S/PV.180 Security Council

The next step is to hear the report on the development of the work assigned at the hundred and seventy-s.eventh meeting to the Sub-Cornmittee. I recognize the Chainnan of t.1:lat Sub-Committee, the representative of Colombia.,' Mr. L6PEZ (Colombia): I very much regret to inform the Security Council that the Sub- Committee failed entirely to find common ground \ for formulating a new draft resolution on the Greekqttestion, which might have been recommended. by the: Sub-Committee to the Council for its approval. . The Sub-Committee had two meetings, one on Thursday,..7 August, and the other':on Friday, 8' AUg1',st. During the dis<;:ussicins, we naturally went over some of the ground that had previous1y been covered in the Security ·Council, without however reducing the area of ottr disagreement; if anything, I could say the differences of opinion were brought into sharper contrast. The meetings were held in·a very easy and frank atmosphere whic1} gave all the members of the Sub-Committee; the' oppotillnity to present their views in yery clear form.. That atmosphere *as so pronounced that, by our second meeting, we wo~nd,it would be useless, as was informa1lyintim.ated bv the French representative, to meet again un1es~ some new suggestion were presented. If there were.some assurance from. the USSR representative that,such a suggestion wou1d be acceptable to his delegation, we mj~ht meet again and engage in new discussion. So far as I have been informed, nothing has come, out of that idea. We return to the Council with the suggestion that the Council should proceed to discuss the proposals already submitted. Le desir de paix de la Yougoslavie ne fait pas de doute. La Yougoslavie s'est consacree entierement au travail de reconstruction. Taus les observateurs objectif;; le reconnaissent. Le marechal Tito, dans sa derniere declaration, a' fait allusion a ce desir de paix de la Yougoslavie. "Nous desirolls la paix", a-t-il dit, "le developpement pacifrque de notre pays durement devaste par la guern... Cette paix, ce developpement, nous les defendrons jusqu'a notre dernier souLde." vernem,ent grec. r::'est d,ans ce ,sens que nous vous proposons de nouveav de rejeter la derniere <; ccusation lancee par la Grece. . Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Nous pas- SOl1S maintenant a l'audition du rapport relatif aux travaux confies au S-ous-Comite [ors de la cent-soixante-dix~septieme seal1ce, Je donne. la parole au President de ce SOus-Colr.ite, le repre':' sentant de la Colombie. . , M. LOPEZ (Colombie) (traduit de l'anglais): Tai le grand regret d'informer le Conseil de securite que le Sous-Comite n'a pas reussi a trou'ver un terrain d'entente qui permit la redaction d'un nouveau projet de resolution re1atif a la question grecque et susceptible d\~tre recommande par le Sous-Comite a l'approbation du Conseil. . Le Sous-Comite a tenu deuX seances, l'une le jeudi7 aout, l'autre le vendredi 8 aout. Au cour des discussions, nous avons naturellement refait une partie du chemin parcouru deja par le Conseil de securite, sans arriver a reduire, cependant, la marge de desaccord. A vrai dire, les divergences d'opinioI!s ont meme eu tendance a s'accentuer. Les seances se sont en effet tenues dans une atmosphere tres libre et tres franche, qui a donne a tous les l11embres du Sous-Comite l'occasion d'exprimer leurs vues, avec le maximum de nettete. La. situation etait si claire que, a. notre deuxieme seance, nous avons juge, comme le suggerait offi~ieusement le representant de la France, inutile de nous reunir' a 110uveau, a mains que ne fUt presentee que1que' nouvelle suggestion. Si le representant de l'URSS not,ls avait donrie quelque assurance que sa delegation trouverait acceptab1e une telle suggestion, nous aurions pu nous reunir a nouveau et repreridre la discussion sur nouveaux frais. Pour autant que je' sache" . rien n'est sorti de cette idee. Nous reyenons done devant le Conseil pour lui suggerer de reprendre la discussion des propositions deja deposees. At a later stage in the discussion, in view of what happened at the meetings of t\J.e Sub-Corn, mittee, I intend ta request the Council to allow the Colombian delegation to withdraw its pr<r posals1 because, to express our opinian brielly, there seems now to be no use in requesting the COUllcil tQ give any furthel' consideration to those propo~al!? I understand, ho:wever, that the Australian representative still has his proposa11 under consideration. The Security CouncIl will have the opportunity to hear every member of the Sub- Committee express his views on this questiop in the light of the explanations given in the meetings .af the Sub-Committee. The PRESIDENT: We regret that the Sub- Conimittee was unable to pre~ent to the Council anything that might ~ave usefu1 results. Now we pass to the next step, a discussion on the reso- .lutiOns which were previously presented. As the Colombian representative has withdrawn his resolution' for reasons he has already explained, I ask the Australian representative whether he would like his proposal disC11ssed now. rf~lP'ettons que le Sous-Comite n'ait pas ete en mesure de :foumil'" au Conseil un travail qui eut presente une utilite certaine. I1 nous reste mainte- . nant a ouvrir la discussion sur les resalutions Colonel H()D,GSON (Australia): I all} su;e that we all heard Wlth deep regret the ..observations of the Colombian representative on the break-down of the discussions in the Sub-Committee, and the failure to arrive at some concrete draft resolutions or, at least, to find some basis for further discussion. It is quite clear that the break-down PI' dead... lo~ has been caused by one factor. When dealing' with a concrete set of facts, representatives may honestly differ as to the correct solution to meet the situation disclosed by those facts; but in this case the failure of the SecUrity Council to reach ~y decision at all is solely due to the fact t.,hat we'cannot agree on the facts. In other words, One !\i!ie insists that the trouble is wholly due to the inte~al conditions in vreece, and the other side base!! its position on the majoritY report of the Corp.mission of Investigation. dell! Gr;eqe; les. av.tres s'appuient sur l~ rapport de la majorite de li:l, CommissiQn d'enquete. N-pus en sommes donc la: nous ne saurions declarer au monde que le Conseil de securite est in1puissan.t, que nQus somm!s il1capables de rem- . Plir les fonctions dont la 01at:te uous a investis. A .. mon avis, ce serait un desastre. La geule solution encore possible, c'~st que le' Gl'Oupe s\J.Osidiaire demeure en Grece, avec tous les pouvoirs dont notre Cons.eit peut le doteI'. Mais,' ma.lheurel.lSemenJ, le Groupe manque d"autorite. Et, s'il manque d'autorite, c'est parce qu'it p.e bene&cie pas d\.l soutien, de .la cooperation et de I'assistance de certains des Gouvernements inte- So we are left with this. We cannot declare to the world that we are impotent as a Security Council, that we cannot fulfil the functions laid down for us in the Charter. To my mind, that would be disastrous. The only thing left is ~Qr the Subsidiary Group to remain in Greece with a11 the powers with which this Councii cim clothe it. But, unfortunately, the Group lacks authority. It has no authority because it does not get support, it does not get co-operation, and it does not get assistance ffom some of the Governments concerned. Further, as the members of the Council have 'heard this morning, it does not command authority because it