S/PV.169 Security Council

We have discussed the amendments to the United States draft resolution (document S/391) 1 presented by the representatives of the United Kingdom (document S/429)' and France (document S/430),' as well as the suggestions presented by the representatives of other countries. The discussion has led to an acceptance of all these suggestions by the representative of the United States, and the amended United States draft resolution has been distributed to all the representatives at the table. There is only one point which has not been cleared. That is point 7 (a)" referring to the composition of the commission. The original United States proposal stated that the commission should be composed of representatives of all the members of the Council. There were alternative suggestions and possible formal proposals. The discussion of that point was postponed,. and I wish to take it up now. May I ask the representative of the United States for his reactions to the suggestions which were made. Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America): During the discussion of this resolution I have had the opportunity to speak twice on that particular paragraph, and I have nothing substanl Ibid., Second Year, Supplement No. 15, Annex 38. I Ibid., Second Year, Supplement No. 15, Annex 99. • Point 6(a) of the final text. de Son Excellence Wang Shih-chieh, Ministre des affaires etrangeres, un telegramme date du 23 juillet 1947 qui m'apprend que M. Quo Taichi, representant de la Chine au Conseil de securite, est en conge de maladie et que le Gouvernement chinois a designe M. Tsiang Ting-fu pour le remplacer jusqu'a nouvel avis. ccJ'estime que ce telegramme constitue de va~ lables lettres de creance provisoires." En l'absence d'opposition, je considere que les membres du Conseil partagent l'opinion du Secretaire general et que nous acceptons que ce telegramme tienne lieu provisoirement de lettres de creance. C'est ainsi que nous procedons d'habitude et cette procedure est conforme au reglement interieur. 258. Suite de la discussion sur la question grecque Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Nous avons discute les amendements au projet de resolution des Etats-Unis (document 8/391)' presentes par les representants du Royaume-Uni (document S/429)' et de la France (document S/430)' et les propositions faites par les repre- sentants des autres pays. La discussion nous a conduits a accepter toutes les propositions du representant des Etats-Unis, et le projet de reso- lution amende de la delegation des Etats-Unis a ete distribue a tous les representants presents autour de cette table. Il reste un seul point qui n'a.pas ete eclairci. C'est le point 7a)' traitant de la composition de la commission. Aux termes de la proposition originale de la delegation des Etats-Unis, la com- mission doit comprenclre des representants de tous les membres du Conseil. Des variantes ont ete proposees et des propositions officielles peu- vent ctre faites. La discussion de ce point a ete renvoyee et je voudrais la reprendre maintenant. Puis-jc demander au representant des Etats-Unis ce qu'il peuse des ~ropositions qu'on a faites? M. JOHNSON' (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (tra- duit de l'anglais) : Au cours de la discussion rela- tive ala resolution en question, j'ai eu deux fois fois l'occasion de prendre la parole au sujet de 'Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conuil de secu- rite, Deuxieme Annee, No 51, 147eme seance, pages 1124 a 1126. 'Ibid., Deuxieme Annee, Supplement No 15, An- nexe 38. I Ibid., Deuxieme Annee, Supplement No 15, An- nexe 39. . • Point 6a) du texte final. The PfmSlDF.NT: The original fonnulation of the paragraph was: "The cornmi.<;~ion shall be composed of a rep- resentative of each (If the nations members of the Security CCHlI1cil, as they may be from time to time." That is the original wording. I should like to Telle est la redaction originale. Je voudrais know whether any representative wishes to make savoir si l'un des representants desire proposer an alternative propmal. une variante. 1'!r. PARom (France) (translated from French): :!'IIa)' I recall the rca.~()ns, as already advanced by me, which appear to me to militate in favollr of a dHfercnt composition of the commi:';sicm. I should like. first of all, to recall briefly that the actual report made to us by the Commission of In\"e:'ti~ati()11 contains a recommendation for a conHlli$sion with a !imall number of mem- ben;, and secondly, that a. tollllni!iSion with a smaller membn':'hip than onc that was a rcplica of the Security Council would be more efficient amI could wo'rk bl~ltcr; lastly, and most impOl'- tant of all, in "kw of the powers and responsi- bilitics of the cIl11lmi~sinn, I thou~ht it would be better if its mClllhcr~hip conveyed the impression of the ,greatest possihle impartiality, a body which would nmsider the Greek question, pos- sibly k~s as a particular ca~{\ 01' a political dis- pu{(', than 011 it.s own merits, by isolating it and !\tudyin~ it from the most objective point of view. Fnr t1Il'SC reasons, which I have already ad- vanced and on whh~h, consequently, I shall not dwell fmtller. I am indincd to maintain my pre- vious pnsition and to recoml11end setting up a commission smaller in si~c and with a more ob- jective, more neutral membcrship. I should like to ask you, 1:fr. !lresident, how we arl~ going to proceed. Assuming that .,we f~l. low the method hitherto adopted by the CounCIl, then, if I understand rightly, a precise proposal will have to be tahled, distinct from the text of the United Stat('~ resolution, in order that the Council may be properly seized of the question. In the present case, there is perhaps one draw- back to this method. If we decide to set IIp a smaller rol1l1l1issiol1 than that proposed by the United States delegation, we may ~esitate be- tween the several variants from whIch we can choose. I wonder, therefore, if it would not be possi~le to vote, first of all, on the proposal. for ~ co.mmls- sion of eleven members and, If thIS IS not Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Le texte original du paragraphe est le suivant: "La Commission est composee d'un represen- tant de chacun des membres permanents et non permanents du Conseil de securite." M. PAROD! (France): Qu'il me soit permis d'evoquer les raisons que j'ai deja fait valoir et qui me paraissent militer en faveur d'une composition differente de la commission. Je voudrais tout d'abord rappe1er rapidement que le rapport meme de la Commission d'en- qucte dont nous avons ete saisis contenait la recommandation d'une commission reduite en nombre; que, d'autre part, une commission plus reduite en nombre que celle qui serait constituee a l'image du Conseil de securite aurait plus d'efficacite et de facilites pour travailler; enfin, et surtout, qu'il me parrot preferable, etant donne les pouvoirs et responsabilites de la com- mission, que celle-ci ait une composition donnant l'impression d'une objectivite aussi complete que possible et amenant a considerer la question grecque moins peut-etre sous l'aspect d'un cas particulier, d'un coni1it d'ordre politique, qu'en elIe-meme, en l'isolant et en la prenant sous un aspect aussi objectif que possiblc. . Ces raisons, que j'ai deja fait valoir et sur lesquelles par consequent je ne m'etendrai pas davantagc, me conduisent a maintenir la posi- tion que j'avais prise et a recommander la constitution d'une commission plus reduite en nombre et plus objective, plus neutre dans sa composition. Je voudrais vous demander, Monsie~r le Pre- sident comment nous allons proceder: en admettant quc nous en restions a la mani~re en usage jusqu'ici au Co~seil, il serai.t .neceSSa1:e, si je comprends .bi~n, qu une propos1tlo~ pre:ISe soit presentee, dlStmcte du texte de. la res.olut1o~ des Etats-Unis, pOUf que la questIon S01t vraI- ment posee au Conseil de securite. Cette maniere de faire, dans le cas present, a peut-etre un inconvenient: si nous decidons de crecr une commission moins nombreuse qt;e celle qu'a proposee la delegation; des Etats-UnIS, nous pouvons hesiter entre plusleursJormules a- I'egard desquelles le choix est perrms. Je me demande done s'il n; serait pas possi~le que nous nous prononcions d abord sur !e pr~Je~ d'une commission de onze membres et, SI celUl-c1 When 1 spoke the other day, I had in mind a commission of seven members, that is to say, the six non-permanent members plus a seventh. I thought it better that the commission should con- sist of an odd number of members. The subse- quent discussion showed that a fairly large num- ber, I think, of our colleagues are in favour of a commission smaller than that proposed by the United States; but various possibilities differing slightly from one another were suggested. I per- sonally would be glad to agree to them; I would not insist on my own formula-I proposed it merely as a suggestion. Possibly the proposal to take the six non-permanent members of the Security Council would be the simplest and least contentious. Once again, however, I would first of all ask if the normal procedure, assuming that the United States representative agrees, would not be for the Council to vote first on whether the com- mission should consist of eleven members or of a smaller number. If this second solution were adopted, could we not then have a further ex- change of views on the membership of the com- mission? Colonel HODGSON (Australia) : As my delega- tion understands it, the only formal proposal be- fore the Council is that contained in the original United States resolution. In the course of the discussion, the representatives of Colombia, France and Australia· submitted alternative pro- posals or suggestions, but they were never pre- sented as formal written proposals. I do not wish to go into the reasons why we made our suggestion, except to say that it differs from the French proposal in two important as- pects. If 1 remember correctly, the French pro- posal provided that the non-permanent members of the Security Council should be permanent members of the commission, even though their Governments might no longer be members of the Security Council. There may ?e l?ood reasons for that in order to ensure contmUlty of repre~ , . . . sentation' but, to our mmd, representatlOn ID a body su;h as the proposed commis;sion shou~d be a real representation of the Secunty Council. The second point of difference is that the Aus- tralian proposal suggested representatives of the non-permanent members only, without any out~ side neutral such as Sweden. Because of those