the light of the thinking expressed by Sir Coin Crowe in his statement on 25 November last. The representative of the United Kingdom said at .&at time: “We are therefore for the present and perhaps for the next few months confronted only with a hypothesis. If the evidence-which will be fully, freely and fairly collected-is to the effect that the Rhodesian people as a whole do not accept these proposals, then they will have been made in vain. If it is found that they do accept them, then we shall be able to press ahead with the appropriate fegislation and with making them work. It is only at that stage and when the British Government is fully satisfied that the Rhodesian Government has enacted the necessary legislation and taken the necessary steps to give effect to the proposals that the final section of the proposals, which envisages the conferring of legal independence upon Rhodesia and the lifting of sanctions, Will come into effect.” [1602FZd meeting, para. 54.J 42. Thus it is clear that the United Kingdom has taken the decision not to impose a settlement on the population of Southern Rhodesia. For that wish to be duly fulfilled, we believe that when the time comes, special consideration should be given to the machinery which has been called “the test of acceptability”, and to which the representative of the United Kingdom referred in his statement. 43. But what is more, in that sLame statement from which I have already quoted, Sir Colin Crowe assured us that until the assent of the people of Zimbabwe is obtained, freely and with proof, “ . . . the situation will remain exactly as it is now. No legislation will be required or will be undertaken by my Government and all existing measures will remain in force.” [Ibid., paru. S.S.] 45. Reports on the subject are fragmentary and conflicting. Some consider they have real negative effect; others, on the contrary, feel they not only have not caused the regime any damage, but have acted as spurs to new local industries. If the sanctions are really a source of difficulty to the illegal Salisbury regime, it is our duty to persist in standing firm on that course until terms are reached w&lb are absolutely fair to the overwhelming African majority in Southern Rhodesia. 46. In regard to some parts of the agreement, my delegation wishes at this stage in the debate to place on record two fundamental objections. The system of voting and rapresentation, so carefully elaborated in this instrument, is, as we understand it, a reason for justified criticisms. We believe in the equality of man, whatever his creed, race or economic or social condition. That equality must be reflected with pristine clarity in any system which aspires to an integral and equal representation. All must have the same right to vote. 47. Secondly, the clauses of the agreement described to us by Sir Colin Crowe make us lose our sense of time. Decades would have to elapse before the allegorical ship mentioned by the United Kingdom representative reached a safe harbour. 48. Having said that, we would also wish to add that we can well understand the obstacles encountered by the British Government and the good intentions which have inspired it. 49. I should like to end by pointing out that for Argentina a country’s independence is strengthened when, among other factors, the entire population enjoys the same rights. We hope that time will come in the near future for the people of Zimbabwe and for all the inhabftants of Southern Rhodesia, in a peaceful fashion. In this connexion it is fitting to recall the contents of the fifth principle formulated by the Government of the United Kingdom [see S/.ZO40.5/ in relation to a possible solution of the Rhodesian problem, when it declares that any basis proposed for independence of the Territory must be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. In brief, independence must be our final objective, but in seeking it we must never forget the conditions of equality which its real achievement implies. 5 1. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) lfiQl?slRtion from Russian): Mr. President, the USSR delegation would like to draw the attention of the members of the SecllritY Council to document S/10470 of 23 December. We are referring to your note concerning the imple- IllentatiOn of the Security Council decision to invite two outstanding Southern Rhodesian political leaders, Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole, to the meetings of the Council. 52. At the beginning of this month, on 2 December 11604th lneeting], the Security Council adopted a correct and sensible decision to invite the leaders of the ZAPU and ZANU parties, Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole, to its meetings So that the Council mould hear them and obtain from them information concerning the true state of affairs in Southern Wodesia and their appraisal of the Home-Smith agreements. 