S/PV.1693 Security Council

Mr. Prcsldent, may I open this I. Adoption of the agenda. Short stst0r~lolIt on the report of the SEcurity Council Special Mission established under resolution 326 (1973), by extendhig to you the slncercst cangmtulations of my delegation on your assumption of the presidency of this CouncU for the month of March? In so dolug, I wish to recall your constant co.operoUon rind support for issues of vital slgnlfirance to the-future of Africa-whether III the southern or northeastern part of it-whore international peace and security urc behig critically thrcataned. It is therefore a matter of great comfort to my delegotlon that you prosidc at this vcg moment when the situation h\ soud~ern Africa is being assessed by the Council. My delegation extends to you the best of wlshcs und its co~oprution for a successful term in the eventful month of March. 2. Complahrt by Zumbia: Report of the Security Council Speclnl Mission estabilshod under rosoluti~n 326 (1?73$(8/10896 and Corr,l rind Add,l), l3c meet&g was mlled to order ut 4#,20 pm Adoption of the agenda i%e agetda was adoptccl. Complahlt by Zambia Report of the Security Council Special Mission estnblished under resolution 326(1973) (S/10896 and Corr.1 and Add.11) 4. May 1 also ctrngratulatc you; prodccessor in the Chair, my dear colleague and brother, Ambassador OderoeJowi of Kenyn, for the efficient and diligent manner la which he guided the Council during February, and for his successful efforts in dispatchhig the Special Mission to Africa and attcndlng to Its hushass while it was away? 1. The PWSIDENT (ittlerprctatiort front Spatrish): In accordance with previous decisions of the Council /1687rfr tncctblg/, and with its consent, I propose now to irivitc tha rcproscntativc of Zambia to tnkc a place at IIIC Council table, S, As Q mumbcr of the Spechd Mission, It is my pinusnnt duty to join Ambnsssdor Anwur San1 of Indonesia, Chairman of the Mission, ill affirming that tho composition of the Misslon, namely, the four Security Council members, At tlte ittvitatlott of tile &csldettt, Mr. I? J. E Lusaka (Zatt3h) took a place at the Ckxutcil table. the economfc experts and the members of the Secrctarlat, rendered our mission enJoyable as well as productive. For my purt, I submit that it was miiinly r&e to the udmlreblc personal character and high h~tclloctual qualities of Ambati sador Anwar !&ml that the Mission was successlul in its investigations al:d In its ummhnuus asscssmont of the situation and the needs of Zambiu. 2. The PRESIDEN’I’ (ittterpretatlott frottt S@at~ish): Alw ln uccortluncc with previous dcclsionn /1687t/t, 168Ytk uttd 169Wr ttreelitgs/, and with the consent of the Councii, I intend now to invite the reprcsenttrtivcs of Ghana. Morocco, the United Kcpubllc of Tunzaniu, Zrrire, Chile, Algaria, Scncgsl, Egypt, Somallrr, Cubti, Cameroon and Guyann to ttlkc tho pluccs rcscrved for them ill the Council ciiambcr iii order to liilrticipate, without the right to vote, in thu discussion of the Item on our agendu under the terms of Article 31 of the Churter, it bchlg undcrstuud that they 6. The Chulrmun of the Special Mission submitted to the Council a statement /1692& rtzee@/ intruducir~g the report ii1 general tories on bchtllf of all the members of the Mission. My delegation fully endorses that stutement and the assessments of the report. These usscssnients hevlng been reached by the general CO~SC~SUS of the four :- Eltuatloll. .~ : -‘- 8. While in Zumbin, as the report speciflos, we made an axtousive tour of the frontlcr of Zambia, and from UIC plcnc WC saw land clearances for military acroplanos, rullltnry camps, miiitpry roads and gun positions along the frouticrs of Angola, Namibia, Southern Rhodesia and Mozombiquu. On tho Zamblau side WC visited sites of previous nllno explosions and were nearly victbns of ~:ewly planted bombs. During those tours we were left III no doubt that the colonial and racist rdghnes have committed and plan to conuni! acts of aggrossslon and provocation against Zambia which could easily lead to i conflagration. 9, Dy contrast, Zambia has so far mdntaincd a measure of restraint dospite those provocations; yet my delegation wanders how long the Zamblan authorities cnn maintain sucil restruint under mounting provocations and aggressJon against Zantbian citizens whose lives and properties are cousl;l;ltly beiug threa!cned from across the border, 10, it is also important to observe that the de&Ion of Zambia to close the border with Southern Rhodeslo Is irrevocable, and that it is i.~ intention to forss&.e its cxcmptlon under mandatory sanctions against the Ulegol rebel rdghne of Ian Smith by implementing fully the de&ions of the Security Council in this rcspcct. The Council may therefore wish to take full note of this Zambiau decision. t1, As u result of such conourreuce with mandatory sauctlons, the economic assessment of the report under rcvicw cs~h~~atcs the cost of physical requlrcments at $124 million, plus $6.5 milliou monthly for air freight to balance the normal trnffic for essentlai materials and supplles. I refer to paragraphs I75 and 176, It is slgnlflcant to note also that tho csthnoted extra costs for using alternative routes amount to some $50 million aniiualiy. Furthermore, hi purugruph 178, the report shows that these hlghe: costs will incronsc the pslcc level in Zambia, the cost of structure in the mh~irr~. stietor and the government deflclt and, notably, that the forclgn exchange costs “will ncarly double”. The final par&)raph of the economic assessment hIghlIghts the urgency of ;Isslstance iieccssary for the economy of Zamhja to continue to develop L a r~ormsl way, By those quotations from the economic ussetimeut of the uecds of Zaniblu outlined in the report. 1i1J delcaotlon hopcos to impress on the Council and oh ell nle.&beers;f the lutornatlonal community that Zambiu’s sacrifice in huplementlng the Security CouncU mandatory sanctions nguiusr the rebel r&jnie of Southern Rhodesia deserves every hnmcdlnte uosistance and sppreciatlon. 12. In this counexion, my delegation uotes with great satlsfactlon the ussurunces given by neighbouring Africsn couutrlcs or States of full solldnsity and support, even at nutlonal sacrifices, to Zambia, both poiitlcally and err_r!!o- 13. On the political side, my dologatlon oxpreDsas its dismay and grave concern at the situatlon that dangerously contbmos to develop In Zimbabwe, In our view, tho robeI rbglme, through the continuously mounting military prcsencc of South Africans, ia becoming not only more oppressive In the South African QWHW&I manner, but also hlcreashlgly danBerour to Zambis’e security and natlonal hitcgrity. 14. it Is a matter of great regret and conWrn that the adrulnlstcrlng Power, though reaffirming its responaibllity, constantly declines to discharge It by failln~ to take appropriate and effective measures for the rif-dotorn&at&n and Independence of Zimbabwe. Everywhere it went hi Africa the Mission WB ramlnded that, to all istenta nnd purposes, the United Kingdom is seeking recognition for the tan Smith rdglma rather tllan majority rule; that the United Kingdom polloy is guided by sentiments of klnshlp with the white mblority and by economic hitererto in Zhnbabwe Itself, to the detrimbnt of the African majority in Zhnbabwe. My delegtlon wN1 therefore h&t that the United Kingdom Government be constantly rcmlnded and prompted to fulfil its moral and politlcal responribility towords the whole people of Zimbabwe. By the Mlbsion’a findhip il Is also that Government’s duty to affect the total withdrawal of South African armed forces from tho colony. 15, On the question of the assessment of the situation in the area, the MissIon has ascertined that “a consldernblo measure of tension continues to oxh% In the area covered by Security Council resolution 326 (1973)” /&‘/l&!&6, pm. 164/. That is evidently a mild way of doscribing UIO situation. Judging by what we snw across the bordora of Zambia, by way of the massive milllary praranco of South Afrlcuns in Southern Rhodesia, in Cape Caprlvl and In ths south of Angola, by the mllltory camps, military roads, gun posts and the gallant f&h: of the liberation movements hiside those territories, my delegation is more convinced than ever that Ihose racist nlinorlty and coOonlnl r6gimec constitute a real danger to international peace and security In southern Africa. It would pay for the Security Council to toke preventive measures now rather thsn b faced with a mliitary conflagration iater OIL Reports coming from south of the Zambezl river about crtatine, a Viot-Nem in that part of Africa, and the detormlnetion of South Africa to send military forces at will towards the Zambezi, cannot bo dIsmissed ns empty words. The minorilko, haunted by a fear which thoy themrelvee have created, -are highly susceptible to mud actn, utider the nervousness and tenslou in which they are living at the presant time. 16. So fur, President Kauuda has demonrtruted remarkable ~X-~~&hi ;;x! ~ieh~&dp. Faithful to his peaceful .17, On the basis of the short statement I have just made, .nry delegation fully endorses the contenta of the report of lhe Sneclai MUM and ulrdlv loins the fnonsors of the two d&resolutions whlch”wiU~~ presentid, in appealing to tho membera of the Council to voto ~Umously in their favour. 