S/PV.1678 Security Council

A number of representatives of countries which are not members of the Security Council in letters addressed to me, have asked to participate, without the right to vote, in the debate on the item before us. These countries are the following: Chad, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mauritius, Morocco and Sierra Leone. 2. As I hear no objection, I shall, in accordance with past practice and the provisional rules of procedure of the Council, invite them to participate, without the right to vote, in our discussion. 3. In view of the limited number of places at the Council table, I shall invite the representatives concerned to take the places reserved for them in the Council Chamber, on the understanding that they will be called to the Council table when it is their turn to speak. At the invitation of the President, Mr. A. Oueddo (Chad), Mt. 2. Gabre-Sellassie (Ethiopia), Mr. R Weeks (Liberia), Mr. R. Ramphul (Mauritius). Mr, A. Benhima (Morocco) and Mr. I. Taylor-Kamara (Sierra Leone) took the places reserved for them in the Council Chamber.

I have also received a letter dated 22 November from the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia in which he requested, in accordance with a decision taken by that Council at its 161st meeting, on 22 November, to be invited to participate in the discussion of the Security Council at the time of its consideration of the report of the Secretary- General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 319 (1972) concerning the question of Namibia. I therefore propose that the Security Council extend an invitation to the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. 5. As I hear no objection, I shall invite Mr. Olcay, President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, to take a place at the Council table. At the invitation of the &esident, Mr. 0. Olcqv, IPesident of the United Nations Council for Namibiio, took a place at the Council table.

The Security Council will now proceed to the discussion of the item on its agenda. 1 should like to draw the attention of members to document S/10832 and Corr.1, containing the report of the Secretary-General. 7. I call on the Secretary-General, who wishes to make a statement. 8, The SECRETARY-GENERAL (interpretation from French): Madam President, I have not had the opportunity before this meeting to address the Security Council since you became President. It therefore gives me great pleasure to extend to you my congratulations. It is of special significance that you should earn the distinction of being the fast woman to preside over the Council during its 27 years of existence. It is also fitting that you should preside at a time when the Council has been primarily concerned with the problems relating to the great continent of Africa. In the few months that you have represented your country at the United Nations, and in particular during the present month as President of the Security Council, you have not only given able leadership, but also made constructive contributions to the deliberations of the Council. In paying a tribute to you, Madam President, we are also honouring the Government and people of Guinea for their outstanding contribution to the work of the United Nations. [The speaker continued in English.f 29. That that woman should also be an African adds to our satisfaction, for it is more than a symbol: Africa, which but a few years ago was absent from international councfls, has in the space of a decade travelled a very long road. That it is an African woman who has been in the vanguard of that road and is the first to have assumed the presidency of the Security Council is due, no doubt, to what we might be tempted to call coincidence or chance; in politics, however, the mysteries of chance coincide with intelligence. May I add that since the intellectual qualities of a lady are often used by ill-wishers as the only epithets to describe a woman who is not good-looking, it is delightful that our President combines these intellectual and political qualities with African beauty. 24. It will be noted further that Mr. Vorster has stated his readiness to consider removing certain restrictions on freedom of movement and to permit “legitimate political activity including freedom of speech and the holding of meetings.” One would have hoped for an unequivocal decision to institute fully these fundamental rights, but it might be useful to ascertain the precise nature of the proposed measures and their possible effects on the political life of the Territory. While it may be too early to speculate on the future course of events in the Territory, it would appear desirable that in the months ahead the United Nations should remain in touch with developments. Having regard to all the circumstances, and in spite of the gap that remains between the position of South Africa and that of the United Nations, it is my view that the door should not be closed to further contacts. 30. The matter which is before the Council for consideration today is unfortunately one of those chronic problems which the United Nations has not succeeded ih solving. We are periodically summoned to the General Assembly, the Fourth Committee or the Security Council to deal with this problem which comes up cyclically and on which no progress is ever made. The Power which is responsible for this situation has never been prevailed upon to make any promise of understanding, co-operation or goodwill. And it is perhaps of its very nature one of the problems on which the United Nations has experienced constant and very painful frustrations. Some time ago the Security Council took this question up with some hope. I would like to pay a tribute to the Secretary-General here for prevailing upon South Africa to agree for the first time to having the United Nations exercise its rights in regard to a Territory under its trusteeship. South Africa had for a decade repulsed the Secretary-General of the United Nations and refused all dialogue with the Organization. This time the Secretary General secured results, and his efforts deserve credit; I am happy to pay a tribute to him for this success. 25. It is, of course, for the Security Council to decide. Should the Council wish the contacts to be continued, I hope that it would be possible to count on. the help and advice of the group of three established pursuant to Security Council resolution 309 (1972), whose assistance in the past has proved invaluable+ 31. However, our illusions were shortlived. We had thought that this door which had opened to dialogue with the United Nations represented a far-reaching change in South African policy. No matter what reservations or what caution we might feel, whatever limits we might wish to place on our optimism, and particularly the optimism of the peoples concerned, we had to recognize that this attitude was a gesture of a new kind. 26. The PBESIDENT (interpretation from French): I am extremely grateful for the very kind words the Secretary- General addressed to my Government and to me. 27. The first speaker on the list is a r. Benhima, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Morocco and Acting President of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and make his statement. 32. The Security Council had authorized the Secretary- General to initiate these discussions and to select a personal representative to conduct a mission which would investigate on the spot the nature of the policies of South Africa, the political realities in the Territory, the degree of political consciousness and the wishes of the population, and secure-in the short or long term-a definition of South African policy which could serve as a working basis for the Security Council and the United Nations.

The Council has held many meetings since 1 November when you, Madam President, assumed the presidency of this Council. Those many meetings have given both to members of the Council and to other participating delegations around this table an opportunity to pay tribute to your merits and to express their great respect for you and for the Government of Guinea. I am sure that you will &OW me to avail myself of this opportunity to express the pride of the representative of Morocco and those I have the 33. Unfortunately, the Prime Minister of South Africa who was probably moved by domestic considerations in 53. South Africa continues its odious efforts to di+ member and annex the Territory; it persists in flouting the appeals of the General Assembly, the efforts of the Security Council and the pronouncements of the International Court of Justice, and it continues to inflict its repressive policies upon the peoples of that African country.

I thank the representative of Morocco for his tribute to my country and myself. 48. The next name on the list is that of the Foreign Minister of Liberia. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement. 54. There are, in our opinion, two essential backgrounds against which the Council’s current consideration of the question concerning Namibia should be viewed. The first is the historical background, which includes the actions taken so far by the United Nations and its organs, including the International Court of Justice; the attitude of the South African Government in the premises; and the condition of the people of the Territory, with particular reference to’the denial of their freedom of speech and movement and their inalienable right to self-determination and independence. The other background, which I propose to deal with here, is the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Council’s latest resolution concerning the question of Namibia.