53. At the last Council meeting on the question of Southern Rhodesia /I 609th meeting], the USSR delegation raised the issue of the need for speedier compliance with that Council decision and requested information on what Irnd been done by the administering Power, the United Kingdom, to implement that Council decision, 54. AS shown by the note by the President of the Security ~OUIIC~~, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom did not reply to the President of the Council until ttlree weeks after the Council had adopted the decision. In iris official letter on the question, his official statement was, in essence, that the United Kingdom Government would 11ot take any steps whatsoever to ensure compliance with tllat decision of the Security Council, 58. At the international political level, the issue is precisely this: either the United Kingdom Government is making common cause with the Southern Rhodesian racists and is at one with them on this question, in which case, its actions are understandable and their political colouration is fuIly obvious. If this is so, then it is naked, undisguised colonialism and imperialism. Or the United Kingdom Government is able and ready to take even one small realistic step in the interests of the people of Zimbabwe, who are being oppressed by the racists, in which case it is obliged to make it possible for the two Southern Rhodesian political leaders to come to New York to take part in the Council’s debate on the question of Southern Rhodesia. The Council is entitled to put the question precisely in those terms to the United Kingdom Government and to insist, in this connexion, on the adoption of measures and on a definite answer by the United Kingdom representative in the Council. 55. To justify that refusal, an exceedingly strange argurrlent is used in the letter. It is, in fact, not even an argument but a p’urely formal answer and sounds like a mockery of the Security Council decision. The letter states tIlat Mr, Nkomo is in detention and Mr. Sithole is serving a E>rison sentence in Southern Rhodesia. But that is not an argument; it is simply a statement of the well-known scandalous facts concerning the lawlessness and racist and terrorist arbitrariness with regard to those two political leaders of the Zimbabwe people. 59. In connexion with the consideration of the question of Southern Rhodesia and in the interests of a fuller and more comprehensive examination of the question, the Security Council can also not ignore the following circumstance. It was proposed to the United Kingdom representative in a very clear fashion that he should submit to the Security Council the documents which the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, had received from the leaders of the African parties and political groups in Southern Rhodesia and, in particular, the documents which. he had received for Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole, as the two best-known and most prominent political leaders of 56. However, the Security Council did not ask the Government of the United Kingdom where Messrs. Nkomo rind SithOle are at present-in prison or free. The Council requested the United Kingdom Government to take the rlecessary steps to ensure compliance with its decision so thnt Mr. NkomO and Mr. Sithole would be able to Come to New York, t0 the Headquarters of the United Nations, and s~ tliat the Security Council would be able to hear those two well-known political leaders of Southern Rhodesia at its meetings. In this case, it was the Council’s decision wllicll was the essence of the request to the United Kingdom Government; it was not a request that the Council 60. The Security Council must ensure that these political leaders of the Zimbabwe people have an opportunity to speak here, in the Security Council. It must also ensure that the documents which were submitted by those two political leaders to the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Home, come to light and are submitted to the Security Council, too. Only in such a way can the Security Council have a full and comprehensive picture of the events taking place in Southern Rhod.esia and also a-good idea of the substance of the Home-Smith agreement. Otherwise, the Council will be considering this question only in the light of the one-sided British information, agreed upon with the leader of the southern African racists, Ian Smith. 