18. ?&a Jeanne Martin CISl? (Guinea) (itttetprefuflotr from f+e%ch): Mr. President, may I congratulate you on your recession to the presidency of the Council for the mcath of March, assure you of my delegation’s cooperation and express the wish that success may crown the work that awaits YOU thts month. I have had the Privilege of appreciating, thr&th our contacts in the C&ncil-and elsewhere in the United Nptions, your outstanding diplomatic quaIlha, I have thus always enjoyed the relations of solidarity and frien&blp that unite our two countries and our two delegations. A happy accident se& you in the presidency of the Council as it faces one of the urgent probiemr of Afrkp, when only a week now separates us froiia a hifitoric series of meetings of this CouncU in a country of the third world, your own country, Pananla, whose dedic&ur to the principles of peace, freedom and Jurtica is well known beyond your national frontiers. We are thus convinced that qnder your wise presidency the work of the CouncU wUi be aa successful as the peoples of the third world hope. We have not forgotten the very important contribution you made to the success of our work in Addia Ababa in January and February and again in New York in November of 1972. 19. I should like to associate myself with tile preceding speakers in payhlg tribute to the wisdom of Mr. OderoJowi Of Kenya, Who $reslded over the Council last month. VIC fruitful consultations that he carried out with such skill were very happily reflected in the Special Mlssion, whose report is the subject of today’s meeling. To Mr, Anwat !&ni and We companions I would extend my delegation’s gratitude fy the miNion they have successfully discharged. 20. Before turning to the agenda item before us, I should like to ask the deiegatbn of the United Slates to convey our greetings to Ambassador &ail, who is replaclng Mr. George Bush as representative of !he United States in the Co~ncll. I should like to BUU~C htm of my dclegutlon’r intention of cmtlnuing, as In the past, to strengthen the good relatbnr of co-operation wnd friendship that we rnaintllned with htn predecessor. 21. My delegation took note with satlshctiou of the efforts of the Security Counctl to give prompt cffcct to resolution 326(1973) in settln# up II special mission to assess the situation resulting from tha unhappy events In Zambia. We much appreciute the preiseworthy efforts of tie Spcci~i MissS31w which proceeded to London, Zamblrc, 22. The members of the Council will recall that when this problem was presented /1687rir n~eet@/, Be’ rcprcscetativo of the Republic of Zambin, Ambassador Paul Lusaka, drew our attention to the crlnilnal acts of the racisl unrl illegal Government of Ian Smith. ?;lu~ Special MissIon’s report corroborates all the facts and cons!dentiuns that had been reported to the Council. The acts of uggrcsslun perpetrated against the people of Zambia by Riiodcsinn forces. strenathencd by those of South Africa. the uniustified -lncur$ons and ihe laying of land mlnc~ along ihc Zambian frontbr by those forces have been proved. In this regard, the letter from Minis:er Muller of South Africa, deny@ the presence of South African forces in Rhodesia while, at the same time, recognizing the strengthening of the Rhodes&n forces by contingents of the South African potice, seems to be without foundation. 23. ‘Ilie Mission’s report notes in tangible fashion the tension prevatUng in the frontier zones along the Zambian- Rhodesian border aroa. My delegation regrets the detcrioration of the already explosive situation along the Zambezi, marked by Rhodestan military preparations. Thus Zambiu has not only to face the economic difficulties resulting from the closing of its frontier to the transit of its imports but must also eonfront.aggression which is being prcpnrcd against it. 24. Zambia’s geopolitical situation as a landlocked country, end particularly the assistance it is giving to UIC liberation movements, make of it, like of Guinea, the United Republic of Tanzania and other African countries, u strulding target for iiuperiabnl. 25. Within this framework my delegation would like, as it aheadv did in 1970. once aeain to drew the attention of the men&s of the douncil io the provocations of Porlugal against the Republic of Guinea, my own country. III :l communication received from my Govcnuncnt our uttcn~ tion has been drawn to Portugal’s preparation of new exulloits by mercenaries. We have been informed that the v&se1 Albhus, carefully prepared by Portugal, has aIrcad) loft the port of Fucrteventura with subversive elements on board, with 3 view to carrying out furlher aggressdon ugalnst the Republic of Guinea, Followbig the dastardly ussassination of the great PAICC /Part&h Afti~~ da /udcpcrr- Jench (SI Cuitrd e Chbo Verde/ fighter, Amflcar Cabral, Portugal is continublg its cynical attempts to divide the lrl9ks of the liberation movement of Guinea (INxau) and Cape Verde. 26. I can assure the Council that no pressure and no f&x of any kind will prevail over the firni and rcsolutc r;cill of the peoples of Zambia, the United Kepubllc of Tunzunla and other African Stutes to us&t their brothers struggling 28. As was eloquently stressed by the Prime Minister of the United Reaubllc of Tanzania. Mr. R. M. Kawawa /S/10896, +rpc i43/, the Security douncil and the United Nations systetn as a whole have the 1noral and legal obligation, under Aiticle 50 of the Charter, to give Zambia material and other assistance in overcontig its present and future diffkulties. By carrying out the decisions and resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly on Southern Rhodesia, Zambia has undertaken considerable sacrifices. It is therefore essential that no effort be spared 111 co1nLJ to its assistance, 29. To promote and encourage that effort, my delegation believes that the Security Council must urgently take adequate measures and recommend a31 peace-loving and iustlce-lovlna countries to make avaIlable to Zambia all possible m;al and material support, for the country’s economy is now gravciy af?ected. 30. My delegation reyets that the United Klngdom, the arilnhdrtering Power uf the rebel colony of Ian Smith, dld nothing to enable the Special MissIon to proceed to Scrlthern Rhodesk. We were somewhat surprised at this reaction, for we see from the talk.9 held by the Mlsslon with the United Kllgdom ,Mlnlster of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Lady Tweedsmuir, that: “Although !: [that is, the United Kingdom] had responsibllity for Southern Rhodesia, it had had no responslblllty intcrsa!iy for many years and could not force a settle. mont. It was for the ‘Rhodes&m themselves to try and gst together in their own country and to dlsuss a solutlon to the problem.“/Ib&& para 41.1 31. Thai last part ‘is fully in’ keeping with my own d&gat.lon’s analysis a11d that of all Africa11 States, What we want is for the Rhodesians, under majority rule, to accede to the exercise of this much va1111tcd sovereignty. Unfortu. nately--atid this is where wq part company with the United Kingdom-that country renii.ins the administering Power. It is Iberefvre its duty to Induce its rebel colony to respect the exercise of that sovereignty and not to allow a 11undful of wblte racists to govotn. Nevertheless, my delegation hope? tl1at the spirit of rcsponslbllify U1ut guldas the United 33. Mr. hlALJK (Unlotl of Soviet Socialist Republics (tratrsbtlotr front Hussb,,): Mr. Presldcnt, allow me first o all to congratulate you ou behalf of the Soviet delegatlo and on my own personal behalf on your accesslon to the high and responsible post of President of the Seiurlt) Council. The USSR delegatlon In the CouncU work9 ln close contact with tl1e delegation of Psnama. We have had the opportunlty on a number of occasions to convblce our selves of the important contrlbutlon made by the Pana mcnlan delegation, headed by yourself, to the work of the Council and of the United Nations as a whole. Allow me tc offer you my slrtcere witios for your success in this far from easy post in carrying out the responslbllitles conferred upon you, the range of which is constantly inci-easing In connexion wlth the Impending historical event-the meet, ings of the Council to bo held in the capitai of your homeland-and to express my convlctlon that the guidanc of the Council’s work during the month of March is in experienced and reliable hands. The Soviet delegatio would like to asaurc you of Its readlncss to co.opcrato wit1 you In seeking solutions to the problems now before the colulcil. 