S/PV.185 Security Council
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Hundred and eighty-fifth meeting
Page
Official records of the Security Council, Second rear:
Proces-verbaux otticiels du Conseil de securite, Deuxieme siance:
The agenda was adopted.
At the invitation of the President, Mr. Pillai, representative of India; Mr. Sjahrir, Ambassador- at-large of the Republic of Indonesia; Mr. van KlefJens, representative of the Netherlands, and General Romulo, representative of the Philippines, took their places at the Council table.
Sur l'invitation du President, M. Pillai, represen- tant de l'Inde; M. Sjahrir, Ambassadeur extra- ordinaire de la Republique d'Indonesie; M. van Kleffens, representant des Pays-Bas, et le general Romulo, representant des Philippines, prennent place ala table du Conseil.
L'ordre du jour est adopte.
Before proceeding with the discussion, I should like to give an explanation with regard to the matter of the Council's jurisdiction . and the procedure I int~nd to follow.
The representative of the Netherlands has been opposing the assumption of jurisdiction by the Council since the beginning. However, he has not made any formal proposal supported by a member of the Council in order to have formal action taken.
I consider that the Indonesian question has been on the agenda since the last day of the last month. Six or seven meetings have already been held on this question and the agenda has been successively adopted by the Council at the beginning of each meeting. It cannot therefore be considered that the Council has no jurisdiction unless presentation is made of a formal proposal, which would state that since the Indonesian question does not .come under the jurisdiction of the Security Council, it should be deleted from the agenda. If such a proposal were presented, it would be discussed and a decision would be taken concerning it.
I give this explanation in order not to have the matter repeated several times without any action being taken.
General ROMuLo (Philippines): By the terms of the Security Council resolutionof 1 August 1947, the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia were called upon to do two things: first, to cease hostilities forthwith, and second, to settle their dispute by arbitration or by other peaceful means and keep the Security Council informed about the ~_..~._.~."-_._. . -
D'autre part, je propose de supprimer le paragraphe 2, du fait que le Conseil de securite, en adoptant une resolution par laquelle il prend acte de l'initiative des Etats-Unis et de l'AustraIie, confirmerait et accepterait l'arbitrage.
Nous apprecions. tous pleinement les intentions du Gouvernement des Etats..Unis'et,specialement, du Gouvernement de l'Australie, qui a signale cette affaire a l'attention du Conseil de securite, mais nous estimons que, si une commission d'arbitrage doit etre etablie, il faut supprimer ou modifier ce paragraphe.
Je propose egalement que, au paragraphe 3 du projet de resolution de l'Austtalie, apres les mots "de creer une commission", on ajoute: "du Conseil de securite". D'autre part, je me reserve le droit de prendre plus tard la parole sur la composition de la ou des commissions.
Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Avant de poursuivre ce debat, je voudrais mettre au point la question de competence du Conseil et vous exposer la .procedure que je me propose de suivre.
Depuis le debut, le representant des Pays-Bas conteste la competence du Conseil Neanmoins, il n'a presente aucune proposition formelle, appuyee par un des membres du Cons~il, visant a ce qu'une decision soit prise a Ice sujet.
La question indonesienne est a l'ordre du jour du Conseil depuis le 31 juillet. Nous avons deja consacre six ou sept seances a la discussion de cette question, et le Conseil a adopte l'ordre du jour au debut de chaque seance. En consequence, on ne peut considerer que le Conseil n'est pas competent tant qu'une proposition en bonne et due forme n'a pas ete presentee, qui stipulerait que la question indonesienne, ne relevant pas de la competence du Conseil, devrait en consequence etre retiree de 1'0dre du jour.
i:Jclne telle proposition etait presentee, nous la discuterions et nous prendrions une decision a ce sujet.
J'ai donne ces explications pour qu'on ne revienne pas toujours 'sur la meme question sans ja- . m~s prendre de decision.
Le general ROMuLO (Philippines) (traduit de I'anglais): En vertu de la resolution du Conseil de securite en date du ler aout 1947, les Pays-Bas et la Republique d'Indonesie. ont ete invites: premierement, a cesser immediatement les .hostilites et, deuxiemeI:nent, a regler leurs differends en recourant a l'arbitrage ou a tout autre moren'paci-
It follows, therefore, that before the parties in dispute can even begin to comply with the second part of the Security Council directive, namely, to settle their disputes by arbitration or by other means, .the Council must take the necessary steps to make certain that the cease-fire orders were given in good faith, and that they are being carried out to th~ letter.
