S/PV.1636 Security Council

When I spoke at the meeting of the Security Council on 28 January in my capacity as President of the Council /1627th meeting] I remarked that by deciding to hold a series of meetings in Africa the Council was responding publicly and positively to the needs of an area rife with actual and potential threats to peace. I stated on that occasion that the session would enable the Council as a whole to take a fresh look at African problems, to see them from a different perspective. Over the past five Pays all of us have become, I am sure, undoubtedly disposed towards according the many intricate and perplexing problems of southern Africa the necessary degree of understanding they deserve. We have been able to receive views and representations not only from African Government leaders and representatives, but from all the principal liberation movements in Africa. It is my hope that through this interchange at close quarters with African opinion new perspectives have been gained and that they will find expression in constructing approaches to the larger African issues. 45. Within the United Nations there is a tendency to belittle the efforts of those States which continue to demand that the struggle against racism and colonialism must continue without diminution. We hear, for example, that it is unrealistic to pass resolutions which are unlikely to be carried out, or that the concern of African nations over southern Africa might be directed equally to other problems or to problems nearer home. It is significant that such criticisms usually emanate from those States whose economic and other ties with southern Africa are a major contributory cause of the ineffectiveness of the United Nations resolutions on southern African problems. The other main cause, of course, is the continued intransigence of the minority regimes. What then can be done about southern Africa and Guinea (Bissau)? 41. Before I proceed to outline the position of my Government on some of the principal issues before us, allow me to. express to you, Mr. President, the warmest congratulations of my delegation on you assumption of the post of President of the Council for the current month, No one will dispute the heavy responsibilities which you have assumed, Your presidency will witness the conclusion of this historic series of meetings in Africa. We all want this session to end on a positive and meaningful note. We are fortunate that you will be steering our deliberations during this critical period, for if the success of our endeavours will depend on the personal qualities of the President, no better choice could have been made. 46. What is the alternative to insisting that in our attempts to deal with these problems effectively we should be guided primarily by the principles and purposes of the Charter, by the obligations that we are all pledged to discharge by our membership of the United Nations, by calling for the coercive powers of the organization to be directed against the intransigent regimes? The alternatives are silence, inactivity and a compromise on principle, thereby m& lifying whatever moral or practical initiatives the United Nations has so far taken. 42, The majority of African countries, including my own, are faced with pressing and often competing priorities. With limited resources, they are caught between the demands of consolidating their newly-won independence and the demands of supporting remaining areas in Africa in their struggle for liberation. My country is one of those which is attempting to do both. But in these endeavours we have come to realize, through painful experience, that unless there is the national will to help one’s self, the assistance received from outside will always be marginal. 47. The Namibian question is perhaps the most blatant example of the malaise that has overtaken the Security Council in the execution of its decisions. The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice has made it unmistakably clear that the presence in Namibia of South Africa is illegal. That decision has thus confirmed the positions of the General Assembly and the Security Council when those organs declared South Africa’s presence in the Territory to be unlawful and called upon it to withdraw its administration from the Territory. My Government had hoped that, having received the opinion of the highest juridical body in the world, the Security Council would have demanded of all Member States that the, take positive action, collectively, to ensure the withdrawal of South Africa without further argument. The situation, unfortunately, remains the same. The South Africans are still in Namibia, the Namibians are still suffering under racist tyranny, and the United Nations is still groping in the dark for a solution. While the situation continues unattended, the world is being fed with a barrage of propaganda by the 43. Last week-end my Government was privileged and honoured to receive as its guests the distinguished Secretary-General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, and honourable members of this Council. Although the visit was too short for anyone of you to appreciate the endeavours our Government is making in its programme of national development and self-sufficiency, it did provide you with a glimpse of the spirit that is moving our people. This same spirit will be found in many parts of Africa, for Africa can no longer be content to remain in a state of slumber while its people and its rich natural resources are being selfishly exploited by 49. The position of my Government on this question is as follows. 50. First, the Security Council should declare that any further refusal of the South African racist regime to withdraw from Namibia would constitute, among other things, an act of aggression against the Territory of Namibia and a threat to international peace and security within the context of Chapter VII of the Charter. That proposal is not acceptable to the United States and to Western European delegations, But it is difficult to see in what other manner the Namibian situation can be described, since South Africa maintains a military presence in the Territory, since it maintains an illegal presence there, and since it has refused the ‘demands of the Council that it withdraw from the Territory. 