S/PV.178 Security Council

The only point in the Australian representative's statement which concerns the adoptiLl of the agenda is the last one, namely, the re~erence to the application made by the repre- . sentatlve of the Philit)pines. J:here are certain documents which must be taken into consideration when we come to, the Indonesian question; among them is the telegram from the Philippine representative asking to participate in the discussion of the Security Council. That will be the first puint to be discussed when we come to that question. As for the other points, measures will be taken when we come to the third item on the agenda. namely, the Greek question. 284. Letter dated 26 July 1947 from the President and Vice-President of the Council of Ministers of Bulgaria ad- dressed to the Secretary-General The PRESID~NT: The members of the Council have this application before them; it is not neces- sary that it should be read aloud. According to rule 59 of the provisioaal rules of procedure of the Security CDuncil, the pro- cedure to follow, unless the Security Council de- cides otherwise, is for the President to refer this application to the Committee on the Admission of" New Members. If there is no objection to that procedure, I shall rule to that effect, referring it without discussion. cial, qui ne presentera pas son rapport avant le 11 aout, je crois que nous ne pourrons pas poursuivre tres loin l'examen de la question grecque cet apres-midi, it moins qu'il n'y ait d'au- tres orateurs inscrits. Afin de donner au Conseil l'occasion de dis- cuter de la question d'lndonesie aujourd'hui, je voudrais demander au President, s'il lui serait possible d'etablir l'horaire de notre seance de fa~on que nous puissions, eet apres-midi, discuter au moins le point 4. A propos de ce point 4, je ferai d'ailleurs re- marquer qu'il existe une communication du repre- sentant des Philippines portant la cote Sj458, et qu'elle n'est pas indiquee a. l'ordre du jour. ] e propose que nous ne negligions pas cette com- munication et que nous donnions ainsi au repre- sentant des Philippines la possibilite de participer a. toute discussion qui pourrait avoir heu an sujet du point 4. Le PRESIDltNT (tradu.it de l'any'lais): Seule, la derniere des observations faites par le repre- sentant de I'Australie, au sujet de la demande presentee par le representant des Philippines, a trait cl. l'adoption de l'ordre uu jour. II existe certains documentE que nous etudierons lorsque nous en arriverons a la question indonesienne, et parmi eux iigure le telegramme emanant du re- presentant des Philippines, par lequel il demande a. participer a la discussion du Conseil de securite. C'est ce telegramme que 110US examinerons en premier lieu lorsque nous aborderons le pro- bleme de l'lndonesie. En ce qui r.oncerne le autres questions, nous prendrons les mesures qui s'imposent lorsque nous passerons au troisieme point de l'ordre du jour, c'est-it-dire it la question grecque. 284. Lettre, en date du 26 juUlet 1947, adre§see au Secretaire general par le President et le Vice-President du Conseil des Ministres du Gouverne· ment bulgare Le PRESIDENT (traduit de I'anglais): Les membres du Conseil ont cette demande sous les yeux; il n'est done pas necessaire d'en donner lecture. D'apres l'article 59 du reglement interieur pro~ visoire du Conseil de securite, la procedure a suivre, it moins que le Conseil de .securite n'en decide autrement, est la suivante: le President renvoie cette demande au Comite d'admission des nouveaux Membres. S'il n'y a pas d'objec- tion, il en sera decide ainsi. Now this is an application about which there may be considerable discussion. I should like to know whether it is the intention of the Council that the Committee should include a consideratiqn of Bulgaria in its current report or whether it should defer it. I am just pointing out the practical difficulties of giving effect to the decision of the President to refer the application to the Committee. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) ; Si je r.e me trompe, deux seances sont prevues demain pour le Comite d'admission des nouveaux Mem- bres, une le matin et une l'apres-midi. De toutes fac;;ons, nous devons renvoyer cette ql!estion au Comite, et celui-ci ve!Ta ce qu'il peut faire. Si le Comite peut inclure cette question dans son rap- port, c'est tres bien; sinon, il pourra declar-er qu'il n'a pu discuter la question qui a ete pre- sentee trop tard. C'est au Comite d'admission des nouveaux Membres de prendre les mesures qu'il juge necessaires. M. GROMYKO (Unio'1 des Republiques socia- listes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Les re- marques faites id par le representant de l'Austra- lie ne me paraissent pas fondees. Le Comite doit examiner la demande d'admission presentee par la Bulgarie, de la fac;;on ,dont il a deja examine les demandes d'admission des autres pays.

Unless I am mistaken, two meetings are scheduled for the Committee on the dmission of New Members tomorrow, one in we morning and one in the afternoon. We have to refer this matter to the Committee in any case, and the Committee will see what it can do about it. If the Committee can include this matter in its report, very good; if not, it can state that the matter came too late and that it could not discuss' it. It is for the Committee on the Aamission of New Members to take whatever action it thinks fit. :NII'. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialisr Republics) (translated from Russian) : I think that the considerations brought forward here by the :\ustralian representative are ill-founded. The Committee should give i.~ie Bulgarian application the same considera':ion it gave the applications of all the other countries which submitted such applications. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Australia did not object to our sending this application to the Committee on the Admission of New Members. The application is bound to be sent to the Committee and the representative of Australia did not propose that it should not be sent. He raised the question in order to ascertain our views as to how it should be dealt with, and I have given an explanation. I think the representative of Australia is satisfied with that. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Le representant de l'Australie ne s'est pas oppose a ce que nous renvoyions cette demande au Comite d'acln;tission des nouveaux Membres. Il faut envoyer cette demande au Comite, et le representant de I'Australie n'a pas propose de ne pas le faire. Il a pose la question pour s'assurer de la fac;;on clont nous disposerions de la question, et je lui ai donne des explications. Je crois que ma reponse lui a donne satisfaction. M. KATZ-SUCHY (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglais): On a fait remarquer hier, lors de la seance du Comite d'admission des nouveaux Membres, que la periode qui lui avait ete allouee par le Conseil de securite pour prepareI' son rapport etait tres courte, et que de nombreuses reponses emanant de membres et concernant les differentes demandes d'admission n'avaient pas encore atteint le Comite. En meme temps, on a fait remarquer qu'une eup r s'est produite au cours de la discussion sur .a date lirnite a laquelle le rapport devait etre presente et que cette date devrait etre le 12 aout, de fac;;on a rendre possible un examen detaille de la demande d'admission de la Bulgarie et, en meme temps, a permettre aux differents Etats Membres de faire connaitre leur opinion sur les autres demandes. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland): It was pointed out yesterday at the meeting of the Committee on the Admission of New Members that the time limit which had been given to it by the Security Council for the preparation of its report was very s~ort and that very many replies from Members WIth regard to the various applications had not yet reached the Committee. At the same time, it was pointed out that a miscalculation had occurred during the discussion of t~1e. time-limit for the report, and that the timelimIt should be 12 August, so as to make possible the fullest review of the application of Bulgaria and, at the same time, to enable various Member States to state their views on the applications. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): I was quite satisfied with the President's ruling. The only thing which is necessary is for the Council to be a little indulgent and, if it is necessary to allow a couple of days beyond the time which was laid ,lawn in the resolution, to grant that time, so that full consideration can be given to the matter.

We can grant one day only, until 11 August. Rule 59 provides for presentation of the report at least thirty-five days before the first meeting of the Assembly, which will be on 16 September, and 12 August will be beyond such a time-limit. The report must therefore be presented on 11 August. The Committee will discuss it at two meetings tomorrow; it can hold another meeting on Saturday, if necessary, and another on Monday, and I think that gives ample time. As there are no furt!'1er observations on this point, the matter is referred as usual to the Committee on the Admission of Ne''V' Members. 285. Continuation of the discussion on the report by the Commission of InD vestigation concerning Greek Frontier Incidents At the invitation of the President, Colonel Kerenxhi, representative of Albania; Mr. Mevorah, representative of Bulgaria; Mr. Dendramis, representative of Greece, and Mr. ViZfan, representative of Yugoslavia, took their places at the Council table. The P~SIDENT: I have two speakers on the list from yesterday's meeting, the representative of Bulgaria and the representative of Albania. I am sorry they were not able to speak yesterday, owing to the late hour; I shall ask them to make their statements now, and I call now upon the representative of Bulgaria. Mr. MEvoRAH (Bulgaria) (translated from FQ'ench): I should like first of all to thank the President for having called to order Mr. Dendramis, .who yesterday ventured to describe our countries as "satellite countries". This expression is an intolerable insult to my country as well as to the Council itself. I expect the representative of Greece to present his apologies and to agree, as the President suggested, that the offensive passages of his speech should be deleted from the record. Feeling the weakness of his argument, Mr. Dendramis had recourse to invective. I shall not follow his example, although I could talk with much greater justification of the political and economic dependence in which Greece is placed as regards certain great Powers. Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais) ; Je suis tout a fait satisfait de la decision du President. Je crois seulement qu'il est necessaire que le Conseil ait un peu d'indulgence et, s'il faut accorder deux jours de plus qu'H n'est prevu dans la resolution, qu'il accorde ce delai et permette ainsi de bien etudier la question. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais); Nous ne pouvons accorder qu'un delai od'un jour, soit jusqu'au 11 aout. L'articie 59 prevoit, pour la presentation du rapport, un delai de trentecinq jours au moins avant la premiere seance de l'Assemblee generale; eelle-ci etant fixee au 16 septembre, le 12 aout est donc en dehors de cette Iimite. En consequence, le rapport doit etre remis le 11. Le Comite le discutera lors des deux seances qu'il tiendra demain.. I1 pourra se reunir encore une fois samedi si cela est necessaire, et meme lundi. Je pense que cela lui laissera assez de. temps. Puisqu'il n'y. a pas d'autres observations, la question est renvoyee comme d'haaitude au Comite d'admission des nouveaux metnbres. 285. Suite de la diseussion sur le rapport de la commission d'enquete sur les incidents survenus a la frontiere grecque Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais); Deux orateurs, le representant de la Bulgarie et le representant de la Yougoslavie, ont demande la parole hier. Je regrette qu'ils n'aient pu parter en raison de l'heure tardive; je leur demanderai clone de bien vouloir faire leur declaration au- jourd'hui. Je donne maintenant !a parole an re- presentant de la Bulgarie. M. MEVORAH (Bulgarie): Je desirerais d'abord .remercier le President d'avoir rappele a 1'0rdre M. Dendrctmis, qui s'est permis hier de qualifier nos pays de "pays satellites". Cette expression est une insulte intolerable lancee a mon pays ainsi qu'au Conseil lui-meme. J'attends que le representant de la Grece pre- sente des excuses et qu'it accepte, comme le President l'y a invite, que les passages offensants de son discours soient rayes du proces-verbal. . Sentant la faiblesse de sa these, M. Dendramls a eu recour.s aux invectives. Je ne suivrai pas son exemple, bien qu'it me soit possible, et avec beaucoup plus de raison, de parler de la depen- dance .politique et economique dans laquelle la Grece se trouve vis-a.-vis de certaines grandes Puissances. ~ basis of Chapter VI of the Charter. Now, sud- denly, the Council is being asked to make a radical rearrangement and to have recourse to Chapter VII. Why such a last-minute change? I feel that the sense of tranquillity is disappearing. The Chapters of the Charter, however, are not spare parts which can be used one day in one way and another day in another as the plaintiff pleases. Why does Mr. Dendramis resort. to this unex- pected change? The Counc~!, which is about to conclude the discussions in one way or another, has always taken as its basis Chapter VI; now it is desired to make us do this very odd thing: on the one harid, to start discussions about the application of Chapter VII, V'lhile, at the same time, a sub-committee would endeavour to find a compromise solution based on Chapter VI. What is the reason for all this? The representative of Greece has told us him- sm : this new line of attack is a direct consequence of the failure of the United States proposal;1 it is due to the fact that the representative of the U 'ion of Soviet Socialist Republics' did not support the above proposal. However, there is nothing extra- J ordinary about the veto. The representative of the USSR did no more than the representative of the United States, when the lattei refused to admit that t.~e unrest in Greece was due to discrimina- tion against the opposition and the minorities, al- though this point was emphasized in the report of the Commissbn of Investigation. The representative of the Union of Soviet So- cialist Republics voted against the United States proposal in exactly the same way as the repre- sentative of the United States voted against the l!SSR proposal. 