61. In conclusion, the Soviet delegation considers it necessary to stress that the Security Council must demand that the United Kingdom respect the decisions of the Council and comply with them with regard to the invitation 63. In such hours, when men under the weight of titnc look at human problems such as the problem we are considering, they do so in prospect and retrospect. Thus, looking at the problem of Southern Rhodesia as the year comes to an end and the memories of the twenty-sixlth session of the General Assembly are still living with us, we cannot but underline the fact that the problem with which we are dealing within the context of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly is not and has not been an isolated one. Specifically I am referring to the agreemen; that was concluded between the United Kingdom Govern. ment and the rebellious rigime of Ian Smith. I say so because, if we look back at the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, we shall notice that, besides that fact, there have been other similar grave facts of which, 1 ant sure, all the members of this Collncil are aware. Besides the agreement with Ian Smith, there was the Ming of the embargo on the import of chrome from Southern Rhodesia by the United States Government. There was the occupation of three Arab islands in the Arabian peninsttla bb force. Finally, while the Middle East was debated in thi General Assembly the United States Government gave to its Slst State, Israel, over $500 million and a further number of Skyhawk offensive aircraft, in order to perpetuate the Israeli occupation of Arab lands. 64. There were other great tragedies to which I do 1101 want to refer but of which I am sure all the members are fully aware. In a word--and here I am speaking within tn~ limited experience and departing for a little while frorl+ the routine statements to which we are used--the twenty-sisth session of the General Assembly has been charactcrized bv the defiance of right and of the principles of the Charter 6 an unprecedented manner while the General Assembly was meeting. Is that accidental, I ask? Certainly not; but sure;\ the question remains there for future historians, polit&l analysts and students of political science to answer. 65. The working paper submitted to us during this meeting by the representative of Somalia, who so far has distinguished his career and himself by a very gcnuinc arrd d.edicated stand for the rights of people and the right of self-determination, states a position which every fairminded delegation cannot fail to recognize, that is, that the so-called proposals for settlement do not realiy settle anything. They relegate the inalienable rights of the people of Zimbabwe to a remote, uncertain, unknown future. They consolidate the usurpation of power by the minority, thereby asserting again the rule of force.over the rute of law. They subject the practices of racial discrimination and suppression of the political and economic rights of the majority to study and consideration instead of elirninatittg them outright. They introduce fictitious guararltces enabling the minority r&imc to acquire international rccog- 69. Unfortunately, we speak from bitter and sad experience. History-I should like to tell my African brothers-is not made by adopting resolutions regretting or condemning &is or that. History is made-as has been proved to us-by a people’s legitimate use of force to obtain and enjoy its inalienable rights. Thus, throughout history, rights have always been taken and ilever given. These are some thoughts perhaps for the cynic to doubt, for the statesman to ponder and for the thinker, in the silence of his meditation, to confess the truth of. 66. While on this subject, Mr. President, I cannot but express the very great concern of my delegation at the contents of your note to the Security Council [S/10470/. In your own words, the Security Council decided that Mr. Nkomn and Mr. Sithole should “be invited to appear before the Council to state their views of the proposals on Southern Rhodesia”. It is a welKnown fact that both Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sifhole are well-recognized leaders of a well-known liberation movement concerned with a problem of which the General Assembly, the Security Council, the committee on Dccolonizationz and other bodies of the United Nations have been seized for over a decade now. The answer given to us by the representative of the United Kingdom states in its conclusion:

We all know that in Africa a territory exists where a people live who are anxious and waiting to discover what their future will be. Security Council resolution 288 (1970), adopted on I7 November 1970, is quite specific with respect to what is desired and sought in the light of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the purposes of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. “In these circumstances my Government regrets that, as I said during our consultations before you announced that there were no objections to the issuance of the invitation, it is not in a position to require the Rhodesian authorities to allow either Mr. Nkomo or the Reverend Sithole to come to New York.