two import~nt differences, the Australian pro- posal is really an amendment to the French proposal. parti~ du Conseil de securite,. par exeu;ple la Suede. Etant donne ces deux differences nnpor- tantes la proposition austra!i~nne est .en fait un amendement de la propOSItion franc;atSe. Mr. TSIANG (China): My Government fav- ours a full commission with all members of the Council represented. The importance of the question, as well as the general interest which Governments have in its solution, justifies, and even requires, a full commission. The difficulties involved in the selection of a smaller commission are quite real. But these dif- ficulties would not be the only ones, I should like to call attention to even greater difficulties in the execution of the duties entrusted to the commis- sion of its membership is less than one fully rep- resentative of the Council. In the first place, the full commission of eleven members would settle differences and adjust dif- ficulties more easily than a smaller commission. In the second place, if the commission had a membership of six or seven, it could not then be sure that a majority in the commission would be sustained by a majority in the Council. The ele- ments of hesitation and uncertainty in the execu- tion of its duties would creep in. Finally, if ~e have a smaller commissiOl:, Go~­ ernments not represented may have to mvestl- gate and obtain information ind~pende~tly. The Governments not represented rrught raIse more questions and institute more debates here. It seems to me that a full commission would more adequately represent the Council, and, in the long run save the time of the Council. For these reasons; I hope that our colleagues w.ill see their way clear to support the proposal laId be- fore us by the representative of the United States. Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America): I had not thought that this proposition,would be debated further but inasmuch as VIews have been expressed, it may be useful if Irecall to ~he Council certain of the reasons why my delegatlon favours the larger representation. Some of those reasons have been stated by the representatives of Australia and China. The representative of Australia stated that he .thoug?t the commission which might be establIshed ~ Greece should be representative of the. CouncIL That argument would certainly apply ill part to the proposal he suggested for the non-permanent M, TSIANG (Chine) (traduit de l'anglais) : Mon Gouvernement est en faveur d'une commis- sion pleniere Oll tous les membres du Conseil seraient representes. L'importance de la question et l'interet general que les Gouvernements por- tent asa solution justifient et exigent meme une commission pleniere. Les difficultes que comporte le choix des mem- bres d'une commission restreinte sont tres reelles. Mais ces difficuItes ne sont pas les seules. Je voudrais attirer l'attention du Conseil sur les difficultes plus grandes que rencontrerait l'accom- plissement des devoirs confies a la commission dans les cas ou ses membres seraient moins nombreux que ceux du Conseil. En premier lieu, il serait plus facile a. la commission pleniere de onze membres de regler toutes les divergences de vues et de resoudre les difficultes qu'il ne le serait aune commission moins importante. En second lieu, si la commission est composee de six ou sept membres seulement, il n'est pas certain qu'une major~te. ~ la comm,ission soit confirmee par une maJonte a~ Consel!. 1.!n el~­ ment d'hesitation et d'incertItude se ghsseralt dans l'accomplissement des devoirs de la commis- sion. En-fin si nous nous decidons pour une com- mission 'mains importante, 1es Gouvernem.en~ qui n'y sont pas representes pour;ont avoll' .a proceder it des enquHes et a reumr des rensel- gnements individuellement. Les Gouvernements non representes pourront soulever de nouvelles questions et susciter ainsi de nouveaux debats. SeIon moi une commission pIeniere represen- terait plus fidclement le Conseil et, ala lo~gue, lui ferait gagner du temps. P.our ces rals~ns, j'espere que mes co11egues esbmeront posslb~e de soutenir la proposition que soumet le repre- sentant des Etats-Unis. M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'~merique) (tra- duit de l'anglais): Je ne pensaIS pas que cette '(on ferait l'objet d'un nouveau debat, propoilsl 1 te"tre utile etant donne que diverses malS peu ,. . 11 opinions ont ete formulees, que Je rappe e au Conseil certaines des raisons pour lesque11es ~a delegation est en faveur d'une representation plus large. . Les representants de l'Australie et de la Cehine ont expose certaines de ces Jrais~.ns, Le ~epr se~­ tant de l'Australie a dec}ar~ qu il ~ensaIt qGuee a ., qui pourraIt etre creee en l' ce COIDffilSSlon il C t gument cl l't representer le Conse. e ar evra f ' la propo- , r certainement en par le a S.3PP lqu~il a soumise au sujet de la representa- SltlOn qu I believe the full commission would more ade- quately represent the Council's purposes, and would be able to co-ordinate its work with the policy and decisions of the Council more effec- tively than if the representation were smaller; it would give a unity to the execution of the Coun- cil's policies and purposes which would be lack- ing if there were a limited representation. While many arguments in favour of any of these pro- posals might seem good (anyone of the pro- posals for the composition of this commission could be defended plausibly, and could be op- posed plausibly), we believe the full commission would offer the best chance for success and the smallest number of inconveniences. I personally seriously doubt that the sharp differences of opinion which have existed at dif- ferent times in the Commission which is still in existence would be in the least attenuated by having a small commission. I think that it is an illlision, and that those differences of opinion may perhaps be more easily smoothed out by a group representing the entire Security Council. I therefore earnestly hope that the Security Council will be able to take a decision to the effect that the membership of the commission will correspond exactly to that of the Council. Mr. MUNIZ (Brazil): At the hundred and sixty-si.xth meeting,' I mentioned two principles that should be taken into account in the com- position of the commission: the representative character of the commission, and the elimination of choice. Having viewed the nature of the task entrusted to the commission, I believe it is important that the conunission should be fully representative of the Security Council, and should reflect its pres- tige and moral force. If it is a body representa- tive of the Security Council itself, the commission will gain in authority not only in its investigating capacity but also in its duty as 'a conciliator. The commission will have a delicate and diffi- cult task ahead of it. We should not spare any effort to impart to it the highest degree of au- thority. For the commission to have the same cOll:1position as the Security Council would also be an advantage to it in its relations with the Security Council. A commission of eleven members, as proposed by the United States delegation, fulfils all those Je crois que la commission pleniere represen- terait le Conseil plus fidelement et serait en mesure de coordonner son travail avec la poli- tique et les decisions du Conseil mieux que ne le ferait une commission ou la representation serait moins large. Elle donnerait ala mise en applica- tion des programmes et des projets 9,u Conseil une unite qu'une representation limitee ne per- mettrait pas. Un grand nombre d'arguments en faveur de rune quelconque de ces propositions peuvent pa,raJ:tre valables (rune quelconque des propositions soumises au sujet de la composition de cette commission peut etre defendue et atta- quee raisonnablement) > mais nous pensons qu'une commission pleniere offrirait les plus grandes chances de succes et presenterait le plus petit nombre d'inconvenients. Personnellement, je doute serieusement que les grandes divergences d'opinions qui se sont fait jour a diverses reprises au sein de la Commission actuelle soient le moins du monde attenuees si nous disposons d'une commission de composition plus restreinte. Je pense meme que le croire est une illusion et que ccs divergences d'opinions peuvent peut-etre plus facilement disparal:tre au sein d'un groupe representant tout le Conseil. J'espere done que le Conseil de securite vou- dra bien decider que la composition de cette commission representera exactement celle du Conseil. M. MUNIZ (Bresil) (traduit de l'anglais): Lors de la cent-soixante-sixieme seance\ j'ai fait mention de deux principes qu'il convient de prendre en consideration dans la composition de cette commission: le caractere representatif de la commission et l'eIimination du choix. Ayant etudie la nature de la tache confiee a- la commission, je pense qu'il est important que la commission represente le Conseil de securite de fil.<;on plus complete et soit le reflet de son prestige et de la force morale qu'il represente. Si elle constitue un organisme representant le Conseil de securite lui-meme, la commission y gagnera en autorite, non seulement en tant qu'organisme d'enquete, mais aussi dans ses. taches de conciliation. La commission se trouvera en presence d'une tache delicate et difficile. Nous ne devons epar- gner aucun effort pour lui conferer le maximum d'autorite. Avail' la meme composition que le Conseil de securite sera pour eUe un avantage dans ses relations avec ce Conseil. Une commission de onze membres, teUe que la propose la delegation des Etats-Unis, reunit 1 Voir les Proces-v8rbau~ officiels du Con.seil de secu- rite, Deuxieme Annee, No 63. 1\1r. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated from Frc"}ch ): I want to confirm briefly a state- ment wInch I made at the meeting of 24 July.' If the Security Council is offered a choice be- tween the various formulas proposed during the debate,. the Belgian delegation would prefer the suggcstlOn made by the Australian delegation. If, however, no such amendment is moved-and if we are to have a choice, there must be an amcnclment--the Belgian delegation will vote for the original text submitted by the United States delegation. Ivh-. LAWFORD (United Kingdom): In this matter, the United Kingdom delegation is in fa.vour of the text of the United States draft resolution as it stands. We think it is in accord- ance with the responsibility of the Security Coun- cil as a whole, and the United Kingdom, for its part, would be willing to assume its responsibil- ity in this regard.