2 The only difference lies in this: mne representatives voted in favour of the United States proposal while only two supported the USSR proposal, but this does not in any way affec1; the fundamental question. The question h~re IS .rather that of the composition of the Coun- cd, whIch was considered to be defective by the authors of the Charter themselves, and as a result of which the right of veto was introduced. The e?,ercise of a right is never a mistake. A right eIther exists or does not exist and to talk cf a right ~eing abused, in our case,' necessarily makes . one thmk of an abuse by a majority. I do not want to become involved in discussions of this nature, but I have had to mention the prob- lem because the representative of Greece spoke y 1 See Official Rec01'ds of the Security Council, Second 1 Voir Jes Proces-verbau:J: afficiels dlt Conseil de secu- l'ite, Deuxieme Annee, No 66, 170eme seance. • 2 Ibid., No 69. Mr. Dendramis believes that it is useless to in- quire into the elements of a dispute if one is deal- ing with a threat to the peace. That might have far- reaching consequences for him and lead to unfa- vourable results for him. No, he has found another very simple and very original method of proving the existence of a threat to the peace: he tums to the declaration by the representative of the USSR and quotes this passage: 1 "This situation is fraught with serious consequences. It is an obvious threat to the maintenance of peace in the Balkans." The fact is therefure obvious, he says, since the repre- sentative of the USSR himself admits the exist- ence of a threat to the peace. All we have to do, Mr. Dendramis says, is to draw our own conclu- sions from this. But how does this follow? The repres~ntative of the USSR sees a threat in the presence of for- eign troops in Greece, in the regime of terror practised against the Greek people and in the provocation against Greece's neighbours organized by the Greek administrative authorities. Mr. Den- dramis sees a threat to the peace in the thirty-two comic stories which have been reported to us in the White Paper. This is quite a different matter, and it would be stupid to say that this difference is not important. The two statements lead to en- tirely different conclusions and results, and I really cannot accept the remark, "You admit that the Greek Government has caused a threat to the peace; therefore, vote for action against Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia." Since Mr. Dendramis' simple and original meth- od has absolutely no meaning and cannot, in any case, be used, we find ourselves obliged by the force of cilcumstances to revert to the substance of the question. The Commission of Investigation's report itself proposes to classify the findings under Chapter VI. Mr. Dendramis says that this has been done out of charity and that the question should, on the contrary, have been considered from the start under Chapter VII. This is not true. There is no such charitableness in the report. On the contrary, the report goes farther than its own findings re- quire, for it proposes the setting up of a semi- permanent commission and c1ces so after having had to admit that we did not supply the Greek partisans either with arms or with munitions; that we did not train and form bands; that we gave them no financial aid whatsoever, and that the M. Dendramis croit qu'il est inutile de re- chercher dans les elements du d~£ferend si 1'on a affaire it une menace contre la paix. Cela risque- rait de l'entrainer loin, et cela pourrait donner lieu it des resultats negatifs pour lui. Non, il a trouve une autre methode tres simple et tres originale pour demontrer l'existence d'une menace contre la paix: il se reporte it la declara- tion du representant de l'URSS et en tire cette citation1: "eette situation est grosse de conse- quences graves; elle menace d'une fa~on evidente le maintien de la paix dans les Balkans". Il s'agit donc, dit-il, d'une chose evidente, puisque le representant de 1'TJRSS lui-meme admet qu'il existe une menace contre la paix. Nous n'avons, . clit M. Dendramis, qu'it en tirer les conclusions. Mais, comment cela? Le representant de l'URSS voit une r:;~nace dans la presence de troupes etrangerc en Grece, dans le regime de terreur exerce contre le peuple grec et dans les provocations organisees par les autorites ad- ministratives grecques it l'endroit des voisins de la Grece. M. Dendramis voit une menace contre la paix dans les trente-deux histoires comiques qui nous sont rapportees dans le Livre blanc. C'est tout it fait different, et il serait insense d'affirmer que cette difference n'a pas d'impor- tanee. Les deux affirmations amenent des con- clusions et des resultats entierement differellts, et on ne peut vraiment accepter d'entendre dire: "Vous avouez que le Gouvernement grec a cree une menace contre la paix, votez done pour que des mesures soient prises contre l'Albanie, la Bulgarie et la Yougoslavie." Puisque la methode simple et originale de lVI. Dendramis n'a absolument attcun sens et ne peut etre, en aucun cas, utilisee, nous nous voyons obliges, par la. force des c~:Jses, de revenir sur le fond de la question. Le rapport de la Commission d'enquete lui- meme propose de placer les constatations qu'il a faites sous le regime du Chapitre VI. M Den- dramis dit que cela a ete fait par magnanimite et que, att contraire, les choses auraient dft et~e envisagees, des le debut, sous l'angle du ChapI- tre VII. Ce n'est pas vrai. Vne telle magnanimite d'esprit n'existe pas dans le rapport. Bien an contraire, celui-ci va au dela de ce qtt'imposent ses propres constatations, car il propose l'insti- tution d'une commission quasi-permanente, et cela apres avoir ete oblige d'admettre que nons n'avons pas approvisionne les partisans grecs en armes ni en munitions, que nous n'avons pas I do not want to revert in detail to all those points with which the members of the Coun.:il felt it would be too difficult to deal; but I consider it necessary at this late hour, and after having heard so many speeches, to put bluntly and calmly this crucial question: How much truth and real significance is there in all these stories? Putting aside all questions of secondary import- ance, what is the central point, the point on which the whole Greek problem turns? Let us speak as impartial individuals, as his- torians if you will, for what' is happening here is certainly a fragment of history, and we should all realize that the world of today and the world of tomorrow will take due account of our opinions and our decisions. And so, what is the essence of the Greek problem? The main point is that in Greece there is domes- tic strife all over the country, and that this strife, which we avoid calling "civil war" and which is Padons en hommes objectifs, en historiens, s~ l'on veut, car ce qui se fait ici est bien c{;rtaine- ment une parcelIe d'histoire, et nous devons tous avoir conscience que le monde actuel et le- monde de dentain tiendront compte de nos opinions et de nos decisions. Ainsi done, que1 est le fond de i'affaire grecque? Le point principal est qu'il existe en Grece des luttes intestines sur toute l'etendue du terri- toire, et que ces luttes, que l'on evite d'appeler "guerre civile" et que l'on decrit gentiment sous le nom de "malaise", datent deja de plusieurs an- nees; que le rapport lui-meme en voit les causes dans la discrimination exercee a. l'egard de I'op- position et des minorites; et que, pour toute la periode consideree (qui s'etend sur quelques an- nees), le Gouvernement grec n'a pu trouver anous reprocher, et cela avec beaucoup de peine et a. l'aide d'une mise en scene considerable, que que1ques incidents au 'sujet desque1s la Commis- sion d'enquete elle-meme n'a pas daigne enqueter. C'est cela, la verite historique (et je me permets ici d'emprunter a M. Dendramis une expression qui est belle, biel1 qu'il l'emploie tout a. fait a tort), "cette verite historique"1 qui ne peut etre niee par aucun vote, pas meme a. une majorite ecrasante. Les membres du Conseil pourraient-ils, en par- courant l'histoire, trouver un pays qui, contigu a. un autre pays faisant l'objet de luttes intestines, ait fait preuve d'autant de bonne foi que nos trois pays? Paudrait-il evoquer l'image de Franklin pendant la periode de la Revolution fran~aise, ou celle de Byron qui alIa lutter en Grece contre l'oppression ottomane, ou encore celIe de tous les revolutionnaires russes conspirant en Suisse? Faudrait-il rappeler id la position prise lors de la guerre civile en Espagne, par la France, qui, po~itely described as "unrest", has already been gomg on for several years; that the report itself finds the strife is due to the discrimination shown towards the opposition and the minorities; and that for the whole period under consideration (which extends over several years) the Greek Government, by dint of great effort and the use of a lot of ftage tricks, has not been able to find mor.e t~an a few incidents with which to reproach ~s, I~cldents. which the Commission of Investiga- tion Itself dId not bother to investigate. That is the historical truth (and here I venture to borrow a fine expression from Mr. Dendramis, even though he completely misuses it) "That historical t h"1 ' rut which no vote can controvert, not even a vote by a crushing majority. .Could the members of the Council, in scanning hlSt?ry, find any country bordering on another rent ~y mternal strife, which has shown such sincer- Ity as have our three countries? Think of Franklin during the period of the French Revolution, or Byron .who went !o fight in Greece against Turkish oppreslOn, or agam all file Russian revolutionaries plotting in Switzerland? Think of the attitude taken by France during the Spanish Civil War ~hen, alt.hou~h it was following a policy of non~ nterventJon m contrast to the huge consignments What can one say then of these storic~ about us in which smuggling is the salient feature, in which the allegation a:bout supplies of arms is as far frQm being proven as are the claims that the frontiers have been crossed, in which there is no mention of financial aid, in which in order to keep the Press campaign going one has to be satisfied with a few garbled allusions, and in which the international brigades, so much talked about, have been only an excuse for a report which has had to be denied by the o!;'iginators themselves. I will repeat an idea which I have already ex- pressed in my first speech: the situation in Greece being what it is, violent and open intervention might have been expected. If it has not occurred, it is because our people and our Government have '3. burnjng desire for peace. They want peace because it fits in with their conception of the world and of life, and because they are determined to help to set up a new era of peace in the Balkans, where unrest has so long prevailed. No, I am not di,torting the facts; what I say is true: we really desire to work at the difficult problem of reconstruction and we want to be guaranteed the peace necessary to attend to our affairs. I will now return to the question before us, namely, the present and tangible existence of a threat to the peace. So far members of the Council have been using this phrase from Chapter VI: "the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of the peace". I can see no reason for going any further. Peace might be endangered by the pres- ence of a foreign army in Greece. The Council members do not wish to admit this; very well. But if they want to go furth~r, they will be acting spitefully; it will perhaps be another case of the fable of the lamb and the wolf. They will be per- petuating the dispute in order to use it for other aims which they do not dare to admit. What I am saying is that the representative of Greece is asking the Council to take a decision under Cnap- ter VII, although the Council has not adopted a resolution based on Chapter VI. Is it not clearly impossible for the members of the Council to agree to such a proposal? To describe the Greek proposal I will use the words the representative of the United States employed the other day: there i3 <"'0 air of 110- I reality about this resolution. It cannot be accepted, franchies, all l'aide financiere n'existe pas, ou, pour alimenter une campagne de presse, on est force de se contenter de quelques allusions mal interpretees, et Oll les brigades internationales annoncees avec tant d'eclat n'ont ete que le pre- texte d'une nouvelle qui a dd etre dementie par ses auteurs eux-memes? Je repeterai une pensee que j'ai deja. exprimee lors de ma premiere intervention: etant donne la situation en Grece, on pouvait s'attendre a quelque intervention violente et ouverte, et, si ce n'est pas le cas, c'est que notre peuple et notre Gouvernement sont animes d'un ardent desir de palX. Cette paix, ils la veulent parce qu'elle entre dans le cadre de leur conception du monde et des chases et parce qu'ils sont determines a faiie regner une ere nouvelle de concorde dans ces Balkans tourmentes depuis de longs siec1es. Non, je ne de£igure pas les choses. Je parte d'une realite: nous voulons reellement travailler au grave probleme de la reconstruction, et nous desirons qu'on nous garantisse la tranquillite necessaire pour vaquer a nos occupations. Je reviens maintenant a la question qui no~s preoccupe, a savoir l'existence actuelle et tangI- ble d'une menace contre la paix. Le Conseil s'est servi jusqu'a. present de cette phrase du Chapitre VI: "dont la prolongation est susceptible de menacer le maintien de la paix". Je ne puis pas trouver de raison nou~ permettant d'aller plus loin. La paix pourralt etre menacee par la presence d'une armee etran- gere en Gnke. Les membres du Conseil ne veu- lent pas en convenir, c'est bien; mais vouloir al!er plus loin, c'est temoigner d'un esprit de malIce et c'est peut-etre vouloir repeter la fable ~e l'agneau et du loup. C'est vouloir eterniser le ?If- ferend pour pouvoir s'en servir a d'autres fms, qu'on n'ose pas avouer. Nous disons: le repre- sentant de la Grece demande au Conseil de prendre une decision en vertu du Chapitre ,:U, alors qu'une resolution fonMe sur le Chapltr.e VI n'a pas He adoptee par le Conseil. N'est-ll pas evident qu'il est impossible pour les membres du Conseil d'arriver ~t un accord sur une telle proposition? Pour qualifier la proposition de la Grece, je me 'servirai des paroles que le representant des Eta!s- Unis employait l'autre jour: i1 y a un air d'lr- realite qui plane sur cette resolution. Elle est If Mr. Dendramis succeeded in his new attempt, I should note with regret that all our efforts had been in vain and that we had not succeeded in convincing the members of the Council about a situation which is, nevertheless, very simple and very clear. If the Council asked us. to see that everything on our frontier was for the best in the best of all possible worlds, we could not agree, for it does not depend on us alone. The clashes be- tween Government forces and Greek partisans will continue to take place near our frontiers, and there will of necessity be fugitives, who will cross them: notre frontiere, nons ne pourrions pas le lui pro- mettre, car cela ne depend pas que de nous. Les combats entre les forces gouvernementales et les partisans grecs continueront a avoir lieu a proxi- mite de nos frontieres et, forcement, il y aura des fugitifs qui franchiront celles-ci: on trouvera tou- jours, dans ce cas, quelques temoins grecs com- plaisants et louches que diront avoir vu un groupe de partisans traverser la frontiere. Tant que les choses resteront a ce niveau d'in- signifiance, le Conseil peut etre tranquille. De petites choses comme celles-la ne sont qu'un signe - etant donne les circonstances presentes - de sante internationale. J'espere ayoir convaincu les membres du Con- seil car, comme I'a dit hier M. Lopez, I'espoir est la chose que 1'0n doit perdre en tout dernier lieu. Je continue done a esp6rer que le ConseiI repren- dra son sang-froid et se contentera de prendre des mesures qui correspondent a la realite et qui nous aident a mettre de l'ordre dans les relations internationales. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je tiens a faire connaitre au representant de la Bulgarie que la phrase qu'il a mentionnee a deja ete eliminee du proces-verbal ainsi que je l'ai dit hierl • Le colonel KERENXHI (Albanie): Depuis long- temps deja, nous sommes accuses par les gou- vernants grecs d'avoir commis, et de continuer a commettre, des actes contre la Grece afin de porter atteinte a la paix et a la seurite. Depuis longtemps aussi, il est avere que ces gouvernants tentent, a certains moments donnes, de renforcer leurs accusations-sans tenir compte du fait que, pour renforcer des accusations, il faut presenter ~ few obliging and shady Greek witnesses will al- ways be found to say they have seen a group of partisans crossing the f!'ontier. As long as the affair remains as insignificant as this, the Council. can be reassured. Minor inci- dents such as these are-in the present circum- stances-only a sign of international health. I hope that I have convinced the members of the Council, for, as Mr. Lopez said yesterday, hope is the very last thing that one should lose. I shall therefore continue to hope that the Council will regain its composure and will confine itself to taking measures which correspond to the facts and which will help us to clear up international relations. The PRESIDENT: I wish to inform the Bulgarian representative that I have already requested that the word to which he referred be struck from the record, as I said yesterday that I would.l Colonel KERENXHI (Albania) (translated from French) : For some time past we have been ac- cused by the Greek authorities of having commit- ted, and of continuing to commit, acts hostile to Greece with the object of prejudicing peace and security. For a long time, also, we have noticed that these authorities were trying at specific mo- ments to reinforce their accusations-without real- izing that in order to reinforce accusations new facts ~d proofs must be given. Every time that the lymg Greek accusations are proved to be false, new acc~sations are levelled, but they are always substantially the same-the same insignificant facts ~ready referred to--a few changes being made m the form of the accusations and in the demands by which they are f~llowed up. a la fois des faits nouveaux et des preuves. Or, toutes les fois que les accusations mensongeres grecques se revelent fausses, on en formule de nouvelIes, mais on leur conserve toujours le meme fond - les memes faits insignifiants deja relevees - en apportant seulement quelques changements it la fa<;on dont ces accusations sont formulees et aux demandes qui leur font suite. How could we pass so easily from discussing the measures to be taken under Chapter VI of the Charter to discussing the measures provided for by Chapter VII? What are the reasons advanced in support of such a procedure, claimed to be necessary for the settlement of the problem? One will not find, either in Mr. Tsaldaris' letter, or in the Greek representative's declaration, any convincing argument in favour of its adoption. The supporting arguments are merely provocative; they have no real weight. . Greek G0vernment circles are apparently con- vinced that it is easy to pass over the fact that the Commission of Investigation itself said nothing about the existence of a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace in describing the situation in Greece. This was simply because it had been in- controvertibly established that the causes of the civil war in Greece were of an internal nature and that, consequently, such a situation could not pos- sibly be interpreted as constituting a breach of the peace caused by Greece's northern neighbours. We should also note that the Greek authorities, by acting in this way, overlook the fact that the Security Council has not yet, even after some twenty meetings, concluded its discussion of the Greek question within the framework of Chapter VI-this Chapter being the appropriate section of· the Charter for dealing with such questions. sa discussion de la queption grecque dans !e cadre du Chapitre VI-ce Chapitre etant la partle de la Charte qui convient pour traiter de telles questions. En examinant la lettre de M. Tsaldaris et la declaration du representant de la Grece, on cons: tate que le Gouvernement grec invoque, a. l'appUI de sa demande, de pretendus incidents qui se- raient survenus dernierement et qui auraient ete confirmes par le Groupe subsidiaire. . Je com;ois bien que les gouvernants grecs SOlent les seuls a. trouver le courage de prononcer pareilles affirmations. En fait, de quelle confirm~­ tion s'agit-il? Est-ce que des incidents inv.entes de toutes pieces pourraient avoir une confmna- tion? Cela est impossible. This statement by Greece puts the Subsidiary Cette affirmation de la. part de la Grece .pla~e Group in an awkward position with regard to the le -Groupe subsidiaire dans une position dlfficll~ Security Council. This is what happened: it seems vis-a.-vis du Conesil de securite. Void ce qUI that Mr. Tsaldaris, when he was in Washington, s'est passe: il parait que M. Tsaldaris, alors qu'll received from the Subsidiary Group confirmation se trouvait a Washington, aurait re<;u du: Gro~pe about an invasion of Greece, while the Security subsidiaire une confirmation concernant l'mvaslOn Council, which should have been the first to receive de la Grece, alors que le Conseil de securite, q~i de- such confirmation, had not received it, even seven vrait etre le premier a recevoir une telle c01;fl,nna- or eight days later. One thing is certain. There tion, ne l'avait pas re<;ue, meme sept ou ~Ult Jour~ can be no suc;h confirmation. However, this clearly i plus tard. Ce qui est certain, c'est qu'll ?e per proves that the Greek Government is abusing the Iy avoir une telle confirmation. Toutefols, cd a existence of the Subsidiary Group and is using, prouve bien que le Gouvernement grec abuse e If we examine Mr. Tsaldaris' letter and the Greek representative's declaration, we find that the Greek Government adduces, in support of its ap- plication, so-called incidents, which they say have occurred recently and been confirmed by the Sub- sidiary Group. I can quite understand the Greek authorities being the only people brave enough to make su/,;h statements. In fact, what confirmation is there? Can completely fictitious incidents be confirmed? It is possible. Il semble que les milieux gouvernementaux grecs soient persuades qu'il soit facile de faire oublier le fait que la Commission d'enquete e1le- meme n'a pas invoque l'existence d'une menace contre la paix ou d'etat de rupture de la paix pour qualifier la situation en Grece; et cela, tout simplement parce qu'il a ete etabli d'une maniere indeniable que les causes de la guerre civile en Grece sont d'ordre interieur et que, par conse- quent, une telle situation ne pourrait en aucune maniere etre interpretee comme confirmant une rupture de la paix causee par les voisins septen- trionaux de la Grece. Il est a. remarquer aussi que les gouverriants grecs, en agissant ainsi, ne tiennent pas compte du fait que le Conseil de securite n'a pas encore termine, meme apres une vingtaine de seances, That does not worry the Greek Government; 'it is sure ~hat there will pe s~m~0l1:e to .support its mendacIOus arguments. And It IS nght, m so far as there have already been similar cases for which advocates have been found. It is thus encouraged to formulate new accusations and new misleading arguments before the Security Council and before public opinion. . But it seems clear. that our refusal to take part in an investigation of trumped-up non-existent in- cidents constitutes in the eyes of the Greek Gov- ernment corroboratory evidence, evidence corrob- orating this provocation. This is the ridiculous foundation upon which the Greek Government is basing its application. On this basis, to refuse to play the game of the Greek instigators would be tantamount to back- ing their trumped-up accusations. In the same way they are trying to make people believe that, by refusing to take part in the investigation of com- pletely imaginary incidents, we show that we are trying to conceal the truth. But the fact that we are defending our national honour and prestige, which has .been challenged by the trumped-up accusations of the Greeks, cannot be interpreted as evidence in support of these accusations. .. We read in Mr. Tsaldaris' letter: "These acts of aggression have increased in boldness and inten- sity, culminating in the well-organized invasion of Greece ..." Here again we have this famous inva.sion, a lamentable incident because it did not turn out to be what it really was: that is to say, a base provo- cation. On this subject I shall add, by way of in- formation, that a senior Greek officer, named Manidaksis, representing the Greek General Staff, speaking of the so-called invasion at a Press con- ference, stated that it was a "report spread by irresponsible persons", and added that "the General Staff knew nothing at all about it." The Greek paper Ta Nea, on the other hand, wrote that Gen- eral Zervas, commenting on the declaration of this representative of the General Staff, had said: "In such circumstances soldiers should hold their Voila la base ridicule sur laquelle le Gouverne- ment grec fonde sa demande. Ainsi, refuser de faire le jeu des provocateurs grecs equivaudrait a apporter des preuves it l'appui de leurs accusa- tions inventees. Et l'on tente, par les memes methodes, de faire croire au monde que, en refu- sant de participer a l'enquete sur des incidents inventes de toutes pieces, nous prouvons que nous cherchons a dissimuler la verite. Mais le fait de de£endre notre honneur et notre prestige d'Etat mis en jeu par les accusations inventees par des Grecs ne peut etre interprete comme une preuve it l'appui de ces accusations. On lit, dans la lettre de M. Tsa1daris: "Le caractere audacieux de ces actes d'agression s'est accru ainsi que 1eur intensite; leur point culminant a ete l'invasion organisee de la Grece . . ." Eh bien! la voila encore, cette fameuse inva- sion, qui nous fait pitie puisqu'elle s'est reve1ee n't~tre que ce qu'elle etait vraiment: c'est-a-dire une provocation ignoble. A ce propos, j'ajouterai, it titre d'information, qu'un officier superieur grec, nomme Manidaksis, representant l'etat-major su- 'perieur grec, parIant de la pretendue invasion au cours d'une conference de presse, affirmait qu'il iagissait d'une "information propagee par des personnes irresponsables"; il ajoutait que "l'etat- major superieur ignorait tout it ce sujet". De son cote, le journal grec Ta Nea ecrivait que le ge- neral Zervas, commentant la declaration de ce representant de l'etat-major, s'etait exprime ainsi: "Dans de telles conditions, les militaires doivent se taire", ajoutant qu'il n'etait pas ~dans l'interet de la nation de discuter de ces evenements de fac;on detaillee. . Le representant de la Grece vientde reprendre la teneur de la lettre de M. Tsaldaris, sans apporter d'autre argument serieux. Mais ce qu'it fait de plus, c'est qu'i1 crie it l'acte d'agression, a la rupture de la paix. La verite n'en sera aucu- nement modifiee. Dans ces conditions, quand j'ente11ds les mi- lieux gouvernementaux grecs nous accuser a haute voix de soutenir la lutte des partisans en Grece, ~ongues", adding that it was not in the national mterest to discuss these events in detail. The Greek representative has just repeated to us the tenor of Mr. Tsaldaris' letter, without ad- ducing any new argument of importance, but he has done more. He has talked loudly of aggression, of a breach of the peace. That will not affect the truth in the slightest. , In these circumstances, when I hear Greek Gov- ernment circles accuse us at the top of their voices of Supporting the struggle of the Greek partisans, I ~ay to myself: "Have they started fresh cam- paIgns of arrests and mass deportations? Is that why they are sounding the alarm in this way?" je me demande, pour ma part: "Ont-ils repris de noulles campagnes d'arrestations et des de- portations en masse? Est-ce pour les justifier qu'ils sonnent ainsi l'alarme?" Nous retenons seulement que le Gouvernement grec participe a t1l1e politique d'injures injusti- fiees, qu'il porte contre nos pays des accusations sans nul fondement, au moment meme ou les I s~all merely observe that the Greek Govern- ment. 1~ eng.aging in a policy of unjustified insults, that It IS bnnging against our countries completely unfounded accusations at the very moment when The Greek representative thinks there is no need to go on debating the question of determin- ing whether there is, in fact, a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace and an invasion of Greece, because this fact is generally admitted. What a frivolous allegation! In such case I would ask the Greek representative how it comes about that the breach of the peace and the in- vasion, which are universally admitted, are not so admitted by the most responsible authorities in Greece, for example, by the Greek General Staff itself. The breach of the peace, the invasion, should be recognized in Greece better than any- where else, parti~ular1y by the military authori- ties, who would be responsible for opposing the invasion. How is it that the breach of the peace and the invasion are recognized a:broad and ignored at home? The answer can be found in the declaration made by Mr. Tsaldaris on 11 June last, when he said that the rumours current about an invasion were intended for the outside world and not for Greece. I have already referred to this some days ago. There is no need to mention it again.1 It is the Greek representative's turn to admit this and not mine to repeat it. The answer can also be found in General Zervas' statement which I mentioned earlier, and which was published in the newspaper Ta N ea. In conclusion, may I say that the Greek appli- cation is not in accordance with the facts. It is un- justified and constitutes a new provocation, which should be rejected immediately. The PRESIDENT: The general discussion of the subject is now closed; the Council will await the report of the Sub-Committee to which the ques- tion of the resolutions and discussions has been referred. The report is expected on Monday, so that the Council will have its next meeting on the Greek question on Tuesday at 10.30 a.m. As there are no further observations, the Council will pass to the ne:ct item on the agenda. 286. Continuation of the discussion on the Indonesian question La reponse, on peut la trouver egalement dans la declaration du general Zervas, mentionnee plus haut et publiee par le journal Ta N ea. Il est permis pour conclure de declarer que la demande grecque ne correspond pas a. la realite; elle est injustifiee et constitue une nouvelle pro- vocation qui doit etre rejetee sur le champ. . Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): La dIS- cussion generale de cette question est maintenant terminee. Le Conseil attendra que lui soit pre. sente le rapport du Sous-Comite auque1 a ~te renvoyee la question des resolutions et des. dIS- cussions. Ce rapport doit etre remis lundt, de fa<;on que le Conseil tienne la prochaine seance consacree a. la question grecque mardi a. 10 h.3~. S'il n'y a pas d'autres observations, le Conseil passe maintenant au point suivant de l'ordre du joo~ . Le colonel Kerenxhi, representant de l'Albame; M. M evorah, representant de la Bulgar re;. M. Dendramis, representant de la Grece et M. Vflfan, representant de la Yugoslavie, se retirent. 286. Suite de la discussion sur la ques" tion indonesienne Sur l'invitation du President, M. van Kleffens, representant des Pays-Bas, et M. Sen, represen- tant de l'Inde, .prennent place d la table du Con- seil. Mr. KERNO (Assistant Secretary-General in charge of the Legal Department): The text of the telegram, dated 1 August 1947, from General Romulo, the permanent representative of the Philippines, appears in do~ument S/458 and reads as follows: "I have been instructed by my Government to transmit its stand in favour of the intervention of the Security Council to halt the armed conflict between the Netherlands Government and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia. It is urged therefore that the Security Council take such steps as may be necessary to bring about the immediate cessation of hostilities and, without passing judgment on the responsibility of either party for such hostilities, to prevail upon them to submit the controversy to arbitration as provided in article 17 of the Cheribon Agreement. "The Philippine Government has been moved to take this step because it is vitallv interested in the maintenance of peace in that area and because of its humanitarian desire to prevent further bloodshed. Accordingly my Government wishes to express its desire to participate in the discussion of this matter before the Security Council, be- cause it considers itself specially affected by any disturbance of peace in that part of the Pacific. ret vital pour lui que la paix soit maintenue dans cette region et qu'il eprouve par humanite le desir de faire cesser toute effusion de sang. Il tient en consequence a exprimer le desir de par- ticiper aux debats du Conseil de securite sur cette affaire, estimant qu'il est particulierement atteint qUu'nd la paix est troublee dans cette partie du Pacifique. "I wish furthermore to communicate to you "Je tiens a vous informer en outre que mon the availability of my Government to participate Gouvernement est dispose a participer a toute in any action that may lead to the settlement of I action qui puisse aboutir a regler le conflit par the dispute by arbitration." . voie d'arbitrage."