51. Secondly, accepting the fact that South Africa maintains an illegal presence in Namibia, and since the United Nations has decided to take action on the political, diplomatic and economic levels against this illegality, then, in the view of my Government, the fact must also be accepted that action taken by the people of Namibia to resist that illegal occupation is legitimate. Having recognized the right of the people to resist an illegal occupation, the Council should provide the liberation forces of that Territory with all the necessary assistance in furtherance of that common objective. 52. Thirdly, the Security Council should take energetic measures to ensure that the arms embargo imposed on South Africa is fully honoured both in the letter and spirit of its decisions. Security Council resolution 283 (1970) recognized the significance to the Territory and people of Namibia of the arms embargo against South Africa. Yet, despite South Africa’s defiance, it is still being supplied with arms to strengthen its position in the occupied Territory. The recent strike by the Ovambos witnessed the dispatch to the Territory of South African armed units to 54. Finally, my Government subscribes to the view that following the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice there has devolved on all Member States an obligation to accept and carry out the provisions of Article 25 of the Charter. If Member States can claim the right to exclude themselves from the obligations imposed upon them under the Charter whenever their interests are affected, then I am afraid we shall turn this decision-making body into nothing less than a talking shop. We have seen the consequences of such attitudes in the Middle East problem, where the interests of Zionism have been able to prevail over United Nations decisions simply because the Security Council has not been morally and politically strong enough to enforce its authority. Namibia, like the Middle East problem, presents a unique challenge to the United Nations. The challenge is whether right will eventually triumph over might, whether the principles and purposes of the Charter will form the basis of United Nations actions or will be allowed to be thrown aside each time they conflict with the interest of any one Member State. 55. The situation in tie Portuguese-controlled Territories of Guinea (Bissau), Angola and Mozambique has reached a state where direct United Nations intervention is necessary to save the further loss of life that is being suffered by the valiant people of those Territories. Portugal’s refusal to act in accordance with the Declaration op the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples has led to brutal colonial wars being waged against the people under its domination. It has been estimated that more than 150,000 Portuguese troops are involved in those wars. Portugal’s efforts to crush a just struggle for liberation from foreign and oppressive rule are the cause of the everwidening circle of violence directed against the independent African States which border the Territories under Portuguese rule. Regrettably, the Security Council has not directed its attention to these wars in the past. The conflict 56. The Security Council must use the force of its authority to stop these senseless wars Portugal is waging against Africa. Portugal must not be provided with the means to wage those wars. It should be subjected to an arms embargo. Portugal must be prevailed upon by the Council to abandon the myth it has created that the African Territories of Guinea (Bissau), Angola and Mozambique are part of the Portuguese homeland. It must be asked to allow the people of those Territories the right to self-determination and independence-not in accordance with its own thinking, but in strict conformity with the provisions of the Charter and General Assembly resolution 15 14 (XV). 57. In October 1971 the question of the Portuguesecontrolled Territories and other southern African Territories was discussed at length by the Conference of Heads of State and Government of East and Central African States when it convened in Mogadiscio. There emerged from that Conference the Mogadiscio Declaration, which dealt extensively with all the colonial and racial problems of Africa. In the concluding section of the Declaration the Conference expressed regret at the concerted support given by certain NATO countries to South Africa and Portugal in their wars of oppression. In the view of the Conference, this military, economic and other assistance constitutes an important element in the execution of the vicious wars being waged against the peoples in those Territories. Such assistance amounts to a hostile act against the African peoples as a whole. In the opinion of the Conference there is no way left to the liberation of southern Africa except through armed struggle. The Somali Democratic Republic 4s fully committed to giving assistance to the liberation movements in their just struggle. 58. In the course of the debates engendered in the Security Council by the announcement of the agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and the rebel regime of Ian Smith3 my delegation asked a number of questions about the nature of the agreement and about the circumstances which would surround the so-called test of acceptability. We did not receive any satisfactory replies to our questions, which, it was conceded, were valid ones. However, our questions are now being answered clearly by the events which have taken place in Rhodesia since the Pearce Commission began its hearings. 3 See Officiel Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement far October, November and December 1971, document S/10405. 60. The alternatives being offered to the African people of that territory were either to say “yes” to the proposals or to experience the rigour of police state law, to accept an arrangement that would both perpetuate and give legal recognition to white minority rule or be labelled “stupid and lacking maturity” as the rebel leader has described the opponents of the agreement. 