As there are no formal pro~ posals or amendments to paragraph 7 (a), the original United States wording stands. Mr. PARODI (France) (translated from French): As I pointed out just now, the best kind of procedure in this discussion would seem to me to be to vote first of all on the United States text; if this text were not adopted, we could try to find the formula which would best replace it. This was also, I think, the opinion of the representative of Australia. The statement just made by the Belgian representative worries me a little because it does not fit in with this procedure. I should therefore like to know your decision, Mr. President, as to how you wish this question put. I shall submit an amendment if that is necessary. But I thought the other solution was the best. Mr. Er.-KHOURI (Syria): The representative of Fl'ance has suggested that action should be taken on the original proposal first. If it were rejected, he would then present an amendment or another proposal. That procedure does not seem to me advisable. It would be better for the representative of France to present his amendment now before' the United States proposal is voted upon l so that his amendment may be voted upon first. If it were rejected, and if all the other amendments were rejected, we should then return to the original proposal. On behalf of the Syrian delegation, I proposed at the hundred and sixty-sixth meeting' that there M', VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgique): Je desire ~?~fir~er en quelques mots la declaration que ] al fmte au cours de la seance du 24 juillet'. Si un choix est offert au Conseil de securite entre les diverses formules proposees au cours des debats, les preferences de la delegation belge se porteront sur la suggestion formulce par la delegation de l'Australie. A defaut toutefois d'un am:nderr:ent ,dans ce ,sens - car pour que ce ChOlX pUlsse s exercer 11 faut un amendement - la delegation belge votera pour le texte primitif' de la delegation des Etats-Unis. M. LAWFORD (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): Pour la question qui nous occupe, la delegation du Royaume-Uni est favorable au texte du projet de resolution des Etats-Unis, td . qu'il se presente actuellement. Nous pensons qu'il est en accord avec les responsabilites du Conseil de securite considere dans son ensemble, et le Royaume-Uni, en ce qui le concerne, est pret a assumer sa part de responsabilite a cet egard. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Etant donne qu'il n'existe aucune proposition ni amendement officiels relatifs au paragraphe 7a), la redaction originale presentee par les Etats-Unis est maintenue. M. PARODI (France): Comme je l'ai indique tout al'heure, la meilleure maniere de proceder dans cette discussion me paraissait etre de nous prononcer d'abord sur le texte des Etats-Unis; si ce texte n'etait pas adoptc, nous pouvions chercher la formule qui le remplacerait le mieux. Cela etait egalement, il me semble, l'opinion du representant de l'Australie. La declaration que vient de faire le representant de la Belgique me gene un peu car eUe ne cadre pas avec cette methode de travail. Je voudrais donc Monsieur le President, connaitre votre decision' sur la falion dont vous desirez que la question soit posee. S'il c;st necess~re qu.e je presente un amendemc;nt, ]e ~e feral. MaJS l'autre solution me semblaIt la meilleure. M. EL-KHOURI (Syrie) (traduit de f anglais) : Le representant de la France a propose que l'on prenne d'abord une decision au sujet de la proposition originale et, si celle-ci etait repoussee, il presenterait un amendement ou une a?tre proposition. Cette procedure ne. me parrot p~s a conseiller. 11 serait preferable que le representant de la France soumette son amendement maintenant, avant que la proposition des E~ats­ Unis soit mise aux voix, afin que nous vonons d'abord sur cet amendement. S'il etait rejet~ et si tous les ;autres amendements l'etaient aUSSl, nous reviendrions alors ala proposition originale. Au nom de la delegation de la Syrie, j'ai propose, lors de la cent-soixante-sixieme seance', 'Voir les Proces-verbaux officisls du Conseil de sicurite, Deuxieme Annee, No 63; 166eme seance. If any delegation wishes to present an amendment, it should be presented now before we proceed to vote on the original text. If the French representative would hesitate to approve that method of deciding upon a formula, we should then return to the original text. In any case, the Syrian delegation would not vote for the French proposal to have on the commission six nonpermanent members of the Council and another member of the United Nations outside the Security Council. There is no justification for that forml,lla. It is much better either to appoint all the Security Council members, or to adopt the Australian proposal, if there is a proposal to be presented now before voting on the original proposal. We are faced with these formulas for the composition of the commission. We can appoint only the five permanent members to constitute the commission, or the six non-permanent members, or all the members of the Security Council. There is no proposal, except mine, which advocates a single commissioner; that is not easy to handle in this present situation.

I shall follow the wishes of the representatives of Australia and France. If they wish to make a formal amendment, I shall submit it to the Council for discussion. If they prefer the other course, then we shall vote in due time on the paragraph of the United States proposal in question. If it is not adopted, I shall then give them the opportunity to present any amendments they may desire. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): I share the view which has just been expressed by the President. If we are going to vote on this text now, there would be some point in what the representative of Syria has just said about taking a decision on it. We are not going to vote at the present time. The position is therefore quite clear. When we come to the vote, we shall have before us only the original proposal. If that is not carried, I shall then be ready to submit my proposal to the Council. Mr. LOPEZ (Colombia): There is very little M. LOPEZ (Colombie) (traduit de l'anglais) : that I can add to what I have already said about Je ne peux pas ajouter grand-chose a ce que Si une delegation quelconque desire presenter un amendement, c'est maintenant qu'il convient de le faire, avant que nous mettions aux voix le texte original. Si le representant de la France hesite a approuver cette fac;on de decider de la formule choisie, nous reviendrons au texte original. En tout cas, la delegation de la Syrie ne votera pas en faveur de la proposition franc;aise de faire sieger a la Commission six membres non permanents du Conseil et un autre Membre des Nations Unies qui ne soit pas m.embre du Conseil. Cette formule ne se justifie pas. Il est de beaucoup preferable, soit de designer tous les membres du Conseil de securite, soit de s'en tenir ala proposition australienne, si nous devons nous prononcer maintenant sur une proposition avant de mettre aux voix le texte original. Nous nous trouvons en presence des formules suivantes relatives a la composition de la commission: elle peut etre constituee des cinq membres permanents ou des six membres non permanents seulement ou de tous les membres du Conseil. Il existe aucune proposition, si ce n'est la mienne, qui recommande un seul commissaire, ce qui n'est peut-etre pas tres pratique dans le cas present. Le PRESIDENT (tradui"t de l'anglais): Je me conformerai au desir des representants de l'Australie et de la France. S'ils desirent faire une proposition officielle d'amendement, je la soumettrai au Conseil pour discussion. S'ils pre:- ferent s'en tenir al'autre methode, nous mettrons aux voix, en temps voulu, le paragraphe en question de la proposition des Etats-Unis. S'il n'est pas accept6, je leur donnerai la possibilite de soumettre tous les amendements qu'ils desireront. Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): Je partage l'opinion que vient d'exprimer le President. Si nous devons immediatement mettre le texte aux voix, ce que vient de declarer le representant de la Syrie au sujet de la decision a prendre est tres pertinent. Mais nous n'allons pas voter tout de suite. La situation .est done parfaitement claire. Lorsque nous en viendrons au vote, nous nous trouverons en presence de la proposition originale. Si elle n'est pas adoptee, je serai pret asoumettre ma proposition au Conseil. First, I shall refer to the procedure, which is the point we are discussing at present. It seems to me rather important to decide whether or not we are establishing a precedent in the way in which we are conducting this discussion. If I interpret our rules correctly, the proper course of action to follow, after a proposal has been presented, is to submit amendments, if any, and to vote on the amendments first. Therefore, if there is a French or an Australian amendment to the original United States proposal, according to our rules of procedure such an amendment should be formally submitted and voted on before a vote is taken on the proposal itself. Of course, we have been following a rather unprecedented procedure, because both the President and the Security Council have decided to overlook the rules. Whenever an amendment is introduced, our first step is to ask the United States delegation whether the amendment is acceptable to it. But the rules really provide that the Security Council itself should make that decision. When there is a proposal, and an amendment to it is submitted, the Council, according to our rules of procedure, is expected to take a decision on the amendment. But according to our present procedure, any amendment submitted is presented to the United States delegation first; and if it is acceptable to the United States delegation, then the Council discusses it. That is why I believe it is extremely important for the Council to decide whether we are going to follow that procedure in other cases, or whether this procedure applies only to the discussion of the Greek question. With regard to the point under consideration, I also find that entirely different results. may follow from different voting procedures. It does make a difference whether we vote first on the United States proposal or on one of the amendments suggested. To begin with, our French colleague said that the best procedure would .be. t.o vote on the United States proposal, and 1£ It 18 not accepted, to vote on the amendment which he would then propose. From my point of vie~, once the.Council has not accepted our suggestlOns regarding the seat of the cOl111lUssion and its functions, and I might even say regarding the appr?ach to the question, I would ~e .