Article 31 of the Charter reads Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'ang1ais) : L'Article as follows: "Any Member of the United Nations 31 de la Charte dit: "Tout Membre de l'Organisawhich is not a member of the Security Council tion qui n'est pas membre du Conseil de securite may participate, without vote, in the discussion peut participer, sans droit de vote, a la discussion of any question brought before the Security Counde toute question soumise au Conseil de securite, cil whenever the latter considers that the interests chaque fois que celui-ci estime que les interets of that Member are specially affected." de ce Membre sont particulierement' affectes". Before inviting the Philippine representative Avant d'inviter le representant des Piilippines to participate in our discussion, I should like the a participer a notre discussion, je voudrais prier Council to decide whether it considers that the le Conseil de decider s'il estime que les interets interests of the Philippines are specially affected. des Philippines sont particulierement affectes. Mr. NrsoT (Belgium) (translated from M. :NrsoT (Belgique): Dans l'etat actue1 de French) : As my information stands at present I mon information, je ne puis me prononcer, ni cannot give an opinion either for or against the pour, ni contre la demande des Philippines. Mais Philippine demand, but may I call the Security je me permets d'appeler l'attention du Conseil de" Council's attention to the importance of the precesecurite sur la gravite du precedent qu'il est sur dent which it is about to create. The Council canle point de poser. Le Conseil ne saurait se pro- ~ot express an opinion until it has made a serious noncerlS un serieux examen. Ita, selon moi, mvestigation. It is its duty, in my opinion, to le devoir de rechercher si les interets des Philipfi~d out if the interests of the Philippines are in pines sont, en l'occurence, partitulierement afthIs case specially affected within the meaning of fectes au sens de l'Article 31 de la Charte. Article 31 of the Charter. . Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : I should be reluctant to oppose any request made by t~e Philippines; but at the same time I should !Ike to observe that I think the Security Council Itse~f ought to be rather careful how it applies ArtIcle 31 of the Charter, which provides for the attendance at a discussion before the Council ot a M. KERNO (Secretaire general adjoint charge des questions j!1ridiques) (traduit de l'anglais) : Voici le texte du telegramme du general Romulo, representant permanent des Philippines, en date du ler aout 1947, qui figure au document S/458: "Je suis charge par mon Gouvernement de vous informer qu'il preconise l'intervention du Conseil de securite pour mettre fin au conflit arme entre le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et le Gouvernement de la Republique d'Indonesie. Il insiste donc pour que le Conseil de securite prenne les mesures necessaires en vue de faire cesser immediatement les hostilites et que, sans porter a cet egard le jugement sur la responsabilite de l'une ou l'autre des parties, il obtienne a'elles qu'elles soumettent le conflit a un arbitrage comme le prevoit l'article 17 de l'Accord de Cheribon. "Le Gouvernement des Philippines est pousse a faire cette demarche, parce qu'il est d'un inte- Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je ne voudrais m'opposer aaucune demande presentee par le Gouvernement des Philippines; mais, d'autre part, je tiens a faire remarquer que le Conseil de securite devrait examiner avec soin de quelle fa~on il y a lieu d'appliquer l'Article 31 de la Charte, qui prevoit qu'un The Philippine Government, in making this request, states that it "has been moved to tal;:~ this step because it is vitally interested in the maintenance of peace in that area and because of its humanitarian desire to prevent further bloodshed". It is perhaps undeniable that the Philippines is vitally interested in the maintenance of peace in that area, but there are other States which might consider themselves similarly involved. I might recall to the Council that we have just been discussing what is known as the Greek question, and I should have thought that the States which are vitally interested in the maintenance of peace in that area might be held to be at least all of the European Members of the United Nations. The other reason given by the Philippinesand an excellent one-is the humanitarian. desire to prevent further bloodshed. On that score, I should hope that every Member of the United Nations might be pennitted to attend a discussion where a question of bloodshed was involved. Therefore, whatever may be the ultimate decision of the Security Council, I do not think that the document before us sufficiently shows that the Philippines is specially affected in the sense of Article 31 of the Charter, as I read it. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): The representative of india was invited to participate without having to indicate his reasons in full; there was no debate on the question of his participation nor were any objections raised. My delegationcan call to mind other occasions when parties only indirectly concerned in a situation or a dispute were asked to participate; for instance, in September 1946, when the Ukrainian SSR participated in the discussions on the Greek question. As we see it, the interests of the Philippines in this case are similar to ours, but the representative of the Philippines has not set down the full reasons. Probably he did not think he would have to justify his case fully. I can, however, immediately and with no difficulty call to mind many other considerations. For instance, there is the fact that a great portion of the trade of the Philippines is with the Netherlands East Indies. If communications are disrupted, that disruption will affect the stahility, reconstruction and rehabilitation not only of the Philippines but of 'other parts of that area. For these reasons the Australian delegation considers that the Philippines is directly concerned in this dispute and that its representative should be invited to participate in our deliberations. Mr. SEN (India) : It was quite clear in the discussions last week th~t the main reason why the Security Council decided to ask for the cessation of hostilities, in spite of its doubts about the Je me permets de rappeler au Conseil que nous venons de discuter ce qu'on appelle la question grecque, et je crois qu'au moins tous les Membres europeens de 1'0rganisation des Nations Unies peuvent etre consideres comme particulierement interesses au maintien de la paix dans cette region du monde. L'autre raison, d'ailleurs excellente, qu'invoque le Gouvernement des Philippines, est le desir humal1~taire de faire cesser toute effusion de sang. J'ose croire que tous les Membres de 1'0rganisation des Nations Unies pourraient, pour le meme motif, etre autorises a participar a la discussion de toute question impliquant effusion de sang. Par consequent, queUe que soit la decision finale du Conseil de securite, je ne pense pas que le document qui nous a ete presente prouve de fa<;on suffisante que les Philippines sont particulierement affectees, au sens ou j'inter~rete l'Article 31 de la Charte. Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais) : Le representant de I'Inde a ete invite a participer a nos debats sans qu'il doive indiquer de fa<;on detaillee ses raisons, et sans que sa participation donne lieu a des discussions ou a des objections. Il y a eu d'autres cas, que ma delegation peut citer, ou des Membres des Nations Unies qui n'etaient qu'indirectement interesses a une situation ou a un differend ont ete pries de participer aux debats; par exemple, en septembre 1946, la Republique socialiste sovietique d'Ukraine a participe a la discussion sur la question grecque. A notre avis, les interets des Philippines sont, dans le cas qui nous occupe, semblables aux notres, mais le representant des Philippines n'a pas expose toutes ses raisons. I1 n.'a probablement pas pense qu'il devrait motiver pleinement sa demande. Je puis, quant a moi, fournir sur le champ et sans difficulte, beaucoup d'autres considerations al'appui de cette de111ande. Par exemple, il yale fait qu'une grande partie du commert:e des Philippines se fait avec les Indes neerlandaises. Si les communications sont interrompues, cette rupture nuira a la stabilite, a la reconstruction et au relevement, non seulement des Philippines, mais aussi d'autres pays de cette partie du monde. C'est pourquoi la delegation australienne estime que les -Philippines sont directement interessees a ce differend et que leur representant devrait etre invite a participer aux debats du Conseil de securite. M. SEN (Inde) (traduit de l'anglais) : Il ressortait clairement des discussions qui ont eu lieu la semaine derniere que si, malgre des hesitations sur les aspects d'ordre juridique et autres de la I could not follow the argument of the representative of the United Kingdom to the effect that, if the Philippine representative were permitted to take part in our discussions, then in other cases various other countries would have to be allowed to take part in the deliberations. He cited the instance of Greece. So far as the Indonesian question is concerned, I do not know of any considerable Power whose interests are involved which does not have a seat in the Council or which has not been invited to participate in the discussion. I therefore suggest for the consideration of the Security Council that the Philippines should be invited to participate in the discussion. The PRESID:ENT: As the views which have already been expressed here are divergent, I must put the matter to a vote. I would ask those who consider that the interests of the Philippines are specially affected in this case to indicate their opinion by a show of hands. Par consequent, je me permets de proposer au Conseil de securite d'admettre les Philippines a prendre part a notre discussion. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de 1'anglais): Etant donne que les avis qui nous ont deja ete presentes sont partages, je dois mettre la question au voix. Je desirerais demander a ceux des membres du sur la question de savoir si les interets des Philippines sont particulierement affectes dans le cas qui nous occupe, de bien vouloir lever la main. Cependant, le representant de la Colombie desire presenter une motion d'ordre. M. LOPEZ (Colombie) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je voudrais 'etre sur que nous devons bien voter sur la question de savoir si les interets des Philippines sont particulierement affectes ou non. Je crois que nous devrions plutot voter sur la question de savoir si nous desirons acceder a la demande formulee par les Philippines et les admettre a prendre part a notre discussion. Je tiens a declarer que je preconise chaleureusement la participation des Philippines a nos debats. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je me rallie a I'avis du representant de la Colombie. J e vais maintenant mettre aux voix la question d'accorder aux Philippines la permission de participer a nQtre discussion. Il est procede au vote cl main levee. Il y a 6 voix pour et 5 abstentions. N'ayant pas obtenu le vote affirnwtif de sept membres, la proposition n'est pas adoptee. Votent pour: Australie, Bresil, Chine, Colombie, Syrie, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. S'abstiennent: Belgique, France, Pologne, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, Royaume- Uni. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Le Secretaire general adjoint va maintenant donner lecture des titres des documents qui ont ete distribues aux membres du Conseil. The representative of Colombia, however, wishes to raise a point of order. Mr. LOPEZ (Colombia): I should like to make sure whether we should vote on the question as to whether the Philippines is affected or not. I believe that the question on which we should vote is wheth,;r we are in favour of granting the request of the Philippines to participate in the discussion. I wish to take the opportunity of saying that I am strongly in favour of their participation in the discussion.

I accept the view of the representative of Colombia. I shall now put to the vote the question of granting the Philippines permi.,;sion to participate in this discussion. _ A vote was taken by show of hands. There were 6 votes in favour and 5 abstentions. The proposal w~s not adopted, hmting failed to ob.tain the affirmatzve votes of seven mem.bers. Votes for: Australia, Brazil, China, Colombia, Syria, United States of America. Abs~entions: Belgium, France, Poland, Union of SOVIet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom.

The Assistant Secretary-General will read out the titles of the documents which have been circulated to the members. 1 See Official Reco:'ds of the Security Council, St:cond Year, No. 68, 173rd meeting. The text of t.lte resolution adopted by the Council is as follows: Document S/459 1 August 1947 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securite, Deuxieme Annee, No 68, 173eme seance. Le texte de la resolution adoptee par le Conseil est le suivant: Document Si459 ler aout 1947 [Texte original en anglais] Le Conseil de sec~trite, Constatant avec inquietude le deroulement des hostilites entre les forces arn:6es des PaysBas et la Republique d'Indonesie, Invite les parties: a) A cesser immediatement les hostilites, et b) A regler leurs differends en recourant a l'arbitrag-e ou a tout autre moyen pacifique et a tenir le Conseil de securite au courant des resultats acquis en vue de ce reglement. [Orig~'nal text: English] The SeCltrity Council, Notin.q with concern the hostilities in progress between the armed forces of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. Calls upon the parties: (a) To cease hostilities forthwith, and (b) To settle their disputes by arbitration or by other peaceful means and keep the Security Council informed about the progress of the settlement. 1. Telegram dated 1 August 1947 from the permanent representative (Jf the Philippines to the United Nations, a::!Glessed to the Secretary-General (document S/458); this telegram contains the Philippine request to take part in the Security Council's discussion. 2. Cablegram dated 1 August 1947 from the President of the Security Council communicating to the Prime Minister of the Indonesian Republic the resolution adopted by the Security Council at its hundred and seventy-third meeting; and reply of 4 August 1947 from the Deputy Prime Minister (document S/465).1 3. Letter dated 1 August 1947 from the President of the Security Council communicating to the Ambassador of the Netherlands to the United States the resolution adopted by the Security Council at its hundred and seventy-third meeting; and replies dated 3 and 4 August 1947 (document S/466).2 4. Cablegram dated 5 August 1947 from the Deputy Prime Minister of the Indonesian Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council (document S/469). 5. Text of the speech broadcast on 4 August 1947 by the President of the Indonesian Republic and communicated to the President of the Security Council (document S/470).3 S The following is the text of the speech, which was broadcast through stations of the Indonesian Republican radio on 4 August at 24.00 hours, Indonesian standard time: Document S/470 6 August 1947 [Original text: English] To the entire armed forces and people of Indonesia: On 21 July,.the third day of this holy month, I gave the order to our entire people and armed forces to arise as one man to resist the outrageous Dutch aggression. The Indonesian people and our armed forces have complied with that order and have demonstrated to the world that they have done their duty .faithfully and unconditionally. I express my gratitude to all members of the armed forces who have made sacrifices and suffered tribulations in carrying out their tasks. I pray that God may be merciful on those who fall on the field of honour. We and all our friends abroad have unceasingly endeavoured to make it clear that the Dutch attack is in fact a colonial war, that the Dutch are 'guilty of imposing their will on the Indonesian people by force of arms. The world has condemned the Dutch aggression. The Security Council has voiced its opinion and appealed for a cessation of the hostilities launched by the Dutch. That appeal has been forwarded to the Republic of Indonesia. We have demonstrated that we are able to counter the Dutch aggression, that we are able to inflict blows upon the Dutch in a hard fight against a colonial army. The world does not nurse any :1oubt as to the righteousness of the Republican standpoint now. The world is anxious to stop this war in Indonesia and recommends peaceful means. We are profoundly convinced that peaceful means are the righteous and perfect means. We do not forget our cause in that we shall continue to be awa~'e that our struggle will be sustained. However, we realize the urgency 2. Cablogramme, en date du leraout 1947, adresse au Premier Ministre de la Republique d'Indonesie par le President du Conseil de securite et communiquant la resolution adoptee par le Conseil asa cent-soixante-treizieme seance, et reponse en date du 4 aotit 1947, du Vice-Premier Ministre (document S/465) 1. 3. Lettre, en date du ler aotit 1947, adressee a l'Ambassadeur des Pays-Bas aux Etats-Unis par le President du Conseil de securite, et communiquant la resolution adoptee par le Conseil de securite a sa cent soixante-treizieme seance, et reponses, en date des 3 et 4 aotit 1947 (document S/466)2. 4. Cablogramme, en date du 5 aotit 1947. adresse au President du Conseil de securite par le Vice-Premier Ministre· de la Republique d'Indonesie (document S/469). 5. Texte de l'allocution radiophonique prononcee le 4 aotit 1947 par M. Cockarno, President de la Republique d'Indonesie, et communiquee au President du Conseil de securite (document S/470)3. 1 Le texte de la reponse du Vice-Premier Ministre de la Republique d'Indonesie figure au Proces-verbaux officiels dt~ Conseil de securite, Deuxieme Annee, No 69, 174eme seance. 2 Les reponses de l'Ambassadeur des Pays-Bas aux Etats-Unis et de la delegation des Pays-Bas aupres de ~'Organisation des Nations Unies, figurent aux Procesverbauz officiels du Conseil de sec'Urite, Deuxieme Annee, 174eme seance. 