“[Ibid.] 71. The people of Southern Rhodesia have the right to express themselves with complete freedom in accordance with the sacred principle of self-determination, which we mtist observe. We hope that the honourable Government of the United Kingdom will continue to analyse every facet of this question and, with the nobility of character and ability which are characteristic of it, will contribute to a solution which will meet the principles of the Charter and the will of the people of Southern Rhodesia. Let us not lose hope. It is indeed very strange that the IJnited Kingdom Covern- Inent can conclude an agreement with Ian Smith and his r+=bellious rggime-an agreement which has the force to last for 20 or 30 years, or God knows how many years to come, before the people can obtain their rights-while declaring at the same time its inability to require two leaders of the liberation movement to come to address the Council in accordance with a decision taken by the Council. Thus we 72. The calendar of our activities shows us that today is 29 December. A few hours before the expiration of my term of office as the representative of Nicaragua on the Security Council, I am duty-bound to state that I shall leave carrying with me the most gratifying memories of each and every representative. It has been a signal honour for me to have participated for two years in the work of this respected forum for peace and international security. I shall always esteem as a highly valued treasure the experience I have acquired working with the members of the Council. witness once more that it is the rule of force, not the rule of law, that prevails. The will of the Security Council is defeated by one of its permanent members entrusted with the speciaI task of world peace-and human rights and their itnplementation go hand in hand with world peace. 6 7. As the curtain falls on a departing year, tragedies such as the one with which we are dealing are perpetuated. We Jlave nothing to do except to vote on a draft resolution emanating from a working paper-a fitting epitaph indeed for another Palestine, another South Africa, another Southern Rhodesia, ail the legacy of the same Power, the United Kingdom. 73. During July 1970 and then last October it was my privilege to preside over the Security Council. I repeat to members my gratitude for the friendly assistance which all generously offered me. It was my fate to have had to deal with important and delicate matters, and I am certain that I acted conscientiously and with a sense of responsibility in keeping with the confidence which the General Assembly placed in my country when it elected us a non-permanent member of the Security Council. 68. And what about the sacred and inalienable rights of self-determination and the rule of the majority, and all the principles enshrined in the Charter and alluded tb in the 74. I shall not forget the distinction which was offered me when I became a member and Chairman of the Special Mission which went to Senegal last July, a duty which we 2 Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 75. I recall that in my first statement in the Council almost two years ago I said: “If power without justice is tyranny, while justice without power is a mockery, in the wise words of Pascal, let us make every effort to combine power with justice, so that power will always be just and justice will never cease to be powerful.” /1527th meeting, para. 94.1 76. In bidding the Council farewell, I reiterate these ideas, confident as I am in the destiny of our Organization. Strength and justice, justice and strength-this is the key to our success. I shall see the members of the Council again when I visit this august chamber from time to time with the intention of attentively following your debates. From the observer seats, I shall be with the Council in thought, and wish the members continued success in their endeavours. 77. I congratulate the representative of Sierra Leone on his intense work as President. ‘This must be a source of well earned satisfaction to him, and of course to his noble country and his esteemed Government. 78. I reiterate my tribute to U Thant, our beloved apostle of peace, who for many reasons deserves the undying gratitude of the world. He knows how much we esteem him. 79. In advance, I should like to congratulate Ambassador Farah, the representative of Somalia, because he will become President of the Council on 1 January 1972. I am certain of the success which our friend Ambassador Farah will achieve, with his recognized experience in international affairs. 80. As members well know, Panama will replace Nicaragua as a non-permanent member-the Republic of Panama, a nation which we all so dearly love, where, as though by a miracle, the oceans are joined, and where north and south meet as members of a family on the continent of hope. 81. It has been said, and it is true, that parting is sweet sorrow-but this occasion is made somewhat less sorrowful for me since I carry with me the very happiest memories of all your personalities and the friendship you have so generously proferred me. Distinguished Ambassadors, I wish you a new year filled with the greatest personal successes, for yourselves and for your distinguished families, and for the nations which you so worthily represent. X2. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Nicaragua for the nice things he said about my country and about me.