~ore stron~l~ ~n .favour of leaving the responsIbility of the mlt1atlVe to the United States. We have proposed that a smaller commiss~on should be set up with the idea of approaching Je parlerai d'abord de la procedure dont nollS discutons en ce moment. n me parait important de decider si nous allous ou non creer un precedent par la far;on dont nous conduisons ces debats. Si j'interprete correctement notre reglement interieur, il convient, apres qu'une proposition a ete presentee, de soumettrc des amendements, s'il y a lieu, et de les mettre tout d'abord aux voix. En consequence, s'il existe un amendement franr;ais ou australien ala proposition originale des Etats-Unis, il convient, conformement anotre reglement interieur, de le presenter officiellement et de le mettre aux voix avant de mettre am.: voiX la proposition ellememe. EVidemment, nous avons suivi une procedure assez nouvelle puisque le President et le Conseil de securite a la fois ont decide de ne pas tenir compte du reglement. Chaque fois qu'un amendement est presente, la premiere chose que nous faisons .est de demander a la delegation des Etats-Unis si dIe le juge acceptable. Mais en realite le reglement prevoit que le Conseil de securite lui-mcme doit prendre une decision. Lorsque nous nous trouvons en presence d'une proposition et d'un amendement a cette proposition, le Conseil, conformement a notre reglement interieur, doit prendre une decision au sujet de l'amendement. Mais dans notre procedure actuelle, tout amendement propose est prealablement soumis a la delegation des Etats- Unis. Si elle l'accepte, le Conseil le discute. C'est pourquoi je peuse qu'il est extremement important que le Conseil ~ecid~ si no;zs alions suivre cette procedure a I avemr ou SI elle.ne s'applique qu'a la discussion de la questIon grecque. Pour en venir au point que nous examinons, je pense que differents modes de .votation p~ur­ raient entrainer des resultats entlcrement differents. Le fait de mettre d'abord aux voix la pro~ position des Etats-Unis ou l'un des amendements proposes n'est pas sans importance. Notre collegue fran~ais a declare que la ~eil­ leure procedure serait d~ metu:e aux ,VOIX la proposition des Etats-U111S et, SI eHe n est pas acceptee, de mettre aux voix yn ~mendcmeD:t qu'il proposerait alors. Quant a m?I! le Con~eil n'ayant pas accepte notre prop~sl~lOn relative au lieu de reunion de la comllUSSlOn et a ses attributions, et je pourrais J?em~ di;c rel~tive a la far;on d'aborder la questlOn, Je D: en SUlS que plus dispose a laisser aux Etats-Ums la respon~ sabilite de l'initiative. . NoilS avons propose la creation d'une commission restreinte avec l'intention d'aborder le pro- But since the commission is going to be on the border, since it is going to have powers of investigation, and since it is supposed to take over the same functions and powers as the original Commission of Investigation and the Subsidiary Group, I believe we have to come to the conclusion that there is really very little fundamental change f~om the original United States proposal. The French amendments may have helped to make some improvement in the wording of some paragraphs i but after all, as the press has reported, there is no substantial change either in the approach or in the proposals originally submitted by the United States delegation. Substantially, it stands as it did at the beginning. There is very little use in following a different approach in a fragmentary way, because it would not change the policy and it would not change the approach. If we have a commlSSlOn of six of the nonpermanent members and none of the permanent members of the Security Council, I doubt very much that the commission would have the necessary backing. In my opinion, the backing of the commission does not rest primarily with the number of members. I do not believe that the num1;>er of members, whether it were seven, nine or eleven, would influence the solidarity or the authority the commission might have. As I said before, that depends upon how far the Security Council decides to go in backing'the findings of the commission. Then, of course, I do not believe we should be blind to the fact that, under the arrangements just completed by the Greek and the United States Governments, implementing the Truman Doctrine, the presence of the United States representatives in Athens has very much to do with the whole development of the task of this commission. I believe that is what gives the decisions of the commission their primary strength. A point has been raised here regarding the weight the recommendations of the Security Council will carry with the Balkan Governments. I should like to state that that point has given us great concern. When it brought up the Spanish question in the General Assembly, the Colombian delegation stated very clearly that it understood that the recommendations of the General Assembly were binding upon the Members of the Organization. Likewise, we believe that the recommendations of the Security Council are binding upon the Members of the Organization. We may be wrong, but that is our opinion. Of Mais puisque la commission sera sur la frontiere, puisqu'elle doit avoir des pouvoirs d'enquete et puisqu'elle doit assumer les memes fonctions et pouvoirs que la Commission d'enquete et le Groupe subsidiaire originaux, je pense que nous en sommes arrives ala conclusion que la proposition originale de la delegation des Etats-Unis n'a subi que tres peu de modifications fondamentales. Les amendements fran~ais peuvent avoir ete de quelque utilite pour ameliorer la redaction de certains paragraphes, mais apres tout, ainsi que le signale la presse, il n'y a pas de modification substantielle, ni dans la fac;on d'aborder la question, ni dans les propositions soumises initialement par la delegation des Etas- Unis. Elle est telle qu'elle etait des le debut quant au fond. Adopter une fac;on differente d'aborder certaines parties de la question, une solution fragmentaire, ne serait pas d'une grande utilite, car cela ne changerait ni la politique, ni la fac;on d'aborder la question. Si nous disposons d'une commission composee de six des membres non permanents sans aucun des membres permanents du Conseil de securite, je crains fort que la commission ne soit pas suffisamment soutenue. A mon avis, le nombre de' membres qui la composeront ne suffit pas essentielIement alui donner de I'autorite. Je ne pense pas que cenombre - que ce soit cinq, neuf ou onze - puisse influencer la solidarite ou l'autorite que la commission peut montrer. Ainsi que je l'ai dit precedemment, cela depend uniquement de la fac;on dont le Conseil de securite decidera de soutenir les conclusions de la commission. D'autre part, je ne pense evidemment pas que nous devions ignorer le fait que, conformement aux mesures priSes d'un commun accord par les Gouvernements de la Grece et des Etats- Unis pour l'application de la doctrine de Truman, la presence de representants des Etats- Unis aAthenes a beaucoup afaire avec l'accomplissement de la tache de la commission. Je crois que c'est ce qui donne aux decisions de la commission leur force principale. On a souleve la question de l'importance qu'attacheront les Gouvernements des Balkans aux recommandations du Conseil de securite. Je desire declarer que l'examen de ce point nous a donne beaucoup d'inquietude. Lorsque nous avons souleve la question espagnole a I'Assemblee generale, la delegation de la Colombie a declare tres clairement qu'elle comprenait que, seIon eIle, les recommandations de l'Assemblee generale liaient les Membres des Nations Unies. Nous pensons que les recomrnandations du Conseil de securite les lient egalement. 11 se peut que nous ayons tort, mais telle est notre If some Members have the privilege of making their choice with respect to whether or not they accept the recommendations, I believe we will have an entirely different situation. In the same way, I believe that, since we are taking such a positive stand on thc possibility of a threat to the peace in the Balkans, we should not be so very slow in considering, for instance, a question such as we have in Indonesia at present. We do not have a threat to peace there, but actually an undeclared war, regarding which the Security Council is doing nothing. I am very glad .to see that the Council has shown its willingness, by its decision, to take some very positive action in the sense of avoiding threats to the peace and breaches of the peace. As we 110W make this decision, I believe we are taking a very encouraging step towards carrying our work in other fields to its logical conclusion. For instance, in the Spanish Cj.uestion, the resolution of the General Assembly provided that, if after a certain time the resolution did not have a satisfactory effect, something should be done by the Security Council. I suppose wc shall be able to take IIp the matter with the idea of giving general effect to general policy, in keeping with the provisions of the Charter. If we apply the provisions of the Charter democratically and sincerely in every case, I believe the work of the Security Council will become more effective and command the support of the world at large. Otherwi~e, I believe we shall be running the risk of simply having a new resolution, like the resolution on Spain, like the resolution regarding the treatment of Indians in South Africa,' or another situation like any of those we ha"{re been considering for the last six or seven months and on which we have not been able to reach agreement: for example, the atomic bomb, the report of the Military Staff Committee, conventional armament,>, the Corfu Channel incident and Trieste. As far as I can sec now, we arc not going to reach much agreement on the Greek question. Vve shall have a majority agreement, as we' have always had, on the subjects under discussion; but we shall not be making very real and substantial progress in reaching an agreement that will give 1 Sce Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during the ~ccolld part of its first session, resolution 39(1), page 63. aIbid' J resolution 44(1). page 69. g~ne~ale lient ou non les Membres de l'Orga.