does not command respect. resses. ":En outre, comtne les memb:res dt1: (onseil l'ontenter.du ,dire ,ce matin, le Gmupe subsidiaire n'a pas d'autorite parce qu'il n'impose pas le respect. con~id~f~tion. ' Je crois neanmoins savoir que le repres~ntant de I~Australie a maintenu sa prppasition1. Le Censeil de securite va pouvoir entendre I'opinion" de tous les membreEi du Sous.,Comite sur '.!ette question a la llumiere des explications donnees au cours des seances du Sous-Comite• Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Nous qui nous ont eie sQumises. Puisque le representant de la Calombie a retire la sienne pour les raisons qu'il a exposees, je demande au representant de l'Australie s'il aimerait voir sa proposition mise en discussion maintenant. Le colonel HOOOSON (Allstralie) (traduit de l~anglaif): Je suis certain que nous avons tous entendu ~vec un profond r(lgret les' ohset;Vations du representant de la Colombie surl'echec des discussions du Sous-Comite et rimpossi~ bilite de redi~~r un projet concret de resolution ou de trouV0r, a tout le moins, une base de discussion future. I1 est clqir que l'echec, ou l'impasse devant laqueHe nous nous trouvo:as, n'ont I ea l"0ur cause qu'un seul facteur. Lorsqu'ils traitent d'un ensemble coneret de faits, 1es representants peuvent,en toute' honnetete, etre en ~~sac;~Qr4 51.1-1'. ~ sP}utiQJ1, q1.\i r~PQnQ:raitl~ mj~ux a l~ &i~uati()n e~prim~e pqr I;f;S faits; .IMi~, dw.s le ~a,s pre~ent, l'~ch~c du <;:ons4'lil de ~c,k"l'ite, qqi J;:\'a pq parvcynir a a.ucune f;9~c.lu,siQP, est tln~Ql,1eme~t 4f;J. il c~ ql:1e nou,S n'arri:vp:Q~ p~.s a nous mettre d'a~eorQ. SUr lE!s fl:\its, En Q!CJ;utre::; termes, lIes uns affirment, que les diffictJ:lt~~ provienne~t uniq1,lement de la. situation iut.erieure al:re?d.~ inv.~t~gateq, cHld th~xe.. \S'. nq. tI;',ed; to hwt}st~~e. 1'hexe were no sij,~h 11l(:ldentS. , So we l'ea.ch J.ie concl'1£Sion that we cannot leave it at that by saying that the S1Jbsidiary Group, with no authority, shall remain in Greece. That is 1'10 sa1ution. Therefore, we try to approach the problem in a new way. It is not fair to say, as has been suggested, that we thought of br.inging our resolution forward only after the United Scil:tes propll8RI had meen rejecte:d, .wd after the Greek Government had pr0duced that new lettt':r to the, Security Council asklJ;lg the Council to! act under Chapte.r VH of the Charter. My GOVflffiment had been seriously considering: this method of a£ipr0ach fol' some thne, and so, immediately: following the rejection of the Po1ish resolu.tion, an behalf or my Governm.ent I produced this pr<r pasal. I introduced it in an endeavour, to find something acceptabl!€ to all and! baseq on the r~atities C!)f the e~isting situation. Other representatives hel'e, either dil'eet1y or by implication, have stated that there is a 'threat to the peace, alt1:lough not specifical1y mentioning Article 39; and so bl'inging it under Chaptel' VII. I ~I;lall not. weary, the members of the Coul1cil blft. r can quote directly from the various. statements mad~ by representaHves at this Council as. flJ.r ba<;k as SeJ?teil;lbt:r of last year. I (;an quote prt:v,ious l?t.atements, by the r~'prc::sent.ative of th~ VSSR where he said in September laat1 that thisr situat~qn, rs. a "manifest thJeat U to the pea<:e, and we all know: the situation has ~avely d.'etf:riorated' sinc~ that time. We have alf seen and felt the effe~ of that deterioration even in the statements m,llde befqre thi's Council QJ the representatives or the countries involved. ' SQ. let us, £~ce .up to the fact that we have aR a.dmittOO anq stCJ.ted t.@t the situation cQnstitutes a tht('.a.t to the pe.ace. We accept that determination, and it auto~ti,@ly bi:ings the situation under Chapter, VU, which compels us squarely to face the situation. , In'accordan,(:e with' the pro\\is.~on$ of Article 39, we" cOij.ld immediately proc€t;d to recommend. But we do nQ1; do that; we put 'the question on t~~ basis, of Article 40 by proposing certain provn.onal me&&ures. What are ~ose provisional me~s1.!re~? To enter into,direct negotiation--,.direct negotIatIon is an obHgati()n under the Charter --:: to reli~ve the tension at present existing, With a "Iew to the resumption of norm,al an~ peacef~ qiplom"1tlc rela.tions. That is not a ser~ol,tf'obllga.tion. Nobody is blamed there. Nobody IS ~o~de!1Ul,ed. We merely direct the parties to do cect~n things which th~y have all said they are ;prep::tred to do. They have all said here at Se' S~! sOfltil;ia1 ~t:.Cqrd,r of. t{11l .seCI~ritil' Ca,mcil, ~irst Year, con er es. NO\, 7. pai~ 1110. c~de au¥ en,quetesl il n,'e.st pas besoin d'en,~ueter. c~s inqide.nts n'ont pa,~ exi~t.e." ' . NQus arri"ons ainsi a. cette CQJ;lclusiQU que 1),oas ne pouvons en 7-ester la et dedder ql;te le Groupe subsidiair€ va. rester en Grece sa.ns aucune autorite. Ce n;'es.1! pas, uue soLution. NOItS lW.tI" effQr<;ons donc d'abollder le probleme sous un angle noqveau. 11 n'estpas jiuste de dire que n01Js n'avolils s.0nge a deposer netre lles9ltition quiapres le rejet de la proposi~ian '<:les Emts,- Un.is. et ap.I:€$ la remlse all Conseilt de s.eeurite de 1a lwuv.ellfl lettl1e du Gouver:nement grec ou ce1ui-ci demande an COl1seil drappliquer re Chapitr~ VU de la. Char-te. En effet, m{i)1iJ. Go~'o verne.ment etutlie depuis longtemps cfltte b<;(j)n d'aborder le probleme, et c~est immediaWlmerrt apres le rejat de la rel:1oIution de· la Folagatt que fai pres~nte, au nom de mon, Gliluvernement, la presente proposition. J~ li'ai faii: pour tenter de tnou"er une solution acceptable paul" tous et reposant sur les reaJires de la situation actueiie. D'autres representant&; onti dedaFe· iCi:i, directement ou indirectement, que la pabq est menacee, sans toutefois mentionner expressement l'Article 39, ce qui placerait le probleme !:Ur le terrain du Chapitre VII. Je ne veUK .pas e~uyer le~ m€mml'es d't1 ConsdI, mais je sa-is en meSUl'e de citeI' textuellement des extmits, deljl; dive1'lses doolarat-ions. faites par des representants deVaIJt cc <Conserl et' qui llemon,.. tent i.usquten septembl'e· 1946. ]e peux citer des d~clal'ationi faites: :ear le JTepI'e~enta~t de IfU.<RtSS dans l~squ(tlIl€s il i:lisait, au mois de seprembre de l'<l'1'1i1ee dc'rnie11e\ que cette' situatioa. lnen.a(!e d'ul1e f~C;Qn evidente le maintien: de la pal-x, et noas savons tous qae, depms lors, la situati@n s'est considerablement aggravee. Nous· aIVons, toas c~.mstate et ressenti Ies effets de cette aggravatIon, meme dans les declarations faites devant ?e , CO~1I~1 par. lIes repr~ep,tant~ d,es pays mt,eresses.