S/PV.176 Security Council

The Council will meet again this afternoon at 3 p.m. and the proceedings will begin with the statement by the representative of the United Kingdom. The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m. HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SIXTH MEETING Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 5 August 1947, at 3 p.m. President': Mr. F., EL-KHOURI (Syria)., Present: The. representatives of the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, Colombia, France, Poland, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. 277. Continuation of the discussion on the Egyptian question At the invitation of the President, M ahmoud Fahmy Nokrashy Pasha, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, took his place at the Council table. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): I think the Council will not expect me at this moment to make a detailed reply to the long statement which we heard this morning from the Egyptian Prime Minister. Until this morning, we did n"~ know in exactly what form the Egyptian complaint would be plo.~ed before the Council. We had, of course, the letter addressed to the Secretary-General by the Egyptian delegation on 8 July,! and we naturally gave that letter all the attention which was due to it. I have prepared a statement With regard to that letter which, with the President's permission, I shall make. 277. Suite de iu discussion sur la question egyptienne Sur l'invitation du President, M ahmoud Fahmy Nokrashy Pacha, Premier Ministre et Ministre des Affaires etrangeres d'Egypte, prend place ala table du Conseil. .Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): J~ pense qut: le Conseil n'attend pas de moi, pour l'instant, une reponse detaillee ala longue declaration que nous a faite ce matin le Premier Ministre egyptien. Jusque-Ia nous ne savions pas exactement sous quelle forme les Egyptiens presenteraient leur revendication au Conseil. Nous etions, bien entendu, saisis de la lettre adressee par la delegation egyptienne au Secretaire general le 8 juilletl , et nous lui avions accorde toute l'attention qui lui etait due. C'est d'ailleurs a cette lettre que se rapporte la declaration que j'ai preparee et dont je vais, avec la permission dll President, vous donner connaissance. Nous sommes convaincus que notre cause est juste. Nous sommes certains de n'avoir pas fait appel en vain au Conseil. Nous avons une confiance inebranlable dans les principes de la Charte. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Le Conseil se reunira de nouveau cet apres-midi a 15 heures, et la seance debutera par la declaration du representant du Royaume-Uni. La seance est levee a13 h. 35. CENT-SOIXANTE-SEIZIEME SEANCE Tenue aLake Success, New-York, le mardi 5 aout 1947, a15 heures. President: M. F. EL-KHOURI (Syrie). Presents: Les representants des pays suivants: Austr<l1ie, Belgique, Bresil, Chine, Colombie, France, Pologne, Syrie, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. As regards the case as formulated by the Egyptian delegation in its letter to the Secretary- General, I would observe that the Egyptian Government has brought this matter before the Security Council under Articles 35 and 37 of the Charter as a dispute the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Neither that letter from the Egyptian delegation nor the statement which we listened to this morning seemed to me to offer any proof that international peace and security were under any threat, unless, of course, the Egyptian Government contemplated creating it. In the Egyptian letter of 8 July, two claims are made: 1. The total and immediate evacuation of British troops from Egypt and from the Sudan; 2. The termination of the present administrative regime in the Sudan. Both these claims relate to matters which are provided for in the Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and Egypt! which was signed in 1936 and came into force on 20 December of that year. It is article 8 of that Treaty which, together with its annex, provides for the stationing on Egyptian territory, in the vicinity of the Sue:! Canal, of a certain limited number of United Kingdom military and air forces. It is article 11 which provides for the continuance of the present administrative regime in the Sudan and also makes certain provisions with regard to the stationing there of United Kingdom and Egyptian troops. This Treaty of 1936 has, under ar;icle 16, a period of over nine years still to run before either High Contracting Party has any right to demand its revision. It is true that the same article 16 provides in its last sentence that, with the consent 1 See Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Egypt, signed at London, 26 August 1936. League of Nations, Treaty Series, VoI. 173, No. 4031, pages WI-424. un certain reconfort a voir ici le Premier Ministre egyptien, assis a la table du Conseil, attaquer en toute liberte un autre Membre des Nations Unies. Ma deuxieme remarque est celle-ci: le representant de I'Egypte, on s'en souvient, s'est lance dans un long expose historique. Il nous a brosse un tableau assez sombre de l'attitude et de l'activite de mon Gouvernement en Egypte et au Soudan. C'est un tableau dont je conteste l'exactitude. Pour corriger l'impression qu'il a pu produire, il me faudra a mon tour brosser un tableau, different, celui-Ia, ce que j'espere pouvoir faire un peu plus tard. J'en reviens maintenant au cas expose par la delegation de l'Egypte dans sa lettre au Secretaire general. Je ferai remarquer que le Gouvernement egyptien a porte cette affaire devant le Conseil de securite aux termes des Articles 35 et 37 de la Charte, comme un differend dont la prolongation semble devoir menacer le rnaintien' de la paix et de la securite internationales. Ni la lettre de la delegation de l'Egypte, ni la declaration que nous avons entendue ce matin n'apportent la moindre preuve qu'il y ait une menace quelconque a la paix et a la securite internationales, a moins, evidemment, que le Gouvernement egyptien n'envisage de la creer lui-meme. Dans sa lettre du 8 juillet, il formule deux revendications: 1. L'evacuation totale et immediate de I'Egypte, y compris le Soudan, par les troupes du Royaume-Uni; 2. La revocation du regime administratif actuellement en vigueur au Soudan. Ces deux revendications ont trait a des questions qui sont prevues dans le Traite d'alliance entre le Royaume-Uni et l'Egypte!, signe en 1936 et entre en vigueur le 20 decembre de la meme annee. C'est l'article 8 de ce Traite qui, avec son annexe, prevoit l'installation en territoire egyptien, au voisinage du canal de Suez, de forces terrestres et aeriennes du Royaume-Uni, a effectifs limites. C'est l'article 11 du meme traite qui prevoit le maintien du regime administratif actuel au Soudan et qui contient aussi des clauses visant le stationnement de troupes du Royaume-Uni et ,de l'Egypte dans cette region. Le Traite de 1936, aux termes de son article 16, doit rester en vigueur plus de neuf ans encore, avant que l'une ou l'autre des deux Hautes Parties contractantes ait le droit d'en demander la revision. Il est exact que le meme article 16, . 1 Voir le Traite d'alliance entre le Royaume-Uni de Grand·Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord et l'Egypte, signe a Londres, le 26 aout 1936. Societe des Nations, Recueil des Traites, Volume 173, No 4031, pages 401·424. L'article 16 le dit: on ne peut proceder a cette revision apres une periode de dix ans que si les deux parties le desirent. En fait, c'est le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni qui, aIlant dans le sens des desirs du Gouvernement egyptien, a entrepris avec ce dernier des negociations en vue d'une revision du Traite avant que les dix ans ne fussent ecoules. Ces negociations ont abouti a la redaction d'un nouveau Traite d'assistance mutuellel accompagne de deux protocoles, ayant trait, l'un a. l'evacuation de l'Egypte par les forces du Royaume-Uniz, I'autre au Soudanl ; ils ont ete par~phes le 25 octobre 1946 par Sidky Pacha, alors Premier Ministre d'Egypte, et par M. Bevin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres du Royaume-Uni. As article 16 shows, this reVISIOn after ten years is only a matter to be undertaken if both parties desire to do so. In fact, and in order to meet the wishes of the Egyptian Government, the Government of the United Kingdom began negotiations with the Egyptian Government for the revision of this. Treaty some months before this period of ten years had elapsed. These negotiations led to the drawing up of a new Treaty of Mutual Assistance,1 accompanied by two Protocols, one relating to the evacuation of United Kingdom forces from EgyptZ and the other relating to the Sudan,J which were initialed on 25 October 1946 by the then Egyptian Prime Minister Sidky Pasha and Mr. Bevin, th~ Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom. Those initialed texts are now in the hands of the members of the Security Council, and I wish merely, at this moment, to state that there was one re:-lSon, and one