S/PV.166 Security Council

Paragraph 3(a) of the ,United States draft resolution (document S/391 )2 is under discussion. The.representative of France made a suggestion on this point at the himdred and sixty-fifth meeting. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): It may be recalled that, during the general discussion, l reserved the right to speak on the question of the composition of the proposed commission. This is a matter which caused my delegatian sorne concern at the outset; and l suggested that the United States representative might furnish us with reasons for his departure from the recom- The original Commission of·Investigation, in the light of its experience, had very definite rea· sons for recommending that there should be a smaIl commission. They aIso went on to say that, if the Council should propose a single commissioner, the staff should be composed of nationaIs neither of L;'e States that were permanent members of the Security Council nor of any States which had any direct interest or concern with any of the four Governments invoîved. It was for that very reason, that during the special session of the General Assembly, my delegation proposed a resolution that the permanent members should be exc1uded from the Special Committee on Palestine (document AIC.l/178) . It has been suggested that a body consisting of representatives of aIl the members of the Security Council would have more weight and more authority than a smaIler body. We are not satisfied with that argument, because the experienoe of the Commission of Investigation proved that days, even weeks, were taken up in arguing on procedural questions and all kinds of irrelevant matters in which the representatives of the permanent members were mainly concemed. As we see it, the proposed commission would have more authority if the representatives of the .four countries concerned believed that it was entire1y neutral, because in our opinion they are apt, in the light of what has happened, to have in their minds, consciously or unconsciously, the impression that one or the other is being backed Or supported by one of the permanent members. For those reasons, we think that a small commission composed of the six non-permanent members would be more effective, more expeditious, and would be likely to obtain better results. During the last inquiry, one of the field groups -on1y a small team-found, when they wanted to conduct a particular investigation, that their staff, inc1uding their interpreters and all the people accompanying them, consisted of fiftytwo people. Such considerations caused the Commission to recommend a small commission. The argument that a large commission could break into sma11er groups,. or two field groups, does not seem to us substantial, because the experience in the past proved that, when there was a division into two groups, one group would not accept the views or the evidence of the other. But with a small group, in which all could par- 1 See Officiai Records of the 8ecurity Council, Second Year, Special Supplement No. 2, Part IV, Chapter l, paragraph C (a). There is another important aspect. One of the objects or functions of the proposed commission is that of mediation or ;:onciliation. The importance of that function has been considerably stressed. We think a small or a smaller commission, composed of the non-permanent members, with very open and objective minds, could. accomplish more in the way of conciliation and mediation than a full commission. As regards the size of the commission, six is a reasonable number. li: could actby a majori.ty vote of four out of six, which is a reasonable majority that does not require any deciding vote by the chairman. Consequently, we would support the French proposaI, although we would, as 1 say, suggest the six non-perma:lent members. We would not suggest that a neutral country, such as Sweden, should be called in, because that would open up a new field, and there would then be various other suggestions, such as Switzerland or sorne other country. li'/e can eliminate aIl that. For these reasons, we would support the French proposaI, and we would ask. the representative of the United States to consider whether he couldaccept it. Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America) : 1 expressed in the name of the United State's delegation several days ago the reasons which influenced my Government to take a line divergent from the original recommendatior! of the Commission and to propose a commission of the members of the Security Council as it may be constituted at any given time. 1 shall not weary the Council with a detailed repetition of what 1 said then. 1 shouJd, however, like to place sorne emphasis on one point that 1 made and to which we attach sorne importance. We believe a commission representing the entire Council would represent more effectively the great moral as weIl as legal responsibilitie::> for the maintenance of international peace and security with which the Security Council has been charged under the Charter. The fact that the composition of the commission would be automatic and that there would not be sa great an opportunity for divergence of views in the Council.itself and in recommendations and findings of f~ct which might be presented by that commis- SIOn, would, we believe, give a unity to the work 1 am quite willing to agree, because 1 honestly think so, that in theory a small body might be more effective. 1 certainly feel that it would be more effective to have a single commissioner with an adequate staff, if he were the ideal individual-a man of vision, integrity and decision, possessing the power to command and to take respl)!'..:;ibility, who could be selected without regard to what sorne country might think of the country from which he came or of his political ideas. But we are not going to get such a man; it is a physical impossibility under the existing procedure and at the present stage of development of the United Nations. 1 should like to request that the vote on this particular clause of the resolution should be deferred until tomorrow, perhaps, so that we can hear the views which any member of the Council would like to e{press in regard to the matter. Before 1 close, 1 shall express one preference, if 1 may; that is, that as a possible alternative to the suggestion made by the United States, 1 prefer the suggestion made by the representative of Colombia to that made by the representative of France. Mr. LÔPEZ (Colombia): 1 have so little to add to what we have already said in support of our suggestion that 1 had intended not to speak again. However,.1 feel greatly encouraged by the reception that the representative of the United States has accorded the recommendation and suggestions submitted by the delegation of Colombia, particularly because 1 know how , We did not follow that point of view because we thought that it would be id1e ta leave the great Powers out of any important question, not on}.y the question of disarmament but aIso the question of Palestine. We still follow that reasoning with respect to the Greek question. We very seriously doubt that there is any such thing as a neutral when there is a sharp division of opinion. We have what Ml'. Johnson very properly termp-d an unfortunate situation in this rfgard. However, 1 differ from him in the approach. 