S/PV.1679 Security Council

In a letter dated 28 November 1972 addressed to the President of the Security Council, which is in document S/10841, the representatives of Somalia and the Sudan have asked that an invitation be extended to Mr. Mueshihange, in accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council. If there is no objection, 1 propose that the Council invite Mr. Mueshihange to make a statement to the Council. He will be invited to speak, at the appropriate time, with the consent of the Council. ? agenda wns adopted. rituation in Namibia: wt of the Secretary-General on the implementation of urity Council resolution 319 (1972) concerning the :&ion of Namibia (S/10832 and CbrrX~ he PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): In dance with the decision taken by the Security Council 1678th meeting, I shall invite the representatives of , Ethiopia, Liberia, Mauritius, Morocco and Sierra :: to participate, without the right to vote, in the cil debate on the question on its agenda. 6. The Security Council will now continue its consideration of the item on its agenda. The first speaker on my list is the representative of Sierra Leone. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement. urthermore, the representatives of Nigeria and Bu- , in letters dated 28 November 1972 addressed to the lent of the Security Council, have asked to be allowed trticipate, without the right to vote, in the Council e on the item before us. If there is’no objection, T in accordance with the past practice of the Council he provisional rules of procedure of the Council, invite spresentatives of Nigeria and Burundi also to partici- II our discussion without the right to vote.

Madam President, permit me to associate myself with the kind sentiments which my Minister of External Affairs has expressed regarding your election to the high office of President of the Security Council and to convey also the grateful thanks of my delegation, through you, to members of the Council for granting me permission to participate in this debate on the question of Namibia. s I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Council 5 to invite those representatives to participate, without ight to vote, in the Council debate, In view of the d number of places at the Council table, and in dance with the practice of the Council, I shall invite spresentatives I have mentioned to take the places ‘ed for the% in the Council Chamber, on the under- 8. My delegation is convinced that, with consta.nt pressure and persuasion, justice will eventually prevail, and Namibia will very soon take its rightful place as a Member of the United Nations. 9. In recent years the General Assembly has by its resolutions called the world’s attention to the grave 10. It is the view of my delegation-and, I am sure, of many other delegations-that the progress towards complete emancipation and independence for people under the colonial yoke has been too slow and very unsatisfactory. In Africa the regimes of both South Africa and Portugal not only h:.ve refused to co-operate in achieving that objective but are continually oppressing non-whites in their territories, with the ultimate aim of keeping them under colonial domination indefinitely. 11. The Republic of South Africa, in defiance of United Nations resolutions which terminated its mandate over Namibia and brought that Territory directly under the control of the United Nations Council for Namibia, and in contempt of the legal opinion of the International Court of Justice, still suppresses that Territory and continues to hold it down by its military strength. 12. South Africa is spending large sums of money on either importing or manufacturing various types of weapons to intensify its war of repression in Africa. 13. That is why South Africa’s offer to conclude nonaggression pacts with African States will not be accepted, for this would only allow the further time required by South Africa to continue its apartheid policies and plans to create “homelands” in Namibia against the wishes of its non-white inhabitants. The oppressed people have their representatives, with whom South Africa could conclude treaties, and in this regard my delegation would ask for nothing less than complete withdrawal. 14. It seems to my delegation that one of the steps to be taken now by all States friendly to South Africa as regards its conduct towards non-whites in southern Africa and Namibia is that of giving another warning to South Africa to get out of Namibia so as to allow the real Africans to rule themselves. 15. Whenever the question of Namibia has been discussed, whether in the General Assembly, the Security Council or any other body, my delegation has always drawn attention to the refusal of South Africa to listen to world opinion and permit the Namibian people to exercise self-determination and independence, which is one of its inalienable rights. Instead, we find in Namibia a new system of colonialism under which the people are held in subjugation, not only in defiance of the concepts of human justice and equality but also in flagrant breach of international law, 16. By continuing to hold on to the Territory of Namibia in open defiance of United Nations decisions and in complete contempt of the decision of the International Court of Justice; by setting up its so-called “homelands” in this Territory against the wishes of the people, thus exporting its infamous apartheid policies to unwilling recipients; by refusing to co-operate with the United Nations Council for Namibia, South Africa, in the view of 18. My delegation is of the opinion that each Member State, by its action against South Africa, would help to bring that Government to reason. To our great regret, however, it seems that nothing is being done to eliminate this intolerable state of affairs by those nations which are indeed the very Powers in a position to do so. Instead of exerting pressure, they have encouraged co-operation with South Africa; they have offered friendship, increased trade and made new investments, where a boycott was necessary. 19; We shall continue to remind those States which enjoy special economic and cultural relations with South Africa that they are under an obligation to help actively in creating a new Africa. 20. It is known that countries like Canada, France, the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, Belgium and the Federal Republic of Germany are all participants in the economic development of the Territory of Namibia. If they can exchange consular representations, meet in sports and trade in arms with South Africa, it seems to my delegation that it should not be very difficult for those trading partners to persuade South Africa to realize that the cries and anguish of the Namibian people are a curse on anyone who conspires to fleece and suppress innocent people. 21. In this connexion, my delegation genuinely believes that the Federal Republic of Germany has a very important role to play, as the white settlers and farmers in Namibia apparently influencing the South African Government have been mainly of German descent. The Federal Republic of Germany can point to its friendship and co-operation with black African States to demonstrate to the settlers in Namibia that a stable and lasting future lies only in the democratization and independence of the Territory. 