S/PV.1692 Security Council

Mr, l’rcsldc\\t, hoforc I lntroducc the report of the Spcclal MIssIon ullow W, 011 bolialf of i\\y dolckatloa, to oxpross iiiy grout sutlsfuctlon ut sceli\g you, Sir, In tlic Cliulr II\ your capuclty us I’rosldc\it of tlio Sccurlty Cou~~cll for Uils \\\o\\ tli. h\do~\cslu rc\\\ci\\bcrs will\ approclutloa iu\d gr8tltudc tlic cfflclol\t o\\d cl’fcctlve way you prcsidcd over the dlfflcult u~\d dcllcutc col\cludl\\g dcbatcs OI\ UIC \lroblc\\\ of West lrlat\ durlar! the twentyfourtl\ session of tllc Goocral Assc~~\bly In I(j;69, u\\d II& you guided the dlscussloiis to u successful concluslo\l. Rcccntiy WC wlt\\csscd your cupublc l\ti\\dllug of the h\vltatlo\\ cxtc\\dcd by your Govcrnn\c\\t to U\c Sccurlty Com\cll to \\\cct In I’UI~UII\U, WIIICII Icd to Its ucccptuncc by the Council. My dclcgutlo\\ Is tl\crcforc co\\vl\\ccd that, u\\der your able iu\d cxpcrlc\\ccd guldurcc, the Council CUII look forward to a fruitful r\\o\\tl\ of work a~\d acl~lcvc~nc~~t l\crc tu\d III I~IIPI~~~. To tl\at end, IIIY delcgutlo\\ pro\\\lses you its full support a\\d co-opcratlo\\. 12, Dcparthig frota tlic tradltloriul proccdurc, I sliould Ilkc, as Prosldcnt, to cxpross upprcclntlon oucc uguk\ for the fact that tl\c hlstorlcrl dcclslon WIIICII WC huvc taken, to meet for Iho first thiic on Uic Lath\ Amcrlcan co\\tlt\cnt, wus In lurk0 \\\msuro tlic result of Uic li\telllgc\\ce, tuct u\\d fr\\\ncss wItI\ wl\lcl~ our work WPS guldod II\ U\c month of Januury by the rrprcscntatlvc lof Jj\do\\csln, A\\\bnssador k\war SunI. Adoptlou of the agenda llre age/da was adopted Coi\\plul\\t by Zan\blu Report of the Security Council Spechl Mlsslo~~ establlshcd waler rcsolutlo\\ 326 (1973) (S/10896 UII~ Add.1 1) 13. Tl\e I~I~SIDENT (iuterpretatkw fiouor,l Spadslr): III accordance with the decisions take\\ by the Coundl WIICII It co\\rldcred tl\is I~CI\I last 1\101\th / 1687th rw~ti~~~/, I propose liow, with tlic co\\sc\\t of the Couiicll, to h\Vltc tl\c rcprcsei\tatlvc of Zambia to take a place at tl\c Cotuicll table IX. I slmld llkc also to tukc tl\is opportu\\lty to cxprcss tl~c oppreclatlo\\ a11d thu\\ks of my dclcgutlo\\ to the outgning Prcsldcnt, our collcuguc from\\ Kcryu, A\\\bassador OdcreJowl, who successfully guldcd Ulc work of the Council durl\\g tl\c \\\o\\tl\ of February II\ u ~\\ost efflclc\\t und capublc \\\a\\\\cr. 19. Turning HOW to the buslwss before us, I IIOVC the l~onour to subalit, on bcl\alf of IIIY collcug~~cs und n\ysclf, for tl\c co\\sldcratlo\\ of tl\o Security Cour\cll tl\c report of tl\c Spcclul Mlsslon cstabllsl\cd under rcsolutlon 326 (1973) of 2 February 1973. At tlte iwltatio~~ of tile Presklewt, hfr, I! J. 1:. Lusaka (Zambia) took a place at tile Courwil table- 14. The I’RESIDRNT (itrterpretatiorr jiw~ Sl)artislr): Again II\ uccorde\\ce wit11 our prcvlous dcclsio~\s /1687t/r, 1689rk arid 169Ot1! werings/ I propose I\OW, wItI\ tl\c consent of tlio Council, to h~vltc tl\o rcprosr\\tatlvos of Gha~\a, Morocco, the U\\ltcd Rcpubllc of Tanzat\la, Zaire, Chile, Algerht, Scncgnl, Egypt, Somallu, Cuba, Cumeroon u\d Guyu~\a to take U\e pluces rcscrvcd for them II\ tl~c Council chn\\\ber III order to partlclpate, wltllout the right to vote, b\ UIO discussion of U\c item on our ugcnda under the tern\s of Artlclc 31 of the Chartor. It Is u\\dcrstood that they will be lnvlted to take a place at tl\c Com\cil table when tl\ey wish to speuk. 20, It I\\UY be rccnllcd tl\it purugraph 9 of tl\at rcrolutlo\\ dacldcd to: “dlsna tch h\\\\\edlatcly u speclul ~~llsslot~, cot\slsth\g of fou; members of thcwSccurhy Council, to bo uppointcd by tl\o Prcsldo\\t of the Security COUIXII uftor consults tlons with tlie members, to assess the sltuatlo\\ In U\C ama”, thut area being, of course, the reglo\\s near t!