At this stage, therefore, it would appear that the Australian proposal to create a commission, which will report to the Council on the situation in the Republic of Indonesia following the Council's resolution of 1 August, is in order. Such a commission, ' acting in the name and by the authority of the Secl1rity Council, would report on matters of fact that come to its knowledge and observation, and would stand by until all major threats of a breach of the truce are ended.
While this preventive measure is being taken, the Security Council could proceed to consider long-term measures looking to the peaceful settlement of the dispute by arbitration or by other peaceful means. In this way, the Security Council would further buttress the truce which has been declared, and at the same time enjoy greater free. dom of action in deliberating upon the various modes. of pacific settlement which have already been suggested to it by various members as well as by the parties to the dispute th~elves.
The following concrete pr~posals were made on behalf of the Repuhlic of Indonesia by the Indonesian repr.esentative in his" statement before lhe Security Council yesterday!:
First, that a commission should be appointed by the Security Council to proceed immediately to Indonesia to supervise implementation of the Council's cease-me order of 1 August. Such a commission would 'report on law and order in the areas seized by the Netherlands forces and supervise their withdrawal to positions determined by the truce agreement of 14 October 1946.
Secondly, that another commission be appointed to arbitrate all points of dispute between the Government of the Netherlands and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia.
Thirdly, that as a constructive step leading to arbitration by a United Nations commission, the Republic of Indonesia should a,ccept, as in fact it has accepted, the offer of good offices by the United States, and Australia's offer of mediation or arbitration.
On t.he other hand, .the very~ble representative D'autre part, le tres competent representant des of the Netherlands has made the position of his Pays-B~l.sa clairement expose la position de son Government clear on the following points: Gouvernement sur les po~nts suivants: '
Il s'ensuit done que, avant que les deux parties au differend puissent meme continuer a se conformer a la deuxieme partie de l'ordre du Conseil de securite, a savoir de regler leur differend en re- . courant a l'arbitrage ou a tout autre moyen, le Conseil doit prendre les mesures necessaires pour s'assurer' que les ordres de cesser le feu ont ete donnes de bonne foi et qu'ils sont executes a la lettre.
Dans' ce~ circonstances, il semble done que la proposition de l'Australie visant a creer une commission qui fera rapport au Conseil sur la situation dans la Republique d'lndonesie, conformement 'a la resolution du Cbnseil du 1er aout, soit appropriee. Cette commission, agissant au nom et par ordre du Conseil de securite, ferait rapport sur les faits qui parviendraient a sa connaissance ou qu'elle aurait elle-meme constates, et elle resterait sur les lieu.'C jusqu'a ce que tout~ menace serieuse de violation de l'accord cl'armistice ait disparu.
Tout en prenant cette mesure preventive, le Conseil de securite pourrait commencer a envisager des mesures a longue echeance pour le reglement pacifique du differen~ par l'arbitrage ou par d'auttes :noyens pacifiques. De cette fa~on, le Conseil de securite'renforcerait la treve qui a ete conclue et, en meme temps, jouirait d'lIne plus grande liberte d'action pour discuter des divers modes de reglement pacifique que plusieurs membres ont deja proposes au Conseil, de meme que les parties au differend elles-memes. .
Au nom de son Gouvernement, le representant de'la Republique d'lndont'isie a fait hier! dans sa declaration au Conseil les propositions concretes suivantes:
. Premierement, qu'une commission soit designee par le Conseil de securite pour se rendre immediatement en Indonesie et surveiller. la maniere dont est execute I'ordre de cesser le feu, donne par 'le Conseille 1er aout. Cette commission ferait rapport sur I'ordre qui regne dans les'regions occupees par les Hollandais et surveillerait le retrait des troupes neer!andaises jusqu'aux positions determinees par l'accord d'armistice d~ 14 octobre 1946. . , Deuxiemement, qu'ime autre commission soit designee pour arbitrer tous les points en litige entre le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et le Gouvernement de la Republique d'lndonesie.
Tro~siemement, la Republique d'lndonesie devrait accepter, comme en fait' elle I'a deja fait, I'offre des bons offices des Etats-Unis ainsi que l'offre de mediation et d'arbitrage de I'Australie, comme une etape constructive vers l'arbitrage par une Commission des Nations Unies.
Secondly, the Netherlands Government does not recognize the authority of the SecUl'ity Council to intervene in what the Netherlands considers to be a domestic affair.
Deuxi(:mement, le Gouvernement des Pays-;Bas n'admet pas que le Conseil de securite ait le droit d'intervenir dans ce qu'il considere comme une affaire interieure.