- nIsation. Si certains Membres ont le privilege de choisir entre l'acceptation ou le refus de respecter Ces recommandations, je crois' que la nous nous trouverons devant une situation enticrement differente. De la rneme maniere, je peuse que, puisque nous prenons une attitude aussi nette sur la possibilite d'une menaCe ala paix dans les Balkans, nous ne devons pas tarder aexaminer, par e.xemple, une question telle que celle de la situation actuelle en Indonesie. En Indonesie, ce n'est pas une menace it la paix que nous aVOilS mais en fait une guerre non declaree au sujet de laquelle le Conseil de securite ne fait rien. le suis tres heureux de constater que le Conseil de securite a manifeste par sa decision son desir de prendre quelque mesure tres positive pour eviter les menaces ala paix et les attentats contre la paix. En prenant cette decision, je crois que nous faisons un pas tres encourageant vers la conclusion logique du travail que nous accomplissons dans d'autres domaines. En ce qui concerne la question espagnole, par exemple, la resolution de l'Assemblee general~ prevoit que si, apres un certain temps, cette resolution n'a pas eu un effet satisfaisant, le Conseil de securite devra prendre quelque mesure. le suppose que nous pourrons reprendre la question avec l'intention d'appliquer d'une fa~on egalement generale cette politique generale, conformement aux dispositions de la Charte. Si, dans chaque cas, nous appliquons ces dispositions democratiquement et sincerement, je pense que le travail du Conseil de securite sera plus efficace et recevra l'appui du monde entier. S'il en etait autrement, je crois que nollS CaUl'· rions le risque de n'avoir qu'une resolution de plus, comme la resolution espagnole, comme la resolution concernant le traitement des Hindous dans l'Union Sud-Africaine', ou nne situation analogue a celle qui se presente pour les questions que nous avons examinees au cours des six ou sept derniers mois, questions sur lesquelles nous n'avohs pas pu aboutir a un accord: la bombe atomique, le rapport du Comite d'etatmajor, les armements de type classique, les incidents de Corfou et la question de Trieste. Autant que je puisse m'en rendre com~te maintenant, nous ne sommes pas ~ur le pomt d'aboutir a un accord sur la questlOn grecque. Nous aurons l'accord d'une majorite, comme nous l'avons deja eu sur les sujets discutes, m,ais DOUS ne ferons pas un progres reel et ,substantiel' ~ Voir les Resolutions adop~Jes par I'AS!el}tblh g~ni" rale pendant la seconde partJe de sa premIere seSSIon, resolution 39(1), page 63. 'Ibid., resolution 44(1), page 69. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je desire ajouter quelques mots d'explication sur la question soulevee par le representant de la Colombie. Je ne pense pas que nous nous soyons ecartes en aucune fa<;:on de notre reglement interieur. Chaque fois que nouS nous trouvons en presence d'une proposition officielle d'amendement, nous la mettons aux voix avant de mettre aux voix le texte de la resolution. Jusqu'ici, on n'a pas propose un seul amendement officiel au texte de la delegation des Etats-Unis et il ne nous etait pas possible de mettre aux voix des amendements inexistants. The PR:E;SIDENT: I wish to give a few words of explanation on the point raised by the representative of Colombia. I do not think that we have in any way deviated from our rules of procedure. Whenever there is a formal proposal for an amendment, it is voted before the text of the resolution. Thus far not a single formal amendment to the United States text has been proposed, so that we could not have a vote on nonexistent amendments. De plus, chaque fois qu'une proposition est faite, que ce soit officiellement ou officieusement, il est parfaitement naturel de donner a l'auteur de la resolution le choix de l'accepter ou de la refuser, puisque c'est de sa resolution qu'il s'agit. Telle est la procedure que nous avons generalement suivie. Furthermore, whenever, any suggestion is made, whether formally or informally, it is quite natural for the original author of the resolution to be given the chance to accept or reject it, because it is his resolution. That is the procedure which we have usually adopted. M. PARODI (France) : Comme vous, Monsieur le President, je pense qu'en ce qui concerne la procedure tout a ete parfaitement regulier. Pour ce qui est specialement des suggestions que nous avons faites quant a la composition de la commission, je fais remarquer au representant de la Colombie que nous n'avons pas, jusqu'ici, preaente d'amendement; nous avons suivi precisement la voie qu'il a lui-meme suivie a plusieurs reprises - tres utilement d'ailleurs - consistant a presenter des propositions sous la forme de simples suggestions. Mr. PARODI (France) (translated from French): I agree with you, Mr. President, that so far as the procedure is concerned, it has all been perfectly normal. With special reference to the suggestions my delegation has made regarding the composition of the commission, I would remind the Colombian representative that thus far we have not submitted an amendment; we have taken precisely the same course which he himself has frequently taken-and very usefully Do-of making proposals in the form of simple uggestions. Actuellement, nous en sommes a une suggestion. Si je m'en tiens la, alors que pour les, autres points la delegation fran<;:aise avait tenu a proposer des amendements, c'est encore une fois parce que, dans l'ordre logique de la discussion, il me paralt que la maniere de faire normale consiste d'abord a nous prononcer sur le projet de onze membres, qui, s'il est adopte, met fin .a toute discussion; puis, seulement s'il n'est pas adopte, a faire examiner queUe est la meilleure des autres solutions possibles. At the moment we are offering a suggestion. If I go no further than that, whereas in the case . of other points the French delegation submitted amendments, the reason once again is that, in the logical order of discussion, I thought that the normal thing would be to decide first on the deven-member proposal, which, if adopted, ends the whole discussion; then, only if it is not carried, to see which is the best of the other possible solutions. With regard to the very interesting general remarks just made by the Colombian representative, I should like to say that, in my opinion, the text we have before us today differs quite appreciably from the original text. It differs in its spirit, in the way in which the various points are submitted and, above all, in the way it stresses the commission's task of conciliation. A l'egard des observations generales que le representant de la Colombie vient de presenter de fa<;:on si interessante je voudrais dire qu'a mori avis le texte en presence duquel nous sommes aujourd'hui se distingue assez sensiblement du texte initial. Il s'en distingue par son esprit, par la maniere dont les differents points sont presentes et, essentiellement, parce qu'il met en valeur la tache conciliatrice de la commission. . If I have modified my previous views on many points, it is because I felt that the membership of the commission was one of its essential aspects. I still think that the spirit of the resolution will largely depend on how the commission is constituted. I repeat what I said just now, that it appears to me essential that we should stress the Si, sur beaucoup de points, j'ai attenue les vues qui avaient d'abord ete les miennes, c'est parce que je considerais qu'un aspect essentiel etait precisement celui de la composition de la commission. Je continue a penser" que l'esprit de la resolution dependra en grande partie de la maniere dont la commission sera constituee. Ce I would add a secondary remark about the other arguments put forward here. It has been said that, if the commission did not exactly represent the Security Council, it might perhaps get less support from the Council; it would have less authority. I should recall, however, that it is not the function of the commission to take decisions. Its functions are, on the one hand, conciliation or rapprochement; and on the other, information. For purposes both of information and conciliation, the commission, by virtue of its membership, should have the intrinsic authority derived from the neutral or balanced character of its membership. In these circumstances, I still think that the solution I advocated just now is preferable, and the one best calculated to settle the difficulties confronting us. Mr. LAWFORD (United Kingdom): May I ask the French representative whether he intends to propose an amendment on this point before we finally vote on the text of the United States resolution; because if not, I wonder whether, in accordance with our rules of procedure, we can vote on his suggestion?