\c border between Zambia UII~ !he Territory of Souther\\ Rhodesla, TIIC Cour~cll will furthc\nrore recsll that the Spccinl Misskm wus also dlreclcd by pm’ogr:ipli 3 of Security Coullcll rewlutkm 327 (lY73) uf tl\c SIIIIC date “to ~sscss UIC uccds of Zambia, in mulr~tuinliig nlternatlvc systci\is ol’ road, rail, air und sea co\ilt~\uriicutions for tlic II~I~II~~ flow of truffic”, in which tusk it WIS to be usslstcd by P tcum of six U111ted Nations experts. At ttle itwltatbl uj’ Ibe I’rcside~lt, Mr. A. i<atrcrl (Algcrki), Mr, H. Alarcdtr (Cuba)# Mr. A. ~eytnorrr (i$yl)t)v Mr. 1,. tittuds (Guyam), Mr. M. Fall (Setlegul), Mr. JI Sullm (lhited Iiepublic uf 1irrr;urriu) ml Mr, Ilm.!o I::wblr lI&rul’asi (&ire) took ttle places reserved jix t/rem it1 ttle Courwll dwriber. 15. TIE PRESIDCNT (ititerpretatiuri frottt ,I’puttis/t): UCfore culling (III the first spcakcr ot\ the list, I would draw 21, It WIIS o geat l\orlour for IIIC to IIWC bceu c11ose11 by lily COllCil&$lC!i lo bc C’hulrn\n\\ of such al\ i\\\port:inI inissiori. II wus a privilege as well as \I plcusurc IO c:iriy 0111 _ 12. I should llkc ul,so to tukc tbls opportunity to tbunk tbc _ very conqmnt teunl of Unllcd Nutlons ccoi~onilc cxpcrts, : kWdGd by hOfCSSO1 <;OrdOll (;uUlldrCy Of ~UllUdU, WithOUt wllosc dcdlcutod efforts our report would not IlaW bccll possible, Muy I ulso cxprcss tbc MIssIon’s grutltudc to tbc tlcvotcd und compctcnt minbcrs of tbc Sccrcturlut wlio _ ~con~punlcd us, thus mklng u nmningful coniriblltioll to = the successful uccoi~iplisll~~~crt of our tusk, It would not bc prop to conclude tbcsc uckriowlcdgclncilts witbout cxpressing tbc profound upprcclution und grutlludc of tllc MissIon to IIIC Govcrmncnts of tbc United Kingdom, Zun~blu, the Unlted I(epubllc of ‘l’u~m~~in Und Kcnyo 011d to 1 thclr offlciuls Wiii: r:olluborutcd so whole-licurtcdly with OUI efforts to curry oul our ussignnient und who buvc provldrd the lnfornmtiou on wbicb our report Is bused, TIE officials f of tl~ose Covcrnnnznts who hclpcd us during tbc work of Y our hllsslon urc too numerous to mcntlon by nun~c, but WC -~ wisli lo cxtond to cacli of llicni our grullludc for theii : assistonce. _ 23. Tile members of tbc Speciul h!lsslon hop tbnt the = mcmbcrs of tbc Security Council will rend our report in I full; WC bclicvc it mcrlts such attention. Ilowcvcr, I should like to nlcntlon briefly u few pertinent points. I buve in 7 inind cliaptcr VII: “Asscssnicnt under Sccurlty Council ’ resolution 326 (1973)” and cbeptcr VIII: “ASSCSSIIICII~ = ilndcr Sccurlty COUIICII rcrolution 327 (1973’1”. ’ 24. In our usscssiiici~l, us culled for by rcsolutlon 326 (1973), the Spcclul Mission wus ublc to uscertuln tlmt u ; consldcrablc mcusurc of tcnslon contlnucd to exist in tbc nrcu, the orlglns of wlllcl~ dld not stcni exclusively from i rcccnt cvcnts on the Zullibloil/Soutllerli Rbodesiun border. It is nccessury to bcur In mlnd ulso tla situation pertulnlng 1 to the whole of soutbcrn Africa, The developments with 1 wlilcb the Sccurlty Council IIUS been sclzcd are, in great r part, u result of the dcnlul of tbc rl&t to self-dctclnllnutlon 1 to tbc niujorlty of 1110 Afrlcun pcoplcs liv111g under the z dominotlon of the ruclst, minority and colonlul r&imcs in soutbcrn Africu, None tllc Icss, the state of tension hus hew 1 I~eightened to u mcusurublc degree following tllc provocutivc und qgrcs;;vc acts connnlttcd by tbc Illeg;d rdgime of Suuthcrn IUlodcsiu against tbc I<epublio of Zambia. l’11c effects of tbosc ucts were rcflcctcd in tllc pulitlcal, milltar) nlId e~u~w~~~lc flclds. TIIC considcrcd view of the Zumbiun t ;ovcrnnicnt is tlmt i! Is unublc to cxcrcisc uny influence over tbc outivitics of libcralion niovcnicnts insldc Territories subjected to culoniallsm, rucism :111d mlnorlty lulc, It amld IIUI, tbcrcforc, bu lleld rcsponsiblc for dcvclopncnts ~~nr~ing in those Tcrritorlcs. ?.S. The stute of tcnslon in tbc arcu is uggravuted by the loilituiy prcpur;itlons confronting Inrgc portions of %aiw blu’s I’ronlicr ahg the %amlwi r5w UIKI by incidwts 26. The Speclul MIssIon bolicvcs that the key to the solution of tbosc problems llcs In tlic i~~~pleiiiciitutloii of mundutory sunctlons uguinst tbc lllcgul r6glmo of Soutbcrn Rbodcslu, us well us of other rclcvunt rcsolutlons of tbc Security Council wit11 regard to tbc wbolc urcu, und In tbc appllcutlon of majority rule in tbc Territory of Soutban Rbodcsiu. 