· ' Rendo.ns-nous a Fevide.nce: nQus avons tous admis et declare que. cette §ituation (:onstitue une menace contre la, paUl::. Nous, acceptons cette n::tani~J;'e de voir, et elte nous amene. autornatiquement sur le terrain du Chapitre VU, ce qu,i nous' force a faire loyalement' face a la situation. En noqs ?pp11yant SUJ;4 les <UsPQ~itions, de l'Article 39, nOU$ pourrions passeI' hnmediatement a:u~ recomlllandations. Mais nol.1S ne le faisons pas; nous posQns la questjon 1Iij.1' le terr<1.in de l'Article 40 en propoScwt ce~ajnes' mesures provisoires. Quelles sont ~es mflSij.reS plOvi~()ires? E~~ger des negociations dir~ctes - eng8.gGr des n~g()ciAtions directes. est Qbligatoire q.ux termes de Iq Charte - et atte~uer la tension e:x;is~ant qctue~lerne1lit aiin d'assurer l~ reprise de relations diplomatiques norrilales et pacifiques. Cette obligation n'est pas partictllierement lourde. Elle ~~ constitue de blame ni de condqmnation pour personne. Nous dema,ndons silnp1ement aux 'V~ir lCll Prqcesove,lla.u;;, (;Q'iciels an CQII$(!il. tl" slcl{J<ite, Prem,ere Annee. DeU-'Cleme Sene, N° 7, pal/ie IIlO. Therefore,-to those critics who may feel that because we bring this under Chapter VII we bring it under the strong Chapter of ,the Charter, we say: that may be so. But it is only strong, as regards the obligation imposed. So far as this particular case is concerned, it is very clear . that we have exhausted Chapter VI, beC3use' under Chapter VI, whatever we do, a portion of any resDlution must take the form of a recom- ' mendation; a portion of it must consist in the establishment of a commission of investigation. ' But we are faced here in this dispute with the . doctrine which I hope will never be pursued again because it means the complete break-down ' of the Charter. So far as the pacific settlement, of disputes is concerned, the doctrine is that action under Chapter VI can be only a recommendation, and therefore not binding on the parties. But be ' that·as it. may, whether that doctrine is held sincerely or not, the fact remains that for the purposes of this dispute we have reached a dead- , lock.as to the applications of the provisions of Chapter VI. At the hundred and seventy-seventh meeting of the- Council, the representative of the USSR stated that the Australian proposal combined mechanically the two elements of the Indonesian case and the United States reso1ution. Without going into any argument, I suggest that this ob- I servation is not correct. In the Indonesian case hostilities had in fact broken out. The war was on. In this, case we simply determine, as we have all admitted and, agreed, that there is a threat to the peace. The second point .is that the United States resolution:!' provided for a commission of investigation with very wide powers of investigation and powers of reporting. This resolution does not ask for that. This is a decision binding on the parties, any violation of which will mean a viola- -tion of the Charter, and the Council itse1f will then be in a position to decide what other measures are necessaty. Ref~rring to. the point as to what we had in mind regarding the observers, we have not elaborated on that question; but as I pointed out' in my opening remarks, we find that inasmuch as the replJrts which we are receiving 'are not based on the full facts, they are of.very little value. The Subsidiary Group'spends days and days in argument as to whether it shall investigate, what it shall investigate, and so on: Then it has to agree on a report and agree to send it back to this Counci1.0ur proposal is that the obserVers -:-and we have made a careful assessment-ean fulfil the role we visualize; that is, we feel that eleven to twelve observers can fulfil the duty of 'les hostilites avaient commence effectivement. La guerre avait ·'lieu. Dans le cas present, nous constatons simplement, comme nous ravons tous admis 'et reconnu, qu'il y a une ~enace contre la paix. La resol.ution des Etats-Unis:l, d'autre part, stipulait la creation d'une commission d'enquete investie de pouvoirs etendus pour ses enquetes et autorisee a faire rapport. La presente resolution n'exige pas cela. II s'agit ici d'une decision obligatoire pour les parties et dont toute violation equivaudra a une violation de la Charte, ce qui permettra au Conseil de decider desautres mesures, necessaires. Quant a ce que nous envisagions de faire au sujet des observateurs, nous n'avons pas etudie 'cette question a fond; mais, comme je I'ai' indique dans mes premieres remarques, noUS estimons que, dans la mesure. Oll les rapports que nous recevons ne sont pas foncles sur l'ensemble des faits, ils n'ont qtie tres peu de valeur. Le Groupe subsidiaire consacre des joumees entieres a discuter. pour savoir s'il qoit proceder a l'enquete, sur quoi eUe doit porter, etc. Il discute ensuite pour arriver a se mettre d'accord sur un rapport et, enfin, sur l'envoi de ce rapport au Conseil. Dans notre proposition - et n01,lsetI avons soigneusement pese les termes - We say there is no derogation of sovereignty in this resolution. It is not severe. There' is no onerous obligation. It simply puts into' words what all the parties have said they are ready and willing,to do, without any condemnation on allY party, without any implication that any party is guilty, as was the suggestion made about the various resolutions submitted under Chapter VI. For those reasons, we commend this .resolution to the earnest consideration of the Cpuncil, in the hope that it will see us out of the difficult positionconfronting it so far as the Council's authority and prestige are concerned. Mr. LOPEZ (Colombia): I requested to speak because 1 wish to clarify a point. I simply wish , to ·say that at a 1ater stage 1 intend to'request the Council to allow me to withdraw my proposal.

The representative of Aus- , traliahas alreadv declared that he wishes his' proposal to be discussed and, a£j:er a gener.al, discussion, adopted. Therefore I declare that the proposal' of the Austraiian, repres~tative as circulated is now open for gt"neral' discussion before proceeding to 'vote. Mr. JOHNSciN (United States of America) :·1 : agree in very large part with the general comments on the situation in which the Council now finds itself, which have 'been very eloquently expressed by the representative of Australia. T1;le United States. delegation wi'll propose minor amendments to the Australian resolution,! which we should like to see accepted, and we shall vote for that resolution. The Security Council now has attempted for many months to find a sQlution totheGreekquestion by the processes of pacific settlement. Many proposals have been presented to us, most of which have carefully avoidedfindings of guilt or blame on' either of the parties to this dispute. Al~ those solutions have failed, as the President aqd the other members of the Council know. The report of the Sub~ColTu"llittee indica:tes clearly, as , :Mr. Lopez has told us, that there is no longer any hope of reaGhing compromise solutioIls. The Security Council is faced with a complete deadlock which prevents it from taking the necessary measures to deal with' the factual situation along the Greek border. 1 "-'he following is the text of'the am~ndments: Document S/471/Add. 1 ,12 Attgust 1947 [Original text: Englis'h] " I, To be added at the end of paragraph number 2: " "and frontier violations along the borders' oIf Greece on the 2¥e hand and Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania on the other." • ,,0 be;added; at the end of paragraph number 4:, "" .. .Pdendihn,g the appointment of such observers by the Council an t,elr. arrival on the ,spot! the Subsidiary Gr<mp of the Invest!gatmg Commission is directed to report to the Council "regardmg t1ie compliance of the parties with this decision!' . M. LOPEZ (Colombie), (traduit de l'anglais):' J'ai demande [a parole parce que je desire apporter tL."1 eclaircissement. Je'desire simplement declarer que j'ai l'intention, a..un stade'u1te.rieur de la discussion, de' .demander au Consel1 de me permettre de retirer m~, proposition. Le P~ESIDENT (traauit de'1'anglais) : Le representant de l'Australie a deja declare qu'll desire que sa proposition soit discutee et' qu'elle soit adoptee apres discussion generale. Je declare done ouverte la discussion genenle sur la propo- ·sition du representant de l'Australie; tel1e qu'e1le a. ·ete 'distribuee, avant que nous ne' passions auvote.' M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais): J'approuve en grande partie :les cornmentaires generaux que le repre,sentant de l'Auf-tralie vient de'presenter sur la sit'l1ation dans laquelle le Conseil setrouve actuellement. -La delegation .des' Etats-Unis proposera' des .amendements de detail a. la resolution 'de ·la delegation de l'Austraiiel, qu'elle, aimerait voir adopter, et elle votera eh· faveur de cette re§olution. , , , Depuis de nombreuxmois, le Conseil ~de se.