reason only, which led to Egypt's final rejection of those texts. The text of the main document, the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, contained provisions for collective selfdefence under Article 51 of the Charter, not including the stationing of any United Kingdom forces on Egyptian territory, and was not the cause of the rejection of the texts. The Evacuation Protocol provided for the evacuation of United Kingdom troops from Egypt. This action, which was to be completed by 1 September 1949, was to begin with the evacuation of United Kingdom troops from the Nile delta, including the cities of Caim and Alexandria, by 31 March. This evacuation of the Nile delta had been begun before the negotiations came to an end, and was virtually completed by 31 March of this year, in 'spite of the fact that the Egyptian Government had then rejected the initialed texts. It was not the provisions with regard to evacuation which led to the rejection of the texts. The Sudan Protocol provided, until certain objectives were realized in full common agreement, for the continuance of the present administrative regime in the Sudan, and in addition set forth certain essential objectives which both High Contracting Parties undertook to follow in the Sudan. The objectives were to ensure, first, the well-being of the Sudanese and the development of their interests; secondly, their active preparation for self-government; and thirdly, the I See Papers regarding the Negotiations for a Revision Of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, Vnited Kingdom Command Pal!er 7179. Les Membres du Conseil de securite ont maintenant entre les mains ces textes paraphes, et je me bornerai pour l'instant a. declarer qu'il n'y a eu qu'une raison, et une seule, au rejet final de ces teXIt:" uu cote egyptien. Le texte du document principal, le Traite d'assistance mutuelle, contenait des dispositions relatives a. la legitime defense collective, seIon les termes de l'Article 51 de la Charte, dispositions ne comportant pas le stationnement de troupes du Royaume-Uni en territoire egyptien. Ce n'est pas lui qui est la cause du rejet de I'ensemble des textes. Le protocole d'evacuation prevoyait, avant le 1er septembre 1949, l'evacuation de l'Egypte par les troupes du Royaume-Uni. Cette evacuation devait commencer le 31 mars par le retrait des troupes du Royaume-Uni en garnison dans le delta du Nil, y compris les deux viIIes du Caire et d'AIexandrie. Cette evacuation du delta du Nil avait commence avant mcme la fin des negociations et etait pratiquement achevee le 31 mars 1947, en depit du fait que le Gouvernement egyptien avait rejete les textes paraphes. Ce ne sont donc pas les clauses relatives a. l'evacuation qui ont conduit au rejet des textes. Le protocole sur le Soudan prevoyait que, jusqu'a. ce que certains objectifs fussent atteints en complet accord, le regime administratif existant serail: maintenu au Soudan; de plus il enon~ait certains objectifs essentiels que les deux Rautes Parties contractantes s'engageaient a poursuivre au Soudan. Ces objectifs etaient, en premier lieu, d'assurer le bien-ctre des Soudanais et de favoriser leurs interets, en second lieu de les prepareI' activement a I'autonomie, et, en troi- 1 Voir Papers regarding the Negotiations for a Revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, United Kingdom Command Pal'Jer 7I79. 'Ibid., Annexe 3, Projet de protocole relatif a l'evacuation. "Ibid., Annexe 2, Projet de protocole relatif au Soudan. His Majesty's Government, by" this phrase, understood that the Sudanese, when the full development for self-government had been achieved, should be able to choose freely the future F:lsition of their country. For example, they might choose, if they so wished, to be associated with Egypt ill one way or anotherpossi'i:>ly as two countries under a common Crown, possibly in the form of an integral union with Egypt. Again, the Sudanese might choose that their country should become a fully independent State bound by no legal ties of union either to Egypt or to any other country. It was for the Sudanese freely to choose. This was how my Government interpreted the texts. The Egyptian Government, on the other hand, maintained that the choice of the Sudanese should be limited. They might choose to be completely united with Egypt or perhaps to be a self-governing territory, but still united with Egypt under a common C~own. In other words, Egypt was not prepared to accord to the Sudan that freedom to choose complete independence which Egypt so ardently claims to be the right of other territories and which it had itself received from the United Killgdom. For many centuries, until it was thus granted its freedQm, Egypt had not been an independent country. It had remained under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Sultan, though possessing under the Khedive, the Sultan's vassal, a great measure of internal' independence and a certain limited participation in external affairs. It was the action 'of the United Kingdom which brought about the release of Egypt from Ottoman sovereignty. , This Ottoman sovereignty was replaced for a period, mainly that of the First World War, by the protection of the British Crown, a protection which ended in 1922, when Egypt first became an independent State, by the unilateral declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom. Par cette expression, le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste entendait que, lorsque les Soudanais auraient atteint leur pleine preparation a l'autonomie, ils devraient etre ameme de choisir librement le regime futur de leur pays. Par exemple, ils pourraient, si tel etait leur desir, choisir de s'associer a l'Egypte, de fa~on ou d'autre - soit comme deux pays reunis sous une meme couronne, soit meme sous la forme d'une union complete avec l'Egypte. Les Soudanais pourraient encore decider de faire de leur pays un Etat pleinement independant, sans aucun lien juridique d'union qui les attachat, soit a l'Egypte, soit a un autre pays. C'etait aux Soudanais qu'il appartenait de choisir, en toute liberte. Telle etait, du moins, l'interpretation de mon Gouvernemcnt. Le Gouvernement egyptien, de son cote, soutenait qu'il fallait limiter le choix des Soudanais. Ils pourraient choisir, soit d'etre unis completement al'Egypte, soit, peut-etre, de devenir territoire autonome, mais restant reuni a l'Egypte sous une meme couronne. En d'autres termes, l'Egypte n'etait pas disposee a reronnaitre au Soudan toute liberte de choisir l'independance complete, liberte que l'Egypte reclame si ardemment pour d'autres territoires comme un droit, et qu'elle-meme a obtenue du Royaume-Uni. Pendant des siecles, tant qu'elle n'eut pas ainsi re~u sa liberte, l'Egypte n'apas ete un pays independant. Elle etait restee sous la souverainete du Sultan ottoman, tout en jouissant, sous l'autorite du Khedive, vassal du Sultan, d'une grande independance a l'interieur et, dans certames limites, d'une participation aux affaires exterieures. C'est grace au Royaume-Uni que l'Egypte se libera de la souverainete ottomane. Pendant une certaine periode, essentiellement celle de la premiere guerre mondiale, la protection de la Couronne britannique rempla~a cette' souverainete ottomane. Cette protection prit :fin en 1922, date a laquelle l'Egypte devint un Etat independant, de par la declaration unilaterale du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni. However, for the reasons which I have given, the texts initialed in October 194'6 were rejected by Egypt. They are not instruments in force; but they show that the wide claims now made by Egypt are quite unrelated to the single issue on which the negotiations broke down. The members of the Security Council may be interested to hear in this connexion that the British Foreign Secretary, in the course of his efforts to prevent the final breakdown, offered to sign separately the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Evacuation Protocol, reserving the question of the Sudan for a later conference at which the Sudan Government would be represented. That offer was ignored. Had it been accepted, the Egyptian Government would have secured the total evacuation of United Kingdom troops from Egyptian territory by September 1949 without in any way prejudicing its attitude in regard to the Sudan. We return therefort.: to the Treaty of 1936. As I have said, this Treaty has, according to its own article 16, a further period of over nine years to run before either party has any right to demand its revision. This Treaty provides in articles 8 and 11 a complete answer to both the claims which Egypt has made. If this Treaty is valid, as I shall hope to show it is, Egypt has no case at all to bring before the· Council. We maintain that the Treaty of 1936 remains valid and effective till 1956 in default of its revision by bilateral negotiation in accordance with the provisiom of the Treaty itself and in a °manner acceptable to both parties. We could have refused to discl.!sS its Tevision last year. We did not do that: we entered