S/PV.179 Security Council

The procedure which we are to follow is, first, to exhaust all that the parties have to say on the subject, and then, after they 'See Oificit.U Records of the Security Council, Second I 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de secu- Year, No. 59, 159th meeting. rite, Deuxieme Annee, No 59, 15geme seance. CONSEIL DE SECURITE PROCES·VERBAUX OFFICIELS CENT·SOIXANTE-DIX.NEUVIEME SEANCE Tenue aLake Success, New-York, le lundi 11 aout 1947, d: 15 heures. President: M. F. EL-KHOURI (Syric). Presents: Les representants des pays suivants: AustraIie, Belgique, Bresil, Chine, Colombie, France, Pologne, Syrie, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. 287. Ordre du jour provisoire (document S/478) 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour. 2. Lettre, en date du 8 juilIet 1947, addressee au Secretaire general par le Premier Ministre, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres d'Egypte (document S/410)1. 288. Adoption de l'ordre du jour L'ol'dre du jour est adopte. 289. Suite de la discussion sur la question egyptienne Sur l'inmtation du President, Mahmoud Fahmy Nokrachy Pacha, Premier Ministre et Ministre des Affaires etran,qeres d'Egypte, prend place a la table du Conseil. . Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Void la procedure que je propose de suivre: tout d'abord, les parties epuiseront tout ce qu'eIles ant cl di.e NOKR.\sHY PASHA (Egypt): As I listened to the statement made last week by the representative of the United Kingdom,! I could not fail to be astonished that here in the Security Council, in the very heart of the United Nations, I should be hearing such an unrestrained apology for nineteenth-century imperialism. I thought we had seen the last manifestation of that spirit WD ,n nazism and fascism were finally crushed I thought history had passed final judgment on the methods which were the common practice of imperialistic diplomacy iri the last century. I could hardly believe my ears when I heard Sir Alexander Cadogan declare that his country now takes pride in its record in Egypt and the Sudan. It was no surprise to me that in his apology the representative of the United Kingdom declared the history of Anglo-Egyptian relations from ] 882 onwards to be irrelevant to the issues now before the Council. I can well understand that the United Kingdom would seek to subordinate the whole background of this dispute. I can understand why it would wish the Council to take no account of such patent facts as its bombardment of Alexandria sixty-five years ago, followed by its military occupation of my country, which it so solemnly declared to be merely temporary and provisional, and of its consequent seizure of the whole administration of a large part of Egyptian territory under its euphemistic title of "condominium". I can understand also why British imperialism must be cloaked by professions of high purpose. It has always advanced and entrenched itself, wherever .its covetous gaze was centred, under the guise of its mission to redress "massacres", to restore "government and administration", and to abolish "corruption 'llld incompetence". Yet I was surprised that Sir Alexander Cadogan should ignore the outstanding facts of Egypt's history apart from British aggran-. dizement-even to the point of tracing Egypt's sovereignty and independence to the bounty of the United Kingdom and of attributing all of Egypt's progress to its guidance. We, for our part, do not care to dwell on bitter memories. Yet such distortions call for some reply, and, in justice to my own country NOKRACHY PAeHA (Egypte) (traduit de l'anglais) : En ecoutant la declaration faite, la semaine derniere, par le representant du Royaume-Uni\ quelle n'a pas ete ma surprise d'entendre faire, au Conseil de securite, au CITur me111e de I'Organisati0n des Nations Unies, l'apologie de J'imperialisme du XIXeme siecle en termes aussi peu moderes. ]e croyais que nous avions assiste a. la derniere manifestation de cd imperialisme avant l'ecrasement definitif du nazisme et du fascisme. ] e pensais que l'histoire avait porte jugement definitif sur les methodes qui etaient de regIe dans la diplomatie imperialiste du siecle demie.. ],ai eu peine a. en croire mes oreilles iorsque j'ai entendu Sir Alexander Cadogan declarer que son pays s'enorgueillit aujourd'hui de son attitude passee eri Egypte et au Soudan. ]e n'ai pas ete surpris, toutefois, d'entendre le representant du Royaume-Uni declarer, Jans sa justification, que l'histoire des relations angloegyptiennes depuis 1882 n'anit aucun rapport avec les questions qui occupent actuellement le Consei!. ]e comprends fort bien que le Royaume- Uni cherche a. minimiser l'importance de tous les elements qui sont a. l'arriere-plan de notre differend actuel. Je comprends pourquoi il aimerait que le Conseil fasse abstraction de faits aussi indiscutables que le bombardement d'Alexandrie par ses armees, il y a soixante-cinq ans, suivi de l'occupation militaire de l'Egypte, (occupation quiaux termes des declarations les plus solennellesne devait etre que temporaire) et, enfin, cette mainmise sur toute l'administration d'une grande partie du territoire egyptien que le Royanme-Uni nomma, par euphemisme, condominium. ]e comprends egalement pourquoi l'imperialisme britannique doit se dissimuler derriere des declarations •faite~; sur le ton d'un idealisme eleve. Le Royatime- Uni a toujours evolue et s'est toujours retranche, partout ou se dirigeaient ses regards cupides, sous le couvert d'nne croisade entreprise pour venger des "massacres", pour retablir "le gouvernement et l'administration" et pour faire disparaitre "la .coriuption et l'incompetence". Toutefois, je me suis etonne de voir Sir Alexander Cadogan meconnaitre les grands evenements de l'histoire d'Egypte, en dehors de l'expansion britannique, au point meme d'attribuer l'independance de l'Egypte et sa qualite d'Etat souverain ala generosite du Royaume-Uni et d'attribuer aux avis eclaires de ce Gouvernement tous les progres realises par mon pays. Nous n'avons nulle envie, pour notre part, de nous attarder a. des souvenirs penibles. Cependant, une telle deformation des faits exige une reponse Le representant du.Royaume-Uni voudrait que nous eprouvions de la gratitude pour le Royaume- Uni "grace auquel I'Egypte se libera de la souverainete ottomane". Cette domination, toute nominale, de l'Empire ottoman sur l'Egypte pesait si peu dans Ila balance que les armees egyptiennes atteignirent les faubourgs de Constantinople, une premiere fois ~n 1833, puis, de nbuveau, en 1839, apres avoir inflige des defaites ecrasantes aux arinees du Sultan. 'L'Egypte etait alors en mesure de .se liberer de la domination turque sans l'aide dU Royaume-Uni,; c'est uniquement I'intervention des Puissances, provoquee d'ailleurs par le Royaume-Uni, qui l'en a empechee, Si, plus tard, le Royaume-Uni a contribue a briser les liens legers qui nous rattachaient a l'Empire ottoman, ce ne fut que pour les remplacer par les chaines plus lourdes de sa propre domination. Lorsque le representant du Royaume-Uni tire gloire des progres realises par man pays sous la tutelle du Royaume-Uni, il feint c1'ignorer le mouvement de rel1aissance qui s'etait dessine en Egypte des 1882. Mon opinion est que, si l'occupation par les forces du Royaume-Uni n'avait pas eu lieu, I'evolution moderne de l'Egypte se serait poursuivie sans rencoiltrer d'obstacle. Nous avons eu nos crises-politiques, sodales, financierescomme tonte nation en pleine croissance. Comme toutes les autres nations, !lous les aurions surmontees. Sans "la tutelle du Royaume-Uni", la tache eut ete menee a bien d'une fa<;on plus satisfaisante et certainement moin~ onereuse. D'une maniere toute imperialiste, le representant du Royaume-Uni declare que c'est son pays qui a donne sa souverainete al'Egypte. Comment le Royaume-Uni aurait-il pu accorder une souverainete quelconque a l'Egypte, alors que sa propre situation dans notre pays etait si precaire qu'il lui fallait recourir a des pretextes divers pour expliquer le maintien de sa presence .sur le territoire egyptien? Sir Alexander Cadogan affirme que I'occupation de l'Egypte par les forces du Royaume-Uni en 1882 n'etait pas "injustifiee". I1 apporte de nouveaux arguments post m01'tein pour la justifier. I1 expose au Conseil de securite que les troupes du Royaume-Uni n'ont occupe I'Egypte "qu'a la suite de massacres de chreticns et cJ'Europeens." I1 semble tres ett:ange que le Roy:iume-Uni art ete seul a oMir a une si noble impulsion. La France, I'Autrichc, la Russie, I'Allemagne avaient toutes des ressortissants plus nombreux et des interets plus importants en Egyptc que n'en avait le RoyaU111e-Uni et cependant, aucun' de ces pays n'a $ir Alexander Cadogan protests that the occupation of Egypt by United Kingdom forces in 1882 was not "unwarranted". He presents fresh post-mortem justifications. He tells the Security Council that the United Kingdom troops occupied Egypt only "after there had been massacres of Christians and Europeans". It seems very strange that only the United Kingdom felt thiS noble urge. France, Austria, Russia, Germany - all had more nationals and more vested interestf 'n Egypt than it had; yet none of them thoug-ht of taking action of such an "unwarranted" nature. songe a prendre des .mesures d'un caractere aussi "injustifie". "Injustifiees", oes mesures I'etaient c1'autant "It will not be possible for us to regain our ascendancy until the military supremacy which at present weighs upon the country is broken.... I believe that some complication of an acute nature must supervene before any satisfactory solution of the Egyptian question can be attained and that it would be wiser to hasten it than to endeavor to retard it". That "complication of an acute nature" eventually "supervened" when the Admiral commanding the British neet suddenly discovered that certain forts at Alexandria were being restored. He acted at once and bombarded the town on 11 July 1882. The French Admiral refused to associate himself vvith the ultimatum sent by his United Kingdom. colleague on such a futile pretense, and the French fleet withdrew from Egyptian waters on orders from its Government, which did not wish to par'l:icipate in the violation of an international agreement which it had just signed. Sir Alexander Cadogan goes on to claim that "United Kingdom forces entered Egypt in fulfilment of a promise of support made to the Khedive". The Egyptian delegation has no knowledg~of such support eve," having been requested. It can only record the strong protesT lodged by the Egyptian Cabinet, presided over by the Khedive himself, against the ultimatum which preceded the bombardment of Alexandria. "What the United Kingdom calls "support" came out as the rawest kind of subjection. Another astounding assertion in the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom must have puzzled any of his listeners who were familiar with the history of the Middle East. He said that the Ottoman Sultan had consented to the remaining of the United Kingdom forces in Egypt by a convention of 1885. This must refer to the Agree'ment of 24 October 1885 between Sir Henry Drummond W olff, on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom, and the Sultan. That is the only 1885 agreement on rscord. That Agreement provided for measures to be taken to accelerate the evacuati0n of the United Un message adresse en mai 1882 par Sir, Ed ' ward Mallet, Consul general de Sa Majeste britapnique, a Lord Granville, Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires etrangeres du, Royaumi-Uni, donnent q1.1elques eclaircissements sur la mission dont les Britanniques s'etaient charges. Voici le texte du message adresse par Sir Edward Mallet it Lord Granville: "lIne nous sera possible de recouvrer notre influence qu<:' le' jour Otl la suprematie militaire qui pese actuellement sur le pays sera abbattue. A mon avis, il faut qu'il se produise une complication de caractere aigu avant que l'on puisse ab~utir it une solution satisfaisante de la question egyptienne, et il serait plus sage de la hater que de chercher a h retarc..'r." Cette "complication de caractere aigu" se prod'lisit finalement lorsque l'amiral commandant la flotte britannique s'apen,;ut soudain que certains forts d'Alexandrie etaient en voie de restauration. I1 agit immediatement et bombarda la ville le 11 juilIet 18~2. L'amiral iran<;ais refusa de s'associer al'ultimatum adresse par son collegue du Royaume-Uni sous un pretexte aussi futile, et la flotte fran<;aise se retira des eaux egyptiennes sur l'ordre de son Gouvernement, qui ne voulait pas participer cl k. violation d'un accord international qu'il venait de signer. Sir Alexander Cadogan pretend ensuite que "les forces du Royaume-Uni sont entrees en Egypte en execution d'une promesse de soutien faite au Khedive". La delega.tion egyptienne n'a nullement connaissance qu'un tel appui ait jamais ete sollicite. Elle ne peut que rappeler la protestation energique fOrImJIee par le Cabinet egyptien, qui etait preside par le Khedive en personne, contre l'ultimatum qui avait precede le bombardement d'Alexandrie. Ce que le Royaume-Uni appelIe "soutien" s'est revele la plus dure des dominations. L'expose du representant du Royaume-Uni COIltient une autre affirmation etonnante, qui a du embarrasser tous <;eux qui, parmi ses auditeurs, connaissaient bien l'histoire du Moyen Orient. D'apres lui, le Sultan ottoman avait, par une convention signee en 1855, donne son consentement au maintien des forces du Royaume-Uni en Egypte. Cela doit sans doute designer l'Accord. du 24 octobre 1885, passe entre Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, agissant au nom dl1 Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, et le Sultan. C'est le seul accord enregistre pour 1885; cet Accord prevoyait les mesures cl prendre en vue d'accelerer le retrait des troupes du Royaume-Uni en garnison en Egypte. The representative of the United Kingdom has asserted that both of Egypt's claims "relate to matter:s which are provided for" in the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of ] 936, and that, because of this Treaty, Egypt has no case at all to bring before the Council. On these grounds, he has contended that the Security Council should .peremptorily dismiss the claim made by Egypt in this case. Sir Alexander Cadogan has been at great pains to sustain the legal validity of this Treaty. To this end, he has referred to various principles of international law, such as the principles of pa,cta su,nt servanda and of l'cbus sic stantibus, to which the Egyptian Government has not once alluded. His 'argument has even gone to the extent of representing the Security Council to be an organ. of international law when dealing with a dispute, and he seems to call upon the Security Council as such to declare that the Treaty is valid. In my own presentation, I have refrained from relying on juridical considerations. I have cl6ne so because I believe the Security Council is not limited to settlement of the legal aspect of a dispute brought before it. The Council is not called upon to adjudicate on the legal rights of the parties. Its mission-I shall say its higher mission-is to preserve peace aad security, to see to it that conditioI18 prevail in which peaceful and friendly relations may obtain among nations. In performing this mission, it is not stimiecl by the legal commitments of the parties, which are not infrequently relied upon to justify inertia in the face of Sir Alexander Cadogan a eu grand mal a soutenir la vaIidite juridique du Traite de 1936. II a Qil recourir pour cela cl divers principes d~ droit international, tels que les regles: pacta sunt servando et rebus sic stantibus, auxquelles le Gouvernement egyptien n'a pas fait allusion une seule fois. II est meme alle, clans son argumentation, jusqu'a pretendre que le Conseil de securite, lorsqu'il traite d'un differend, agit en tant qu'organisme de droit international, et il semble inviter le Conseil de securite, en cette qualite, adeclarer que le Traite est valide. Pour ma part, en presentant les faits, je me suis abstenn de m'appuyer sur des considerations d'ordre juridique. Je l'ai fait parce que, cl 1110n avis, la competence du Conseil de securite ne se borne pas a statuer sur l'aspect juridique des clifferencls dont il est saisi. Le Conseil n'est pas appeIe a se prononcer sur les droits des parties, au sens juri\" clique. Il a pour mission-je dirais meme pour plus haute mission~de maintenir la paix et la securite, de veiller cl ce que regnent des conditions qui rendent poss~ble le maintien de relations pacifiques et amicales entre les nations. Dans l'accomplissement de cette mission, le Conseil n'est pas arrete par les engagements de caractere juri- • En11n, lorsque le representant du Royaume-Uni declare que l'Egypte a ret;u sa liberte du Royaume- Uni, il passe Lien legerement sur la periode qui s'etend entre la premiere guerre mondiale et 1922, afin de dormer l'impression que c'est spontanemem et de son plein gre que le Gouvernement du Royallme-Uni a accorde son independance ·cl l'Egypte par une declaration unilaterale. If omet de rappeler que le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, apres avoir repousse net les revendications egyptiennes en 1918, fut rontraint cl'agir par la revolution nationale egyptierme qui pendant plus de quatre ans s'est dres"t§e contre la domination britanniClue, malgre l'etat de siege proclame par ces dermers. Les depeches expediees L:ouramment par Lord Allenby, Haut Commissaire en Egypte, avaient indique que la situation du Royaume-Uni etait tout cl fait intenable. L'affaire se tenriina par la :leclarat;on de HJ:?2 du Royaume-Uni. Tels sont les faits qui expliquent les relations ac- ~l,,~l1es entre le Royaume-Uni et l'Egypte. C'est cl iu. lumiere de ces faits et d'autres de caractere analogue que le Traite de ] DiHi, ainsi que revolution ulterieure de la situation, doivent etre examir.es. Le representant du Royaume-Uni a affirme, d'une part, que les deux revendications de I'Egypte "ont trait it des questions qui sont prevues" dans le Traite anglo-egyptien de 1U36 et, d'autre part, qu'en raison de ce Traite, I'Egypte n'a absolument aucune affaire cl porter devant le Conseil. I1 se fonde sur ces assertions pour, pretendre que le Conseil de securite devrait categoriquement debouter l'Egypte de sa reclamation dans le cas present. I think I have made clear my own posltlOn on the Treaty of 1936. It has outlived its purpose. \Vhatever usefulness it has had in the past, it can no longer serve as a bridge of contentment and friendly relations between Egypt and the United Kingdom. Its objectives have been exhausted. It has become an anachronism. Its political and moral force has been spent. It survives only as a menace to peace and security. I do not ask the Council to pronounce upon the Treaty of 1936. I do not ask it to deduce legal consequences from the events which have transpired clince the Treaty was concluded. I ask it merely to take account of the hard facts -Awhich lie at the basis of this dispute. At the risk of taxing his patience, I must ask the President to permit me again to relate the circumstances under which the Treaty of 1936 was concluded and to review its text a!ld its tenor. I would first point out that the Treaty of 1936 was not concluded for any definite period of time. It provides, in article 16, merely for negotiations for revision. It sets a perioli of twenty years after the expiration of which such negotiations must be entered into at the request of either party. It also sets a period of ten years upon the expiration of which such negotiations may be entered into with the consent of both parties. Aside from indicating that the Treaty was what I have termed a temporary expedient, the latter provision was, of course, superfluous, for the parties to an international instrument are always frep. to revise it. The United Kingdom can take no credit for having entered into revision negutiations shortly prior to ·the expiration of the ten-year period. It did so, in the words of Mr. Bevin, because it shared the Egyptian conviction that "the interests of both countries call for a fresh treaty". Now we have the fact that both parties did "consent" to entering into the negotiations for revision. VIre have also the fact that those negotiations were fruitful of no result. Article 16 anticipated this very event. It provided that "in case of the High Contracting Parties being unable to agree upon the terms of the revised Treaty, the difference will be submitted Je crois avoir precise ma propre position a. l'egard du Traite de 1936. Ce Traite n'a plus de raison cl'etre. Quelle qu'ait ete son utilite dans Je passe, il ne peut plus servir cle lien entre l'Egyptf' et le Royaume-Uni Jeur permettant d'entretenir des relations satisfaisantes et amicales. Il n'a plus aucune portee. I1 est devenu un anachronisme. 