- curite tente de trouver une solution a'la question grecque par le moyen d'un' reglement' pacifique_ De nombreuses propositions, nous ontete soumises; la piupart evitaient soigneusementde con- £lure a la culpabilite de rune quelconque des parties en cause ou a la necessite d'infliger un blame a l'une d'entre dIes. Toutes ces solutions ont echoue; comme le savent le President et les 'autres membres duConseil. Le rapport du Sous- Comite indique clairethent, comme nous l'a dit M. Lopez, qu'il n'y a plus. d'espoir d'arriver a une solution de 'compromis. Le· Conseil ,de securite se trouve dans une impasse qtft l'empeche de prendre les mesures necessaires pour ,venii 'a bout de la situation actuelle le long de la frontiere grecque. ' 2 Void.le texte des amendements: Document S/471/Add. 1 12 aout 1947 [Texte original en anglais] 1. Ajouter, a la fin du paragraphe 2: "et violations de frontiere' le long de.~ ~frontieres greCoalbanaise, greco-yougoslave Pot /Feco'bulgare!' ' ;;!. Ajouter, a la, fin du paragraphe 4: "En attendant la designation oe ces observateurs par le Conseil et 'Ieur arrivee sur les Iieux. le Groupe subsidiair<: de la Commission d'enquete est charge de faire rapport au Conseil ,sur la fa~oit dont les parties interessees se sont conformees a cette decision!' I may say in passing that the Australian resolution also imputes no blanle, but, it does take care 0.£ the situation of danger and, if passed, will give the Security Council some hold, some measures of CGntrol. . , • After I have expressed the view which my Government and my delegation'hold on this situation; I shall put before the Council another draft resolution from the United States delegation. I shall not co~ment spedfically on that draft •resolution. I think tha,t our views regarding It will be clear from the general staterilent which I propose to make. I need hardly remind the Council that if the Australian resolution is passed by the Council, the United States resolution wilt be withdrawn. It is the view of the United States Government that Greece is in grave peril. This peril results from the guerrilla warfare now being waged against the Greek Government by com~u­ nist-led bands actively supported by Albania, Buigaria and Yugoslavia"and by the Communist Patty of Greece. It is perfectly clear that the ' Governments of'the three northern countries are working in close conjunction with the Greek Communists with a common objective - the establishment in'Greece of a minority totalitarian government which would be subservient to the communist-controlled countries. 4 The United States Government considers that the evidence,obtained by the Security Council's Commission of Investigation and the ,Subsidiary Group as set forth in a series of reports to the Securit".f Council unquestionably proves that substantial assistance is being received by the Greek guerril1as from the northern C0untries, and , further shows that this assistance is of such importance as to constitute a very serk JS threat to Greek independence and integrity. .. It is because of the obvious seriousness of the situation that my Government has taken so active an interest in the Greek complaint to the Security Council. We believe that with the United States assistance now being made available to Greece and with the assistance which other nations and international organizations may be able to provide in the future, Greece can solve her domestic difficulties provided she is 'relieved of the constantly growing threat from the north. We further believe that this threat can be checked it it is firmly faced by the United Natians. When the report of the Commissio!;1 of Investigation was first submitted to the Security Council, the United States thought that the measures proposed in our resolution of 27 June would Apres avoir expose)es'vues de mon Gouvernement et de ma delegation sur cette question, je soumettrai au Con~eil un autre projet de reSolution ·de la delegation des Etats-Unis. Je ne comll1enterai pas le detail de ce projet, de resolution; Je pense que notre point de VUe se degagera ,de la declaration generale que je me propose de vous presenter. nest inutile que je rappelle au Conseil que, si la resolution de l'Australie est adoptee, Ila resolution des Etats- Unis sera'retiree. ne Gouvernement des Etats-Unis estime qu~ la Grece court un grave d3.llger. Cc danger resulte de la guerre de francs-tireurs que m~nent' contre le Gouvernement grec des bandes menees par des communistes et acti\rement 'soutenues par l'Albanie, la Bulgarie et la Yougoslavieet par le parti communiste grec. n' est parfaitement clair que les Gouvernements de ces trois voisins septentrionaux travaillent, en cooperation etroite avec lIes communistes grecs, a la poursuite d'Ull but, commun -" l'etablissement en Grece du gouvernement d'une niinorite totalitaire qui serait aux ordres des pays sous controle coinmuniste. Le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis est d'avis que les :preuves recueillies par la Commission d'enquete du Conseil de securite et par le Groupe subsidiaire, teHes qu'elles SO:1t reproduites dans ' une serie de rapports au Conseil de sec4rite, prouvtpt indubitablement que les partisans grecs rec;oivent une aide considerable des pays sitttes au nord de la Grece et que les conatatations faites montrent, de plus, que cette aide est d'uneimportance telle qu'eHe constitue une menace tres serieuse -contre 1'independance et I'integrite htlleniques. C'est a cause de la gravite evidente de ,fa situation que mon Gouvernement attache un si grand interet a la plainte adressee par, 'la Grece au Conseil de securite. Nous croyonsque, avec l'aide mairttenant fournie a la Grece par les Etats-Unis, et avec l'aide que d'autres nations ou des organisations internationales pourront fournir a l'avenir, la Grece pourra resoudre ses difficultes interieures, a condition qu'elle soit debarrassee de la menace toujours plus grande qui, vien~ du Nord. ' De plus, nouse'royons que cette menace, peut etre jugulee si l'Organisation des Nations' Unies lui..,!ait face resolument. Lorsque le rapport de , la L.ommission d'enquetea ete soumis pour la, premiere fois au Conseil de securite, les Etats- Unis pensaient que les mesures proposees dans si()n' and ,the Subsidiary Group, taken in con- , junction with'the renewed request of the Greek • Government and the continued defiance of the Sectirity C,ouncil by Albania; Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, now more than ever obligates the Council' to seek positive measures which would, if adopted, have a reasonable prospect of success. We believe that this course is, required by the terms of the Charter, by common 1€lgic and by the necessity for'preserving thoe position of this , Council commensurate with its responsibility. My t Government is firmly convinced that the standing of the Security Council before the world can never' be maintained by avoiding 'the issues or by attempting to take measures which are obviously inadequate. It is my Government's conviction iliat each member of