1 do not quite agree that it is unfortunate, and that we should more or less take it as it is. 1 think we should make a very determined effort ta try to change the :situation, ta improve it; and to see that wé finally succeed in bringing about a better understanding in .the Council, as the United States representative expressed it, and among the great Powers. That is what the world is expecting. We believe that everybody would rejoice if the Security Council could show its ability to bring about that change. 1 wonder whether we could not make another effort to find a composition of the commission that would be acceptable not only ta the United States of America but also ta the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Mter all, the Greek question is primarily a difference of opinion between the two strongest Powers. We should attempt ta prevent strati.fication of this situation. It can be changed, and it can be improved. The four non-permanent members, 1 believe, could be selected more easily. If we approach this matter in the spirit of co-operation and good will, the task should not be too difficult. Perhaps 1 am over-estimating the possibilities, but just as we have invited the Balkan countries to make an effort to reach an understanding, and just as we are taking action to be sure that the Balkan countries follow our recommendationsrecommendations to the effect that they should establish diplomatic relations and maintain goodneighbourly relations as weIl as refrain from any act that might endanger international peace and security either directly or indirectly-why not also go a step further and venture to inquire into the possibility of reaching an understanding among the permanent members of the Council who are directly interested. For my part, 1 do not believe that the number of members on the commission has any connexion with its weight and authority. 1 believe that a commission of five, seven, nine, or eleven 'members would have the same authority and would carry the same weight, if it were known that the commission actually represented the spirit and the will of the Council to obtain a satisfactory settlement of the Greek question. In our opinion, it is the bacIcingthat is given to the commission, primarily by the .great Powersthose who have the responsibility for the maintenance of peace and international securitywhich will really give the commission its strength an~ authority, and not the number of its members. Once it is cIearly understood that the Security Council, ar.ting on behalf of the United Nations, has definitely made up its mind to have peace and security in the Balkans, it will not matter very much whether the commission is composed of five, seven, nine or eleven members. Tt is our determination that gives weight to the commission. 1 believe there is very little doubt that the sense of the Security Council is that we are determined to see this matter settled. For that reason, 1 am very strongly of the opinion that we should approach the question in a conciliatory spirit first. Because it is lmown that we intend to enforce our resolution, why should we in any way reduce the area of agreement or the possibility of conciliation by making the terms of our That is why 1 have been insisting aIl along that we should show in our resolution a more friendly and co-operative spirit, bearing in mind the idea that no objection should be possible on the ground that we are looking backwards, mak·· ing condemnations, or indulging in recriminations. That has aIready been done. Wc had our Commission of Investgation, and we are acting on its findings. Now we have to look into the future. It is definitely a question for the Balkan States to decide whether they are willing to cooperate with the Security Council in finding a suitable solution. That seerns to us to be very obvious. If it is not, at any rate 1 hope these suggestions will be received in the spirit in which they are very respectfully submitted to the Council.

1 should like to know whether the suggestions that have been made have the status of formai proposaIs. The representative of Colombia has not made a formai proposaI, and 1 understand that the same is the case with the representative of Australia. The representative of the United States has proposed that, if a vote is taken on the suggestions made, it should be deferred until tomorrow. At the moment, 1 do not see the necessity of taking a vote, because we have no formaI proposais be": fore us; we merely have suggestions. If 1 am correct, the United States representative seerns to want further time in which to consider his reactions. If that iS the case, 1 should be glad to postpùne further discussion on this particular point. .. 1 am informed that the United States representative wishes to have sorne time before giving us his final reaction to the suggestions made. 1 think it only fair to give him that time. We may, however, continue the discussion if anyone wishes to express an opinion on the subject. . Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): As we are considermg suggestions, 1 have one to make. There is a suggestion in the report of the Commission of Investi6'",tion that the proposed commission should be composed of one, or more than one ~ember; that is to say, there is a proposai that 1t should consist of one member in the report of the Commission. 1 believe that the weight of the findings of br tha~~~~ission would depend, in the first place, 1 notice that none of the members of the Security Council has ~eferred to having oruy one observer, or investigator, or adviser, acting in the name of the Security Council, and instructed to help, advise, conciliate, and act as arbitrator in time of necessity. One member of a commission would be bound to agree with himself and would arrive at a single opinion. He could not differ with hinlSelf, as two, three or four members could do. 1 do not know why we do not try to find one person who would be competent to hold that position and worthy to exercise the power he would receive from the Security Council and from the United Nations. Because of his competence and his high qualities, he would be more effective than any number which might be chosen. He would have as large a staff with him as would be necessary. As the representative of the United States prefers that the matter should not be decided today, 1 make this suggestion for your consideration; 1 hope that all the members will think carefully about it. We may agree on some impartial person who is out of this circle, who does not belong to aState which is rather partial, or which has shown itself ta have a certain partiality, or to lack neutrality. There are in the world many great persons who are competent and able to perform the task. 1 hope, if it is not a matter to be decided today, that this question will be given much thought. It may then be easier to agree upon someone. That is my suggesti~:m, and 1 hope it will be taken into consideration. Mr. PAROD! (France) (translated trom French): Mr. President, 1 do not wish to hasten the discussion, but 1 should· like to ask you for an explanation of a remark you made just now. You said that we could not vote because there was no formaI proposal tabled in opposition to l should like to know if you think that this method might be followed-not today, but tomorrow, allowing all the necessary time-or if you think that in any case we should reach a specifie agreement now on the proposaI to set up .a smaller commission. 1 repeat 1 personally would prefer the other method which would, 1 think, make our discussion more methodicai by defining the two stages.