27. 111 its ussessmcnt under Security Council rcsolutlon 327 (I 973), tbc Speciul Mission ostlnmtcd, In qnnntitutivc tcrnls, spcclfic needs of Zumbiu to maintuln ultcrnutivc systems of road, ruil, air und scu soliiiliuilicutlolis for tbc normul flow of truffle. ILtlicr tbun going into detuils, I prefer to lcuvc it IO tbc mcnlbcrs of tbc Council to study tboso needs. I should Ilkc to cnlpl~uslzc, however, ~IUI thy ure of conslderublc nlugnitndc; for cxumple, the orlginal cupitul costs ulonc arc ulrcudy cstlrnutcd at $124 n~llllon, while bigber trunsport costs would un1ou11t to ubout 350 million unnuully, Morcovcr, nt the bcglnning, uddltlonal ulr frclgbt rcquircments would reqairc $6.5 mllllon per month. In uddition IO tbesc sums, slgniflcant umounts of tccbnicul ussistunce, including operating personnel, will bc necdcd to nssist Zunlbiu In bundling the nmjor tusk of rerouting imports und exports, 28. It dues IIOI requlrc much innq$mtlon to envisugc tlmt the economy of Zunlbiu will be seriously and udvcrscly uffcctcd if ussistuncc is not soon fortbcomlng~ Only udeqmte and timely ossistunce will nmke it possible for that country to develop its cconoiny constructively. 29, I should like to conclude my remarks by asking tbc members of the COUICII to study the Speciul hlisslo~~‘s report wltb cure and uttentlon, I~lnully, niuy I repcut, on bebulf of the acalbcrs oi the MissIon, our tlmks to you, Mr. PresIdeat, und tllc members of tbc Council for tbc honour of this ussignmcnt and the confidence wblcb the Cou~vzil bus placed III us. 30. The I’I~BSIDBNT @~lap,ptarbr fkorn S/~artislt/: I wlsb to express my warmest gratitude to the Clmirnmn of the Special MissIon for 111s very cleur htroductloo of the report. I Um also very gr;ltcW to blni for tbc kind words be bus addressed IO WC. 31. I feel tliul tbc rcprcsentulivcs of Anslria, Indonesia. I’eru and tllc Sudan lmvc rendered must v;IIIIuL~I~ services to the Security Council in tllc mission witll wblcb we entrusted tliem and we congra(nlate tbenl inust wurrnly. ‘4’ . LI l‘hc next IMIIIO on the list of speakcts is tlmt of ~IIC rcprcscntntive of Zainbia, 011 wl~ui~i I iiow ciill. 33, hlr. LUSAKA (Zumbkl): Mr. I’rrsidcnt, I wish to begin by congrutnlnting YOU U~OII )'OUI' ;~sWni>~i(lll 01’ ~IIC I$li In hospital, 011 2 hlurch u1lothor laudn1lnc oxplodcd la the ~= smo nrcn Injuring 0110 IIIUII, It 0~11 tllorcfore bc S~OII that huvc been ut u more flttiog pcrlod than this month wh the Coui~cll will hold iucctliigs In your bmtiful cnpltul city. thorc IIUS bccmn Intouslflcutlon of culculntcd, provocntlvo nets of ~iggrcsslnli llgl\illSt ZllllaL 40. It Is Important for the Sccurlty Council to understnod tlic uiidcrlylilg cuuscs of tciislon in this urcu; It is hportunt to defho tl1c fuodumcntul clonmts in this coofrontutioo. 34, Pcnnlt 1110, Mr. I’rcsldcnt, also to cxprcss 111y grutitudc to your prcdcccssor, hhussudor Joseph OdomJowl of Kcnyu, u country wlth WIIICII WC CII~OY the best of rclutlons, for tlic very wlsc cou11scl Iic lmuglit I to bcur oii the 011ly III this wuy cun WC rcullstlcully proscrlbc s:htlous to the cuuscs of the crlsls In soutlicru Afrlcu. A111oi1g the fundun1entul cuuscs urc: (a) the rcbelllon III Ihdoslu; (b) the tyrumlcul, opprossivc und mlnorlty rule III tllc procccdlogs of tl1c Cou~icll duriiig the nioi)tli of I+bruury, 3.5, My dclcgatlon liud tl1c .opportui1lty to uddrcss Its whole of soutltortl Afrlcu compounded by rnclnlisiq apurl- /rid uod cxploltution; (c) South Afrlou’s mlliturlm and its offcnslvc policy of oxtcndiiig its lines of dcfc~wc