22. My delegation believes that the time has come for the international community to act in unison to remove South Africa’s control over the Territory. The International Court of Justice on 21 June this year gave every country that responsibility.1 i Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Aftica in Namibia (South West Africa) nOtwithStanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisop Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16. 24. Against this background, there have been in our midst colleagues who have believed that some different method of approach should be introduced to persuade and convince the Government of South Africa to abandon its position of persistent refusal to afford the Namibian people the exercise of its inalienable right to self-determination and independence. 25. Therefore, by resolution 309 (1972) of 4 February 1972 the Security Council invited the Secretary-General: ‘6 . . . in consultation and close co-operation with a group of the Security Council, composed of the representatives of Argentina, Somalia and Yugoslavia, to initiate as soon as palssible contacts with all parties concerned, with a view to establishing the necessary conditions to enable the people of Namibia, freely and with strict regard to the principle of human equality, to exercise their right to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;” In that resolution the Secretary-General was also requested to make contact with the South African regime to discuss the creation of favourable conditions for the speedy achieve:ment by the Namibian people of the right to self-detiermination and independence, and to report thereon by 31 July 1972. 26. In his report of 17 July [S/10738] the Secretary- General requested, among other things, that another opportunity be given him to follow up the discussion which he had started with the South African Government. The Security Council agreed to his request and the Secretary- General appointed his own representative, Mr. Alfred Martin Escher of Switzerland to carry out strictly the primary task of obtaining “a complete and unequivocal clarification from the Government of South Africa with regard to its policy of self-determination and independence for Namibia, so as to enable the Security Council to decide whether it coincides with the United Nations position on this matter and whether the efforts made under resolutions 309 (1972) and 319 (1972) should be continued.” [See SflO832 and Gzr.1, annex 1.1 27. The representative of the Secretary-General was also to make it clear to the Soutn African Government that the United Nations resolutions adopted on the question of Namib.ia stood firm and valid and should be actively pursued; the contacts carried on should be strictly in accordance with the mandate of resolutions 309 (1972) and 3 19 (1972); the need to maintain national unity and territorial integrity must be kept in mind all the time; the Government of South Africa should discontinue the application of its “homelands” policies and abolish repressive measures in Namibia; and, finally, South Africa should indicate readiness to co-operate. with regard to the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia. The Prime Minister agreed to discuss specific matters through the representative on his return to Pretoria. But on 30 October 1972, after returning to Pretoria from Namibia, the representative had a second meeting with the Prime Minister. The representative, who had at that time done extensive travelling in Namibia and had had an opportunity of meeting and ascertaining the views of a very wide cross-section of the population of Namibia, conveyed to the Prime Minister his general impression that the majority of the non-white population supported the establishment of a united and independent Namibia. He further indicated that the majority of whites-who apparently amount to less than 20 per cent of the population-supported the “homelands” policy. On the other hand, the Prime Minister felt that the representative did not have sufficient evidence in support of his findings. 29. Again, during the last meetings between the representative and the Prime Minister, which took place on 1 and 2 November 1972, in the presence of Mr. Muller, the Foreign Minister, and one of his colleagues, the dis&ssions were specifically directed to common understanding on three principles: complete and unequivocal clarification of South Africa’s policy of selfdetermination and independence for Namibia and assurance of full freedom of political activity; discontinuance by South Africa of the application of a policy of separate development in “homelands”; abolition of all discriminatory measures and establishment of equality for all Namibians, which in the opinion of the representative would establish the necessary conditions for the exercise of self-determination and independence. 30. In reply, the Prime Minister appears to have ignored the main matters and issues for, while he reaffrmed the willingness and desire of his Government to continue with the contacts with a view to exploring all possible avenues to an agreed solution acceptable to the inhabitants of the Territory, he felt it would be most unrealistic to expect agreement on the issues involved in a matter of days or weeks. The Prime Minister further stated that in taking decisions concerning Namibia he had to seek the views of his white South African colleagues. 31. We are all familiar with those facts, and we are also familiar with the reply of the Prime Minister, who apparently first challenged the authenticity of the findings of Mr. Escher and then, while reaffirming the Willingness and desire of his Government to continue the Contacts with a view to exploring all possible avenues to a solution acceptable to the Africans of the Territory, made it clear that it would be most unrealistic to expect agreement on those issues within a short time. This attitude of the Prime mister, in the view of my delegation, is contrary to all our hopes, and the report of the Secretary-General testifies to the present indifference of the V rster regime to the hopes and appeals, the anger and ’ courting of the United &9 Nations regarding the freedom of the Nmibian people. “From South Africa’s point of view, such an agreement, if approved by the Security Council, would amount to no less than United Nations endorsement of the policy of separate development. It would be a complete ratification of the status quo in South West Africa, a fact which indicates the near certainty that the report will not be approved by the Security Council. Indeed, it seems likely that the Secretary-General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, will not be given an extension of his mandate to negotiate with South Africa over the disputed Territory.” 