11 a perdu toute valeur politique et morale. I1 ne subsiste que comme une menace it la paix et it la seC'..lrite. :.\Iais je ne demanc1e pas au Conseil de se prononcer sur le Traite de 1!J36; je ne 1ui demancle pas de tirer les consequences juridiques des evenements qui se sont produits depuis la conclusion de ce Traite. Je lui demande simplement de prendre en consideration les faits penibles qui sont it la base de notre differend actueJ. Au risqllc de lasser la patience du President, j c me vois dans l'obligation de Jui demander de bien vouloir me permettre de rappeler une fois encore les circonstances dans lesqt:.elles le Traite ~' >' 1936 a ere conc!u et d'en examiner le texk et la porh~e. Je tiens a. faire observer, tout d'abord que le Traite de 1936 n'a pas ete conc!u pour une periode determinee. Son article 16 pn~voit simplemel1t des negociations en vue de sa revision. I1 fixe un delai de vingt ac:; a. l'expiration duquel, it la demande de l'une des deux parties, des negociations devront etre ouvertes. Il fixe de meme un delai de clix ans a. l'expiration duque1 ces negociations pourront etre entreprises cl'un commun accorcl e'ltre les deux parties. I1 ressort d'abord de cette disposition que le Traite etait ce que j'ai appele un expedient temporaire, mais, en outre, cette clispositioi" elle-meme etait superflue, etallt donne que les parties a un instrument international sont toujours libres de le reviser. Le Royaume-Uni n'a pas lieu de s'enorgueillir clu fait qu'il a ouvert les negociations en vue de la revision clu traite peu cle temps avant l'expiration clu delai cle dix ans. Si le Royaume-Uni a procede ainsi, c'est parce quepour reprendre les termes clont s'est servi M. Bevin-il par,tageait la conviction du Gouvernement egyptien, que, "dans l'interet des deux pays, 1111 nouveau traite clevait etre conclu". Nous savons maintenant que les deux parties ont' effectivement "consenti" cl entreprendre des negociations en vue de la revision du Traite. Nous savons egalement que ces negociations n'ont c1onne aucun resultat. L'artic1e 16 prevoyait justement cette eventualite. 11 stipule que "clans le cas C'etait lit tine sadvegarde importante, une reelle protection pour l'Egypte. Mais e1le ~;'est evanouie. Le Conseil de la SociEte des Nations n'existe plus; il a disparu sans laisser de succcsseur. Le There was an i iportant safeguard, a protection, for Egypt. Yet it has now eVdporated. The Council of the League of Nations exists no more. It has expired without leaving a successor. The Covenant is no longer in force. Hence, no competent body now exists to deal with such a difference, short of willingness on the part of the United Kingdom to confer a new competence. In other words, this vital part of the Treaty has outlived its purpose. Pade ,,'est plus en vigueur. 11 s'en suit qu'il n'exi- "te pas actucllement d'organisme qui ait competence pour resouclre un difierend de cette nature, it mains que le Royaume-Uni ne se montre dispose a donner competence it un nouvel organisme. En (i'autres termci". cette partie essentielle du Traite n'a plus de raison c!'etre. Puisque j'en sl1is it l'artiele 1u, il me fant en citer cette disposition qui subsist€:' et it laquelle- :'l J11(ln graml etonnement-le representant du Roy- <ll1J11e-Uni n'a pas meJ11e fait allusion et S~lr laquelle il a meme semble vouloir jeter un voile. 1] s'ilgit de la disposition stipi.llant que "toute revision du present traite devra prevoir la continuation de I'alliance entre les Hautcs Parties contractantes en conformire des principes contenus dans les urtieles -1, 6, (j et ,/". Autrement clit, dans la mesure ou les relations entre les Parties ~ont subordonnees aux ten~les d'un traite, l'a!liance de- "ait etre pcrpetuelle. \Vhik I am on article 16, I must refer to its remaining provision, to which, to my astonishment, the representative of the United Kingdom did 110t even allude-which he even seemed to desire to withhold from the Council's attention. This is the provision that "any revision of this treaty will provide for the continuation of the alliance between the }~igh Contracting Parties in accordance with the principles contained in articles 4, 5, 6, and 7". In other words, in so far as the relations between the parties are dependent on a treaty, the alliance was to be perpetual. I am aware that perpetual alliances had a certain vogue in the eigliteenth century, albeit they all broke down. Perhaps examples may be found even in the nineteenth century. Yet I know of no other attempt to establish a perpetual alliance in the twentieth century. 1'0- rlay the Charter clearly precludes any such attempt. The recent treaties of alliance to which Sir Alexander Cadogan referred were all for a limited number of years. \Vithout violating its commitments under the Charter, Egypt cannot now agree to any revision of the 1936 Treaty confirming this perpetual alliance. In other words, in this vital respect, the Treaty of 1836 has outlived its purpose. It has been superseded by the Charter. Je ~;ais bien que les alliances perpetuelles ont connu une certaine vogue au XVIIIe:me siecle, incn qu'clles aient toutes ete rompues. On pourrait n1t~J11e peut-etre en trouver des exe11lples au cours e1u XIXeme si·~cle. Pour le XXeme siecJe, je nai pas connaissance d'autres tentatives en vue d'etablir une alliance perpetuelle. Et, aujourd'hui, la Charte rend c1airement impossible toute tentative de ce genre. Les traites recents auxquels Sir Alexander Cadogan s'est rHere ont tous ete cone1us pour des periodes limitees. L'Egypte ne saurait actuellement, sans violer les engagements de la Chart!" auxquels die a souscrit, donuer son adhesion a une revision du Traite de 1836 qui consacrerait cette alliance perpetuelle. En rl'autres tcrmes, sur ce point capital, le Traite de 1936 n'a plus de raison d'etre. II a ete remplace par la Charte. Voila, pour ce qui est du facteur temps clans le Traite de 1836. Permettez-moi maintenant de passer en revue d'alltres aspects de ce Traite, qui ant concluit mon Gouvernement a soutenir que le Traite est devenu sans objet. Je passerai rapidement sur les dispositions <iu Traite qui ant ete pleinement mises en ceuvre et qui, par consequent, n'appellent plus d'autre action de la part des deux parties. TeI ~st le cas de I'article :J concernant la qualite de membre de la Societe des Natiol1s. Tel est egalement ce1ui des articles 12 et 13 concernant la protection des etrangers et l'aholition des Capitt1lations. Le Royaume-Uni semble croire que l'Egypte devrait "se souvenir avec gratitude" de I'aide ac- So much for the time element in the 19::16 Treaty. Let me now review other phases of the Treaty which have led to my Government's view that the Treaty has outlived its purpose, I shall pass hurriedly over those provisions in the Treaty which have been fully executed, and which therefore call for no further performance on either side. Such, for instance, was article 3, concerning membership in the League of Nations. Such also were articles 12 and 13, concerning the protection of foreigners and the abolition of the Capitulations. The United Kingdom seems to think that Egypt ought to "look back with some gratitude" on this latter provision. The truth is One of the most important articles of the 1936 Treaty, article 15, deals with the settlement of differences relating to the application or interpretation of its provisions. I can understand why Sir Alexander Cadogan did not refer to this article, though 1 think he referred to almost every other article of the Treaty. N aturally, the United Kingdom attaches little importance to this article, for it has long been accustomed to settling its disputes with Eg-ypt by rr.arching its bayonets through the streets of Cairo. To Egypt, however, the article was essential. It was its safety valve. Article 15 provides that, if the parties are unable to settle a dispute by direct negotiations, it should be "dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Connant of the League of Nations". Now that the Covenant has disappeared, we have no obligatory procedure open to us for dealing with disputes arising under the Treaty. In other words, this central article, covering all the other provisions of the Treaty, has clearly outlived its purpose. I come now to article 8 and its provisions for stationing United Kingdom forces on Egyptian territory in the vicinity of the Canal "until such time as the High Contracting Parties agree that the Egyptian Army is in a position to ensure by its own resources the liberty and entire security of navigation of the CanaL" It was stipulated that, after a period of twenty years, "the question whether the presence of British forces is no longer necessary O\ving to the fact that the Egyptian Army is in a position to ensure by its own resources the liberty and entire security of navigation of the CaneJ.1 may, if the High Contracting Parti'es do not agree thereon, be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations for decision in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant in force at the time of signature of the present Treaty or to such other person or body of persons for decision in accordance with such other procedure as the High Contracting Parties may agree". As the Council of the League ot Nations is no longer in existence, Egypt would have no recourse for a decision on this vital question at rends relatifs a l'application ou a l'interpretation des dispositions du Traite. Je ne comprends pas tres bien pourquoi Sir Alexander Cadogan n'a pas fait allusion a cet article, bien qu'il ait, je crois, fait mention de presque tous les autres articles du Traite. Le Royaume-Uni, comme il est naturel, attache peu d'importance a cet article, car il v a bien longtemps qu'i] a pris l'habitude dd regler-ses differends avec l'Egypte en faisant defiler ses baionnettes dans les rues du Caire. Pour l'Egypte, toutefois, cet article avait une importance capitale: il constituait une soupape de su.rete. L'article 15 prevoit que, si les parties ne peuvent regler un differend par voie de negociations directes, ce differend sera "regIe selon les dispositions du Pacte de la Societe des Nations". Maintenant que le Facte n'existe plus, il n':" a pas de procedure obligatoire qui nous soit ouverte pour le reglement des differends souleves par l'application du Traite. Autrement dit, cet article central, qui domine toutes les autres dispositions du Traite, a nettement perdu toute signification. Ten 'liens maintenant a l'artic1e 8 et aux dispositions qu'il cOlltient relativement aux forces armees du Royaume-Uni en garnison sur le territoire egyptien, aux abords dl1 Canal de Suez. jusqu'au moment ou "les Hautes Parties contractantes conviennent que l'armee egyptienne se trouve en etat d'assurer par ses propres moyens la liberte et l'entiere securite de navigation du Canal". Il stipule que, apres une ptriode de vingt ans, "la question de savoir si la presence des forces annees britanniques n'est plus il1dispensablc. parce que l'armee egyptienne est en mesure d'assurer par ses propres moyens la liberte et l'entiere securite de la navigation sur le Canal, pourra, si les Hautes Parties contractantes ne sont pas d'accord sur ce point, etre portee devant le Conseil de la Societe des Nations pour decision, conformement aux dispositions du Pacte en vigueur au moment de la signature du Traite, ou"c1evant telle autre personne ou groupe de personnes, pour decision, conformement a toute autre procedure sur laquelle les Hautes Parties contractantes pourront se mettre d'ac-:ord." Comme le Conseil de la Societe des Nations n'existe plus, l'Egypte n'aurait aucun recours pour ohtenir une decision sur cette question essentielle, Indeed, from the very outbreak of the war, Egypt had severed its diplomatic relations with the Axis Powers. If it did not declare war officially until the beginning of 1945, the reason was that given by Mr. Churchill in his speech in the House of Commons on 27 February 1945: "Never at any moment", he declared, "have we pressed the Egyptian Government to come into the war. In point of fact, our advice on more than one occasion in the past was against such a course.... We have been fully satisfied with the attitude of Egypt as a cobelligerent." la cause commune? Parlant a la Conference de Paris, le 12 aout 1946, M. Alexander qui representait le Royaume-Uni, s'est expri1I1e comme suit: "A cet egard, je dirais que,parfois.,...nous n'avons pas accorde assez d'importance au fait que l'Egypte s'est battue contre l'Italie aux cotes des Allies, que, a partir du 20 juin 1940 et clans les premieres annees de la guerre, le territoire egyptien contigu aux colonies italiennes a ete envahi sur une tres grande partie de son etendue et que ce pays a fourni un effort de guerre considerable, mettant a la disposition des Allies ses f6rces armees, son aviation de guerre et son territoire comme base d'operations alliees-base de la plus haute importance." En fait, des que la guerre a eclate, l'Egypte a rompu les relations diplomatiques avec les Puissances de l'Axe. Si elle n'a declare officiellement la guerre qu'au debut de 1945, la raison est ceUe qu'en a donnee M. Churchill dans son discours prononce a la Chambre-des Communes le 27 fevrier 1945: "Jamais", a-t-il declare, "a aucun moment, nous n'avons insiste aupres du Gouvernement egyptien pour qu'il entrat dans la guerre. En realite, en plus d'une occasion, dans le passe, nous nous sommes prononces cantre son entree dans la guerre. . . . Nous avons ete pleinement satisfaits de l'attitude de I'Egypte en tant que Puissance cobelligerante". The Cnited Kingdom forces are spread over an area of Egyptian soil covering about two and a quarter million acres. Even since the evacuation of Cairo and Alexandria. they still occupy a vast region over sixty miles from our capital; they continue to practise manoeuvres in a huge area on the western and eastern banks of the Canal; they assert a right to fly over the whole country; they claim extensive privileges. and exemptions. The presence of these forces enables the United Kingdom to exercise a pressure on the Egyptian Government wholly inconsistent witl1, Egypt's status as an independent and ~overeignState. In 1938 and in 1944. the United Kingdom resorted to such pressure to curtail the legislative power of the Egyptian Parliament. In 10·W. in ] 042, and again in 1045, the Cnited Kingdom even brought about the dismissal of Egyptian cabinets. Now what can the real object of such an occupation be? The Treaty says it is to protect the Canal; but the other obligations, such as the creation of motor routes and the building of railways. show that the real object of the Treaty is to enable the United Kingdom to move its forces about in such a manner as to dominate Egypt, from the ground and from the air. Can we compare this to treaties of mutual assistance, as the representative of the United Kingdom sought to do? This part of the Treaty of ]036 is clearly inconsistent with the Charter. It is a negation of collective security. It is art obstacle to Egypt's discharge of its obligation under the Charter to co-operate in suppressing aggression from whatever source it may originate. I have previously referred to the General Assembly resolution of 14 December 1946, calling on Members for H ••• the withdrawal without delay of their armed forces stationed in the territories of Members without their consent freely and publicly expressed in treaties or agreements consistent with the Charter and not contradicting international agreements".l I have previously shown that Egypt was not <' free agent in entering into the Treaty of 1936. 1 See Resoht"tiolls adopted by the General Assembly during th~ second part of its first session, No. 41 (I). de, un euphemisme. Cest le cas egalement de la declaration contenue dans l'article 8, aux termes de laquelle le maintien des forces du Royaume- Cni en Egypte, prevu par le Traite, "n'aura aucun caractere d'occupation et ne portera, en aucune fC:Lc;on, atteinte aux droits de souverainete de l'Egypte." En elIet, l'application de l'article 8 et son annexe perpetue tll1e occupation militaire tres etendue et d'une vaste portee. Les forces armees du Royamne-Uni sont reparties en territoire egyptien sur une superficie de deux millions et quart d·acres. Et meme, depuis l'evacuation du Caire et d'Alexandrie, eUes occupent encore une vaste region it soixante milles ou plus de la capitale egyptienne; elles continuent de faire des manll't1\TeS sur une grande etendue le long des rives occidentale et orientale du Canal; e1les revel1diquent le droit de survoI du pays tout entier: eUes reclament des privileges et exemptions consicterables. Grace a la presence de ces forces, le Royaume- Dni peut exercer sur le Gouvernement egyptien une pression qui est tout a fait incompatible avec le statut d'Etat independant et souverain qui est celui de l'Egypte. En ]938, puis en 194"1, c'est de cette pression qu'a use le Royaume-Uni pour restreindre le pouvoir legislatif du Parlement egyptien. En 1940, en 1942, et enfin en 1945, le Royaume-Uni est meme alle jusqu'a faire revoquer certains Car-inets egyptiens. Quel peut etre l'objet veritable de cette occupation? Aux termes du Traite, elle a pour but d'assurer la protection du Canal: mais les autres obligations que comporte le Traite, telles que la creation d'autostrades et la construction de voies ferrees, indiquent que son veritable objet est de permettre au Royaume-Uni de cIeplacer ses troupes de maniere a clominer l'Egypte sur terre et clans les airs. Est-il possible de comparer un tel traite aux traites d'assistance mutuelle, comme a voulu le faire le representant du Royaume-Uni? Cette partie du Traite de 1936 est manifestemel1t incompatible avec la Charte. Elle est la negation cle la securite collective; c'est, pour l'Egypte, un obstacle a remplir les obligations qu'elle a contractees en execution de la Charte, de collaborer a.supprimer l'agression, d'ou qu'elle vienne. J'ai deja cite la resolution prise par l'Assemblee generale le 14 decembre 1946, invitant les Membres a "... proceder ... au retrait sans delai de leurs forces stationnees dans des territoires des Etats Membres sans le consentement de ceux-ci librement et publiquement exprime dans des traites ou accords compatibles avec la Charte et ne contreclisant pas des accords internationaux1 " . .rai deja montre que l'Egypte, lorsqll'elle a conclu le Traite de ] 936, n'etait pas libre de ses 1 Voir les Resolutions adoptees par l'Assembtee generale pendant la seconde partie de sa premiere session, No 41 (1). ~ought stability. It wished to avoid the aftermath of previous failures in negotiations, following