furtlicr north bcyood the LII~~JOIJO und IJC~OII~ the Zun~bczl; ((I) the Afrlcur llberutlotl strueglc us the lncvltnblc fcnctlon scl~tilllcllts to AllllJllssudl~r Allwur ‘SUlll of Illdllllesiu wllcll lit prcsldcd over tlic procecdlojis of this Couiicll durlng tlic month of Juouury. I suld tlmn, irrlrr a/h, thut WC wcrc fortunutc to IIUVC 111111 prcsldlog over the dclibcrutlorls of the C0u1nAl durliig tliut inoiitli. WC liuvc ugulii ~~XJIII~ lndcbtcd to 111111 for lcudiog the Speclul MIssion of the of tlic opprcsscd ~nusscs agulost tlic tyranny rind terror of tlio n1liiorlty. Couiicil. Wo wish to cxprcss our grutltudc for his vuluul~lc lcudcrsl~il~ and cou~~scl wl~lcl~ cnubled the Mission to ucc0111l~lisl1 Ita rcspoi~sll~lllty cxpoditlously und cfficientJy. 41. TIIOSC urc the fundmcntul CPIISCS, but thcrc nrc nlso cntulytlc und other fuctors WIIICII IIUVC u decisive role III the nature or chnructer of tl1e confrontntlon, its nlngoitudc uod tllc direction mid pace of clinngc. Among those fnctors urc: 36. Under resolution 326 (1973), puragraph 10, the Zoln* blun Covormcnt, u111011g othcls, wus cnllcd upon to provide thr Speclul Mlss1011 wlth the ~mcssery co-opclntion (al the failulc of the Unltcd Khgdom, ns the ndmialstcring Power, to quell the rebclllon In IUlodeain; (0) the fullurc of mid nsslstuocc in the discl~argc of its tusk, WC In Zmbla welco~ncd the Mlsslon. My Govcrmcnt was only too Imppy the incPsurcs so for token to topph the illcgul r6giliic ill Snllsbury: (c) politicnl, cco~~o~nic und nlilltary support given the nhorlty rbghcs In southern African by sou1c Mcnlbcrs to rccelvc u tculn of hapurtiul observers to Inuke UII Ldcpcndent usscssmcnt of the situutlon crcntcd by the ucts of oggrcssioil conu11ittcd by niiiiority r&inics In southcrii of the United Nutlons: (d) the dclibcrutc flouting of the United Natloos sunctlons by ccrtnin Stntcs; (c) the closure of the IUlodcslan.ZuolblaII border by Smith, tOgCthCr wItI Africa agnlnst Zmbiu und the blnck mssos. TIIO Zmblrrrl Covcrnlncrlt put at the dlsposul of the Missh~ the llodtcd fucllltlcs at Its conumod to ennble the ncmbers to cxccute the cxploslo~~s of lundn1lnos hid OII Zumbiuo tcrrltory by tlic I~l10dcsia11 lllegnl forces III c0llusl011 with thclr South Afrlcaa supporters. the purpose of the Mlsslor~ within tilt short the nvuilnblc. We should IIUVC wlsiled the MIssloo to stay longor, vlslt more places, gether more cvldeocc, see nlorc rcfugccs nod 42. WC Hst thcsc fuctors III conflrn~utiorl of the stntomcnt heur for itself’ the sad und distressing tales of suvagc torture, massacre, terror and deprlvntlcn nt tllc hods of outlnws-to hear of hurdslllps WIIICII drove thcsc lnnoccot II~CII, women nod clrildreu away from tllelr homes IO sock u new home mode by the Speclal MIssIon In Its nsscssnmt of the situation, nu~ncly: that the tensIon dots not stem exclu. slvely from rcceot events OII the border with the rcbcl colony; It Is the product of the situntioii In the cntlrc southern Africno urcu, WIIICII lm been dcveloplag over tlic und brouthe the ulr of freedom In Zumbln. yeurs from bad to worst, pnrticulurly since the unllntcrnl dcclnrutlon of Indcpcndoncc. We also list thcnl to dcnlonstrutc thnt Zumbin is not responslblc for the current tcmion in southem Afrlcu. 37. WC uccepted that the Mlsslorl hnd to do Its work rupldly. It was urgent, ITor the problems we face ns a result of the rebellloo III 1U:odcslu and the uctlvltlcs of the Illegal r6ghe ure ~I~IIII~II~~. 