61. It has become clear too that the Pearce Commission is not acting with the force of authority that belongs to the representatives of an administering Power. It is totally under the direction of the Smith regime which has the power to cancel hearings of the Commission over the objections of its members. 62. My delegation had also referred to the dubious haste in which the agreement would be presented to the people for acceptance-almost as though the British Government feared that if there was time to think and to ponder its implications they would be revealed in their basic inadequacy. ?.!ie African people are showing that they refuse to be railroaded into an arrangement drawn up by an absentee government and an oppressive regime. 63. One of the questions to which my delegation had attached the greatest importance was that of who would guarantee the guarantees. It was a question based on well-founded suspicions about the good faith of the Smith regime. Some of the recent statements of that rebel go far to support ihose suspicions. In saying that through the recent disturbances ,the Africans had “ironically played right into our hands”, he made it clear that his regime’s major hope, if not its major aim, was for an opportunity to continue with the racist Constitution of 1969, but this time with the consent of the United Kingdom. The deep racial prejudice of his attitude was clearly illustrated by his claim that the disturbances were proof of the lack of civilization of the African majority. Smith has his own kind of intelligence and he must be aware that countries which he would unquestionably consider civilized are quite familiar with even more violent protest over matters of much less grave character than the denial of basic human rights. 64. The question that has not been answered in this Council, and one to which the, international community deserves an answer, is the following: what does the British Government intend to do; now that the African people have demonstrated so forcibly, and at so great a cost in lives, that they reject the settlement proposals? Does the British Government intend to say that it has done all that it could do and that it now washes its hand of the situation? Will it give up the last vestiges of that responsibility which it has so far claimed to have for Rhodesian affairs and abandon the African population to the 1969 Constitution? Would the posture it has maintained over the years 65, Britain and those who support its position, overtly or covertly, must stand up and be counted here in Africa, either on the side of a narrow materialistic national self-interest that cares nothing for justice or human rights for the African people, or on the side of peace, justice and progress for the oppressed people of that Territory. 66. The position of the Somali Democratic Republic on the Southern Rhodesian queston has already been made clear to the international community both through this Council, the General Assembly and the international press. For the record of this meeting, let me summarize the reasons which have prompted my Government to reject the so-called settlement arranged between the British Government and the rebel regime. 67. First, the so-called “settlement” does not entail any fundamental retreat from the provisions of the 1969 Constitution of the rebel regime. 68. Secondly, the cardinal principle of NIBMAR-no independence before majority rule-has been deliberately ignored. 69. Thirdly, in the absence of a referendum for ascertaining the aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe, the so-called test of acceptability would be meaningless. 70. Fourthly, the implementation of the terms of the settlement, as bad as it is, is left to the goodwill of Ian Smith and his colleagues, a group of racists who have already demonstrated their disregard for human rights and international public opinion. 71. Fifthly, the terms of the “settlement” were concluded behind the backs of the African population and their legitimate representatives, the liberation movements. 72. Finally, the sole aim of the British Government in accommodating the rebel regime is to seek face-saving means, and to confer legal independence on the minority regime contrary to resolutions passed by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity and in defiance of world public opinion, 73. It is with these considerations in mind that my delegation has the privilege of introducing a draft resolution, contained in document S/10606, which has been distributed to the members of the Council. Although it is sponsored by three African members of the Council, namely, Guinea, Sudan and my own country, Somalia, it has the full backing of all member States of the Organization of African Unity. 74. The preambular paragraphs of the draft resolution are quite straightforward and factual. They express concern at the dangerous political situation that has developed in Southern Rhodesia and at the recent killings, woundings 75. In the course of consultations which my delegation has had with members of the Council, no objection has been raised to any of the paragraphs of the preamble. 76. I should now like to turn to the operative paragraphs of the draft resolution. Operative paragraph 1 would ask the Council to reaffirm, as it has done in its resolutions 232 (1966) and 277 (1970), that the present situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security. Having regard to developments that have taken place in the territory since 1965, there is no other manner in which the situation can be described. When a small group of people, of not more than one quarter of a million, endeavours by brute military power and with the tacit co-operation of foreign elements, to exercise a ruthless, colonial and racist rule over 5 million others, the prospect for peace is surely remote. 