Il s'ensuit que les' Pa.ys-Bas n'acceptent pas la creation d'une' commission d'arbitrage par le Conseil de securite, conformement la demande du Gouvernement de la Republique d'Indonesie. Telles sont les declarations qu'a faites cet apres-midi le representant des Pays-Bas. Le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas a marque nettement sa preference pour la mediation par un groupe d'Etats, sans rapport avec le Conseil de securite et en dehors de 1'01'- ganisation des l"Jations Unies.
It follows from this position that the Netherlands does not agree to the appointment of a commission of arbitration by the Security Council as requested by the Republic of Indonesia. The representative of the Netherlands has so stated this afternoon. The Netherlands Government has stated quite clearly that it would prefer mediation by a group of States functioning without relation to the Security Council, and outside the United Nations.
Apart from the fact that the proposals advanced . Independa.n:ment de llopposition absolue qui by'the parties in dispute appear to b,e in complete semble exister entre les propositions formulees par opposition, the members of the Council cannot but les parties au differend, les membres du Conseil have noted the utter contrast between the attitude n'ont certainement pas manque de remarquer le shown by the two parties: The Government of the contraste frappant entre I'attitude des deux parties. Republic of Indonesia has.affirmed that it places Le Gouvernement de la Republique d'Indonesie a full reliance upon and will accept any impartial affirme qu'il acceptait, avec une entiere confiance, arbitration and abide by any decisions of the Securtout arbitrage impartial et qu'il se soumettait aux ity Council with regard to obligations, duties and decisions du Qonseil de securite, en ce qui oConcerne . responsibilities imposed by the .united Nations les obligations, devoirs et responsabilites imposes' . Chart(;i. This indeed is very high tribute to the par la Charte des Nations Unies. C'est la un ·tres Security Council, as well as to the United Nations grand hommage au Conseil de securite ainsi ql,l'a as a whole. That it should have come, unsolicited, l'Organisation des Nations Unies dans' son enfrom a country not a Member of the United semble. Que cet hommage soit· venu spontane- . .Nations makes it all the more valuable. O~e might ment d'un pays qui n'estpas Membre des Nations wish that this expression of faith in our United Unies, cela ne fait qu'en augmenter la valeur. On Nations and in its capacity for just and effective, pourrait souhaiter.qu'une telle confiance dans notre action would evoke in others, and especially in .Organisation, et dans les mesures justes et efficaces countries that are themselves Members of the qu'elle est capable de prendre, suscite chez d'autres, United Nations, at least an equal measure of supet plus particulierement dans les pays qui sont e~- ' port and confidence. memes Membres de l'Organisation,au moins up. degre egal d'appui et de confiance.
Two modes 'of pacific settlement have been pro- . posed, namely, arbitration bya United Nations commission and mediation outside the framework of the United Nations. They are different because of the possibilities implicit in the question as to whether or not the dispute is a purely domestic affair of the Netherlands, and therefore oU:l:side and beyond the jurisdiction of the Security Council. The representative of t1}.e Netherlands has already argued this point at·some length; and he pressed it further the other dayl in his attempt to bar representation of the Republic of Indonesia in the deliberations of the Security Council.
La difference qui existe entre les deux modes de reglement pacifique qui ont.ete proposes, a savcir, l'arbitrage par une commission des Nations Unies 'et la mediation en dehors du cadre des Nations Unies, reside dansla question de savoir si le differend constitue une affaire purement interieure des Pays-Bas et ne releve par consequent pas de la competence du Conseil de securite.Le representant des Pays-Eas a deja expose longuement cette these et il a essaye, l'autre jour encore!, de l~ faire prevaloir en essayant d'empecher la Republiq'!ie d'Indon6sie de participer aux deliberations du Conseil de securite. .