43. ‘I’lic solutloii of the curreill crisis tics hi llolicsty and 38. WC ure hu~~py thnt, witllin the the available, IIIC Mlssiorl was able to conl’hl our convictions. A serious crisis, a dangerous cimiioiitation, exist iii our pirrt of tllc trutlililliiess 011 tllc purt of ull tliose I)coplC rcspoiislblc f’ol the currciit sltuutlo~~. II also lies Iii posltivc nctloll by the hlted NutIons. world. Tl~erc Is ml tensloll IIOW, particulurly 011 our border with the rclal cohy of Solltllelll I~lllXleSiil. We arc Iltl[)pY 44. Iii tl~c case of tlic first liinduniciitul C:IIISC~-~~uiiicly, the rcbcllioll in I~l~odesh the Security Couacll rccoghed tl~c thut the Mlsskm bus collf’irrllcrl thut 111~. border closure is orlly we 01' the lllillly riiar~lfesl;ilioi~s of tllc growing dnngcrs inhcrcnt III the rchllioll :IS cnrly ilS 12 NOVCIII~CI l9GS, ii day uftcr tlic uiiilutcrul declurution of ilidcpcndencc, when, under p:lnlgrqh 2 of rrsolutioii 216 (1X15), It culled tlpm :I11 StiltCS IlOt to rCC0glliZC the illegul r@lnic conl’roiitatlim 011 the hil~czl Kivcr. The st:itc of tellsloll has Its origins very deep ill the pust. Uut tlicrc ure ;IIsu currctlt ciltulytic tiictors WIIICII htJhlgC WI thC sltiiutioii i~lld thus contribute to tlic Cscd;~Iii~~l 01' tciisloil. and to refriih t’roiil reiidcriug iiiiy iwktuiicc lo tliut r6glmc. 45, Shicc tl10 ndop!io11 of tl1nt rcsolutlo11, subscquciltm doclsiom l1nvo boo11 iiiadc by the Security Cou~icil, ~011. firinl11g tl1ut 1110 l~l1odcsln11 situnllon constltutcs n tlircat to i11tcrnutlo11nl pcaco n11d security; Mc111bor Stntcs wcro cnllod upon to tnkc cffoctivc 111cusurcs to dcul wit11 tl1c situntlon und to bring tl1c Smith rd@mc IO heel. Member Stntcs l1nvc fro111 tin10 to thno bco11 cnllcd up011 to desist fro111 giving nsslslnoc? and co111fort to that r8gi1110, 46, lhspitc nil tl1cse resolutions, UIC S111itl1 r6gln1c still reniuir1s Iii powcr I11 Snllsbury, Tlic 111ovc of tl10 lllcgnl rbginic this your to close tlio border wltl1 Znniblu dc111011~ slrntcs very clearly tlic basic lntc11tiou of tl10 Snllsbury cllquc lo cxtcnd Its war ugninst the hfrlcnti mJorlty beyond Its borders. Many acts of nggrcsslon hnvc bee11 collllniltcd “gaillst Zal1lbla-acts wllicll, cxccpt for our policy of 111nxi111u111 rostrnlnt, would ulrcndy liovc Icd to u sl1ootlug wnr wltli tliis baad of outlaws, 47. Tlic strcngtli of tlic Sn~itli rbghno Hcs outside tl10 bordors of Rl~odoslu. htor11nlly tl1o rbgl111c is very weak bccnuso tlic n1nsscs arc against It. Every Zinibubwcon is osso11tiully n freedom flglitcr, Unfortunatc!y, t!ic United Kingdo 11~s glvc11 In11 Sn1ltl1 trcutmcnt liot befitting u rcbcl, Slucc 196.5, tl1c stntcn1ents 111adc by the British Govcr11111cnt n11d tl1e docislons taker1 by tl1c Security Council and otlicr lntcr11ntionnl orgunlwtions linvo rcnf. flrnicd tlic i11tornationid policy 011 Southor I~l~odcsiu as one of quelllrig the rcbelllon and tlius brl11glng down tlic S111ltl1 r6gimc. It rc111nli1s 0110 of denylug any ussistnncc to the rcbcls. Tliut rcninliis the policy, ul lcnst 011 paper, 48. But ccrtnln couutrles li~vc u11dorn1incd the meiisurcs tukc11 by the Internutlonal conu11u11i1y against UIO rcbcl rdgi111e by, for cxa111plc, vlolnting tl1c United Natio11s sanctions and by giving 111ornl n11d 111ntorlul support which furtlicrs the nh1s and obJcctivos of tl1c rcbolllou. We l1nvc wltncsscd u defhltc clu111go of policy 011 the pnrt of the Urltlsl1 Govorn1nont fro111 tl1at of quelling tl1o rcbolllo11 und put1lsl1lny tlio truitors to one of n1ulatni1iiiig tlic status qm, This n~c”ns recogulzhg tl1e Illegul r&$1)?c iu1d mctifylng Smith und Ih robclllon. Bnltl1 Is now bolng regarded by his protectors us a Ilborul, und they clulru that, if IIC wore removed, a much more ruthless loader would take over the lendersl~ip of the i<hodesiou front, So wl1atcvcr the 111eas. uros trrkeu agulnst S111itl1, tl1cy rue mutrnllzcd by those who wnnt Id111 to remuln 111 power, 49, We ure not Intcrcsted III the intcr11ul politics of the I~llodcslur~ front. I<hodcsiu Is in II stnto of rcbcllion Icd by Sulitl1. We urc htcrosted III the re111oval of the Illegal r&he and the irltroductlon of 111ujorlty rule. That remeins the objcchvc of tl1c Security Cout~cil. 50. ‘1110 crli11itiul uctlvilles of S111itli nrc bcliig swept under the carpet, Par so111c ?imc IIOW the rel~clllor~ 11~s IWCII probnbly by now have had a dlsl1onourablo sottlomont _ bnscd 011 rnclnlls111, rognrdlcss of the wlsl1os of the pooplo, --~ ~~-- -~ ~- ~. 