3 Voir le texte de cette allocution qui a ete retransmise par les stations radiophoniques de la Republique d'Indonesie le 4 aoftt a minuit, heure locale: Document S/470 6 aoftt 1947 [Texte original en angklis] A I'ensemble des forces armees et au peuple d'Indonesie: Le 21 juillet, troisieme jour de ce saint mois, j'ai donne l'ordre a I'ensemble de notre peuple et de nos forces armees de se dresser comme un sew homme et de resister a la revoltante agression des Pays-Bas. Le peuple indonesien et nos forces armees ont repondu a cet ordre et ont demontre au monde qu'its ont fait ensemble leur devoir fidelement et sans reserves. J'exprime ici ma gratitude atous les membres des forces armees qui ont accompli des sacrifices et subi des epreuves en accomplissant 1e'.1rs taches. Je prie Dieu d'avoir pitie de ceux qui tombent au champ d'honneur. Nous, et tous nos amis a I'etranger, nous sommes inlassablement efforces d'expliquer clairement que l'attaque des Pays-Bas est, en realite, une guerre coloniale, et que les Hollandais sont coupables d'imposer par la force des armes leur volonte au peuple indonesien. Le monde a condamne I'agression des PaY5-Bas. Le Conseil de securite a fait connaitre son opinion, et a lance un appel en faveur de la cessation des hostilites declenchees par les Hollandais. Cet appel a ete transmis a la Republique d'Indonesie. Nous avons demontre que nous sommes capables de repondre a I'agression des Pays-Bas et de porter des coups aux Hollandais dans un duI' combat contre une armee coloniale. Le monde n'a aucun doute quant a la justice des points de vue des republicains maintenant. Le monde est tres desireux de mettre fin a cette guerre en Indonesie et recommande les moyens pacifiques. Nous sommes profondement convaincus que les moyens pacifiques sont les moyens justes et parfaits. Nous n'oublions pas notre cause, en ce sens que nous continuerons a nous rappeler que nous poursuivons notre lutte. Ce- 7. Cablegram dated 6 August 1947 from the Deputy Prime Minister of the Indonesian Republic addressed to the President of the Security '> Council concerning Netherlands military operations (do~ument S/475) . The PRESIDENT: As these documents have been circulated, and as the Council has expressed the desire to be informed of what is happening,· the Secretariat has remained in continuous communication with the area in question. The documents which have been mentioned show what is taking , place and what progress has been made with re- ~rd to the Indonesian question. Mr. SEN (India) : Since the request for a cessa- . tion of hostilities was made by the Security Council, reports have been received from the Government of the Netherlands and from the Government of the Indonesian Rey'ublic concerning the manner in which that request has been complied with. The reports are contradictory; each side claims that the other has continued hostilities after the cease fire order was supposed to become effective. Fmihermore, a cablegram dated 5 August,l addressed to the President of the Security Council, has been received from Mr. Gani, Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, containing certain suggestions in regard to the implement:'ltion of the appeal, and we shall choose peaceful means while being fully convinced of our own strength and of the righteousness of our cause. With complete faith that we are able to sustain our struggle, we shall comply with the appeal of the· Security Comcil. pendant, nous avons pleine conscience de l'urgence de cet appel, et nous choisirons les moyens pacifiques tout en restant entierement persuades de notre propre force et de la justice de notre cause. Fermement convaincus que nous sommes capables de continueI' la lutte, nous repondrons al'appel lance par le Conseil de securite. En consequence, je donne l'ordre al'ensemble des forces armees de la Republique d'Indonesie et au peuple qui combat avec elles de rester sur les positions occupees en ce' moment et de cesser toute hostilite. I therefore give the following order to the entire armed forces of the Indonesian Republic and to the people struggling at the side of our armed forces: to remain in the positions which they now occupy and to cease all hostilities. 1 The following is the text of the cablegram: Document S/469 6 August 1947 [Original tC%t: English] . 1. The Government of the Republic of Indonesia, wishmg to comply with the decision taken by the Security Council on 1 August 1947, and earnestly desiring to re- 1 Void le texte de ce cablogramme: Document S/469 6 aoiit 1947 [Tc%te original en anglais] 1. Le Gouvernement de la Republique d'Indonesie, soucieux de se conformer a la decision du Conseil de securite en date du 1er aoiit 1947, et profondement desireux de retablir la paix en Indonesie, a decide de donner l'ordre a toutes les forces armees de la Republique de cesser les hostilites le lundi 4 aoiit aminuit (heure locale). 2. Le Gouvernement de la Republique d'Indonesie appelle l'attention du Conseil de securite sur le fait que les autorites neerlandaises de Djakatra n'ont tran~mis ladite decision au Gouvernement de la Republique que le 4 aoiit 1947 a 1 heure du matin (heure locale). Etant donne que les mesures tendant a executer effectivement l'ordre de cesser les hostilites doivent etre prises le plus tot possible, le Gouvernement de la Republique d'Indonesie deplore vivement le delai mis par les autorites neerlandaises de Djakatra a lui transmettre la decision du Conseil de securite. s~ore peace in Indonesia, has decided to order all Repubhcan armed forces to cease hostilities on Monday, 4 August, at 24.00 hours, Indonesian standard time. 2; The Government of the Republic of Indonesia calls to the attention of the Security Council the fact that the Netherlands Government in Djakatra did not communicate the aforementioned decision to the Republican Gov.. emment u?til 4 August 1947, at 01.00 hours, Indonesian stan~ard tIme. In view of the need for taking the speediest POSSIble measures to ensure effective execution of the order to c~ase hostilities, the Government of the Republic of !~donesla greatly regrets that the transmission of the decISIon of the Security Council was delayed by the Netherlands authorities in Djakatra. 3. The Government of the Republic of Indonesia req.uests the SecUl:ity Council to take into fullest consideration t~e fac~ that,,in executing the cease fire order, serious tec]mlcal dIfficultIes, such as the shortage of time and the. heavy damage caused to Republican lines of communication by Dutch acts of aggression, had to be overcome. 3. Le Gouvernement de la Repub:ique d'Indonesie demande au Conseil de securite de bien wu10ir tenir compte, dans toute la mesure qui s'impose, de ';ertaines difficultes materielles serieuses qu'il a dii surmQnter pour appliquer l'ordre de cessation des hostilites.. et ilotamment du peu de tel'Jps dont it disposait et des Clegats importants que les actes d'agression des Hollandais ont causes aux lignes de communication de la Republique. 4. 11 convient, en outre, de ne pas oublier que, contrairement a la situation militaire du 14 octobre 1946, date a laquelle l'ordre de cesser les hostilites a ete donne la p~miere fois, par l'une et l'autre des parties, en presence d'une tierce partie, on ne saurait, a l'heure actuelle, tracer exactement la ligne de demarcation qui separe nettement les forces de la Republique de celIes des Hollandais. Etant donne le systeme de de£ense populaire adopte par l'armee nationale de la Republique, les combats ne sont pas limites a un front bien marque. Au contraire, dans de nombreuses 4. It should be considered furthermore that at the pr~sent time, in contrast with 'the military situation which eXIsted on 14 October 1946, when for the first time a bease fit;e order was issued by both sides and witnessed y a t~lrd party, no definite line of demarcation clearly separatmg the Republican and the Netherlands' forces ca~ be t,·aced. In view of the system of popular defenc~ ilihlc~ ha~ been followed by the Republican national army, oe :htmg has not been restricted to definite frf)nts. n t e contrary, in many towns and areas which the The Japanese had overrun Indonesia by April 1942, within almost three months of the declaration of war, and occupied the country until their defeat by the Allies in August 1945. It will be recalled that almost exactly a year after the declaration of war, Queen Wilhelmina gave an assurance to the Indonesians in a radio broadcast that she would convene a conference to decide on the political reorganization of Indonesia, a reorganization which would be based on the principle of partnership and voluntary acceptance. The Indonesiau nationalists were not prepared to accept the Dutch assurance. Two days after the Japanese surrender, Indonesians led by Mr. Soekamo proclaimed the establishment and independence of the Republic of Indonesia. They promulgated a provisional constitution and established administrative machinery. When Japan surrendered, Dutch forces were not available on the scene. Indian troops moved into Batavia on 29 September 1945 under the command of General Christison, representing the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command. India was told, and so was the world, that the Allies had only two objectives: to disarm and concentrate the defeated Japanese forces, and to rescue and repatriate Allied prisoners of war and internees. It was announced that the intention was to restrict the occupation to a few key cities and not to interfere in the local administration. The Republican Government declared its willingness to assist the Allied forces to carry out their two primary tasks, making it clear that it would resist any attempt, whether by the Allies or by the Dutch acting alone, to re-impose their authority. Netherlands military command claimed to have occupied, the Republican forces have up till now maintained their positions. 5. The Government of the Republic of Indonesia, mindful of the experience gained during the past two years, wishes to express its grave concern about the fact that, unless the execution of the cease fire order is fully and continuously supervised by a neutral third party, there is no guarantee that it will not be unilaterally violated by the Netherlands forces. The Republican Government therefore strongly urges the Security Council to appoint a committee composed of the representatives of several countries and to dispatch it to Indonesia as soon as possible for the purpose of ensuring the effective and smooth implementation of the cease fire order. 6. The Government of the Republic of Indonesia wishes to emphasize that it is imperative that the Netherlands cease fire order should imply the cessation of all kinds of action directed by the Netherlands military and civil authorities against the Indonesian population. 7. Finally, the Republican Government is of the opinion that the cessation of hostilities should be followed by the withdrawal of the Netherlands armed forces from Republican territory at least behind the demarcation lines fixed by both sides on 14 October 1946. En avril 1942, moins de trois mois apres la declaration de guerre, les Japonais avaient envahi toute l'Indonesie et ils ont occupe le pays jusqu'a ce qu'ils soient vaincus par les Allies en aout 1945. Presque exactement un an apres la declaration de guerre, on se rappellera que la reine Wilhelmine a, dans une declaration radiodiffusee, donne aux Indonesiens I'assurance qu'elle reunirait une conference chargee de decider de la reorganisation politique de l'Indonesie, reorganisation qui serait fondee sur le principe de l'association et du consentement volontaire. Les nationalistes indonesiens n'etaient pas disposes it accepter les assurances que leur donnaient les Pays-Bas. Deux jours apres la capitulation japonaise, les Indonesiens; sous la conduite de M. Soekarno, ont proclame I'etablissement d'une Republique d'Indonesie independante. Ils ont promulgue une constitution provisoire et mis sur pied un appareil administratif. Lors de la'reddition japonaise, il n'y avait pas sur place de forces neerlandaises. Des troupes hindoues, sous le commandement du general Christison, representant le Commandant en chef de la region du sud-esc de l'Asie, firent leur entree it Batavia, le 29 septembre 1945. Les Allies dec1arerent it l'Inde, comme au reste du mode, qu'i!s n'avaient que deux objectifs: desarmer et reunir les forces japonaises battues, liberer et rapatrier les prisonniers de guerre allies et les internes. Ils annoncerent qu'ils avaient I'intention de limiter l'occupation it quelques villes-cle et de ne pas s'immiscer dans l'administration locale. Le Gouvemement republicain declara qu'il etait pret it aider les forces alliees it mener it bien lem:,s deux taches pnmordiales, indiquant clairement qu'il resisterait it toute tentative, soit des Allies, soit des seuls Pays-Bas, visant it restaurer I'autorite de ces demiers. villes et regions que le commandement militaire neer]andais pretend avoi~ occupees, les forces de la Repubhque conservent toujours leurs positions. 5. Le Gouvernement de la Republique d'Indonesi~, ins: truit par l'exrerience des deux dernieres annees, bent a exprimer toute la crainte qu'il eprouve de voir les forces neerlandaises violer unilateralement l'ordre de cesser le feu si l'execution de cet ordre n'est pas garanti completement et constamment par une tierce partie neutre. En consequence, le Gouvernement de la Republique dem,ande instamment qu'une commission composee de repr~sen­ tants de plusieurs pays, et nommee par le Con~el1 de securite, soit envoyee le plus tot possible en Indonesle Pdur assurer l'execution effective et sans incidents de l'or re de cessation des hostilites. . 6. Le Gouvernement de la Republique d'Indones,ie tient a souligner que I'ordre des autorites neerlanda~ses de cesser les hostilites doit comporter, comme C?l}s~quence obligatoire, la cessation par les autorites mllttalr~s, et civiles neerlandaises, des operations de tous ordres dtrlgees contre la population indonesienne. . 7. Enfin, le Gouvernement de la Republique estlID.e que la cessation des hostilites doit etre suivie du retralt. des forces armees neerlandaises du territoire de la Republ!q~e, au moins jusque derriere les lignes de demarcation flxees par les deux parties le 15 octobre 1946. facto authority of the Republic, although recognizing at the same time the de jure sovereignty of the Netherlands. The Unii:ed Kingdom had to adopt that attitude because world opinion was against the use of Allied military force to help the Dutch regain their lost territory. temps l'autorite de droit des Pays-Bas. Le Royaume-Uni fut contraint d'adopter cette attitude parce que l'opinion mondiale s'opposait a ce que les forces militaires alliees fussent employees a aider les Hollandais a regagner les territoires qu'ils avaient perdus. Les Pays-Bas, cependant, refuserent de reconnaitre la Republique d'Indonesie, et, en octobre, des combats intermittents eurent lieu entre les Indonesiens et les troupes d'occupation sur le pourtour des secteurs occupes par ces dernieres. Se rendant compte de la necessite, pour les Allies, de se retirer de l'Indonesie clans un avenir rapproche,. et en raison des protestations qui s'elevaient, particulierement aux Indes, contre l'emploi de troupes alliees en Indonesie pour des buts autres que le desarmement des troupes japonaises, la delivrance des prisonniers de guerre allies, et leur rapatriement, les Pays-Bas exprimerert le desir de rechercher la mediation du Royaume- Uni en vue d'aboutir a une entente avec les atitorites republicaines. Le 15 mars 1946, des negociations commencerent entre les Pays-Bas, representes par M. van Mook, et les Indonesiens diriges par M. Sjahriar, l'Ambassadeur du Royaume-Uni, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, faisant fonction de president. Cependant, a la fin d'avril, on aboutit a une impasse, les Indonesiens pretendant que la Republique, qui avait deja ete reconnue de facto par les forces d'occupation, devait etre reconnue de fa<;on formeHe en tant qu'Etat souverain par les Pays-Bas. Les negociations ne furent pas reprises avant le ler juin 1946. Pendant cette periode, les Hollandais renfor- <;aient leur puissance militaire dans cette region, sous la protection des Allies et grace a l'aide que ceux-ci leur apportaient en armes, equipement el instruction militaire. Lorsque les negociations £urent, en fin de compte, rompues, les Hollandais avaient rassemble environ 100.000 hommes entierement armes et equipes d'armes modernes. Ils avaient egalement mis sur pied un Etat pretendu autonome en Indonesie orientale, sous leur protection militaire, et un autre Etat dans le Borneo du Sud. Lorsque les negociations reprirent au mois de juin, le Gouvernement republicain protesta contre ce qu'il appelait une action unilaterale, affirmant que c'etait la un acte tendant nettement a affaiblir les forces de la Republique, tant pendant la periode de gouvernement interimaire que lorsque serait cree un gouvernement des Etats- Unis d'Indonesie comme on se proposait de le faire. Le Gouvernement de la Republique d'Indonesie insistait de plus sur la reconnaissance de son autorite souveraine. Les negociations avec le representant de l'Indonesie ayant echoue, les Hollandais reunirent a Malino, le 15 juin 1946, une conference comprenant des chefs indonesiens venus de Borneo, des Celebes, et d'autres iles de l'est de l'archipel. A cette conference, on se mit d'accord sur la reorganisation des ~ndes neerlandaises en tIne federation d'Etats autonomes. Au mois d'aout, les Etats generaux des Pays- The Dutch, however, refused to recognize the Indonesian Republic, and in October spasmodic fighting broke out betwee.n the Indonesians and the occupying forces on the outskirts of the sectors held by the latter. Realizing the inevitabiJity of an Allied withdrawal from Indonesia in the near future (protests against the use of Allied troops in Indonesia for any purposes other than disarmament of Japanese troops and rescue and repatriation of Allied prisoners of war were growing daily, particularly in India) the Dutch expressed their willingness to seek mediation. by the British in coming to an understanding with the RepUblican