77. Operative paragraph 2 would have the Council express regret at the failure of the United Kingdom to bring the rebellion to an end. 78. Operative paragraphs 3 and 4 condemn the brutalities and other oppressive measures carried out by the rebel regime against the African population and call upon the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, to take all appropriate measures to safeguard the lives and welfare of the African people against a repetition of those acts. 79. Operative paragraphs 5 and 6 go to the heart of the question. In recent weeks the African people of Southern Rhodesia has paid a heavy price to make it clear to the British Government that it rejects the settlement proposals agreed upon between that Government and the rebel regime. How many more casualties must the Africans suffer before they can bring home to the British Government their complete rejection of those proposals? Surely the British Government has had sufficient evidence of the strength of African opposition. Can it be that it is still clingini to the hope that in the weeks ahead the political situation can,be so juggled that the Pearce Commission might be able to report a favourable response to the settlement proposals? 80. The British Government must be certain about one fact: it is that no self-respecting African will accept a settlement of the Rhodesian situation which Africans have not had a part in formulating. The British Government cannot, on the one hand, say it has no power to establish 81. The history of Southern Rhodesia has been characterized by a calculated policy of excluding Africans from the main political institutions of the Territory. Despite the fact that the Africans outnumber the European minority by over 20 to 1, they have had no political rights and they have been denied opportunities for social and cultural advancement, while in the economic field they occupy the lowest jobs and are paid wages barely sufficient to maintain a subsistence type of living, But, thankfully, the African population has never been more conscious of its political b rights than at present. It has demonstrated this in no uncertain manner to the Pearce Commission and in activities throughout the Territory. Conditions will never be the same again: the Africans are on the move and will certainly not cease pressing for their rights until liberty and justice prevail in their Territory. 82. In recent weeks, and particularly since our Secretary- General took office, more attention is being paid to the need for preventive diplomacy-I repeat, preventive diplomacy-to prevent situations from developing into threats to international peace and security or into armed hostility. In the view of the African States-and this is expressed in operative paragraph 6-the most prudent, most judicious and fairest manner to prevent the Southern Rhodesia situation from deteriorating further would be to convene a constitutional conference in which the genuine representatives of the African people would be able to participate in the formulation of new proposals for the political and constitutional advancement of their country, By adopting operative paragraph 6 the Security Council would endorse the principle of the right of all citizens to take an equal part in the political life of the Territory and in the shaping of its future destiny. 83. In operative paragraph 7 the Security Council would urge the United Kingdom to convene such a conference as a matter of urgency. X4. Naturally, while the situation in Southern Rhodesia remains unresolved, and s? long as the rebel r@.me remains in control of the Territory, sanctions must continue to be applied. Experience over the past years has shown that two States-South Africa and Portugal-have made no secret of the fact that they will not abide by the decisions of the Security Council in this respect. Other States have taken only half-hearted measures towards the implementation of sanctions and have not exercised sufficient control of their nationals, organizations and companies to prevent a circumvention of sanctions. Operative paragraph 8 has been formulated to take care of .this unsatisfactory situation and calls for more stringent measures to be taken by all States to ensure full observance of sanctions. 85. No secret is being made of the fact that South African police and armed units maintain a presence in Southern 86. The text of the draft resolution which I have outlined is relatively moderate and far short of what the African States Members of the United Nations consider the Security Council should do in this matter. The draft resolution has been formulated after extensive consultations with all the members of the Council. It has been our aim to prepare a draft resolution which would command a wide measure of support: it is not extravagant in its demands; its strength lies in the fact that it is based on the purposes and principles of the Charter and on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is directed to test the fair-mindedness of Governments towards African problems and to give justice t,> an ,oppressed majority. 87. When the President of the Somali Democratic Republic had an opportunity of meeting with the Secretary- General and members of this Council in Mogadiscio last week-end, he mentioned how some of the permanent members exercised the use of the veto, not in the interest of the oppressed but simply to advance their own selfinterests. Last December the Somali delegation, along with the delegal.ions of Burundi, Sierra Leone and the Syrian Arab Republic, presented a draft resolution on Southern Rhodesia [S/10489] -a draft resolution to which no fair-minded State could have found objection. It was vetoed. It will certainly destroy confidence in the utility and effectiveness of the Security Council if nations that turn to it for redress discover that their grievances and complaints are not considered on their merits but purely in terms of whether a decision, one way or the other, will affect the wider interests of a permanent member. 88. I trust that this draft resolution will be viewed objectively and will find full support from all members of this Council. 