into negotiations. We reached, as we thought, agreement. Bllt the negotiations broke down in the manner I have described. We are now haled before the Security Council because of the failure of negotiations which we need never have undertaken. I submit that the Security Council can do nothing in regard to that: it cannot intervene in respect of negotiations, which we were in no way committed to undertake, Revenons-en au Traite de 1936. Comme je l'ai deja dit, ce Traite, aux termes de son article 16, doit encore rester en vigueur plus de .neuf allS avant que rune des parties ait le droit d'en demander la revision. Ce Traite, dans ses articles 8 et 11, fournit une reponse complete aux deux revendications formuIees par l'Egypte. Si ce Traite est valide - et j'espere prouver qu'il l'est -l'Egypte n'a aucune action a intenter devant le Conseil. Nous soutenons que le Traite de 1936 demeure valide et applicable jusqu'en 1956, sauf revision par negociations bilatl~rales -comme i1 a ete prevu par le Traite lui-memeet acceptation par les deux parties. Nous audons pu refuser, l'annee derniere, de discuter de sa revision. Au contraire, nous avons engage des negociations. Nous avons abouti a ce que nous croyions etre un accord. Mais les negociations ont ete rompues, clans les conditions que j'ai dites. On nous traine maintenant devant le ConseiI de securite a cause de l'echec de negociations que nous n'etions nullement tenus d'engager. Je pretends que le Conseil de securite ne peut ri~n faire en la matiere; il n'a pas a interdegre de developpement remarquable. Enfin, c'est la seule politique compatible avec l'esprit de la Charte des Nations Unies qui, dans son Article premier, paragraphe 2, fait mention expresse du droit des peuples a disposer d'euxmemes. Cependant, l'Egypte, pour les raisons que j'ai donnees, a rejete les textes paraphes en octobre 1946. Ce ne sont donc pas des instruments en vigueur, mais on y peut voir que les revendications etendues que presente maintenant l'Egypte sont sans rapport avec l'unique question qui a amene la rupture des °negociations. Il sera peutetre interessant pour les membr~s du Conseil de securite d'apprendre, a ce sujet, que le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres du Royaume-Uni, dans ses efforts pour empecher la rupture definitive, a offert de signer separement le Traite d'assistance mutuelle et le Protocole d'evacuation, en reservant la question du Soudan pour une conference ulterieure a °laquelle le Soudan serait represente. Cette offre n'a pas ete retenue. S'il l'avait acceptee, le Gouvernement egyptien se serait assure l'evacuation totale du territoire egyptien par les troupes du Royaume-Uni avant septembre 1949, sans aucun prejudice de son attitude en ce qui concerrie le Soudan. It is one of the fundamental purposes of the Charter, set forth in Article 1, paragraph 1, to bring about, by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, the settlement of international disputes. The principle pacta sunt servanda is pe·rhaps the most fundamental principle of international law and one on which, after all, the Charter itself depends. I heard the Egypt~an Prime Minister this morning characterize the Treaty of 1936 as a temporary expedient. That seems to me to be a curious phrase to apply to a treaty duly signed and ratified. I trust the same phrase will never be applied to the Egyptian signature of the Charter of the United Nations. If the Treaty of 1936 is valid, the Security Council cannot, consistently with the purposes of the United Nations, take any other course than that of recognizing this fact and of removing this matter from the agenda. No other course would be consistent with the principles of justice and international law. If there then remained any situation between the two countries threatening international pe~ce and security and relating to this treaty, it could only be because Egypt itself was contemplating measures threatening peace and security instead of accepting the provisions of a treaty which was binding on it. Under no principle of justice or international law can a State acquire rights by creating a threat to peace or security through its refusal to acct;pt and conform to its existing international obligations. It would seem as though the Egyptian Government were conscious of the weakness of its position in this matter, for we find a shift of ground: in its letter of 8 July, it has contended that the Treaty of 1936 "cannot bind Egypt any longer, having outlived its purposes, besides being inconsistent with the Charter". In other words, the Egyptian Government contests the continued validity of the Treaty of 1936. That is a legal question. I shall therefore deal with this contention which is, I believe, substantially the only matter which the Security Council has to consider in the present case; It is true that the Egyptian delegation, perhaps realizing that the issue which it has raised is a purely legal one, and not being very confident of the legal soundness of its case, has attempted to obscure it by going through the past history of Anglo-Egyptian relations from 1882 onwards, including the creation of the present administrative regime for the Sudan by the Condominium Agreement of 1899 and the manner in which the administration of the Sudan has been carried on since that date. The Egyptian delegation has 'made a number of allegations with the object apres tout, repose la Charte elle-meme. J'ai entendu ce matin le Premier Ministre egyptien appeler le Traite de 1936: expedient provisoire. Je trouve que c'est HI. une bien curieuse expression a appliquer a un traite qui a ete dument signe et ratifie. J'ose esperer que pareille expression ne s'appliquera jamais a la signature 'que l'Egypte a apposee au bas de la Ch1l.rte des Nations Unies. Si le Traite de 1936 est valable, le Conseil de securite ne peut, conformement aux buts poursuivis par l'Organisation des Nations Unies, que reconnaitre le fait et rayer la question de son ordre du jour. Une autre attitude serait incompatible avec les principes de justice et de droit international. S'il persistait alors entre les deux pays une situation qui mena~at la paix et la securite internationales, et qui eut un rapport avec ce Traite, ce ne pourrait etre que parce que l'Egypte ellememe envisagerait des mesures menac;ant la paix et la securite, au lieu d'accepter les dispositions d'un traite par lequel elle est liee. Aucun principe de justice ou de droit international ne permet a un Etat d'acquerir des droits en creant une menace a la paix au a la securite, par son refus d'accepter de se conformer ases obligations internationales existantes. Il semble d'ail!eurs qur. le Gouvernement egyptien se soit rendu compte de la faiblesse de sa position en la matiere, car nous notons un deplacement de la question: dans sa lettre du 8 juillet, le Gouvernement egyptien pretend que le Traite de 1936 "ne peut lier plus longtemps l'Egypte puisqu'il n'a plus de raison d'etre, independamment du fait qu'il est incompatible avec la Charte". En d'autres termes, le Gouvernement egyptien conteste que le Traite de 1936 soit encore valide. C'est la une question juridique. Je traiterai donc de cette these qui est, je crois, le seul s11jd positif quP, le Conseil de securite ait a examiner dans l'affaire qui nous occupe. Il est vrai que la delegation egyptienne, se rendant compte peut-etre que la question qu'elle a soulevee est d'ordre purement juridique et n'etant pas tres sure de la valeur juridique de son action, a essaye de l'embrouiller. en se lanc;ant dans un historique des relations anglo-egyptiennes apres 1882, y compris la creation du regime administratif actueldu Soudan par l'Accord de Condominium de 1899, et de la fac;on dont cette administration a ete assuree depuis lors. La delegation egyptienne a avance un certain nombre d'allegations tendant a presenter The Egyptian letter of 8 July says that the Treaty of 1936 "cannot bind Egypt any longer, having outlived its purposes, besides being inconsistent with the Charter". It would appear that two arguments are put forward here. The first is contained in the words "having outlived its purposes", and would appear to be an appeal to the doctrine rebus sic stantibus. The other, contained in the words "inconsistent with the Charter"> clearly refers to Article 103 of that document, which says: "En cas de conflit entre les obligations des Membres des Nations Unies en vertu de la presente Charte, et leurs obligations en vertu de tout autre accord international, les premieres prevaudront." "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail." J e traiterai done ces deux arguments separement, en commen~ant par le premier, l'argument tire de la doctrine rebus sic stantibus, contenu dans les mots "puisqu'il n'a plus de raison d'etre". I shall therefore deal with these two arguments separately, beginning with the first, the rebus sic stantibus argument contained in the words "having outlived its purposes". Afin d'apprecier cet argument a sa valeur reelle, il est indispensable de se reporter aux dispositions du Traite de 1936 lui-meme. Il