While it is true that Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter denies the authority of the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any'State, the same paragraph qualifies 'the rule with the statement that the said principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. In other words, even if it were claimed that the armed clash, between the NetheJ:1ands and the Republic of Indonesia is a domestic. dispute, such a claim would not.and could not nave the effect of depriving the Security
Bien qu'il soit·exact q'tie, aux tennes du paragraphe 7 de l'Article 2 de la Charte, les Nations Unies n'ont pas le droit d'intervenir dans des affaires qui relevent essentiellement de lacompetence. nanonale d'un Etat, le meme paragraphe apporte une reserye a cet Article en stipulant que ce principe ne porte en rien atteinte a l'applica.tion des mesures de coercition prevues au Chapitre VII.. En d'autres tennes, meme si l'on pretend que le conflit anne entre les Pays-B~ et la Republique d'Indonesie constitue un differend d'ordre interieur, pareilleaffirmation n'aurapas et ne pourra
I can very well understand the insistence of the Netherlands Government .in regarding its dispute with the Republic of Indonesia as an essentially domestic affair. Theoretically speaking, acceptance of the Netherlands position would have the effect, .not of depriving the Council of its jurisdiction, as I have already demonstrated, but simply of limiting the nature and scope of the action to be undertaken. by the Council under Articles 34· and 39 of the
Ch~er. That is, the Council would not -be able to take steps to settle the dispute, and its action would be limited to measures necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Frankly, however, it is difficult to conceive that peace could be preserved merely by fencing off the area of hostilities, without removing the threat to peace that comes from within.
The representative of the Umted Kingdom alluded the other day! to the fact that repercussions of the situation in neighbouring Asia and Australia~and if I may be permitted' to add, in the Philippines also-had been serious, and that the situation could conceivably endanger international peace and security. Certainly., the more humane as well as the more practical method to prevent an epidemic is not merely to put an infected person under quarantine, but to combat the disease itself within the body of the patient. It should be remembered that the Government of India has brought the matter before the Security Council as a dispute or situation endangering the maintenance .of international peace and security within the meaning of Article 34 of the Charter. And the Council, having actually recommended measures, withal of a provisional character, for the pacific settlement of the dispute between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia, and having invited representatives of the Republic of Indonesia, to participate in the discussions pursuant to Article· 32 of the Charter, it seems to me that the.issue of jurisdiction· has already been resolveg against the contentions of the Netherlands Government. I should like, however, to adduce a few arguments, in addition to those previously advanced by the representatives of Syria and Australia,·in support of the proposition that the dispute. in question is not a matter.essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the Netherlands.
In the fust place, the Netherlands is estopped by its own acts from claiming that its dispute with
En premier lieu, les Pays-Bas ne peuvent, en raison de leurs propres actes, pretendre que leurdiffe-
Mais, comme le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et le pretendu Gouvernement de l'Indonesie orientale ont pris grand soin de le souligner, les Etats-Unis d'Indonesie n'existent pas encore. Si je puis me permettre de pousser plus loin la comparaison, je dirais que la Republique d'Indonesie occupemain- . tenant une position se~blable a celle de l'Etat de New-York immediatement apres la revoIte des treize colonies contre le Royaume-Uni, maisavant que le Statut de la Confederation ou meme la Constitution ne fussent entres en vigueur; c'est-a-dire avant que les differents Etats americains aient abandonne leur souverainete respective en faveur de l'Union. En second lieu, la Republique d'Indonesie possede tous les titres requis pour constituer 'un Etat. Personne ne niera qu'elle possede un territoire, une population et un Gouvernement, queUe que soit la mesure dans laquelle les frontieres dudit territoire et l'importance numerique de la population que la Republique revendique, sont contestes par les Pays- Bas. La Republique pretend devant le monde conduire ses relations etrangeres pour son propre compte, ce qui, d'apres le Gouvernementneerlandais, serait precisement une violation de l'Accord de Linggadjati. Il convient de declarer que la possession, par la Republiquc d'Indonesie, des titres requis pour constituer un Etat et l'exerc1ce des droits qui en decoulent, ne dependent pas de leur reconnaissance par d'autres Etats. Heureusement, les Pays-Bas ont reconnu de facto la Republique d'Indonesie et d'autres Etats ont fait de meme. Je voudrais profiter de cette-occasion - ceci dit entre parentheses -:- pour'declarer que le Gouvernement des Philippines, dans une ceremonie qui a eu lieu a ManiIle aujourd'hui apr~s-m.idi, a annonce publiquement qu'il reconnaissait trois nouveaux Etats . en. Asie: l'Inde, le Pakistan et la' Republique d'Indonesie. Bien que des specialistes en droit international puissent discuter des differences· essentielles entre