51, It is ngninst tl1nt bockground tl1nt WC IIOW hnvo to usk tl10 q1icstlon: Wlint Is tlio policy of tlic l11tcr11utlonol cmmunlty towards Bnltl1 rind Ills robclllon? !s it to topple tl1o illcgnl rbglmo? WC sny yes. Notl1ing 110s tnkcn place to nccessltuto a rcvcrsul of intor11ntlo11ul policy 011 tlils issue. This policy is dcrlved fron1 tl1o fu11da111cntnl nnd noblc l~rlncll~lcs e11sl1rlnod la tl1c Cliartcr of the hitcd Nntions. 52, WC arc tllcroforc nmozcd tl1nt certalu countries IIUVO ur1dcrmhlcd the objcctlvcs of this wortliy policy. Every positive move has bccn countcrnctcd und snbotugcd la ordc1 to protect S111itl1 and tl1c rebellion, TIICSC coutitrlos are busy pulling tl1c wool over tlic cycs of others. This Is the grcntost paradox of tl1o dovelopn1cnts in soudcrn Africa. 53. If thcrc has been u cl1nnge In policy, why brng about sanctions? Wl1y dcccivc otl1ors into continuing to 111nkc sncriflccs such as Znnibia is 111nklng to brine down the Smith r8glmc wl1ll0, ut tl1o ~a1110 ti111e, undcr111lning tl1cir efforts to mahtoln 8111itl1 In powcr? Just as “you cannot l1ave your cnkc and cat It”, you cen11ot topple Smith and at tl1e sun10 the give I11111 all the support he nocds to 111nintui11 lllnisclf in powcr. 54, WC say tl1at if tl1e rebellion is tl1e fundnmental cause of tenslou In Southern Rhodesia, tl1o11 it must be brougllt to an end by removing tl10 Sn1itl1 r&In& i11chding S111itl1 I1ln1self. WC disugrce wiU1 the Iden U1ut S111itl1 Is a n1oderate or liburul. Look at Ills record oi crimes co111111itted against tl1c 111ussos of U1c people In Zimbubwo, He Is just u rebel-in fuct, u Nazi in practice. 55. WC must deal also with tl1c second elen1ent of the confroutation: thnt is, oppresslou and rncis111 la the wl1olc of soutl1er11 Africa. The answer lies in tl1c Declnrutlon on the Grunting of Independe11ce to Colonial Countries and I1coples, General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). We 111ust homur rind ln1ple111et1t this resolution in full und thou there will be pence h’southern Africa. If we ignore tl1e 111nssos, tl1e11 trouble is incvltnble, The musses should purtlclpnte in worklug out their owl1 future, in detcrn1i11i1ig wlint they wunt, what they need and wl1at tl1cy deserve; then there will be potice. The struggle for frecdol11 in southem Africa need not be violent. It should not be violent. Howcvcr, this will coiiie &out only if the minority r~ginies accept civillzed and dcmocrntic priur:iples. Supporting the 111li1o~ ity r8giincs 111e111is denying to the 111asses tl1clr rights, Tl1cse people wunt to nchieve their independcncc by penceful lneans. No OIIC condones violetice. We in Zmbia abhor it, 56. South Africnn tuilllnry uctivlties in IU~odesls p’ace further obstncles it1 tl1e way of dcmocrotic change, ‘lhsc who wuilt pcuceful dl”llgC must bring prcswrc to bcur on South Africu to rc11Iuvc Its military forces from lU~odcslu. ‘I’IIc l11ilitury occulmtiou of Ihdesiu by Soutl1 Africun 1unJorlty ru!c”; &I) &ko tl1o snnotlm 11&o colul~rollonslvom ~~~~~ uiid offoctlvo. And, whllo those 11icnsuros aro In force, the Ihltlsli Govor1uiio1~t should c0hvo110 a co11stltutlo11ul con- : In the kllllng of our Inuocont clvllla11s, wo sl1all rosorvo tl1o 1 right to take wl1atovor nioasuros aro nocossary to protoct llfo ; and proprty, WP sliall protect Zuniblan l11d0]1011d01100 with tlio asslstanc0 of any frlond In tl10 world. Wo hove 110 cl10lco hI t]lO mUttOr. I$OrOfrJro,t]lOSO W]lO WUllt IIOUCO Und SOCurtty foronco truly roprosontatlvo of all rncos and Intorosts. Tlio Afrloa11 majority 1nust 11ot bo a third purty, moroly to bo IiifOriucd of tlic results, must cnsurc tl10 lul11uXIlutc rciuoval Of Soytl1 Afrlcau forces from Zinibnbwo, , 62, It is agnl11st tl1ls background tl1nt wo