34. The Soviet delcgatlon would also like to express Its gratitude and thanks to UIO Permanent Representative of Kenya to the United Nations, our dlstb1gulshed colleagu Ambassador OderoJowi, for hls extremely useful aud effective work last month as President of the Council. 35. Mr. President, before coming to the substance of the item now under dlscussloa by the Security COUIICLI, the Soviet delegation would llko to express Its views on the matters you touched upon In your introductory statemen at the last meeting of the Council, 36, The Soviet Union welcomed the results of the Pari Conference which confirmed, at the international level, the cessation of the war and the restoratlo11 of peace In Viet-Nam, and reaffirmed the bask national rights of U1 Vlet.Namese people-Independence, sovereignty, and tlie u11lty and 11ational l11tegrity of Vlct-Num. 37. The agreemcrit reached in Paris wns tlie result of a hard, long and cuuragcous struggle by the Viet.Names people against aggresslou; it was u victory for justice realism and reason. The agreement was made possib primarily through the hcrolc efforts of the Viet-Name people themselves who could nut but command the ympathy of all tu whom the ideals of freedom and 38. The sigrting of the Paris agreement is only the first step on the path towards P complete settlement of the Viet-Nam prtiblem. The task now is to secure the complete implementaUon of the provblons of the ;Oar& agreement. May I axpre8s my cc.wicUon that the solutloiu reached at the Par& Conference will scne the CBU~O of establishing a stable peace in VlebNant, in IndoXhina li6 a whole and throughout Ule workI. 39. The whole world recently witnessed the latest criminal acts committed by the lsraell aggressors wdiut tha Arab peoples and against peace in the Middle East. The barbarous attack by the Israeli air force on a Llbvan civil aircraft. whkh resulted in the tragic death of over 100 peacefui clvUiana, coheided with another plraticul raid by Israeli rrnted forces agablgf the peace-loving State of Lebanon, which once agabi took innocent civilian lives. These piratkal acts by Israel have aroused just anger aud condemnation no! only in the Middle East but also throughout Ule world. The inhuman action of Israel in JhooUnq down an unarmed civil aircraft cannot be regarded as a chance incident. This crime iu just one of the tragic links in the chain of outrages committed by the Israeli troops in Uro hllddle East for the purpose of implemenUng a policy of force in that region and aggravating an already tense rltuatlon Ln order to undermine the effort8 being made by the Arab side towards a peaceful settlement. ~.- 40. Responrlbillty for the destruction of !he Libyan aircraft and the death of completely innocent people, inch&g women and children, must ti placed squarely on the Government of Israel which has made mass terror and the escalation of aggression the main objective of its official policy. It is now perfectly clear to everyoue that Israel is coinmiltIng these criminal acts for the purpose of further Increasing tension in the Middle East, Just aa a time when trends favourable to peace are apparent in the international situ;lUon and when the principle of the non-use of force in internnUond relations is gaining increasing recognition and has already been recognlzcd and confirmed in the historic decision taken by the General Assembly at its twentyseventh session [resolutiott 2936 (XXVII)]. 41. The lsraell aggressors arc wrong In thinting that nowadays it is possible to float .B rules of international law rnd U~D &cir~Iu~u of th2 I’,.tted Nations with impunity. Tha Inmate of pence HIIG justice in the Middle East u:gnUy require that all Governments and, above all, all ?he Govarnmenls of the perinauent members of the Securlly Council, should muke every effort IO restrain the israeli aggiessora and extremists, to achieve lhe withdrawal of Ismell troops from all the Arab territories seized by them in June 1967, and to ensure respect for the rights and legitimate interests of the Arub pcoplc of Palestine. 42. lo connoxlon with the monrtrous terror&t acl coinmltted agaijnst the diplomatic representatives of lhc United cannedon with the situatton in the Middle Eant lies primarily with the Israeli aggressors who are continuing to pursue their criminal policy of aggression and are impeding a peaceful seulement. We strongly condemn the use of terrorist methods in international politics regardless of whether they are used against Soviet citizens or against citizens of other countries. The position of principle of the Soviet Union was stated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. A. A. Gromyko, at the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly, In his statement on 26 September last he said: “We . . , support the Just struggle of the Arab people of Palestine for the restoration of their inalienable rights, which have been recognized by the United Nations. At Us same time, we cannot, of course, condone the acts of terrorirm committed by certain elements among the members of the Palestinian movement.. . . Thclr crimina! acts also strike a blow at the national interests and appiratlons of the Palestinians and arc used by the Israeli criminals to cover up their own piraticel policy against the Arab peoples.“~ 44. Proceeding from that purition taken by tho Soviet Union, we express our regret in connexion with the murder of the diplomatic representatives of the United States and the cbrg6 d’affiircs of Belgium in Khartoum. 45. The Security Council, as you know, having considered an appeal by Zambia in January this year conccr:ih& acts of provocation and aggresslon committed by the iiiegal racist r@me in Sallsbury against Zambia, expressed grave concern at Ue situaUon that had developed and condemned all these acts of harrassment, including economic blockade, blackmail and military threats against Zambia, committed by the illegal rt!gime in Salisbury in collusion with the racist colon&list rbgbnes of South Africa and Portugal, 46. A number of representatives pointed out in their statements in the Council that the racist rCghnc in Salisbury was using economic blackmail and had conunittcd nun~crous acts of subversion and sabotage in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zambia in an attempt to force the Government and pcoplo of Zambia to refrain from sympathizing with and supporting the Icgitimate struggle of the people of Zimbabwb, to conceal the growing national liberation movement of the people of Zimbabwe, and to place the responsibil!ty for the crisis brought about by its racist and colonialist policy on Zambis, 48. Tho report of the hiMon, as wall as other material beforo the members of the Council, confirms that the sitwtion in southern Africa haa deteriorated otill further recently and that tension on UIO borders @ween Rhodesia a~ld Zambia has incrcascd and beep aggravated to a dangerous level. The Southern Rhodadan racist authorities are cout@Ung to challenge Zambia and the wholo of free Africa by their acts of aggression. .ConUnuing their hortlle provocnUon and pursuing a policy of aggression against Zambia, tho Smith regime recently annouuced a blockade of postal communications with Zambia, Southom Rhode- &m troops are continuing their anned actions againat hmbia. Those actions are accompanied by a campaign of thrcnts. 4% 1110 raport of the Special hMon once again confinns that South Africa and Portugal are assisting Southern Rhoda& in its aggressive acts against Zambia. Several thousand soldiers and officers of the South African armid forces are still h the territory of Southern Rhodesia, rlcspilo the Security Cowncti’s condemnation of the prescnce of those troops in Southern Rhodesia and its demand, in rho resolution adopted on 2 Pobruary last /326 (1973)/, for the immediate and total withdrawaLof South African armed forces from Southern Rhodssla. 50. Thu situation that has developed in this region is fraught with further complications and danger, as h&Wed in paragraph 166 of die MisYlon’s report. 