I Republic of Indonesia now occupies a position comparable to the State of New York immediately after the revolt of t.he thirteen Colonies against the United Kingdom, but before the Articles of Confederation or even the Constitution went into effect; that is, before the various American States surrendered their respective sovereignties in favour of the Union. In the second place, ,the Republic of Indonesia possesses all the essential attributes of a State. Nobody will deny that it possesses territory, people and Government, however much the confines of such territory or the number of its popUlation whose allegiance is claimed by'the Republic, may be disputed by the Netherlands. The Republic holds itself out before the world as conducting its foreign relations on its own behalf, which is precisely one of the alleged violations of the Linggadjati Agreement cited by the Netherlands Government. It should be stated that the possession by the Republic of Indonesia of the constituent elements, and its exercise of the corresponding rights, of statehood, are facts which are not dependent upon external acknowledgment by other States. Happily, the Netherlands has accorded de facto. recognition to the Republic of Indonesia and other States have followed suit. I would like to take this opportunity to announce parenthetically that the Government of the Philippines, in a ceremony in Manila at noon today, made public announcement of its recognition of three new
~tates in Asia, namely, India, Pakistan, and the Indonesian Republic. . While publicists may quibble about the difference in essence between de jure and de facto --- , 1 See 0ffi.cial Records of the Security Council, Second Year, No. 76, 184th meeting, document 8/474. ,
Moreover, some States have already given de jure recognition to the Republic of Indc;mesia and entered into diplomatic relations with its C'TOvemment. .Certainly, the Republic of Indonesia better meets the qualifications of a State, as that term is employed in the Chartel'! of the United Nations, than the Philippines did at the time of its admission into-the United Nations, that is, before the Philippines became a Republic; or, for that matter better than India;, Syria orLeban~n, at the tin;l.e of their becoming Members of the United Nations. In ,the third pla~e,'the Linggadjati Agreement has all the characteristics of an intemational treaty. It is not 1;he result of a unilateral act onthe part of the Netherlands, but of a bilateral agreement between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. A sovereign does not bargain ,with any Goyemment subject to its jurisdiction; it issues commands to be obeyed, regardless of the will of the other. By appealing to the Republic of Indonesia to fulfil the terms of the Agreement, the Netherlands only confirmed ~e fact that it had discarded the mantle of itS sovereignty,the moment it entered into that ~greement. . It goes. without saying that any dispute arising out of an international agreement, .though it may deal with domestic ~fairs,ceases to lie within the exclusive domestic jurisdietion of either paJ.'ty to the agreement. The rule, as stated in an advisory. opinion of.the Permanent Court of Intemational Justice,! is that a matter ceases to be of domestic jurisdiction ,if it is regulated, by an international 'treaty. '
'. In the fourth place, it,would not be.correct to apply exclusively the standards set by intemational law as the yardstick to determine what matters are or are not of "domestic jurisdiction", as that term is used in the Charter. The DumbartOh Oaks proposals, following thelead given in the Covenant of the. Leagu~ of Nations, sought to estahlish ~Iuch a criterion, but that mode .of .interpretation was rejected by the sponso~g Governments on the broad grounds thatthe concept of domestic jurisdiction, 'embodied as. it was in the statement of purposes in the Charter, should be dealt with as a •"basic principle" and not. "as .technical and legalistic formula designed to deal with the settlement of disputes.by the SecUrity councn"~2
Even the concept Qf ,,~hat isa "State", as'that term is used in theCharter, is not unduly restricted by ,the rigid rules ,of international law, but is some;' what·broadened by·'the liberal spirit which per-
1 See Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Series B, No. 4 (Nationality Decrees in Tunis and .Morocco) •
. Woil les Publications de la COU'7' permanente de Justice internationale, serie B, No 4 (decrets de nationalite promulgues a Tunis eLau Maroc). . ~Voir les,Documents de la ConftJrence des Nations Um6S sur l'organisation. internationqle, (San-Francisco,. I%?) • Volume 6, CoillDrlssion I, page 514. 't"f""II
For the same reasons, the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco ruled out any special provision as to who is to decide whether or not a particular matter is essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.1 By inference this meant that tills question would be decided by the organs of the United Na.tions concerned and by the Members. themselves, on the merits of each particular case.
Pour les memes raisons, la Conference des Nations sur l'organisation internationale qui s'est tenue a San-Francisco a ecarte toute disposition speciale relative a l'autorite qui doit decider si une question releve oU non de la conipetence exdusiyed'un Etat quelconque1• Par deduction, ce·sont donc les organes des Nations Unies interesses etles Membres eux-memes a qui il incombe de d~cider d'apres les elements entrant en jeu dans chaque cas particu- . lier, .de la competence du Comei!.