33. That is why my delegation, while not opposing the idea of reviewing contacts with South Africa, is doubtful whether this will not be another fruitless effort. My delegation does not, however, oppose the holding of talks between the Secretary-General and the leaders of the racist regime, nor will it oppose the holding of talks between super-Powers or States having economic interests in Namibia and the South African Government. And if the South African Government is ready and willing to hold a dialogue with the Namlbian people my delegation will not be : opposed to that proposal either. Nevertheless it should be understood that such contact, if it should be continued, should be undertaken with a view to the full implementation of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, in particular those of the Security Council, bearing in mind fully the recognition of the direct responsibility which the United Nations has assumed for the Territory until its independence as well as the necessity to effect the immediate elimination of South Africa’s presence in Narni. bia. It is the earnest hope of my Government that the efforts of the SecretavGeneral in this regard will bring about the desired results without further delay. Africa has waited far too long. 34. To argue that a Territory must continue to be supervised by foreign bullies because it is small or backward is to beg the question. International comoperation on earth has now developed to the point where no nation, however small, however poor, is unable to govern itself; and no nation, however affluent or prosperous, is satisfied with being ruled by another. Besides, if a people cannot judge for itself, it will not know how backward it is. 35. My delegation therefore invokes today the spirit of those brave Americans who cherished freedom more than life when they stood up against British suppression, those brave Frenchmen who rose up against the Bastille, a symbol of tyranny, suppression and slavery, to give birth to free France, to appeal to all countries operating colonies or States, directly or indirectly, to take immediate steps to grant these subjected peoples free and full independence. After independence, these Territories will develop new ties with their former administrators, but the difference is that

Having studied carefully the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 3 19 (1972) concerning the question of Namibia, I wish to state at the outset that we recognize that the mandate given to the Secretary.GenerJ was a heavy responsibility and that the diplomatic assignment he entrusted to his representative, Mr. Escher, was an extremely difficult one. 37. We are obliged, I think, to understand thoroughly the situation in Namibia before we judge it. After occupying the Territory during the First World War, the Government of South Africa was given, on 17 December 1920, the Mandate of Namibia-then South West Africa-under the League of Nations. 38. On the dissolution of the League of Nations, South Africa refused to honour its obligations under the Covenant of the League. It refused to submit a trusteeship agreement which would have placed the Mandated Territory of South West Africa under the jurisdiction of the United Nations Trusteeship System. It must be recalled that South Africa, as an original Member of the United Nations, did not only participate in the drafting of the Chapter in the Charter relating to the International Trusteeship System and to Non-Self-Governing Territories, but also joined in the unanimous vote of the Assembly of the League of Nations when its final resolution on Mandates was adopted on 18 April 1946. South Africa therefore agreed to the following propositions of the League of Nations, namely, that it: “Recognizes that, on the termination of the League’s existence, its functions with respect to the mandated territories will come to an end, but notes that Chapters XI, XH, and XIII of the Charter of the United Nations embody principles corresponding to those declared in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League; “Takes note of the expressed intentions of the Members of the League now administering territories under mandate to continue to administer them for the well-being and development of the peoples concerned in accordance with the obligations contained in the respective Mandates, until other arrangements have been agreed between the United Nations and the respective mandatory Powers.“s 39. Here we have a situation where South Africa itself helped to bridge the gap between the jurisdiction of the League of Nations over Mandated Territories and the jurisdiction of the United Nations over the Territories of the Trusteeship System, However, the Government of Pretoria requested the General Assembly, at its very first session, to allow South Africa to annex South West Africa, thus further implying recognition of United Nations authority on the Territory. 2 f&e bague of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement No, 194, annex 21. the Territory. Its recommendations called for the &v&ion of the Territory itiib separate white and non-white areas, with the most productive and developed portions &gm?cl to the white minority. It also called for: first, creation of 10 “Bantustans” or exclusive African homelands, each et.lr its own “citizenship”; second, incorporation of most of the opinion of the International Court of Justice are wellknown to the members of the Council and I need not repeat them here, except to say that they reinforced the claim of the United Nations to exercise international supervision over the Territory, under the terms of the Mandaite, as the successor of the League of Nations. The Court concluded, inter uliu, that South West Africa re. mained a Territory under international Mandate, that the obligations of the Mandatory under the Mandate continued unimpaired, and that the supervisory functions ‘m respect of the Mandate were exercisable by the United Nations. territorial administration into that of the Republic of South Africa, and, third, a five-year development plan involving transfer of population and land at a cost of about $US 218 million. 44. Contrary to the decisions of the United Nations for leading the Territory to self-determination and independence, some of these “Bantustans” have already been created. 41. The chain of events and manoeuvres that took place since then demonstrated South Africa’s determination to evade its obligation with regard to Namibia. There was, for example, the proposal made by South Africa at the sixth session of the General Assembly, in 1951, to the effect that it should negotiate a new international instrument with France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. In 1958, a Good Offices Committee on South West Africa, consisting of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Brazil, which was established on 25 October 1957 under General Assembly resolution 1143 (XII), asked the General Assembly to endorse a prop&l that South Africa should be allowed to annex the rich southern region of the Territory, and to administer the small northern region under some kind of trusteeship agreenlent with the United Nations, That proposal, of course, was rejected by the General Assembly, as shown in resolution 1243 (XIII). 45. The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, rendered on 2 1 June 197 1, states inter alia that, the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the Territory”. 46. It is thus established that the continuation of South Africa’s presence in Namibia is completely illegal. 47. It is upon this background that we must consider the problem of the unfortunate Territory of Namibia. 48, For my delegation the results of the talks with the Prime Minister of South Africa are totally unsatisfactory. 