each of which the United Kingdom had prO\'oked an internal political crisis in Egypt. Egypt consented to the Treaty of 1936 as a stage in its liberation. It was asserted at the time that the Treaty contradicted Egypt's independence. Sir Alexander Cadogan has referred to its reception in the Egyptian Parliament, and in this connexion he quoted a statement by Mohammed Mahmoud Pasha, leader of the' Liberal party. Let me expand the quotation for him. The late Mohammed Mahmoud Pasha said: "The military obligations are in contradiction with the independence of Egypt, and were it not for our special circumstances, and were it not for certain advantages of the Treaty and for the international circumstances at present prevailing, that force us to take into consideration these hard facts and prevent us from concentrating on our hopes and aspirations, it would have never come to my mind to accept this Treaty". And what did Ahmed Maher Pasha, President of the Chamber, have to say about the Treaty? Speaking in the Chamber of Deputies at the time, he said: "vVe were compelled to accept these conditions in view of the inescapable circumstances prevailing". And before the Senate, H ussein Heykal Pasha, now President of that body, declared: "In case you wish to change the situation of which we are wearied ... with the hope that any change may bring blessings, then accept this Treaty on condition that it should be revised at the earliest opportunity in such manner as to remove anything that affects the independence of Egypt". The fact that Egypt had concluded the 1936 Treaty under the pressure of circumstances was corroborated a year a'go by outstanding members of the British Parliament. Allow me to quote only one. Mr. Lindsay, who was a member of the Government of the United Kingdom at the time the 1936 Treaty was signed, stated in the House of Commons, in May of last year: "It is perfectly true that even that Treaty was negotiated under some duress. It was certainly done with the knowledge that there was war impending, and it was never meant to be the last word on the subject". :\. cette epoque, on avait declare que le Traite n'etait pas compatible avec l'independance de l'Egypte. Sir Alexander Cadogan a parle de l'accueil fait au Traite par le Parlement egyptien, et, a cet egard, il a cite un passage du discGurs de Mohammed Mahmoud Pacha, chef du parti liberal. Permettez~moi de continuer la citation qu'il avait commencee. "Les obligations militaires", a declare feu IVlohammed Mahmoud Pacha, "sont en contradiction avec l'independance de l'Egypte, et n'eussent ete, d'une part, les circonstances particulieres ott nous nous trouvons, et, d'autre part, certains avantages que comporte le Traite, et enfin la situation internationale actuelle, je n'aurais jamais envisage d'accepter ce Traite. Les dures necessites du moment qui nous empechent de nous consacrer uniquement a nos espoirs et a nos aspirations nous ant amenes a cette decision". Et que disait encore Ahmed Maher Pacha, President de la Chambre, au sujet du Traite? Parlant a cette epoque a la Chambre des deputes, il declarait: "Nous avons ete obliges d'accepter ces conditions en raison des circonstances actuelles, qui sont ineluctables". Et, devant le Senat, Hussein Heykal Pacha, aujourd'hui President de cette assemblee, declarait: ,.Si vous desirez voir se modifier une situation qui nous pese ... dans l'espoir qu'un changement p'ourra etre bienfaisant, alors acceptez ce Traite, etant entendu que, a la premiere occasion, on devra le reviser de fa<;on it en eliminer tout ce qui parte :ltteinte it l'independance de l'Egypte". Le fait que c'est sous la pression des circonstances que l'Egypte a conclu le Traite de 1936 a ete confirme, il y a un an, par des membres importants du Parlement britanniqu('. Permettez-moi de n'en citer qu'ttrJ. M. Lindsay, qui faisait partie du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni lOTs de la signature cln Traite de 1936, a declare en mai del !lier, cl la Chambre des Communes: "I! est parfaitement exact que ce Traite-Ia Iui-meme a ete, dans une certaine mesure, negocie sous la contrainte. TI est certain que, lorsqu'il est intervenu, on savait que la guerre mena<;ait, et il n'a jamais ete considere comme constituant le dernier mat sur la question". The representative of the United Kingdom sought to make out that the General Assembly resolution of 14 December 1946 gave approval as a matter of principle to a Member's stationing its forces on another Member's territory as a result of a treaty. On the contrary, it stated the opposite principle that there should be no such stationing, and added as an e:"ception that stationing might be authorized by a treaty meeting three conditions. The Treaty of 1936 does not meet any of these fhree conditions. United Kingdom troops are not on Egyptian soil with Egypt's consent "freely and publicly expressed in treaties or agreements consistent with the Charter and not contradicting international agreements", Now it remains for me to complete my analysis of the provisions of the 1936 Treaty by referring to article 11, which deals with the Sudan. The Security Council is aware of the informal nature of the 1899 Agreements "relating to the future administration of the Sudan". It is aware that those Agreements were based on a United Kingdom claim to share in the administration "by right of conquest". Sir Alexander Cadogan said that, prior to the Agreements, the Sudan "had been lost to Egypt for a number of years as a result of a successful revolt". He had apparently forgotten that the United Kingdom itself had prevented Egypt from suppressing the revolt when it was only budding, that it compelled Egypt to evacuate its army from the Sudan when order could still have been restored there. Egypt has never relinquished its unity with the Sudan. It was in the narr.C of Egypt that Lord Kitchener appealed to the Sudanese, and that the French expedition was turned back at 'lUX relations entre la (~rande-nretagne et I'Egypte une base differente de cellc sur laquelle elles avaient repose jusqu'ici, base qui serait plus moderne que la precedente, en ce sens que les relations entre les deux pays seraient celles existant entre egallx et ne reposeraient plus sur l'occllpation". Tels sont les termes memes dont s'est servi M. Bevin. Je crois avoir clemontre egalement que l'alliance perpetuelle que prevoit le Traite-alliance artificielle, mal eqllilibree, sans dignite-n'est pas compatible avcc la Charte. En outre, comme je l'ai deja incIiqu~, le Traite est en contradiction avec la Convention de lSt'O relative au Canal de Suez. Le representant du Royaume-Uni a cherche a prouver que la resolution de l'Assemblee generale, en date du H· d~cembre 19·16, approuvait en principe la presence des forces d'un Etat Membre sur le territoire d'un autre IVlembre, si c'etait par I'eftet d'un traite. Au contraire, la resolution en question enonce le principe inverse, a savoir qu'il ne devrait pas y avoir de stationnement de forces armees, ajoutant qu'il ne pourrait etre autorise qll'a titre exceptionnel en application d'un traite reunissant trois conditions. Or, le Traite de 1936 ne presente aucune des trois conditions requises. Les troupes du Royaume-Uni ne se trollvent pas sur le territoire egyptien avec le consentement de l'Egypte "Iibrement et publiquement exprime dans des traites ou accords compatibles avec la Charte et ne contredisant pas cl~s accords intemationaux". I1 me reste maintenant a terminer I'examen detaille des dispositions du Traite de 1936, en me re£erant a I'article 11 qui a trait au Soudan. Le Conseil de securite connait le caractt~re offideux des accords de 1899 "relatifs a l'administration future du Soudan". II sait que ces accords sont fondes sur ttne revendication du Royaume- Uni de participer cl cette administration "par droit de conquete". Sir Alexander Cadogan a declare que, anterieurement aux accords, "le Souclan avait ete perdu par l'Egypte depuis un certain nombre d'annees, it la suite eI'une revolte couronnee de succes". II semble avair oublie que c'est le Royaume-Uni lui-meme qui avait empeche l'Egyptc d'etouffer la revolte dans I'ct'uf et qui a oblige ce pays a retirer son armee du Soudan a un moment Oil il aurait encore ete possible de retablir I'oreIre. L'Egypte n'a jamais renonce cl son unite avec le Soudan. C'est au nom de l'Egypte que Lord Kitchener a fait appel aux Soudanais et a fait rebrousser chemin a l'expedition fral1l;aise a Fa- ~nents". Sir Alexander Cadogan has alluded to the (;O\'erl1111ent of the Sudan. In reality, the Sqdan has long been governed-it is now governed-from London. That Government in London rises and falls from time to time, not on issues relating _to the Sudan, but on local issues chiefly related to the British Isles. That Government in London maintains an administration in the Sudan which is a complete military autocracy. Such is the administration which the United Kingdom would continue under the Treaty of 1936. The representative of the lJnitcd Kingdom states that his Government is proud of its record in the Sudan. Is it proud of the backward condition in which the Sudanese have been kept? Does it dare to defend its course in withholding general education from the Sudanese; in restricting even higher education to that designed to prepare for only menial tasks? The truth is that, after almost fifty years of United Kingdom administration, education in the Sudan is more neglected than it was in Egypt after twenty years of occupation. Sir Alexander Cadogan has had a great deal to say about giving t.J the Sudanese people a freedom of choice as to their own future. Even in the eyes of the United Kingdom, this is not an immediate problem. It will only arise when the Sudanese have been "prepared for selfgovernment", and, in imperial terms, that means in a far-off and distant future. The United Kingdom even admits that it sees a period of many years as an interval. It would keep it in its own hands to say when the Sudanese have become "prepared for self-government". From time to time, the United Kingdom has referred to a consultation of the Sudanese "through constitutional channels". In a country which has had no election of any kind during the forty-eight years of United Kingdom administration, it is little short of mockery to speak of constitutional channels for consultation. Of course, this means consultation under the British occupation as directed from London. I can state very frankly the attitude of the Egyptian Government on this question. \Ve consider the relations between the peoples inhabiting the two parts of the Nile valley an internal. a domestic matter. \Ve will not bargain with any intruder concerning it-even if we could thereby gain some of our national aspi- Sir Alexander Cadogan a fait allusion au Gouvernement du Soudan. En realite, depuis longtemps, c'est de Londres que le Soudan est gouverne, et qu'il I'est encore. Si a Londres le GOU\'ernement se forme ou tombe de temps cl autre, ce n'est pas a propos de questions concernant le Souclan, mais de questions d'ordre interieur ayant trait smiout aux Iles britanniques. De Londres, ce Gouvernemcnt exerce au Soudan nne administration qui consistitue en tons points une autocratie militaire. TeI est le genre d'administration que le Royaume-Uni voudrait maintenir en vertu du Traite de 1936. Le representant du Royaume-Uni declare que le Royaume-Uni est fier de son action passee au Souclan. Tire-t-il gloire de I'obscurantisme qu'it a impose aux Soudanais? Ose-t-il se justifier en ecartant les Soudanais du benefice de l'instruction generale; bien plus, d'avoir limite l'enseignement c1u seconcl c1egre aux seules branches pouvant preparer a des emplois subalternes? La verite est que, apres cinquante ans environ d'administration exercee par le Royaume-l~ni, I'instf11ctio!1 est plus negligee au Sondan qn'elle ne l'etait en Egypte apres vingt ans d'occupation. Sir Alexander Caclogan s'est longuement etenc1u sur l'idee qu'il faut donner au peuple souclanais la liberte de choisir lui-meme son destin. Mais, de I'avis meme du Royaume-Uni, ce n'est pas la un problcme immediat. I1 ne se posera que lorsque les Soudanais auront ete "prepares a un gouvernement autonome"; et, en language imperialiste, cela-signifie, on le sait, un avenir fort eloigne. Le Royaume-Uni avoue meme envisager que cela ne se fera pas avant de longues annees. I1 voudrait se reserver le privilege de fixer le moment ou les Soudanais seront "prets pour un gouvernement autonome". Le Royaume-Uni a, de temps cl autre, parle de consulter les Soudanais "par les voies constitutionnclles". Mais clans un pays qui n'a pas eu d'electinns c1'ancunc sorte Illendant les quarantehuitlees c1'administration exercee par le Royaumc-Uni, n'est-ce pas se moquer que de parler ell' consultation par des voies constitutionnelles? De toutc evidence cela signifie: consultation conduite sous I'occnpation britannique et dirigee de Londres. Je peux preciser sans detours I'attitude du Gouvernement egyptien sur ce point. Nous considelions que les relations entre les peuples qui habitent les c1eux parties de la vallee du Nil constituent nne question d'ordre purement interieur. Nous ne voulons pas de marchandage avec une tierce Puissance a Cl' sujet, meme si nous pou- I have previously set forth the reasons which make it imperative that the unity of the Nile ,"alley should be respected. I have shown that Egypt cannot live without the Sudan, and the Sudan cannot live without Egypt. Nor does the life-giving Nile alone compel our partnership. Traditions coming down through hundreds of years, giving our people to a large extent a common language and a common culture, forging for us ties which neither Egyptians nor Sudanese wish to sever, make Nile' unity a vital necessity for all of the people who live· upon its bounty. Now it is that unity which the United Kingdom seeks to disrupt. The continuance of its administration in the Sudan does disrupt it. Sir Alexander Cadogan assures the Council that the Government of the United Kingdom has not adopted a policy designed to sever the Sudan from Egypt. Yet I think he will not deny that that is precisely the effect of what United Kingdom officials have been doing in the Sudan, and we are doing there today. Their action goes even further: it seems to be directed towards a partition of the Sudan itself. I think it must now be (;lear why the Treaty of 1936 is regarded by the Egyptian Government as having outlived its usefulness; why, also, after the failure of our negotiations for its revision, we are driven to appealing for the aid of the Security Council. The representative of the United Kingdom referred at some length to the recent negotiations between our countries. He declared that, on the part of the United Kingdom, the entry into these negotiations was merely a matter of grace. That was not the view of the British Foreign Secretary when he declared in the House of Commons on 27 January of this year that "it is $;vident that the interests of both countries call for airesh treaty". The representative of the Umted Kingdom ascribed the failure of the recent negotiations to disagreement on one issue alone. He sought thus to narrow the difference between the parties to a quarrel over the wording of one of the drafts initialed by Sidky Pasha and Mr. Bevin .in London last October. I must, therefore, explain to the Security Council that the recent negotiations involved a variety of questions. From the very beginning, the Egyptian delegation insisted on a recognition of the unity of the valley of the Nile as a condition sine qua non of any agreeculture en grande partie communes, creent entre nos peuples des liens que ni les Egyptiens, ni les Soudanais ne veulent briser, et font de l'unite des pays que traverse le Nil une necessite vitale pour l'ensemble des peuples qui vivent de ses largesses. I Or, c'est eette unite que le Royaume-Uni cherche a rompre. Et le maintien de son administration au Soudan la rompt effectivement. Sir Alexander Cadogan assure que le Gouvernement du Royaurne-Uni n'a pas adopte une ligne de' conduite qui tende aseparer le Soudan de I'Egypte. Il ne niera toutefois pas, je pense, qu'en fait c'est bien exactement la le resultat de ce qu'ont fait clan.; le passe des fonctionnaires du Royaume- Uni au Soudan et de ce qu'ils y font encore. Leur action va meme plus loin: eIle semble tendre au partage du Soudan lui-meme. Je crois avoir f2-it ressortir clairement pourquoi le Gou)\'ernement egyptien estime que le Traite de 1936 a desormais perdu toute signification, et aussi pourquoi, apres l'echec des negociations menees pour sa revision, nous avons ete contraints de faire appel it l'aide du Conseil de securite. Le representant du Royaurne-Uni a parle assez longuement des recentes negociations qui se sont deroulees entre nos deux pays. 11 a declare que, de la part du Royaume-Uni, le fait d'engager des negociations etait simplement une faveur. Telle n'etait pas l'opinion du Ministre des Affaires etrangeres britannique lorsque, le 27 janvier de cette annee, il declarait it la Chambre des Communes qu' "il est evident que l'interet des deux pays appelle un nouveau traite". Le representant du Royaume-Uni attribuait l'echec des dernieres negociations au desaeeord qui s'est fait jour sur un seul point. Il cherchait ainsi it reduire le differend entre les parties aux proportions d'un dissentiment sur la redaction de l'un des projets pa.raphes par Sidky Paeha et par M. Bevin, en octobre dernier it Londres. Je me vois done dans l'obligation d'expIiquer au Conseil de securite que les recentes negociations portaient sur une serie de questions. Des le debut, la delegation egyptienne insista pour que l'unite de la valj(~e du Nil ftit reconnue et fit de .cette reconnaissance une condition sine qua During many months, the United Kingdom negotiators avoided considering this central demand on the part of Egypt. So insistent was the Egyptian delegation, however, that on this point the representatives of the United Kingclom left Cairo in September of last year, virtually breaking off the' negotiations. In the hope of saving the situation, Sidky Pasha went to 'London to meet Mr. Bevin. As Prime Minister Attlee told the House of Commons on 28 October 1946, the exchanges of views in London "were conversations on a personal and exploratory basis and not negotiations. They were conducted on the understanding that they did not commit either Government and that they were to be treated as confidential". I have already quoted Mr. Attlee's words. The two Ministers sought an all-inclusive transaction for settling the whole dispute. Their initialed drafts therefore covered the various questions involved, and the solutions outlined were thus interdependent. Failure of ultimate agreement on any essential item spells a failure of the proposals as a whole a.nd leaves open the entire area of disagreement. In one of the drafts, Mr. Bevin yielded to Egypt's initial demand and recognized "the unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the common Crown of Egypt". Yet no sooner had this fact become public than it appeared that divergent interpretations were given to the draft. On the part of the United Kingdom, it was said that only a "recognition of symbolic sovereignty" was provided for-this, although Egypt's actual sovereignty over the Sudan had not been drawn in question during the conversations. Mr. Bevin only emphasized the divergence by suggesting, on 6 December, that Sidky Pasha send to him a "letter of interpretation", to be affixed to the Treaty, and a draft text of such a letter was enclosed. with the suggestion. This text covered not one but many topics, some of which had not been raised in the previous discussions. Among other things, Sidky Pasha was asked to say that the initialed