authorities. On 15 March' 1946, negotiations began between the Dutch, represented by Mr. Van Mook, and the Indonesians, led by Mr. Sjahriar, with the British .Ambassador, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr acting as chairman. However, at the end of April a deadlock was reached because of the Indonesian claim that the Republic, which had alreacdy received de facto recognition from the occupying forces,. should receive formal recognition as a ~verElgn State from the Netherlands, The negotiatIons were not resumed until 1 June 1946. Throughout that period, the Dutch were building up their military strength in that area under Alli.ed protection and with Allied help in arms, eqUIpment and training. By the time negotiations were finally broken off, the Dutch had collected a force of nearly 100,000 men, fully armed and equipped with modern weapons. They had also promoted a so-called autonomous State in East Indonesia ut:der their military protection, and another State 111 South Borneo. When negotiations were resumed in June, the Republican Governme?t protested against what it termed unilateral actIOn, alleging it to be a deliberate act to weaken the power of the Republic, both during the period of the proposed interim government and also when the projected United States of Indonesia was final- ~y ~aunched. The Republican Government further InSIsted on recognition of its sovereign authority. The negotiations with the Indonesian representative having broken down, on 15 July 1946 the Dutch called a conference at Malino of Indonesian ~eaders from Borneo, Ce1ebes and other eastern Islands of the archipelago. That conference agreed on ~he. reorganization of the Netherlands East Indles mto a federation of autonomous States. The developments which followed the signing of the draft agreement on 15 November will be of special interest to the Security Council. The Netherlands Parliament gave its assent to the final ratification of the Agreement on the express condition that the terms were interpreted in accordance with a lengthy elucidation issued by the Dutch Commission-General. Actually, however, when the Agreement was finally signed and ratified on 25 March 1947,1 the Neth;.:-lands representatives signed it on the condition laid down by the Netherlands Parliament, while at the same time accepting the Indonesian condition that the Indonesian representatives, for their part, should be bound only by the text of the Agreement and by such minutes as had been signed by both parties. When, in a dispute of this nature, each party is expressly allowed to make its own interpretation of the text, it is only to be expected that the agreement will not lead to peace and understanding. The Dutch complained that the Indonesians continued to maintain a full internal blockade and created border incidents; they objected to the activities of the Republic in the field of diplomatic relations with India, Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, Australia, China and other nations. The Indonesians complained that the Dutch maintained their naval blockade of the Republic and were primarily responsible for the armed incidents along the border. The Indonesians claimed that they had the right to en~er into diplomatic relations with foreign countries, on the ground that the de facto authority of the Indonesian Republic had already been recognized by the Netherlands. On 27 May 1947 the Commission-General presented a memorandum to the Republican delegation on the implementation of the Agreement. In the memorandum the Commission-General laid down its own interpretation of the articles of the Agreement with regard to: 1. The re-organization of the Netherlands East Indies Government into a central apparatus of the future federation and the establishment of organs for co-operation with the supreme Government of the Netherlands; 2. The O!"ganization of foreign relations ar.d the preparation of a foreign service for the future United States of Indonesia; , 3. Military co-operation with a view to ensuring complete cessation of hostilities, restoration of law 1 The text of the Agreement is contained in the volume entitled Tht Political Events in the Republic of Indonesia, published by the Netherlands Information Bureau, 10 Rockefeller Plaza, New York. d'Indonesie et d'apres lesquelles les representants d'Indonesie ne seraient lies que par le texte de l'accord et par tels proces-verbaux qui auraient ete signes par les deux parties. Lorsque, dans un differend de cette nature, iI est expressement permis achaque partie de donner au texte sa propre interpretation, il faut s'attendre a ce que l'accord ne conduise, ni a la paixl ni a une entente. Les Pays-Bas se sont plaints que les Indonesiens aient continue le blocus interieur integral et qu'ils aient cree des incidents de frontiere. IIs se sont eleves contre les mesures prises par la Republique dans le domaine des relations diplomatiques avec I'Inde, l'Egypte, la Chine, le Liban, I'Irak, l'Australie et d'autres nations. Les Indonesiens se sont plaints que les Pays-Bas continuaient leur blocus naval de la Republique, et its les ont accuses d'etre prirtci~ale­ ment responsables des engagements provoques le long de la frontiere. Les Indonesiens ont rever!- dique leur droit d'etablir des relations diplomatrques avec les pays etrangers, invoquant le fait que 'l'autorite de fait de la Republique indonesienne avait deja ete reconnue par les Hollandais. Le 27 mai 1947, la Commission generale presenta a la delegation de la Republique un memorandum concernant la mise en vigueur'de l'Accord. ElIe y exposait sa propre interpretation des articles de l'Accord ayant trait a: 1. La reorganisation du Gouvernement des ~n: des neerlandaises en un organisme central destme a assurer la federation future et la creation d'organes de cooperation avec le Gouvernement supreme des Pays-Bas; 2. L'organisation des relations avec l'etranger et la preparation d'un service des affaires ~tran­ geres pour les futurs Etats-Unis d'Indonesle; 3. La collaboration militaire en vue d'une cessation complete des hostilites, du retablissement de 1 Le texte de l'Accord figure dans un volume.intitulll: The Political Events in the Republic of IndoneSla~ eNtpublie par le Bureau d'information des Pays-Bas a ew' York. 5. The Indonesian Republic's relations with parts of Indonesia not ~e1ong!ng to it, co-operation between them, and mc1USlOn of the occupled territories of Java and Sumatra in Republican territory. I would emphasize here that these interpretations were made by the Netherlands Commission- General, which asked the Indonesian Republic to accept them and implement the Agreement. .Among the main interpretations of the Netherlands Commission-General were the following: that during the transition period, namely, during the period of the organization of the United States of Indonesia, the sovereignty of the Dutch Crown would be maintained; that in the Federal Council, that is, in the interim government which would be formed by the representative of the Crown together with the representatives of the political bodies in Indonesia, the representative of the Crown should have a special position with the power of decision; and that a joint gendarmerie should be formed in the occupied territories to ensure law and order. In the memorandum which thus gave an entirely unilateral interpretation of the Agreement, the Commission-General stated categoric211y that it would not accept any essential alteration of its proposals. It demanded a reply within fourteen days: "In case the answer is in the negative or unsatisfactory, the Commission-General sees, to its regret, no possibility of continuing the discussions, and will have to submit to the Netherlands Government the question as to what is to happen further." The Indonesian reaction to that memorandum was naturally unfavourable. The Indonesians reiterated instances of Dutch infringement of the Agrement by the naval blockade, constant crossing of the boundary lines, and encouragement of separat!st movements in the occupied areas. They particularly emphasized that in the memorandum the de facto position of the Republic during the transition period, as accepted by the Netherlands Gove~ment in the Agreement, had not been recog- Dlzed. They accepted practically all the specific demands made by the Dutch except the institution of a joint police force. The maintenance of peace and order in the area of the Republic, they contended, must be treated as a task for the Republican police and not for the Netherlands army. They were agreeable to immediate cessation of hostilities as demanded by the Dutch, provided it was mutual. The reply of the Indonesians did not satisfy the Dutch, who would not give any assurance of mutual .c.essation of hostilities nor of any reduction ~f mlhtary strength. They insisted on the organization ,?f a joint police force. On 14 and 15 July they lssued an ultimatum, with which the Indone- La reponse des Indonesiens n'a pas donne sa'dsfaction aux Hollandais, qui ne voulaient offrir aucune assurance reciproque de cessation des hostilites ni de reducti0n des forces militaires. 11s insistaient sur l'organisation d'une force de police mixte. Les 14 et 15 juillet, ils adresserent un That is the background against which the proposals I should like to submit to the Security Council should be judged. The course of events since the declaration of hostilities is known to the Council. The Dutch forces have proceeded from one victory to another. By this time practically all the strategic areas in Java and Sumatra are in their hands. I cast no reflection on the courage and bravery of the Dutr:l; but I submit that when one party, equipped with modern arms and weapons, fights another party which has only bamboo poles and fights mostly with its hands, such victories are quite understandable. I realize that the bamboo pole, when sufficiently sharpened, can be very uncomfortable. But against modern weapons such means can be of no avail. As has been said, the main point of the proposal which was made at the hundred and seventy-second meeting1 was that, with the cessation of hostilities, the Security Council should also ask for the withdrawal of the Dutch to their original positions. For various reasons, the members of the Security Council 'iIiilre not disposed to take up the matter seriously • that stage. Their principal concern was the cessation of hostilities, and they wanted that question settled before going into the merits of the case. The time has now come to do so. Unless the Dutch withdraw to the positions which they held when hostilities broke out, the Indonesians consider that they will be at a great disadvantage when the time for negotiations comes. I am sure that no one who has foHowed the course of events in Indonesia will dispute that fact. Already the rich lands which provide fcod for the people have been occupied by the Dutch. Other materials of vital economic importance to the people of Indonesia are under the control of the Dutch. In these circumstances, if negotiations are to take place between these two States-as I will call them-it is clear that one party, namely, Indonesia, must be at a great disadvantage. I therefore submit for the consideration of the Security Council that it should seriously examine the proposal of the Indonesian Republic which the Deputy Prime Minister makes in his cablegram dated 5 August addressed to the President of the Security Council, namely, that "cessation of hostilities should be followed by withdrawal of the Dutch armed forces from Republican territory at least behind the demarcation lines fixed by both sides on 14 October 1946". I ask the Security Council to take this into consideration. I am not in a position to define exactrywhat the Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia means by the demarcation lines fixed by both sides on 14 October 1946, for the very simple reason that I am not aware of what those lines were. As a matter of fact, the Deputy Prime Minister himself, in the course of his cablegram, says that there are no definite lines of demarcation. In paragraph 4 he says that "at evenements depuis la declaration des hostilites est bien connue du Conseil. Les forces neerlandaises ont vole de victoire en victoire. En ce moment, presque toutes les zones strategiques de Java et de Sumatra sont entre leurs mains. Je ne mets pas en doute le courage ni la bravoure des Hollandais, mais je pense que, lorsque I'une des parties, equipee d'armes et d'engins modernes, combat un adversaire qui ne dispose que de perches de bambou et lutte .surtout corps a. corps, ces victoires 50nt faciles a. comprendre. Je me rends parfaitement compte qu'une tige de bambou, bien taillee, peut se reveler tres desagreable. Mais, contre les armes modernes, de tels moyens de defense sont sans efficacite. Comme on l'a declare anterieurement, le point principal de la proposition soumise a. la cent-soixante-douzieme seance1 est que le Conseil de securite devrait demander le retrait des troupes neerlandaises sur leurs positions initiales, ainsi que la cessation des hostilites. Pour diverses raisons, les membres Oti Conseil de securite n'etaient pas disposes a. envisager la question serieusement a. ce moment-la.. Leur preoccupation majeure etait la cessation des hostilites, et ils voulaient que cette question fut reglee avant d'examiner le fond de la question. Le moment est venu, maintenant, de le faire. A moins que les Hollandais ne se retirent sur les positions qu'ils tenaient au moment ou les hostilites ont eclate, les Indonesiens considerent qu'ils seront desavantages lorsqt!e le moment des negociations viendra. Je suis certain que personne ne contestera ce fait, s'il a suivi l'evolution des evenements en Indonesie. Deja., les Hollandais ont occupe les terres riches qui assurent la nourriture du peuple. lIs ont la haute main sur d'autres matieres premieres d'importance economique /itale pour le peuple indonesien. Dans ces cor.ditions, si des negociations doivcnt etre engagees entre ces deux Etats - et je me plais a. les appeler ainsi - il est clair que l'une des parties, l'Indonesie dans le cas qui nous occupe, serait tres desavantagee. Je propose done que le Conseil envisage I'examen tres attentif des propositions que le Vice-Premier Ministre de la Republique d'Indonesie a faites, au nom de son Gouvernement, dans le cablogramme en cfate du 5 aout qu'il adressait au President du Conseil de securite, a. savoir "... que la cessation des hostilites doit etre suivie du retrait des forces armees neerlandaises du territoire de la Republique, au moins jusque derriere les lignes de demarcation fixees par les deux parties le 14 octobre 1946". Je demande au Conseil de securite d'etudier cette question. Je ne suis pas en mesure de de£inir exactement ce que le Vice-Premier Ministre de la Republique d'Indonesie entend par "1ignes de demarcation fixees par les deux parties le 14 octobre 1946", pour la raison tres simple que je ne sais pas ce que sont ces lignes. En realite, le Vice- Premier Ministre lui-meme, dans son ciiblo- The other important suggestion made on behalf of the Indonesian Reuublic is that an international arbitration commission should be set up and dispatched to Indonesia without delay.l In putting this suggestion to the Security Council, I should like to state that India is grateful to the United States for the offer of its good offices to both siJ.es to settle the dispute. If I press for this proposal for an international arbitration commission, it is not because I do not 1 The suggestion is contained in the following cablegram dated 7 August 1947 from Mr. Gani, Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, addressed to the President of the Security Council: Document Si477 7 August 1947 [Origiool text: EngUsh] 1. The Government and the people of the Republic of Indonesia heard with great gratitl1de and appreciation the offer broadcast on behalf of the United States Government to extend its good offices to the Indonesian Government in any future negotiations in which the Government of the Republic may be involved. 2. The Government of the Republic of Indonesia has the honour to call the attention of the United States Government to the decision adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations. The Republican Government adhering to the principles of the United Nations, is ful1~ prepared to submit to the decision of the Security Coundl in which arbitration has been recommended as the primary means of settling the present dispute. The Indonesian Government cordially accepts the good offices of the United States Government and requests it to use its influence with the G~vernment of .the Net~erla~ds and with the Security CounCIl of the Umted NatIons In order that, in accord- ~nce with the Indonesian proposal, an international arbitratIOn commission should be dispatched without delay to Indonesia. 3. In view of the fact that two years of negotiation and media.tion have failed to prevent the outbreak of largescale hostihties, the Republican Government feels sure that the Governments of the United States of America the Unit.ed ~ingdom and the Netherlands will aU agre~ that arbItratIon by a United Nations commission constitutes the only and final hope of settling this dispute by peaceful means. 4. :r~e Gover~ment of the Republic is unanimous in its convIctIon that If the United States feels able to support the aforementioned proposal, it will for the following reasons be performing a deed of lasting value: (a) The Governments of the Republic and of the Netherlands could agree to abide loyally by any decision reached by the a.rbitration commission; (b) Th.ere is therefore strong reason to believe that suc~ an International commission would bring about a lastIng settlement; (c) The United Nations would thus be creating a much needed. precedent which would prove to the world that its authOrIty can stop wars and settle disputes. 