ronfflr111 our bollof Iii tl1c policy of topI~ll11g tlic S111ltl1 rfrglino as 0 solution to the currout tonslou; It is agul11st this buckyrouad tl1at wo roafflrin Our policy agdnst rncIs111, up7~l/ield, 57. Wo must ulso clod wltl! cl10 catalytic fuctors, Tlic Unltcd KIngdon 111ust dlscllurgo ,‘its rcs]m11slbllltlos, The colo11lallsn~, ox]~loltatlon and mlnorlty rule. Wo rcufflrm our doclslo1i not to rosuiuo tl10 us0 of the soutliorii rout0 dcclslo11s ulado by tl1c Unltod Nations ad all Its ago11clos must bo i1i~]~lc111011tcd urgoiitly aud offoctlvcly, Sn11ctlons = 1nUst bo bto11siflod und mad0 nioro Com]~rolio1lsivo; no nsslstallco must bu glvcn to SIllIll Ulld Ills cllqw Snlltll Is whllc Siidtli ro11ial1is Iii power, Wo roaffIr111 our cu11uult~ mont to tl1o Unltod Nations sanctions policy, WC rouffhn our p011Cy of nou~rucldls11~. Wo rcufflrtn our co111111lt11101it to freedom, poaco uud peuceful clraugo In soutlrcrn Afrlcu. synonymous wltli robolllo1i. Sniltli staiids for robollio11; I10 is rcbclllon t~orsoulfiod. If WC do 11ot tako u flr111 doclslo11 Ellld ]~OSltlVO~aCtlOil, thOl1 tll0 ]JOllCy Of SllllCtlOllS IS U COStly : ganiblc-lndood, a farce, WC lidvc mad0 sacrlflcos Ii1 the pust and wo will cu11tl11uo to do SO If tlils will sorvo tl10 Intorests of liuuianity and strongtllcn pact and securlt.y, 11ot only In southor Africa but In tl1o world us u wldo. 58. Zaiiil~iu Is tlio iiiiioce11t vlctliii of many uii]ustifIod uccusatlons. Wc have bccu accused of Iiarbourlug freedom 63. I should now like to draw the atto11tlo11 of the Cou11cil to UIC problo1ns faced by Zumbla In U1o lu1]h111c11tutlon of fighters, Wo liavc be011 accused of brcnklng su11ctioiis, Wo linvo bcon accused of cncouraglug torrorlsm and oscalatio11 of tcnslon. Wo liavc boon aocuscd of I11torforl11g hi tlio sn11ctl011s. -1 internal affairs of Rliodosla, NI tlioso cliarps arc busoloss. 64. BcfUro inde]~cndonCo, the Zambiaa economy wns closely tied to thnt of Souther11 IU~orlcsIa. At tllo ttmo 01 l1ulo]1o11do11cc tl10 Zu111bla11 Covortuucut decldcd to dison. gage ltsclf fro111 the suutl1. This policy was accclorutod aftc1 the u11llatorul tloclarutlu1r Of III~O~~OII~OIICO by tl1o S111ltl1 59. S111itl~ lihs0lf lias already uclinow1odgcd tliat tlio frccdoiu fIghtcrs Ii1 tlic Ccritc11ary district of Rhodosla did 1iot co1110 fro111 Zuinbla, 111 a tolovlslo11 lutorvlow 011 8 February In Salisbury ho said: rdgl111c In Novombor 1965. The h11111edlutc co11scq~o11ccs of tl1o rcbelllu1r for Za111blu wero the hlal to Zambia by th rcbol rbglulo of petroleum, oils, lubricants, con1 and othc1 ossontlal su]~]Jllcs WMCII were cumlng In by the southern routos, Thcsc lssuos wcro consldored by the Sccurlty “Tb tcrrorlsts in the northeast aro uot oporatl11g fro111 Zaniblan soil; tlioy Imvcii’t co1110 across fro111 Zainbluii soil, and wo liatl to fact up to tlils problo111. We couldn’t possibly expect Zambln to tako actlo agid11st poplo wl10 Cou110ll at tl1c tInlo. Tl10 i11tcr11atlonal co111111u11lty re. spoudcd h verlous ways to tl1e IIOC~S of Zmbln, i11cludl11g arc oporutlne from sol1 other the11 Zambln11 soil.” UIO 111ou1itl11~ of ulr lifts of osscntlul su]~]~llos ml fuel, : However, In contradlctlon, the n~ossago dated 14 February from tl10 South Africa11 Govoriui1011t nddrosscd to tI10 G5. hplto douluratlo11s by ccrtd11 cuuntrlos tl1at tl1c Presldont of the Security Council cliarpcd: robolllon was going to bc quollocl III a maltor Of wcoks, Zumbia rnado It clear tl1ut U1is would uot hu]~]~on unless forcu was used, Wo wont ahid III dovclo]~liiy altcriiatc “Tills situntlon”-that Is, the cscalatlon of tcnslo11-“was created entlrcly by I11crsuscd actlvlty (III the pnrt of the terrorists bused ill Zun1blu wl1lcl1 led to lucrcascd Cow tcractlvity 011 the pa11 Of U1c sccurlty units ui1 tl10 fU10dcslun sldc Of tlic border.” ruutcs to llic nUrtl1 at trcmcudous CUSt and SIjCrlflco to (1u1 CCunu~~~y. WC