51, In his statement yesterday to the Security Couilcll /1692ud neer&&/, the representative of Zambia, Ambassador Lusaka, quite rightly noted that the acts being committed by the racista ware creeting a direct threat to peace und security in this part of Africa. ‘IWs we are tivrlillg wilh lho use of brute force by Southern Rhodesia and South Africa agllinst a young hidependent Africa State, Zambia, Another ally of UIC Southern Rhodoslan racists, the Portuguese colorUalists, frequently and aystematically ruscrts to the use of force also. It is no mere chance, thcreforc, that at the twenty-seventh session of the Ganoral Asscmbiy, South Africa and Portugal voted agalnot the resolution on the non-use of force in International relations and the permanent prollbition of the USC of nuclear weapons. Ilie vote agahist that resolution, which was adopted, as you know, on the initiative of the Soviet Union, was cleirr proof and an lndicution of the fact that the South African and Portuguese racists and colonhdists reyilrd that resolution as a so~iow international hnpcdhuent towards their implen~entation of a policy of aggression agaIns young African States, which is a threat to the wacc and sccurily of the peuplce of Africa. 53. The aggresplon being committed by UIO Southern Rhode&n racists against Zamble, rind tho partlcipatlon In it by South Africa and Portugal, simply confirms once sgnin that here Is an urpnt ~mxl for the United Nations to adopt affective measures to restrain UIO aggressors and lhnit UIC porolbllitles open to thou aggressors. 54. In thts connexion, the importance attached by the non&gned countries, UIO countries of the third world as U~oy are called In the United Nutions, to UIE aftlrmation of the piincipla of the non-us4 uf force ii) international relations is significant. At the Confercnca in Georgotown (Guysna) in August last your, the non-aligned countries stated, aa you know, that one of their most important tasks was to alimlnate force from lilternaUonal relations, that Ls, to ensure UIO non-use of force iii relations between Statu. Moreover, they placed purticnlar slrr33 on the fact that States must refrain from the thrcut or USC of force in their international relations. At the twenty-seventh scsslon of the General Assembly, in keephlg with this position takeu by the tMrd world countries on this lmportent internationsl question, the well-known Declaration on the non-use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibi- Uou of nuclear wcapuns was, as I have alrcndy said, adopted otz the initiative of the Soviet Union. Thnt Gcnerbll Assembly decision contains the recommendation that the Security Council dlould take, as won I potibla, “‘zippro- @ate meosuras for the fuli inrplanientation of the prcsant declaration of the Gencral Asscmbiy”. The Secretary- General, on 5 December last, transmitted this resolution to the President of the Security Cowncil for the Council to take the necessary measuics /S/1(1844/, Unfortunately, however, the Council bus not yet taken uny measures on this matter. It Is thereforu essential for UIO President of UIC Council this month and. for his successor next month to take the neces3ary measures, 55. Another Importunt tssk which, if cnrried out, could help, first, to curb ug&rcssors and, secondly, to release funds for development, In view of UIO fact that cvory year the world spends over $220 thousand mlilion on the arms race, Is the preparation for and tho convenhig of a world disarmament conforcncc. At Ule twenty-seventh ses.dur~ of the General Assembly ways and 1mx11s were found and approved for preparations fur c01wc11i1ig such a conference, and a rpecial commltteo was established for fhaL purposa. And, hero too, we can say quite deflnitcly tha( the idea of convening such a conference rccclves wide support from the third world countries. This is quite clear from the position thut was tak)tn by the non-aligned countria3 boil1 in Guyana and at thr last session of the General Assembly, The resolution on that item woo adopted by IO5 votes In favour, with 1 abstcn, ion. 56. Those who oppose the cor~vcr~hg of thill confercncc, however, BTJ inventing quilo i!njxiUfied obstacles to pm- 57. The ‘Prcsidont of Zambln, %r. Kcnncth Kaundn, an outstandhig African statesman and polltloian, whom 1 havo had the honour of mcothlg and talking to personally, stated In kis mossago whtch wns clrculntcd as a Security Council document /S/10677/ that the pcoplc of Zambln could no longcr con~inuo lo that mamlcr whilo Rhodcslnn nnd South Afrlcan ormcd forces violntcd Znmbln’s territory, killed and mahncd innocon t pcoplo nnd dcstroycd property, The mcssago strosscs thnt the maln tusk of the Council Is to consldcr scrlously urgent action to put an end to the critical situation, and cmphaslzcs in particular the nced to onsurc tho withdrawnl of South Afrlcnn troops from Southern Rhodcsin. 58, The USSR dclcgatlon fully supports thcso proposals and demands made by the Prcsldcnt of Zambia. These arc IcgiUmntc and fair demnnds madc by the hoad of a sovorclgu State In Africa, and the Security Council Is obliged to give Ulcn~, fill dgc attention and tom take tho ncccssary steps. S9, Tho question has frcqucntly been asked ia the Security Council, whnt is lhc ronson for tho oxplcs? z sltuntion cxistlng on the border bctwccn Zambia and Rhodosln and in the whole of southern Africa. ‘I’hoso directly rcsponsiblc fur the situntion nrc, of course, SmiU~‘s Covcrmucnt, his ruling clique of white racists and the other colonialist and rnclst rdglmrs In southern Africa. GO, In rcsoh~Uon 320 (1972), tho Security Council des. cribcd the policy of South Africa and Portugal as n refusal to co.opcratc wi111 the United Nntlons la the obsaivanco and itnplcmcntntlun of Sccurlty Council dcclsions agulnst South Af~lca and XIIICI~OI~S ugnhuinst Southern Rhodcsla; it condemned than for this nnd Icqucstcd the Security Council C~on~n~iltca on Southern Rhodesia to proparo a mport on ucllons that could bo taken ngnhlst those two countries. IJut 1110 cxlstenco of the Smith r6ghnc is to b0 oxplahicd not only by this, but mninly and prhnarlly by the support nnd asslstancc it rccclvos openly and sc+ly from certain clrclcs in Wcslcrn countrlos and from the iniurtrti tioiu~l hnpcrlnllst mo~~opollcs whose s)nistor rot0 In Ihc world toduy wils so sogcntly cxposcd lmd dcrcribcd by the Prcsldcnt 01 (%llc. Mr, Allcnde. In his brilliant statement at tho twc~lf,y.w/c~~~l~ session of the Gcncral Asscmbly.3 Much ol‘ lhc ~crponsibllity fol lbu cxlslc~nrc of lhc rCelni0 hi !$alisl~~~.t and Its unti.Africun cvll und criminal actlvltics and for the iiict thut the S milllun gcoplc of Zhubabwc are still, in the &,,md half of the twcnticth ccnlury, llvhlg In slnvcry undor the power anti racist opltrcrsion uf the usurI=rs, is to bc placed on tu1lng cl&s in thu Unltcd Kl~~ydom Tim report of the Spcclal Mission, which we UIC dlsusslng. ptovidcs cxt~c~ucly convhlclng proof of this. The I lnltcd Khlgdom IIUP not dlschur+~d 11s ~sponsibllitles towards the people 01’ Zimbabwe ;!nli, In vlolution of’ United Natlons 61. Thus, tha aggravation of the situation on thc borders between iridcpcndcnt Afrioa and tho rnclst rdgimcs, lo 1111s case the Pasclst rdglme in Southern Rhodesia, ,ls II direct result of the connIvanco, bordering on cncourngcmont, of cortahl Wcstcrn countries, above all tho Unltcd Klngdum, with those rdghnos. lnotcad of takhlg strong mcasurcs ugnlnst the lllogal Smith rbglmo und its policy of u~rcsslon, violence and racism, London rccommcnds P cnut!ous and cahn approach to the problem rather than n firm “MI” IO the rob4 Smith rbgimc. London is clearly lust courting UIO r6ghc und seeking alllcs for Itself, 62. Such an approach on the part of the IUIIII~ clrclcs of the metropolitan country to a rcbol rbgimcr la a colony undermines any soluUon to the Southern Rhodcslua qucse tion and other problems of southern Afrlco. It cncourugos the Smith rEglmc, covers up Its crhnos und SCIVUS the inlcrcsts of slr~nglhenlng the position of tho rncisl cola. ah&t forces In that area. 63. In rcsoluUon 253 (1968), thci Security Council la. posed compulsory sanctions against Southern Rhodcsln with a view to putting an end to the racist Smith rbgimo. Ilowovor, In spltc of this and shnilar subsequent dcclsions by the Council, the sanoUons agahut Southern Rhodoslu arc being vlolatcd by South Africa, Portugnl and certain Western countrlos. This, of course, cannot but undormh~c the authority of the Unltcd NnUons; it provonts it from being mom affective and hnplomenth~g the mcnsurcs It hus adopted to mahit& pcacc and security and to hnston the cllmb~otion of colonialism and tho Uboration of the pcoplc ol’ Zimbabwe and other pcoplcs In southern Africa from racist and colonialkt tyranny. Why are sunctlons agahlst Southern Phodcsia not acldoving thclr ahnl The auswcr Is clear: certain States mombcrs of the CouncU thnt voted 111 favour oftho applicntlan of sanctions had, aild still have, no real l+cntlon of applying sanctions in pructlcc tmd lmplc~ mcntlng the Council dcoision on sanctions. Tho rosolutlons upplylrg snnctlons are bolng violated both covertly and whh oynlcal openness. Thu wide gates through which lrudo and economic co.opcrutlon with internntlonal mono. pollee-ln which Rrltish und United Stutcs capltul p~cdomlnatus--is still being car&d 011 with the racist Smith rdglmc arc South Africu und Portugal. 