Of course, if a formaI proposaI were presented and if it shoulci not be accepted by the representative of the United States, a vote would be taken at the proper time -not today. Mr. LÔPEZ (Colombia): Inasmuch as the representative of the United States has suggested that he desires to have the vote on this matter postponed untii tomorrow, perhaps we might just as weIl postpone the discussion of it also; then, in the event Mr. Johnson should desire to present a proposaI, we could consider. it tomorrow. Mr. LAwFoRD (United Kingdom): 1 should like to speak at this time on the subject of the paragraph in the resolution under discussion. Like the Syrian Government, my Government is rather pessimistic about the. likelihood of ever finding anybody suitable on whom all of us could agree. After careful consideration, the oruy alternative seems to us ta be a commission of governmental representatives; and as regards the number of the representatives, my Government feeIs strongly that there is no practicai aIternative to the full e1even. The proposaI which Mr. Parodi introduced this morning is attractive in a way, but there seem to be two points in cOIDlexion with it which are perhaps worth discussing. . In the first place, 1 think, as has aIready been pointed out, that this commission would not really be representative of the Security Council. !n.the second place, 1 am nat quite sure how far ~=::t~.t~~ay, as 1 think he said, that the l should also like to make a remark about the Colombian representative's suggestion. The Colombian representative spoke-and l am sure we all agree with r..im-of bis desire for the conciliation of opposing views and of the need to achieve the greatest measure of agreement. l fully sympathize with his aims; but in the light of bis own words, l asked myself in what way is the area of disagreement that exists in the Council likely to be reduced in a commission such as he proposed, given the fact that under bis proposai the United States of America and the Union of Soviet SociaIist Republics would be on the commission. During the interpretation of his preceding remarks, the representative of the United King· dom made the following statement: l have a point of order. l should simply like to make it quite clear that-·the interpretation was exactly accurate-I was not suggesting that Poland was not neutral, but that the choice of .Foland in this particular connexion could not be based on the criterion of neutrality. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated trom French): l thought a wish had been expressed just now that members of the Council should give their opinion on the various proposaIs which have been made. l think that it would be desirable to adopt asimple formula for the composition of the commission. By a simple formula, l mean one that would not oblige the Security Council to make a choice. The experienc~ of the past has shown us the difficulties which might arise from such a choice. 1 think t..1Us would be especially the case if the Council adoptedthe suggestion made a moment ago by the representative of Syria, for the formula he proposed is simple only in appearance. The nnly rel.;.lining simple formulas are either that the commission should be composed of the eleven members of the Security Council, or that it should be composed of the non-permanent members. Both of these formulas have advantages and disadvantages. For my part, if l had to choose, l should prefer the formula submitted by the Australian delegation. The Coùncil has tried the formula of a composition identical with its own; perhaps it might now try the other alternative. Mr. HSIA (China): Without finally committing my delegation as to its exact preference until we have heard the statement of the representative of the United States, J wish to make, at tms stage, a few tentative observations. .diale. In the first place, we share the view of the United Kingdom that a single commissioner would be ideaI, if such a person couId be found. It seems, from aU reports, that that is not possible. Then our first preference is to have a COIDmission of eleven members; failit;lg that, we prefer the Colombian proposaI of seven members to the French proposaI of six members representing the non-permanent members of the Security Council, Here are some of the reasons. The first is the question of size. To us size is not really important. It is true that the size of the commission might be unwieldy, but we do not know how things are going to develop in the Balkans. If there is going to be a lot of work for the commission, then even with only one commissioner, or six commissioners, or severi commissioners, the commission would have to have a very large staff. of perhaps severaI hunmed people. Therefore, the addition of a few more commissioners does not seem to me to be a very important considerati<m. The second consideration is concemed with possible disagreements within the commission. Here 1 agree with Mr. Johnson that, if there is disagreement, it is certainly sharper among a smaller number than a larger number. 1 believe thatis one of the reasons why certain delegations are in favour of a commission of eleven members. They favour this proposaI because they think when disagreements arise there will be more of a cusmon and more room for compromise. The most important is the third consideration. We are in favour of a larger commission of eleven members because such a commission, including all the permanent members of the Sec~ty Council, would have all the knowledge ~d authority it must have in the discharge of lts responsibility. 1 think the idea of excluding permanent members of the Security Council is inadvisable. Mter aIl, sorne of the permanent members of the Security Council know a great deal about the .question, ~e more interested in the success of the commission, and have the authority necessary to bring .about an agreement among the Balkan coüntries. 1 am sure our Balkan friends probably respect people who know the problems and who carry authoriry. 