During the quarter-century existence of the United Nations one of the Organization’s most significant achievements has been in the field of decoionization. The United Nations was founded with 51 Member States. Today its membership has grown to 132, most of its new Members being territories which were under colonial domination in 1945. But the Council will, I am sure, agree that the task of dismantling the colonial system is still unfinished. Colonialism continues to rear its ugly head in new and varying forms, especially on my own continent of Africa, where it presents its most difficult and most intransigent problems. There are pockets of resistance to which we must concertedly lend our efforts and bring to a long overdue close this terrible chapter in human history. Africa is committed to that goal, and so is the United Nations. 55. A careful study of the report has given rise to many questions which, with the Council’s indulgence, I wish briefly to review. 56. The report implies that South Africa has some rights in Namibia, since the Secretary-General’s representative stated to the South African Prime Minister that he was in Namibia with “the full co-operation” of the South African Government. This, in the view of my delegation, is contrary to the position reflected in all United Nations resolutions on Namibia and contrary to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice that South Africa has no legal rights in Namibia. 50. On 15 November 1972 the Council afforded me the opportunity to address this august body on Portuguese colonialism in Africa [1672nd meeting/. It is therefore with an abiding sense of gratitude that I take advantage of the opportunity to address the Council again today, in its consideration of the question of Namibia. 51. The Government of Liberia and the Organization of African Unity attach great importance to the possibility that we may be able to call to the Council’s attention and the attention of the whole world the intransigent attitude of the South African Government in its continued repressive measures against the indigenous people of Namibia, its violation of the sacred trust of civilization and its illegal persistence in controlling the affairs of Namibia against the wishes of the majority of the population of that country and the authority of the United Nations. 57. In paragraph 15, the representative refers to victimization of Namibians who had met previously with the Secretary-General, but the report does not indicate whether the representative made any attempt to have the South African Government account for them. For example, was there anything inconsistent between Mr. Vorster’s assurantes and the fact that Mr. G. N. Maxuilili was banned after the Secretary-General’s visit and that the banning order was lifted only for the duration of his interview with Mr. Escher? In view of the allegations as to the fate of persons who saw the Secretary-General and of the failure of the South African Government to disprove those allegetions, did the representative believe the Prime Minister’s assurances this time? If so, on what grounds? If not, what guarantees did he seek? 52. As the United Nations Office of Public Information has SO rightly put it, for two decades the United Nations has patiently and persistently sought to persuade South Africa to bring Namibia under the United Nations Trusteeship System and to fulfil the obligations of its Mandate towards the people of Namibia. The question of Namibia -_ S9. My delegation wonders why the rcprescntalive felt any need for clarification of South Africa’s policy on .sclfdetermination nnd independence for Namibia? Surely he must have known or should 1~~ bccn tdd tiIi$t South Africa’s Mandate over South West Africa had been termb nated and that consequently South Africa’s policy as to self-determination was totally irrelevant to his mission. 60. South Africa’s policy on self-determination is a matter of public record. It is to be found in the country’s legislation and in numerous public statements by members of the South African Government in Parliriment~ The policy is clear: South Africa dots not intend to grant, sovereignty to Namibia and Namibians, either as a territorial entity or even in individual ‘“home1ands”. South Africa merely intends to grant some vague form of home rule to Namibia by the terms of which Namibia would remain perpetually under South Africa’s over-all control. 61, Admittedly, the aide-m&moire to the Secretary. General by the group of three, which is conttincd irt annex I to the report, suggested that: “The main task of the representative should be to obtain a complete and unequivocal clarification from the Government of South Africa with regard to its policy of self-determination and independence for Namibia, so IS to enable the Security Council to decide whether it coincides with the United Nations position on this matter. , ,“, Ilowever, this term of reference should not hrtve beon interpreted as reversing previous resolutions tcrminnting South Africa’s Mandate or the opinion of the lnternutionul Court of Justice that South Africa has no legal rights in Namibia. It is, in fact, n challcngc to the South African Government either to change its position now or to persist in its intransigence, thus unequivocally clarifying its current position and enabling the Council and the United Nations to pursue the most expeditious course of action for “establishing the necessary conditions” tn enable the people of Namibia “to exercise their right to self-dcterminatlon and independence” possible. with as little further delay as 62, Prime Minister Vorster’s statement, as reflected in paragraph 21 of the report, that it was not appropriate to discuss selfwdetermlnation and independence until the “necessary conditions were established and the inhabitants had more administrative , , . experience” can only be interpreted as a refusal to discuss the issue until the “homeland” policy is fully implemented, irk contravention of all United Nations resolutions. Perhaps Mr. Escher should have requested a freeze so that the stulus lluu of the 64. The Council will note from paragraph 11 (j) of the report that the “authority for the wlicrlc TCrrltt)ry” would he only an advisory body, according to the Prime Minister, Scrvicc on such u body would ntrt lead tu legislative or administrative experience, which the Prime Minister himself has stated he deems a nccesstary precondition for even discussing the South African ~,~ov~r~inlent’s interpretation of self-deternlh~ticnn and independence. F”urthcrmclrc, the assumption of trvcr-iIll r~s~)(~~~sib~lit~~ for the ‘I’rrritory by the Prime Minister is a distinction without a difference. For, after all, he wtjuld still have tc> exercise his rersponsi. bilitics and his functions through thr Ministries. 65. Puragnph 21 refers to “inf7ux cwtri711’. I sir~~rely submit tht this is nothing more or lcs$ thtm a fancy term for the paa system, and for imlx&ng unnatural curbs on the freedom of movement of the indi population. The Frime Mi&er’s statement cm freedom of movement is unworthy of rcpctition, a3 it merely promises to consider the pusribility, and not the m&dit.ias, of ellmL1ating the paIs system withuut im@ring its main provision. 66, According to paragraph 21 [i], the Prime Minister made nu prrsmisc whatsuevcr tcr abolish existing restrictions an freedom of speech otnd the holding of politicul mtxtings. Apparently, freedom of’ the press wa$ not even dircumd. He did not offer to repeal or to de&at from applying to Namibia the buic rcprenive ,%mth African laws, such WB the Supprcsslarl of Communhm Act, the Tmwism Act, the Riotous Assemblies Qrdinnncc, the BOSS Act, and so on. There is no indiation that Mr. Escher mada any inquiries &aut put go~errunent actitms in Ovsmhohnd or about the present statu6 of the emergency rcgulutions spplicd there since February, or about persona imprimned or pemdiied under them. 67, There appears to have been no dliicunicm of the abolition of racially discriminatclry laws ttml practices in the Territory. 68, My delegation belicve_s that the report faib to spell out specifically what rcprcllents progrt?~ towrrrds sclf~doterml. nation and indapondcnce for Namibia, with territorial integrity. 69, I consider that the South Africnn Prime Minister has yet to define tha “necessary conditions’” which must be nttalncd before arry further concrete progras can be made 88 to anything the mlsslon is supposed to accompllh. If 71. My delegation believes that the Prime Minister’s “promise to examine the possibility” of certain ameliorative action as to repressive legislation, other than the most important laws maintaining the pass system, commits South Africa to absolutely nothing and does not in any manner offer self-determination. 77. If, therefore, the Security Council believes, as my Government does, that it must uphold the rights of the Namibian people as defined in all the resolutions which the General Assembly and the Security Council have adopted over the years, then let us dispense with diplomatic diversions on the one hand and empty denunciations of South Africa on the other and let us start to consider some realistic methods of getting on with the business of ending South Africa’s unlawful occupation of Namibia, and ensuring the early realization of freedom, self-determination and independence for Namibia and its people. 