In the case now before us, it is the Security, . Council which is the organ. called upon to make the .decision. Though a Member may claim a matter to be essentially within its domestic jurisdiction, the other Members are not bound by that interpretation; and the point of order the President decided this afternoon just dovetails ,with what I am saying in my statement t,oday. I"t is left, therefore, to the collective good sense of the members of the Security Council to determine, within the ,broad provisions of the Charter, whether or not the dispute between the Netherlands and the RepubliC . of Indonesia is essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the Netherlands. On what grounds does the Netherlands seek to deny legal personality before the United Nations to a Government the de facto authority of which it has itself recognized, and which it has treated as an equal by entering into a free, voluntary and bilateral agreement with it? On purely.technical grounds, I repeat, the case for the Netherlands is based on a very restrictive interpretation of international law, the principles of which by themselves alone are clearly not adequate to determine the very issue raised before the Security Council. Indeed, the burden of the appeal made by the representative of the Republic of Indonesia requesting intervention by the pnited Nations is a stirring plea for justice. .
Dans le cas qui nous occupe en ce moment, c'est le Conseil de securite qUi estappele aprelldre la decision. Bien qu'un Membre puisse pretendre qu'une affaire releve essentiellement de sa competence nationale, les. autres Membres' ne sont pas lies par cette interpretation, et la question d'ordre .au sujet de laquelle le President a pris une decision cet apres-midi s'accorde avec ma declaration. C'est done au 'bon sens de tous lesmembres du Conseil de securite qu'est laisse le 'soin de determiner, d'apres les dispositions generales de la Charte, si le differend qui oppose les Pays-Bas et la Republique d'Indonesie releve essentiellement de la competence nationale des P.ays-Bas. Sur quelles raisons le Gouvernement des Pays- Bas se fonde;,.t-il quand il cherche a refuser la personnalite juridique devant les Natiorts Unies _a un Gouvernement clont il a lui-meme reconnu l'autorite de facto et qu'il a traite d'egal a egal en concluant avec lui un accord libre, volontaire et bilateral? Sur des raisons purement techniques. Je tepete que le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas se fonde sur une interpretation tres etroite du droit international, dont les regles· a elles seules -ne sont manifestement pas suffisantes pour trancher la question meme soulevee devant le Cons~il de securite. De fait, le fond de l'appellance par le representant de la Republique d'Indonesie pour demander l'intervention des Nations tJnies constitue un emouvant plaidoyer en faveur de la justice. L'Organisation des Nations Unies repose sUr le principe meme de la justice. L'Article premier de la Charte qui enonce les butsprincipaux de 1'01'- ganisation ordollne, entre ::lutres choses, :'l.UX Mcmbres en general et a l'Organisation ell particulier de "realiseI', par des moyens pacifiques, conformement aux principes de la justice et du droit international, l'ajustement ou le reglement de differends ou de situations, de caractere international, susceptibles de IIiener a une rupture" de la paix". C'est precisement dans l'interet des petites nations que l'on a employe le mot "justice" dans la Charte. 11 s'ensuit que, en s'occupant du differend ou de la situation dont il est maintenant saisi, le Conseil de securite doit etreguide, non seulement par les . regles du droi~ international, mais egalement par les principes de la justice, de la. pUTe et simple justice, de la justice de tousles jours. On ne peut trop souligner la necessite de mettre .en harmonie les principes de la justice et les regles Hu droit international quand on discute d'une question.. Apres tout, le droit international est le code
The United Nations is founded on the bedrock .of justice. Article 1 of the Charter, which is an enunciation of the great purposes of the United Nations, enjoins the Members in general and the Organization in particular, inter alia, "to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes Or situations which might lead to a breach of the .peace." The word "justice" was inserted in the Charter precisely in the interests of small nations. It follows that in dealing wit11the dispute or situation now before us, the Security Council should be guided not only by the principles of international law but also by th~ principles of justice-of plain, simple, everyday justice.
The necessity of harmonizing the principlt::s of justice and the principles of international law in decid.ir1.g the merits of the issue under discussion can hardly be overemphasized. Mter all, interna-
The Council can ill afford not to follow up this splendid l:!eginning. It cannot afford to disappoint the new liopes 1;hat it has aroused by ~e action it has already taken: it has the opportunity-almost, one Iilight. say, the obligation-to continue and conclude its labours on the Indonesian situation until the dispute shall have been settled to the satisfaction of the Council in accordance with the highest principles of law and justice, of peace and security, of which it stands as the supreme guardian acting on behalf of the United Nations. ,
The representative of Belgium wishes to speak on a point of ord~r. Before recognizing him, I should like to give an explanation in this connexion.