c1nburkcd OII tl~o cuustructto11 of UII uII ]~l]~cllnc from Dur es Sul;ium uld we else lnvcstcd substuntlul uniuuiits of 11~01icy III roads to 4liC noilll. Wc dovc!o]~~I our OWII locul cuul re~uurCcs to substltutc for the crrutlc Cod supply from I<l~udcsia. Wo dso estubllrhcd u You ca:i .qec the ccmfuslon. number of I~dustrlcs tU substitute for those from tl~c south. WC cstul~llslled u KJild lmnspurt Cor]~or~itluii With tllc UIIIIC~ It~]mbllC of T;ltMuliil IIII~ WC IIISO cmburkcd OII tljc COllStrUCtlOll Of :I IICW rSl]\VUy Wlt]l the gCllCrilt IlSStStllllCC Of’ tllc C:lllllusc Govcrlllllcllt. 00. S111itl1 aCCO]ds tJlC filcl that WC aro llot rCSpUllSlblC ful tl1c situntlun In Rhlesiii. Wu iicvcr liavc bccu. WC iirc not J’Ei]JOllSl]J]C L‘Ur t]lC CUllfiil~rlltlOll Wllidl fO]]OWCd t]lC VlSlt U] tlic I’curce (~ommlsslUl~. l’llc ]Jcu]Jlc of ZimlJabWc IlaVc f13Alugs, thy have wlslica und dcslrcs, t!lcy huvc qirritious to fulfil, and tllcy will uCco~~~pllsl~ the UbjCctlvcS of tldj G6. II’ Zambia Id nol gouo h!d wltll thus0 iuvcstn1c11ts, WC S]lOll]d ]l!IvC tl‘!Cll ;I],~Jrldllll~ t]liS C’UmlCl] ;l~l!lll fUI r;ti ugglc wltli or wlthuut cxtcriid nsslstiuicc, Iiruvltlctl tluit 110 uue suppurts Sjuitli. UllUtllCr IIIUSSIVC Ulr lift Of ]JCtrOlCUlll, (Ill, IUIJI IClllltS illltl 67. So long as the illegal rdgime continues to exist in Rhodesia, Zambia will be unable to utilize the southern routes for its imports and exports. The decision by Zambia to close its side of the border remains irrevocable. 68. The sacrifices we have made in fighting .the Smith rigime and on behalf of the British Government and the masses in Zimbabwe require no catalogue. The Security Council recognized our pIight in resolutions 253 (1968) and 277 (1970). In those resolutions the international community was called upon to render assistance to Zambia, for this is not our battle alone-it is a battle for humanity for which the British Government must accept primary responsibility. 69. When the border was closed early this year we had immediately to divert ships on the high seas destined for the port of Beira to bring Zambian imports through Southern Rhodesia. Those ships have now to call at alternative ports which are not adequate to handle the unexpected volume of traffic. As an illustration of the magnitude of the problem brought about by the closure of the border, over 900,000 tons of imports a year and over 400,000 tons of exports were still passing through Southern Rhodesian routes. The issue, therefore, is for Zambia to find alternative routes to handle this volume of traffic. 70. In accordance with the relevant resolution of the Security Council to impose mandatory sanctions against the 71. I am pleased to inform the Council that some countries have already responded positively to our situation by giving material and financial support, and we thank them most sincerely. We also thank the other members of the international community for their expression of solidarity. The situation in southern Africa has entered a very crucial and decisive phase. This is a time for all democratic forces to unite in the interests of peace and security. 72. Finally, we hope that we can now call on all nations to join hands in discharging our responsibility in the elirnination of tension in southern Africa. It is my hope that the report of the Special Mission will not be controversial and that it will be adopted unanimously. We know that even those who directly or indirectly oppose the current international policy against the rebellious r&me will finally be relieved after the rebellion has been ended. The meeting rose at 4.55 p.m. HOW TO OBTAIN YNlTED NATIONS I’UULICATlONS IJt~lled Netlotu~ puhlr~rtionn my bo ot&i~~od Irom Iwol~ulorca nntl di~lrlbulm throughout the world. Comdl your bookstore or wrllo IO: Unilnl Nstlotw, Sales Swtlon, Now York or Gcnovs. conio CoNskxuIf~ PUBLLCACIONES DE LAS NACWNES UMDAS