72. In view of the foregoing, I wonder if ‘the readiness of the South African Government to continue the contacts initiated by the Secretary-General is simply a means of voicing meaningless phrases and carrying on a farce which will prevent the United Nations from taking effective action to expel South Africa from Namibia whilst South Africa continues entrenching itself against attack. 73. My delegation believes that unless the South African Government comes forth immediately with meaningful actions for self-determination of Namibia as a whole under majority rule, the Security Council and the United Nations should not take the bait of these present gestures. My delegation believes that the time has come to start the process of implementing the substantive resolutions on Namibia, and of applying the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. 78. To that end, my delegation believes that there are two alternative courses of action open to the United Nations and the Security Council. The first is to renew the mandate of the Secretary-General to continue his “contacts” with the Government of South Africa but with very specific guidelines and terms of reference and with specified dates for the achievement of the stated objectives of the Unjted Nations. The other course is to take certain direct and concrete steps, with or without the co-operation of South Africa, should the first alternative fail to produce satisfactory results within a specified time, in order to obtain and safeguard peace and security in Namibia. 74. My delegation must state further that it is not clear whether, as the situation stands now, the United Nations is not faced with the problem that the terms by which consultations with the South African Government have commenced have not, in fact, undermined the United Nations authority by accepting, or at least implying, +e right of the South African’Government to dictate the terms on which the Secretary-General or his representative should enter a Territory over which South Africa exercises no lawful rights and over which the United Nations has sovereign rights. Yet, as we understand it, the South African Government not only dictated as to the person whom the Secretary-General might send as his representative to a country lawfully under United Nations jurisdiction, but now seeks to dictate the terms urider which the United Nations should implement its resolutions in respect of the country. 79. But before outlining these proposals for the Council’s consideration, my delegation believes that the following observations may be relevant and useful. 80. First, my delegation recognizes the difficult and complicated nature of the assignment of the representative and the unfavourable circumstances under which he assumed that responsibility, not to mention the impediments and the handicaps which he obviously encountered in undertaking to execute those grave responsibilities. If, therefore, our assessment of the results of his efforts seems critical, it is by no means intended to question the honesty and integrity with which he conducted this most difficult assignment. On the contrary, my delegation continues to hold the representative of the Secretary-General in high esteem for the manner in which he conducted the difficult “contacts” with the Government of South Africa. We have no doubt that with time-and time is important-with the opportunity to develop deeper insights into the nature of the problem, and with the objective assessment which all concerned here will no doubt make of his first efforts, he should be able to grapple more effectively with these problems in the months to come. That is our sincere hope. 75. It is a known fact that the South African Government continues to expand and extend “Bantustans” in defiance of United Nations resolutions. It continues to enforce repressive legislation against citizens of a foreign country over which it has no lawful jurisdiction. It continues to deny the inhabitants of the Territory basic human rights. Is it under such circumstances that the Secretary-General is to continue his “contacts” with all parties concerned, with a view to establishing the necessary conditions to enable the people of Namibia freely, and with strict regard to the principle of human equality, to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations? 81. Secondly, my delegation believes that it matters not what resolutions or declarations are adopted, what efforts 82. Thirdly, the proposals that I shall now set forth are not intended to be mutually exclusive of one another. They may be regarded as alternatives or they may be bnple. mented in whole or in part, simultaneously. 83, With those observations, my delegation proposes, in the first instance, that the Security Council should renew the mandate of the Secretary-General to proceed, through his representative, with “contacts“ with the Government of South Africa, guided by the followhlg specific terms of reference. 84. First, an affimation: (a) of all United Nations reso. lutions adopted on the question of Namibia; (b) thut the Government of South Africa no longer has any right to govern Namibia, as declared by the General Assembly aud the Security Council; (c)of respect for the territorial integrity of Namibia, as nn international Territory; (d) that Namibia shall attain its indspendancc on a date to be determined by the people themselves. 85. Secondly, that the people of Namibia, irrespective of race or ethnic origin, are to be consulted by the Sectetury General during and after the period of “contacts”, and thrlt their views shall be given preferonce, without prejudice to their status, 86, Thirdly, that South Africa be directed to take no action, during the period of “contacts” md after, which would alter or tend to alter the special international status of Namibia. 87. Fourthly, that all exiled Namibians would be allowed to return home without the risk of imprisonment, dcteution or punishment of any kind bemuse of their previous political activities in or outsidc the Territory. 88. Fifthly, that all political prisoners will be released, without distinction as to party or as to rnce. 89. Sixthly, that the Secretary-General tluou& his reprcsontative will seek further clarification from the South Afrhln Goverrmlent on the followillfi points: (u) the terms of reference of the proposed advisory cou~~cU, including its nature, its composition and its objcctivcs; (h) what is meant by “necessary conditions” with respect to the cpstiott of self-determination and independence for Namibia; (c) the question of assumption by the Prime Mirlister of direct, ‘*over-all responsibility for the Territory as a whole .,i.c,, distinct from the ministries now rcsponsiblc for different sectors”; and (lrl the procedure whereby Namibia should accede to national independence and sovereignty, including the establishment of a target date for indcpcndcncc. 90. Seventhly, a visit to South Africa and Namibia by the reproscntativc of the SccrctaryGcnoral, on a date to be 9% In the first place, all United Nations spccialiied agencies and other organizntiuns ccmneetcd with the United Nations should be strongly urged by the United Nations to take steps to prevent the &vcrnment of South Africa from representing the Territory, either explicitly or implicitly, in law or in fact, in such a@ncies or orgtmizations. Thus, inter crlia, such agencies and wrganizations shou1d require that South African statistin exclude Namibian data; that all Suuth hfricarl products, personnel, sites and so on, should ba limited tu South Africa’s own products, personnc1, sites and so on, excluding those from Nmnibiat. 93. One method of assuring that South Africa does not in fact represerrt Namibia iu such agencies and nrganhntions would be for Numihia to become either a full ar an assucintc member and such aigenciex and qquGz.ations should be strongly urged by the United Nations to act favourably, by reasrmabls extension of’ their constitutions and rules whcrc necessary, on rr.uy application for member ahip submitted by the Wrlitcd Neliuna Cuuncil for Namibia, The corollary of this proposal is lhnt the General Assembly should vote an adequate budget to enable tlut Council to be represented in such agencies and tnrganhations by competent, trained reI~r~s~~~t~~ive~, 94, In the second place? all intarnationd &nd multilateral treatfes nnd conventions sp~r~(~red directly or indirectly by the United Nations tihc~uld be open for &nature by the Council for Namibia. The COUW.~~ should be substituted for South Afric,a in any such treaty or convestbn to the extent that South Africa heretofore, explicitly or implicitly, represented Namibia in xespest of such treaty or convention, !75. In the third place, St&s hlembcrs of the United Nations should accept accredited representatives of the Council for Namibia in their respective territories to carry out approprinte functions iuld to prevent representation h fact of Namibian interests by South Africa. Member Stutes shouid also nccept Namibian tmvcl documents and honour visas issued by the Caurrci1 for Namibia for travel in Namibia, 96. In the fourth place, the Council for Namibia should have an adequate staff of competent eqzrts from various disciplines, including outside cxpcrts if ncccssary, to provide it with adctluate technical assistance and guidance in all phases of its activities. Qualified Namibiarls should be engaged to fill such posts or as interns in training, whenever fcnc;iblc. 97. A research programme should h established to provide both km&term studies valuable for a future Namibian Government und also informntisn and techticaI assistance for the Council rind its representatives in United Nations agcncics and ~~raa[~~~ati~~xls on dayetuduy problems. 