1t is my belief that th<: commission would be more likely to succeed if its members possessed a large measure of knowledge and authority. . .These are just my preliminary remarks concerning the position of the Chïnese delegation. Ml'. LÔPEz (Colombia): 1 should like to have the opportunity of making a reply to the United Kingdom representative with regard to how 1 believe that reducing the number of permanent members in the commission might help to reduce the disagreement. 1 do not know whether 1 shall svcceed;perhaps 1 shall not. 1 have already said that the way this debate has been started makes us feel that il: is practicall~' hopeless to expect to reach an agreement. However, we have seen that, as we proceed in our discussion, we succeed in reaching more agreement than we expected, particularly from the 'point of view of the Colombian delegation. We read in the press on several occasiop.s that our suggestions or proposaIs had been rejected by the United States delegation. We found that, as they.arose for disc'lssion, one after the other of our proposals has been accepted by the delegation of the United States. That 'has given us greatsatisfaction. 1 need not say how much we appreciate the way in which Ml'. Johnson has accepted our suggestions. As we look at the general situation, most of us seem to believe that nothing can be done to change it. That-if 1 am not mistaken-is substantially the position taken by the representative of the United Kingdom. He seems to think that the situation will remain the same. 1 should not like to misinterpret him, and that is why 1 am asking whether that is substantially his position. Howev~r, 1 do want to say that, if we accept. .that premise, thex:e is no use discussing anything. If we cannot bring about a change, if we cannot Perhaps it is because 1 am an inveterate optimist that 1 consider it the duty of the small nations to persist in an attempt to see if an agreement is possible. 1 believe that, if we had given the present Commission the responsibility of bringing about an understanding, it would have done so. 1 also believe that, if we give the responsibility to one or the other of the pe~anent members of the Security Council to try to bring about this understanding, we shall have a much betteF chance of succeeding. If we have eleven members on the commission, we are likely to have very long and protracted discussions, as we have had heretofore, on every L-nportant matter. Perhaps if we try to place the responsibility on one of the permanent members of the Council--.-a representative of the United Kingdom, or of Frapce or Chinaand thus reduce the number of those responsible for the results, we may be increasing the possibility of achieving better results. .et In using the formula of a commission composl~d of eleven members, we have failed so often anù for sa long a period that 1 feel as much inclined as the Belgian representative to try something new. That is why, after giving considerable thought to this matter, and without feeling too sure of my ground-because no formula has succeeded sa far in convincing us that it is the .right one for resolving any important questions here-I am inclined to venture to recommend the following formula: three permanent mem-. bers 01 the Council-;-one, the United States 'of America; another, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; and a third to be chosen from among United Kingdom, France or China-and four non-permanent members of the Council. 1 say this without in any way wishing to insist. 1 simply do not wish to prolong the effort of trying to reach what might be a satisfactory solution. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): 1 should like to make onè further observation, based on a telegram 1 have received from the Australian representative on the Subsidiary Group, which to my mind is a convincing reason for the acceptance of the French and Australian proposals. We have been informed that if a group does not include the permanent members, it will not possess the necessary knowledge. 1 gather that Was the tenor of the remarks of the representative of China. 1 do not know whether all the knowledge on this question resides in the permanent members. The representative of China aIso said such a group would not have the neces- The Council has in mind the very recent incident in Greece which demanded immediate action and investigation. This is what happened: By using a series of proceduraI points, one representative of the permanent members s:ucceeded in preventing the Group from taking a full decision to investigate, and thereby delayed its departure for four days. It was not until Friday evening, 18 July, that an AustraIian proposaI for a formaI decision to investigate fully the frontier incidents which took place between Il July and 13 July-that is, six days previously-was adopted. Mr. HSIA (China): 1 am sorry that the particular case cited happened, but 1 do not see how this is due to too much knowledge or too much authority. Mr. PARODI (France) (translated trom French): The question we are now discussing is certainly a difficult one. 1 think that, as sorne of our colleagues have proposed, we should have until tomorrow to think it over. Mter sleeping on it, we should all be in a better position to make our contributions. 1 should merely like to ask your permission to add a few remarks to what has been said this afternoon by certain members of the Security Council. With regard to the commission's authority, 1 quite understand that this authority would normally be greater if the commission were composed of aIl the members of the Security Council. This would only be the case, however, if they were in agreement. If the presence of the permanent members of the Security Council systematically introduced difficulties into the commisSion-and the Australian representative has just provided an example-1 doubt if its authority would be increased; 1 am more inclined to think that it would be diminished. .As to the question of competence, which wa.s aIso brought forward by our Chinese colleague, 1 should like to point out to him that the countries which are at present non-permanent members of the Security Coul1cil have been associated with the investigation of the Greek affair since last December, and, generally speaking, are now as conversant with the question as the permanent members. 