est d'ailleurs necessaire de se reporter a l'ensemble des dispositions de ce Traite, puisque I'Egypte pretend que c'est l'ensemble de ce Traite qui ne peut plus l'engager. Mais, avant de le faire, et pour bien cornprendre certaines des dispositions du Traite, il est necessaire d'avoir present a l'esprit la situation telle qu'elle se presentait avant la conclusion, en 1936, de ce Traite. In order to assess this argument at its true value, it is necessary to look at the provisions of the 1936 Treaty itself. Moreover, it is necessary to look at all the provisions of this Treaty, since Egypt claims the whole of it to be no longer binding on it. But before doing so, and in order to understand some of these provisions, it is necessary to have in mind the situation which existed before this Treaty of 1936 was concluded. Comme je l'ai deja dit, l'Egypte est devenue un Etat independant en 1922, de par 1.a declaration unilaterale du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, qui, en vertu du Protectorat, avait succede a la Turquie dans la souverainete sur I'Egypte. Par cette declaration, toutefois, le Royaume-Uni qui, en vertu du Protectorat, tenant sur certains points le statu quo, avec l'intention de regler a une date ulterieure les points ainsi reserves et de les remplacer par un traite entre le Royaume-Uni et l'Egypte. Ces points reserves constituaient, dans une certaine mesure, As I have already said, Egypt became an independent State in 1922 by the unilateral declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom, which under the Protectorate had succeeded Turkey as sovereign of Egypt. Under this declaration, however, the United Kingdom reserved to itself certain rights, preserving the status quo in regard to these matters, with the intention that at some future date these reserved points should be liquidated and replaced by a treaty between the United Kingdom and Egypt. These reserved points constituted a certain limitation on the full The provisions of the Treaty of 1936 fall into four categories. All of the reserved points were liquidated by agreement in the Treaty of 1936, and all restrictions on the full sl)vereignty of Egypt were removed. To the first category of provisions belong articles 1, 2, 3 and 12. Article 1 provided for the termination of the military occupation of Egypt. The position of the limited number of United Kingdom forces allowed on Egyptian territory after 1936 was completely different from that of the United Kingdom forces in Egypt before that date. Mter 1936, these forces had one function only, namely, defence against external aggression. Article 2 provided for mutual diplomatic representation by ambassadors - previously, the United Kingdom representative in Egypt had been a High Commissioner, not a diplomatic envoy accredited to the King of Egypt. Article 3 provided for United Kingdom support for Egypt's membership in the League of Nations, election to which was restricted to fully self-governing States. Under article 12, the full responsibility for safeguarding the lives and property of foreigners in Egypt passed from the United Kingdom to the Egyptian Government, thus liquidating the third of the reserved points. I take it that the Egyptian Government cannot be basing its case on the ground that these articles have outlived their m~fulness simply because they have been fully and faithfully exeruted by the Government of the United Kingdom. The second catego:y of provi ·.ons tah.es in article 13 of the Treaty and its annex. These were the provisions under which the United Kingdom undertook to assist Egypt in getting rid of the Capitulations System, a system which Egypt felt was an obstacle to good administration as well as a fetter on its exercise of the normal rights of an independent State. Tl-.is provision also has been fully executed. A most successful conference of all the Powers was held at Montreux in 1937,1 and it might be thought that La seconde categorie de dispositions comprend l'article 13 du Traite et son annexe. Ce sont les dispositions aux termes desquel1es le Royaume- Dni s'engage a aider l'Egypte a s'affranchir du Systeme des Capitulations, qu'elle considerait comme un obsta.cle a une bonne administration et comme une entrave a l'exercice des droits normaux d'un Etat independant. Cette disposition egalement a ete integralement appliquee. Une Conference qui a connu un granJ succes s'est tenue a Montreux en 19371, et on aurait 18~9 0"1 the Khedive, when he was still a tributary of the Ottoman Sultan. In v.iew of article 11 of the Treaty of 1936, of what relevance would it be if, to quote the words of the Egyptian letter of 8 July, "the unwarranted occupation of Egypt by United Kingdom troops in 1882 and, as a consequence, their occupation of the southern part of the Nile valley, the Sudan, have enabled the Government of the United Kingdom,. since 1899, to force upon Egypt its partnership in the administration of the Sudan ..."? It would not be relevant even if this account of events in 1882 and 1899 were true. Egypt, as an independent State, freely agreed in 1936 to the continuance of this system of administration in the Sudan. Mais cette version des evenements n'est pas l'image de la realite. L'Accord de Condominium de 1899 a ete signe apres que le Soudan, perdu pour l'Egypte depuis un certain nombre d'annees, a la suite d'une revolte couronnee de succes contre la mauvaise administration et l'oppression egyptiennes, eut ete reconquis par une expedition commandee par Lord Kitchener; les forces du Royaume-Uni formaient une partie importante de cette expedition, et leurs pertes, en fait, depasserent celles des forces egyptiennes. Sans cette aide, l'Egypte n'aurait jamais recouvre le Soudan. However, this account does not give a true picture. The Condominium Agreement of 1899 was concluded after the Sudan, which had been lost to Egypt for a number of years as the result of a successful revolt against Egyptian misrule and oppression, had been reconquered by a military expedition under Lord Kitchener, of which United Kingdom forces formed an important part and in which, in fact, the United Kingdom casualties exceeded those of the Egyptian forces. Without this aid, the Sudan would never have been regained by Egypt. De plus, je ne puis accepter qu'on quaIifie l'occupation de l'Egypte en 1882 d' "injustifiee". Si l'on prend ce terme dans un sens politique ou moral, je repondrai que ces forces"pu Royaume- Uni ont debarque a la suite de massacres de chretiens et d'Europeens, qui s'etaient produits en Egypte au moment ou tout le systeme de gouvernement et d'administration du pays s'etait effondre a la suite d'une r.svolte militaire dirigee contre le Khedive et vena,nt apres des iannees de corruption et d'incompetence administratives. Moreover, I cannot accept the description of the occupation of Egypt in 1882 as "unwarranted". If "unwarranted" is used in a political or moral sense, I answer that these United Kingdom forces landed after there had been massacres of Christians and Europea'1s in Egypt, when the whole system of government and administration of that country had broken down as a result of a military revolt against the Khedive, following years of administrative corruption and incompetence. It was during this occupation of Egypt that all those reforms were introduced which have made the present prosperity and even the independence of Egypt possible. It was during this period, and under United Kingdom guidance, that, for the first time in modem I \story, Egypt C'est durant cette occupation de l'Egypte qu'ant ete introduites toutes les reforrnes qui ant rendu possibles la prosperite actuelle et meme l'independance de l'Egypte. C'est durant cette periode, sous la tutelle du Royaume-Uni que, pour la premiere fois dans l'histoire moderne, 1 See British and Foreign State Pap~. ~7olume 91, 1898-1899, pa~e 19. I Voir British and Foreign State Papers, Volume 91, 1898-1899, page 19. On what ground can it be said that these provisions of article 11 of the Treaty of 1936, continuing the system of administration for the Sudan created by the Condominium Agreement of 1899 and adding thereto certain further provisions, have lost their usefulness, or that circumstances have so vitally changed since 1936? The best evidence that there is no such ground is to be found in the provisions of the Sudan Protocol, initialed by Sidky Pasha and Mr. Bevin in October 1946 and approved by the Egyptian Government and Chamber shortly thereafter. This Protocol again continued the present administrative system, and it was not on this account that the initialed texts were subsequently rejected by Egypt. All that was found in 1946 to be required by way of addition to the Treaty of 1936 was a further definition of the objectives which the High Contracting Pan;es would pursue under this administration: namely, the wellbeing and the development of the interests of the Sudanese, their preparation for self-government, and their ultimate choice of the future status of their territory - and here I repeat that it was only a difference of view as regards the