42. In 1960, as the case of South West Africa required a constructive move, two African States Members of the United Nations, Ethiopia and Liberia, filed contentious proceedings with the International Court of Justice against the Government of South Africa, the outcome of which is well known to all members of the Council, However, at its twenty-first session, the General Assembly, on 27 October 1966, adopted resolution 2145 (XXI), by which it declared that the Mandate of the League of Nations was terminated and that the Territory was under the direct responsibility of the United Nations. This landmark decision was taken because, following the dissolution of the League of Nations, the Supenrisory authority for the Territory was inherited by the United Nations. Subsequent to that decision, the General Assembly established under its resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967, the United Nations Council for South West Africa, later renamed the United Nations Council for Namibia in resolution 2372 (XXII), to administer the Territory until independence and called upon the Government of South Africa to facilitate the transfer of the administration of the Territory to the Council, 49. I must state that my delegation finds the report now before this Council not only disappointing but also in some respects constituting a retrograde step. The meaning of the replies given by Prime Minister Vorster to Mr. Escher on the various questions raised by the representative of the Secretary-General are not clear, but they can be sufficiently understood if they are taken together. And once they are understood, they become completely unacceptable and do not constitute even a meeting point, One of the main tasks of the representatives of the Secretary-General was “to obtain a complete and unequivocal clarification from the Government of South Africa with regard to its policy of self.detenmnation and independence for Namibia” as recommended in the aide-mdmoire of 26 September 1972 /ibid.] presented to the Secretary-General by the group of three established in accordance with resolution 309 (1972) and without prejudice to other resolutions adopted on the question of Namibia. 50. In our past approaches to the question under review, we recogaed that the question of Namibia was admittedly a difficult and delicate one and that no avenue was to be left unexplored, These and other considerations led the Somali delegation to agree to the new initiative, and even though we were doubtful about the possible outcome of resolutions 309 (1972) and 319 (1972) we hoped that the 43. The racist Government of the Republic of South Africa has, in total disregard of all General Assembly and -- 3 set) znternational status of South West AFk Advisory Opinion, Z.C.J. Reports 1954 p. 128. 51. I should like to deal now with those elements of the report contained in paragraph 21 of the report, which, limited as they are in scope, are what some delegations think constitute some sign of progress towards alleviating the harsh and unjust conditions which the Namibian people suffer under oppressive South African rule. 52. In this context I will first of all repeat what the Somali delegation had to say on 31 July of this year, on the question of establishing the necessary conditions for the people of Namibia to exercise its right to self-determination and independence. We said that the exercise of these rights “must presuppose the establishment of such essential . . . principles as equal political [and civil] rights, universal suffrage, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of movement?‘. [I656th meeting, para. 64.1 We emphasized the equal importance of the release of political detainees and the right of political exiles to return to the Territory. We emphasized, too, that any effort in Namibia with which the United Nations is associated must include bringing a speedy end to the iniquitous system of laws and the racist policies which oppress the people of Namibia. 53. In the view of my delegation, the main purpose of resolutions 309 (l-972) and 319 (1972) was to give the South African Government an opportunity to fulfil its obligations as a State Member of the United Nations in the context of the Namibian situation. It was to give South Africa a golden opportunity to abide by the decisions of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the International Court of Justice. It was to offer South Africa the means of transferring, in a reasonable way, the reins of its administration of Namibia. Finally, it was to give the United Nations a legitimate basis, in the likely event of the continued intransigence of South Africa, for taking positive action, including the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter, in order to support the just aspirations of the Namibian people and enforce the decisions of the United Nations. 54. We have always rejected the South African Govemment’s view which conceives the principle of self-determination on the basis of the division of the Territory on tribal and racial lines through the establishment of so-called “homelands”. The Prime Minister of South Africa stated that “this was not the appropriate stage to go into a detailed discussion of the interpretation of self-determination and independence.” Furthermore, the Prime Minister added to his interpretation the factor that “experience in self-government was an essential element for eventual self-determination”. He also reiterated “that this could be best achieved on a regional basis”. These words are nothing but a new way of describing the “Bantustan” policy-a policy that is obviously directed to the disintegration of the Territory and the undermining of the very-basis of the unity which, in this delicate phase, is vital to Namibia’s 55: The Nazi Prime Minister of South Africa, Mr. Vorster, who was once sentenced to two years of imprisonment with hard labour by the British Government during the Second World War for heading the Ossewa Brandwag-the Nazi party in South Africa-is asking too much of the United Nations. He is, in fact, asking the United Nations to agree to equivocal proposals which fit only his political require. ment of the moment, while in return he is not conceding anything. This singular but not surprising attitude reminds me of a revealing passage that a great thinker, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, a fellow countryman of Mr. Escher, wrote some 200 years ago in his famous book, The Social Contract: “It will always be foolish for a man to say to a man [or to a people], I make with you a convention wholly at your expense and wholly to my advantage; I shall keep it as long as I like, and you shall keep it as long as I like.” 56. The matter of political experience of the Narnibiarr people is only one of the unacceptable principles which Mr. Vorster has applied to the question of self-determink tion. The United Nations, as I pointed out before, has been unequivocal in its demand that the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia be preserved. 57. The people of Namibia are no less politically dev& oped than are those of many countries, including my own, which in the relatively recent past received their indepen. dence. The political institutions of the newly independent African Territories were all in their infancy at the time 01 their independence. 