64. Tho Security Council ustabllsbcd a spcclal commlttec on SuuUran Rhudcsia, Its mandate lncludcs promotIny ho effective hnplenicntatlo~i of anctluns by Stulcs and thu prcpnrolion of recoearlcadatiors to the Council on tho lyp of actiun it could take against violutions and against those who vlolatc thu suactiuna. I+~~pusalu rugardhlg tha adoption of rcully cffcctivc nic~sures which ura consistently llulntr submitted to UIC Cununlttcc by Afrlcau and wcictlr;~t countries and which could lead to tcul results in curblng the racist rOgl111c III Soutl~eru Rhudesla, uro met with iicr’c~ 65. Tho Security Cou~wil cannot rornain.llidifforeiit to this challenge hurled by the colonialist 2nd racist r&imes of southern Africa at 1110 4fricon pcoplos 2nd the whole world III dlsrcgard of United Nations decisions and lu violntlon of its Charter. In the opinion of t11e Soviet dolegatlon, if this cxpIoslve situation is to bc ended, it is essential that t11e Council not 011ly broaden tho compulsory sancllons against Southern Rhodcsla but also take mc2surcs against it under Artlclc 4! of the Charter, in order to cilsuro the compulso~y ,obscrvance by all States of the szmctions against Southern Rhodcfla and the lmmediatc ropcal of legislation permitting trudo with Southern Rhode& in violation of United Nations dcclsions. In view of tho direct vlola!io~~ by l’ortugai and South Africa of the Council de&ion on sanctions and the stubborn refusal by UIOSC countries to co-opcratc With the Council in this matter, the Council should rake measures to apply sanctions also egainst South Africa and Portugal, G6, T11e Soviet dciegntion fully supports the proposal n1ndo by another outstanding African statesman and poll. tician whom I have also had UIU pleasure of meet@ and talking with, the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Mr. Nyerore, at UIO s&on of the Organlzaation of African Unity at Rabat in 1972, a proposal aimed at strengthening mnctions against Southern Rhodesia. He proposed that a boycott should be instituted against firms, c~inpmios 2nd monopolies wldch violate sanctions aghast the racist Smith r6ghne and that wldcr publicity should be given through the United Nations.to those who violato unctions. In supporting this proposal made by Preddcnt Nyercre, we submit that that khid of action hy the United NaUons would be ,effecUvc and would have some Influence. 67. Lastly, it would be completely logical, justilled and proper for the Security Council to take a decision to the effect that the material responsibility fwr the consequences 01‘ aggression against Zambia by the racist r&&e in Southern Rbodcria, and for the losses incurred ln Zambia as a aesult of these aggressive acts oi ihe Southern Rhodesian r&lmc, should be placed 011 those States an their monopnlies.. both n2ti01121 and muitinational--whit ‘v,c~e rcsponsihlc for tile secession of the racist r&me to .vcr and which arc continuing to support It through contacts, and through the maintenance of eooiiomic, trade and other &tions. 68. To shift the responsibility for the damage caused by the racists of Rhodesia, Sonth Africa and Portuga:al to tho ~w01ld commuaity would mcau In fact lifting it from those \,+r~ arc mainly responsible l’or the accession to power and itlu cOi!tinUafi0ll iu power of tllc racist, eoloni2liJt r&line in Suutherr~ Riludcsiu. 70. Mr. ODi.!RO.JOWI (Kenya): Mr. Presldcnt, first of all I should like to congratnlatc you very warmly on assuming the piesldency of UIC Council for tho month of March, My dclegatlon’s ussocintlon with yours and my own personal contacts witl~ you convlncc me that during this month we shall be in safa hands. WC shall be in the hands of a fair, dedlcatcd, internationally.mlnded, friendly Latin American statesm8.n whose interest in the problems of UI~ world, and particularly in t11e problems of the third world, are beyond reproach. We are contldent that during your presldencp serious matters such as the item we aro discus&g this aftcnloon will be given the weight they deserve rllid that solutions ~111 be found to as many of those problems as possible. 71. Before introducing the two draft rcsoludons on behalf of the delegations of Guincn, India, the Sudan, Yugoslavia and my own delegation, I should like to congratulate the Special Mission to Zambia for the good work it ncconp plished. Whon we sent the Mission to Zambia we rcalized that it was going on 2 tricky mission. While it was moving around in the Republic of Zambia, it was reported all over the world that it missed 2 bomb cxploslon by 2 couple of minutes. We at1 prayod for its safe and speedy return, because WC rcalizcd that the situa!lon it was down there to invcsti@e warranted quick ac!ion, was fraught with danger and was 2 se&us cl~ul~c~~ge to the intcrnattonal community and to peace and security in the world. The report of the Mission speaks for itself and we thank the Mirslon, parUcul2rly Its Chairman, for the good job it did on the instructions of this Council. 72. The two dral’t resolutions which 1 have the honour of introducing deal with two broad aspects of the situatiorr that WC are at present discussing. 73. The first draft resolution, in docunient S/lOgc)S, deals with pollticnl und military aspects ol’ the situation Ic southern Africa, focused on Zambia. This drsft ‘resolution deals with four m2jor aspects of the situation. It deals with the f2ct of continuance of rebellion In Southern Rhodesia; it deals with cc~ntir~ued intci I’crence by the South African rCgln1e in the internal affaiis of tbc colo11y ol’ SouUicrn 74;? ‘thlqk enough has been sold about the sltuatlon In ~~ .~ -8outhern Rhodcda; I think enough has been said about the throat to the peace and security of the Republic of Zambia posed by the Southern Rhodcslan rcbclllon, It is the view of my delcgotlon-and 1 am sure the sponsors of the two draft rcsolutlons will agree-that the time llos now come for actlon by the Council, by the United Natlons and, Indeed, by the lntcrnatlonal community. Continuance of the rcbcl]lon In Southern Rhodes& is a direct threat to peace and security In southern Africa, ln Afrlcn generally and lu the world. I say that because I know the sltuatlon yorsonally, 75. The whlte r&lmc In South Africa and the Legal r&lmc In Southern Rhodesia Intend to pcrpotuate their domlnatlon over the majority of the African people In southern Africa. That Is why the South African Govern. merit has decmcd It fit to lntcrvene In the sltuatlon In Southern Rhodcsla-because the South African r&h&e regards Southern Rhodosla as the northern bulwark for white domlnntlon. On the other sldo of the picture is the fnct that wc Africans arc not going to tolerate domlnatlon and oppression by mlnodty rdglmcs in Africa any longer. 76. So we have n sltuatlon which Id cscalntlng seriously. It Is a dtuation which has all the elements of danger, Ilkc the sltuatlon In the Middle Eust. We have a dtuntlon where the whlte mlnorlty r&lmes In South Africa and Rhodesla are working In collusion to oppress the independent African peoples through mllltary might-indeed, to terrorlze them, just as we see peoples In the Mlddle East bolng terrorized through mllltary rnlght. Dut tha Afrlcln peoples are determined to march for Independence and to free those parts or Africa still under colonial rule and those stUJ under minority r@ntcs. 77, For quite some time It was hoped that the whltc regimes In southern Africa would change their minds and enter lnto meaningful dialogue and nogotlntlons with the African peol~les for some klnd of rational settlement of the sltuntlon. That was the thrust of the Lusaka Manifesto.4 It has been the thrust ot a number of decisions by the Organlzatlon of African Unity. Dut the white mlnorlty rdglmes ln southern Africa hnve rejected the hands and gestures of Blendship of the African Independent States. They have elected to entrust their future and their lives to the gull and mflltary might. But ‘NC African people are not going to take that line because WC owa It to our brothers and sisters In Southern Rhodesia to ensure Uint they will be independent and enjoy the dignity due them as human beings and 3s citizens of the great continent of Africa. 