S/PV.1712 Security Council

This meeting of the Security Council has been convened in response to the request made by the 8. As is to be seen from a 24-point document submitted by the delegations of Guinea, Kenya and the Sudan, we would have wished to try to plug these leaks which defeat the Council’s efforts and encourage the regime of Ian Smith. 9. Our requests were not exorbitant. We sought to have exports from South Africa, Angola, and Mozambique closely controlled so that firms cheating through the intermediary of those countries would see their risks increase. 10. We would have wished all States to refuse landing rights to the national carriers of countries continuing to grant landing rights to aircraft coming from Rhodesia or having air services with that territory as their destination. 11. We would have wished all States that had not yet done so to adopt legislative measures forbidding insurance companies to cover flights to or from Rhodesia. We would have wished States to adopt legislative measures also forbidding shipping companies to carry Rhodesian goods or goods intended for Rhodesia and forbidding insurance companies to insure either those goods or the vessels transporting them. We would have wished States to adopt legislative measures imposing on insurance companies the obligation to include in every contract a clause of nullity specifying that no goods coming from Southern Rhodesia would be covered by that contract. 12. We would have wished the blockade of Beira to be extended to include Lourengo Marques and to cover Rhodesian goods and products, and we would have wished that Member States prepared to do so would contribute to British patrols. 13. We would have wished States to communicate to the Committee their present sources of supply for products they imported from Rhodesia before the application of sanctions. 14. Finally, we would have wished the Security Council, this lofty international body, to call on the United States of America to rescind the senseless law which, by officially authorizing the violation of sanctions, ruins our hopes and its prestige. 1.5. Who will tell us that those proposals were unreasonable? Who can tell us they were excessive? Yet, despite the support of certain delegations to which we pay a tribute for 16. The African proposals are not, however, in bad company: alternative proposals by the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union are there alongside them. And if, in that context, the positions expressed by certain delegations in section V of the report are studied, it cannot be denied that there is in the Committee profound concern regarding the situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia. 17. I am submitting this report rather hapazardly. Leaving sections I and II, which are little more than introductory, we have gone through section IV and have recalled section V. 18. I am sure the Council will not hold it against me when I inform them that I have left until last section III, which was adopted unanimously. It is entitled “Recommendations and suggestions” and comprises paragraphs 10 to 22 of the report. It envisages measures to be taken by Governments, by the Committee or by the Secretary-General. Moreover, the terms of reference frequently overlap. 19. I shall mention only the most important proposals. 20. Among those addressed to Governments, one cannot overlook paragraph 10, which emphasizes the importance of States that have not already done so urgently instituting effective procedures at the point of import to ensure that goods imported from South Africa, Mozambique and Angola are not cleared through customs until they are satisfied that the documentation is in order and complete and to ensure that, if need be, procedures provide for the recall of goods cleared through customs for custody if it is subsequently established that they are of Southern Rhodesian origin. 21. Paragraph 21 should be understood in the same way: States trading with South Africa, Mozambique and Angola should be informed of the existence of certain discrepancies concerning goods originating in southern Africa. Those discrepancies appear in the amounts indicated for export by South Africa, Mozambique and Angola and the amounts indicated for import by their trading partners. That anomalous situation should therefore be clarified, and the States concerned should take precautions to make sure of the real origin of the goods in question. Paragraph 14 recommends that goods be seized in the event that they are of Southern Rhodesian origin. 22. In order to facilitate the often difficult task of national authorities in conducting enquiries, the Corn. mittee, as is indicated in paragraph 1 1, has considered the publication of a manual setting forth documentation and clearing procedures necessary to determine the true origin of products of doubtful origin. Furthermore, as is indicated in paragraph 12, it envisages public-tion of a list of experts 29. But cases of suspected violation multiply and correspondence mounts unceasingly. Futhermore, the Committee is in ever-increasing need of research work and analysis. It therefore desires that the present team from the Secretariat which assists it should be considerably reinforced, not only for routine work but also at the technical level and, in particular, by the inclusion in it of a person with practical experience in international commerce. That is the unanimous recommendation expressed by the Committee in paragraph 19 of the report, and I wish to draw the Secretary-General’s attention to this particularly. 24. All those measures may lead to expendituresparticularly the use of experts and the measures the Committee may have to take to encourage the public to channeI useful information. In paragraph 15 the Committee therefore envisages establishment of a special fund to be financed by voluntary contributions, especially by the proceeds of the sale of Southern Rhodesian cargo which has been seized. In this regard it may be worth while to recall that, in one case mentioned in the fifth annual report of the Committee,’ the Government of Egypt, acting on the basis of information supplied by the Committee, confiscated the cargo in question. Furthermore, in a stroke of African solidarity, the Government spontaneously sent the cash receipts of the sale of that cargo to the Organization of African Unity in order to assist the liberation efforts of Africa. That is an example the Committee should encourage. 30. That is what the Committee has included in this report. My delegation has sought to introduce it quite objectively, with due respect for the wisdom which cannot but flow from a unanimous decision which we hope will be endorsed by the Council. 