draft protocol on the Sudan "amounts to an affirmation of the existing status" of the Sudan and that it "in no way affects the right of the United Kingdom to secure the defence of the Sudan". What in effect Sidky Pasha was asked to say was that, instead of its effe~ting a recognition of the unity of Egypt and the pondit au vceu commun des Egyptiens et des Soudanais. Durant plusieurs mois, les negociateurs du Royaume-Uni eviterent de prendre en consideration cette exigence capitale de l'Egypte. L'insistance de la delegation egyptienne fut telle, cependant, que c'est preciseinent sur ce point que les representants du Royaume-Uni ont pratiquement rompu les negociations en quittant Le Caire au mois de septembre de l'annee derniere. Dans l'espoir de sauver la situation, Sidky Pacha se rendit a Londres pour y rencontrer M. Bevin. Ainsi que l'a declare M. Attlee, Premier Ministre, a la Chambre des Communes, le 28 octobre 1946, l'echange de vues de Londres "avait le caractere de conversations personneiles, de sondages et non de negociations proprement dites. Cet echange de vues eut lieu, etant entendu que les conversations n'engageaient aUCUll des deux Gouvernements et qu'elles devaient etre considerees comme strictement confidentielles"., I'ai deja cite les paroles de M. Attlee. Les deux Ministres se sont efforces d'aboutir a un accord qui reglerait l'ensemble du differend. Les projets qu'il ont paraphes portent done sur les nombreuses questions en cause et, par suite, les solutions qui y sont formttJees s'interpenetrent. Si les parties n'arrivent pas a s'entendre en definitive sur l'u~ que1conque des points essentie1s, l'echec du projet dans son ensemble est certain et laisse subsister tout le desaccord. Dans l'un des projets, M. Bevin cedait a la premiere ~xigence de l'Egypte et reconnaissait "1'unit6 de l'Egypte et du Soudan, sous la couronne commune de l'Egypte". Mais, des que ce fait fut rendu public, des interpretations contradictoires en furent donnees. Du cote du Royaume-Uni, on dec1ara que cette disposition ne constH:uait "qu'une reconnaissance de souverainete symbolique", et cela bien que la veritable souverainete de l'Egypte sur le Soudan n'eut jamais ete mise en cause au cours des conversationlS. M. Bevin ne fit que souligner la divergence d'opinions en suggerant, le 6 decembre, que Sidky Pacha lui envoyat une "Iettre d'interpretation" qui devait etre jointe en annexe au Traite; et M. Bevin avait joint a sa proposition un projet de texte pour cette Iettre. Ce texte visait non pas un seuI point, mais un grand nombre, dont quelques-uns n'avaient pas ete souleves au cours des discussions precedentes. Entre autres, Sidky Pacha etait invite a declarer que le projet de protocoIe reIatif au Soudan qui avait ete paraphe "equivalait a une confirmation du statut existant" du Soudan, et qu'il "ne portait aucunement atteinte all droit du Royaume-Uni d'assurer la defense du Soudan". Ce qu'on demandait en fait a Sidky Paeha, c'etait de declarer que le projet Of course, Sidky Pasha refused to sign the draft letter presented by Mr. Bevin. Instead, he communicated an aide-memoire. setting Jorth his own clear understanding of the draft protocol and pointing out that the United Kingdom interpretation of it went beyond the text and beyond the conversations which had led up to it. These events served to undermine Egyptian confidence in the good faith of the Government of the United Kingdom in declaring its willingness to recognize the unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the common Crown of Egypt, and they.emphasized once more the impossibility of any settlement which would give satisfaction to Egypt's essential demands. There was nothing left for Egypt to do but to appeal to the Security Council. . As a result, the dispute is now before the, Security Council, unencumbered by the tentatives advanced in the Sidky-Bevin proposals. It has not been narrowed by the negotiations to which we devoted a whole year. It involves, as it has always involved, the question of the immediate and unconditional evacuation of United Kingdom forces from every part 'of Egypt's territory and the termination of the separatist United Kingdom administration in the Sudan. Having analysed the Treaty of ] 9::36 and the neg-otiations for its revision, I want to present briefly to the Security Council the political setting of the Treaty-the setting in which the Council will view it when considering our daims. The representative of the United Kingdom has adumbrated this setting in his frequent references to' the liquidation of his country's reservations of 1922. That liquidation was indeed the object of the Treaty. Now what were those reservations? They were contained in a unilateral declaration made by the United Kingdom before Turkey's suzerainty over Egypt had been renounced. That declaration was in itself a liquidation of the Protectorate proclaimed by the United Kingdom without consulting the Egyptian nation in 1914. That Protectorate was, in turn, a liquidation of the military occupation begun in 1882. All roads lead back, therefore, to the unwarranted al'ld illegal use of force by which the United Kingdom attained its foothold in Bien entendu, Sidky Pacha refusa de signer le projet de lettre prepare par M. Bevin. I1 fit, au contraire, parvenir cl ce dernier un aide-memoire dans lequel il exposait clairement son interpretation personnelle du projet de protocole, faisant ressortir que celle du Royaume-Uni outrepassait la portee du texte et des conversations qui avaient precede son etablissement. Ces faits contribuerent a ebranler la confiance de l'Egypte dans la bonne foi du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni lorsque celui-ci se declarait dispose cl reconnaitre l'unite de l'Egypte et du Soudan sous la couronne egyptienne commune; ils soulignerent une fois de plus qu'il etait impossible d'arriver a aucun accord qui donnat satisfaction aux exigences principales de l'Egypte. I1 ne restait cl ceUe-ci d'autre solution que d'en appeler au Conseil de securite. En consequence, les tentatives d'accord Sidky- Bevin n'ont eu aucune porh~e sur le differe~d dont le Conseil se trouve maintenant saisi, et les negociations auxquelles nous avons consacre une annee entiere n'en ont pas diminue l'importance. I1 porte, comme ill'a toujours fait, sur deux questions: le retrait immediat et sans conditions des forces du ~oyaume-Unihors de toutes les parties du territoire egyptien, et la fin du regime d'administration separatiste impose par le Royaume- Uni au Soudan. Apres avoir analyse le Traite de 1936 et les negociations poursuivies en vue de sa revision, je voudrais maintenant presenter brievement au Conseil le cadre politique du Traite, cadre ou il faudra le replacer lorsque vous aurez a examiner nos demandes. Le representant du Royaume-Uni en a esquisse les grandes lignes par les nombreuses references qu'il a faites a la liquidation des reserves faites par ce pays en 1922. Le but de ce Traite etait precisement de mettre fin aces reserves. QueUes etaient donc au juste ces reserves? On les trouve dans une declaration unilaterale faite par le Royaume-Uni avant que la Turquie ellt renonce a sa suzeraine1:e sur l'Egypte. Cette declaration, en e1Ie-meme, mettait fin au protectorat qu'avait proclame le Royaume-Uni en 1914 sans avoir consulte la nation egyptienne. Et le Protectorat lui-meme marquait deja la fin de l'occupation militaire qui avait commence en 1882. Par ces voies successives, nous remontons au point de depart qui a ete l'emploi injustifie et illegal de la force, grace auquel le Royaume-Uni a Surely it must be plain that the imperialist legend must come to an end; that it can no longer be permitted to embroil relations oetween Egypt and the United Kingdom in struggles, in bitterness, and in frustration. Not our interest alone, but also that of the United Kingdom, calls for a new order. A contented Egypt and the Sudan could have the most cordial relations with other countries, including the Unit~d Kingdom. It would make once more for peace along the Nile. It would assist the United Nations in bolstering the peace of the Middle East and the peace of the world. Treaty or no treaty, it is the duty of the Security Council to deal with any menace to peace, "to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace", to take' cognizance of any dispute "the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security". The Security Council cannot evade its "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" because of the "legal" position of the parties to the dispute. In coming before the Security Council, the Egyptian Government has insisted upon bald political facts which cannot be successfully controverted: first, the fact that a: dispute exists; secondly, the fact that the Egyptian Government has made a determined and honest effort to settle the dispute by negotiation with the United Kingdom, and that this effort has failed; thirdly, the fact that the continuance of this dispute is likely to endanger the maintenance of peace and security not only in the valley of the Nile but also throughout the Middle East; fourthly, the fact that the "conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations" can be brought about in that part of the world only by the complete withdrawal of United Kingdom forces from Egyptian territory and the termination of the separatist United Kingdom administration in the Sudan. These are the facts which have led the Egyptian Government to appeal for the aid of the Security Council. The representative of the United Kingdom ha5 sought to make it appear that any danger to peace and security inhering in this dispute would be solely due to the Egyptian Government. mem~ que la Charte des Nations Unies est devenue la pierre angulaire des relations internationales. II faut, de toute evidence" mettre un terme ala tegende imperialiste; on ne saurait tolerer plus longtemps qu'elle envenime les relations entre l'Egypte et le Royaume-Uni en donnant naissance a des luttes cruelles et injustes. Ce n'est pas notre seul interet, mais c'est aussi celui du Royaume- Uni, qui demande l'institution d'un ordre nouveau. L'Egypte, une fois satisfaite, et le Soudan pourraient entretenir les relations les plus cordiales avec les autres pays, y compris le Royaume-Uni. La paix en serait retablie dans la vallee du Nil. CeIa aurait pour effet d'aider les Nations Unies a assurer la paix dans le Moyen Orient et la paix dans le monde. Qu'il existe ou non un traite, il est du devoir du Conseil de securite de s'occuper de tout ce qui constitue une menace contre la paix, "de prendre des mesures collectives efficaces en vue de prevenir et d'ecarter les menaces a la paix", d'examiner tout "differend dont la prolongation est susceptible de menacer le maintien de la paix et de la securite internationales". Le Conseil de securite ne peut se derober a la "responsabiIite principale du maintien de la paix et de la securite internationales" qui lui a ete conferee, en invoquant la position "juridique" des parties au differend. En venant devant le Conseil de securite, le Gouvernement egyptie;n a tenu a souligner des faits politiques qui se passent de commentaires et qui sont tout afait indiscutables: prima, le fait qu'un differend existe; secunda, le fait que le Gouvernement egyptien s'est resolument et sinc~rement efforce de regler le differend par voie de negociations avec le Royaume-Uni, et que cet effort a echoue; tertio, le fait que, si ce differend se prolongeait, il risquerait de menacer le maintien de la paix et de la securite, non lieulement dans la vallee du Nil, mais aussi dans tout le Moyen Orient; qUMta, le fait que "les conditions de stabiIite et de bien-etre necessaires a l'existence de relations pacifiques et amicaks" ne 'peuvent etre realisees dans cette region du monde que si les forces du Royaume-Uni sont entierement retirees du territoire egyptien et s'il est mis fin au regime d'adminstration separatiste institue par le Royaume-Uni au Soudan. Tels sont l~s faits qui ont amene le Gouvernement egyptien a faire appel a l'assistance du Conseil de secunte. Le representant du Royaume-Uni s'est efforce de faire croire que tous les elements qui, dans ce differend, constituent une menace contre la paix et la securite, sont uniquement imputables au Gouvernement egyptien. Let me explain more fully why, despite the peaceful intentions of the Egyptian Government, the continuance of this dispute is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. During sixty-five long years, the millions of people who inhabit the valley of the Nile have never ceased to resent tHe presence of United Kingdom forces on Egyptian territory. Time and again, their hopes for settlement of this dispute have been dashed. Time and again, the invader's assurances of withdrawal have been flouted. Time and again, serious incidents have occurred betpeen our population and the uninvited guests, who have acted as if they owned the country. The popular resentment is not <?nly understandable, it is inevitable. It cannot be choked down. It is bound to flare up. It has repeatedly led to violence. In quite recent months, it has produced bloodshed and taken a toll of many lives. If the Egyptian Government has held back the tide, if it is now able to ward off the storm, it is because we have proceeded to lodge this appeal for aid by the Security Council, in which the hopes of Egyptians are now centred. I wish to repeat that, so long as the occupation continues, this popular resentment cannot be stilled. Its flare-ups cannot be prevented. Such a situation can easily get out of hand. The peaceful intentions of my Government may be thwarted. Surely it is the duty of the Egyptian Government to anticipate such possibilities, to move in advance to prevent them. Surely it is the function of the Security Council, after the failure of our direct negotiations, to put an end to the British occupation and the British ihtervention against which the popular resentment is directed. Surely the Council will help us to root out this cancer which infects peace along the Nile. I think I have made it plain to the Security Council that, so long as the occupation el1- I am confident that that same spirit will imbue the Security Council. I ask it to deal with this case in the year 194"1, in the light of the I Charter, in pursuance of its high mission under the Charter to safeguard nt:ace and security. Sir ALEXANDER CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : At the last meeting of the Security Council at which this question was discussed,l I had the honour to make a statement to the Council dealing with the letter of 8 July from the Egyptian delegation. At that same meeting, I explained that it was not possible for me then and there to deal with the long statement made to the Council that morning by Nokrashy Pasha,2 and I reserved the right to reply to that statement at a subsequent meeting. I had expected to speak first this afternoon, and thus to complete my initial reply to the initial statement of the Egyptian Prime Minister. I refer to this now only in order to make it quite plain that what I am going to say today Le Royaume-Uni possede le moyen de remedier a cette situation. Il n'a nulleme:p.t besoin, pour retirer ses forces du territoire egyptien, qu'un traite avec l'Egypte lui en donne l'autorisation. II peut les retirer des demain. Mais, il semble que le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni soit incapable d'operer cette evacuation de son propre gre. C'est pourquoi l'Egypte s'est vu ohligee de faire appel au Conseil de securite, pour qu'il la decharge de ce trop lourd fardeau. C'est pourquoi l'Egypte a dti demanCIer au Conseil de prescrire l'evacuation immediate, totale et inconditionnelle des forces du Royaume- Uni se trouvant dans la vallee du Nil, de meme que la fin de I'administration clu Royaume-Uni au Soudan. Pour citer les paroles de .:'>1. Herhert Morrison, prononcees a. la Chambre des Communes, le "I mai 1946: "L'annee 1946 aans le Moyen Orient n'est le renouvellement, ni de 1936, ni de 1929. Le monde porte en soi le changement; nous esperons qu ce changement est un progres". On "pourrait croire que la situation que nous avons a regler dans les discussions actuelles sur l'Egypte, en cette annee 1946, reproduit celles de 1936 ou de 1929. Je puis vous assurer qu'il n'en est rien, elle en differe totalement". Je suis persuade que c'est dans ce meme esprit que le Conseil de securite examinera la situation. Je lui demande de regler l'affaire dont il est saisi, en cette annee 1947, a la lumiere de la Charte et en execution de la haute mission qui lui incombe en vertu de ce texte: sauvegarder la paix et la securite. Sir ALEXANDER CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (fra-duit de l'anglais): Lors de la derniere seance du Conseil de securite, au cours de laquelle cette qu~stion a ete discuteet, j'ai eu l'honneur de faire une declaration au Conseil concernant la lettre de la delegation egyptienne en date du 8 juillet. Au coms de la meme seance, j'ai explique que je n'etais pas en mesure de repondre sur-le-champ a la longue declaration que Nokrachy Pacha avait faite devant le Consei!'Ie matin meme2. Je m'etais reserve le droit de repondre a cette declaration au cours d'u1Je seance ulterieure. ]'avais espere' avoir la parole le premier cet apres-midi, et pou- \'oir ainsi en terminer a\'ec ma reponse aux declarations initiales du Premier Ministre de l'Egypte. Je tiens a rappeler ces circonstances pour qu'il soit parfaitement clair que ma presente declara- Although a large part of my remarks today will be directed to c')rrecting the Egyptian account of the British occupation of Egypt from 1882 to 1922 and pf the history of the Sudan, I repeat what I have already said to the Council: that, strictly speaking, all this is irrelevant to the question which is before i:he Council. My delegation cannot, however, let pass without challenge an account of our work in Egypt and. the Sudan which is design~d to convey the impression of purely selfish imperialism. In the case of Egypt, our work has led to the establishment of Egypt as a prosperous, independent State. We brought about those conditions, administrative and economic, which rendered .this happy result possible. Our role in Egypt was similar to that played by some other great Powers in some other parts of the world, where it has also happily resulted in the presence in the United Nations of other fully independent States. I know that the ideas of today are different from those of the ,nineteenth century. No Power has given greater evidence of its evolution of ideas in this respect than the United Kingdom, which has given some hund:reds of , millions of Indians and Burmese their freedom, and which was ready to withdraw the last British soldier from Egyptian soil within a year or two of Egypt's salvation from the Nazi hordes at the expense of many thousands of British soldiers' lives. Our conduct in the nineteenth century can be judged fairly only by the ideas of that period; but whatever the criterion by, which our work in Egypt is judged, the aspersions of Nokrashy Pasha are in the highest degree unjust and inaccurate. I do not propose to waste the Council's time with a disquisition on imperialism in the r.bstract. During roughly the same period of 1. :story, several of the countries now represented on this Council were expanding in Africa or in Asia, and they still include, within their present borders some of the results of such expansion. Egypt itself was among the countries which extended their domains by conquest during the early nineteenth century. nonce par Nokrachy Pacha en date du 5 aout. Bien qu'une grande partie de mes remarques aient pour but aujourd'hui de rectifier la relation egyptienne de