scope of t~at ultimate choice which caused the rejection of the texts. There is no ground, therefore, for saying that these provisions have outlived their usefulness, or for the application of the rebus sic stantibus doctrine. These very provisions were to be continued by the texts negotiated last year, in 1946. They include a pr~vision for the stationing of both United Kingdom and Egyptian forces in the Sudan; and I observe that it is now one of Egypt's claims that United Kingdom forces should be removed from the Sudan, although, on 1 December 1946, His Majesty's Government was informed by the Egyptian Government that the latter was ready to sign a treaty maintaining this provision in force. Members of the Council will no doubt. be aware that during the Second World War United Kingdom and Indian forces in the Sudan played an important part in resistance to the Axis. These forces, with the gallant aid of the Sudan Defence Force, first prevented the invasion of Egypt from the south, and later combined with United Kingdom and South African forces from East Africa and other Allied ~ultan ottoman - souverain en titre de l'Egypte - qui, par la Convention de 1885, les a autorisees a demeurer sur pla·ce. Sur quoi peut-0n se fonder pour dire que les dispositions de l'article 11 du Traite de 1936, prevoyant le maintien du systeme d'administration du Soudan qu'avait cree I'Accord de Condominium de 1889, et ajoutant a ce systeme certaines dispositions complementaires, ont perdu leur utilite, ou que les conditions ont si radicalement change depuis 1936? La meilleure preuve qu'une assertion de ce genre ne repose sur rien reside dans les dispositions du protocole sur le Soudan, paraphe en octobre 1946 par Sidky Pacha et M. Bevin, et approuve peu apres par le Gouvernement et la Chambre 'd'Egypte. Ce protocole, lui aussi, prevoyait le maintien du regime administratif existant, et ce n'est pas pour cette raison que les textes paraphes ont ete ensuite rejetes par l'Egypte. Tout ce qu'on a juge necessaire d'ajouter, en 1946, au Traite de 1936, c'est une definition complementaire des buts que les Hautes Parties contractantes poursuivraient par cette administration, a savoir assurer le bien-etre et favoriser les interets des Soudanais, les prepareI' a l'autonomie et leur assurer le choLx final du statut futur de leur territoire; et, je le repet.e encore, c'est seulement une divergence de vues quant a la portee de ce choix final qui est la cause du rejet de ces textes. 11 n'y a donc pas lieu de pretendre que ces dispositions n'ont plus de raison d'etre et qu'on doit appliquer la doctrine rebus sic stantibus. Ces dispositions memes devaient etre maintenues par les textes negocies en 1946. Ceux-ci contiennent une clause relative an stationnement au Soudan de troupes du Royaume-Uni et de l'Egypte. Et je vois que maintenant l'Egypte demande, dans l'une de ses revendications, que les forces du Royaume-Uni soient retirees du Soudan, bien que, le 1er decembre 1946, le Gouvernement egyptien ait informe le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni qu'il etait pret a signer un traite maint-enant cette clause en vigueur. Les membres du Conseil sont certainement au courant de la part importante que les forces du Royaume-Uni et de l'Inde ont prise au Soudan dans la resistance a l'Axe, pendant la deuxieme guerre mondiale. Ces forces ont d'abord, avec l'aide des heroiques troupes du Groupe de defense soudanais, empeche l'invasion de l'Egypte par le sud; elles se sont ensuite jointes aux forces I take this opportunity to deny absolutely the allegation in the Egyptian letter of 8 July that my Government "have adopted a policy designed to sever the Sudan from Egypt; discrediting Egypt and the Egyptians; creating discord between them and the Sudanese ... instigating and encouraging artificial separatist movements". On the contrary, the Government of the Sudan has preserved the most complete impartiality. Indeed, far from having shown an anti-Egyptian bias, it has on occasion actually prosecuted Sudanese for manifestations hostile to Egypt and has done so in spite of agitation fostered against it by Egypt. The Government of the United Kingdom has never sought to influence the Gcwernment of the Sudan to pursue any policy other than one <Of impartiality. There remains therefore only the last class of provisions, which are the alliance provisions to be found in articles 4,5,6, 7 and 8 of the Treaty. Article 4 creates an alliance bet", ..:en the contracting parties. Article 5 contains the provision that neither party shall adopt an attitude or conclude treaties inconsistent with this alliance. Article 6 contains a provision for consultation in case either party becomes involved in dangerous disputes with third States, with a view to settlement of the dispute in accordance with the Covenant of the League, which was then in force. Article 7 provides for the giving of aid by one party to the other, if either party becomes engaged in war, and further provides for the aid to be given in case of a threat of war or fear of international emergency. All these provisions were made expressly subject to the Covenant of the League of Nations, in accordance with article 10 of the Treaty. The aid which Egypt was to give was to consist of facilities on Egyptian territory for United Kingdom forces. Then follows article 8 with its long annex, which provides for the stationing in time of peace of a limited number of United Kingdom military and air forces in the region of the Suez Canal "with a view to ensuring in co-operation with the Egyptian forces the defence of the Canal" - a provision which, by its own terms, operates for twenty years and is then Jpen for reconsideration. These articles liquidated by agreement the remaining two points reserved in 1922. The usefulness of those provISlons to Egypt, as well as to the United Kingdom and indeed to all the Allied Powers during the'Second World War, was beyond computation. It is difficult to believe that any treaty provisions have proved more valuable in the interests of civilization and freedom. The framers of the Treaty of 1936 correctly saw that Egypt was so geographically situated that in any world war it was likely to be Je profite de.l'occasion pour m'inscrire deliberement en faux contre les allegations contenl.!-es dans la lettre de l'Egypte en date du 8 juillet et selon lesquelles mon Gouvernement aurait "adopte une politique destinee a separer le Soudan de l'Egypte, a discrediter l'Egypte et les Egyptiens, a semer la discorde entre ceux-ci et les Soudanais ..., asusciter et a encourager des mouvements separatistes artificiels". Au contraire, le Gouvernement du Soudan a conserve l'impartialite la plus complete. En fait, bien loin de faire preuve de tendances antiegyptiennes, il a, lorsque le cas s'est presente, effectivement poursuivi les Soudanais qui se livraient a des manifestations hostiles a l'Egypte, en depit de l'agitation que l'Egypte suscitait contre lui. Le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni n'a jamais cherche a pousser le Gouvernement soudanais a une politique autre que celle de l'impartialite. Reste done seulement la derniere categorie de dispositions, concernant l'alliance, qui figurent aux articles 4, 5, 6, 7 et 8 du Traite. L'article 4 etablit une alliance entre les parties contractantes. L'article 5 renferme une disposition suivant laquelle aucune des parties n'adoptera une attitude ou ne conclura de traites incompatibles avec cette alliance. L'article 6 prevoit des consultations, au cas 01\ l'une ou l'autre des parties se trouverait impliquee dans des differends dangereux avec des Etats tiers, en vue du reglement du differend conformement au Pacte, de la Societe des Nations, alors en vigueur. L'article 7 porte qu'une des parties apportera son aide a l'autre si celle-ci se trouve engagee clans une guerre et prevoit en outre l'aide a fournir en cas de menace de guerre ou de crainte d'une crise internationale. Toutes ces dispositions etaient, aux termes de l'article 10 du Traite, placees sous la reserve expresse des stipulations du Pacte de la Societe des Nation.s. L'aide afournir par l'Egypte devait consister en certaines facilites accordees aux forces du Royaume-Uni sur le territoire egyptien. Puis vient l'article 8 et sa longue annexe, qui prevoient le stationnement, en temps de paix, d'effectifs limites des forces terrestres et aeriennes du .Royaume-Uni dans la region du canal de Suez "afin d'assurer la defense du canal, avec la collaboration des forces egyptiennes"; disposition qui, selon les propres termes de l'article, etait applicable pendant vingt ans et serait alors sujette a revision. Ces articles reglaient par accord les deux dernihes questions qui avaiel1t ete reservees en 1922. L'utilite qu'ont eue cp~ dispositions, au caurs de la deuxieme guerre mULldiale, pour l'Egypte comme pour le Royaume-Uni, et, en verite, pour toutes les Puissances alliees, a ete incalculable. 