83. In operative paragraph 5 we rclteratc our “demiuld for the lmmedlntc withdrawal of South African military and armed forces from Southern Rhodesia and from the border of that Icrlii*lty wlUi Zambia”, because It Is due to the rclnforcement of the Rhodcslan forces by the South African armed forces thnt Rhodesia Is thrcatenlng Zambia directly. I have scan press reports In which Smith is allrgcd to have said that ho would bomb targets In Zambia. This reminds me of the situation that exists io the Middle Bust where the sfrong Powers co~~tinuously harass and oppress the weaker ones. This is not the world that the Unlted Natlons can countenance. It Is dirccrly against the Charter. 7g. There lo no doubt that the situation In southern Afrlcu Is fraught wlth dnnger. It Is n threat to InternatIonal pcacc and security au well ns a situation of wldch tMs Council 84. I mentloncd earllcr that African countrlcs unani. nrously extended the hand of frlcndshlp to the whltc ndnority r&lmes in southern Africa but thut this had been turned down. WC should like to see peace rclgn o11 out continent and It Is hccausc of this thut WC are mnkinp, an 80, I dldl now turn to the opcratlvo paragraphs of that &aft rcsolutlon. In paragrnph I, wc cndorsc the assessment and conclusions of the SpeclaI Mhslon-and, as I said carllcr, we arc most grateful for Its very posltlvc and tlmcly assessment of the sltuatlon oxlstlng In that part of southern Africa, It Is my delcgatlon’s vlcw thnt the asscssmcnt and conclusions of tho Mlsslon are rlght, In paragraph 2, we reaffirm that the sltuatlon In Southern Rhodcslu constltutcs a threat to Intcrnatlonal l~o~co. I have ahendy spoken about that. In paragraph 3, as In pnragraphs B and 7, WC dcal with the sltuatlon of rcbclllon In Southern Rhodcsln. In the first place, wo declare that the only effcctlvo solution to this grave sltuatlon flcs In the cxcrelso by the people of Zlmbabwc of their right to self~determlnatlon and lndc. pendence in nccordancc wlth Goncrnl Assembly resolutlon 1514 (XV). WC request all Govornmcnts to take strlngcn! measures to enforce and ensure full compliance by all lndlvlduals and orgnnizntlons under thelr Jurlsdlction with the sanctions policy against Southern Rhodesia, 81. I said carllcr that, in this draft resolution, we were dcallng with n rebellion In southern Rhodesia and our verdict on the rebellion Is contained in operative paragraphs 3,6 and 7. We should llkc sanctions to bo cnforccd against Southern Rhodesia as a means of bringing down the rebel r0gime of Ian Smith. 82. The second clcmcnt ‘wc deal with In thls draft resolution concerns the role of South Africa in the reboIlion In Southern Rhodesia. In operatlvc paragraph 4 we con. demn the South African rdglme “For its perslstcnt refud to withdraw Its mllltary and armed forces from Southern Rhodesia”. I know that the Government of South Africa allcgcs that It has no armed forces s!atloned In Rhodesia but a close serutlny of the report by the SpeclaI Mlsslon leaves no doubt at all that South Africa has tnllltnry and paramllltary forces stntloucd In Southern Rhodesia. 85, The third olemnt hi this draft resolution deals with clu responsibUi(y of 1110 United Khadom. We still bellove hi the logal position that the IJnitcd ‘Kingdom is the adnMsterlng Powcr hi the colony of Southern Rhodcsla. We are sUII pcrsuadcd that it hns UIC powcr to exe&e that aulhorlty hl the colony of Southern Rhodesia. We are sIllI convhiccd that it has not glvcn its blesshig to the rebelllon. That would bc agahlst the whole lcgql tradition of the United Kingdom. SJIlh would be @c ouly rebel hi the hhtory of the Drltish l.!n~pl~ who hQd &Alcd agahIs1 the authoilty of the Queen 0119 got away with it. We have nol been told by the United Khlgdom that it has given up working to brhig down the rebellion in Southern Khodesia, We thcrofore believe thnt, as the admlnlsterhig Power, it has certain rcspom.ibUitics to carry out in order lo bring the rebellion to an end. That is why in oprativc paragrmph g wc urge: “the United Kingdom as tho administering Power to .convcne as soon us possible a naUonal Constitutional Confercnce where genuine representatives of the people of Zirnbabwe would be able to work out a settlement relathlg to the future of the Territory for subsequent endorsement by lhe people through free and universal adult suffrage”, It is In pursuance of thesc beliefs and in supporl of this legal posiition thu! we urge the United mdom, In operalivc paragraph 9, to effect: “(u) The unconditional release of all political prisoners, detPlncos and restrictccs; “lb) The repeal of a11 repressive and discrhnhuuctory legislatioll; “(c) The removed of all rcslrictions on political activity and the establishment of full democratic freedom and equality of politic5l rights”. 815. I now move to th3 second draft resolution contalncd hl dOclJJllCJI t s/ 10899, .,. 87. Iha report of the Spcc!al Mission makes it very clear ihat Zambia has bee11 sufferhig econonlicaUy for a long thnc becausc of its speclai gcoyaphical posltion in that part of southern Africa and (hat it 114s been L’thls negatlw sitrrn~io~~ since 1963. It niukcs it clear ulso that the recent closure of the border by the illegal r&hnc In Southern tilodcsia is orliy one lhik irl a whole chahl, a Whole train of events which have been affecUiig Zambia Irecnure of itr speciui positions irI that part of soutlreia Africa. The United Natlonr should hava recognised the special ccorromic problems of Zambia a long time ago. But it is comforting to know that In 1970, in restdutlou 277 (1970), the Unifed Na~iuns, for thf first thue, recogulzcd the special positiwr of Zambia. Znmbia is WJIJ&IR a battle for the United ~~~~~“&b~~&~uls -the ‘Government of the :Republle -of .-~Zambln for deciding to abandon the use of the southern route for 11~ irade unlll the rob&don lo quelled and nuJodly rule Is established In Southern Rhodesia”, I Udnk that we muat pat Zambia ou the back for fIghUng for the United NatEons. Zambia is Bghtlng to vindicate the principles contahlcd In the Charter of the Un4tod NaUons. 88. In operative paragraph 2 wa take note *of tha urgent economic ncoda of ZRnlbla as Indicated la the roporr of the Special h!lsslon olld ita annexes”. la this respect I ollould Uko to draw the attention of the Cwncll to Ule very clew e.xpaiUon of the special cconomlc diMculUer Zambia in facing in the anmxeo to the *port. 89, In operative paragraph 3 we are appealhlg ‘to all Slatea for irmnedlate technical, fl~~anc&l and mater&l assistance to Zambia In accordance with resolutlono 253 (1968) and 277 (I 970)” and in accordance with a declslon we ourselves took by hnplicatlon when wo weed (0 send a special ~nkislon to Zambia. 90. Zambin needs the help of all pace4ovlng countries in the world, so that it0 economy nlny be salvaged from the ravapa apioing from Zambia’s decision to abandon the southern route because that route is clearly unreliable, We are also appealing to the United Nations and 11s epeclall.zed agencies to lake positive stops to Involve Uicmselvca in the task of aiding Zamblp. 91. Let me repeat that what is happening to ZPnibla hat come about because Zambia la a faithful Member of the United Nations; it has come about because Zambia upholds the tenets of the Charter and because 11 supports all Ute resolutlonn regardhig independence for colonial peoples, human rights and so, forth. Zambia is indeed a loyal Momber of the Organization, a Me!nber In good standlag, and a Member threatened by economic dislocation arising out of the situation in which it fl;rds itself. That Lo why we appeal to the i.ntemaUonal community, through the Unlted Nations and UIQ specialized ag~nnler, for spt~lal aid 10 ZsrUbL 92. Lastly, we are requesting that the Economic and Social Council bc seized of this matter and that il discuss it from tinia to thaw so that the economy of Zambin nay be kept in focus by the lnternatlonal comniunlty. 93. I should like to pohlt out that, us a representative of an eastern African country, a country which haa had mlotiom with Zambia for as many years as we have been around In that part of the world, I know what the situation is; I know what dangers are hUierent In that dluwtion. The international commu&y must not allow the racist rtghm: of Ian Smith to commit aggression against Zanibin mt any time, becaua the States of eastern Africa and all the members of the Organizulion of African Unlty are dutermined lo resist any aggression against ZsJnbia. Any aggres- 95. itut I dull not wait to axprsu our wanwrt tb&a and 8ppcWkw to th0 mprarentHiv0 of Kenya, our good frkad Amwdor &teMowi, for the akilftd, m&c+ur&l md bmad-vidonad way in which ha d&&ar@d the dut&a of Preddstrt for tlm month of Pobruary, tbb month whan the ealllall ullderto0k importmt commitmorlb Md road0 tlr.m de&ion8 mnaarulng the coinplaInt of the Ropublb ofzMlb& the hue before ml today. 