.. A point of order is raised, as I understand it, when one of the members of the Council feels that the busi..'less of the Council is not being conducted in accordance with one of the rules of procedure. He therefore calls the President to order by citing that rule of procedure. If the procedure of the Council is in accordance with the rules of procedure, there is no point of order. I give this explanation so as to eliIilinate mistakes. Many times, "points of order" are raised which are not really points of order at all.
Mr. NISOT (Belgium) (translated from French): Since we are dealing with a controversial question, I should like, with. the President's permission, to revert to the statement he made regarding the Council's competence.
I should like to say, on behalf of my de-Legation that, like the Netherlands delegation, it contests the Council's competence to adopt a resolution such as that subIilitted by the Australian delegation.
I do not have t,"l reIi1ind the President that an action emanating from an incompetent authority is ultra vires,null and void and not binding upon anyone.
,M. NISOT (Belgique): Comme il s'agit d'une question prejudicieUe, je desirerais que le President m'autorise a revenir sur la declaration qu'il a faite au sujet de la competence du ConseiI.
Je desire preciser, des apresent, au nom dema delegation, que, comme la delegation des Pays-Bas, elle conteste que le Conseil soit competent pour adopter une resolution de la nature de celle qu'a soumise la delegation de l'Australie.
Je n'ai pas a rappeler ici que l'acte emanant d'une autorite iIicompetente est un exces de pou- . voir, un acte ~nul, un acte qui n'oblige.peisonne.
I Wl:mt to make a brief comment on the President's ruling concerning the Council's competence, if I understood it correctly. My delegation doubts whether it is correct to insist that those who deny the Council's competence must muster seven votes, including those of all the permanent members, in order to procure a decision to the effect that. it has no competence. In our opinion, it should be the reverse. Under this rule, one permanent member, by means of a veto, could give the Council jurisdiction. That seems to be the case, if I understood it correctly.
As far as my Government is concerned, we would never vote for a resolution if we were convinced that the Council had no competence to act. We would abstain; we would not vote for it. It does not seem that placing a matter on the agenda has any real bearing on the case. The Council must place a matter on the agenda in order to discuss the Council's competence to hear it.
11 ne semble pas que le fait d'inscrire une question a l'ordre du jour ait un rapport quelconque avec l'affaire meme a traiter. 11 faut que le Conseil inscrive une question al'ordre du jour pour pouvoir discuter s'il a la competence voulue pour s'en occuper. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Jeviens d'expliquer que, aussi longtemps que la question est a l'ordre au jour et que l'ordre du jour est adopte, je permettrai la discussion, au Conseil de securite, d'une affaire ou des resolutions s'y rapportant, a moins qu'une proposition formelle ne soit presentee en sens contraire. Si une proposition visant a faire retirer la question de l'ordre du jour etait presentee, nous la discuterions et nous la mettrions aux voix. Il nous est impossible d'agir autrement. M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais): Je ne crois pas que la question soit aussi simple. En effet, nous devons inscrire une question a l'ordre du jOill' pour pouvoir en discuter. Si ce1:te question est a l'ordre du jour, cela n'implique pas forcement que la question relative a la competence du Conseil ne ~f"nt ~tre soulevee, et il semblerait injuste d'estimer obligatoirement qu'il est competent, a moins que le membre qui affirme le contraire ne recueille sept voix, y compris celles des cinq membres permanents: Par le jeu du veto, le Conseil pourrait se voir attribuer la competence requise. Je neme sens pas a meme de discuter cette question d'une maniere approfondie, en ce moment et je ne desire pas faire perdre de temps au Conseil. Toutefois, je reserve la position de mon Gouvernement sur les consequences de cette decision, et je voudrais disposer d'elements d'appreciation plus techniques. Je tiens egalement a ajouter que je ne conteste en aucune .fac;;on le pouvoir· et le droit du Conseil d'etablir sa competence dans une affaire donnee.
My explanation was that as long as the question is on the agenda and the agenda has been adopted, I shall allow the subject and resolutions concerning it to be discussed in the Security Council, unless some formal proposal is presented to the contrary. In case a proposal is presented to the contrary-that is, to take the matter off the agenda-we shall discuss it and vote upon it. We cannot do otherwise.
Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America): I cannot quite see that the matter is as simpk as that, because we must put a question on the agenda in order to discuss it. If it is on the agenda, that does not mean necessarily that the question of the jurisdiction of the Council on that matter cannot be raised, and it would seem inequitable that it must be considered competent unless the member who contests it can muster seven votes, including those of the five permanent members, in order to remove it from the agenda. That would mean that one veto would make the Council competent, and determine the Council's jurisdiction. I do not feel competent to discuss this in greater detail at present or to take the Council's time, but I must reserVe the position of my delegation on the implications of this ruling, and I should like to have a more expert briefing than I have at present.