1 submit these considerations somewhat diffidently, once again as contributions to deliberations which we should certainly continue until tomorrow. . l'organe Mr. MUNIZ (Brazil): 1 want to make oruy a few comments and to reserve my decision until 1 have given further consideration to the matter. In the opi.lion of the Brazilian ddegation, the Security Council should have two factors in mind when setting up the commission. The first factor is the representative character of the commission. That body must be a body of the Security Council. The second factor is the elimination of choice in the composition of the Commission. The proposais of the United States and France have the advantage of eliIPinatingthe necessity for making a choice. The Colombian proposal, on the contrary, emphasizes that a choice must be made not oruy among the five permanent members, but also among the non-permanent members. That fact might hamper its adoption. The Australian proposaI meets these two requirements, and its simplicity is also very attractive. The only objection we might make against it is that it proposes an even mimber of members, which might lead to a tie. Ml'. LÔPEz (Colombia): 1 fully concur with the remark made by the French representative; in fact, that was intended to be my main argument. Whateverthe composition of the commission, it is going to refiect the opinion of the States represented; and the principal task of the third permanent member which we had in mind is not to bring about an understanding amongthe members of the commission, but to help bring about an understanding between the two major Powers concerned. 1 do not know wn.ether 1t would be out of place for the President to ask what the Council thinks of adjourning for today, so that we might have time to give more thought to this matter As regards the general adjournment that, since we still have about an hour's time, 1 think it might be useful, to begin the discussion on the next point, without necessarily taking any decision. 1 do not know how the majority of the Council feels, but in view of the fact that the discussion is proceeding rather slowly, 1 am personally inclined, though 1 will not press the mat- . ter, to proceed to the discussion on the next . point, and accomplish as much as possible by six o'dock. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated trom Russian): The USSR delegation has studied thoroughly the amendments submitted by the representative of France. 1 appreciate the spirit in which these amendments have been submitted to the Council. However, 1 must say that these amendments, if adopted by the Security Council, would not change the substance of the United States resolution. The improvement of the resolution, if such amendments were accepted by the Security Council, would be insignificant. Therefore, the attitude of the USSR delegation towards the resolution of the United States, if amended in t.he light of the French proposais,' would be the same as its attiude towards the original United States draft resalutian. . As ta the original United States resolution, 1 have already expressed the opinion of the USSR delegation. 1 am not going to repeat it. 1 have also expression the opinion of the USSR delegation as to the amendments of the United Kingdom which we have considered at our meetings today. . 1 should like to add that what 1 have said relates to all the French amendments, not to any particu!ar one. 1 did not have in mind.the particular amendment we have under consid~ration at this moment. As 1 have alteady stated, what 1 have said relates to all the French amendments under consideration today.

Before passing on to the next point, 1 wish to furnish an explanation which 1 think 1 owe tO the Council as representative of PqLAND. 1 refer to the political commitments which Poland has towards the different Balkan countries•. ~uch aggression, the other High Ccntracting Party shall afford such Party immediate military and other assistance and support by aIl means at its disposaI." In further explanation, 1 wish to add that in the last war against Germany, Poland was .an ally of bath Greece and Yugoslavia. Moreover, the Polish Government considers that the antifascist forces in Bulgaria and in Albania which fought against Germany and which are now in control of the Governments of these countries, were its allies, too. Furthermore, 1 should like to .add that with none of the Balkan countries does Poland have any treatks with regard to maintaining Polish troops many of these count:-ies, or Polish military personnel of any kind; neither does the Polish Government intend ever to enter into any 5uch treaty with any of the Balkan countries or any other countries whatsoever. Mr. LAWFORD (United Kingdom) : 1 am very grateful to the President for his exposition. 1 should now like simply to say that my Government would include Poland on this commission, as a member of the Security Council. 1 said th~t we would not include Poland necessarily, if we were to stipulate that members should be neutrals. Among other things, it would he because l do not know what a neutraI in such a case is.

1 should like to explain that. 1 did not have in mind including or excluding Poland from this commission. 1 simply thought that 1 should give the pu'lition of PoIand in t~âs situation. ' 1 think it is now appropriate to pass on to the next point in the United States resolution, paragraph 3(b), which defines the duties and powers of the cOInmission. On this subject we have a French amendment.2 The French amendment (document S/430) reads, "The functions of the commission shall he those ...", and so on. J shaIl not read 19 ~57ee United Nations Treaty Series, Volume l, 1946- 'r , page 62. With regard to paragraphs 1 to 5 of this amendment, 1 do not think that any too great difficulties will arise. But 1 think that paragraph 6 will raise certain objections; that is the paragraph which deals with the investigating functions of the commission.

Does the representative of the United States now wish to give his reaction to the proposal? Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America): The United States delegation can accept this amendment in part. 1 think, however, it would be simpler for us to indicate our opinion on each paragraph of the amendment if we consid r the paragraphs separately.