58. Political development depends on the leadership, competence and experience of a relatively small cadre of local political leaders, and not on those of the whoic population. Namibia has its Political leaders and its political parties; and it is a tribute to their ability that they’have been able, either in exile or within the Territory, to develop resistance to South Africa’s usurpation in spite of the restrictive and discriminatory laws of apartheid which have been extended to Namibia. 59. The report indicates that Mr. Vorster is “prepared tc establish an advisory council drawn from representatives cf the various regions, regional governments or authorities”. If there had been any doubt about what Mr. Vorster meant by “regional authorities” they must now be dispelled by his public announcement that he will press ahead with plans tc grant self-determination to 10 non-white “homelands”. His 60. Furthermore, our knowledge of and sad experience with colonial tricks allow us to understand fully the meaning and composition of a colonial advisory council. We will, therefore, be pardoned if we look this gift horse carefully in the mouth. Such a council will have no competence whatsoever and it will be packed with salaried tribal elders and other lackeys scrupulously selected by the South African Government in Pretoria. The persons to be “drawn from representatives of the various regions”, which Mr. Vorster mentions, will be the likes of those who, in a memorandum to the representative of the Secretary General, stated: 64. ;The present situation demands that the people of Namibia must be enabled to exercise their right to self-determination, not on some vague future determined by the white regime’s desire to maintain its privileges and power, but now, without any delay, so that they can be free from the yoke of oppression; free to develop their own political institutions; free to achieve their independence and shape their own destinies. “We Kavangos consider the Republic of South Africa as a mother, a friend and a benefactor. We have never received a cent from the United Nations for our development sch.emes, but from the Republic of South Africa we have been and are receiving help in every respect. Our forefathers were putting on skins, but we are wearing suits, running our own shops and driving magnificent cars.” 65. In the past we heard the clear rejection of the “Bantustan” policy by leaders such as Bishop Auala and Sam Nujoma. In the Secretary-General’s report we have now been presented with other voices, no less clear and unequivocal, and these voices are in the majority. The United Nations, in its support to the Narnibian people, cannot accept either under the old or under new nomenclature the system of “Bantustans” which the South African Government is implementing in order to divide and rule, to perpetuate the migrant labour system; in short, to preserve the privileges and power of the white minority. Those are the people who would be chosen to represent the people of Namibia on a colonial advisory council. The passages that I have quoted are contained in the memorandum listed as item 63 in the list of written communications in appendix II to the report. 66. The conclusions contained in ISectiqn IV of the report state that what has been agreed upon between the Prime Minister of South Africa and the representative of the Secretary-General represents some progress towards the achievement of the right of self-determination and independence for the people of Namibia. Apart from the fact that there were no terms of reference to agree to anything with the South African Government, the representative of the Secretary-General feels that the contacts with the Sotith African regime should be continued. 61. It has been clearly demonstrated in the case of the older “Bantustans” set up in the Republic of South Africa itself how empty and fraudulent is the promise of selfgovernment held out by the “Bantustan” policy. One can only view with sympathy those few groups in Namibia which, blinded by the patronage and petty status given to them by the South African authorities, have also been taken in by this promise. 62. With regard to the abolition of restrictive legislation, Mr. Vorster has mentioned only two aspects of this important matter and he has couched his remarks in vague and unspecified terms. Re will pnly “examine the possibility” of removing restrictions on movement “without impairing influx control”. Now influx control, which Mr. Vorster claims to be in the interest of all inhabitants in the ‘Territory, is the chief restriction on freedom of movement and the core of the migrant labour system; understandably, Mr. Vorster does not want it impaired. 67. In our analysis of this report we do not find signs of any progress on the fundamental issues involved. Instead we have a situation in which the conditions laid down in Security Council resolution 319 (1972) and the specific recommendations contained in the aide-memoire of the group of three referred to earlier in my statement, have not been observed, It would seem rather that some fundamental principles have been compromised by the unfortunate result, that unacceptable policies have been associated with a United Nations initiative in Namibia. In this regard my delegation must express here its dismay that the representative of the Secretary-General found it necessary to state in the report his belief that the interpretation of the principle of self-determination given by the Prime Minister of South Africa is acceptable in principle. That seems to my delegation to represent a new and extremely unfortunate development, especially when stated under the auspices of the Umted Nations. My delegation emphatically rejects this approach to the question of Namibia. If the United Nations 63. :My delegation notes that Mr. Vorster is in agreement that ,there should be legitimate political activity, including freedtom of speech and holding of meetings. But the Terrorism Act, which is in force in Namibia, as in South Africa, and the other racial laws are all directed towards preve:nting any social and political communications between peoples. The Africans are under constant restraint in the matter of political expression. The limited political experience they are allowed is narrowly parochial and is not 68. There is no mention in the report of even such basic initial steps as arrangements for a permanent United Nations presence or a time-table for the handing over of the administration of Namibia. These grave omissions add to the uneasiness which many delegations, including my own, feel about the recent talks with tbe South African Government. 69. As far as my delegation is concerned, we must reject 76. both the underlying implications and the substance of the It will be remembered that last year at about the same main proposals put forward by Mr. Vorster to the Secretime in this very Council the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my country, speaking on the problem now under discus. tary-General’s representative. sion, said: 70. The responsibility for preventing a disastrous situation and obtaining for the people of Namibia the inalienable rights and freedoms proclaimed for all peoples by the “Charter rests with the Security Council, and I would urge the members of this Council to avoid making a political error of judgement in an excess of unjustified optimism. 