5. Finally, th~ Government of the Republic of Indonesia reque~ts the Umted St~tes Government to instruct a representatIVe to fly to Jog)akarta as soon as possible in order ~~at th~ R~publica;u Government may more fully acquaint Im WIth Its offi~lal point of view. d 6.. The Repubhcan Government would appreciate early a VIce by radio from the United States Government as to ~e.probable time of arrival of the representative of the mted States representative at Jogjaka~a airport. L'autre proposition importante faite au nom de la Republique d'Indonesie prevoit la creation d'une commission internationale d'arbitrage et son depart immediat pour l'Indonesie1• En portant cette proposition a la connaissance du Conseil de securite, je tiens aexprimer la gratitude de l'Inde enve-s les Etats-Unis pour l'offre de bons offices que ce pays a faite aux deux parties pour regler le differend. Si j'insiste sur cette proposition relative a la creation d'une commission internationale d'arbitrage, ce n'est pas parce que je ne me rends' pas 1 Cette proposition est contenue dans le ciblogramme, en date du 1 aout 1947, adresse au President du Conseil de securite par M. Gani, Vice-Primier Ministre de la Republique d'Indonesie. Voici le texte de ce ciblogramme: Document S/477 7 aout 1947 [Texte origiool en anglais] 1. Le Gouvernement et le peuple de la Republique d'Indonesie ont appris avec grande reconnaissance et satisfaction I'offre radiodiffusee faite par le Gouvernement des Etats- Unis de mettre ses services a la disposition du Gouvemement de l'Indonesie pour tOl1tes negociations futures auxqueUes ce Gouvernement peut etre appele a participer. 2. Le Gouvernement de la Republique d'Indonesie a I'honneur d'attirer I'attention du Gouvernement des Etats- Unis sur la decision adoptee par le Conseil de securite des Nations Uuies. Adherant aux principes de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, le Gouvernement de la Republique est entierement dispose ase soumettre ala decision du Conseil de securite aux termes de laquelle I'arbitrage a ete recommande comme le moyen principal de regler le differend actuel. En acceptant cordialement les bons offices du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis, le Gouvernement de l'Indonesie prie le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'user de SOn influence aupres du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et aupres du Conseil de securite des Nations Unies pour que, conformement ala proposition de l'Indonesie, une commission internationale d'arbitrage soit envoyee sans retard dans ce pays. 3. Le Gouvernement de la Republique a la certitude que les Gouvernements des Etats-Unis d'Amerique, du Royaume-Uni et des Pays-Bas reconnaitront tous, etant donne qUe deux annees de negociations et de mediation n'ont pas pu empecher le dec1enchement d'hostilites sur une !<rande echelle, que le seul et ultime espoir de regler ce differend par des moyens pacifiques reside dans l'arbitrage d'une commission des Nations Unies. 4. Le Gouvernement de la Republique est unanimement convaincu que, si les Etats-Unis se jugent en mesure d'appuyer la proposition mentionnee ci-dessus, it aura fait reuvre durable, pour les raisons suivantes: a) Le Gouvernement de la Republique et celui des Pays- Bas pourraient accepter de respecter loyalement toute decision prise par la commission d'arbitrage; h) I1 existe done de bonnes raisons de croire qu'une telle commission internationale reglerait le conflit de faJ;on durable; c) L'Organisation des Nations Unies creerait ainsi l'indispensable precedent qui prouverait au monde qu'elle peut, par son autorite, arreter les guerres et regler les differends. 5. Enfin le Gouvernement de la Republique d'Indonesie prie le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'envoyer a Djokjakarta des que possible, par voie aerienne, un representant a qui le Gouvernement de la Republique l',JUrra faire connaitre plus amplement son point de vue officiel. 6. Le Gouvernement de la Republique serait reconnaissant au Gouvernement des Etats-Unis de lui faire connaitre a l'avance par radio l'heure probable d'arrivee du representant des Etats-Unis a l'aerodrome de Djokjakarta. The reasons why we took that action were, as I said then, the following: that hostages were still being kept-not in accordance with the Linggadjati Agreement; that the territories held by us were systematically starved and foodstuffs were prevented from being moved in-not in accordance with the Linggadjati Agreement; and that hostilities had not ceased-again not in accordance with the Linggadjati Agreement. I mentioned that we had evidence-and I am going to produce that evidence-of more than one thousand infractions of the armistice signed in October last year. Then there was the general impotence of the Republican Government to master the wild and lawless elements which were roaming the countryside and terrorizing the population; and coupled therewith were the chaotic conditions that prevailed in the territories under the nominal authority of the Republic of Indonesia. Order had to be restored in the interest of the people. We do not glory in that brief campaign; M. VAN KLEFFE:NS (Pays-Bas) (traduit d~ l'anglais): Nous venons d'entendre un expose assez complet des affaires interieures du Royaume des Pays-Bas, Membre de 1'0rganisation des Nations Unies. Si cet expose etait, a bien des egards, exact, il ne l'etait cependant pas entierement. Je ne pense pas, toute£ois, qu'il entre dans la competence du Conseil de s'occuper de ces questions, et, par consequent, je m'abstiendrai de les examiner en detail, en faisant toutefois exception pour celle que voici. Je ne veux pas que s'accredite davantage la legende que noUs sommes passes aux actes contre les forces de la Republique parce que nous ne pouvions pas noUs mettre d'accord sur la question de la gendarmerie. On l'a dit a maintes reprises; je repete ce que j'ai deja dit a la centsoixante et onzieme seance1 : ce n'est pas vrai. Les raisons pour lesqt1elle~ nous sommes passes aux actes, ainsi que je l'ai dit alors, sont les suivantes: on detient encore des otages, ce qui n'est pas prevu par l'Accord de Linggadjati; les territoires que nous occupons sont systematiquement affames et 1'0n empeche les denrees alimentaires d'y penetrer, ce qui n'est pas prevu par l'Accord de Linggadjati; les hostilites n'ont pas pris fin, ce qui n'est pas non plus conforme a l'Accord de Linggadjati. rai dit que nous avions la preuve, et je vais maintenant la fournir, qu'il y a eu plus de mille infractions a l'armistice signe en octobre demier. Il y a' eu egalement l'impuissance generale du Gouvernement republicain cl. maitriser les bandes dechainees qui sillonnent la campagne pour terroriser la population, impuissance cl. laquelle s'ajoutent les conditions chaotiques qui dominent dans ces territoires places sous l'autorite nominale de la Republique d'Indonesie. Dans l'inten~t du peuple, il convenait de restaurer l'ordre. Nous ne tirons pas gloire de cette Let me quote a witness, who has given me his permission to mention this or any other portion from his report. He is Mr. Leslie B. Moss, Executive Director of the American Church World Service, a responsible organization created by the Protestant Churches of America to organize their aid to churches abroad. Mr. Moss says: "There are close observers of the situation who feel certain that the temporizing tactics of the Indonesians arise not so much from fear of the Dutch authorities as from the realization of their own unreadiness to deal effectively with the hard tasks of statesmanship and government. Whether this fact plays an important part in the situ~tion can hardly be surely known, but in any case there is continued criticism between the two. My own feeling"-he has been on the spot- "is that there is too much of the debating and bargaining psychology among the Indonesians and a genuine lack of comprehension of what the task of government over seventy million people involves. They discuss interminably, it seems, points in the Agreement which they signed quite freely after they had participated in making it, but the points they discuss are the ones that are clear and precise; about the ones which are vague or general III.their terminology, about which there could corrc~lvably be grounds for differences of interpretatIon, they raise few questions in the field of clarification." It is that sort of situation, and not disagreement on that one question of a joint gendarmerie, which was the reason for our action. I d0 not want the other story to gain ground. We went in to help not only the Republic, but also such countries as East Indonesia and Borneo. yve do notwant to oppress them, but to assist them 111 overcoming their growing pains in conditions of com~lete civic freedom and autonomy. We should lIke to help them federate into a United States of Indonesia. However, the RepUblic could n.ot or would not desist from its aggressive tendencIes. It wanted to swallow up its neighbours and equals. I hope the Council will have an opportunity M. Moss declare: "Certains observateurs attentifs de la situation ont la certitude que les method~s de temporisation des Indonesiens resultent moins de la crainte des autorites neerlandaises que de la conscience qu'ils ont de n'etre pas euxmemes ala hauteur des taches ardues de la diplomatie et du gouvernement. II est difficile de savoir de fac;on certaine si ce fait joue un role important dans la situation, mais, en tout cas, les deux p;'lrties s'adressent des c;:itiques constantes. Selon moi"-il s'est rendu sur les lieux-"il existe chez les Indonesiens un sens hypertrophie de la discussion et du marchandage, ainsi qu'un veritable manque de comprehension de ce que peut etre la tache de gouverner 70 millions d'hommes. IIs discutent interminablement, semble-t-il, des points de l'Accord qu'ils ont signe en toute liberte apres avoir participe a sa redaction, mais' les points ' qu'ils discutent sont preeisement les points clairs et precis; ils ne posent que peu de questions pour elucider ceux qui sont vagues ou rediges de fac;on tres generale, et au sujet.desquels on pourrait concevoir de serieuses raisons de divergences d'interpretation." C'est ce genre de situation, et non les divergences de vues sur cette seule question d'une gendarmerie mixte, qui est la raison de notre action. Je ne tiens pas a ce que l'autre version gagne du terrain. Nous sommes entres en campagne pour venir en aide, non seulement a la Republique, mais egalement aux pays comme l'Indonesie orientale et Borneo. Nous ne voulons pas les opprimer, mais les aider a surmonter, en toute liberte et en toute independance civique, les difficultes inherentes aux periodes de deveIoppement. Nous aimerions les aider a former une federation des Etats-Unis d'Indonesie. Cependant, la Republique ne pouvait pas ou ne voulait pas se departir de The people of East Indonesia and Borneo are anxious to preserve their own freedom and they have refused to become part and parcel of the Republic of Indonesia which has consistently tried to swallow them up. The second reason why I asked for the privilege of the floor was that the Australian representative-in my absence, I regret to say-raised certain points at the hundred and seventy-fourth meetingl with regard to the delay in the transmission . of the Security Council's cablegram to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia concerning the cessation of hostilities. I can tell the Council exactly what happened. Why our Government was invoked as an intermediary to transmit this message, I do not know. However, it was invoked, and I have a telegram here which says that, contrary to the assertion of the Australian representative, the cablegram concerning the cessation of hostilities arrived in Batavia some time between late Saturday night and early Sunday morning. It was on the table of the Lieutenant Governor-General on Sunday morning at 10.00 a.m. On Sunday afternoon ~t was presented by.one of the officials of the Netherlands East Indies Government to Mr. Gani, Deputy Prime Minister of the Republican Government, with a letter in which we offered him all facilities for its transmission to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia. Mr.. Gani did not, apparently, reply at once, but later tu the evening of Sunday he notified the Netherlands East Indies Government that he could not accept any responsibility. Thereupon, wishing to be helpful, we transmitted the message by radio, using what we call extra-broadcasting transmitters. On Monday morning those broadcasts were repeated-I imagine that the capital of the Republic had not signified receipt of the first message-at 6.30 a.m. and at 7.30 a.m., Java time. f In addition, a second copy of the cablegram- . the first being the one handed to Mr. Gani the previous day-was dropped by parachute on Monday afternoon at 3 p.m. above the airfield at Jogjakarta, and pl:>nes of the Netherlands Government dropped pamphlets-so as to make doubly sure that the Republic received the message. . What more could we do? I was a little sorry to see that the Australian representative made so much of the matter in my absence. I may mention that the telegram I addressed to the President of the Security Council at 8.58 p.m. on Sunday regarding the cease fire order apparently took considerable time in transmission. I have heard that it was not received here-it was addressed to the President at Lake Success-until the following afternoon. I took pains to confirm that telegram with a letter sent by airmail, special-delivery. Apparently it had not reached the President by the next morning. That was no reason for me to cry publique d'Indonesie. Je puis dire exactement au Conseil ce qui est arrive. Je ne saurais dire pourquoi l'on a choisi notre Gouvernement pour servir d'intermediaire dans la transmission de ce message. Il en est cependant ainsi, et j'ai ici un telegramme ou je lis que, contrairement aux affirmations du representant de l'Australie, le c:lblogramme concernant la cessation des hostilites est arrive it Borneo dans la nuit de samedi it dimanche. Il etait sur la table du Lieutenant-Gouverneur general dimanche matin it 10 heures. Le dimanche apres-midi, l'un des fonctiGnnaires du Gouvernement des Indes l1(~er­ landaises l'a presente it M. Gani, Vice-Premier Ministre du Gouvernement republicain, avec une lettre dans laquelle nous lui offrions toutes facilites pour lui permettre de le transmettre au Gouvernement de la Republique d'Indonesie. I1 semble que M. Gani n'ait pas repondu immediatement; mais plus tard, dans la soiree de dimanche, il faisait connaitre au Gouvernement des Indes neerlandaises qu'il ne pouvait accepter aucune responsabilite. Sur quoi, desireux de nous rendre utiles, nous avons transmis le message par radio en utilisant ce que nous appelons des emetteurs supplementaires. Le lundi matin, nous avons repete les emissions - j'imagine que la capitale de la 'Republique n'avait pas accuse reception du premier message - it 6 h. 30 et it 7 h. 30, heure de Java. En outte, un second exemplaire du ciblogramme - le premier etant celui qui avait et~ remis it M. Gani la veille - a ete parachute lundl apres-midi it trois heures sur le terrain de Djokjakarta, et des appareils du Gouvernement des Pays- Bas ant lance des tracts afin d'avoir une certitude double que la Republique recevrait le message. Que pouvions-nous faire de plus? J'ai ete assez peine que le representant de l'Australie ait tellement insiste sur ce point en mon absence. Je pourrais rappeler que le telegramme que j'ai adresse dimanche it 20 h. 58 au President du Conseil de securite ausujet de l'ordre de cesser le feu a m~s, apparemment, assez longtemps it etre transnus: J'ai entendu dire qu'il n'avait ete re<;U ici-je I'm adresse au President it Lake Success-que l'apresmidi suivant. J'ai pris le peine de confinner ce telegramme par une lettre expres par avion. Il semble que le President ne l'ait pas re<;ue le lendemain matin. Je n'avais pas lieu de m'en alarmer; etait garde en residence surveillee, et il nous a remercies de la fa<;on dont nous l'avons traite. Nous avons une idee assez juste des honneurs et des egards que nous devons a une personne de son rang. C'est egalement a tort qu'on pretend que nous avons retenu la communication jusqu'au lendemain soir a 20 heures. J'ai deja expose ce qui s'est produit sur la foi de renseignements officiels que j'ai sous les yeux. Il est encore inexact de dire que M. Gani n'avait aMcune possibilite de transmettre le message parce qu'il se trouvait completement isole; nous avons mis a sa disposition tous les moyens dont nous disposions. Pourquoi a-t-on fait toutes ces declarations inexactes, declarations qui, dans l'esprit de ceux qui les ont ecoutees, pourraient faire naitre un doute quant anotre sincerite? It was also inaccurate to say that the communication was held up until 8.00 p.m. the following night. I have already stated what actually happ~ned, on the basis of official information which I have here before me. It was inaccurate, furthermore, to say that Mr. Gani had no way of transmitting the message because he was completely isolated; he was given every facility available. Why were all these inaccurate statements made. statements which could give rise to doubts as t~ our sincerity in the minds of those who heard them? The truth is that Mr. Gani, who had the message on Sunday afternoo:1, said that he could take no resp~:msibility in the matter. Whereupon WE' saw to It that the message was transmitted. The Council will know best how to appreciate the true reasons for Mr. Gani's unco-operative attitude a~d reluctance to transmit that message. La verite est que M. Gani, qui etait en possession du message dimanche apres-midi, a declare ne pouvoir prendre aucune responsabilite dans cette affaire. Ce que voyant, nous avons veille a ce que le message soit transmis. Le Conseil appreciera les veritables motifs du manque de collaboration dont temoigne l'attitude de M. Gani et de sa repugnance a transmettre ce message. Je n'ajouterai rien aux remarques que je viens de faire, et que je me sentais dans l'obligation de faire, d'autant plus que je ne sais pas si nous par- Ions en ce moment d'une motion ou d'une proposition queIconque. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Je desire faire connaitre au Conseil que je viens de recevoir du Vice-Premier Ministre de la Republique l'Indonesie un cablogramme, en date du 7 aout, qui figure au document Sj477. On y lit, notamment: I shall add no more at this time to the remarks which I have just made, and which I felt constrained to make, inasmuch as I do not know whether we are speaking here on a motion or on a proposal of any kind.