31. But everything depends, of course, on the manner in which these recommendations are implemented. Knowing that politics is the art of the possible, the African delegations that have participated so closely in the preparation of this report have accepted a compromise. But too many companies are still cheating, too many authorities close their eyes, too many Governments allow themselves to be taken by surprise. 25. As regards the publicity to be given to the work of the Committee-and here there is a plan similar to that of the mobilization of public opinion-paragraph 20 says the Committee should circulate lists of all goods that Rhodesia is currently known to export so as to establish by .comparison the extent to which South African, Mozambique and Angola exports have increased since the unilateral declaration of independence. 32. We should like nssurances from those who have led us to accept this compromise. We should like them to tell us and affirm that they will do everything within their power to see to it that at least these over-modest recommendations will be totally implemented. Thus perhaps it will be possible for the question of Southern Rhodesia to be considered of itself, in itself, free from any distorting reflections of political friendships, military alliances and trade interests. 26. Furthermore, in paragraph 18 the Committee considers the release of quarterly lists containing names of companies found guilty of sanctions violations and Governments that have not responded within the prescribed period of two months to an inquiry from the Committee regarding cases of possible sanctions violations. 33. The Security Council is the noblest of our councils because it is the council of peace. But there is no peace without justice. What we ask of the Council, in its great strength, as laid down in the Charter, is freedom for our brothers, dignity for men, and justice for an oppressed people. 27. As the Council is certainly aware, the programme of work that the Commitee has thus drawn up for itself is vast. but it simply adds to and completes the programme already set out in previous reports-in particular in the third annual report2 and in the first special report [S/10632 of 9 May 19721. L

Mr. President, first of all I should like to congratulate you most cordially on your assumption of the presidency of the Council. for the month of May. My delegation is very happy to see you presiding over this meeting, as the representative of an African and non-aligned country with which my country has always enjoyed the best of relations, and one whose devotion to the struggle for changing the shameful conditions under which part of the African people in the south of Africa still live, is very well known. All of us here will certainly recall your personal, as well as your delegation’s, unreserved 28. The members of the Committee were unanimous-and we did not deem it necessary to include this in the report-in considering that the task entrusted to them by 1 OffKal Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh Year, Special Supplement No. 2. 2 Ibid; Twenty-fifth Year, Special Supplement No. 3 and 3A. 35. May I also express my delegation’s admiration for the able and decisive way in which the representative of Peru, Mr. PBrez de CuBlIar, conducted the active work of the Security Council for the month of April. 3G. Before turning to the subject on our agenda, I wish also to congratulate the representative of Guinea, Mrs. Jeanne Martin Ciss6, Chairman of the Committee, under whose guidance that Committee has adopted its present report. 37, As the main theme of our meeting is the consideration of the second special report of the Committee, I am going to limit my remarks to questions which are dealt with in the report, although, of course, the whole complex of the problems of sanctions cannot be removed from the general framework of the situation in Southern Rhodesia, which is becoming increasingly serious and disturbing. It is, however, our understanding and hope that the Security Council will soon take up, at an appropriate time, this aspect of the Southern Rhodesian issue, too. 38. Precisely owing to the grave and dangerous situation in Southern Rhodesia, my delegation attaches particular significance to this latest report of the Committee and to the whole sanctions policy in general. This report is presented for the attention of the Council in a situation characterized by the continued and intensified oppression of the people of Zimbabwe by the illegal racist minority re’gime, by the arbitrary and unlawful imprisonment and detention of the legitimate representatives of the Zimbabwe people and the continued denial of fundamental human rights including, especially, the recent abhorrent measures of collective punishment. This situation clearly constitutes a threat to regional and international peace and security and provokes the legitimate struggle of the Zimbabwe people and their national liberation movement against oppression and against tile policy of apartheid in Southern Rhodesia. The illegal regime is continuing its apartheid policy, especially by the establishment of so-called “tribal trust homelands”, copying thereby the practice of apartheid, imported from South Africa. The illegal presence of South African forces in Southern Rhodesia is continuing. This seriously threatens the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighbouring independent African States, as ws clearly shown in the case of Zambia, which was recently the subject of the Council’s deliberations. So far the administering Power has failed to take effective measures to put an end to the illegal re’gime and to discharge its primary responsibility by enabling the people of Zimbabwe to exercise freely their right to self-determination and independence. Furthermore, no steps towards the political solution of the problem have been made recently, 39. Turning now, more specifically, to the question of sanctions, we note that the situation remains gloomy and disturbing. The discrepancies-revealed in annex V of the 40. At the beginning of this year an analysis was made of all cases of suspected or possible violations of sanctions which were brought to the attention of the Committee since its inception. The number of such cases totalled 135. Of these, in 14 cases transactions were conducted with the knowledge of Governments, which means that, first, the violations were verified and, second, the Governments permitting the transactions took no punitive action a In only 27 cases one or more Governments reported punitive or preventive measures following requests or inquiries by the Committee. Five cases were closed because the Committee decided that no further action was necessary. This leaves us with approximately 90 cases in which no conclusive