11 est difficile de trouver des dispositions de traite qui se soient averees plus precieuses aux interets de la civilisation et de la liberte. Les auteurs du Traite de 1936 avaient prevu avec justesse que, dans toute guerre mondiale, l'Egypte, de par I repeat that, without these treaty provisions and these forces, it is questionable whether victory would have been achieved or the United Nations ever created. In virtue of these provisions, Egypt's territory was defended by United Kingd.om forces. The Axis forces never reached the fertile regions of the Nile valley. Egypt indeed provided the.facilities which the Treaty required, although it did not declare war until March 1945. But, as the result of these provisions, Egypt emerged from the war a richer country and almost entirely unscathed. Have these proVISIons, which had such a glorious fulfilment within four or five years of their conclusion, now lost their utility, and if so why? It is clear that the Charter does not consider that provisions for mutual assistance may be no longer useful. Otherwise Article 51, providing for collective self-defence, and Article 52 for regional security arrangements, would not have been inserted. It is clear, moreover, that it is not yet considered by many Powers that the Charter and the security arrangements thereunder have rendered treaties of alliance unnecessary, for otherwise the Treaty of Dunkirk between the United Kingdom and France would not have been concluded. The Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would have been scrapped instead of being made the subject of negotiations for reYision. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would not have concluded treaties of alliance with some of its western neighbours and with France. For reasons very similar to those which dictated the continuance or conclusion of the treaties to which I have just referred, my Government for .:~ i-'lrt does in fact regard as necessary in the present circumstances the continuance of mutual defence arrangements designed to safeguard the security of the Middle East area. Moreover, since the question is a legal one, it must be stated that the extent to which treaties can be held to be invalid on rebus sic stantibus grounds, otherwise than by agreement between the parties thelllSelves, is certainly very limited a, well as being controversial. There is no decision of an international tribunal where this The argument against the Treaty of 1936 on rebus sic stantibus lines would seem to have no legal foundation whatsoever. True, certain of its provisions have been fully executed and therefore leave nothing outstanding. They represent the fulfilment of certain Egyptian national aspirations. It was contemplated that they should be realized long before the other provisions became subject to reconsideration. I hope that I have shown that the other provisions, those relating to the Sudan and the Alliance, are untouched and untouchable by any argument on rebus sic stantibus lines. We turn therefore to the second Egyptian argument, in which it is claimed that the Treaty of 1936 is inconsistent with the Charte;, and in order to appreciate it, I have recourse to the first paragraph of the Egyptian letter of 8 July, which reads in part as follows: "The presence of foreign troops within the territory of a Member of the United Nations, L.'1 time of peace and without its free consent, constitutes an offence to its dignity, a hindrance to its normal development, as well as an infringement of the fundamental principle of sovereign equality, and is therefore contrary to the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter under the resolution adopted unanimously by the General Assembly on 14 December 1946."1 That passage I have just read from the Egyptian letter of 8 July makes reference to two provisions which must be considered. The first, the reference to the principle of sovereign equality, is clearly a reference to Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Charter, which says: "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members." The second reference is to the resolution of December last, of which the relevant words run: "The General Assembly, ... Recommends the Members to undertake ... the withdrawal without delay of their armed forces stationed in the territories of Members without their consent freely and publicly expressed in treaties or agreements consistent with the Charter and not contradicting international agreements." The very .words of that resolution to which the Egyptian. letter refers show, if it were necessary to demonstrate such an obvious proposition, that the mere fact that a treaty provides for the stationing of forces of one Member in the territory of another in peacetime does not necessarily make that treaty inconsistent with the Charter or with the principle of equality. It further shows that a treaty is pre-eminently Dans ce passage de la lettre de l'Egypte en date du 8 juillet que je viens de lire, il est fait reference adeux dispositions qu'il nous faut . examiner. La premiere reference, au principe de l'egale souverainete, nous reporte tres clairement al'Article 2, paragraphe premier, de la Charte qui dit: "L'Organisation est fondee sur le principe de l'egalite souveraine de tous ses Membres". La seconde a trait ala resolution de decembre dernier dont void le passage qui nous interesse id: "DAssembLee generale . . . Recommande. aux Etats Membres de proceder . . . sans delai au retrait de leurs forces stationnees dans de~ territoires des Etats Membres sans le consentement de ceux-ci, librement et publiquement exprime dans des traites ou accords compatibles avec la Charte et ne contredisant pas des accords internationaux." Les termes memes de la resolution alaquelle la lettre egyptienne se refere prouve s'il est vraiment necessaire de demo~;.i:rer lme proposition aussi evidente que le simple fait qu'un traite prevoie le stationnement en temps de paix de forces armees d'un Membre sur le territoire d'un autre, ne rend pas necessairement ledit traite incompatible L'argument que 1'on tire de la doctrine rebus sic stantibus contre le Traite de 1936 semble done mal fonde juridiquement. Ilest exact que certaines des dispositions du Traite ont re~u pleine execution et ne 1<'1.lssent, par consequent, rien en suspenso Elles representent la realisation de certaines aspirations nationales p~ptiennes. Jl etait envisage que ces clauses devaient etre mises aexecution bien avant que les autres dispositions du Traite ne devinssent sujettes arevision. J'espere avoir montre que les autres dispositions, relatives au Soudan et a- 1'alliance, ne sont et ne peuvent etre affectees par aucune argumentation fondee sur la doctrine rebus sic stantibus. . Passons maintenant au second argument de la delegation egyptienne, d'apres lequel le Traite de 1936 ser'ait incompatible avec la Charte. Afin de bien peser ledit argument, je me reporterai au premier paragraphe de la lettre egyptienne en date du 8 juillet qui dit en particulier ceci: "La presence de troupes etrangeres sur le territoire d'un Etat Membre de 1'Organisation des Nations Unies en temps de paix et sans le libre consentement de cet Etat, constitue une atteinte asa dignite, un obstacle ason developpement normal, ainsi qu'une violation du principe de 1'egale souverainete. Aussi est-elle contraire ala lettre et a l'esprit de la Charte des Nations Unies et ala resolution adoptee unanimement par 1'AssembIee generale le 14 decembre 19461." Prima facie, therefore, the resolution would appear almost by itself to refute the Egyptian argument. Was the Egyptian consent to the provisions of article 8 of the Treaty of 1936 not freely and publicly given? Nothing could have been more public. Is it alleged that it was not . free? In the period from 1922 onwards, Egypt had exercised the greatest freedom in rejecting proposals for treaties of alliance. A whole series of unsuccessful negotiations is there to attest this. Was Egypt less free in 1936 than it had been in 1924, 1927, 1929, or 1930 when proposals for a treaty were rejected? Was Nokrashy Pasha, who, with twelve other Egyptian signatories representing virtually every party in Egypt, signed this Treaty of 1936, less free than was Nahas Pasha in 1930, or Sarwat Pasha in 1927, or Mohammed Mahmoud Pasha in 1929? The Treaty was submitted to ratification, and was passed almost unanimously, by 203 votes to 11, through the Egyptian Parliament. Here are one or two of the things which were ~aid about it by prominent Egyptian statesmen when it was before the Egyptian Parliament: The then Prime Minister of Egypt, in introducing it to the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies, said: "The last conversations have succeeded because the British point of view was not incompatible with independence and did not infringe any of Egypt's rights ..." Again: "Good will and sincere intentions have largely helped in the reaching of this agreement, which realizes the nation's hopes, safegu.ards the interests of,Great Britain, and strengthens our relations on a free and honourable basis of friendship, equality and alliance ..." And again: "This alliance, gentlemen, has been concluded on a footing of real equality. It is a piece of good