the- Council is under, a moral duty in a case of this kind to act in accordance with the facts and in conformity with t4e high principles of the Charter. Each one of us must live up to the trust reposed ih us by. the -United Nations, for we represent the United Nations as a whole, not mere1y our own Governments. The Vnited States, hI taking this stand, is convinced that it is taking a' stand which' is right in the interests of international peace and justice. ,Even though the efforts of the majority of the Council in the future shoutci be blocked, as has been the case already, by the exercise of the veto, my Government does not consider that these efforts would thereby have been fruitles·s.On ' the .contrary, a firm stand by the majority on this issue would demonstrate to the world a determination of nine of the eleven members of the Council to prevent aggression, whereas a failure by the Council to. meet the issue squarely would. be a signal to aggressors and potential aggressors in' other' places' that they could act with impunity, secure in the belief that their actions 'Y0uld .be tacitly condoned. ' , We most earnestly hope that the maj~rityof ' the Council will Join in seeking action under Chapter VII, not only for the fundamental reasons given above, but also for the -reason that a clear decision by ~e majority of the -Council, even though frustrated by a veto, would provide a firm foundation for effective future action w~thin the framework' of the Charter. It' is our thought that, having done all in its power to cope with the situation,. shouM the Council, for the ,present at least, findJtself un~bll':.tQ afford b.'-.-.. ! front ou en, essayant de prendre des mesures II;Ianifestement inadequates. Mon Gouvernement est profondement convaincu que chaque membre du Conseil a le devoir moral, dans un cas de ce genre, d'agir en tenant compte des faits et en s'inspirant des principes. eleves de la Charte. Chacun de nous doit agir de fal;on a justifier la confiance quinous est accordeepar les Nations U:nies, car nous'representonsles Nations Unies dans leur ensemble, et non pas seulement nos Gouvernements respectifs. En adoptant cette attitude, les Etats- Dnis sont convaincus qu'ils adopteIlt uhe position juste et conforme aux interets de lapaix et de la justice inteJ:'nationales. !Meme si, dans I'avenir, les efforts de la majorite dti Conseil' devaient etre paralyses par l'exercice.du droit de veto, ce qui a deja ete le cas, mon Gouvernement ne consi.dere pas que ces efforts seraient steriles~ Au contrair.e, une attitude ferrtle de la majorite sur cette question .demontrerait au mon9-e. la determination de neuf desonze membres du Conseil d'empecher une agression; .a1ors que,. ,~i le Conseil evitait d'aborder resolt.iment le prObleme, il donnerait aux agresseurs, ou a des agresseurs eventue1s en d'autres lieux; I'indication qu'ilspeuvent agir impunement, .forts de la certitude que letirs actes serai~nt taeitement excuses: ~Jous avons ie fer'me espoir que la majorite au Conseil se decidera a agir'en.application du Chapitre VII, non seulement pour les raisons fondamentales que j'ai indiquees precedement, • 'lis .aussi parce qu'une decision nette de la majorite du Conseil, meme si dIe etait contrecarree par un veto, fournirait une base solide pour Ulie action future efficace dansle cadre de la Charte., NQusestimons que, si le Conseil, apres avoir fait tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour . !air~, 'face a ~a situatiqn, se trouve daps My Government will not sit idly by while the territorial integrity, and pdlitical independence of a Member-of the United Nations are challenged. We do not consider that our obligations or the obligations of the United Nations in this ,regard are ended merely because we haveseeri , our objectives frustrated by the veto of another permanent member of the Council. It becomes all too clear that this veto has been used in defence of the aggressior1s. of Yugoslavia, A1bania and Bulgaria. Greece's right to exist is ~nvolve<J in this case. We wish to make it very clear that we shall not hesitate to exhaust every available means within the framework of the Charter of'the United Nations to maintain inter- ' national peace and to prQvideGreece with whatever protection it.may need in the future. , ~ , The continued failure, so fa.r, of the Security Council to take effective action in this case beca~se of the- USSR veto· cannot, in the opinion of the United States Government, preclude individual or.cOllective .action by States willing to , act, so long as they act in accordance with the general purposes and principles of the United Nations. This ,is particularly true when such individual or collective action is .in support of a policy or course of action which has, the approval of a clear preponderance of the permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council. In the case.o,f the blocking of Security Council action by the veto,. we are confident that the General Assembly will exercise 'its powers' to the.limit for the protection of 'Greece. , The United States for its part would be prepared to comply with any Genera'l Assehibly recommendations for the solution of this problem. It.would also be prepared to co-operate with like-minded' Members of the United Nations in taking any steps' which might b~come necessary, within the terms of the Assembly recommendations or within the provisions of the Charter, to afford Greece the. protection .to which we think she isentitIed under the Charter. , I shall ha~ the draft resoluhonwhich I mel~~ tionedat tile beginning· of this. intervention written and distributed to the members of tile Council.1 'Volel le texte du llrojet de resolution: Document 8-/486 12 lIOt1t 1941 [Tt.flt' original /Ill pllolail'] Le Consell de stlcurit6, ayant examln6 le rap-port de In Commission .d'en!lullte constitu6e en vertu de la t'csolulion dl\ Conseil du 19 dl!cembre 1946; llyant tlCnmin6 les renseill!llc· ments fournls pllr le Groupe QUbsldiaire de la Commlss OIl .. 'The following is the text of the draft resolution: Docum.ent S/486 12 August 1941 [Original 'tX': ~tlolisllJ . . The Security Council having considered the report of the Commission of Investigatioll' established by resolution \ of the Council of 19 Dcecm.ber 1946, and having considerelt the in. formati.on supplied by the Subsidiary Group of the Commission contrecarres par le veto d'\tt1 ,autre membre permanentdu Conseil. It est de plus en plus clair que. ce droit de veto a ete utilise pour soutenir les agressions de la YougQslavie, de l'Alban.i~ et de la Bulgarie. C'est le droit de la r:rece al'cxistence qui est en jeu dans cette aff&lre. Nous voulons qu'il soit parfaitement clair que nous n'hesiterons pas a epuiser tous les moyens prevus, dans le cadre de la Charte des Nations Unies, pour ma1ntenir la paix internationa.Ie et pour fournir a la Grece toute la protection dont elle pourra avoir besoin dans l'avenir. • Le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis estime que les echecs successifs du Conseil de securite, dus au veto de I'URSS contre toute action effective, ne peuvent empecher une action individuelle ou collective des Etats desireux d'agir, tant qu'ils agiront conformement aux buts et aux principes de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Cela est vrai tout particulil~rement lorsqu'une telle action individuelle ou collective est entreprise pour appuyer une politique ou ttne liglle de conduite qui a l'approbation d'ne majorite importante des membres