l'occupation de l'Egypte par les forces du Royaume-Uni, entre 1882 et 1922, et de l'histoire du Soudan, je repete ce que j'ai deja dit au Conseil de securite: que, strictement parlant, tout ceci est sans rapport avec la question dont le Conseil est saisi. Neanmoins, ma delegation ne petit laissi...'" passer sans contestation un expose sur notre ceuvre en Egypte et au Soudan, qui vise cl. donner l'impression d'un imperialisme purement egoiste. Dans le cas de l'Egypte, notre ceuvre a permis a l'Egypte de devenir un Etat independant et prospere. C'est nous qui av<;ms cree les conditions, d'ordre administratif et eQonomique, qui ont rendu possible cet heureux resultat. Notre role en Egypte a ete comparable a ce1ui qu'ont joue d'autres grandes Puissances dans d'aut.es parties du monde, ou ce role a eu egalement pour resultat heureux d'amener au sein de l'Organisation des Nations Unies d'autres Etats pleinement independants. Je sais que les idees d'aujourd'hui sont differentes de celles du XIXeme siec1e. Aucune Puissance n'a fourni de preuves plus convaincantes de l'evolution de ses idees a cet egard que le Royaume-Uni, qui a donne la liberte a des cent.aines de millions d'Hindous et de Birmans, et qui etait pret a. retirer le dernier soldat britannique du sol egyptien un an ou deux apres que l'Egypte eut ete sauvee des hordes nazies au prix de mi111ers de vies de soldats britanniques. Notre conduite au cours du XIXeme siecle ne peut etre ~quitablement jugee qu'en tenant compte des idees qui avaient cours a cette epoque. Mais, quel que soit le criterium utilise pour juger notre ceuvre (n Egypte, les calomnies de :N okrachy Pacha sont I le comble de l'injustice et de l'inexactitude. Je n'ai pas l'intention de faire perdre son temps au Conseil en faisant une dissertation abstraite sur l'imperialisme. Pendant environ la meme periode de l'histoire, plusieurs des pays actuellement representes a. ce Conseil s'etendaient en Afrique et en Asie et conservent encore dans le cadre de leurs frontieres certains des territoires ou cette expansion les a amenes a s'installer. VEgypte elle-meme etait parmi ces pays qui ont etendu leur domaine par la conquete au cours de la premiere partie du XIXeme siecle. Nokrashy Pasha further suggests that, from the time of Napoleon on, my country resolved that no strong government should rule in Egypt and that, as a primary step, it mobilized the Concert of Europe against Egyptian independence. This is a complete travesty of the facts. The intervention' of the Powers in 1839, to which he appears to refer, was provoked by 'Mohammed Ali himself, whose campaign of aggression in Syria, far beyond his own country's borders, eventually caused the Ottoman Sultan to appeal for European intervention'. In the event, both the former boundaries 0f Egypt and the privileges of the Viceroy remained unimpaired. Indeed. the latter were actually extended by the Sultan's Firman of 184], which not only granted to Mohammed Ali the administration of additional territory during his lifetime, but also conferred the viceroyalty on 'him and his heirs in hereditary succession. The Convention of London of the previous year, to which the Ottoman Government was a signatory, was the foundation upon which that Firman was framed. I, I I wish now to dispose of the grossly mi:oleading suggestion that the British fleet bombarded the city of Alexandria in 1882. The facts of this matter are that a military party under Arabi Pasha had revolted against the authority of the Khedive and had plunged the country into anarchy. Christians and Europeans were b~ing intimidated, and in Alexandria itself upwards of fifty had been brutally massacred. In spite of warnings to stop his preparations, Arabi persisted in arming the forts in a way which threatened the ships sent by the United Kingdom and other Powers to protect their nationals. A final warning having been disrega'rded, the forts-I repeat, the forts-were destroyed by the United Kingdom warships. The town was left untouched by the United Kingdom forces-but not by the retreating soldiers of Arabi, who pillaged and set fire to it before they withdrew. Her Majesty's Government was stilI reluctant. however, to extend the scope of operations of the small United Kingdom force which was then landed at Alexandria in response to imperative humanitarian demands. It hoped that the au- France brought with it a change of view. It tried in the second place to persuade the Ottoman Sultan to send forces, but he refused to do so in any conditions which would have been prejudicial to the position of the Khedive in relation to his suzerain. It was not till some weeks later, after all such kopes had proved vain, that United Kingdom troops were landed in the Isthmus of Suez with the authority of the Khedive and indeed at his earnest request. ~ot long afterwards, Arabi's military faction collapsed completely after the battle of Tell el- Kebir, and the Khedive, accompanied by the commander of the United Kingdom forces, was enthusiastically welcomed by the population of Cairo. So much for the circumstances in which United Kingdom troops first came tq Egypt. They came, as I have shown, at the request and with the authorization of the Khedive, the Sultan's Viceroy. Having come, they ',tayed, as Nokrashy Pasha has pointed out, for sixty-five years, in spite of statements by Mr. Gladstone and other ministers that there was no intention of remaining indefinitely. These statements were made in good faith; but the United Kingdom forces stayed because the United Kingdom authorities, inspired by ideas of constructive imperialism which it is now the fashion to decry, found before them an immense task which they felt it their duty to perform. Had the forces left after a year or two, Egypt would inevitably have relapsed into the conditions of misrule and anarchy which had been the cause of their coming. Suh a relapse, in view of the large numbers of Europeans and Christians in Egypt and in view of the international financial liabilities of the Egyptian Government, would have rendered inevitable Cl fresh intervention by a Power or Powers of more advanced standards. Let us examine, in a spirit of greater historical accuracy than the Egyptian Prime Minister's, the actual results of my country's long association with Egypt. In 1882, Egypt's finances were once more in a disastrous state, the chaos resulting from the Arabi revolt having nullified all the previous efforts to reform them. The irrigation works which had been initiated by Mohammed Ali had fallen into disrepair. Taxation bore mqst heavily upon those least able to bear the burden. The fellaheen were dragged from the fields and forced Royal1m~-Uni furent debarql1e~s dans l'isthme de Suez avec l'autorisation du Khedive et, en fait, sur sa demande instante. Peu de temps apres, la faction militaire d'Arabi s'effondrait completement apres la bataiIle de TeIl-el-Kebir, et le Khedive, accompagne par le commandant des forces du Royaume-Uni, recevait un accueil enthousiaste de la population du Caire. TeIles sont les circonstances reeIles dans lesquelles les troupes du Royaume-Uni debarquerent pour la premiere fois en Egypte. Elles y sont v~nues, ainsi que je l'ai expose, a la demande et avec l'autorisation du Khedive, vice-roi representant le Sultan. Etant venues, elles resterent, ainsi que l'a declare Nokrachy Pacha, pendant soixante-cinq ans, en depit des declarations faites par M. Gladstone et d'autres ministres, seIon lesquelles on n'avait pas l'intention de les y main- ' tenir indefiniment. Ces declarations ont ete prononcees de bonne foi, mais les forces du Royaume- Uni durent rester parce que les autorites du Royaume-Uni,. inspirees par les idees d'imperialisme constructif qu'il est de mode de decrier aujourd'hui, se sont trouvees en face d'une tache immense qn'eIles estimaient de leur devoir rl'ac- . complir. Si les forces du Royaume-Uni s'etaient retirees un DU deux ans plus tard; l'Egypte serait inevitablement retombee dans les abus et l'etat d'anarchie qui avaient ete la cause de leur venue. Une telle rechnte, etant donne le nombre considerable d'Europeens et de chretiens en Egypte et les engagements internationaux d'ordre financier contractes par le Gouvernement egyptien, aurait rendu inevitable une nouvelle intervention de la part d'une ou de plusieurs Puissances plus evoluees. Ex~minons donc, avec un soud de verite historique plus grand que celui du Premier Ministre de l'Egypte, les resultats' veritables de la longue association de mon pays avec l'Egypte. En 1882, les finances egyptiennes etaient une fois de plus dans un etat desastreux, le chaos resultant de la revolte cl'Arabi ayant reduit a neant tous les efforts precedents pour reformer les finances de l'Egypte. Les installations d'irrigation qui avaient ete commencees par Mehemet Ali etaient tombee en ruines. Les impots pesaient le plus lourdement sur ceux qui etai'ent le mains en mesure de Under British guid:'!l1ce and supervision, taxation was lightened and it." burden more equitably distributed. The revenue increased from nine and a half million Egyptian pounds in ]882 to nearly forty-two millions in 1922. The irrigation system was restored and greatly extended. The crop area was nearly doubled. Forced labour and the lash were abolished. Slave trading was abolished and slavery ceased. It is these outstanding reforms in the financial, economic and social spheres that Nokrashy Pasha is plea.sed to dismiss with a sneer as the United Kingdom's "high mission of protecting the foreign bondholders, disregarding the welfare and aspirations of the Egyptian people". Moreover, it was the policy of the successive Governments of the United Kingdom to place Egypt on its feet and render it completely selfgoverning. The first step was the increase of local self-government. The next and great step was taken in. 1922, when Egypt became independent, and at once there was a termination of the employment of the vast majority of United Kingdom officials. Egypt, which under the guidance of the United Kingdom had become an exceptionally prosperous country, was free from 1922 onwards to effect suel, 60cial and other reforms as it desired. Can this record of the work accomplished by the United Kingdom in Egypt, of which I have necessarily given but a brief account, be held to have been-to quote Nokrashy Pasha's words-"a cruel trial for the Egyptians to endure"? Naturally the governing classes in Egypt disliked foreign leading-strings. Nevertheless I claim that during this long period, in which the Egyptian State has been developed, under British guidance, out of despotism and corruption and endowed with its present Constitution, my Government and the officials to whom its policy in Egypt has been entrusted have been actuated by the spirit in which Lord Dufferin prefaced his proposals for reform in 1883 with these words: "Egypt, and the Egyptian people whom we have undertaken to rescue from anarchy, have alike a right to require that our intervention shall pe beneficent and its results enduring; that it should obviate the danger of all future perturbations; and that it should leave established on sure foundations the principles of justice, liberty and public happiness." I must now turn to the Sudan. It has been argued that Egypt and the Sudan have been ott autre qu'elle desirait. De l'a:uvre accomplie par le Royaume-Uni en Egypte, dont je ne peux, bien entendu, donner qu'une breve relation, peut-on dire qu'elle fut, pour citer les paroles de Nokrachy Pacha, "une dure epreuve pour les Egyptiens"? Evidemment, les classes gouvernantes d'Egypte n'aimaient guere sentir les renes que tenait l'etranger. Neanmoins, je pretends que, pendant cette longue periode au cours de laquelle.l'Etat egyptien s'est libere, sous la tutelle du Royaume-Uni, du despotisme et de la corruption et a re~u sa presente Constitution, mon Gouvernement, et les fonctionnaires quOil avait charges d'appliquer sa politique' en Egypte, ont ete animes par J'esprit dans lequel Lord Dufferin a preface ses propositions de reforme'en 1883, clans les termes suivants : "L'Egypte et le peuple egyptien, que nous avons entrepris de sauver de l'anarchie, ont un droit egal a demander que notre intervention soit bienfaisante et ses resuItats durab1c.s, qu'elle pare au danger de taus troubles future et qu'elle pos~, sur des bases solides, les principes de justice, de li-. 'berte et de bien-etre public." ]'en viens maintenant a la question du Soudan. On a pretenc1u que l'Egypte et le Soudan ont, Mohammed Ali's invasion of the Sudan in 1821 was made possible by internal dissensions in the Sudanese Kingdom of Sennar. His generals defeated the Sudanese in battle, quashed a subsequent revolt with a brutality which is remembered to this day, and established Egyptian rule over the Sudan south of the great Nile bend for the first time in history. Since the year 661 RC., two and a half thousand years before, when a Sudanese ruler of Egypt had been driven south of Assuan by the Assyrians, the frontier which Nokrashy Pasha calls a United Kingdom invention had been in existence in the area between the first and second cataracts of the Nile where it is today. The political unity of the Nile valley is a myth. Egypt and the Sudan are linked by the river Nile and separated by hundreds of miles of desert. The northern Sudanese, whose Arab ancestors came into the country by general routes and mixed with the non-Egyptian indigenous population, and who have in,their midst, notably in Kordofan and Darfur, large Negro and negroid elements, share with Egypt only a common language and a common religionlinks which are equally applicable to many other peoples who once formed part of the Ottoman Empire. The southern Sudanese, who constitute abo't a third of the population, have no racial, linguistic, or religious links with the Egyptians at all. Mehemet Ali et ses successeurs regnerent sur le Soudan pendant soixante ans. L'oppression qui caracterisait cette domination et la traite des esclaves qui I'accompagnait ont ete attestees par nombr"e de voyageurs et de fonctionnaires europeens. Le succes de la revolte du Mahdi fut du en partie a la haine que nourrissaient les Soudanais contre les abus de pouvoir des Egyptiens et, d'autre part, it I'etat de (l<~sorganisation financiere et administrative dans lequel l'Egypte etait elIe-meme tombee, et qui avait encore affaibli I'efficacite de I'administration egyptienne au Soudan ainsi que le moral des forces militaires egyptiennes, dont la plupart n'avaien( pas re<:;u de solde depuis des annees. L'Egypte elle-meme n'avait, ni les ressources financieres, ni les moyens militaires necessaires pour faire face a cette revolte. On en trouve la preuve dans les nombreux desastres que subirent les forces egyptiennes au Soudan. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste n'etait pas dispose it cette epoque it accroitre !"es obliga- Mohammed Ali and his successors ruled the Sudan for sixty years. The oppressive nature of that rule and of the slave trade which accompanied it is attested by scores of European travellers and o officials. The success of the Mahdi's revolt was due in part to the hatred felt by the Sudanese for Egyptian misrule and in part to the financial and administrative chaos into which Egypt itself had fallen and which had weakened even further the efficiency of the Egyptian administration of the Sudan and the morale of its military forces, most of whom had not been paid for years. Egypt itself had neither the financial nor the military resources to cope with this revolt, as was evidenced by a number of di~astrous defeats suffered by Egyptian forces in the Sudan. Her Majesty's Government was unwilling at that time to increase its financial' or military commitments to the extent necessary to give Egypt that degree of assistance which a successful operation would have de- Nokrashy Pasha contemptuously dismisses the part played by the United Kingdom forces in this campaign with a reference to "a few United Kingdom battalions". Amongst many, this is his most glaring perversion of history. Even ignoring the fact that the success of the campaign was due to the organizing genius of Lord Kitchener and to the administrative competence of the British officers who in the space of a few years had converted the Egyptian Army from a demoralized rabble into an efficient fighting machine, the figures and statistics relating to the campaign ate there to prove such an argument untenable. The facts are these: at the battle of Atbara in April, 1898, the United Kingdom brigade which took part consisted of 101 officers and 3,357 men. The Egyptian forces numbered 82 British officers, 13 British non-commissioned officers, 332 Egyptian officers, and 9,781 other ranks. The total casualties killed and wounded were 20 British officers and 539 men. Of these, the Egyptian battalions had one man' killed and 13 wounded. In the final advance on Khartoum, a force of 8,200 United Kingdom troops and 17,600 officers and men of the Egyptian Army-Egyptians and Sudanese-took part. In the battle of Omdurrnan, the British units lost 27 killed and 133 wounded; the Egyptians 14 killed and 152 wounded; the Sudanese 15 killed and 149 wounded. These figures speak for themselves. The Sudan having been reconquered by the forces under the command of Lord Kitchener, the problem arose of providing for the future administration of that country. There were four main elements which had to be taken into consideration. In the first place, there were Egypt's claims to the Sudan, which had never been abandoned, though Egypt had been unable to exercise them for over twelve years, coupled with the facts that two-thirds of the Le Soudan ayant ete reconquis par les forces pIacees sous le cOl11mandement de Lord Kitchener, le probleme se posa d'assurer la future administration du pays. Quatre elements principaux devaient entrer en ligne de compte. En premier lieu, les pretentions de l'Egypte sur le Soudan, qui n'avaient jamais ete abondonnees, bien que I'Egypte eut ete incapable de les faire valoir pendant plus de douze ans; il s'y ajoutait le fait que les forces qui avaient reconquis le Soudan se Nokrachy Pacha refuse avec dedain de reconnaitre la part qu'a jouee le Royaume-Uni dans cette campagne: il parle de "que1ques bataillons britanniques". Entre beaucoup d'autres, c'est la I'accroc le plus flagrant qu'il ait fait a la verite historique. Admettons que I'on passe sous silence le fait que le succes de la campagne est du au genie organisateur de Lord Kitchener et a la competence administrative des officiers britanniques, qui, en l'espace de quelques annees avaient fait une machine de combat efficace du troupeau demoralise qu'etait l'armee egyptienne; les chiffres et les statistiques relatifs a la campagne sont la pour prouver qu'une allegation comme celle ci-dessus est insoutenable. Voici les faits: a la bataille d'Atbara, en avril 1898, du cote du Royaume-Uni, la brigade engagee se composait de 101 officiel'S et 3.357 hommes; les forces egyptiennes comprenaient 82 officiel'S .et 13 sous-officiers britanniques, 332 officers egyptiens et 9.781 hommes. Les pertes totales en tues et blesses furent de 20 officiers britanniques et 539 hommes. Panni ces dernters, les bataillons egyptiens eurent un tue et 13 blesses. Dans l'avance finale sur Khartoum, un groupe de 8.200 soldats du Royaume-Uni et 17.600 officiel'S et hommes de I'armee egyptienne (Egyptiens et Soudanais) furent engages. A la bataille de Omdunnan, les unites britanniqu~s perdirent 27 tues et 133 blesses, les Egyptiens 14 hies et 152 blesses. Ces chiffres parlent d'eux-memes. It was in these cicumstances that the C01tdominium described by Lord Cromer as a "hybrid form of government hitherto unknown to international jurisprudence" was devised. Under the Agreement of 