evidence has as yet been evinced that the reported suspected violations of sanctions did or did not occur. In alI these cases the Committee sent inquiries to the Covcrnmerits involved but it was unable to reach any decision, primarily, because: (a) some Governments have failed to reply; (b) the replies of some Governments were elusive, incomplete or did not relate to the matter at all; (cl the conduct of an investigation was indicated, but the results have never been made known to the Committee ; and (d) certificates of origin issued by Portuguese colonial authorities were offered as proof that the goods were not of Southern Rhodesian origin, which certainly should be regarded as invalid and insufficient. Some >f these cases are 42. But precisely because of the gloomy picture portrayed here, of which we all are very well aware, and because of the fact that the imposed sanctions have not yet brought the racist regime of Ian Smith to an end, we must not allow any relaxation in all the efforts to assure the effectiveness of the sanctions; we must not allow a feeling of indifference or resignation to take over. We must thus continue to lend full political support to the people of Zimbabwe, as has already been done in so many resolutions of the General Assembly, of the Security Council and of the Committee of Twenty-Four.3 By doing so, we give heart to the people of Zimbabwe to continue their struggle against oppression and colonialist rule. We must exert all-out efforts in the sanctions Committee and in the Security Council with a view to improving the effectiveness of sanctions and their strict application to finding new measures that may prove to be useful in this respect and to rendering the violators’ job more difficult. We must pursue these efforts firmly until the present Southern Rhodesian regime comes to an end. Recent information to the effect that the foreign currency reserves situation in Rhodesia is seriously deteriorating despite all illegal trade is an encouraging sign showing that the effects of our sanctions policy, incomplete as they are, are still proving to be at least partially effective. 46. The remaining African proposals, placed in the unagreed part of the report, especially those dealing with the question of insurance-paragraphs 28 and 29-and the one containing the recommendation that the United States be requested to co-operate with the United Nations and to revoke its existing legislation permitting the importation of minerals from Southern Rhodesia-paragraph 33-are all very reasonable and useful and indeed merit the attention of the Council. It is the opinion of the Yugoslav delegation, therefore, that the Council should seriously consider approving all the remaining African proposals too, as essential for the effective implementation of sanctions. 47. The Yugoslav delegation, together with the delegations of India, Indonesia, Panama and Peru, continues to support the African proposals and positions contained in section IV of the report, as expressed in paragraph 44. We shall, therefore, support every motion that the Council endorse the African proposals contained in section IV, together with the proposals embodied in section III of the report. 43. A further step in this direction is now before US: it is incorporated in the report of the Committee, on which I Should like now to comment brizfy. 48. In addition, the Yugoslav Government’s position, as poinrcd out in paragraph 60 and expressed on previous occasions, is that sanctions against Southern Rhodesia can be fully effective only if they are applied against Portugal and South Africa as well. That is why we fully agree with the delegations that have expressed the same view in the report. 44. The Yugoslav delegation has supported, from the very beginning, all the proposals contained in the document submitted by the delegations of Guinea, Kenya and the Sudan, which has been accepted as a basis for the preparation of the report. Out of 24 proposals that the African document contains, 11 were accepted and included in the agreed portion of the report, with some modifications which, in our opinion, have detracted from their intended effectiveness while making them more palatable to some members of the Committee. But, even with those modifications, the agreed proposals, if applied in practice, could constitute an important and substantive step forward in the sanctions policy. There is, perhaps, no need for me to list them here, even briefly, as we have all no doubt read section III of the report, and we have just listened to the able presentation of those points by the representative of Guinea. 49. Let me conclude with a few words about the problem of Southern Rhodesia in general, of which the sanctions constitute an inseparable part. This is a grave problem which makes it imperative for us constantly to improve, widen and tighten the sanctions. 50. The basic elements of the solution of this problem are outlined in numerous resolutions of various United Nations organs, including the Security Council. The people of Zimbabwe have the inalienable right to self-determination, freedom and independence and also to secure the enjoyment of this right by all available means at their disposal. There should be no independence before majority rule in Zimbabwe, and any settlement relating to the future of the Territory must be worked out with the full participation of genuine political leaders and leaders of the national liberation movements, who are the true representatives of the people of Zimbabwe. The Government of the administering Power should not transfer or accord, under any 45. It should be noted, however, that the Committee was not able to come up with stronger and more meaningful j Specjal Committee on t11e Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 51. These are the only principles and courses of action which, if strictly observed and followed, are liable to bring a just solution to the peopIe of Zimbabwe. That is why we have always supported them and will continue to do so. Furthermore, we think that the continuation and strengthening of the direct support and assistance of the United Nations and all its organs and agencies, as well as of all peaceful, progressive and anti-colonialist forces in the 52. We are convinced that the forthcoming tenth anniversary meeting of the Organization of African IJnity in Addis Ababa and the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries in Algiers, which will be held this year in September, will bring some new elements and adopt some new decisions aimed at the final solution of this problem. It is in this general context that we shall continue to approach the issues of a better and more effective application of sanctions. The meeting rose at 12 noon.