99- In the fifth place, the Council for Namibia should be encouraged to take measures, which will assist the future Narnibian State when it comes into being. In addition to the kind of research projects discussed above, the Council, with the aid of the Secretariat or outside experts, should undertake the following: (a) the establishment of a land title registry, which would require every person who claims title to land in Namibia to file his claim, with copies of or references to documents on which such claim is based. Although the Council may not be in a position to adjudge registered claims, the registry would help to preserve records and claims against the passage of time and the confusion which may accompany transition from South Afi-ican rule to self-rule; (b) the registration of all corporations doing business in Namibia, setting modest fees for such registration. The Council may provide penalties for failure to register, including denial of the right to operate under the corporate name in the event of failure to register; and fc) the drafting and enactment of corporate tax legislation. Such legislation should embrace all companies doing business in Namibia, and should provide for penalties for failure to pay such taxes. 100. In the sixth place, the Council should denounce as invalid all South African laws purportedly applied to Namibia after the revocation of the Mandate. It shquld also be authorized to repeal earlier repressive or discriminatory legislation, to enact new legislation and to amend existing legislation, as the circumstances may warrant. 10 I. In the seventh place, the Council may also grant its own concessions or licences to exploit minerals, fisheries or other resources to persons willing to pay a fair fee for such concessions. 102. In the eighth place, the Council for Namibia should issue its own postage stamps, valid for mail originating in Namibia. The sale of such stamps would form a small but steady source of revenue for the Council. 103. These proposed measures will not themselves bring about an automatic end to the illegal South African occupation of Namibia. But they do represent concrete actions, within the ability of the United Nations, which to the extent that they are carried out should make foreign exploitation of Namibian resources in active or tacit co&&oration with the South African Government a little more dubious. More important, these measures will signal

The next speaker is the president of the United Nations Council for Namibia, and I invite him to make his statement.

Allow me first of all, Madam President, to say how happy I am to address the Security Council, which is meeting under your competent and gracious presidency. The Security Council has waited a long time before finding in you the first lady to preside over its work. It is not only your own country, Guinea, and the continent you represent, Africa, which can justly take pride in this but also the whole of mankind, for you symbolize the ideal of equality, to which we all aspire. 106. As president of the United Nations Council for Namibia I am very much aware of the honour that is bestowed on me in allowing me to address the Security Council at the time when it is considering the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 319 (1972) on Namibia. My colleagues on the United Nations Council for Nambia, Mr. Shahi of Pakistan, Mr. Adeniji of Nigeria and Mr. Samuels of Guyana, have already had an opportunity of addressing the Council on this question at the Addis Ababa meetings in January- February of this year and later in New York in July-August 1972. The presence of a representative of the United Nations Council for Namibia during those debates, as well as at other meetings, is a symbol and a recognition of the responsibilities accepted by the United Nations in regard to that Territory. Those responsibilities, let us remember, proceed from the decision of the General Assembly which terminated the Mandate of South Africa over Namibia in 1966, and its establishment of the United Nations Council for Namibia. 107. As all members of the Council know, but as I believe must still be repeated so that it will be engraved on our minds as well as in the annals, the United Nations Council for Namibia was established by the General Assembly as the only organ responsible for the administration of Namibia until independence and was, in the meantime, to prepare the people of the Territory for independence. The mandate of the Council was confirmed in 1971, when the International Court of Justice upheld the United Nations resolutions which declared that the presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal and demanded its withdrawal 108. Parallel with that, the United Nations Council for Namibia has endeavoured to challcngc the representation of Namibia by South Africa at international gatherings. The United Nations Council for Namibia has already represented Namibia at meetings of the Organiwtiun of African Unity and at other internationnl conferences, It may well be that it will shortly participate, as the administering authority, in technical meetings of the International Civil Aviation Organization. Thus the authority af the Council and its action to protect and defend the intcrosts of Namibia and the Namibians are strengthened from day to day. At the same time the Council is redoubling its efforts to follow the situation in the Territory, reveal the intontions of South Africa in proceeding with its policy of “Bantustans” and its practice of aplwlheid and denauncc 1 Legal Coonsequences for States of the Cuntinucd Presence of South Afilm in South West AP&a (Numibfa) notwlthstandlng Security Council resolirtkm 276 (i970), Advisory Opimorr, LC6J: Reports 1971. p. 16. 110. The Council for Namibia also drew the attention of Mr, Escher to the refusal of South Africa to allow the Namibians to exercise their right to self-determination and independence and to its obstinacy and insistence on fragmenting the Territory of Namibia into many noneviable entities on the pretext that the Nandbians could not live together because they belonged to different ethnic groups. The obstinacy of South Africa is furthermore shown in its practice of rt{xu-tlteirf, and confirmed by the arrests and the measures of repression wllich increased, in particular after the visit uf the Secretary+Genetal, and by the restrictions on individual freedoms and the many violations of human rights which continue to afflict Namibia. 111, Regrettably, the observations of the Council for Namibia at that time, as well as the remarks made to Mr, Escher after his return from South Africa, seem not to h&e beon included in the report which is before us. The Utited Nations Council for Namibia, in July last, regretted that it had not bexen consulted for, under the terms of resolution 309 (1972), consultations should have bean carried out with all parties concerned. The United Nations Council for Namibia, according to the mandate conferred upon It by the General Assembly, felt that it was not only an interatcd party but also that it constituted the only legal authority of the Territory. Hare 1 must pay a tribute ta the SecretaryGeneral because, after the adoption uf that resolution and of resolution 319 (1872), he stated hLs intention to co-operate with the United Nations Council for Namibia, and he has already established close contacts with the Prcsidcnt. 1 should also like to thank Mr. Escher for first having understood the need to get in touch with the Council beforc leaving on his mission and immediately nfter hll return from South Africa. But, to be frank, I must also express the disappointment of the Council in seeing itself barely mentioned in tho report. Some members uf the Council for Namibia hoped that not only would their views be included in the report, but that its own report to the General Assembly2 might have constituted one of the annexes to the Secretary-General’s report. But besides this point, which is of considerable imprtance to the United Nations Council for Namibia, the Secretary-General’s report on Mr. E&et’s mission, in the opinion of the members of the Council for Namibia, is very fu from satisfying the concerns of the latter. 2 Offickd Rectnds of rhe General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplemerr t No. 24. 113. Unfortunately, this unanimity, which was expressed by all the Namibians, seems not have served as the basis of the discussions with the South African authorities, despite the fact that in paragraph 14 of his report Mr. Escher indicates that the Prime Minister of South Africa said to him: “Once there was a fully representative view among the inhabitants, both South Africa and the United Nations would have to take cognizance of that view.” Not only does South Africa appear not to want to take into account the wishes of the Namibian people but, on the contrary, seems to wish to have the United Nations-whose resolutions it refuses to recognize, particularly Security Council resolutions 309 (1972), 310 (1972) and 319 (1972), which are the basis for the mission of the Secretary-General-endorse its policy of dismembering the Territory and its practice of apartheid. 