96. Aa my ddopUon tidy rat forth our c&u ad CrtopdNl viaw collNrlliDp tlda lllJsttor at the CouDcll’r me&p of 29 Jarmary lI687th meetrcls;l and 2 February fl69h.t mtteetittg/, wa dud mSmh from raperUng them now and &a!l addrora ourvalv~ to the eubraquent &vel. opmantm and raqukcnmb 0f the presmt altuation 00ly. 97, I &all @M-and tt h truly P great pleaemu to do @o-by OtaurQ how impmsrad my delogatloil iu with tho rapcat of the Spscipl Mluioa, refkctiug the tmmarndow amumt of work done by rind the great und~ri&inding, poWal wkdora and rem&m of the Misdon’o membera, (ha rupmilbntaUwo of Indonorln, Aurtria, Peru and tko Sudan. i&il&~ 326 (1973) aud 327 (fi73) mapecUvely, and we hope, in&d we urge, nsmben of the Council to ondorte tb report fully and mMmoudy. 98. 3’urx&g to tha pollUcnl part of the situation, I would mv that it ilnnortMt to not0 that t&o lmoaruml Mblolr of ihi Cwncll -‘lug confIrmed the asse&snts that hrva corrilotw~tly mcitlvatad tho Council in CDosIlag with the dtU8l.h crated by the mb%!IM Of LO iuagsl m&t @me in Southarn Elbdoda and ita coIIuUon witk thataoiat and colontd r4&11ea in South Africn and Portugel. +I+~B m,ti data t&It the dwelopmentn with which the CouilcU & ~gsre,Inlpdrtput,r~tof~~oftfieright of alf&tarminaUon to the majority of the Aftican cou~~triar ntled and tcrrotid by the Bbovc.mentioned r&lInw. It strwleJ, hOWeVQ, thlt tko CQNtRllt et4to of teodon hu bwn heightened to a marcurable dagrua by the provo&iw md rpgramive ac% mcontly committed by the smith r&he qdsut Zambia. Tha Ml&n hru observed the ndh’)’ plOpWBfiON GO~lfroIithl~ h&e PC&ON of ?&nblm’r border and tieno them PI BI-I important factor in lncmsiog tan&n, I 16gitirulta CIU# of concdrn for tha Gouammmt of Zunbir, and u fmught with the dnngeroue pc~t~~~tid of OSI&UOII that could Iuve UB &ar~ effect as the rrUtra& of mrtrnint adoptod 10 fur by Zambia. Iu tha “ths koy to the udutlon of tiw problem , , , lice in the L 0 p&xtlon of majority rule iu , . , Southern Rhodesia, rtilot hlpbmtaU0li of t3la , * , @ancuom agaimt the illapl r4&lo. I. and the hplenlcntaUan of relevant mwhtloun of tha Security Council with regard to the whole ~MR”[~M& p&r. IbE] 59, It in very timely and mwt helpful for tho who nwdod it, thnt the MMola has both piahed the matPaint Of the Gavmmmt of Zambia, even under extmno provocation, aud Wd to scat the s~urto~ red horrtag of the ~~ipts md their mupportm that the natiorrp1 llbwtion etruggle and the pmjlh war that lo on tllo ttwwo in Soutlm0 Rhode& had baen somehow brought from outs&, from Zambln aud oiher countries. That in of course a regular excuse of all reactionary and oppressive r@n~eo embattled fjgnhst pmptar who rim to mus to Ubfmte themselves, t0 order to prooead with les bnpu@ty with terror, oppresslm and ~xpl~JtaUon. In hia able pm&enteUon in the Council ytmterday [169&d meti?@, Antbacador Lusaka, the mpmsentntivo of Zambia, made onlightenlng comn~ents GUI the -true f&a of the uprising of the people of Zimbabwe. 100. It ta for all thbre reaaona that any resolution dealing with the paWcal sspcct.6 of these developments has to tx+aSSirm ti on0 way or the other all the basic element8 of the wdUon of the Council aad the United Nations cm the mattor of Southern l&dada and related questicurs end to hdiwo what ciwt ty the pdU.kA ways af denling with the dtuation a8 it develops now. For that reason my delegation ia rpo~~dn& tqpthw akin Guha, India, Kenya and ff~o Sudan, tho draft remlution contied in document S/ 10898 whf& wan jlutt so ably introduced by the represent&o of Wi!. ~. 101. In that connexlon we should be at leant somewhat manmud, or at Ieat &xne of our f&u’s would -b+~ to COJ~~@ axtent Plluycd, if we should Lcarn from the admInIstering Power what exactly It thinDvs it Is propnrcd to contklua doing In that mepxt. We have to hear more reassuring titamants, not juust statenxwte harkhg bwk to the ded proposal@ for wtllemcnt, which WIIQ so dccisivcly Fafocted by tic people of Zlmbabwa, or npeUUom of the wuunad total Impotence of tho admtutatohg Power. If wa continue to hear only exprosslonr: of hope that romehow, st MI=N Wm Smlfli la ylng to fdk to fha people ho oppresses, wa-an@ not only we alone-should rcmaiu ~prehendve of p&Me new attempts at enabling the raolpt minority to continue i9n rule wide obtelrring the attributes of legitinuwy. ‘%IO ~Speoial MIssion’s work was not for the people of Ziunbla alone. Rvory tntemationaiist who believed tn the Wnitod Nations must accept that what Zambia was dohrg was not its affair alone but a matter for humanity as a who!o.‘“[S/10896, pare. 129.j , 103. It is absolutely fmpossib!a not tb see tn the Zambian de&ion. f\llty to apply sancttons against the UIesnl rbgime, a maJor and noble deefslon ori the part of ar ~outstanding Momber of the United Nations in contributina its utmost. and against overwhehning difficulties, to the”Unitad Na: Uons struggle for assuring the peoples of southern Atijca self~detornlnattan, independence and majority nrlo. That rerualns tho only way in which we can remove the hotbed of tension and war thraatening international peace and seourity~ One would havo hoped that all the Members of the United Nations, especially blg, rich and industrlrrllzad Members, would follow suit and not help the Smith &hue through broakhrg the sanotions. It is for those reasons that we find totally unacceptable the viows expressed to the Speoial Mission by high offloials of some Governments that “tho fact that Zambia had &self do&led to oloao the border WRS cntlrely a mattei for its own decision” and that “the closure was expected to bring some difficulties for Zambia, but the matter remained Zambia’s internal affair.” [&!&, VU 39.1 104. WhUe wo are glad that somewhat dlfferont views on this point were expressed in slnfflar quarters, we are disturbed by the advocacy by sonio of going back to the so~alled &lus qua a&?, of merely roaum&tg trade and commmricatibns whh the, illegal r6gime instead of wol. coming anything and everything that makes that r&hne’s suxvivLl more difB.xdt, which both rho sphit and the letter of many unanimously adopted resohrtions of the Council ask ur. to do. Agstu, we are somewhat heartened by the fact that there are, ht similar quarters, those who welcome the Zambisn decision as a major strike for the more strhrgont application of mandatory sanoUona. Tho report dircotly and honestly states that ‘the evasions of the sarroUons by certahr powerful industrial&d countries, as well ss by Southern Rhodcsla’s neighbours, were) quite s@itlcant” but that, “in the long term, sanctions, particularly tlnanchd sanctions, had a curnu&Uve and hlcresshrg effect.” [&&I,, pm. 5.s.j 105. It is hi thut context, and in the context of the item on tho agenda today, and bccauso it is very relevant to the ~Ircisions we are ubout to take, that my delegation attaches pwUcular importance to the work of the Security Cou~~eii’s thmmittoo an Southern Rhodcsie, which is to submit to us u epxhl reprt uu reyuired by resolution 320 (1972). My dclcgation wNI cwtinuu to do sll it curl to make the (:onnntttce’s forthcoming reconnnondaHons to the Council %I Iii10 with one of the k&lo abjeotives of u1e sallotlon8 p&y, and it fflwtratod the need for appropriate triter. nationsI as&tame to !&ambia, so that it could play its full part h ItilplonlE!l~tillg that polhly.“[ltrw,, puru S?/ ,. To that we would add the conchrdhtg aaaessment of the report-the very last senteuce-where it Is stated that “only adequate and thnely assistance will m&o it possible for the economy of Zambia to eontlnua to &v&p In II normal f~Qu.~~rf&~,~K 179,j 107. For those rossons we urge the Council to adopt also the second draft reaolutlou contired in document S/ lOSp9, subinltted by Guinea, India, Kenya, the Sudan and Yugoslavia, because it adequately meets the needs and ObjeCtfVC8 of the moment fn our common effort, together w&h Zambia, in keep&r with the bask U&d Nations polioy in Afrioa. 108, We are sure that the Cotmall whl conthiuo to be seized of this item, and my delegation will support reconatderatbn of f&a matter of adequate international osnlsranoo to Zarnbip if and whenever that should be required. 109. Mr, DE3 CUIRINGAUD (Pranca) (&lev~~erullotr fionl I&?&r): Mr. President, before de&g with the subject before ~8, may II say, Sir, that we are partiodarly gfatificd to see you preside over the work of the Security Counoil and we wish to congratulate you most warmly on this cwmdon? My &legation is convinced that, thanka to your abtlity and experience, our meettnga here and In Panama will be pre8hled over with authority and in the nmt effective possfble fsshlon. 