We sh:ùl, therefore, discuss the amendment paragraph by paragraph. . As regards paragraph 1 of the amendment, shall ask the representative of the United States to give us his opinion, if he wishes to do so. Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America) The United States delegation accepts the first line of the amendment, i.e.," the simple statement: "The functions of the commission shall be those of conciliation and investigation." The United States delegation aIso accepts paragraph 1: "Ta use its good offices to assist the Governments concerned in the negotiation and conclusion of the frontier conventions recommended U:lder this resolution." We also accept paragraph 2, which reads: "To study and make recommendations to the Govei'nments concerned with respect to such additional biJ.ateral agree1r'.ents between them for the pacific settlements of disputes relating to frontier incidents or conditions on the frontier as the commission consider desirable." We aIso accept the next paragraph relating to refugees.

1 suggest that we limit our discussion at the present time to these three paragraphs; otherwise we may become rather confused. These three paragraphs are acceptable to the representative of the United States.

In view of that statement, 1 -shaI1 include those two paragraphs in our discus- :sion. It would, however, seem desirable that the discussion should proceed in a more orderly fashion. 1 shall, therefore, ask first for comments on paragraph 1. Mr. VILFAN (Yugoslavia) (translated from French): The first line of the third French amendment reads as follows: "The functions of the commission shaH be those of conciliation and investigation. . ." 1 should like to say a few words on the question of principle regarding the <competence of the commission. Whenever our delegation has expressed its views in the last few days, it has done so only in order to indicate our position regarding questiors which have arisen during die course of the debat~o For instance, our delegation did not think it necessary to give its views on paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the amendments submitted by the United :Kingdom representative, for we thought that our views on those paragraphs of the amended United States resolution had been given clearly in our last statement. Today, 1 should like to make an exception and return to a point 1 have aIready dealt with. I shall do so simply because my Government attaches a great deal of importance to this point, namely, the competence of the commission. The United States resolution and the amendments contemplate a commission set up in. advance whïch would be imposed upon the States concerned and which would be empowered to undertake investigations. My Government's opinion is that, under the Charter, such a commission cannot be set up: Chapter VI of the C'l.arter provides for investigation only as a method of procedure, and any decision taken by the Security Council regarding an investigation is a -decision pro fora interna. . 1 shall not embark now on a detailed analysis of Chapter VI of the Charter and of its Articles. You will remember the discussion which arose in the Council two days ago. An attempt was made to justify a commission of this kind by invoking the various Articles of Chapter VI. I could summarize the result of this discussion very ~riefly. 1 shall quote the words of the representa- !lve of France who, after a long discussion dur- ~g which attempts were made, to find justification, in aIl the Articles of Chapter VI, for the establishment of this commission, .'laid the following'::"-I shaH read the text of the English interpretation for 1 have not a French text before lJIIt: "If wel>~~:,~~iri.the literaI interpretation of This means that, if.we translate the last provision of Article 2, paragraph 7 into positive terms, we should say: the Charter restricts the sovereignty of States only in the case of the measures provided for in Chapter VII. It is obvious, however, that the existence of a commission such as that provided for in t.he United States re:;olution restricts the sovereignty of the States concerned. That is why the United States proposaI is contrary not only ta the letter of Chapter VI, but ta the very principles of the Charter. These are, briefly, the reasons why our Government thinks that a commissio:l such as thîs cannot be established if we wish to remain faithfuI to the Charter. But 1should like ta dispel a misunderstanding. We are not returning ta this question for the pleasure of entering upon a procedural quibble. 1 do not think that this has been understood, for otherwise 1 cannot understand·why we are told: "If you do not accept~he commission under Chapter VI, it will be set up under Chapter VII." 1 repeat that we have no wish ta quibble; we wish to defend the principles of the Charter in this matter. This is not only a proceduraI question, but a question of substance. Unis\ mêmes pacifique. d'intervenir soigneusement devient tien prévu première raineté et l'indépendance au mûrir l'indépendance intéressés. coup, de cette "Every assiJtance is provided to the nations themselves to settle their troubles peacefully. The right of the Security CouDcil to intervene develops by carefully grad'..lated stages only as it becomes necessary to do sa for the maintenance of peace." This means that the Charter has deliberately provided for successive stages: it has provided for a first phase, in which the sovereignty and independence of States are respected, and during which any possible agreement is left, so to speak, to mature as a fruit of the independent and free Will of the States concerned. 1 think, gentlemen, that you will detract greatly, not to say entirely, from the moral value of YOUf decisions, if you do not take into account this difference between the Chapters of the Charter. Above all, 1 would ask you what interpretation might be given to your decisions by the States concerned, if they found that when we made criticisms our remarks were simply ignored. Our representative to the Commission of Investigation submitted sorne remarks at Geneva; 1 believe he spoke for several hours. The ma.- jority of the Commissibn took no notice whatever. Gentlemen, 1 have come before yeu. 1 have tried to be as brief as possible, but 1 think 1 have submitted to you remarks which would constitute convincing argL:uents in a court of law, of a nature to involve a revision of the verdict. 