I should like to inform the Council that I have just received a cablegram dated 7 August from the Deputy Prime Minister of the Indonesian Republic. It appears in docum~~t S/477 and reads, in part: . T?e Repuhl.ican Goverp.ment, adhering to the prmclple.s of the United Nations, is fully prepared t? submIt to the decision of the Security CouncIl.... The Indonesian Government cordially accepts the good offices of the United States Government and requests it to use its influence with the Government of the Netherlands and with the -- o 1 F.ol" the text of this telegram (document 5/466) see ,/final Records of the Security Council Second Year 1VO. 69, 174th meeting. ' , H ••• Adherant aux principes de 1'Organisation des Nations Unies, le Gouvernement de la Republique est entierement dispose a se soumettre ala decision du c'onseil de securite.... En acceptant cordialement les hons offices du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis. le Gouvernement de l'Indonesie prie le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'user de son in- 1 Le texte de ce telegramm~ (document S/466) figure aux ProcCs-7'crbaIlX ofjiciels du Conseil de sewrite, Deuxieme Annee. No 69. 174eme seance. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): At the outset of this case, my delegation made it clear that we did not desire a discussion on the merits of this dispute; we did not wish to judge or prejudge it in any way. That is still our attitude. It is a case, as may be seen, which is bristling with contradictions even as to the facts. The last thing I desire is to enter into any controversy with Mr. van Kleffens. However, as he questioned my motives -in presenting, during his absence, certain aspects of the matter concerning the, delayed cablegrams, I simply wish to make it clear that the information that I gave to the Security Council was received directly from our representative in Batavia, who saw the messages. He stated that "this information-namely, the message from the Security Council-"was received at Batavia by cable and wireless at midday". Apparently through some delay-it is not clear where it occurred-"it was received by the Dutch authorities at 10.00 p.m. on Saturday". "The house arrest of Gani and Tamzil was lifted this afternoon", our representative states, "though the Indonesian Mayor of Batavia is still confined to his house. About 8.00 p.m. tonight"-that was Sunday night-"two hours before van Mook gave his broadcast, Koets"-I gather that he is the legal adviser-"delivered this message personally to Gani." Those are the facts received directly from our own representative, who was in touch with these people and who actually saw the messages. We also have before us the cablegram dated 5 August from the Deputy Prime Minister of the Indonesian Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council in which it is stated: "The Government of the Republic of Indonesia requests the attention of the Security Council that the aforementioned decision was handed to the Republican Government through the Netherlands Government in Djakatra only on 4 August 1947, at 01.00 hours Indonesian standard time. In view of the earliest possible measures to be taken in order to realize the order of cessation of hostilities effectively, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia painfully regrets the transfer of the decision of the Security Council being delayed by the Netherlands authorities in Djakatra." , My only reason for raising the question of investigating the difficulties of communication at a time when communications were so completely disrupted, was the fact that my Government, in view of the difficulties which might arise and the complaints which might be lodged regarding the inability of the parties to implement the cease-fire order within the time suggested, did not want the position of either side to be prejudged. Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais) : Des l'origine de cette affaire, ma delegation a expose clairement que nous ne desirons pas discuter de ce differend quant au fond. Nous ne voulions, ni le juger, ni le prejuger de quelque fa<;on que ce soit. Notre attitude n'a pas change. Ce cas, on le voit, est herisse de contradictions, meme en ce qui concerne les faits. Entrer dans une controverse qui m'opposei."ait a M. van Kleffens est la derniere chose que je desire faire. Cependant, comme il a mis en doute les motifs qui m'ont pousse a presenter pendant son absence certains aspects de la question relative aux cablogrammes retardes, je desire simplement declarer clairement que les renseignements que j'ai donnes au Conseil de securite me sont parvenus directement de notre representant a Batavia, qui a vu les messages. Celui-ci a declare que "ces renseignements" - c'est-a-dire le message du Conseil de securite-"sont parvenus aBatavia par cable et radio a midi". Apparemment, par suite de quelque retard-on ne sait pas exactement ou ce retard s'est produit-"il a, ete re<;u par les autorites neerlandaises a 22 heures, samedi". "Gani et Tamzil ont cesse cet apres-midi d'etre gardes en residence surveiIIee", declare notre representant, "bien que le maire indonesien de Batavia soit encore oblige de rester a son domicile. Vers 20 heures, ce soir"-c'etait la dimanche at! soir-"c'est-a-dire deux heures avant que van Mook ne radiodiffuse son message, Koets"-je pense qu'il s'agit du conseiller juridique-"a remis personnellement le message aGani." Tels sont les faits dans la forme oit je les tiens de notre representant, qui etait en contact avec ces personnes et qui a effectivement vu ces messages. Nous lisons egalement dans le cablogramme, en date du 5 aout, adresse au President du Conseil de securite par le Vice-Premier Ministre, la declaration suivante: "Le Gouvernement de la Republique d'Indonesie appelle l'attention du ConseiI de securite sur le fait que les autorites neerlandaises de Djakatra n'ont transmis ladite decision au Gouvernement de la Republique que le 4 aoiit 1947 a une heure (heure normale d'Indonesie). Etant donne que les mesures tendant a executer effect"ivement l'ordre de cesser les hostilites doivent etre prises le plus tot possible, le Gouvernement de l:;t Republique d'Indonesie deplore vivement le delai mis par les autorites neerlandaises de Djakatra a lui transmettre la decision du Conseil de securite." La seule raison que j'ai de soulever la question d'une enquete sur les 'difficultes de communication, a une epoque oit les communications etaie~t si completement desorganisees, reside dans le faIt que mon Gouvernement, etant donne les difficultes qui pourraient surgir et les plaintes qu'on pourrait formuler au sujet de l'incapacite des parties, de mettre en application l'ordre de cesser le feu dans le delai propose, ne veut pas qu'~n pui'sse prejuger l'attitude de l'une ou l'autre partle. Quelle est la situation qui regne en Indonesie au moment de cette decision? Nous constatons que les conditions y sont beucoup' plus instables que lors de la treve de 1946. C'etait alors le mois d'octobre. 11 y avait a cette epoque certains elements stabilisateurs. Nous avions, en la personne du representat du Royaume-Uni, un mediateur acceptable pour les deux parties. 11 .existait ~nt~e les deux parties un contact effectlf. 11 eXlstalt une ligne de demarcation dont on pouvait verifier le trace, mais dont la determination, meme a cette epoque, a cependant exige un certain temps. Aucun de ces elements n'existe a l'heure actuelle. Les communications sont completement desorganisees. 11 n'existe aucune ligne nette de demarcation; il n'existe entre les parties aucun contact administratif ou politique. C'est pour ces raisons ·que ma delegation a propose, immediatement apres que le Conseil eut pris sa decision qu'il autorise le President· a consulter avec le Secretaire general en vue d'envoyer immediatement sur les lieux, en qualite d'observateur et de rapporteur, un fonctionnaire superieur du Secretariat qui serait charge de presenter un rapport sur I? maniere dont la decision du Conseil est respectee. Nous demandons si des mesures queIconques ont ete prises au sujet de cette proposition, dont le President a dit qu'il s'occuperait personnellement. Entre temps sont arrives divers rapports de nature contradictoire, que je ne discuterai pas maintenant. On a pretendu que, dans certains cas, l'ordre de cesser le feu avait ete viole, ce qui souligne la necessite pour le Conseil de securite de disposer d'un agent charge de s'assurer que sa decision est integralement respectee. On peut le faire de deux manieres, soit que le Conseil de securite decide d'envoyer aux Indes neerlandaises un fonctionnaire superieur du Secretariat, ce qui, a certains egards, donnerait des resultats plus rapides; sait qu'il etablisse, et envoie sur les Heux, une petite commission ou un comite d'observateurs qui le representerait. C'est la une des considerations que je soumets au Conseil, et je pourrais la qualifier de probleme a courte echeance. ---- La question, soit de media on, soit d'arbitrage, c'est-a-dire la decision du Conseil prevoyant que les parties soumettent leur differend a un arbitrage ou le reglent par des moyens pacifiques, constitue le probleme a longue echeance. 11 existe une grande difference entre mediation et arbitrage, et, lorsque le Conseil a adopte le mot "arbitrage", mon Gouvernement a naturellement pense qu'il voulait dire arbitrage par l'intermediaire des agents du Conseil. Quant .i la mediation, celle-ci aussi doit etre acceptable pour les deux parties, et tout ce que nous savons est le fait que le Gouvernement d'Indonesie n'a accepte que l'offre de bons offices des Etats-Unis. Aucune offre de mediation n'a ete agreee, et personne n'a pro- What is the situation in Indonesia at the time of this decision? We find that conditions there are more unstable than at the time of the truce in 1946. That was in October. At that time there were some stabilizing elements. We had a mutually acceptable mediator in the representative of the United Kingdom. There was actual contact between the parties. There was an ascertainable demarcation line which even then took time to determine. None of those elements is present at the moment. Communications are completely disrupted. There is no clear line of demarcation; there is no political or administrative contact between the parties. That is why my delegation proposed, immediately after the CQuncil had taken its decision, that it shOUld authorize the President to confer with the Secretary-General with a view to arranging for the immediate dispatch of a senior officer of the Secretariat to report, in the capacity of an observer and reporter, on the way the decision of the Council was being carried out. We ask whfither anything was done on that proposal which the President said he would personally take up. . In the meantime, various reports of a conflicting nature-I shall not go into them now-have been received. We have allegations of violations of the cease fire order, which emphasize the necessity for the Security Council to have some agent to ensure that, its decision is fully observed. There are two ways in which that could be done: the Council could decide to send a senior officer of the Secretariat to the Netherlands East Indies, which in many ways might be far more expeditious; or the Council could appoint and send out a small <::ommissi?n or committee of observers, representative of ;tIllS Council. That is one of the considerations I submit to this Council, and I might call it the short-term problem before us. . T.he long-te~m 1?roblem is the question of medIation or arbl,.tratlon; that is the decision of the Council that the parties shouid arbitrate or settle t~eir dispute by peaceful means. There is a big difference between mediation and arbitration and when this Council adopted the term "arbitration", my. Go~ernment naturally interpreted it to mean arbltrat.lOt; by agents of this Council. With regard t? medIatIOn, that too must be acceptable to both sld~s, and all we know is the fact that the IndoneSIan Government has accepted the United States hffer of good offices only. No offer of mediation as been accepted and no suggestion has been made by anyone, so far as we know, of arbitration. In connection with the latter point-the longrange solution-I should like to say that the Australian Prime Minister yesterday made the following statement: "If both parties consider it would help to terminate this interim period and to commence negotiations immediately, the Australian Government, for its part, would be prepared to act jointly with the United States Government in the capacity of mediator and arbitrator." This offer is made in the spirit in which the Australian Government raised the matter in the Security Council, that is, in a spirit of impartiality and with only one desire: that a peaceful settlement of the prolonged dispute in the Netherlands East Indies should be achieved as soon as possible. That, at the moment, is what I wish the members of the Security Council to consider during the period between this meeting and the next. To that end my Government will submit on 12 August a draft resolution covering those points; it will be circulated in due course.

I shall give a short explanation to the representative of Australia about his suggestion that an official of the Secretariat should be sent to Indonesia to report to the Council on the facts of the case. The Acting Secretary-General thought it would be useless to send such a person without terms of reference and without authority. We are already receiving official information through official channels, which is sufficient in that respect. However, the request of the Indonesian Government that the Security Council should send a commission will be considered, and we shall discuss it at a subsequent meeting. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): In the communication dated 5 August which we have received from the Government of Indonesia, reference is made to a certain kind of commission. In the communication which the President read during this meeting, reference is made to a different kind of commission. I should like to ascertain whether reference is made by the Indonesian Government to two different commissions or to only one.

I would inform the USSR representative that the first request we received from the Indonesian Government was for a commission to supervise the execution of the decision of the Security Council. The next request, which arrived only today and which will be circulated as a document tomorrow, was for a commission of international arbitration. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): So both requests stand? bue en temps voulu. ' Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'ang1ais): Je vais donner au representant de l'Australie une breve explication au sujet de la proposition qu'il a faite d'envoyer sur les lieux un fonctionnaire du Secretariat, charge de faire rapport au Conseil sur les faits se deroulant en Indonesie. Le Secretaire general par interim a pense qu'il serait inutile d'envoyer sur place une personne n'ayant ni mandat, ni autorite. Nous recevons deja des renseignements officiels par des voies officielles, ce qui suffit ~n l'occurrence. Cependant, nous examinerons, lors d'un prochaine seance, la requete presentee par le Gouvernement de l'Indonesie dernandant au Conseil de securite d'envoyer une commission. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit de l'anglais) : Dans la communication, en date du 5 aout, que nous avons rec;ue du Gouvernement d'Indonesie il est fait mention d'une commission d'un certain genre.' Dans la communication que vous avez lue, au cours de la presente seance, il est question d'u~e commission d'un genre differend. ]'aimerals savoir si le Gouvern<:IOent de l'Indonesie a mentionne deux commissions differentes ou une seule. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'ang1ai;) : Je tiens a faire connaltre au representant de l'URSS que la premiere demance que nous avons rec;ue du Gouvernement indonesien faisait etat d'une commission chargee de surveiller l'execution de la decision du Conseil de securite. La deuxieme demande, qui n'est arrivee qu'aujourd'hui et qui sera distribuee demain, en tant que document, mentionne une commission internationale d'arbitrage. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit de rang1ais) : Les deux demandes restent donc valables? La seance est levee a18 h. 55. The meeting rose at 6.55 p.m. FRANCE Editions A. Pedone 13, rue SoufHot PARIS, ye GREECE-GRECE "Eleftheroudakis" Librairie internationale Place de la Constitution ATHENES Agence et Messageries de la Presse, S. A. 14·22 rue du Persi! BRUXELLES BOLlVIA-BOLiVIE Libreria Cientifica y Literaria Avenida 16 de Julio, 216 Casilla 972 LA PAZ CANADA The Ryerson Press 299 Queen Street West TORONTO CHILE-CHill Edmundo Pizarro Merced 846 SA:'ITIAGO CHINA-CHINE The Commercial Press Ltd. 211 Honan Road SHANGHAI COLOMBIA-COLOMBIE Libreria Latina Ltda. 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