1899, the form of which was in careful harmony with the relevant Ot- " toman firmans and the Convention of 1885, the whole administration of the country is entrusted to a Governor-General who is appointed by the Sovereign of Egypt, upon the recommendation of the Government of the United Kingdom. The Sudan is administered as a territory entirely separate from Egypt, and the effect of the Condominium Agreement from the legal point of view can be best appreciated from the judgments of two courts in Egypt, one of them a judgment of the mixed courts and the other a judg~nt of the Egyptian native courts. I shall circulate copies of the Condominium Agreement and of these judgments so that any members who are interested in these legal questions may read them. It is true that the Governor-General has always been a British subject. I do not think that it was ever in the minds of either party to the Condominiwm Agreement that the United Kingdom Government would recommend a person of any other nationality. It was also int /itable that, in the initial stages, all the high administrative officials should also be British. I have referred to the hatred of the Egyptians which the Sudanese harboured at the time of the Mahdi revolt. It was also an undeniable fact that there were not in Egypt at that time persons possessing the administrative capacity and experience necessary for the government of this territory and willing to serve there. I shall deal later with the question of administrative officials in subsequent years. But what are the facts about Sudan trade in general and Sudan trade with Egypt in particular? The volume of trade in the Sudan, which in 1898 was completely cut off from world markets for lack of communications, stands today at eighty-eight million dollars. Exports to Egypt in pre-war years constituted eleven per cent of the whole, and in 1946 twenty per cent. Egypt does not want ginned cotton or gum arabic, which between them constitute sixty-four per cent of the 1946 total export figure, and it received more than half of the remainder. Moreover, it must be remembered that the destination of certain export commodities, such as oil seeds, is still controlled by the International Emerge:1cy Food Council. Egypt's share of imports into the Sudan, which, according to the Prime Minister, is impaired by the present Sudan administration, amounts to twenty per cent. It would have been higher in 1946, if the Sudan, with its cost of living index figure of 170, could have afforded to pay prices then current in Egypt, where the figure was 300, and if Egyptian exporters had not been anxious to sell in more lucrative markets elsewhere. In 1942, for instance, the Egyptian sugar combine defaulted on a long-established contract and refused to supply the Sudan in its need. Under the Condominit-t,m Agreemel1t, the Sudan may not impose import duties higher than those in force in Egypt, and Egyptian goods have free entry into the Sudan under reciprocal arrangements. aent has already done in this respect. Its record has earned world-wide acknowledgement from critics, some of whom had no reason to be friendly to the United Kingdom. It is summarized in the Record of Progress,l copies of which have been circulated to the members of this Council. I have already denied that the Sudan administration has indulged in anti-Egyptian propaganda. In fact, the direct opposite is the case. In the period 1919-1924, a campaign of virulent propaganda and organized incitement to revolt was carried out by Press and politicians in Egypt and by Egyptian officials and officers in the Sudan. This culminated first in an abortive mutiny by an Egyptian-officered Sudanese battalion in Khartoum, with disturbances in other parts of the country where Egyptians were stationed, and later in the assassination in Cairo of Sir Lee Stack, the Governor-General -an assassination which, far from being what Nokrashy Pasha has called "the kind of unfortunate incident which could occur anywhere", was the culmination of a campaign of violence in which responsible Egyptians were deeply involved. The progress and results of this campaign are lucidly described in the volume of the Survey of International Affairs from which the Egyptian Prime Minister has quoted. It is there stated: "From that time (1919) onwards, Egyptian political leaders of all parties insistently demanded the integral corporation of the Sudan in a so'Vereign independent Egyptian state; and in the Sudan itself, a number of individual Egyptians-some service, and other private persons operating from Cairo-started an anti-British agitation which, while it did not affect the Condominium at law, made it almost unworkable in practice within less than five years." During the last eighteen months, the Egyptian Press has indulged in a precisely similar campaign of abuse against the Sudan Government. That responsible Egyptians were prepared to associate themselves with this campaign is shown by the appearance in the newspaper At Mussawar of 23 January 1947 of an article by a Minister of the Egyptian Crown accusing the Sudan Government of deliberately closing its eyes to the introduction of harmful narcotics amongst the primitive peoples of the south-a charge as baseless as it is absurd. In these conditions, is it surprising th~t the Sudan Government was forced to ban tHe 1 The Sudan: a Record of Progress (1898-1947), printed by the authority of the Sudan Government. tiens agissant a titre indivic1uel (les uns fonctionnaires, les autres, personnes privees operant du Caire) ont fomente une agitation antibritannique qui, sans toucher au condOl1tinium du point de vue juridique, en a rendu le fonetionnement presque impossible en mains de dnq ans". Au cours des dix-huit derniers mois, la presse egyptienne a mene une c.ampagne d'injures tout a fait semblable contre le Gouvernement du Soudan. Que des Egyptiens responsables fussent prets a s'associer a cette campagne, la preuve en est donnee par la publication, dans le journal Al Mussawar du 23 juin 1947, d'un article signe d'un Ministre de la Couronne egyptienne, accusant le Gouvernement du Soudan de fermer c1eliberement les yeux sur l'introduction de stupefiants nocifs chez les populations primitives c1u Sud~accusation. aussi mal foncIee qu'absurde. Dans ces conditions, il n'est pas surprenant que le Gouvernement du Soudan ait ete force d'inter- 1 The S1tda1~: a Record of Progress (1898-1947), impdme. sous l'autorite du Gouvernement du Soudan. The same remarks apply to the alleged repression of freedom of speech and of the Press. The Government's power to suppress newspapers is exercised less frequently than in most other eastern countries, including Egypt itself. Here, too, tolerance of violent newspaper attacks has been the subject of remonstrance from moderate-minded Sudanese. The pro- Egyptian party leader who was convicted last November had headed a demonstration, for which the Government gave permission, but which resulted in a clash with supporters of the rival party, which is anti-Egyptian and claims the independence of the Sudan. He was sentenced to a fine of twenty-five pounds for publishing in the Press on the following eay a telegram addressed to the Governor-General, falsely accusing the police and administrative officials of having fomented or condoned attacks on his supporters. The Egyptian lawyers who were prevented from speaking in his defence were not members of the Sudan bar (members of which were perfectly competent to defend the accused) and one of them was a notorious political agitator. The permission given for this demonstration to be held was in itself a sign of the Sudan Government's willingness to give full scope to propagandists of the unity of the Nile valley. Such propagandists have been allowed to tour the country and to express their views in print to their hearts' content, subject only to a temporary ban on public meetings, which was imposed, with general approbation, as a result of the clashes between rival parties which I have mentioned. meme la preuve que le Gouvernemcnt du Soudan etait dispose a laisser toute liberte d'action aux propagandistes de l'unite de la vallee du Nil. Ces propagandistes ont ete autorises a faire des tournees dans le pays et a exprimer, a loisir, leurs vues dans la presse. lIs n'ont ete soumis qu'a des interdictions momentanees concernant des reunions publiques, interdictions imposees, cl l'approbation generale, a la suite des rixes mentionnees ci-dessus entre partis rivaux. Ces manifestations et ce~ rixes, ainsi que les 'declarations de fonctionnaires du Royaume-Uni qui, si l'on en croit le Premier Ministre d'Egypte, avaient pour but d'envenimer les relations entre Soudanais et Egyptiens, aloIlS que des negociations etaient en cours, etaient le resultat direct de la publication par la presse egyptienne de declarations attribuees a Sidky Pacha, a son retour de Londres, qui aurait pretendu que le Royaume- These demonstrations and clashes, and also the statements by United Kingdom officials which, according to the Egyptian Prime Minister, were designed to stir up bad feeling between the Sudanese and the Egyptians while negotiations were in progress, were both direct results of the publication by the Egyptian Press of statements attributed to Sidky Pasha on his return from London, claiming that the I fendre publiquement contre les allegations, meme les plus grossieres, favorisees par l'une des parties a l'Accord de condo1ninium. Les memes remarques peuvent s'appliquer a la pretendue repression de la liberte de parole et de la presse. Le pouvoir qu'a le Gouvernement d'interdire des journaux est moin frequemment exerce que dans la plupart des autres pay; d'Orient, y compris l'Egypte elle-meme. La aussi, la tolerance montr~e a l'egard de violentes attaques de presse a ete un sujet de reproches de la part de Soudanais a I'esprit modere. Le chef du part! pro-egyptien, condamne en novembre dernie:r, avait dirige une manifestation, autorisee par le Gouvernement, qui degenera en rixe avec les partisans du mouvement adverse, lequel est antiegyptien et reclame l'independance du Soudan. Le' chef du parti pro-egyptien fut condamne a une amende de 25 livres pour avoir publie dans la presse du lendemain un telegramme adresse au Gouverneur general, accusant faussement la police et des fonctionnaires charges de l'administration d'avoir provoque ou tolere des attaques contre ses partisans. Les avocats egyptiens auxquels i1 fut interdit de plaider pour fui, n'etaient pas membres du barreau soud~l.l1ais-certains mel11- bres de ce dernier auraient ete parfaitement competents pour defendre l'accuse--et l'un d'entre eux etait un agitateur politique notoire. L'autorisation donnee a cette manifestation etait en elie- It should be noted that the steps which have already been taken to create self-governing institutions in accordance with their desiresthe creation in 1944 of an experimental Advisory Council for the northern Sudan, and the present proposals for the replacement of the Governor-General's Council by a legislative council and an executive council with fifty percent Sudanese membership-have both hitherto been stroI1gly opposed by virtually the whole of the Egyptian Press, although I am glad to learn that during the last month the Egyptian Government has agreed in principle to the proposal for a legislative council. The measure to which the Egyptian Prime Minister takes exception on the grounds that it is a nationality law, is an ordinance to define the meaning of the term "Sudanese". It was requested by the Sudanese graduates of Egyptian universities in 1942 and again by the Advisorv Council in 194.4. Such a definition has been -found increasingly necessary in the dayto-day administration. I may remark here that, contr;lry to what Nokrashy Pasha has told the Council, no ordinances-or, in other words, laws-have ever been promulgated by the Governor-General without notification to the Egyptian Council of Ministers as the Condominium Agreement prescribes. Nor has the Egyptian Government's right of direct approach to the Governor-General ever been questioned. Nahas Pasha, in particular, availed himself of it, and Il est eompletement faux de pretendre que la masse des Soudanais desire l'union avec l'Egypte ou que ceux qui ne desirent pas cette union. sont une minorite insignifiante, produit de l'administration soudanaise. 11 se peut que l'Egypte se soit penetree cle cette croyance trompeuse en refusant a tous eeux dont l'avis etait contraire atl sien l'acces aux co'onnes de sa presse, et en s'opposant meme a la publication de documents objectifs tels que le Record of Progress, actuellement entre les mains du Conseil, qui a ete presente dans la presse egyptienne eomme une attaque contre l'Egypte. Les masses soudanaises ne sont pas pro-egyptiennes et n'ont aucun desir ele changement. Les Soudanais instruits sont unis dans le elesir d'obtenir prochainement l'autonomie et, jusqu'a present, les seules divergences existant entre eux ont porte sur la question de savoir si cette autonomie devait se traduire par la constitution d'un dominion autonome, sous la Couronne egyptienne, ou par l'independance compl{~te. Il eonvient de remarquer que les mesures qui ont cleja ete prises pour creer des institutions autonomes conformement aux desirs des Soudanais -creation a titre d'essai en 1944, d'un Conseil consultatif pour le Soudan du Nord; et proposition .actuelle de remplacer le Conseil clu Gouverneur general par un conseil legislatif et un conseil executif avec participation d'elements soudanais dans la mesure de cinquante pour cent-ont jusqu'ici reneontre une vive opposition de la part, pratiquement, de toute la presse egyptienne, bien que j'apprenne avee plaisir que, au cours du mois dernier, le Gouvernement egyptien s'est eleclare cl'accord en prineipe sur la proposition visant a constituer un conseil legislatif. La mesure dont le Premier Ministre de l'Egypte s'est formalise en pretendant qu'elle constitue une loi sur les nationalites est une ordonnance tendant a definir la portee du terme "Soudanais". Elle a ete demandee, en 1942, par les Soudanais dipl6mes des universites egyptiennes, et de nouveau en 1944, par le Conseil consultatif. On a senti, dans l'administration quotidienne, la necessite croissante d'une telle definition. Je ferai remarquer ici que, eontrairement a ce que Nokrachy Paeha a declare au Conseil, aucune ordonnance ou, en el'autres termes, aucune loi n'a jamais ete promulguee par le Gouverneur general sans que le Conseil des Ministres egyptiells en eut re~u notification, ainsi que le preserit l'Accord de conaom£nium. Le droit eles membres du Gouvernement egyptien a etre aelmis directement aupres elu Gouverneur general n'a jamais ete conteste. Nahas Pacha, en particulier, en a fait In fact, Egypt's policy has not been to influence the Sudan Government, but to ignore it. Egypt has sought to set up in the Sudan what are in effect branches of its own departments, instead of proceeding by co-operation with the Sudan Government departments; it has offered scholarships at Egyptian universities to students of the Gordon Memorial College without any information to the College authorities, thus tending to disrupt the Government's plan for the recruitment of Sudanese to the higher branches of the civil service; and it has discussed projects and initiated arrangements for works to be carried out in the Sudan without any notifica.tion to the Governor-General. The charge that the Sudan Government has resisted European penetration would be regarded by the Sudanese intelligentsia and Press as a point in its favour. In point of fact, the Sudan Press, with a touch of that xenophobia which is so marked a characteristic of Egypt at the present moment, is continually complaining that trading licenses are given to too many foreigners. The charge of resisting European penetration is, however, presumably based upon the restrictions on the sale of land to non-Sudanese which are designed to protect the Sudanese smallholder and to which, like every other restriction on ioreigners, British subjects are equally liable. The same is true of the passport regulations, which require all non-Sudanese to obtain an entry permit at a cost of half a dollar. This permit is never refused except on grounds of public order or public health, and in point of fact many thousands of Egyptians enter and leave the Sudan annually. The Sudan Government is in no way a military autocracy. The military garrison consists of two United Kingdom battalions, one of which was introduced last year after the disturbances consequent upon Egyptian misinterpretations of the Sidky-Bevin Protocol, and of one Egyptiap battalion. All thn.e of these are stationed 'in Khartoum, and there is an Egyptian artillery unit in Port Sudan. No United Kingdom troops have actually been used for internal security purposes since 1924. The civil police, with the Sudan defence force of an established strength of about 4,000 rifles in reserve, constitute the backing of the civil authority, and both are largely officered by Sudanese. Nokrashy Pasha alleged that martial L'accusation selon laquelle le Gouvernement du Soudan a resiste a la penetration europeenne serait consideree par Telite intellectuelle et par la presse soudanaise comme un argument en faveur de ce \'ouvernement. En fait, la presse soudanaise, avec un peu de cette xenophobie qui est la caracteristique si marquee de 1':2gypte contemporaine, se plaint continuellement qu'un trop grand nombre de licences commerciales soit accorde cl des etrangers. Cependant, cette accusation de resistance cl la penetration europeenne se fonde sans doute sur les restrictions apportees cl la vente des terres aux personnes qui n'ont pas la nationalite soudanai3e, mesure qui est destinee cl proteger les petits proprietaires soudanais. A ces restrictions cI'ailleurs, comme cl toutes autres restrictions visant les etrangers, les citoyens britanniques sont egalement soumis. Il en va de meme en ce qui concerne la reglementation sur les passeports, qui impose cl toutes les personnes qui ne sont pas de nationalite soudanaise I'obligation d'obtenir un permis d'entree au prix d'un demi-dollar. Ce permis n'est jamais refuse, sauf pour des ril1sons d'ordre public ou de sante publique: et en fait, plusieurs milIiers d'Egyptiens entrent au Soudan et en sortent chaque annee. Le Gouvernement du Soudan n'est en aucune fa,on une autocratie militaire. Sa garnison militaire se compose de deux batailIons du Royaume- Uni clont l'un a ete introduit l'annee dernh~re cl la suite des troubles qui suivirent les interpretations erronees donnees en Egypte du Protocole Siclky-Bevin, et d'un batai110n eg-yptien. Ces trois hataillons sont stationnes cl Khartoum. Il existe en outre une unite d'artillerie egyptienne cl Port·· Soudan. Aucune unite des troupes du Royaumeuni n'a ete employee a des fins de securite interieure depuis 1924. La police civile av,~c, en reserve, le corps de defense du Soudan (dont I'effecti f est d'environ 4.000 fusils) constitue le soutien de I'autorite civile. Ces deux corps sont largement encadres par des Soudanais. Nokrachy I have already exp med how, at the beginning of the condominiUlH regime, the senior administrative officials in the Sudan were British because, inevitably, they were recruited f'.