Before I call upon the representative of France to reply, perhaps I may express my view on this subject. The procedure will be to vote in due course upon this particular paragraph of the United States resolution. If it is accepted, the question is settled; if it is not accepted, then what the representative of France would present would not be an amendment but a new proposal. The same is true with regard to the representative of Australia. Mr. PAROD! (France) (translated from French): I have nothing to add to what you have just said, Mr. President. I entirely agree with you.

As there are no formal proposals, paragraph 7 (a) of the new text stands in the original formulation presented by the United States delegation. We have now finished our discussion on the draft resolution submitted by the representative of the United States, and we are ready to vote upon it. Before we do so, the representatives of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia wish to make brief declarations. Mr. MEvoRAH (Bulgaria) (translated from French): The United Kingdom representative reproached me yesterday for having described the situation as reminiscent of the best of all possible worlds. I did not say that. I said, how- J'ajoute une remarque secondaire se rapportant a d'autr~ arguments presentes ici. .La commission, a-t-on dit, si eUe ne representalt pas exactement le Conseil de securite risquerait peut-etre d'etre moins suivie p~ le Conseil, d'avoir moins d'autorite. Mais je rappelie que le role de la commission n'est pas un role de decision: d'une part, il est de conciliation, de rapprochement; d'autre part, d'information. Aussi bien pour la tache de rapprochement que pour ceUe d'information, il est necessaire que la commission, par la maniere dont eUe est composee, ait une autorite intrinseque tenant, encore une fois, au caractere neutre ou equilibre de sa composition. Je persiste, dans ces conditions, apenser que la solution que j'ai defendue tout al'heure est preferable et la plus propre a mettre fin aux difficultes en presence desquelles nous nous trouvons. M. LAWFORD (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): Puis-je demander au representant de la France s'il a l'intention de proposer un amendement ace sujet avant que nous mettions definitivement aux voix le texte de la resolution des Etats-Unis, car, s'il n'en fait rien, je me demande si, confonnement a notre reglement interieur, nous pouvons mettre aux voix sa proposition? Le PRESIDENT (traduit de, l'anglais): Avant de donner la parole au representant de la France pour lui permettre de repondre, peut-etre puis-je exprimer mon opinion a ce sujet. La procedure que nous adopterons sera de mettre aux voix en temps voulu ce paragraphe particulier de la resolution des Etats-Unis. S'll est accepte, la question est resolue, s'll ne l'est pas, ce que le representant de la France soumettra ne serait pas un amendement, mais une proposition nouveUe. La meme remarque reste valable pour la proposition du representant de l'Australie. M. PARODI (France): Je n'ai rien aajouter, Monsieur le President, ace que vous venez de dire. Je partage entierement vos vues. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Aucune proposition officielle n'ayant ete presentee, le paragraphe 7a) du n?~veau texte re~te t~l qu'il etait dans le texte ongmal de la delegatIOn des Etats-Unis. Nous avons maintenant termine notre discussion du projet de resolution soumis par le representant des Etats-Unis et nous sommes prets ale mettre aux voix. Avant que noUS le fassions, 178 representants de la Bulgarie et de la Yougoslavle desirent faire de breves declarations. . M. MEvoRAH (Bulgarie): Le representant du Royaume.Uni m'a reprochC hier d'av~?, fresente la situation sous un aspect tel, qu il ev~­ quait le meilleur des mo~des. Je ~ al. pas, dlt cela. Mais rai declare qu'll n'y aValt nen a la In the second place, the resolution disregards the findings of the Commission of Investigation about the internal situation of Greece and its causes. The report expressly states that the causes of the trouble are to be sought in the discrimination shown by the pres~nt Government towards the opposition and minorities. That, I think, is the most important part of the report. The report very tentatively suggests that, if the Greek Government should decide to grant an amnesty to the political prisoners and the partisans, the Commission would propose that the Security Council infonn the Greek Government of its readiness, on the Government's request, to lend its good offices to assure the implementation of this measure. Nothing is said of this proposal in the draft resolution. To avoid any misunderstanding, I should add that I am not expressing myself in favour of an amnesty. I merely note that this important point has been overlooked by the Council, and that the unfortunate result of this omission was to divert attention towards us instead of concentrating it on the real crux of the problem, namely, the terror exercised against the Greek people. Everything else is secondary. The proposed commission will not put an end to the civil war nor to the "fabrication" of frontier incidents. If some State wishes at all costs to establish, consolidate and justify control over Greece, and if it thinks that the commission might help it to do so, we can only regret that we have been chosen to be the scapegoat. . In conClusion, I declare, nevertheless, that our people and our Government have no aggressive intentions and will continue to work, in the factories and in the fields, for the establishment of peace, at home and in the Balkans. r thank you, Mr. President, and I also thank I the Council for having given me a patient hearing throughout all my speeches. Mr. VILFAN (Yugoslavia): It seems to me appropriate at this moment to stress once more the attitude of the Yugoslav delegation with regard to the amended United States resolution. ~er que des incidents insignifiants, qui ont ete laisses de cote par la Commission d'enquete el1ememe. Si on vous demandait en quoi consiste l'aide que la Bulgarie a accordee a la Grece, vous seriez en peine de repondre. Dans ces conditions, pour avoir la conscience tranquille, je crois que l'on aurait dO. se contenter de recommandations et d'une offre de bons offices. En second lieu, la resolution ne fait aucun cas des constatations de la Commission d'enquete relatives a la situation interieure de la Grece et aux causes qui l'ont d6terminee. Le rapport constate expressement que les causes du malaise doivent etre cherchCes dans la discrimination dont le Gouvernement actue1 a fait preuve a 1'egard de 1'opposition et des minorites. C'est la, amon avis, la partie la plus importante du rapport. Avec beaucoup de circonspection, le rapport suggere que si le Gouvernement grec decide d'atcorder une amnistie aux prisonniers politiques et aux partisans, la Commission propose que le Conseil de securite fasse savoir au Gouvernement grec qu'il serait pret, si celui-ci le lui demandait, a preter ses bons offices afin d'assurer la realisation de cette mesure. Cette proposition n'a pas trouve d'echo dans le projet de resolution. J'ajoute, pour eviter tout malentendu, que je ne me prononce pas pour l'amnistie. Je constate seulement que ce point primordial a ete omis par le Conseil et que cette o,mission a eu pour resultat malheureux de devier l'attention vers nous, .au lieu que celle-ci se concentrat sur le nceud veritable du probleme, asavoir: la terreur exercee contre le peuple grec. Tout le reste est secondaire. La commission que 1'on veut creer ne mettra pas fin ala guerre civile ni a la "fabrication" d'incidents de fron-· tihe. Si quelque Etat veut a tout prix instituer, consolider et justifier un controle sur la Grece et croit que la commission puisse lui etre utile en cela, nous n'avons qu'a regretter d'avoir ete choisis comme bouc emissaire. Je declare neanmoins, en terminant, que notre 'peuple, comme notre Gouvemement, ne nourrit pas d'intentions agressives et continuera de travailler, dans les usines et dans les champs, a 1'etablissement de la paix, chez lui et dans les Balkans. Je vous remercie, Monsieur le President, et je remercie egalement le Conseil, d'avoir eu la patience de m'ecouter jusqu'au bout au cours de mes interventions. M. VILFAN (Yougoslavie) (traduit de l'anglais): I1 me semble maintenant cipportun de souligner encore une fois l'attitude de la deIe~ gation yougoslave en ce qui concerne la resolution amendee des Etats-Unis. However, the contrary was taken as the starting point and the following erroneous presumptions were taken as a basis: (1) that the general condition of unrest in Greece and foreign intervention in the country are not important to, and have no connexion with the causes of the disturbed situation in Greece and on its northern frontiers; (2) that disturbances in northern Greece and on its northern frontiers were provoked by its northern neighbours, who had armed and sent groups of partisans into that country. Because of these presumptions, the report of the Conunission of Investigation certainly cannot provide a basis for recommendations. We have, in our statements before the Security Council, proved the accuracy of that thesis, and have at the same time urged a systematic and detailed discussion on these questions. Our request was not honoured; this, too, was one of the reasons which contributed to the formulation of erroneous recommendations. Let us be more precise. The contents of the resolution can be divided into two parts. The first part-paragraphs 1, 2 and 3-includes recommendations which, if separately applied, would be of help to the situation in the Balkans. Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6, however, provide for measures which could be characterized as unjust and as having no legal foundation. As regards the problem of refugees, it is erroneous and unjust to identify the refugees in Yugoslavia with the quislings in Greece. In our opinion, that is not in accordance either with international obligations or with a basic concept of justice. The international control of refugees in the form proposed is, we think, incompatible with the principle of sovereignty. It is perfectly true, as has been said, that this would mean a police control. We cannot agree with the recommendation regarding the problem of national minorities. Following the establishment.of facts on the denationalization and extermination of the Macedonian and Albanian national minorities in Greece, admitted also by the majority in its conclusions, an astonishing recommendation was reached concerning a possible transfer of these minorities. We cannot consider it otherwise than as sanctioning the denationalization and extermination carried out, and sanctioning the Greek thesis as a whole. C'est cependant le contraire qui a ete pris comme point de depart et les fausses presomptions suivantes ant servi de base: 1) que la situation generale d'insecurite en Grece et les interventions etrangeres dans ce pays sont sans importance pour la situation troublee qui regne dans ce pays et sur ses frontieres nord et n'ont aucun lien avec eUe; 2) que les troubles qui regnent dans la Grece du Nord et aux frontieres nord de ce pays ant ete provoques par ses voisins du nord, qui ont arme et envoye dans le pays des groupes de partisans. Du fait de ces presomptions, le rapport de la Commission d'enqucte ne peut certainement pas servir de base a des recommandations. Au cours de nos declarations devant le Conseil de securite, nous availS demontre la verite de cette these et en meme temps demande une discussion systematique et detaillee de ces questions. Notre requete n'a pas ete entendue, et c'est la encore une des raisons qui ant contribue a la redaction de recommandations erronees. Soyons plus precis. Le contenu de la resolution peut etre divise en deux parties. La premiere partie, paragraphes 1, 2 et 3, comprend des recommandations qui, si elles etaient appliquees separement, contribueraient a eclaircir la situation dans les Balkans. Les paragraphes 4, 5 et 6 prevoient cependant des mesures qui peuvent etre qualifiees d'injustes, car elles n'ont aucun fondement juridique. En ce qui concerne le probleme des rCfugies, il est faux et injuste d'identifier aux quislings grecs les refugies qui se trouvent en Yougoslavie. Selon nous, cela n'est en accord ni avec les obligations internationales, ni avec le concept fondamental de' justice. Le controle international des rCfugies, sous la forme que 1'0n propose, est, croyons-nous, incompatible avec le principe:de la souverainete. I1 est parfaitement exact, comme on l'a declare, que cela reviendrait auncontrole de police. Nous ne pouvons pas accepter les recommandations relatives au probleme des minorites nationales. Apres avail' etabli les faits relatifs a la denationalisation et a l'extermination des minorites ethniques macedonienne et albanaise en Gn~ce, egalement admis par la ~aj~rite dans ses conclusions une recommandatlOn etonnante a ete votee au ~ujet d'Ull transfert possible ~e,ces minorites. Nous ne pouvons pas la conslderer autrement que sanctionnant l~ denationaIisa~on et l'extermination auxquelles il a ete procede et satlctionnant la these grecque dans son ensemble. The proposals included in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 jeopardize the positive effect of the proposals included in paragraphs 1,2 and 3. Therefore, the resolution as a whole cannot help normalize conditions in the Balkans nor, more precisely, can it help normalize the situation in Greece and on its northern frontiers. Colonel KERENxHI (Albania) (translated from French): During the discussions on the Greek question, the amended United States proposal has undergone severe criticism based on the Charter and on the facts observed by the Commission during its investigation. Despite this, the changes made in the United States proposal do not constitute an improvement in the substance of the proposal except as regards the reference to re-establishing good relations between the interested countries. We found ourselves contending and we are still contending with unfair proposals, proposals which are not justified by the true situation in Greece and which are at variance with the United Nations Charter. We are confronted with proposals which threaten to confuse the situation and are of no help in clarifying or improving it. And yet, the United States proposal is about to be put to the vote. We would have welcomed draft resolutions based on the real facts of the situation. We cannot possibly admit the justice of proposals which do not meet the requirements of the situation, and which, on the contrary, might oblige us to submit to control and would place our Government under the authority of an external body, which, in the concrete case before you, would be contrary to the Charter. In the first place, the draft United States resolution is erroneous since it is based on conclusions which are not in accordance with the facts. The conclusions which· maintain that the northern neighbours of Greece have supported the campaign against that country are manifestly, from beginning to end of the report, entirely unfounded. The facts which emerge from the investigation do not justify such conclusions or, consequently, such proposals. The bias shown in the Commission of Investigation's conclusions has served subsequently as a basis for the proposal embodied in the United States resolution. This proposal cannot apply to a situation which has been the subject of investigation; it has no bearing on that situation. The evidence collected showed that the situation is due to causes of an internal nature, and that Greece's north~rn Les propositions figurant dans les paragraphes 4, 5 e~ 6 annulent l'efl'et positif des propositions figurant dans les paragraphes 1, 2 et. 3. En consequence, la resolution dans son ensemble ne peut pas contribuer a normaliser la situation dans les Balkans, ni, plus precisement, anormaliser la situation en Grece et sur la frontiere nord de ce pays. Le colonel KERENXHI (Albanie): Au cours des discussions sur la question grecque, la proposition amendee des Etats-Unis a ete soumise a une critique severe fonMe sur la Charte et sur les faits releves par la Commission durant son enquete. Malgre cela, les changements apportes a la proposition des Etats-Unis ne representent aucune amelioration quant au fond de cette proposition, sauf en ce qui concerne la mention du retablissement de bonnes relations entre les pays interesses. Nous etions, et nous sommes toujours, devant des propositions injustes, des propositions qui ne sont pas dictees par la situation reelle en Grece et qui sont contraires a la Charte des Nations Unies. Nous sommes devant des propositions qui risquent d'embrouiller la situation et ne contribuent pas du tout a l'eclaircir ou al'ameliorer. Et cependant, la proposition des Etats-Unis est sur le point d'etre mise aux voix. Nous aurions salue des projets de resolution qui se seraient inspires des causes reelles de la situation. Nous ne pouvons en aucune maniere admettre comme justes des propositions qui ne repondent pas aux necessites de la situation; qui, au contraire, pourraient nous obliger a nous soumettre a un control~ et qui placeraient notre Gouvernement sous l'autorite d'un organisme exterieur, ce qui, dans le cas concret que vous examinez, serait contraire ala Charte. Tout d'abord, le projet de resolution des Etats-Unis est errone puisqu'il est fonde sur des conclusions qui ne correspondent pas aux faits. Les conclusions selon lesquelles les voisins septentrionaux de la Grece ont donne leur soutien a .la lutte contre ce pays apparaissent de toute evidence, d'un bout al'autre du rapport, comme depourvues de tout fondement; les faits ressortant de l'enquete ne permettent pas d'arriver a de telles conclusions et, par consequent, a de telles propositions. Le manque d'objectivite des conclusions de la Commission d'enquete a servi, par la suite, de base ala proposition de resolution des Etats-Unis. Cette proposition ne peut s'appliquer a une situation qui a fait l'objet d'une enquete; elle est etrangere a cette situation. Les preuves recueillies ont demontre que cette situation est due a des causes d'ordre interieur; elles It has been clearly pointed out in the Security Council that the Council's recommendations are not binding when the decisions adopted are based on Chapter VI of the Charter. Decisions taken under Chapter VI bear essentially the character of recommendations and not of obligations. The amended United States proposal,· however, goes beyond the measures provided in Chapter VI, and consequently, infringes the Charter by providing for decisions which violate the sovereignty of our countries and place them under control and tutelage. This has been strikingly proved during the discussion of the draft United States resolution. To summarize, there are strong reasons why the Security Council should not take decisions unrelated to a situation which has been the subject of investigation, decisions of a compulsory character which would be in contradiction to the Charter. These various reasons can be summarized as follows: 1. The real causes of the situation are to be found inside Greece and have nothing to do with us. The Security Council's recommendations should be directly related to these causes. 2. We are not defendants, sitting at the Council table waiting for decisions which will entail an obligation. 