114. What would be the purpose of the advisory council mentioned in paragraph 21 if not to legitimize the establishment of ‘LBantustans”, which are also called regions, many of which were set up after the visit of the Secretary-General and to confirm the direct authority of South Africa over the internationally administered Territory of Namibia in defence of the decisions taken by the international community? In reviewing the proposals of South Africa, the Security Council should recall that it was at its own request that the International Court of Justice decided that the presence of South Africa was illegal. To endorse the establishment of this advisory council as proposed and virtually accepted by the representative of the Secretary-General would be tantamount to a failure on the part of the Organization to carry out its own 115. In its aide-mkmoire the group of three laid down the basis for discussions with South Africa. In paragraphs 1 and 2 of the aide-memoire it is stated that all United Nations resolutions adopted on the question of Namibia stand fxm and valid and should be actively pursued and that the contacts to be carried out with the Government of South Africa should always be conducted in accordance with the mandate of resolutions 309 (1972) and 319 (1972). There is nothing to indicate that South Africa considers that the resolutions are valid or that contacts to be established with the Government of South Africa were to be placed in the framework of the mandate defied in resolutions 309 (1972) and 319 (1972). Everything leads us to believe that South Africa continues to claim that the discussions are based on the invitation of its Government addressed to the Secretary-General personally. 116. Furthermore, in paragraph 5 of the aide-m&moire it is stated that the Government of South Africa should discontinue the application of so-called “homelands” policies. Unfortunately, in the report we find no direct reply from South Africa on this question. The impression which we gather from the report, on the contrary, is that South Africa bases its entire future policy on “homelands”, which are modestly called “regions” as a cover-up. 117. The same paragraph calls on South Africa to “abolish any repressive measures in Namibia”. South Africa’s reply to this point has been vague. It is a question of eliminating restrictions of movement without thereby renouncing control, In every legislation in the world the right of a national to move freely within his country is recognized as an inherent right. In Namibia, it was necessary for the Secretary-General and his representative to make a trip there before South Africa declared that it would study the situation. Elsewhere in the report it is indicated that the Prime Minister of South Africa stated that it was desirable that legitimate political activity should exist. To what kind of legitimacy did he refer, and why have political arrests increased? Moreover, the report is discreet, perhaps out of necessity, on the increase in the number of arrests and on the fate of the political prisoners. 118. Finally, we note that in paragraph 3 of the sidememoire it is stated: “The main task of the representative should be to obtain a complete and unequivocal clarification from the Government of South Africa with regard to its policy of self-determination and independence for Namibia, SO as to enable the Security Council to decide whether it coincides with the United Nations position on this matter 3 Quoted in English by the speaker. 120. The discussions with South Africa, which originally were to hiwe referred to the modalities of the transfer of power to the United Nations Council for Namibia, seem to have deviated from their main objective, The Council for Namibia hopes that the Security Council, in taking a decision on the Secretary-General’s report, wit1 take into account, as it should, the fact that the situation in Namibia has not altered since the adoption of resolution 309 (1972). 121. By its attitude, particularly by its rcfusat to accept formally the United Nations resolutions, especial@ rest)+ lutions 309 (X972), 310 (1972) and 319 (19X!), its refusal to discuss its withdrawal from Namibia, its refusal to accept self-determination as being based on the principle uf “one man, one vote” and, finally, its refusal to take up the problems of the release of prisoners and barriers to individual freedoms, South Africa has demonstrated that no dialogue seems to be possible with it. 122. For its part, the United Nations Council for Namibia wishes to reiterate its intention fully to, carry out the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly. In this task it appeals for the assistance and support of the Security Council and requests it to take energetic measures to compel South Africa to withdraw from the Territory EU that the Council for Namibia may go thorc in conformity with the decision of the international community alkd in accordance with the wishes of the Namibian population,

f thank the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia for the very kind words he addressed to my country and to me. 124. I now invite the representative of Ethiopia to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

I wish to avail myself of this opportunity to thank the members of the Council for acceding to my request to be allowed to participate in this debate on Namibia. Perhaps a word or two is necessary to explain why I have asked to be allowed to speak today. Naturally, as a Mombcr of the United Nations and as an African country in particular, Ethiopia feels that it has the duty to draw the attention of the Council to a situation obtaining on our continent which, in our judgcment, is nothing less than naked aggression, 126. The Council is fully aware that throughout the years, whenaver the question of Namibia has come before the 127. Ilowcver, over and above Ethioph‘s Brtg-standing intcrast in the question of’ Namibia, I am ~~rivileged to huvc the opportunity tu address the Council in my cap&y both as current I’llirirnian of the African Gntup in the United Nations and ~1s rcprcsentirtive of one of titc sountricls which hers been given a nmndatc by the As%nrbly of X-leads uf State and Government of the Qrgankatiun of nfrieiln Unity tr5 represent them on this occasion. “I’hcrwf~~rs I shall to the best of my ability cndcavcrur to exprtlss the. views of the African countries with regard to the situation and particularly ttrcir views with regard to the rcqwircmuntx frrr the just and amicable solution to tha Namihian problem which it is the rcspunsibility and obligation of the Security Council to achieve. 12X. The Cuuncil is &led today to discuss the report of the Socsetary-C;enornt submitted in pursuance a,f its tesotution 319 (1972). More specifically, the (“ouneil will be c&ted to decide whether the findin@ tsf the rcptirt justify the continuation of the contacts with ths Govcrnnlent of South Africa as uuthuri;r,cd by Security c’inmcil rcsotutiua 309 (1972). The Se~r~tary-~~~~~ra~s uri@nat mandate was renewed in resolution 319 (197x?) with the additional pruviaiun that he appoint a tipatlial representative to assist him in his discussions with the authorities uf South Africa for the implementation of the terms of Council rasotutions 309 (1972) and 3 19 (1972). 129. There wodd appear to bc two ways uf looking at the report now before the Council. It may be hx)kcd at simply as the first results of a new effort ,a new effort which, morcovcr, holds some prospect for suct‘ess, (%n the other hand, the report may be seen as yet one mtsrr? amfirmatiun of South Africa’s intransipncc in this matter, one which is, in fact, a further reflection of the deceptive IHIIWUV~CS for which South Africa has become f”Eunous, if not infamous, throughout the many years the question of Namibia has come bcforc the organs of the United Nations, 130. To whichever of the two views we may tend, there is need to examine the report of the Secretary-General and his representative carefully and conscientiously. The report should particularly be examined with a view to ascertaining whother there is anything new in what both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Ministar of South Africa have told the Secretary~Concrat’s representative which can be considered to bc a depmturc from the tong-stnnding intrap sigcncc of South Africa, so as to m&c worth while the continuation of the SecretaryGeneral’s effort along the indicated lines. 131. The report should dso be considered in the context of the various efforts undertaken in the United Nations to find a just solution to the problem and to deat with the 133. It should be remembered that throughout the 27 years in which the United Nations has been seized of the question of Namibia, every available procedure under the Charter for the settlement of disputes, and every means of diplomacy known in the United Nations, has been used to reach an accommodation with South Africa so as to enable the people of Namibia to exercise their right to selfdetermination and independence, in accordance with the Charter. To that end, negotiation, the good offices of the Secretary-General, resort to the International Court of Justice, action by the General Assembly and by this Council have been tried, to no acceptable result. 