1 have not even received a reply. prétation sions que, la heures. 1 ask you, what can be the impression in my country when 1 observe at the same time that a powerful State rightly expressed a very definite legal opinion, two years ago, with regard ta the interpretation of Chapter VI of the Charter? What are we ta think whèn we find that, two days after 1 made my remarks, 1 have not yet received a reply? You will not be surprised when 1 say that the~e is only one possible explanation: stat pro ratlOne voluntas, the will is considered as a suffi- , 'iJhal'ter of the United Nations, Report ta the Presia/;:.t on.the results of the San Francisco Conference by t e Chatrman of the United States delegation, Washington, 26 June 1945. Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America): 1 do not agree with the interpretation of the representative of Yugoslavia regarding the intent of our resolution, nor do 1 agree with him in what seems ta he bis interpretation of the Charter. 1 should not like to engage in a long juridical argu..11lent without some opportunity for preparation, but 1 must attempt to refute certain points which the Yugoslav representati'-e has made. 1 do not in the slightest degree challenge the sincerity of bis approach or what he said; it is simply a question of complete disagreement on my part. Chapter VI of the. Charter contains two Articles, Articles 33 and 34 which, in my opinien, are complementary and are not interdependent. Article 33 imposes a moral and-if one may say so-a legal obligation on individual Members of the United Nations, obligations which flow basically from Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter. Paragraph 2 of Article 33 stipulat~.s that, if the Members of the United Nations who may have causes of difference, have not, without any prodding from tbis Couneil whatsoever, fully performed their moral duty to O·:"èY the injunction contamed in paragraph 1 of Article 33, then the Security Council, when it deems necessary, should caU upon the parties to' settle theh' dispute. by the peaceful means stipulated in Article 33, paragraph 1. However, the Security Council, when told in Article 33 that it ". . . shaH . . ." after consideration <G.' •• when it deeros necessary, call UpOG the parties to settle their dispute by such means," has also other means at its disposaI for carrying out its duties under the Charter as the guardian of international peace. It is Article 34, which confers full and complete authority on the Security Couneil to investigate any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute. If, in order to make such an investigation, the Security Council feels it necessary j,. go itself to the territory of some Member State, or to the territory of some non-member State, which for the purposes of the dispute has accepted its obligations, the Security Couneil has the right to ask that State for certain facilities and for cooperation. The actual implementation of that request may enta': certain inconveniences to the 1 :::~tate ~anting it, but tî.:;><;e im:onveniences are to be expected, if they are n;.c1;~'gar: for carrying out the purposes of the C.:::'.rteL This does not mean that the Security Council, the United Nations (: any individual Member of the United Nations dei:iires to impair the sovereignty of that State. Any treaty entered into que donner pas drait signifierait pratiquement ne par rien depuis résolution convaincre du et liation doctrine la 34, pouvoir agréable est Yougoslavie vertu chargée Yougoslavie prétation et qu'elle annulerait l'ensemble du In' my honest opinion, if the interpretation which has just been given by the representative of Yugoslavia of what may or may not be (Vue by the Council under Chapter VI is accepteJ, it would mean a complete nullL4ication of Article 34. It would mean that Chapter VI, for all practical purposes, consists of Articles 33, 36 and 37. l do not think that anything that the Yugoslav representative has said, nor anything that has been said at the Council table since the discussion of the United States resolution began, has in any way convinced me that our resolution exceeds the bounds of Chapter VI. The Council certainly has powers and rights of conciliation, and unless the doctrine just proposed by the representative of Yugoslavia is rejected, it would have no power under Article 34 ta make investigations. The Council has the power to make those investigations whether or· not the country being investigated likes it; that is the fundamental issue. The representative of Yugoslavia claims that the Council can set up a commission to make investigations in Yugoslavia under Chapter VI only if Yugoslavia consents. l think that is completely erroneous as an interpretation of the Charter, and it would nullify the whole operative intent of Chapter VI. Mr. PARODI (FrRnce) (translated tram French): l have listened carefuUy to the extremely interesting observations just made by the Yugoslav representative. 1 should like to make one or two remarks on the considerations he has put forward. The Yugoslav representative quoted a phrase l used the other day which contained the expression "the literaI interpretation of the text" :with regard to Article 34. 1 should like to !rlake it quite clear that when 1 said "literaI interpretation" 1 did not mean a true and proper interpreiation of the text, but, on the contraty, a tion slavie. ~1arrow interpretation regardless of a reasonable meaning or of the most ~·tlSonable meaning. When l used this expression-<!-nd it may he possible that the interpretation 1 gave was doubtfuI from the legal point of view-what 1 meant to say was: "an interpretation which is too narrow to constitute a good legal interpretation". That is how 1 understood the expression which l used. ~ith regard to the Yugoslav representative's other remarks, if 1 understood him correctly, they referred to the sentence introciucing aU this . part of the amendments: "The functions of the ~~~~J~ In our opinion, the phrase, "The functions of t;he commission shall be those of conciliation and investigation", does not mean that powers of investigation will be given in respect of aIl the paragraphs. Paragraph 1 involves only functions of conciliation. The same applies to paragraphs 2, 3, and 4.. It is paragraph 6 that defines cases where powers of investigation will be used, and it refers only to paragraph 5. 1 think that we . are agreed on this point. 