permanents et non permanents du Conseil de securite., . Notts avons l'espoir que, dans le cas Oll l'action du Conseil de securit't serait bloquee par l'exerdce du droit de veto, l'Assemblee generale exercera ses pouvoirs jusqu'au bout, pour la protection de la Grece. Pour sa part, la delegation des Etats-Unis serait prete a se conformer it toute recommandation" de l'Assembtee generale pour la solution de ce ptobleme. EHe serait prete aussi a collaborer avec les Etats Membres des Nations Unies qui partagent son opinion, pour prendre, conformcment aux termes des recommandations de rAssembleeotl aux dispositions de la Charte, toutes mesures qui pourraient etre 'necessaires afin de donner a' la Grece la protection a laquelle €!lle nous semble avoir droit en vertu de la Charte. Le projet de resolution1 que j'ai mentionne au debut de mon interventi9n sera redige et distribuc aux membres du Conseil. . Je demande au President de 111'autoriser a ajouter un. mot sur la question tres grave que l'on viellt de debattre id. En ce qui concerne le projet de resolution presente par le representant de l'Australie, 'il111e semble q~'un certain nombre d'affirmations ant ete repetees .ici sans qu'il ait ete tenu compte des remarques que 'nous avons eu l'honneur de presenter ces derniers jour's di.\l:ant le Conseils. . Tout d'abord, ie representant de rAustralie declare qU'il existe une menace a. la paix. Or1nous continuons a crier notre desir de savoir 011 se trouve cette menace, 011 elle se dissimule1en quoi elle cOllsiste1par quoi eUe est prouvee. rai 'maintes fois souleve 1a question; j'ai·dit qu'il s'agissait, en quelque sorte, d'un deni de justice1en me plaignant a juste titre que le Conseil, pour uile raison ou une autre, n'ait jamais elt, je voud·rais dire l'audace, mais il n'a jamais 111eme manifeste le desir d'entrer dans le> detail du -rappprt pour determiner t~i, vraiment, 1es allegations de celui-ci sont justifiees, si la marche des pensees et des idees a suivi la bonne orienta- . tion. et si les conclusions qu'il nou5. propose s'imposent en tant que suite logique a ce qui a ete cpnstate. Je n:'ai jamais reliU de reponse a cette question. Le representant de la YQugoslavie vient d'exposer a nouveatt ce grief, aujourd'hui, lorsqtt'il a declare formeUement qu'il ne constatflit, de .ia part d~'i Conseil, aucuit desir, aucun effort en vue , d'cnqullte, ninsl que les declarations ecrltes et orales faltes devaut le Conseil par I'Albanie, Ir. Bulgarie, la Greee et la Yougoslav!e; In the first place, the Australian representative stated that the peace is threatened. I,stHl repeat that I would like to know where this threat is' to be found, where it is concealed, in what it consists and how it can be proven. 1 have raised this question on several occasions i I said that we were faced with a kind of denial of justice and I complained rightly that the Council, for one reaSOll or another, has never had the courage or even the interest; to examine the report in detail in order to see whether tI:te contentions in that report were realiy justified, whether the train of thoughts and ideas was correct and wltether the conclusions proposed to us were the logical reslI.lt of these contentions. I have never received a reply to that question. The Yugoslavian representative has just reiteratedthis complaint today when he declared formally that ne discerned no desire and no effort on the part of tile Counci'l to reacll a just of Iuvestigatio;l\ and the oral and written statements made to the Council by Albania, Bnlgaria. Greece and Yugoslavia; lfinds t1mt Albnnin, Dulgnria and Yugoslavill have given lISslstnncc nnd snl'11ort to the' ll'\lerrillns fighting against the GI,reek 90verlllncnt and have continued to do so subs~uent to tie, pcrlod covel'cd' by the report of the Commission of Investl. gntlonl b Detcrmines that such assistance and support'tO! the guerrilllls y Albnnin, Bulgaria and .YUllOshwill constitnte 11 ttlr-cllt to the pence" within the meauing of Chapter VII of the Charter; <ialls Ullon ,Albnnia, Bulgaria and YUllo~lavla ta cease llnd (fleslst fronl rendering nny. fUrtll(~r. assist/mce or sUl!llort ill uuy orlll to thc gucrrillas figlltlng agninst the Greek Governnlcnt; ,DiI'ects tile Subsidiary Grou~ to report to the SecurityCoun- Cthlt on dthe cOlllllllance of Alblll1la, Bulgaria lInd Yugoslnvl~ with 1S or er; ,Calls UPOIl Albania, BUlgaria and, Yugoslavia to eo-ollcrate With Grcece In tile scttlemcnt of their disputes by Ilcnceful m,eans. and to keel) the Security Council informed of the 11Io~csS of the .settlemcnt. 'I he Security Council relllains seized of the' quc.stlon and wilt tall\! SUcll further action In connexion with the cnforcel\lent of I!S order and the settlement of thc dispute liS may from :1II1C to t1!I\e be necessary. No. S6~~ OffICIal Rccortis Of t',c Srcurit~ C?Jlllci,. Second Year, "Au sujet des nouvelles tendancieuses que 1'0n continue arepandre al'etranger sur de pretertdues declarations du Premier, Ministt'e bulgare1 M. Dimitroff, a regard de l'union des trois parties de la Macedoine clans le cadre de la Yougoslavie, l'Agence teIegraphique bulgare est autorisee adeclarer une {ois de plus, de la maniere la plus categorique1 que le Premier Ministre n'a jamais fait a qui que ce soit unetelle declaration." Coustnte que l'Alban!e, la Bulgnrie et la Vougoslnvle ont aecorde aide et soutieu aux francs-tireurs qui combat~ent III Gouvernemimt !Ietlenlque, et que ees pnys ont continue a le flllre apres la fin de III perlode sur laquetle porte le rapport 'de la .~olllllllssion d'enqullte; . • ~dde que I'alde 'et le soutlen accordcs nUll: francs-tlreurs p~ 'Mbanie, la Bulgnrle et la Yugoslnvle constituent ulle' mc..... il contre la palx nux termes du Chapitre VII de In Chnrte; , Invite l'Alballlil, III Dutgnrle et la Youll'oslav!e a. cesser dcsormals d'Recorder tout soutien· ou toute: aide, sous que\que forme que ce solt, aux ,franes·tlreurs gui conlllattent le Gou. vcrnemcnt hetlcnlque; Prcserlt au Groupe subsldialre de falre rapport au Consell dC"'SecurM de l'c:'Cccntion de cet ordre par I'AI6anie, la BUlgarle et In You~slavle; •. Invite lAlbanle, la Bulgarle et II!. Yougoslavle 1i collaborer nvea la Grece au rcglement de leurs differends par des moyens paclfiqucs et n tenlr le Conseit de sccurit6 nu cournnt de la marehe des Ilegoelatlons. Le Conseil de ,sceurite demeure salsi de la question et prendra toutes nouvctles lIlesures. qnl s'av<!reralent par la suite ncces· salrcs n l'executlon de son ordre et nu l'e¥lement du, dlff>!rend. ! I' afso listened' most attentively to the Aus:. tralian' representative. I think he repeated the mistake made by the Greek representative: he objected to any eff.ort b~ng made to justify the aUeged existence of a threat to the peace. He merely said, in effect:' "This is a proven fact! This exists because we all know that the threat exists!" He used the same method when he said that the USSR representative hitnself had admitted: at a certain meeting that a threat existed. The matter was, therefore, beyond dispute. I wish to' remind Je members of the Council that I made some remarks ahout this erroneous method the other day. I thought I had proved to them that they cotild not take part of an admission made by the USSR representative and draw a conclusion from it. The USSR representative admitted the existence of a threat. But he considered that this threat was precisely the, ~tension of the civil war in Greece, the presence of 'foreign troops in that territory and the terror perpetrated