3. The United Nations Charter does not allow the prestige. of independent countries to be injured, nor does it allow such countries to be placed under tutelage or control. 4. Chapter VI of the Charter does not allow binding decisions to be imposed upon us. During the discussions which have taken place here, efforts have been made to affirm the contrary and to justify the draft United States resolution. We are not convinced, however. We shall not change our opinion. We do not think that the Security Council is acting in this concrete. case in conformity with the facts as revealed by the investigation or the requirements of the situation or the Charter. ~ais le projet de resolution des Etats-Unis ne tie?t pas compte de tous ces elements cependant mdIspensables pour en faire une resolution juste et necessaire dans les circonstances actue!- les. Cette proposition ne decoule pas d'une verificati0Il; des accusations, e!le ne correspond pas au~ faIts. ~n ne peut admettre que les accusa~lOns .P?rtees contre nous par les Grecs aient ete ve~Ifiees; par consequent, aucun verdict ne pe.ut et:e prononce contre nous; a plus forte ralson, il ne peut etre question de decisions obli. gatoires, de decisions prises sans notre consentement. Il a ete clairement expose devant le Conseil de securite que les recommandations faites par ce demier n'ont pas un caractere d'obligation lorsque les decisions prises sont fondees sur le Chapitre VI de la Charte. Toutes decisions prises en vertu du Chapitre VI assument essentielle. ment un caractere de recommandation et non pas un caractere d'obligation. Or, la proposition amendee des Etats-Vnis depasse les mesures prevues au Chapitre VI et, par suite, va al'encontre meme de la Charte en prevoyant des decisions qui violent la souverainete de nos pays et soumettent ces derniers a un controle et a une tutelle. Ced a ete demontre par des exemples frappants au cours de la discussion du projet de resolution des Etats-Unis. En resume, il existe de fortes raisons pour que le Conseil de securite ne prenne pas de decisions etrangeres a une situation qui a fait l'objet d'une enquete, deci· sions presentant un caractere d'obligation et qui seraient en contradiction avec la Charte. On peut resumer ainsi ces diverses raisons: 1. Les causes reelles de la situation se trouvent a. l'interieur de la Grece et n'ont pas de rapport avec nous. Les recommandations du Conseil de securite doivent etre en relation directe avec ces causes. 2. Nous ne sommes pas, ala table du Conseil, des accuses attendant des decisions ayant un caractere d'obligation. 3. La Charte des Nations Unies ne permet pas de porter atteinte au prestige de pays independants et elle ne permet pas de soumettre de tels pays a une tutelle,8. un contrOle. 4. Le Chapitre VI de la Charte ne permet pas qu'on nous impose des deci.sions .d'un c~rac­ tere obligatoire. Au cours des dISCUssIons qUI ont eu lieu ici on a tente d'affirmer la these opposee, de justifi~r le projet de resolution des ~tats­ Vnis. Mais nous ne sommes pas convamcus. Nous ne changeons pas d'opinion. Nous ne pensons pas que le Co';Seil de s~cu. rite agisse, dans ce cas concret: d une m~mere conforme aux faits releves par I enquete, m aux necessites de la situation, ni ala Charte. I declare that my country considers itself bound, as are Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, to comply with the resolution and the Council's recommendations and that it undertakes to discharge its obligations fully and in good faith.

I believe that we have finished the discussion and are now ready to vote. Desires have been expressed that the resolution should be voted on in parts. I should like to know whether the representative of the United States has any objection to this. Rule 32 says: "Parts of a motion or of a draft resolution shall be voted on separately at the request of any representative, unless the original mover objects." There is also another point. If we are going to vote on the parts of the resolution separately, it might be desirable to adjourn now and to take the vote at the beginning of the afternoon meeting, with the understanding that no further discussion will take place before the vote. If a member wants to say something before the vote, he should say it nOW. Mr. ]OHNSON (United States of America): In regard to voting on the different sections, I should like to inquire whether my understanding is correct, that we shall vote according to the general line laid down in the numbered sections of the original United States resolution. Some of those have been expanded into more than one section. We are not voting line by line. At the beginning of our discussion, when we were adopting the amendments to this draft text, the numbered paragraphs of the United States resolution were taken as a guide to control the discussion. For instance, paragraph 2 has been expanded into paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5; and in the text given to us this morning, the preamble to paragraph 6 has been given·a separate number, whereas, as a matter of fact, paragraphs 6 and 7 on the paper we received this morning are really one paragraph. The present paragraph 6 on this paper is only the preamble to the other, but it has been put down as a separate numbered paragraph. That is possibly merely an error in typing, because the present paragraph is not a separate section; it is the preamble to what follows. There must have. been an error in transcription.

In regard to the last point raised by the representative of the United States, I shall instruct the Secretariat to re-number the paragraphs of the resolution in accordance with what has been said. In regard to the division of the voting, it seems to me that the simplest way would be to vote on the preamble, and then on the paragraphs. The specific requests which I have received are these. The representative of France would wish paragraph 6 (a), according to the final numeration, which deals with the composition of the commission, to be voted on as a separate paragraph, if that is agreeable to the representative of the United States. The representative of Poland would appreciate it if the two sections in paragraph 1 could be voted on separately, if that is agreeable to the representative of the United States. If any other representative has some special wishes regarding the way the paragraphs should be voted on, I invite him to express them. Mr. lOHNsoN (United States of America): I cannot attempt to pose any objection to those two requests. I should like to remind the Council, however, that at the very beginning of this discussion, the United States delegation reserved the right to have its original resolution voted on as it stands, at the very end, if this amended resolution does not carry.

I also want to inform the Council that following the usual procedure, after having voted on the paragraphs, I shall call for a vote on the resolution as a whole. I shall therefore adjourn the meeting, and we shall re-assemble at 3 p.m. The meeting rose at 12:50 p.m. HUNDRED AND SEVEN1'IETH MEETING Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 29 July 1947, at 3 p.m. President: M. O. LANGE (Pologne). Presents: Les representants des pays suivan~: Australie Belgique, Bresil, Chine, Colomblc, Etats-Udis d'Amerique, France" Pol~gne, Royaume-Uni, Syrie, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques. President: Mr. O. LANGE (Poland). Present: The representatives of the. foIlov:ing countries: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, ~hina, Colombia. France Poland, Syria, Umon of Soviet S~cialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. 259. Provisional agenda 1. Adoption of the agenda, . 2. The Greek 'question: report .of the CkomFmlssion of Investigation concermng Gree rontier Incidents to the Security Council (document S/360): 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux' officiels ~u. ~oNse~ de sicurite, Deu,oeme Annee, Supplement sp Clll 0 • En ce qui conceme la division de la resolution pour le vote, il me semble que la fa~on la plus simple serait de voter sur le preambule, puis sur les paragraphes. Les demandes particulieres que j'ai re~ues sont les suivantes: le representant de la France desire que le paragraphe 6a), d'aprcs le numerotage definitif qui traite de la composition de la commission, soit mis aux voix separement si le representant des Etats-Unis y consent. Le representant de la Pologne desire que les deux alineas du paragraphe 1 soient mis· aux voix separement si le representant des Etats-Unis y consent. Si l'un quelconque des autres representants a quelque desir particulier relatif ala fa~on dont il convient de meUre aux voix les differents paragraphes, je l'invite a nous faire connaitre sa fa~on de voir. M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais): Je ne veux pas m'opposer aces demandes de quelque fa~on que ce soit. J'aimerais cependant rappeler au Conseil qu'au debut meme de la presente discussion la delegation des Etats-Unis s'est reserve le droit de faire mettre aux voix sa resolution originale telle qu'elle etait con~ue si en definitive la pr6sente resolution amendee n'etait pas adoptee. Le PRESIDENT: le desire egalement faire connaitre aux membres du Conseil que, conformement ala procedure habitueIle, je soumettrai l'ensemble de la resolution aun vote lorsque les differends paragraphes auront cte votes. La seance est levee et nous nous reunirons a 15 heures. La seance est levee a12 h. 50 CENT-SOIXANTE-DIXIEME SEANCE Tenue aLake Success, New-York, le mardi 29 juillet 1947, a15 heures. 259. Ordre du jour provisoire 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour. e e au 2. La question grecque: rlaPCport r:r .sen de"en Conseil de securite par a omm~slOn . quete sur les incidents survenus1 a la frontiere grecque (document S/360) .