71. The world community has, first in the League of Nations and now in the United Nations, committed itself to bringing independence to the people of Namibia as a sovereign and unitary State. It is the considered view of the delegation of Somalia that the Security Council must be prepared to take all the steps necessary to enforce its decisions in this important matter, including those measures I mentioned earlier. The continuation of these fruitless contacts with the Government of South Africa would only help, we are certain, towards the international Territory of Namibia being added to the long list of issues relegated to the limbo of unsolved problems. I must state frankly and resolutely that I do not find in this report any convincing evidence which indicates South Africa’s willingness even to reconcile our different views on the important principle of self-determination, or any new element which justifies the continuation of contacts with the Government of Pretoria, Consequently I cannot in good conscience commit the people and the Government I represent in this Council to the endorsement of a report whose repercussions would in all probability breed political disaster and social tragedy for the people of the international Territory of Namibia, 72. In conclusion, I would say that there would have to be dramatic and immediate new evidence of willingness on the part of the South African Government to change its policies for us in this Council to feel that the line of approach undertaken as a result of resolutions 309 (1972) and 3 19 (1972) have any validity or usefulness. 73. The’ PRESIDENT (inteq~retatiiv~ from French): me next speaker on my list is the representative of Chad, I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Madam President, I should like first of all on this solemn occasion to address to you on behalf of my delegation and 75. I also wish to thank the members of the Council for the opportunity given me to take pa.t in the debate on the important question of Namibia. ‘1 . . . Refusal by South Africa to discharge the obligations pursuant to the terms of the Mandate made necessary, and even compulsory, the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI), deciding that the Mandate had come to an end and that South Africa did not have the right to administer the territory.” [15&!3th meeting, para. 39.1 77. The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971-made necessary by the refusal of the Republic of South Africa to heed the injunction of the Security Council as contained in its resolution 269 (1969) to leave the internationally administered Territory of Namibia by 4 October 1969 at the latest-confirmed the international status of Namibia and United Nations responsibility for that Territory and its population. 78. How many eminent and authoritative voices have been heard in this vast forum where, no matter where I look, it is difficult to discern the weakness of the United Nations or the powerlessness of the Security Council. How many times ,have we met here in this same Council Chamber, in the past two decades, either to voice pious wishes for the liberation of Namibia or to prepare measures relating to the self-determination and the achievement of independence by the Namibian people. 79. Inspired by the revolutionary ideals of the Progressive Party of Chad, the Republic of Chad sincerely believes that we would be i&advised to bear a grievance against those who might one day be tempted to utter anathema against US because we had failed in our mission and betrayed the cause of freedom, justice and human dignity if today we were once again to meet simply to reaffirm the right to self-determination and independence of the Namibian people or to instruct the United Nations Council for Namibia and the Secretary-General to negotiate with South Africa its withdrawal from the Territory of Namibia, 80. We know full well that the moral force of the General Assembly of the United Nations exists only .within the confines of its Headquarters, We also know full well that the power of the Security Council ,is limited to taking decisions. 91. In the search for possible solutions to the Namibian problem, the Security Council, by its resolution 309 (1972), entrusted the Secretary-General with the task of making contact with the Government of South Africa with a view to obtaining from it complete and unequivocal explanations of its policy for self-determination and independence for Namibia. Within the framework of this mandate the Secretary-General despatched his special representative, Mr. Escher, to South Africa and Namibia. 82. My delegation notes with regret that measures adopted by the United Nations since October 1966 until now have remained a dead letter. 83. In fact, on 27 October 1966 the General Assembly adopted resolution 2145 (XXI), calling on South Africa to leave Namibia before 4 October 1969. On 19 May 1967 at its fifth special session, it adopted resolution 2248 (S-V) by which it put an end to the Mandate of South Africa over South West Africa and created the United Nations Council for South West Africa to administer the Territory until independence, with broader African participation, 92. In the report of the Secretary-General we see that the views of the South African authorities are far from identical with those of the international community with respect to the political future of the Namibian people. The Secretary- General strongly stresses the urgent need actively to strive to Implement the resolutions adopted by the United Nations on Namibia, taking into account the deep aspirations of the various political and social strata of the population of the Territory. The Namibian people,indeed, in its overwhelming majority, demands that an end be put to the domination of the South African Government over its country. It opposes the application in Namibia of the policy of aparrheid, and especially the policy of separate development, of ‘homelands”. It further demands the immediate withdrawal of the South African administration from the international Territory and the establishment of a United Nations presence there. 84. It is hardly necessary for me to recall that the Security Council, in its resolution 269 (1969), decided: L‘ . . . that the continued occupation of the Territory of Namibia by the South African authorities constitutes an aggressive encroachment on the authority of the United Nations, a violation of the territorial integrity and a denial of the political sovereignty of the people of Namibia”. 85. It is necessary to remind you that this same Council, in its resolution 276 (1970), declared: “ . . . that the continued presence of the South African authorities in Namibia is illegal and that consequently all acts taken by the Government of South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termination of the Mandate are Illegal”. 93. Let us not delude ourselves; South Africa has been resorting for years to palliatives and subterfuges to counteract the liberating action of the United Nations, but we must know that the people of Namibia has already made its choice and is addressing an urgent appeal to the international community, the last court of appeal, This choice, this appeal, is very clearly noted by the Secretary-General in his report when he says that the majority of the non-white population of Namibia supports the establishment of a united, independent Namibia and expects the assistance of the United Nations in bringing it about, 86. My Government reiterates its wish to see these resolutions speedily implemented. 