against the Greek people. The USSR repre~~n-' tative drew the logicai conclusions from these' affirmations;· he' submitted a resolutlon1 which rightly insisted on the withdrawal of foreign troops and proposed measures which might have put an end to such terrorism. How can we now take the affirmations minus the premises and. say:' "We are all agreed. Let us' therefore proceed directly to solutions and draft proposals"? It i~ indeed illogical to allege, first of all, that. the USSR representative admitted the existence of a threat to the peace and then to draw the following conclusion: "Let us , stop there. Let us say.no more about it. That is enough.. Let us prescribe the measures contained in the Australian proposal." ' I.real'ly think that the question remains quite open. If we say that peace is threatened, it is absolutely necessary to prove this or at least to show it. This has not been proven, however; it is merely alleged. I also listened with great attention to the United States representative's remarks.. He' referred to the report. He said nothing new to prove the existence of a threat to -the peace; he merely referred to the report. It is this very report that we object to in the first place and whiCh we want to be considered in detait . Furthermore, if we base. ourselves on the rel'ort itself, we shall see that it proposes a p~ocedure which falls within, the framework of . Chapter VI. The report does not recognize the . existence of'a threat to the peace; it merely recognizes a 'situation which, if it' is prolonged, is like1y to endanger peace, and that·is quite a different matter. If such a leap must be made, if we are to pass directly fl:om Chapter VI to Chapter VII, we must be told in what this threat to the peace consists and precisely where it lies: . we still demand this. , I . Je rappelle aux membr~s du Conseil que, 1'autre jour, j'ai precisement faitporter m'es observations sur cette fausse methode. J'avais cru 1eur avoir demontre qu'on ne peut pas, d'une partie de la declaration par laquelle le representant de l'URSS reconnaissait certains faits, tirer une conclusion. Le representant de l'URSS a admis qu'une menace existait. Mais il a vtl cette menace, precisement, dans l'extension de la guerrecivile en Grece, dans la presence de troupes etrangeres dans cepays et dans la terreur exercee contr~ le peuple grec. Le representant de 1'URSS a tire de ces premisses des conclusions logiques: ii a presente une resolution1, exigeant justement le retrait des troupes etrangeres et proposant des mesures qui auraient pu mettre fin it 1'exercice d'une semblable tetreut. Comment se peut-il, maintenant, qu'on prenne la conclusion sans 1es premisses et qu'on dise: I"Nous sommes tous d'accord. Passons done directement aux solutions et aux projets de proposition"? C'est, en v6rite, manquer, a la logique que d'affirmer, tout d'abord, que le representant de l'URSS a dit qu'il y avait une menace contre la paix et d'en co~clure: "Arretons-nous la:~N'en parlons plus. Cela suffit. Edictons les mesures que preconise la proposition de i;Australie. ", Je crois reellement que la question. reste tout a fait ouverte. Si l'on dit que la paix est menacee, il faut absolument 1e demontrer, le montrer tout au moins. Or, on ne le demontre pas, on le pretend ' seulement. J'ai prete egalement la plus grande attention it 1'interventien du representant des Etats-Unis. n se reportc au rapport. I1 ne dit rien de nouveau pour affirmer 1'existence d'une, menace contre la paix: i1 s'en remet au, rapport. Et bien, c'est j1,1stement le rapport que nous attaquons en premier lieu: dont nous reclamons l'examen detail!e. 'En outre, si 1'on prend pour base le rapport lui~meme, on constate 'qu'il propose d'agir' dans le.cadre du<;:hapitre VI. Le rapport I].e reconnait pas 1'existence d'une menace contre la paix: il re,connait tout simplement une situation dont la prolongation esfsusceptible de mettre la paix en danger, ce qui est tou.t' it fait different. Si l'on doit faire ce saut, si 1'0n doit passer directement du Chapitre VI au Chapitre VII, que 1'on nous dise ' donc en quoi consiste cette menace contre la paix et ou elle 'reside precisement: nous continuons a rec1amer cette precision. ,. ." s Voir les p,.oc~s:'V~,.baui officids &u Conseil, de secflrite, . Deu.'tieme Annee, N° SS, lS3eme sbnce. subsequ~nt paragraphs; The first paragraph contains a statement: the situation prevailing On the northern frontiers of Greece constitUtes a: threat to the peace under the terms of· Article 39 of the, Charter. What is the purpose of this statement? -To invite the parties concerned,. namely, Greece on the one hand, and Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the other, to cease all acts of provoc1;ttion. This does not alter the problem in any WilY. I had almost, the same idea, but -I thought of putting it in a more 'a:ccept~ble and less offensive manner.' It would be enough to change slightly the wording of paragraph 2 of this proposal and to say simp1y: '."Invites the Gqvernments to do everything in their power to avoid all acts of ·proyocation and all offensive acts." . Paragraph 3 states ,that, in accordance with Article 40, the Council decides that Greece, on the one hand, and Albania,·Bulgaria and Yug<?'" slavia, on the other, sliould immediately begin direct negotiations.· If the word "decides" were replaced by the expression '''invites, the parties" (and this is the·essence of the Polish proposal), the rest woulq become quite acceptable.: . , . situa;tion existant ala frontiere septentrionale de la Grece constitue une menace contre la paix aux termes de·I'Article 39 ,de la Charte. Ouel est le but de· cette constatation? InviteI' ks· parties interessees, a savoir: la Grece, d'une part, l'Albanie, la Bulgarieetla Yougoslavie, de I'autre, a cesser tous. actes de provocation. Or, ceci ne change den.a la qU<7stion. N.ous avonseu presque la mem~ idee, mais nous l'envisagions formu1ee d'une maniere plus acceptable, moins off~nsante. 11 suffirait de changeI' Iegerement le libelle du paragraphe 2 de cette proposition et de dire simplement: «Invite 'les Gouvernements a' faire le necessaire pour •evitt;r tout acte de provocation. . tout aete offensant ou' autre". . Au paragraphe 3, ort lit que, conformement a l'Article 40, le Conseil decide que la Grece, d'Ul'le part, l'Albanie, 'la Bulgarie et la Yougoslav~e, d'autre part, doivent intreprendre immediatement des negochitions directes. Or, si I'on remplac;ait le'mot "decide" par l'expression "invite les parties" (c'est.la l'essence de la proposition de la Pologne),.le reste deviendrait tout afait acceptable. . ' Je vois bien ou est le point vulnerable .de la resolution .de l'Australie:. it· reside 'precisem~nt dans les termes employes, et non dan~ le fond. En effet, si on examine· cette resolution dans son essence, on constate qu'll' suffirait de changeI' quelques.mots aux points 2.et3 pourenrevenir tout simplement a la proposition de 'la Pologne, laqueUe aurait pu Hre ·'acceptee. Ainsi don:c,si 1'0n supprimait la constatationque. contient le paragraphe, premier et 'qui est tout a fait inuti'1e du poirlt de. vue . logique, et si 1'0nagiss~it de meme pour le paragraphe 4, ainsi que pour les. observateurs que 1'0n, envisage d'envoyer ta~bas. le fond de la proposition serait acceptable. . , It faudrait, a mon sens;rejet.er 'et les conclusions, parce qu'eUes sont inutiles, et les proposi.. tions fondees sur le paragraphe premier, parce qu'elles sontinacceptables quant a leurfond. ·E~ supprimant le