fortune for Egypt to CGnclude an alliance with this Power which is strong on land, on sea, and in the air and which enjoys a considerable international influence. In order that the equality between two allies should be effective, it must be in proportion to the strength of each of the two States. And that is the spirit of the Treaty ..." And again: "The continuation of assistance is in the interest of the two contracting parties and is to their advantage. You know, gentlemen, that all the Powers, both great and small, have recourse to the system of alliances; they do not rely solely, for their defence, upon their own strength, but also upon that of allied countries. It is therefore in Egypt's interest that it should always have a strong Power to which it is allied on a footing of real equality, just as it is in Great Britain's interest that Egypt should afford its support in case of need and that the Treaty Et, plus loin: "La bonne volonte et la sincerite des intentions ont largement facilite la conclusion de cet. accord, qui realise les espoirs de la nation, sauvegarde les interets de la Grande- Bretagne et renforce nos relations avec ce pays, relations etablies librement sur une base honorable d'amitie, d'egalite et d'alliance ..." Plus loin encore: "Cette alliance, Messieurs, a ete reellement conclue sur un pied d'egalite absolue. C'est la bonne fortune de l'Egypte que d'avoir pu conclure une alliance avec cette Puis~ sance, qui est forte sur terre, sur mer et dans les airs, et qui exerce une influence considerable dans le domaine international. Afin que l'egalite entre les deux allies soit effective, elle doit tenir compte de la force de chacun des deux Etats. Voila l'esprit du Traite ..." Et, encore plus loin: "Le maintien de l'assistance repond aux interets des deux parties contractantes, et est aleur avantage. Vous savez, Messieurs, que toutes les Puissances, grandes ou petites, ont recours au systeme des alliances; qu'elles ne confient pas leur defense uniquement a leurs propres forces, mais aussi a celles de leurs allies. 11 est done de l'interet de l'Egypte d'avoir toujours une grande Puissance comme aJ.liee, sur un pied de parfaite egalite, tout comme il est de l'interet de la Grande-Bretagne que l'Egypte puisse lui apporter son soutien en cas The then Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs said: "This Treaty constitutes without any doubt a clear rectification of Egypt's international situation from both the legal and the practical point of view. This Treaty makes Egypt's independence real, and enables it to advance with firmness and wisdom towards its glorious future." Le Rapporteur de la Commission des Affaires etrangeres a la Chambre egyptienne a declare, de son cote: "Il n'y a aucun doute que ce Traite assure a l'Egypte sa souverainete et son independance... The Rapporteur of the Egyptian 'Foreign Affairs Commission said: "There is no doubt but that the Treaty assures to Egypt its sovereignty and its independence . . . "The present Treaty settles all the points which were the subject of disagreement. It liquidates all those questions which were in suspense between Egypt and Great Britain, including the question of the Sudan. It inaugurates an era of friendship and alliance ~etween us and Great Britain as between two independent States, an era of friendship and alliance which liquidates a past of misunderstandings and troubles, of antagonisms and struggles . . . "Le present Traite regIe tous les points qui ont fait l'objet de desaccords, toutes les questions qui etaient pendantes entre l'Egypte et la Grande- Bretagne, notamment la question du Soudan. Il inaugure une ere d'amitie et d'alliance entre la Grande-Bretagne et nous, comme entre deux Etats independants, une ere d'amitie et d'alliance qui met fin a un passe de malentendus et de troubles, d'antagonismes et de luttes ... "La Commission salue la conclusion cl'un traite d'amitie entre l'Egypte et la Grande- Bretagne. Elle considere qu'une alliance entre ces deux nations est necessaire et utile pour la protection des interets des deux pays, et qu'eIle constitue un facteur de grande valeur du maintien de la paix mondiale..." "The Commission welcomes the conclusion of a treaty of friendship between Egypt and Great Britain. It considers that an alliance between the two nations is necessary and useful for protecting the interests of the two countries, and that it constitutes a factor which is of value for the safeguarding of world peace ..." Et Mohammed Mahmoud Pacha, ancien Premier Ministre, de declarer: "Le comm"un' interct des deux pays est de maintenir la paix du monde, en se defendant reciproquement contre toute agression et en renfon:;ant les liens qui les unissent." Mohammed Mahmoud Pasha, a former Prime Minister, said: "... the two countries have, in fact, a common interest in safeguarding the peace of the world, in their reciprocal defence against all aggressidh, and in strengthening the relations which bind them together." Et Ismai:I Sidky Pacha de dire: "En mon nom et en ma qualite de reprefentant d'un des partis politiques, j'approuve ce Traite, a la negociation et a la signature duqud j'ai eu l'honneur de participer." Ismail Sidky Pasha said: "Both personally and as the representative of one of the political parties, I approve of this Treaty, in the negotiation and signature of which I have had the honour to participate." Ces declarations fartes a l'epoque, auxquelles je pourrais ajouter maintes autres declarations aussi enthousiastes, on pourrait les rapprocher du passage de la lettre de l'Egypte en date du 8 juillet, seIon lequel la presence de troupes du Royaume-Uni en Egypte constituerait une atteinte a la dignite de cet Etat, un obstacle a son developpement normal et une violation des principes fondamentaux de la souverainete. Il est difficile d'imaginer qu'un traite puisse ctre accepte avec plus de liberte et plus d'unanimite que l'a ete celui de 1936 par l'Egypte. Comme je l'ai 'montre, l'Egypte, par ce Traite, a realise bon nombre de ses buts, notamment la fin du regime des Capitulations. EUe a obtenu des dispositions qui la prot<'::geaient d'un dan.ger que tous alors n'avaient que trop de raison de redouter. Pour quels motifs, apres avoir retire de ce These contemporary statements, to which I might add many others equally enthusiastic, may be compared with the passage in the Egyptian Government's letter of 8 July alleging that the presence of United Kingdom troops in Egypt constitutes an offence to its dignity, a hindrance to its normal development, and an infringement of the fundamental principles of sovereignty. It is difficult to believe that any treaty could have been more freely or unanimously acceptGd than the Treaty of 1936 was accepted by Egypt. As I have shown, Egypt by that Treaty achieved the fulfilment of a number of its aims, including the ending of the Capitulations. Egypt obtained provisions which protected it against a national danger then all too rightly apprehended. Under what doctrine can Egypt, having obtained so many and such great benefits from this Treaty, The resolution of December last shows that there is no infringement of the principle of sovereign equality in the fact that one State, by virtue of a treaty, stations forces in the territory of another in peacetime. Moreover there are many examples of similar treaties in force today, each with periods of duration longer than that of the Treaty of 1936, which provide for such a stationing of troops. Under an agreement of 1941, the United States enjoys the right to station forces in a number of bases on British territory, and has this right for a period of ninety-nine years. There is another treaty, concluded in 1903 with the Republic of Panama and amended in 1939, by which the United States possesses the right, not merely for a period of years but in perpetuity, to control a zone ten miles in width within the territory of the Panamanian Republic. Under °a treaty of 1947 with the Philippine Republic, the United States Government enjoys for ninety-nine years a lease of five major bases and ten auxiliary and training establishments in the Philippines. By a treaty of August 1945 with China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics acquired the right to maintain military, naval, and air forces in Port Arthur for a period of thirty years. These examples are not exhaustive. For that matter, there is also an agreement recently signed between the United Kingdom and Belgium under which a small number of United Kingdom troops will be maintained on Belgian territory for the purpose of communication with the United Kingdom zone in Germany. I submit that it is clear from the reasons which I have given that there are no grounds on which it can be held that the Treaty of 1936 is invalid. Further, I think I have shown that articles 8 and 11 of this Treaty afford a complete answer to both the claims made by the Egyptian Government. As it is one of the fundamental principles of the Charter that disputes are to be settled in accordance with the principles of international law and justice, and as the