87. The many makeshift solutions put forward by the United Nations in the discharge of such a delicate and important mission as the liberation of Namibia from the tyranny of South Africa are irrefutable proof of the lack of effective measures likely to break the hold of South Africa and its accomplices in its inhuman exploitation of Namibia and in its refusal to respect United Nations resolutions. 94. It is in this context that I should like to present to members of the Council the following proposals. The Security Council should reaffirm the inalienable right of the Namibian people to self-determination and independence pursuant to General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the Charter of the United Nations, reaffirm its non-recognition of the authority of the South African Government over Namibia, create a united, independent Namibia, pursuant to the decision of the General Assembly and to the wishes of the Namibian population, demand that the South African Government take concrete measures to ens&e that fundamental freedoms be exercised and that the political prisoners be freed, invite all Member States and speoialized agencies to grant, through the Organization of African Unity, material assistance to the liberation move. ments of Namibia, set up the United Nations Council for Namibia on Namibian territory; set the date for the proclamation of the independence of Namibia within a 88.. Faced with the challenge of the racist authorities of South Africa, the United Nations engaged in endless talks and negotiations which, in the view of my delegation, delayed the independence of Namibia and weakened the resistance and the combative spirit of the Namibian revolutionaries. 89. For several years the Namibian people has endured and still endures untold misery and bloody repression. For many years South Africa has been despoiling the wealth of the people of Namibia. 90. In the search for solutions to the question with which we are seized, the first duty of the Security Council is to free Namibia. This Council must keep paramount among its 95. I am convinced that the prestige of our Organization would be enhanced if the Security Council took up the challenge of the South African Government to the United Nations. That is what the people languishing in Namibia expects of the Council.

I wish to thank the representative of Chad for the very kind words he has addressed to me. 97. In a letter that has just been addressed ,to me the representative of Zambia has asked to be allowed to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion of the item before the Council. If I hear no objection, in accordance with the provisional rules of procedure and the usual practice of the Council, I intend to invite the representative of Zambia to participate, without the right to vote, in our discussion. There being no objections, I shall invite the representative of Zambia to take a place at the Council table. At the invitation of the President, Mr. K. Nyirenda (Zambia) took a place at the Council table.

Madam President, I wish, on behalf of the delegation of Zambia, to begin by thanking you and, through you, all the members of the Security Council for allowing us to participate, without the right to vote, in this very important debate. Like those who have preceded me, I should like to express my delegation’s profound sense of pleasure, pride and confidence at seeing you preside over the deliberations of the Council during this month. These sincere feelings are derived from the realization that as an acknowledged leader of distinction in your own revolutionary country you have fittingly become the first woman ever to be President of this Council. Once again the great sister Republic of Guinea, with which my OWJI country happily enjoys close fraternal bonds, has, through you, brought honour and pride to Africa and to the women of the world as a whole. 99. Turning to the vexing question concerning the intemationally administered Territory of Namibia of wfiich the Council is currently seized, my delegation wishes at the outset to register its bitter disappointment at the regrettable fact that the grave situation still remains unresolved. The views of my Government on the matter and indeed on the situation in southern Africa as a whole are very well ~IIOWII to this Council. We have on numerous occasions stated our position before this Council, in the General Assembly, in the committees of the General Assembly and elsewhere. Therefore it is unnecessary for me to restate our position in detail during this intervention. The grave situation in Namibia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security. 100. Despite the numerous resolutions adopted by this Council and the General Assembly and despite the advisory ‘opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 101. When the idea of having the United Nations establish contacts with the racist regime in Pretoria over the question of Namibia was originally advanced, Zambia, along with the other independent African States, had misgivings about the wisdom of the initiative. These misgivings were based on a fundamental principle. In the first place, we were convinced beyond doubt that any semblance of United Nations negotiation with the Pretoria regime would be tantamount to a United Nations retreat. We firmly felt that, owing to the fact that the Mandate under which South Africa had administered the Territory had been terminated and the fact that the United Nations had subsequently assumed direct responsibility over Namibia, it was no longer necessary and advisable to have such negotiations with Pretoria. Secondly, the racist regime in Pretoria has over the years demonstrated its total disregard and contempt of human decency and more particularly the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Thirdly, constant calls for a positive response to peaceful change in Namibia and in South Africa itself have fallen on deaf ears. 102. The Security Council adopted its resolution 309 (1972) in Addis Ababa early this year, under which the contacts were initiated. The adoption of that resolution and of resolution 3 19 (1972) was based on the genuine assumption that South Africa would demonstrate its good faith and respond to the legal obligations it has in relation to Namibia by handing over immediately to the United Nations the effective control of that Territory for its administration by the Council for Namibia. This would pave the way for the Namibian people to an early exercise of their inalienable right to self-determination and independence. 103. It is my delegation’s understanding-and we are of the belief that it is the conviction of the Council-that resolutions 309 (1972) and 319 (1972) precisely deal with the question of modalities for the long-overdue transfer of the administration of that Territory by the racist Pretoria regime to the United Nations but not negotiations. However, after studying the report of the Secretary-General, my delegation is left with the disturbing impression that perhaps the United Nations was inadvertently led into negotiating with Pretoria on the legal status and the very future of the Territory of Namibia, contrary to its previous relevant resolutions upheld by the International Court of Justice. 