In the opinion of my delegation, the Government of the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, has the primary responsibility and 84. In the light of those considerations, although we take due note of the efforts made by the Government of the United Kingdom to achieve a settlement, we are obliged to make a few comments on the “Proposals for a Settlement” [see S/10405/ which were worked out at Salisbury in the negotiation between Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Mr. Ian Smith. 85. In our view, the proposals for a settlement do not seem to guarantee majority rule in the near future. Even the process of achieving parity of representation in the House of Assembly seems to be unduly long and complicated. I shall not elaborate this point further because so much has already been said about it in the Council. 86. We are also not very clear about how to guarantee the faithful implementation of the agreement through all its stages, once it passed the test of acceptability. On the surface at least, it would appear that the only guarantee is the good faith of the authotities now headed by Mr. Smith or a similar successor regime. We might assume that Mr, Smith and any successor will make every effort to implement the agreement. But, speaking frankIy, I wouId feel much more assured if I were told that throughout the whole process of implementation, from the beginning to the end objective of majority rule, the United Kingdom would continuously and positively participate in an appropriate way in the process of implementation. 87. I should like to mention another element which is essential for the effective implementation of these proposals once they are accepted-essential because the best hope for achieving majority rule in the foreseeable future depends on it. I am referring to the development programme agreed upon by Sir Alec and Mr. Smith, the purpose of which is “to increase significantly educational and job opportunities for Africans”. In the view of my delegation, it would be absolutely necessary to establish effective supervision over the implementation of each project so as to ensure the eff:ctive use of the funds made available for the purpose of providing better economic opportunities for Africans. This would have the effect of accelerating the pace of attaining the economic qualiflcations necessary for Africans to be registered on the so-called African higher roll. It would be most advisable that the Government of the United Kingdom directly associate itself, in an appropriate way, in the carrying out of the development programme. 88. There is some merit in the argument that although the situation in Southern Rhodesia has continued to deteriorate, this new set of proposals, if implemented in full, might contribute to the improvement of the status of Africans 96. I do not believe that the fear of the whites of Southern Rhodesia can be dissipated now or in the foreseeable future, and any political formula that would not. leave them in the ascendancy would be rejected. As long as Western Europe supports the United Kingdom and, both directly and indirectly, the Government of Southern Rhodesia, there is no hope for the partial-let alone the complete-political emancipation of the blacks. 97. As I mentioned in my last intervention on this item [160&h meeting], economic sanctidns will not work out. I am not going to adduce the reasons I have already given, which are contained in the Council’s records. Subduing the present white regime in Soutlzern Rhodesia is impossible as long as our African brothers, on the one hand, and the major Powers-I repeat, the major Powers-on the other, are in no position to use force. 90. In order to ensure that the test is conducted in a just and fair manner, that all views are expressed freely and that the population is fully informed of the details of the propos& my delegation would like to lend its strong support to the suggestion that arrangements be made for the participation of United Nations observers in the process of carrying out the test of acceptability. 98. Protracted negotiations for the just settlement of the question have so far failed. The whites of Southern Rhodesia are not prepared to allow themselves to be submerged by the blacks, nor do the blacks feel free so long as they do not enjoy the amenities of representative government in their native land. As I see it, the only possible solution for the time being seems to be for the United Kingdom to come up with fair, if not adequately just, proposals as a basis for new negotiations with the Ian Smith regime a 9 1. The PRESIDENT: I invite the representative of Saudi Arabia to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

Mr. President, you may recall that I inscribed my name on the list of speakers on this intractable problem. I have followed the debates and listened very carefully to my colleagues who are non-permanent members of the Council, as also to the permanent members, beside those who, like me, wish to address themselves to the item. 99. The working paper presented by my colleague and friend Ambassador Abby Farah of Somalia constitutes a rejection of the British proposal, but at the same time it contains some constructive suggestions for future negotiations. Criticism in the Council of so-called British imperialist circles without any effective action is of no avail. I should like to address that particular comment to my good friend Ambassador Malik of the Soviet Union. What do we gain from calling certain people “imperialist circles”? What can you do about it? You do not want a confrontation with the West, let us face it. Do we just give our African brothers a lollipop, sugar candy? 93. I have felt discouraged throughout, but have not given UP hope that the United Kingdom may be able to do something in the future if it stilI exercises a semblance of power over Southern Rhodesia. We find that the United Kingdom is trying to normalize its relationship with Southern Rhodesia on the basis of proposals which were explained by our British colleague, Sir Colin Crowe. These proposals envisage limited and indeed very slow political development. It would take from two to three decades to accomplish that development. The consequence would be that the white minority would still govern the black bulk of the population. 