-om the senior officers of the Khedive's forces. Thereafter, a separate service for the Sudan was created, and there was no discrimination against the recruiting of Egyptians. If in fact relatively few Egyptians were recruited, it was bet:ause, as pointed out and deplored by Lord Cromer in his report for the year 1902, young Egyptians of the requisite educational and other qualifications were reluctant to spend their lives in the loneliness and unpleasant climatic conditions of the Sudan. In spite of this, some progress was made in the first and second decades of the century in enlisting Egyptians for the Sudan service, but the events which culminated in the assassination of the Governor-General in 192! caused an understandable setback-a setback which, it was hoped, would be remedied by article 11 of the Treaty of 1936, providing that, where qualified Sudanese were not available, the Governor-General would select suitable candidates of British and Egyptian nationality. Even this provision, however, has failed to attract applications from Egyptians endowed with sufficient qualifications for service in the Sudan. To the reluctance to face discomfort, which was first noted by Lord Cromer, has been added a strange conceit that Egyptians have a right to Immediate appointment to senior posts over the heads of serving officials. Egyptians would also seem to be completely ignorant of the progress made by the Sudanese themselves, who, apart from filling all the junior cadres, have been promoted in increasing numbers to the hIgher offices of state: two Sudanese are alre<...Jy judges of the High Court, others are district comlT'issioners, assistant district commissiuners, and medical offir.ers, and others hold high-ranking posts SUcll 3.3 that of assistant warden of the Gordon College. In all, 115 out of 713 p,.,')ts in the fi. t division are now held by Sudanese. 1 feel confident that Nokrashy Pasha would not for a moment maintain that senior Sudan officials, whether Sudanese or British, who started at the bottom, and had been promoted on their merits, should now make way for Egyptians who have preferred to make their careers in Egypt. The proposal to appoint a Sudanese as Grand Cadi, which roused a storm of indignation in Ego/pt and provoked a claim from the present dont je viens de patler contraste etrangement avec I'assertion du Premier :\Iinist:e de I'Egypte selon laqueIIe Egyptiens et Soudanais forment un tout, un et indivisible, un seul peuple, une seule race. ]'apprends qu'aucune nomination effective a. ce poste n'est encore intervenue, mais que, pendant les huit derniers mois il a ete occupe, a. la complete satisfaction de toutes les classes sociales, par un Soudanais faisant fonction de Grand Cadi. Reserver a. perpetuite ce poste a. un Egyptien l"eviendrait, non seulement a. violer le Traite mais a. refuser d'accorder aux Soudanais leurs droits nature1s por des raisons purement raciales. Pendant que nous sommes sur ce sujet, puis-je faire remarquer que la decision de ne plus faire figurer le nom du roi d'Egypte dans les prieres du vendredi emane, a. l'origine, d'une autorite religieuse et nond'une autorite civile? Le Gouvernement du Soudan n'a rien fait pour intervenir en cette affaire, dont le Gouverneur general a declare, dans une depeche adressee au Premier Ministre d'Egypte en aout 1943, qu'eile ne pouvait faire l'objet d'un ordre officie1 du Gouvernement soudanais. I1 me reste a. repondre a. une derniere accusation, avant de passer a. d'autres questions. I1 s'agit de ceIIe selon laqueIIe le Gouvernement du Soudan aurait travaille a. separer le sud du Soudan d'avec le nord, avec l'intention de rattacher ce dernier aux territoires britanniques de l'Afrique orientale. Je dois tout d'abord expliquer, a. ce sujet, que" si le Gouvernement du Soudan n'avait pas, dans le passe, etabli certaines distinctions administratives entre les Soudanais du Nord et les Soudanais du Sud, il aurait manque au plus clair de ses devoirs. Les populations du Sud sont negres ou negroides, tres primitives pour la plupart. EUes n'ont jamais ete et ne sont pas musulmanes; e1les n'ont jamais parle et ne padent pas l'arabe; eUes n'ont jamais eu et n'ont pas la moindre a.ffinite raciale avec les populations du Nord. Jusqu'a. l'arrivee des Britanniques au Soudan, e11es n'ont cesse d'etre victimes de razzias effectuees par les populations du Nord, et emmenees en esclavage. Les distinctions que le Gouvernement soudanais a etablies dans le passe entre le sud du Soudan et le reste du pays repondait a. une necessite imperieuse, a des raisons de simple humanite, elles visaient a. proteger une peuplade primitive, presque sans defense, contre une exploitation de la part de voisins plus evolues, jusqu'a. ce qu'eUe fut capable de se condulre seule. Touchant la question principale, a. savoir la politique du Gouvernement, on n'a pu retrouver aucune trace d'une declaration attribuee par le Premier Ministre de l'Egypte au Secretaire civil. Cette declaration est en contradiction directe avec une P' ,litique qui s'est traduite recemment par la While on this subject, I may remark that the decision to omit the name of the King of Egypt from the Friday prayers was originally made by a religious, not Q civil authority. No steps have been taken by the Sudan Government to int<::rfere in what was described by the Governor-General in a dispatch to the Prime Minister of Egypt in August 1943 as a matter which could not be made the subject of an official order by the Sudan Government. I have one further charge to answer before I pass on to other matters; that is, that the Sudan Government has endeavoured to split off the south of the Sudan from the north with the idea of attaching it to the British territori,:s in East Africa. I must, in this connexion, first explain that, if the Sudan Government had failed in the past to make certain administrative distinctions between the northern and southern Sudanese, it would have failed in a clear duty. The peoples of the south are Negro or negroid and for the most part extremely primitive. They are not and never were Moslems ; they do not and never did speak Arabic; and they have no racial affinities whatsoever with the north. Until the coming of the British to the Sudan, they were constantly being raided by the northerners and carried off as slaves. Such distinctions as the Sudan Government has drawn in the past between the southern part of the Sudan and the rest of the country have been dictated by the imperative need, in the interests of common humanity, to protect a group of primitive and almost defenceless peoples from exploitation by their more advanced neighbours until such time as they are able to stand on their own feet. On the main issue of government policy, no trace can be found of the statement attributed to the Civil Secretary in the Egyptian Prime Minister's speech. It is directly )l1trary to a policy which is reflected in a rece' t decision of the Governor-General's Counci.i to submit I shall now turn to the allegations of Nokrashy Pasha that the Treaty of 1936 contradicts the Suez Canal Convention of 1888, and that the United Kingdom has sought to make itself the sole guardian of the Canal. There was an implied allegation also that, in the Treaty of H'36, the United Kingdom was denying the character of the Suez Canal as an international waterway open to all nation.s and treating it merely as an essential means of communication between different parts of the British Empire. My answer is, in short, that the United Kingdom did not, in the 1936 Treaty or otherwise, claim to be the sole guardian of the Canal. It does, however, claim to be the second guardian of the Canal, Egypt being the first. The United Kingdom, both in the 19:36 Treaty and otherwise, fully accepts the position of the Canal as that of an international waterway open to all nations, and indeed article 8 of the Treaty of 1936 expressly says so. It uses the words: "In view of the fact that the Suez Canal, whilst being an integral part of Egypt, is a universal means of communication as also an essential means of communication between the different parts of the British Empire . . ." There is no inconsistency. I must, however, explain the basis of the United Kingdom's right to be the guardian of the Canal in the second degree. The Suez Canal C011Vention, after providinE,' for freedom of navigation in peace and war and prescribing a n,umber of restrictions to preserve this freedom, goes on, in articles 9 and 10, to lay down how these provisions are to be enforced and, in short, article 9 says that it is for Egypt to enforce them in the first place but that, if Egypt should not have sufficient means at its disposal to do so, it shall caU upon the Imperial Ottoman Government to take the necessary measures. Egypt was, of course, at that time under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Sultan. Later on, the United Kingdom replaced the Ottoman Stlltan as the sovereign of Egypt as a result of the establishment of its protectorate over Egypt, and at the same time, succeeded to the position of the Ottoman Government as the guardian of the Canal in the second degree. Both these two things were recognized by the Powers in the peace treaties which followed the First World War. Article 147 of the Treaty of Versailles contains the recognition of the United Kingdom's protectorate over Egypt. A.-rticle 152 of the Treaty of Versailles recognizes the transfer to His I3ritannic Majesty's Government of the powers conferred on His Imperial Majesty the Sultan by the Suez Canal Convention. There were' corresponding provisions in the Tre~ties of Saint 11 me faut toutefois expliquer sur quoi se fonde le droit du Royaull1e-Uni it etre le second gardien du Canal. La Convention relative au Canal de Suez, apres avoir proclame la liberte de navigation en temps de paix et en temps de guerre, et prescrit un certain nombre de mesures restrictives destinees it pr oteger cette liberte, poursuit en precisant, dans les articles 9 et 10, comment ces dispositions devront etre appliquees; l'article !l, en bref, dit que c'est it l'Egypte, en premier lieu, qu'il appartient de faire appliquer ces dispositions, mais que, si l'Egypte n'a pas les moyens suffisants pour le faire, elle doit inviter le Gouvernement imperial. ottoman it prendre les mesures necessaires it cet effet. A cette epoque, evidemment, l'Egypte etait placee sous la souverainete du Sultan ottoman. Plus tarel, le Royaume-Uni succeda au Sultan ottoman en qualite de souverain de l'Egypte, comme effet de l'etablissement du protectorat du Royaume- Uni sur I'Egypte; en meme temps, le Royaume- Uni succeda au Go1.1vernement ottoman en sa qualite de second gardien d1.1 Canal. Ces deux' faits ont ete reconnus par les Puissances dans les traites de paix qui ont suivi la premiere guerre mondicde. L'article 147 du Traite de Versailles reconnait l'existence du protectorat du Royaume- Uni sur l'Egypte. L'articIe 152 du Traite de Versailles reconnait le transfert au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste britannique des pouvoirs qui avaient ete conferes it Sa Majeste imperiale le Sultan par la Convention relative au Canal de Suez. Des dispositions carrespondantes figurent dans les Traites de Saint-Germain et de Trianon. Aux En cl'autres terme~, l'Egypte etait au premier chef le gardien du Canal, et le Royaume-Uni l'etait au second chef: il appartenait it ce dernier d'agir lorsque les moyens de l'Egypte seraient insuffisants. Telles sont exactement les stipulations de l'article 8 dont le texte prevoit encore les 1110yens par lesquels le ROYCiume-Uni peut remplir son role de gardien, notamment le stationnel11ent de forces determinees du Royaume-Uni dans la zone du Canal. L'article dit: "en attendant que les Hautes Parties contractantes conviennent que J'armee egyptienne se trouve en' etat d'assurer par ses propres moyens la liberte et l'entiere securite de navigation du Canal, autorise ~l.ctly what article 8 provides, and it also pro- "ides the means by which the United Kingdom was to be in a position to discharge this role, namely by stationing a limited number of its troops in the Canal Zone. It says: "His J\Jajesty the King of Egypt, until such time as the High Contracting Parties agree that the Egyptian Army is in a position to ensure hy its own resource;; the liberty and entire security of navigation of the Canal, authorizes His Majesty the King and Emperor to station forces in Egyptian territory in the vicinity of the Canal ... with a view to ensuring in cooperation with the Egyptian forces the defence of the Canal." "The presence of these forces," says article, 8, "shall not constitute in any manner an occupation and will in no way prejudice the sovereign rights of Egypt." It is then provided that at the end of twenty years, the question shall be considered whether the presence of British forces on the Canal is no longer necessary owing to the fact that the Egyptian Army is in a position to do all that is required by its own resources. Nokrashy Pasha contended that Egypt was n0t a free party in concluding the Treaty of 19ZC for two reasons: first, because its territory was occupied at the time by United Kingdom troops; and secondly, because the Government of the United Kingdom made a verbal communication to the King and to the Prime Minister of Egypt which, he suggested, constituted a threat. Sa Majeste le Roi et Empereur cl installer des forces en territoire egyptien, dans le voisinage du Canal . . . pour assurer la de£ense du Canal en cooperation avec les troupes egyptiennes". .. La presence de ces forces", precise l'articIe 8, "n'aura aucun caractere cl'occupation et ne portera, en aucune fac;on, atteinte aux droits de souverainete de l'Egypte." Et il precise que, it l'expiration cl'un clelai de vingt ans, i1 y aura lieu de considerer cl nouveau la question de savoir si l'armee egyptienne est en mesure de faire le necessaire par ses propres moyens et si, en consequence, la presence de troupes britanniques sur le Canal cesse d'etre indispensable. Nokrachy Pacha a soutenu que l'Egypte n'a- "ait pas les mains libres lorsqu'elle a negocie le Traite de 1926, et cela pour deux raisons: primo, parce que son territoire etait occupe par des troupes du Royaume-Uni; sec1J'I'/.do, parce que le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni avait fait parvenir au Roi et au Premier Ministre d'Egypte une communication verbale qui, aux dires de Nokrachy Pacha, constituait une menace. Je traiterai de ces deux questions separement; mais, avant cle le faire, je voudrais presenter certaines ohservations qui s'appliquent nux deux, d faire observer que ces arguments ne sauraient guere etre pris au serieux. Le Conseil de securite a entenc1u les extraits de ~~larations enthousiastes faites par les Ministres egyptiens devant le Parlement cl'Egypte, au moment ou le Traite de ] 93() lui etait sOt11nis pour ratification. Les membres du Conseil se souviendront qne, cl maintes reprises, avant 1936, des negociations ayant pour objet la conclusion d'un traite ont abouti cl un echec, malgre la presence de troupes d'occupation du Royaume-Uni dans le pays. Les mem- I shaH deal with these two points separately, but before doing so, I must make certain comments which apply to them botl1 and suggest that these arguments need harclly be taken seriously. The Security Council has heard the quotations from the enthusiastic statements macle by Egyptian Ministers in the Egyptian Parliament when the Treaty of 1936 was submitted for ratification. Memhers will recall the number of other occasions when negotiations for a treaty previpus to 1936 failed, although United Kingdom troops were in occupation of the country. They will also remember Nokrashy Pasha's own second explan- However, I return to the two points, and first of all to the fact that United Kingdom troops occupied Egyptian territory. If it is seriously suggested that a treaty is invalid because the troops of one party are in the .territory of the other at the time it is concluded, I must observe that this contention invalidates almost every peace treaty that has ever been concluded, as well as a number of other treaties, including some of those to which I referred in my speech last Tuesday.l Nbkrashy Pasha's second point related to the verbal communication made to the King of Egypt and the Egyptian Prime Minister by the British High Commissioner on the eve of the 1936 negotiations. Now, this is an old story and the facts of it are as follows: in January 1936, His Majesty's Government was being pressed by the EgypfLans to negotiate a new treaty. It had certain qualms about doing so, however, because of so many previous unsuccessful efforts. Moreover, each failure had at the time produced some tension, and 1936 was a dangerous year. His Majesty's Government instructed its representative in Cairo to state that it was ready. to negotiate. He was, however, instructed to tell King Fuad that "the consequences of a failure to reach agreement woud be serious, and that in such an event His Majesty's Government might have to reconsider its whole policy towards Egypt". This was no more than a plain statement of obvious fact. No breakdown of major negotiations between two countries can fail to produce a situation in which the policy of each towards the other becomes subject to reconsideration. However, some members of the tIlL:> tnited front chose to see in this statement a chreat, and asked that the High Commissioner should make a public statement designed to remove the impression that it had been intended as such. The first reaction of His Majesty's Government to this suggestion was the natural one of informing the Egyptian Prime Minister that the statement in question had been intended not as a threat but as a statement of fact. As, however, this did not satisfy m~nts avances par Nokrachy Pacha et, tout d'abord, sur le fait que des troupes du Royaume-Uni aient occupe le territoire egyptien. Si l'on soutient serieusement qu'un traite est sans valeur parce que des troupes appartenant it l'une des parties se trouvent sur le territoire de l'autre au moment de la conclusion du traite, qu'on me permette cl'observer qu'une telle pretention conduit a ater leur validite a presque tous les traites cle paix, ainsi qu'a nombre cl'autres traites, notamment ceux que j'ai mentionnes dans ma declaration cle mardi dernier.l Le second argument de Nokrachy Pacha a trait it une communication verbale qu'a faite le Haut Commissaire britannique au Roi cl'Egypte et au Premier Ministre egyptien a la veille des negociations cle 1936. C'est la une vieille histoire. et je vais en rappeler les faits. En janvier 1936, les Egyptiens demandaient avec insistance au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste qu'un nouveau traite fut negocie entre les deux pays. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste eprouvait certaines apprehensions a s'y engager, en raison de l'insucces qu'avaient auparavant rencontre tant de negociations. De plus, chacun de ces echecs avait cause une certaine tension, et 1936 etait une annee clangereuse. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste invita son representant au eaire a declarer que son Gouvernement etait pret aentrer en negociations. Le representant clu Royaume-Uni clevait cepenclant exposer att Roi Fouad que, s'il n'etait pas possible d'arriver a un accord, "l'echec des negociations aurait cles consequences serieuses et que, clans un telle eventualite, le Gouvemement du Royaume-Uni devrait reconsiderer sa politique envers l'Egypte". Ce n'etait la que la simple constatation d'une evidence. Des negociations importantes entre deux pays ne sont pas rompues sans qu'it en resuIte une situation qui rende necessaire de reexaminer la politique respective de ces deux pays a l'egard l'un de l'autre. Toutefois, certains mem- ~bres clu front alors uni ont voulu voir une menace clans cette communication, et ont demande que le Haut Commissaire fit une declaration publique pour effacer l'impression que sa demarche avait cIeliberement ce caractere. La premiere reaction du Gouvernement de Sa Majeste a l'egard de cette suggestion fut naturellement de faire connaitre au Premier Ministre d'Egypte que la communication en question n'etait pasune menace, mais simplement la constatation d'un fait. Le Premier "In reply, I am happy to inform Your Excellency, on the instructions of my Government, that they sincerely hope, and indeed feel confident, that both sides will do their utmost to ensure that the exercise of this freedom shall not affect the cordial relations between our two countries. They are animated by sentiments of the most cordial good will towards the Egyptian Government and people and, while in common with all Governments they must reserve their liberty of action for an unknown future, they do not feel that if, notwithstanding good will on both sides, there should be a failure to reach agreement, this need necessarily affect the good relations between the two countries which it is their hope not merely to maintain but to strengthen." In the event of the failure of negotiations, Governments do generally reserve their liberty of action-of course within the limits of the law and their treaty obligations. There was no threat here of the restoration of the Protectorate. TItle status of an independent State once granted, even by unilateral action, cannot thereafter be lawfully taken away by unilateral action. Further, I have a better opinion of Nokrashy Pasha and his colleagues than to believe that they would have been influenced by any such threat if it had been made. I think I have already shown that there is not in fact the slightest ground for supposing that this communication had any influ<::nce, in the negotiations, upon the Egyptian representatives. In the earlier part of his speech,1 Nokrashy Pasha gave a somewhat tendentious account of the negotiations which took place in 1946 and which led to the initialled texts which the Security Council has before it. It is quite true that at the beginning of the negotiations my Government desired to have provisions under which the United Kingdom would maintain certain bases on Egyptian territory in peace time. The United Kingdom had in mind the Bases Agreement of 1941 which had been concluded with the United States. Since, however, the Egyptian delegation persisted in consider- It is quite clear that this complete removal of United Kingdom troops from Egypt was conditional. It was conditional on agreement as to the arrangements to be made to make mutual assistance possible. If members will be good enough to look at article 3 of the Treaty which is contained in the initialled texts, they will see quite clearly how little onerous for Egypt were the arrangements which the United Kingdom was eventually prepared to accept. The proposal was for a joint defence board, a proposal, I may say, which was inspired by ce'rtain arrangements which are still in force between the United States and Canada. It is still the case that His Majesty's Government is not prepared to relinquish its rights under article 8 of the Treaty of 1936 unconditionally. As I said last Tuesday, my Government does in fact regard as necessary in the present circumstances the continuance of mt:Lual defence arrangements designed to safeguard the security of the Middle East area. Certain further statements by Nokrashy Pasha seem to show that our view in this respect is a well founded one since, on three separate occasions in his speech, he refers to the "dangers to peace and security in the Middle East", and to the "already precarious situation in the Middle East". Then Nokrashy Pasha proceeds to a complete misinterpretation of the initialled Sudan Protocol. Re says: "The insistence' of the Government of the United Kingdom that the Sudan should be granted the right to secede from Egypt at some future date meant that it would be left for the United Kingdom to decide how long that unity should last, and when and under what conditions it might be broken, although this is an internal matter between Egypt and the Sudan." What the Sudan Protocol says is: "Until the High Contracting Parties can in full common agreement realize this latter objective after consultation with the Sudanese..." The latter objective is "selfgovernment and consequently the exercise of the' right to choose the future status of the Sudan". It is perfectly plain from the text that the realization of this objective is a matter for 11 est bien clair que ce retrait complet des troupes du 'Royaume-Uni du territoire de l'Egypte etait conditionnel. 11 dependait de la conclqsion d'un accord sur les arrangements qu'il fallait prendre pour rendre possible l'assistance mutuelle. Si les membres du Conseil veulent bien se reporter, dans les textes paraphes, a l'article 3 du Traite, ils verront combien peu onereux etaient pour l'Egypte les arrangements que le Ro\'aume-Uni se declarait finalement pret a accepter, Le texte propose tendait a la constitution d'un conseil mixte de de£ense, proposition, je puis le dire, inspiree par cert<;tins arrangements qui sont encore en viguem' entre les Etats-Unis et le Canada. La position demeure inchangee: le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste n'est pas dispose a abandonner inconditionnellement les droits qu'il tient de l'article 8 du Traite de 1936. Comme je l'ai dit mardi dernier, mon Gouvernement estime effectivement necessaire, dans les circonstances actue11es, que soient maintenus les arrangements pour la defense mutuelle destines a garantir la securite du Moyen Orient. Certaines autres de- . c1arations de Nokrachy Pacha semblel\t prouver que nos vues, a cet egard, sont justifiees, puisque, a trois reprises differente~ il s'est refere dans son discours "aux dangers mena<;ant la paix et la securite dans le Moyen Orient" et "a la situation deja precaire dans le Moyen Orient". D'autre part, Nokrachy Pacha donne une interpretation completement erronee du Protocole paraphe sur le Soudan. It dit: "L'insistance du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni a faire reconnaitre au Soudan le droit de se separer de l'Eg-ypte a une epoque ulterieure, signifiait qu'il serait laisse a la discretion du Royaume-Uni de decider de la duree de cette unite et de determiner quand, et dans queUes conditions, eUe pourrait etre rompue, bien qu'il s'agit d'une question d'ordre interne concernant l'Egypte et le Soudan". Voici ce que dit le Protocole sur le Soudan : "Jnsqu'au jour Oil les Rautes Parties contractantes pourront en plein accord atteindre ce d'ernier objectif, apres consultation des Soudanais". Le dernier objectif est "l'antonomie, et, consequemment, le libre exercice du droit de choisir le futur statut du Soudan". 11 ressort evid~mment du texte que la realisation de ce dessein depend d'un accord commun, I would ask: What could render more clear the complete impartiality of the Government of the United Kingdom in this J;natter, or show more clearly that its sole wish has been that the Sudanese people should choose their own future and that they should be able to do so in full freedom? It is Egypt which does not wish the Sudanese to be free to choose. I shall not pause to discuss the correctness" from the strictly legal point of view, of the statement that the future status of the Sudan is an internal matter between Egypt and the Sudanese, beyond pointing out the obvious fact that, by the Treaty of 1936 as well as the Condominium Agreement, the Sudan and its administration are not a purely internal matter for Egypt. 'vVe have heard a grea~ deal about the unity of the Nile valley, and I have already commented on some aspects of this matter. I must emphasize in the first place th~t a very considerable part of the Nile basin lies neither in Egypt nor in the Sudan, but in Ethiopia, Uganda and the Belgian Congo. What is more, these latter countries provide almost aII the Nile's water: of the total Nile discharge, over eighty per cent comes from Ethiopia alone. If we are to accept the doctrine-which is quite a new one to me-that the geographical unity created by a riv~r which is essential for irrigation must necessarily entail a political unity also, then we must consider whether the independent African State of Ethiopia, which is also' a Member of the United Nations, together wi'th Uganda and the Belgian Congo, have any right to remain poEtically separate from Egypt and the Sudan. If it is asserted that the Sudan must be joined politicaIIy to Egypt because it is in a position to interfere with Egypt's water supply, the same holds good for the other three countries that I have just mentioned, which are severaIIy in a position to interfere with the flow of the Nile waters to both Egypt and the Sudan. Let us, in fact, be quite dear as to where this new political doctrine is leading us. ront un conseil mixte, qui se reunira aussi souvent qu'il sera necessaire, pour controler les progres accomplis par les Soudanais dans la voie de l'autonomie, pour rediger des rapports appropries, cl l'intention des deux Gouvernements, et pour recommander par la suite des arrangements convenables permettant de verifier les desirs reels du peuple soudanais et de leur donner suite. Des mesures seront prises pour la representation du peuple soudanais dans ce consei! mixte". Je poserai la question suivante: comment etablir plus nettement lacomplete impartialite du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni en cette affaire, comment montrer plus dairement que son seul desir a ete que le peuple soudanais put choisir lui-meme son avenir et fut en mesure de le faire en toute liberte? C'est I'Egypte qui ne desire pas voir les Soudanais choisir librement. Je ne m'attarderai pas cl discuter, du point de vue strictement juridique, l'exactitude de la declaration selon' laquelle le statut futur du Soudan est une affaire d'ordre interieur entre l'Egypte et les Soudanais. Je me bornerai a attirer l'attention sur ce fait evident: c'est que, de par le Traite de 1936; comme de par l'Accord de condominium" le Soudan et son administration ne constituent pas une affaire purement interieure a l'Egypte. Nous avons entendu de nombreuses observations sur l'unite de la vallee du Nil, et j'ai deja fait connaitre mon sentiment sur certains aspects de cette question. Je dois cependant insister en premier lieu sur le fait qu'une tres grande partie du bassin du Nil ne se trouve, ni en Egypte, ni au Soudan, mais en Ethiopie, dans l'Ouganda et au Congo beIge. Et, qui plus est, ce sont ces derniers pays qui fournisent la presque totalite des eaux du Nil: plus de quatre-vingts pour cent du debit total du fleuve proviennent de l'Ethiopie seule. Si nous acceptions la doctrine-entierement neuve pour moi-que l'unite geographique que cree un fleuve d'interet primordial pour l'irrigation doit necessairement entrainer l'unite politique, nous aurions cl examiner si l'Etat africain d'Ethiopie, Etat independant, qui est !J.ussi Membre de 1'0rganisation des Nations Unieset si l'Ouganda et le Congo beIge ont le droit de demeurer politiquement separes de l'Egypte et du Soudan. Si l'on soutient que le Soudan devrait etre reuni politiquement cl l'Egypte, parce que sa situation lui permet de gener l'alimentation de l'Egypte en eau, la meme theorie pourrait s'appliquer aux trois autres pays que je viens de mentionner et dont chacun, separement, peut par sa situation, mettre obstacle au cours des eaux du Nil vers l'Egypte comme vers le Soudan. Comprenons bien ou 1J.ous conduit cette nouvelle doctrine politique. 'vVe realize that, if in the future the Sudanese should opt for complete independence, there would be here a question which would have to be regulated eq1:1itably and by agreement. In the negotiations, we therefore proposed the text which the Security Council will find under number 2 on page I of the White Paper containing the Sidky-Bevin text. It will be seen that it was proposed that a condition precedent to the assumption by the Sudanese of full independence would be the conclusion of suitable arrangements between Egypt and the Sudan "on a basis of friendship, particular regard being had to the development and utilization of the waters of the Nile for the greatest benefit to the Egyptian and Sudanese peoples and to the other 'material interests of Egypt in the Nile valley". The Egyptian delegation did not. choose to take up this proposal, but its existence is ample evidence of full realization by the United Kingdom that Egypt's equitable interests in the waters of the Nile must be safeguarded. Since, however, this is clearly a matter which can be equitably settled by agreement, it is not right that it should be invoked as a ground for denying the Sudanese independence, should they wish to acquire it in the future at the appropriate time. Nokrashy Pasha indulged in some rather rhetorical phrases both at the beginning and in the middle of his speech. He referred to .the question before the Council as involving Egypt's very existence as a sovereign State. I think I showed last Tuesday that no question of sovereignty is involved:] t all, and that this was dearly realized by the Egyptian negotiators when the Prime Minister of Egypt said that the Treaty of 1936 was not incompatible with independence and did not infringe any of Egypt's rights. Later on, Nokrashy Pasha said an alliance of this sort W'l,S but another form of subordination. In 1906, the Egyptian cessite de sauvegarder les interets equitables de l'Egypte dans le bassin du Nil. Mais puisqu'il s'agit la, de toute evidence, d'une question qui peut etre equitablement reglee par voie d'accord il n'est pas juste qu'eIle sait invoquee a l'appui de la pretention, qui a ete formulee, de refuser l'independance aux Sudanais, si un jour ce peuple cIesirait I'acquerir lorsque le moment serait 'lenu. Nokrachy Pacha s'est complu. a des declarations assez emphatiques, tant au debut qu'au milieu de son discours. II s'est re£ere a la questi)n dont le Conseil est saisi, comme si eIle compromettait l'existence me111e de I'Egypte en tant qu'Etat souverain. Je pense avoil" montre, mardi dernier, qu'aucune question de souverainete n'etait ici en cause et que Ies negociateurs egyptiens eux-memes l'avaient bien compris, quand le Premier Ministre de l'Egypte declarait que le Traite de 1936 n'etait pas incompatible avec l'independance de I'Egypte et ne portait en rien atteinte a ses droits. Plus tard, Nokrachy Pacha a pretendu qu'une alliance de cette sorte n'etait qu'une autre Nokrashy Pasha said that the alliance ties Egypt to United Kil;Igdom economy. This is a statement which is quite incomprehensible to me. There is not one word in the Treaty of Alliance which limits the commercial or financial freedom of Egypt, and further the mere statistics of Egypt's trade and commerce show how utterly unfounded this statement is. As far as finance is concerned, it was not through any treaty or any other obligation that Egypt was for a time within the sterling area, and it is a matter of common knowledge that it has just left the sterling area. Nor do I know of any rule of politics or of law to the effect that treaties of alliance must he concluded only between countries which are in geographical propinquity. The Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and the USSR, amongst o~hers, disproves the existence of any such rule. Nokrashy Pasha seems to be harking back here to an unsuccessful proposal made by the Egyptian representative at the San Francisco Conference. P.erhaps I owe an apology to the Council for having taken up so much of its time with these matters, many of which, as I have said before, are irrelevant to the real question at issue. But since the Egyptian Prime Minister devoted much time to an historical review of very questionable accuracy,' I have felt it my duty to obtain equal publicity for the correction of some of his misrepresentations. I shall add o'nly one short general comment, in the form of an expression of regret that, in the whole of his speech the other day and today, there should have been no word of recognition of what the British Commonwealth, assisted by its Allies, did for Egypt during the Second World \Var. It is no fault of the United Kingdom Government that Egypt is so placed geographically as to be inevitably involved as a strategic objec.tive in any world war, In the autumn of 194·2, the Axis aggressors were at Egypt's very door. I can only express my disappointment-to say the least--that we are now shown the door, with nothing but reproaches and abuse. But I conclude with the reminder that the real point at issue is the validity of the 1936 Treaty. \Ve claim, and I confidently believe the Council must find that this Treaty remains valid and affords in itself a complete answer to both the claims made by Egypt. Nokrachy Pacha a dit que 1'alliance liait l'Egypte a l'economie du Rovaume-Uni. C'est la une affirmation qui est t~ut cl fait incomprehensible pour moi. I1 n'y a pas, dans le Traite d'alliance, un seul mot qui limite la liberte commerciale ou financiere de 1'Egypte; en outre, la seule lecture des statistiques du commerce et des echanges de l'Egypte suffit cl montrer qu'une telle affirmation est depourvue de tout fondement. En ce qui concerne les finances, ce n'est pas en vertu d'un traite ou d'une autre obligation, quelle qu'eUe sO,it que l'Egypte a, pendant un certain temps, fait partie du bloc sterling. Tout le 1110nde sait d'ailleurs que l'Egypte vient de le quitter. Je ne connais pas davantage de regles de politique ou de droit, aux termes desquelles des traites d'alliance ne doivent etre conc1us qu'entre des pays geographiquement voisins. Le traite d'alliance entre le Rovaume-Uni et l'URSS, entre autres, est la preuv~ qu'une telle regIe n'existe pas. Nokrachv Pacha semble revenir, en l'ocCtlt:'rence, cl une proposition qu'avait formulee le representant de 1'Egypte a la Conference de San-Francisco, et qui n'<1 pas abouti. Sans doute dois-je des excuses au Conseil pour avoir si longuement retenu son attention sur ces questions; beaucoup d'entre e1les, je l'ai deja dit, n'ont aucun rapport avec la veritable question qui est portee devant le Conseil. Mais comme le Premier Ministre d'Egypte a consacre lui-meme bea'lcoup de temps cl un expose historique d'une exactitude tout a fait douteuse, j'ai crn de man devoir d'obtenir qu'une egale publicite fut donnee aux corrections qu'appelaient certaines de ses declarations inexactes. Je n'ajouterai que quelques breves observations generales, expriinant le regret que, dans tout son discours de l'autre jour, et dans celui d'aujourd'hui, Nokrachy Pacha n'ait pas eu un seul mot de reconnaissance pour tout ce que le Commonwealth hritannique, aide par ses allies, a fait pour l'Egypte au cours de la seconde guerre mondiale, Ce n'est pas la faute dll Gouvernement du Royaume- Uni si 1'Egypte occupe une position geographique telle, qu'elle constitue inevitablement un objectif strategique dans toute guerre mondiale. A 1'automne de 1942, les agresseurs de l'Axe etaient aux partes memes de l'Egypte. Je ne peux qu'exprimer ma deception-pouf employer le mot le plu3 faible-de voir que, maintenant, on nons montre la parte, sans nous adresser rien d'autre que des reproches et des injures. Mais je rappelle, en terminant, que la question effectivement en cause est la validite du Trait de 1936. Nous pretendons, et j'ai la conviction que le Conseil partagera cette opinion, que ce Traite demeure valide et qu'il fournit en lui-meme une reponse complete aux deux revendications que l'Egypte a formulees. • La seance est levee a19 h. 50. A:JSTRALlA FRANCE Editions A. Pedone 13, rue Soufilot PARIS, Ve H. A. Goddard Pty. Ltd. 255a George Street SYDNEY, N. S. W. BeLGIUM GREECE "Eleftheroudakis" Librairie internationale Place de la Constitution ATBENES Agence et M:essageries de ~a Presse, S. A. 14-22 rue du Persil BnUXELLES BOliVIA Libreria Cientifica y Literaria Avenida 16 de JOOo, 216 f'asilla 972 LA. PA?: GUATEMALA Jose Goubaud Goubaud & Cia. Ltda. Sucesor 5a Av. Sur No. 6 y 9a C. P. 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