104. The mandate contained in paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 319 (1972) is very clear and unambiguous in its terms of reference. It reads: “‘Invites the Secretary-General, in consultation and close co-operation with the group of the Security Couhl established in accordance with resolution 309 (1972), to continue his contacts with all parties concerned, with a view to establishing the necessary conditions so as to “The Prime Minister believed that experience in selfgovernment Was an essential element for eventual selfdetermination and that such experience could be best achieved on a regional basis”, 105. Equally clear are the principles contained in the aide-m.8moire presented to the Secretary-General by the group Of three. The main role of the Secretary-General’s representative was +&us to obtain from Pretoria a complete &d unequivocal clarification with regard to its position concerning a number of fundamental principles, particularly tihe following: the inalienable and imprescriptible right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence in conformity with General Assembly resolution I514 (Xv) and the Charter of the United Nations; the unity and territorial integrity of Namibia; the international status of Namibia in the light of the relevant United Nations resolutions and the pronouncement of the International Court of Justice. 1 Il. It is astonishing that the representative of the Secretary-General found this to be “acceptable in princi. pie,” as indicated in paragraph 21 (e) of the report. And one wonders under what terms of reference this particular acceptability was meant, or at least indicated. It is quite evident that “regionalism” is intended to be a guise for the so-called “homeland”. In fact, it is simply another word for “homeland” or “Bantustan”. The policy has been condemned by the United Nations and the whole international communityty. The report itself does indicate that the people of Namibia are totally opposed to this “homeland” policy, 106. In the report of the Secretary-General’s representative it is evidently clear that Pretoria deviously evaded giving explicit and concrete answers to questions on the fundamental principles involved. For instance, concerning the inalienable right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence, it is noted from paragraph 91 of the report that the Prime Minister of South Africa felt “that it was not the appropriate stage to go into a detailed discussion of that question. He felt that this could be done with better results, once the necessary conditions are established and the inhabitants have had more administrative and political experience.” The South African regime has repeatedly stated and maintained this position as grounds for impeding the progressive development of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence. 112. The international status of Namibia is now an established fact. It is-as it has been since the termination of the Mandate under which South Africa administered the Territory-a responsibility of the United Nations. 113. Yet, South Africa continues illegally to occupy that Territory. It is noted that no mention in the report is made of South Africa’s commitment to abide by the relevant resolutions of the United Nations. 114. It is also stated in paragraph 21 (f) of the report that the South African Prime Minister intends to establish an advisory council drawn from representatives of the various so-called “homelands” under his own direct responsibility. It is an adverse development which demands serious attention by the Council. 107. It is our view that the people of Namibia are ready for independence the moment they themselves state that they alre ready for independence. They have stated and amply demonstrated this before in various forms and they also stated this position when they were contacted by the representative of the Secretary-General. 115. From what we have so far tried to indicate, it should be pointedly clear that the Pretoria regime has not changed one iota of its intransigence. By failing to provide precise and positive answers to direct questions on the fundamental principles relating to Namibia, it has demonstrated once again its contempt of the Organization and, indeed, its burning desire to deceive the international community. 108. In this connexion, it is noted from paragraph 28 of the report that a great number of persons met by the representative of the Secretary-General during his visit to Namib’ia called for an end to the rule of the South Africa regime over the Territory and expressed their opposition to the implementation of South Africa’s apartheid policies in Naroib’ia, and particularly to its policy of separate development of each ethnic group within its own “homeland.” It &ou.ld. therefore be clear even to those who were in doubt before as to the wishes and aspirations of the Namibian people. 116. Yet we are advised that progress was made during the mission to Namibia and South Africa by the representative of the Secretary-General. This progress, if indeed it is to be so termed, is based mainly on the South African Prime Minister’s vague expressions of intention or aSSertiOns relating to the freedom, of movement and of speech, including the holding of meetings by Namibians within Namibia. However, the fact that the question of freedom of movement within Namibia is qualified with “influx con trol” should in itself be revealing. Just as revealing should be the qu&fications of political activity with the adjective ‘leatimate”. ~0 is to determine what is legitimate political activity’? Is it not a contradiction of the highest order that an illegal rggime can arrogate to itself the responsibj&ty of detemining for the owners of the country as to what is legitimate and what is illegitimate? 109. To this extent, it should be recalled that the demonstrations of the Ovambo workers early this year against contract labour practices were a further expression of the determination of the Namibian people to rid themselves of the yoke of racist oppression and exploitation. 110. As regards the unity and territorial integrity of Namiblia, it is noted again that the mission failed to get the 120. Let history not pass a harsh judgement on the Council and the Organization as a whole for its failure to discharge its solemn obligation to the people of Namibia. One thing is clear: the people of Namibia will not share the responsibility for the catastrophe that might befall that Territory. 118. In this regard, we share the views so eloquently expressed, in their statements before this Council at the preceding meeting, by the Foreign Ministers of Morocco and Liberia and the Chairman of the African Group for this month, the representative of Ethiopia. It is, we are convinced, urgently incumbent upon the Security Council to draw the necessary conclusions from the report of the Secretary-General and take the appropriate measures accordingly. The Pretoria regime should be told in no uncertain terms that the firm commitment of the United Nations is to ensure an immediate removal of South

I thank the representative of Zambia for the kind words he has addressed to me, The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.