89. Allow me to conclude with a quotation from the statement which the President of the Somali Democratic Republic, Mohammed Siad Barre, made when he addressed members of this Council in Mogadiscio last week-end. He said : “The indigenous African in southern Africa is determined to gain his freedom. He has shown patience, but events have overtaken him; he has shouted aloud, but no one has heard him; he has protested peacefully, but deadly bullets have killed him; his daylight activity follows dark night prayers, yet deep in his heart faith in 91. If we are meeting here in Addis Ababa today, we are doing so essentially because of the initiative of the African Heads of State and Government who requested a special session of the Security Council in Africa. Such a session, according to the resolution of the Assembly of Heads, of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, is to be “devoted solely to the measures to be taken with a view to implementing the various Security Cou !- cil . . . resolutions on decolonization, the struggle against apartheid, racial discrimination in Africa”.4 92. The key words in this paragraph of the Organization of African Unity resolution are “measures to be taken with a view to implementing the various Security Council . . . resolutions”. The current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity Assembly of Heads of State and Government, His Excellency President Ould Daddah, amplified this theme before the Council last week when he said: “Thus, after a detailed analysis of our determination as well as of our spirit of realism, we detected the new and decisive force that might emerge from united action oy the Security Council and, above all, by its permanent members. Thus we considered as a positive and therefore decisive potentiality the actions and difficult but necessary changes that had to be undertaken in order one day to lead the Security Council to assume its responsibilities more fully than in the past-not only at the level of the generation and formulation of resolutions but also, more particularly, at the level of the implementation and supervision of decisions contained in resolutions dealing with colonialism and apartheid.” [1627th meeting, para. 31.1 93. This is what Africa, according to its elders, expects from US. I am sure that all members of the Council, after a week on African soil and among African people, have had a sensation of what colonialism and racism mean to us here and how fervently determined we are to erase these anachronistic barbarities from our soil, . 94. The Security Council-and this is the firm belief of our people-can never act as an insular, self-contained and 106. Those are indeed the realities that Africa expected the Council to see, sitting away from the polluted atmosphere of New York, away from the sensationalism of the media and away from the dressing up of public relations. bIbid., Supplement for July, August and September 1971, document S/10272. 95. Within a different context, the terms “realities” and “realism” have so often been used both inside and outside this chamber. But “realities” and “realism” are loaded expressions. Indeed they are so loaded that they are almost vacuous. 96. Limitation on the freedon of action of some of the major Powers represented here due to what they consider paramount national and strategic interest is a reality. But this is not the only reality in life. 97, The existence of the barbarous policies of apartheid in South Africa in spite of universal condemnation is a reality. 98. The incidence of malnutrition, deficiency, tuberculosis and scurvy in the fascist reserves of South Africa is a reality. 99. The mass eviction of. hundreds of thousands of Africans from their homes to make way for white immigrants in that part of Africa is a reality. 100. The crushing with a bloody heel of African men and women in Namibia who are clamouring for the realization of their inherent inalienable rights recognized by the United Nations in general and this Council in particular is a reality. 101. The abominable repression by the jackbooted Lisbon dictatorship of our brothers and sisters in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) is a reality. 102. The constant criminal assaults by South Africa and Portugal on sovereign African States, Members of this Organization, encroaching aggressively on their territorial integrity under the guise of a discredited concept of hot pursuit, as was evidenced in the Congo, in Guinea, in Senegal, in Tanzania and in Zambia, is a reality. 103. The failure of the major Powers of the West to bring pressure to bear and indeed the support, military and otherwise, they give instead to Portugal and South Africa is a reality. 104. The stealthy action by one of the senior members of this Council to grant a measure of legality and respectability to the hideous minority regime in Southern Rhodesia which was placed by the whole world for five years behind a cordon sanitaire is a reality. 105. The constant erosion by the trade partners of South Africa and Rhodesia of sanctions, the only valid weapon available to the United Nations short of the use of force, is a reality. 108. African knows more than anybody else that smaller countries can hardly make war and progress at the same time. But Africa will have no option but to continue its war against oppression until an honourable peace is achieved. 109. Africa is not congenitally violent, and hence we appreciate the passionate calls for non-violence by some of 110. We in Africa are facing situations fraught with grave danger as well as with emotion and we are the first to admit it. To avert an imminent catastrophe what is required-and I repeat it-is concrete action. Neither metaphysical speculations nor passionate appeals, nor, for that matter, incendiary rhetoric would take us very far. And those of us who want this Council to stand on its confessed limitations are nullifying the very concept of peace-making in a changing world. Peace-making in the world of today is a dynamic concept. 111. Indeed we should be realistic. Indeed we should realize our limitations. But in doing so we should never lose sight of the paramount moral considerations. Morality is not a circumstantial necessity that can be traded for expediency. It is a universal imperative, much more so in an Organization devoted to peace on earth and the well-being of man. The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.