110. May I also pay. a tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador tXero&wf, the represedtative of Kenya? He earned rhat tribute for the wa~in which he presided ovar our debates durina the month of Pebruarv. It was under his enlightened presidency that the Courtoil, itrter a&, adopted thorn resohrUons that led to the sendJng to Luraka of the Mirzion whose report wa are now examining, 111. Tho Syeclat Mission that want to Zambia, pursuant to tha terms of resolution 326 (1973, has submitted a long report, We w&&r to congratulate It for Uro considerable work it has done In record thne. This Is, ht fact, an extremely complete and praeise document which doubtless wlU serva ss one of the most. useful hrstruments in the work and meet.@s of the CouucU. UnSortunatoly, we have not had sufffciont time to study Ulfr document in derail; and at this staga of our debato \YQ can only permit ourselves a fow vary @mcral Nmurlents. 112. The politlcsl findtn~ reached tn the field by the euvoya of the C!ouncM do not surprise us. Thoy conftrrn, if arch confhnation war0 neccs8ary, that Uia tension axloting 113, Tho Prmcl~ dolcgntion hus u11coa5i11gly stated tl1at tha problcn1 is l~oliticnl nod that the bnslo rcsponsibiiity 110s with Uta ndn1hiistoring Powor. Thoro coo bo uo solution unless it is acccptod by tho 111a]ority. And thus the failure of the Poarcu Conunission should not dlscouragc us. As wc have stated buforo III the Council chambor, it had a two,foh! mrit, 0~ tho ono hnnd it lowed thnt the United Kingdom wns dctormhiod not (0 shirk its rcsponslbilitics; and, 011 thu other, It allowed tbo cstablish111c11t of direct contacts bctwecn tho ndmlnistoriny Powor ond the populn. (Ion und, hi so doing, pvo sonic hoi10 to tho indigenous ma]ority. WC also havo stutod III Uro pnst Ulut sn11ctio11s 111ust bo implcn1cntod, Althougli wo should not overestimate the cffcctivcncss of sucii nioasurOs, for which Prance has votod over since 1968, and with which wo scrupulously comply, tl~uy do contribute to placing tho illegal r6@mo in on cmbnrrasdng situation and do hoip in tho search for a solution, 114, The report of the Special Mission is to a Iargc Oxtcnt dovoted to a11 ns.scssmOnt of the needs of Znmbin to mah~taia its trndo reintions. I wisi1 once sgalo to pny tribute to the dotcrminolion shown by I’rosidunt Kaundn who, despite the difflcultios confronted by his country, dacidod novcrtholesi to tako up the challcngu of Inn Smith, rofushg to take ndvantago of the reqming of the frontlcr and dccidinp to apply the su11ctio11s fully, dcspitc the doso cconomlc dopondencc that tics Zambia to Rhodesia bccnusc of 0 c0111111011 pllst. I IS. The oxpurts stress the fact that the needs are groat. Obviously, their study Is of lntcrost minly to the principal trading pnrtnors of Znmbia und the foreign companlcs that havo invostcd III thet country. Tho report speaks not only -of the imn~Odin!o needs of the country but nlso of the morO long&nn ConscquOnccs of Zambin’s givh~g up of the Boirn rallroad for thO import and export of its products. Perhaps wo ought not to loso sight of the fact tha!, within thrco yuars, thanks to Tnnzpm, Znmbia will hnvo a mqro direct access to the soa. 116, The vory brlof ti111c thnt bus been given us to cxamlno this report of tho Special Mission obviously does not allow us to tako n positio~t now oo the rcqucasts it coatni~~s, These must first bc rcforrcd to our Govcrmncnts, cspcdaily since any decision with financial i~npiicaUons presupposes COIIsultation with the dif’forcnt respun&lc dcpnrtmcnts. But WO can Rssuru tho roprescntutlva of Zumbin thut the concern felt by the Vrcnch Govcrnmont about ho dlfflcuitios confronted by 111s Govcrnmcnt will load IIS to study the documcut wit11 the best i)~&blu spirl1 of undorstandlng and to exu111i11e IIOW best WC cao rcsimd 10 the appcai mdc by the Zambian Govcrnmcnt to UK intcr~~ationui commur~ity. It is in this spirit thut the French delcgution is ready to take noto of the report beforu it, 118, The French dologatio;i \viii boar nli ~IIOSO fncts 111 mind whoa considuriag U1o draft rosolutlons that hnvo just boon submitted to tho Council,

Mr. Prosidont, wo shall iiav4 the proper opportuiiity to congrntulatc you on tho assun~ption of thu office of Prcsldcnt when wo meet la Panama; wo shnli bo hapily rho11 to do SO. Now I would si111ply oxpross nly plunsurcc at your proscilco iii tho Clinir nud assure you of our co-operation III UIC conduct ,of your arduous dutlos, 120. I should also like to congrntulnto our outgoing I’roddont, Ambnssador Odcro-Jowl, for his decIslvc rind cfficic11t couduct of our business lust month. 121. Coming to UIO substam of tho mttcr, I should first of ali iiko to associotc myself wit11 U1oso who have congrutulatud the Special Mission on the six+cd and offlclcncy with which it has propared Its cxtrcmcly corn. prchcnsivo n11d adntirablo report. WC nrc all grntofui to the individunl mombcrs of the Mission, whose unsparing and co11sci0r1tlous offorts have enabled us to rccclvo and discuss Uioir raport in the rcintively short time before the Council lunves for I’aoania. 122. No 0110 would dcscribo the Rhodesinn question as a sinipio one, but I thiok it would i1elp to clarify our apl)roach to UIC prosent situation if we disth~gulshed two main nsimts: U1o immodinto offccts of ti1c events which began in January with the closure of tho Rhodcsian. Zambiao bordor by tho Smith r6gimc, OII UIC ono hod, and the i111pllcntio11s which those events my have for the wider question of a suttlcm11t of tho Rhodosino probim, on the other, Obviously, thu two arc intor~connectod, but it is bcttcr to consldcr the111 0110 nt a tine. On both these questions 1 described my Govcmn1ont’s posltion in the Conncfl on 29 Jn11uary /1687th rmefhg/ and 2 Pcbrunty [1691st tncotingl s 123, As regards L!C CVCIHS cormctcd with tha closlog of the border, my Government’s views uro ugnl11 described in paragrnphs 39 and 46 to 48 of the report of the Special Mission. We dcplorcd th\: ciosu~o of tho border by the Rhodesinn r6gimc. Not only was this a blow at tho economy of Zambia, but also this inow and other uctions at about the same time rcprcsentcd n flcigbteniug of tonsio11, Wo thcreforc wclcomd the revr:csui of the Rhodcsinn r6glme’s actio11. Tills was n 111ovc towards a less tense situntio~~ But, of course, WC rccognizcd 01u( this did not eliminate the dlfficuitics which faced 111~ C;~~VCIIIIIICII~ 01 Zambia, We syn~imthrzcd wit11 the Govcr~mumt of %iu11bia in thcsc difficultias nud rccognizcd that, ctmccrni11g a qU0Stioo vitni for its cconon.y, Zainbiu could not aliow itself to rcmah1 at risk, 124. We thorofore understund Za~:rblu’s decisions to free itself of the dengor 111 future of uny intcrfcrcntc witi~ 11s ” ‘12%’ Amy Govormnont’s vlowo on the longer-term affects of thcso dovolopmonts hava also bcon made qulto clear and 1 was sorw to sco, from the spcach of tho wprosentntivo of Zombin ycstordny /1692& nleerlrlg/, and from that of the roprosontatlvo of the Sudan today, that them still appears to b some niisundorstonding about thorn, My Govcrsmunt does not rognrd the starlls puo In Rhodesia as satisfactory nor Is it trying to protect the Smi$ rbgbno. My Govcrnntont has already givt proof of! Its dosir0 to achieve a scttlcmont nccoptablc to the poop10 of Rhodesia as a whole, 126, Wo do lndcad f&r that a worse sltuatlon could dcvclop. It was prcctsely bccnusa of this dfIngor that wo doplorod the octlon of UN Rhodcslan r6gbne In closing the border with ZambiP. We am concerned that hrcldcnts such ns this muy prcjudico tho more positivu signs thnt there have bcon of dovclopmonts In relations botweon all parties wlthln Khodosla Itself, on which wo are dependent for furthar progross iu tho solution of the Rhodcelan problem. That Is n very dlfforont thlnn from wlshlng to maintain or snnctlfy the srutus quo, IIS I would have hoped that nnyone who had studied my Government’s rtatonnnOs on the subject would mnllzo, Tho report of the Spcclal Mlssion also records our VIOWS on this point, though I must admit that paragraph 41 I.lIh In Ilnltad Nhm, NW York rrlcrl SU,8. 1.00 (01 eqlllvr:aIll In otrlsr curranclar) 73.ll2046-Docenhor 1976~-1,925 I think that would havo bcon II ruther more accuroto roprosentnthl of what the Mh~lstcr said. 127. I must strass ognnln: only those who llvo ln Rhodosln can b~lng about a puncoful sottlomc~~~, and It must be tho aim of everybody clso to glvu thonl cvcry opportunity to doso. 128, Agninst thnt background, my dolcgntlon will study tho two draft resolutions which hove been aubmlttod this afternoon. My dolemUon will wish to play OS helpful and constructlvo a part 3s possible, and 1 have already mudo somo prelbnhlnry comments to tho sponsors. I shall, of course, seek lnstructlons nnd hope to bc in P posltion tomorrow to discuss the druft rcsolutlons furthor, 27re wrc&g rose at 6.25 pm