138. In connexion with the Committee’s recommendation, Liberia and Ethiopia started proceedings against South Africa in 1960 in the International Court of Justice, At the same time, attempts to find a political solution to the problem continued, first through the Committee on South West Africa, and later on through the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 134. Ever since South Africa requested during the first session of the General Assembly that it be allowed to incorporate Namibia into its territory-a request which was rightly and properly then and there rejected by the Assembly-South Africa has refused to co-operate with the United Nations. South Africa not only has refused to place its Mandate over Namibia under United Nations Trusteeship-as indeed all other Mandatories of the League did-but has, in fact, continued to claim that whatever responsibility it might have had under the League’s Mandate lapsed with the dissolution of the League. For that reason, it could not consider itself accountable to any organ of the United Nations with regard to Namrbia. 139. South Africa first contested the competence of the Court to judge its administration of Namibia, especially its racial policies, which Liberia and Ethiopia contended violated its obligations under the League’s Mandate, particularly its obligation to promote to the utmost the moral and material well-being and the social progress of the indigenous inhabitants of the Territory. When the Court ruled that it indeed was competent, South Africa began a long legal manoeuvre without ever stating that it was prepared to abide by the decision of the Court. It tried to convince the Court that apartheid not only was compatible with its obligations under the Mandate, but was, in fact, beneficial to the people. South Africa also requested the Court to reverse its earlier findings and to declare that the Mandate, and any accountability under it to the United Nations, had ceased to exist with the dissolution of the League of Nations. 135. Despite this intransigent stand, South Africa continued for a long time to receive the benefit of the doubt of the United Nations. As early as 1950, the General Assembly resorted to one of the procedures for settlement of disputes available under the Charter by seeking an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on South Africa’s position in Namibia. In an opinion handed down the same year, the Court found that South Africa continued to have an obligation under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League, and that it did not have the right to modify the status of the Territory.4 Subsequent advisory opinions of the Court have also established that South Africa was under an obligation to report to the General Assembly of the United Nations on its administration of Namibia. 140. In 1966 the Court,5 however, left intact the Mandate jurisprudence it had developed; but for reasons that astonished international jurists all over the world, a divided Court-with the President casting the deciding vote-refused to rule on the submissions of Liberia and Ethiopia on the technical ground that the two States had not established sufficient right to receive judgement on their submissions. 141. This failure and reluctance on the part of the Court could not have come at a more opportune time for South Africa. South Africa immediately distorted the Court’s position and launched a vast propaganda campaign to convince the world that the Court had absolved South Africa of any wrong-doing and that it had, in fact, confumed South Africa’s assertion of its rights in Namibia. 136. Following the 1950 opinion of the Court, the avenue of negotiation was tried repeatedly. By resolution 449 (V) of 13 December 1950, the Assembly established a fivemember committee to discuss with the Government of South Africa procedural measures necessary for implementing the Court’s opinion. After three years of unsuccessful negotiation, South Africa announced in 1954 that it would not negotiate further with the committee as it considered the Mandate of the League to have lapsed. 142. Basing itself on the Mandate jurisprudence developed by the Court, and after an extensive review of South Africa’s record of its administration of Namibia, and particularly its refusal to fulfil its part of the obligations under the Mandate, the General Assembly, at its twenty 137. At its eleventh session the General Assembiy decided on two additional approaches to the question of the 5 sout~l West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, 1; CJ Reports 1966, p. 6. 4Ittternational status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion: I.CJ. Reports 1950, p. 128. 143. To implement that decision, and following its exami nation of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee for Sotlth West Africa which had studied ways and means of giving effect to the new United Nations responsibility for the administration of the Territory, the General Assembly subsequently established, by its adoption at its fifth special session of resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967, the United Nations Council for Namibia, charged with the administration of the Territory until independence, which, as envisaged by the General Assembly, would be attained by June 1968. 148. That is unmistakably the position that South Africa has now assumed, since the real issues have been clarified through long, arduous and patient debate, and in particular since the last advisory opinion of the Court was given. Clearly, South Africa does not now intend to miss an opportunity once more to confuse the issues. It is therefore not because of any change of heart that South Africa has been prepared to hold talks with the Secretary-General and his representative but because discussions with a view to establishing the necessary conditions can in its view be sustained within its unchanging policy. 144. Up to the present, ail efforts by the Council to fulfil the functions entrusted to it by the Assembly have been frustrated by the refusal of the Government of South Africa to recognize the Council. To the direct request addressed by the Council to the Government of South Africa that arrangements be made to transfer to it all administrative functions, the Government of South Africa, throueh communications addressed to the Secretaw 149. SO much for South Africa’s various manoeuvres throughout the years the United Nations has been seized of the question of Namibia. What about the report now before the Council? Gene&l, has made it clear in no uncertain terms that it cannot co-operate with the CounciI as it considers the 150. As I suggested at the beginning of my remarks, this Assembly’s resolution establishing it to be illegal. report cannot be discussed without reference to the various efforts in the United Nations to find an equitable solution to the problem. 145. If I have taken the time of the Council to trace once again the tortuous history of Namibia in the United Nations, it has been first of alI to show that South Africa’s attitude has not changed since the time when, in 1946, it requested the General Assembly to permit it to take over Namibia. After 27 years of long and continuous debate, and after 27 years of uninterrupted search for a solution to the problem created by South Africa’s policy in Namibia, the United Nations finds itself again confronting the everlengthening challenge, which has now assumed-if we are to accept South Africa’s actions at face value-the character of a fait accompli. 151, It is a matter of record that the Genera1 Assembly has on several occasions requested South Africa to enable the people of Namibia to exercise their right to selfdetermination and independence. The Security Council likewise has on a number of occasions rccognized the right of the Namibian people to freedom and independence. It should also be recalled that in order to enable the people of Namibia to exercise that right the General Assembly has established the Council for Namibia, All these decisions remain firm and valid and obviously determine the conditions in which and the purposes for which the Secretary- General’s contacts with South Africa are to be conducted. 