rule pacta sunt servanda is a primary principle of international law, I submit that the Security Council must dismiss the claim brought against my Government by the Egyptian Government. When once any possible misunderstanding about the validity of the 1936 Treaty has been dissipated, I hope that the Egyptian Government will loyally recognize its obli;:;ations thereunder, bearing in mind that the fulfilment of inter- La resolution de decembre dernier montre que le fait, pour un Etat, d'entretenir en temps de paix des troupes sur le territoire d'un autre, en vertu d'un traite, ne porte pas atteinte au principe de l'egalite de souverainete. De plus, il y a nombre d'exemples de traites analogues, actuellement en vigueur, etablis pour des durees plus longues que celle qui a ete assignee au Traite de 1936, et qui prevoient aussi le stationnement de troupes etrangeres. Aux termes d'un accord signe en 194:1, les Etats-Unis ont le droit d:entretenir des troupes en territoire britannique, dans un certain nombre de bases, pour une periode de quatre-vingt dix-neuf ans. Un autre traite, conclu en 1903 avec la Republique de Panama et modifie en 1939, donne aux Etats-Unis le droit d'exercer leur autorite, non pour une periode determinee, mais a perpetuite, sur une zone large de dix milles situee sur le territoire de la Republique de Panama. Aux termes cl'un traite conclu en 1947 avec la Republique des Philippines, le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis detient a bail, pour une duree de quatre-vingt dix-neuf ans, cinq bases essentielles, dix bases auxiliaires et des centres d'instruction aux Philippines. Par un traite conclu avec la Chine en 194c5, I'Union des Republiques sodalistes sovietiques a acquis le droit de maintenir a Port-Arthm" des forces militaires, navales et aerierines pour une periode de trente ans. Ma liste d'exemples n'est pas epuisee. Je pourrais encore citer un accord signe recemment entre le Royaume-Uni et la Belg\que, qui "onne au Royaume-Uni le droit d'entretenir en 3elgique des forces a faible effectif pour assurer ses communications avec la zone britannique d'occupation en Allemagne. Pour toutes les raisons que je viens de VollS donner, je soutiens que l'on ne peut abon droit nier la validite du Traite de 1936. De plus, je crois avoir demontre que les articles 8 et 11 dudit Traite fournissent une reponse decisive aux deux tevendications presentees'par le Gouvernement Ic;gyptien. Etant donne que l'un des principes fondamentaux de la Charte est que les differends doivent etre regIes conformement aux principes du droit international et de la justice, et eta,:.i. donne, d'autre part, que la regIe pacta sunt 0 _ servanda est un principe fondamental du droit international, je propose au Conseil de securite 'de rejeter la revendication presentee par l'Egypte contre mon Gouvernement. Une fois dissipe tout malentendu possible au sujet de la validite du Traite de 1936, j'espere que le Gouvernement egyptien, ayant conscience que le respect des obligations internationales est un des elements fondamentaux de l'egalite de Egypt alleges in the first· sentence of its letter to the Secretary-General that the people of Egypt desire the removal of United Kingdom troops from its territory. This mayor may not be true, but if it is true, it can avail nothing. To take another example ~hich I have already mentioned, the United Kingdom has leased bases to the United States for ninet;-nin'e years under an agreement concluded in wartime which may have been useful for purposes of mutual defence. Could the United Kingdom, now that the. war is over and the immediate danger past, CC1me to the Security Council and say that, circumstances having changed, and the agreement having been accepted by the United Kingdom as a temporary expedient, the people of the United Kingdom and of the territories where the bases are situated unanimously desire and demand the removal of the United States forces from these places? I think not; and yet the cases are exactly parallel. Under the Treaty of 1936, Egypt realized certain of her long-cherished ambitions, and was also protected, in the greatest conflict <;>f history, from the Axis, emerging almost unscathed. If a party to a treaty feels that some evolution of popular feeling or some other event makes some modification of a treaty desirable from its point of view, this is a matter for negotiation by agreement between the parties. It is not a matter which can fittingly be brought before the Secur- , ity Council. As the Council is now aware, the Government of the United Kingdom met the Egyptian request for a revision of the Treaty in the most sympathetic manner and the negotiations led to the drawing up of new instruments. These instruments failed to come into force for only one reason, namely, that Egypt was not prepared to accord in the future to the Sudanese people the right of self-determination which it had claimed for Arabs elsewhere and which it was able to exercise thanks to the United Kingdom. On that issue, His Majesty's Government feels obliged to maintain its policy, which is the only one which it conceives to be consistent with its own national record, with the principles of the Charter and with the interests of the Sudanese. In conclusion, I think I have shown, first, that there is no doubt as to the validity of the Treaty of 1936. It is, indeed, simply a le~al ques- Pour reprendre un autre exemple que j'ai deja cite: le Royaume-Uni, aux termes d'un accord conclu en temps de guerre et qui pouvait etre utile pour la defense commune, a cede a bail aux Etats-Unis un certain nombre de bases, pour quatre-vingt dix-neuf ans. Le Royaume-Uni pourrait-il, maintenant que la guerre est finie et le danger immediat passe, venir devant le Conseil de seeurite declarer que, les circonstances ayant change et le Royaume-Uni n'ayant accepte ce traite qu'a titre d'expedient temporaire, le peuple du Royaume-Uni et ceIui des territoires sur lesquels se trouvent ces bases sont unanimes a desirer le retrait des forces des Etats-Unis? Je ne le crois pas; et cependant, les deux cas sont absolument identiques. Le Traite de 1936 a permis a l'Egypte de realiser des ambitions longuement caressees et d'etre protegee contre l'Axe dans le plus gFand conflit de l'histoire, dont dIe est sortie presque indemne. Si une partie a un traite estime que l'evolution du sentiment populaire ou quelque autre evenement rend, de son point de vue, une modification du traite desirable, c'est la, pour les parties, une matiere a negociations en vue d'arriver a un accord. Ce n'est pas une matiere qu'il convienne de porter devant le Conseil de securite. Comme le Conseille sait, le Gouvernement du Royaume- Uni a accueilli tres favorablement les demandes de revision presentees par l'Egypte et les negociations ont abouti a la redaction d'un nouve! instrument diplomatique. Si ce dernier n'est pas entre en vigueur, c'est pour l'unique raison que l'Egypte n'etait pas disposee a reconnaitre ulterieurement au peuple soudanais le dioit de disposer de lui-meme, droit qu'elle a revendique, d'a~tre part, pour les Arabes et qu'elle peut exercer elle-meme grace au Royaume-Uni. Sur ce point, le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste se sent tenu de poursuivre la seule politique qui soit compatible avec ses prowes traditions national~'), avec les principes de la Charte et avec les int6'ets du peuple soudanais. Pour conclure, j'estime qu'il ne peut y avoir aucun doute quant a la validite du Traite de 1936. Il y a la uniquement une question juridique I. ]':1 I till1 I apologize for having detained the Council Je m'excuse d'avoir si longtemps retenu l'attenso long a time, but I felt it due to the Council tion dn Conseil, mais j'estimais que je devais au for me to give as 90mplete a reply as I could to Conseil de donner une reponse aussi complete the case as presented by the Egyptian delegation que possible a l'action entreprise par la delegain its letter of 8 July 1947 to the Secretarytion egyptienne dans sa lettre au Secretaire General. , general, en date du 8 juillet 1947.

I believe that the points of Le PRESIDENT: Je crois que les points de vue view of both parties to this controversy have des deux parties a la controverse qui nOilS occupe now been sufficiently explained to the members ont ete suffisamment exposes aux membres du of the Security Council. As various documents Conseil de securite. Comme, d'autre part, nous have been presented, I think it would be advisable avons ete saisis de differents documents, je crois at this time to discontinue the discussion of this que nous pourrions laisser la pour aujourd'hui matter in order to give both parties a chance to la discussion de cette question, afin de permettre study their respective points of view, so that they a chaque partie d'-Studier le point de vue de may prepare for further amplification of their l'autre et de pouvoir ainsi developper ulterieurecontentions. ment sa these. Consideration of the Anglo-Egyptian question will be' renewed at the meeting of the Council . which is scheduled for Monday, 11 August 1947, at 3 p.m.