100. Furthermore, under the present circumstances I do not believe that the white regime in Southern Rhodesia would allow black leaders to come to New York to testify before the Council. Let us face these facts. Assuming that some leaders surreptitiously found their way to New York and appeared before you gentlemen and in unmistakable terms decried Ian Smith’s regime, do you believe it would be safe for them to return to Southern Rhodesia? Or will some representatives of the Council perhaps encourage them to form the nucleus of a government in exile -somewhere in Africa or on some other continent, perhaps here in New York City? Such governments in exile have in my humble experience proven academic in the past-unless, of course, resort to force changed the internal situation in the country from which they had fled, as happened in the Second World War. 94. I recently read some statistics according to w.hich the black population of Southern Rhodesia is increasing at the rate of approximately a quarter million annually. The white population amounts to only 250,000 at present. Before the end of the century the black population may conceivably number 8 to 10 million, if not more, while the whites of Southern Rhodesia can hardly attain a half million in the same period. 95. Let us face the facts. Between 5 and 8 per cent of the population-the whites-would still dominate 8 to 10 mil- Iion blacks in less than three decades. The United Kingdom wishes to gain time so as to adjust itself to the demands of Mr. Ian Smith and his successors, whose political power 102. The United Kingdom is still considered the administering Power. Is it the administering Power or is it not? If it is still the administering Power, it should assert itself. How? It is not for me to :?lggest. After all, they have Iong experience in colonial affairs. It is true that, as Sir Colin Crewe has told us, Southern Rhodesia is a peculiar case. But for every peculiar case there should be a special solution. Otherwise, Mr. President and members of the Council, you are wasting your time-and we cannot afford to waste more time in such fruitless debates, especially since we are on the threshold of 1972, which should mark the turning of a new leaf in the history of the United Nations. 103. What is the alternative? Do you want to give the Africans a sort of opium-which they will not want to take any more-by telling them that we will bring petitioners from abroad and establish a government in exile? The only ones who can exercise power are the major Powers in the Council. Some of them may not be in a position to do so; but how is it that some can wage war ten thousand miles from their own soil when their interests are at stake? Why do not some of the Powers look upon this case not in the light of special national interests, but in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter? You gentlemen, especially the five permanent members of the Council, you are the ones who can tip the scale either to the side of justice or to the side of expediency.

There are no further names on the list of speakers. Members may wish to accept the suggestion of the representative of Somalia for an adjournment until tomorrow morning. He has submitted to the Council a working paper which he has taken considerable time and Point of order by the representative of Somalia

I call on the representative of Somalia on a point of order.

Before you adjourn our meeting, Mr. President, I wish to speak on an entirely different subject, relating to the request made by the Organization of African Unity tiat the Security Council should perhaps consider holding a series of meetings in Africa in 1972. The General Assembly, by a resolution adopted on 20 December 1971 by a vote of 113 in favour and only 2 against [resolution 2863(XXVI)], invited the Security Council to consider the request of the Organization of African Unity concerning the holding of such meetings in an African capital. I was wondering whether the time might not be opportune, Mr. President, for you to begin consultations with delegations here, in the hope that we could perhaps reach some agreement as to how we should proceed on the matter. 1 understand that this matter has not yet been officially transmitted to the Security Council by the relevant Department of the Secretariat which deals with the transmission of General Assembly resolutions; but because of the time factor, I think it is important that we take up this matter, and I hope it will be possible to conclude it in fact during your term as President.

As far as 1 know, the resolution the representative of Somalia has referred to has not yet officially reached me. I shall take steps as suggested by the representative of Somalia. In this connexion, may I add that I have received an application from the delegation of Guinea which I have already passed on to the Secretariat so that copies may be made and circulated to members.3 Tlze meeting rose at 1 pm. 3 Subsequently circulated as document S/10477. HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva. COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES Les publications des Nations Unies sont en vente dans les librairies et les agences depositaires du mondc entier. Informez-vous aup& de votre libraire ou adressez-vous B : Nations Unies, Section des ventes, New York ou Gem&e. COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas e&in en venta en librerias y ca~as distribuidoras en todas partes de1 mundo. Consulte a su librero o dir&se a: Naciones Unidas, Seccidn de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra. Litho in United Nations, New York Price: $U.S. 1.00 (or equivalent in other currencies) 82285-October 1974-2,050