debut et la fin du texte, il ne demeurerait que .la partie mediane, laquelle, modifiee dans sa forme et fondee sur le Chapitre VI, equivaudra.it, en somme, ala proposition de la Pologne avec des moclifications, qui serait alors susceptible d'etre acceptee par le Conseil dans son ensemble. ' Voila ce que je voulais ajouter a ce que j'ai dit avant-hier au sujet du Chapitre VI. La these '. que j'ai developpee, ce jour-la pour de£endre l'application'du Chapitt:e VI n'a pas eteebranlee par le representant de l'Australie; eUe n'a. meme pas ete touchee. . . .' , .M. DENDRAMIS (Grece): Le President, me pennettra-t-il de dire deux mots seulement a la suite de la declaration faite par le representant 'de la Bulgarie? Je desire souligner queJes declarations attribuees a M. Diinitroff ont ete publiees dans plusieurs journaux. Elles ont ete donnees a un correspondant du journal sue~ois Goteborgs Hamdels Och Sjofarts Tidning. Elles ont egaleb, ".' I fully realize that the weak point of the Australiaq reso1ution lies in the -terms· used and not in its substance. If we conside]; the substance of this resolution we shall see that it would be enou~h to change a few words in paragraphs Z' anfr-,3 simply to' revert to. the Polish proposal, which would be acceptable. Thus, if we were to delete the statem.ent in' paragraph 1, which is absdlutely unnecessary from the logical point of view, and if we were· to do the same with parag!aph 4 and with the reference to the observers who are to be sent to the spot, the substance of the proposalwould be acceptable. .'.' . I think we should reject both conclusions - .because they are unnecessary - and: the proposals based on parag:t;aph one-because they are unacceptable in substance. If the· beginning and the end of the textwere deleted, only the middle part would be retained which, differently drafted and based on Chapter VI, would be generally the same as the amended I;'qlishproposal, which could then be accepted by the Council as a whole. That is what I wanted to add to the remarks I niade concerning .Chapter VI the day before yesterday. The arguments I ""advanced on that day in defence of the application of Chapter VI have not been shaken by the Australian representative; they have not been affected at all. Mr. DENDRAMIS (Greece) (translated fr~m French): I 111,erely want to say a few words in· reply to the Bulgarian representative's statement. I want to point out that the statements attributed to.Mr. Dimitrov were published in several new~­ papers. They were, given to a,correspondent of a S~edish newspaper' Goteborgs Handels Och Sf/arts Tidning. They were also given to the The meeting rose' at 12.55 p.m. HUNDRED ANDEIGHTY·FIRST MEETING ,Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, i2 A:ugust 1947, at 3.QO p.m. _ President: :M:r.':F. EL-KHOURI (Syria). I' Present: The representatives of the following c~>untries: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, Colombia, France" Poland, .Syria, Union of Soviet. Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of. America. . 293. Provisional agenda 1. A90ption of the agenda.- 2. The Indonesian questiofl: (a) Letter dated 30 July 1947 from the acting repreSientative of Australia on the Security. Council addressed to the Secre- . tary-Genera!l (document S/449);1 (b) Letter dated 30 July frbm the Permanent Liaison Officer of India addressed to the 'President of the' Sectfrity ,Council (document S/447).2 2940 Adoption of the agen~a The. agenda was adopted. 295. Continuation' of the discU8sionon the Indonesian question At the invitation of the President, ¥r. Sen, representative of'India, and Mr. van Kleffens, representative of' the Netherlands, took their places at the Council table. The PRESIDENT: A letter dated 8 AugUst 1947, addressed to the President of the' Security Council, has just been received from qeneral Romulo, representative of the Philippines,3 asking that the Council, should give renewed considera- ~ion to the request which was previously submitted at the hundred and seventy-eighth meeting,'" namely, that he should be allowed to " take part in the discussions on the Indonesiant ,question..- However, the letter cannqt be discussed or voted upon except at the request of a member of the Council. Ibid., SUPJllement No. 16, Annex 41. • See OfficIal Records of the Security Council, Second Year, No. 72. • The following is the text of the letter and of'the memorandum enclosed therein: ' Document S/485 12 August 1947 [Original text:' English] , In accordance witli instructions received from my Govern. m.ent, I ,have the honour to request reconsideration by the Security Council. of its decision of 7 August 1947 denying the application of the Philippines to participate in the discussion of the Indonesian CJ,uestion. My Government IS taking this step in the belief that the vote on that occasion, which stood at 6 in favour, none against, with 5, abstentions, indicated the possibility that further con" CENT-QUATRE·VINGT.UNIEME SEANCE T;nue a L,ake Success, New-York,. le'mardi 12 aout 1947, a15 heures. -' , Pr-esident: M. F. E,L-KHOUR£ (Syrie). Presents:Les, representants des pays suivants: Australie, Belgique, Bresil, 'Chine, ColOlilbie, France, Pologne, Syrie, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. .- 293. Ordre du jo~ provisoire 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour., 2. La question indonesienne: a) Lettre, en date du 30 juillet 1947, adressee au Secretaire general par ie representant par interim de l'Australie au Conseil de securite, (document S/449)1; • b) Lettre,en date du 30 juillet 1947, adressee au President du Conseil de securite par I'agent de liaison permanent de l'Inde (document S/447)~. ( 294. Adoption de I'ordre du jour.' L'ordre du jour est adopte. 295. SQite de la discussion sur.a question indonesienne Sur l'invitation du President, M. Sen, representant de I'!nd'e, et M. vg,n Kleffens, representant' des Pays~Bas, prennernt place a.la table d~t Conseil. Le PRESIDENT (tradui-t· de ,I'anglais): Le Conseil de securite vient de recevoir une lettre, en 'date du 8 aoitt 1947, adressee au President par le general Romulo, representant des Philippines3, et demandant au Conseil d'examiner a nouveau la requete qui avait deja etepresentee lors de la cent soixante-dix-huitierne seance4,a savoir, d'etre autorise aparticiper aux deliberations relatives a la question indonesienne. Toutefois, nous ne pouvons discuter cette lettre, ni la mettre aux voix, que si un membre du Conseil le demande. 1 Voir les Proces-'lIerblUlJ: officiels ~ Conseil de secUf'ite, Deweieme Annee, Sup.p)ement N° 16, Annexe 40. • Ibill., Supplc!ment N° 16, Annexe 41. • Voir les Proces-'lIerbauJ: officiels du, Conseil de, securite, Deux. ieme Annee, N° 72. 3 Void le, texte de cette leftre ,et du memorandum qui I'accom· pagne: '. [Texte originale;: anglais] Conformement awe instructions que ;'ai rec;ues de mon - Gouvernement, j'ai l'honneur de demander au Conseil de securite de revenir sur la decision gu'iI a prise le 7 aout 1947 de -ne pas accc!der a la demande des Phillppines de participer a la discussion de la situation indonesienne. Cette ,d"marche de mon Gouvernement procede de la convi.c· tion que le vote qui a eu lieu ~ cette occasion avec '6 VD'" pour, zero contre et 5 abstentions a donne I'imp,ression qu'un 12 aout 1947 FRANCE Editions A. Pedone 13, rue SoufHot PARIS, Ve GREECE-GREeE BELGIUM-BELGIQU~ Agence et Messagerles de la Presse, S. A. ' 14·22 rue du Pelsi! 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