146. This unhappy history is also consistently instructive in one important respect. It reveals the persisting if varying schemes of South Africa elaborated to confuse the issue 152. Having said that, I shall now turn to the report and to divert attention from the real problems at hand. before the Council. Before I do so, however, I wish to When the Assembly turned down South Africa’s request to express to Mr. Escher my delegation’s appreciation for his incorporate Namibia into its territory, South Africa wanted having carried out what has been a most delicate and the world to believe that it was prepared to accept its demanding diplomatic assignment, He has in our judgement obligations under the Mandate, but without accountability elicited sufficient response from the authorities of South to the United Nations. I need hardlyadd that this claim was Africa to enable the Council to draw the nec’essary as meaningless as it was contradictory, for without accountconclusion. ability the Mandate could not be said to function. When public opinion did not accept that, South Africa agreed to 153. But what does the report contain that is new, that we litigation in the Court, but only to buy time and create the have not known before? We may well ask. I submit that appearance of co-operating in the search for a mutually the report contains nothing we did not know before. acceptable solution. When in 1966, the Court declined to Perhaps here and there the South African authorities, for give judgement as requested by Liberia and Ethiopia, South effect, have used some terms that we use at the United Africa launched a propaganda offensive to convince the Nations, but this language can hardly hide the fact that world that the Court had confirmed the rightness of its nothing has changed. Perhaps the saying about “old wine in position. But when the Assembly terminated the Mandate a new bottle” best expresses the situation, and requested South Africa to co-operate with a United Nations organ in transferring power to the people of 154. Reporting on the various contacts he had with the & representatives of the people of Namibia, the Secretary- 155. The world knows by now that the people of Namibia could not have carried on their struggle for so long if the overwhelming majority of the people of Namibia did not believe in independence for Namibia as a whole. What could have come as a surprise even to the South African authorities is the fact that, despite the repressive measures that South Africa has imposed in Namibia, and despite the spectre of victimization, so many representatives of the people should have come to express their views to Mr. Escher. The risks that were taken in those manifestations, of course, place an increased obligation upon the Council and upon the Members of the United Nations. 160. If the South African authorities insist on calling the intended set-up a regional government, then they should make it clear that it is a regional government to that of Pretoria and not to Windhoek or Namibia, since no central government is envisaged under the South African scheme. 156. There are one or two elements in the report which, at first glance, may look new but which, in fact, are but slightly refashioned propaganda themes. For this reason they need particular explanation. First, there is South Africa’s suggestion that it is creating conditions for the eventual exercise of “self-determination” by the people of Namibia and that this may result in the establishment of “regional governments or authorities”. 161. If we further examine the report critically, the importance of what has been omitted becomes more significant than what has been revealed in the report. For example, nowhere in the present report, or in the last report the Secretary-General submitted to the Council in July 1972, is there any indication that South Africa accepts any United Nations responsibility or role as to the time or the circumstances under which the people of Namibia are to exercise their right to self-determination? Even the fact that the United Nations has an established interest in the independence of Namibia has not been recognized. 157. It should be emphasized that the ideologues of apartheid have always accepted a certain concept, which, in the language of their reverse logic, they call “self-determination”. As a matter of fact, South Africa’s brand of “self-determination”, leading to the creation of “homelands”, is, as these exponents of the apartheid system describe it, the ultimate objective of apartheid However, this is nothing less than another name for a policy which they have been implementing for some years now to set up one group against another, to create disparate, non-viable communities, ever prone to the pressures of Pretoria and pliable to its every bidding. Everyone knows t?hat this policy has never been used, and cannot in fact be used to build nations. It is used rather to break them up and keep them broken. That indeed is what it is being programmed for in Namibia. 162. Nor is there any indication where the Government of South Africa stands with regard to the termination of the Mandate. As I have said, South Africa has always held a contradictory position with regard to the Mandate. #en it suited its purposes, South Africa had maintained that, although it considered the Mandate to have lapsed, it was prepared to abide by its obligations. At other times, it had asserted that South Africa’s right in Namibia is based on conquest: when, for instance, the South African representative stated in a plenary meeting of the General Assembly that South Africa’s right to administer Namibia “is not derived from the Mandate but militaryconquest”. 163. In view of the record of intransigence of South Africa that I have recounted and in view of the wide gulf that separates South Africa’s view with that of the United Nations on the principle of self-determination, what use could it serve, we may ask, to continue contacts with the Governments of South Africa that so evidently lead to an unacceptable result. 158. The name of self-determination is sometimes given to this South African version of divide and rule so as to soothe at home’ the conscience of those who may, at times, develop doubts when they realize the injustice of the system of oppression they help to maintain; abroad, it is used to pretend that apartheid conforms to the basic decencies of government that most people hold. When the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of South Africa use the term “self-determination” in their meetings with Mr. Escher, they are not speaking a United Nations language, but are in fact indulging in the language of apartheid That this is so has been made clear by the refusal or inability of the Prime Minister to give any precision to the concepts of “homeland” or “regional government” which he pressed upon Mr. Escher. So also when the latter pressed for precision. 164. I respectfully submit that the Council should draw the necessary conclusions from the report before us. The Council’s inability to take effective action called for by the gravity of the situation should not be allowed to become a justification for opening a course of action, which may lead to unforeseen results. 166. Even more distressing would be to allow South Africa to use these contacts to confuse the issues. There is already some evidence that South Africa may be attempting to do precisely that. The New York Tima of 2 1 November carried a report of a press conference that the Prime Minister of South Africa gave in Johannesburg in which he is quoted as having said that he had reached an agreement with Mr. Escher. As is clear from Mr. Escher’s report now before the Council and from the clarification he gave of the Prime Minister’s contention, also contained in The New York Times report, there was, of course, no such agreement. But it is obvious that it suits the purposes of the South African Government to claim that the Secretary- General’s personal emissary has approved the proposals it has made to him, implying that those proposals were perfectly in accord with the demands of the United Nations. 167. Another example of the abuse of the present programme of contacts may be drawn from the same newspaper report. The Prime Minister, in commenting on his concept of regional governments, was reported to have said that he would press on with this plan to grant self-government to 10 non-white “homelands” in the Territory of South West Africa but would also establish a council of black and mixed race leaders to provide some unifying authority for the area. To Mr. Escher he spoke of regional governments, to his press conference he spoke of “homelands”. Moreover, his plan includes only the 10 already delineated African “homelands”, The white areas are excluded from the scheme of regional governments. These white areas constitute some three fourths of the whole area and contain its most valuable resources. May not the design be to continue to incorporate the white areas in South Africa itself? 168. In the light of this and other newspaper reports can we believe that when the Prime Minister refers to a unifying authority he intends to establish and maintain the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia, as called for by Security Council resolution 309 (1972) and 3 19 (1972) and by the Namibian people themselves? 169. I do not believe that we should be advancing the cause of the independence of the people of Namibia if, wittingly or unwittingly, we played into the hands of the authorities of the Government of South Africa by affording them an opportunity to be seen as co-operating with the United Nations, when the evidence is so clear that they are not. 170. In the circumstances, my delegation believes that the response already elicited from South Africa by the Secretary-General’s representative is adequate to enable the 171. We, the representatives of African States, with, of course, appropriate instructions from our capitals, have been consulting among ourselves on the Secretary-General’s report as circulated. We have examined our consciences deeply. We have put into the balance our responsibility to our brethren in Namibia and our responsibility under the Charter to seek peaceful solutions to disputes. We have also consulted with the legitimate representatives of the people of Namibia, whose interests here are paramount. 