I should also like to make the statement that I am not in any way contesting the power and authority of the Council to determine its jurisdiction in a given matter; I am not contesting that.
Colonel HODGSON (Australia): I am going to speak strictly on the point of order. As a preliminary to that, however, I should like to add that it
Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): Je parlerai uniquement sur la question de procedure qui a ete soulevee. Aup~ravant, je voudrais dire que ce n'est pas sans amdete que nous
But I aJll speaking on the point of,order. As I see it, there was no point of order. It was not a question about procedure, and I think the President should rule it out of order as a point of order.
However, be that as it may, there is no rule of procedure invoked. We have now been sitting on this question for a fortnight, and we sit on the assumption that we are competent. Therefore, if any member or representative challenges that, he has to put in a motion to the effect that he disagrees with that assumption, and considers that tltJs Council is ,not competent; and for the adoption ,of such a motion he has to produce seven votes.
I do not think this is a point of order. I gave an explanation regarding points of, order and what they must be, and this point now is not a point oforder. It does not concern any of our rules of procedure.
I have a list'of six speakers before me. I do not know whether the Council is willing to hear them all tonight as the hour is late. We might listen to two speakers and hear the remaining speakers at our next meeting.
Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America) : I move that we adjourn. lam on the list to speak myself, immediately following the" first speaker, who is, the representative of the USSR. I should like to speak today, but we cannot hear all of these speakers now and it seems to me to be more useful to have them all speak at the next meeting. I move that the Council adjourn right now.
Mr. NISOT (Belgium): I second the motion.;
Colonel HODGso~ (Australia): I object to that.
,The PRESIDENT: Then we shall have to pu~ the motion to adjourn to a vote.
A vote was taken,by show. of'hands, ana the mo-, tionwas adopted by 9 votes in favour and 1 against, with 1 abstention.
Votes for: Belgium, Brazil" China, France, Poland, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America.
Votes against: Australia.
.(1bstentions: Colombia.
The, PRESIDENT: The next meeting on the .Indonesian question will be held on Thursday, 21 August flt 10.30 a.m.
Mais j'ai demande la parole sur une question de reglement. Or, a mon avis, il n'y a pas d~ ques. tion de reglement. Il ne s'agitpas d'une question , de procedure, et j'estime que le President devrait l'ecarter.
Quoi qu'il en soit, on n'a invoque aucune regIe 'de prOcedure. Nous discutons cette question depuis quinze jours, en admettant que nous avons la competence voulue. Par consequent, si l'un quelconque des membres du Conseil conteste ce droit, il doit presenter une motion a cet effet pour mar· quer son desaccora et affirmer que le Conseil 11'est pas competent; pour que sa proposition soit acceptee, dIe devra recueiller 'sept voix. .
Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je ne pense pas, qu'il s'agisse d'une question de procedure. fai deja mis la chose au point, et j'ai defini ce qu'on entend par question de procedure. La question en discussion ne presente pas ce caractere et ne concerne pas notre reglemelit interieur.
Six orateurs ont demaz:1dl.: la parole. Je ne sai$ pas si le Conseil est dispose a les entendre tous ce soir, car l'heure est deja avancee. Deux orateurs pourraient prendre la parole ce soir et nollS entendrions les autres au cours de la prochaine seance.
M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je propose que nous levions la seance. Je dois moi-meme prendre la parole immediatement apres le premier orateur inscrit, qui est le representant de l'URSS. J'aimerais parler aujourcl'hui, mais nous ne pouvons entendre ce soir tous les orateurs inscrits, et il me semble qu'il est preferable de les entendre tous a la prochaine seance. Je propose done que le Conseil s'ajourne maintenallt.
M. NISOT (Belgique) (traduit de l'anglais): J'appuie cette motion.
Le colonel HODG'10N (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): Je m'y oppose.
Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je vais mettre aux voix la motion d'ajournement.
11'est procede au vote a main levee. Par 9 voix contre une, avec une abstention, la motion d'ajournement est adoptee.
,Votent pour: Belgique, Bresil, Chine, France, 1l010gne, Syrie, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Unis d'Amerique.
Vote contre: l'Australie.
S'abstient: la Colombie.
Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): La pro· chaine'seance consacree a la question indonesienne aura lieu le mardi 21 aoilt, a 10 h.30.
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