1 would ask the United States representative if he aIso interprets the ~atterin this way. In any case, the amen(ilnent was submitted in this spirit, and this limits the bearing of the remarks made in this connexion by the Yugoslav representative. 1 think that the Yugoslav representative's remarks do not apply to the pragraphs we are now discussing-I mean the fust four; we should, therefore, consider them in connexion with paragraph 6. In these circumstances, 1 should prefer to reserve mt reply on sùbstance until we begin to discuss paragraph 6. If 1 were to reply immediately, 1 wouldbe anticipating the debate on the latter paragraph. Mr: VILFAN (Yugoslavia) (translated trom French): When 1 quoted the passage from the French represe1.tative's speech, 1 though 1 ·was interpreting it in the same sense as he was. ': The essential thing 1 wished to say was t'hat the French representative had observed that the ArtiCles of Chapter VI did not expressly justify setting up such a commission. If this is th«:f interpretation of the passage concerned, that is enough for me. And 1 added that the Charter contains a passage which expressly prohibits setting up such a commission: 1 mean ArtiCle 2, _paragraph 7. That is my reply to the first question raised by the French representative. Why have 1 raised this question in connexi.on with the first sentence of the French amendment? 8imply because we are confrontcd here with two iJroblen:ls. We have to decide whether the Security Councii is empowered. not only to conduct an investigation, 1:wt aIso to set up a com- 1.lDs,<jÏûr. <t:!d to impose it on the countries con- \ With regard to the United States representative's remarks, 1 believe that 1 emphasized chiefly the fact that he shOlùd quarrel not with me but with the report to the President of the United States. That is the essential point, and aIthough the United States representative may consider his arguments to be enough to refute this report, they have not convinced' me. There isone point only on which 1 am in full agreement with the United St~~tes representative: that is that the members of a commission set up under Article 34 have no right to enter the territory of aState which has not'given its consent. 1 share the United States representative's views on this matter. Why? Because this is in conformity with the provisiorlsof the Charter and with the interpretation of the report to the President of the United States. It is obvious that the right to conduct an investigation in the territory of aState inevitably constitutes a restriction of that State's sovereignty. The· Charter, however, lays down that national sovereignty should. be limited only in very specific conditions: if there is a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or aggression. That is why l think it is quite unnecessary to analyse Article 34. That Article is clear. It merely provides for a method of procedure. Decisions taken under Article 34 are decisions taken pro fo1'o interno of the Security Council. The United States representative said that States ·often sign agreements, and that each of these agreements to some ext€:nt represents a limitation of sovereignty; he said that the signà- ture of the Charter also constituted a limitation of sovereignty, and that the fact that States signed the Charter meant that they were accepting a certain limitation of their sovereignty in advance. That is true. But the Charter clearly states in what conditions national sovereignty can be limited, a.nd it can only be limited as laid down in Chapter VII. It w.as because the spirit and the letter of the Charter Were 50 clear that GU;" Organization could be set up and that the Charter received so many signatures. Ml'. JOHNSON (United States of America): In reply to the representative of Franr u 'vho said he would like to know whether my TI: .. etation of his amendment is the same as lus, 1 should like .to say that it is. The expression which was the immediate cause of the inquiry of the representative of Yugoslavia-that is, the plain, As regards functions of investigation, however, the situation is entirely different. There the Council has a duty-or may have a duty-to the entire United Nations which would override the consideration of the desires of any individual State. 1 shall not attempt to argue in detail because 1 do not feel competent to do so at this moment, but 1 totally reject the interpretation given to Article 34 by the representative of Yugoslavia. 1 should like to point out to the representative of Yugoslavia, however, that consistent with what we be1ieve to be the real intent and meaning of Chapter VI, judged in the light of its history and its formation, and even in the light of the statement of the Secretary of State to which he referred, A:ticle 34 gives the Security Council the right to investigate any dispute regardless of whether or not the State investigated approves or likes it; and other stipulations of the Charter impose on the State being i..1J.vestigated the dut to accept the investigation whether or hot it likes it, and to co-operate loyally. That Article does not confer on the Security Couneil, operating under Chapter VI, any power of sanction or any POWCT of tnforcement. Article 34 gives the Security COUi":cil the means to find out the facts behind al~Y ;,ù'i.mtwlwhich it may determine to investigatE, ~.. o that those facts can be brought before the CouCcciJ in order.:hat it may decide upon the necessary action to he taken under whichever Article or Chapter of the Charter may be appropriate. Bu 1 do not think !hat the Council can accept that it ma)' be frustrated in making an investigation siinply·by the will of one Member of the United Nations who ~~"i'?~"-~'0!~.lij!,~~~.~J'f;l~~~1I,l~:""'~~~~~"!~~"''''''''';'~'''';:' Chapter VI as weIl as many other things in the Charter, it seems to me must also be interpreted in the light of Articles 1 and 2 of the .Charter; and Chapter VI must be read in conjunction with Article 24 when ,consideration. is being given to the powers of the Secunty Council. 1 again repeat that the thesis advanced by the representative of Yugoslavia would complete1y stultify any possible action under Chapter VI, for it would be subject to the veto of any one (lf the fifty-five Members of the United Nations. Mr. VILFAN (Yugoslavia) (translated trom French): If 1 understand rightly, the discussion we have started today will deve10p when we disa cuss point 6?

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