172. Much as all of us would have liked to hope that there could be some way out of the present impasse through these kinds of talks and contacts so well reported to us, even when the odds are so overwhelmingly against it, we sincerely believe that continuation of the Secretary General’s contacts, in the present circumstances and so long as the South African Government does not give some basic clarifications on a number of crucial points, would not be so productive in achieving the purposes of resolutions 309 (1972) and 319 (1972). By lending credence to South Africa’s claim that it is negotiating in earnest, the continuation of these contacts in the present circumstances may, in fact, make it possible for it to implement a policy of Balkanization of Namibia which it and it alone chooses to call self-determination, 173. We sincerely urge the Council to request South Africa to give the necessary clarification. Does South Africa accept United Nations responsibility in the self-determination process? If so, does South Africa accept the establishment of an effective United Nations presence in Namibia? Does South Africa accept the exercise of self-determination by the people of Namibia as a whole? Does South Africa accept the unity of the people of Namibia and the integrity of its territory? Does South Africa accept that whatever rights it might have had under the Mandate of the League have been terminated? 174. These are some of the questions on which the Government of South Africa should give unequivocal clarification. It is only within the framework of such clarification that further contacts can hope to establish the necessary conditions to enable the peohle of Namibiato exercise its right to self-determination and independence. 175. However, pending receipt of such~clarifications, my delegation does not, frankly, see what good in the existing circumstances the continuation of the present programme of contacts serves. 176. We submit therefore that, until such tie as clarifications are given unequivocally and in a language that all of us can understand and accept, the contact which the Secretary-General initiated through his representative with the Government of South Africa should be suspended. 177. Now that the United Nations has assumed responsibility for Namibia, all efforts should be directed to giving

The next speaker on my list is the representative of Mauritius, I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Madam President, I wish to thank you and, through you, the members of the Security Council for allowing me to participate in this debate on the question of Namibia. I wish also to say how proud I am to see you as President of the Security Council, the most important organ of the United Nations. It is indeed an honour for the Group of African States, to which Mauritius has the privilege of belonging, that the first lady to preside over the work of the Council is an African, one so beautiful, elegant and intelligent. [The speaker continued in English] 180. In adopting resolution 319 (1972) of 1 August 1972, the understanding was that the Security Council should be in a position-after the second report by the Secretary- General was submitted on 15 November-to assess the progress that would have been made in order to consider whether the “new approach” that had been initiated under resolution 309 (1972) had brought the United Nations closer to the solution of the question of Namibia. 181. In the opinion of my delegation-and the African Group as a whole shares this view-the time has now come for a final evaluation so that the Council can decide on the future course of action. To this end it is useful to recall very briefly the purposes of the contacts which the Secretary-General was requested to initiate under resolution 309 (1972) and which he was authorized to continue With the assistance of an appointed representative under resolution 319 (1972). 182. According to paragraph 1 of resolution 309 (1972) the goal is the establishment of the necessary ConditionS so as to enable the people of Namibia to exercise their right to self-determination and independence in accordance with the United Nations Charter. One way of achieving this was suggested by the representative of France on 31 July at the 1656th meeting when he said that the South African Government should be induced to negotiate an agreement establishing a provisional international regime which would enable the populations concerned to exercise their right to self-determination. 184. Thus the purposes of the whole exercise under the Security Council resolutions mentioned are very well defined; and it is on that basis that the Council, in the opinion of my delegation, should evaluate the efforts that have been made thus far and decide accordingly. 185. We have always believed that only a clear-cut definition of the South African concepts of self-determination and independence could make the new approach worth pursuing. That is why we are in duty bound to examine carefully the results brought back from Pretoria by the representative of the Secretary-General in order to see exactly where the South African Government stands. 186. The Secretary-General having told the Prime Minister of South Africa last March that reaffirmation of South Africa’s declared policy of self-determination and independence for the peoples of Namibia-that is, the “Bantustan” policy-could not serve as a basis for continuing the contacts envisaged in resolution 309 (1972), we assumed that in agreeing to this mission of the representative of the Secretary-General, the South African Government would endeavour to co-operate with the United Nations and come to terms with the universally accepted idea of self-determination. However, judging from the Prime Minister’s position as described by Mr. Escher in his report, there is doubt that we are making any headway. 187. According to the representative, the Prime Minister believed that experience in self-government was an essential element for eventual self-determination. Bearing in mind the circumstances, he felt that this could best be achieved “on a regional basis”. Althougb.t.he words “on a regional basis” cannot necessarily be interpreted solely in the context of the “Batrtustans” as devised by South Africa for Namibia, we strongly suspect that Pretoria will not accept that experience in self-government be carried out in the context of a Namibian entity. We were strengthened in our doubts and suspicions when the Prime Minister said that he would examine the possibility of removing restrictions on freedom of movement without impairing influx control. For there is no guarantee that the so-called “influx control” will not be used to curb the activities of those interested in selfdetermination for Namibia as a whole, namely, the majority of the non-white population of the Territory. 188. Here attention should be drawn to a very important conclusion in Mr. Escher’s report, namely, that following an extensive 17-day trip which enabled him to ascertain the views of a wide cross-section of the population, it was his tion-camp reservoirs for cheap labour, as welt as pt:rcOs 0t frustration, despair and injustice, Some of them wtirr~ci that confinement of non-whites to the “tzor~~&lrlds’” il situation precisely CRiitCd by the enforcement of th so-called “influx cantrol”’ referred trr by Mr. Vcsr;ter -would result in racial conflict. 189. Bishop Leonard Auala, on authentic spukesmwn for the oppressed people of Namibia, stressed the fact tiltit there was an urgent need to grnnt Nnmibians bnsie 11uman rights, in particular freedom of movement, because the people were becoming restive. Dcing the leader of a 300,000-member multiracinl church, Bishop Auala is in it position to assess the mood of his peoptc. llis warning should be heeded without further delay. We submit that the rejection of the “homclanti’ prrlicy by the people of Namibia is unquivocal. The ma.jority wants rm indcpondcnt and unitary Namibia, so one of the basic demands of the Security Council regarding N&bia-..thrat is the prcscrvation of the national urlity and tcrritorirrl integrity of the Territory-stands firm. Consequently, a coruple tc rcvcrsal of the South African policy of “l~ntustans” is urgently called for if South Africa realty wants to co-operate with the United Nations. 190. On that score thcrc is no clarity in the text reproduced in paragraph 2 I of Mr. Escher’s report summing up the substance of the discussions hctwecn Prime Minister Vorster and himself. In addition, WC fail tu see how the establishment of an advisory council, as envisaged by the Prime Minister in subparagraph (f)# curl bc interpreted as being “in line with the ai.m of maintaining the unity of Namibia”, as the representative of the Secrctary&ncrat has concluded in paragraph 92 of his report. III our view it should be clear that only the creation of muchinery leading to the establjshment of a domoaaticully &ted ~ovcrr~ mcnt for the Territory as a whole can bc ucccptablc. Furthermore, the fact that the kimc Minister of South Africa would assume over-all. responsibility for any or~an created for the Territory as :t whole does not appear to be a step that would lead to a truly independent Namibia.