S/PV.1865 Security Council

Over a long period, the people of East Timor have waged a protracted heroic struggle against colonial rule. On 28 November, East Timor proclaimed independence and established the Democratic Republic of East Timor. This not only reflects the aspirations of the broad masses of the people of East Timor but is the result of the protracted struggle of the people of East Timor. Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/l865) 1. Adoption of the agenda 4. The struggle for independence of the people of East Timor has won the sympathy and support of the people of the third world countries. However, the Indonesian Government has constantly carried out threats and intimidation against the people of East Timor. From the day of the establishment of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, the Indonesian Government has openly indicated its intention to carry out armed intervention. Its officials declared more than once that Indonesia would send its armed forces to invade East Timor, and that in the event of resistance by FRETILIN [Fwnte Rewllrcioncjriu de Timor Leste Independente] it would be ready to use its land, naval and air forces. On 7 December, the Indonesian Government brazenly dispatched large numbers of warships, paratroops and ground forces for large-scale invasion of East Timor, occupied Dili, the capital of East Timor, and is now suppressing the resistance of the people of East Timor with its military strength. The Indonesian Government’s naked aggression against the Democratic Republic of East Timor has fully revealed its wild ambition to exterminate the patriotic forces of the people of East Timor, strangle the new-born Democratic Republic of East Timor and thus realize its long-premeditated scheme of annexing East Timor. The above acts of the Indonesian Government constitute a gross violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The Chinese delegation cannot but express indignation ‘at this and condemns it. 2. The situation in Timor: Letter dated 7 December 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/l 1899) The meeting MWS culled to order ut II.05 u.m. Adoption of the agenda The ugendu wus udopted. The situation in Timor: Letter dated 7 December 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/l 1899)

In accordance with the decisions taken yesterday [/86&h meeting], I propose now, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Portugal, Indonesia, Malaysia and Australia to participate in the discussion of the question before the Council without the right to vote. At the iwitution of the President, Mr. Gulvfio %eles (Portrrgul) und Mr. Anwur Suni (Indonesiu) took pluces ut the Council ruble. 5. It should be pointed out that no matter what pretext the Indonesian Government may use to justify its large-scale armed aggression, it is only deceiving itself and others. The irrefutable fact is that, in order to oppose colonial rule, the people of East Timor have long persisted in unremitting and arduous strug-

I invite the representatives of Malaysia and Australia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber on the usual understanding that they will be invited to take a place at the Council table when it is their turn to address the Council. 6.. One of the pretexts used by the Indonesian side is that the situation in East Timor has “threatened” the “peace” and “security*’ of Indonesia. Anyone with common sense will ask: How can East Timor, with a population of only a few hundred thousand which has just won independence from colonial rule, constitute a threat to Indonesia, a big country in South-East Asia? Things are crystal clear: East Timor has not invaded Indonesia, whereas the Indonesian authorities have openly declared their intention to annex East Timor and’ have dispatched their regular air, naval and ground forces and paratroops for largescale aggression against East Timor. 7. Another pretext used by the Indonesian authorities is the maintaining of the so-called “peace and order” within East Timor. Such an argument is in fact the same cliche used by all aggressors in history to justify their acts of aggression. Have not many third-world countries suffered a great deal from the aggression committed by the use of such cliches? If such an argument is to be accepted tacitly by the United Nations and the Security Council, would not the principles of the Charter be cast to the winds, would it not be permissible for any State with aggressive and expansionist designs to use the same pretext for wilful invasion and occupation of its neighbours? It is still less convincing for the Indonesian Government to assert that the dispatch of its armed forces to invade East Timor was an action taken at the “request” of certain organizations of East Timor. This is simply to delude the public for the purpose of annexation. The desire clearly expressed by the people of East Timor is one other than for the complete realization of their national independence and the resolute defence of their sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is a wellknown fact which allows of no distortion. 8. The pretexts used by the Indonesian Government cannot in the least help it to cover up its ambitious design of aggression and annexation of East Timor. The Democratic Republic of East Timor is a small country with a small population; it has just attained independence and is facing many diffi- I 2 9. In our view, both Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of East Timor are countries of the third world. The Republic of Indonesia, which attained independence earlier, ought to have respected and supported the aspirations of the people of East Timor for independence and should establish and promote the relations between the two sides on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence so as to join in the efforts for defence of peace in this region against super-Power I meddling and rivalry for hegemony. Since the Indonesian Government is clinging to its obdurate course and continuing its aggression and expansion in East Timor, the Chinese delegation maintains that, if the Security Council is not to neglect its duty, it must ste’rnly condemn Indonesia’s armed invasion and annexation of East Timor, that all invading Indonesian troops must be withdrawn immediately and unconditionally from the territory of East Timor, and that all States must respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of East Timor. In view of the fact that East Timor has already become independent, the internal matters of East Timor, including the negotiations between the various organizations, should naturally be settled by the people of East Timor themselves and should not be intervened in by foreign forces. We believe that all countries which uphold the principles of the Charter and stand for justice will support the above just propositions.

I have received a request from the representative of Australia to speak this morning. It has, however, been intimated to me that he would prefer to speak after the Council has heard the other three persons whom it agreed yesterday to hear, under rule 39 of the provisional ruies of procedure. I shall therefore now call upon one of those three, Mr. Mario Carrascalio, member of the Central Committee of the UniHo DemocrAtica de Timor, to take a seat at the Council table and make his statement to the Council. 11. Mr. CARRASCALAO*: Mr. President, allow me to express my gratitude to you and the members * Mr. Carrascal5o spoke in Portuguese. The English version of his statement was supplied by him. 12. Before the fall‘of the Caetano regime, there was in Timor only one political party, the Acao National Popular (ANP), which was nothing else than the Uniao National of the Salazar regime under another name. ANP provided the essential support of the colonial regime. After the fall of the Caetano regime brought about by the military coup of 25 April 1974, five political parties were formed in ‘Timor, each having its programme and its own viewpoint on the political future of Timor. 17. FRETILIN also recognized the importance of UDT. On 22 January 1975 UDT and FRETILIN joined forces, having for their main goal the independence of the Territory. Later, during a meeting of the two parties with the local decolonization committee, ‘presided over by Governor Lemos Pires, UDT was surprised by an intervention by Mr. Reis Marques, a member of that committee, who accused some leaders of FRETILIN of having been informers for PIDE/DGS, among them Xavier do Amaral, President of the party, and other leaders such as Nicolau Lobato. Ramos Horta and Alarico Fernandes. 13. On II May 1974 UDT was formed by a group of 23 Timorese, including three members of the defunct ANP. Perhaps by an irony of fate, Jose Ramos Horta, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Information of FRETILIN and former Secretary-General of ASDT [Asswitrpio Socid Dcnwcrcitictr Timorense], forerunner of FRETILIN, was also one of the founders of UDT. However, Ramos Horta refused to accept office, saying that very soon he~would leave Timor in order to attend a course at the University of Jakarta. However, he did not fail to offer his services, saying that whenever needed he would be present and would collabo.rate with great pleasure. Later on, UDT found out that Horta had belonged to ASDT, the forerunner of FRETiLIN. Later on we found out that Horta, before 25 April 1974, had been an informer for PIDE/DGS, the Portuguese secret police, whose fundamental aim was to detect and imprison all who might be in disagreement with the regime. 18. After this discovery and after four months of uneas y association UDT asked FRETILIN that those leaders should leave the coalition. Through its President, our proposal was refused. Thus on 27 May 1975 UDT decided to leave the coalition. 19. However, in his statement yesterday [/864th nweting], Mr. Horta, the self-appointed FRETILIN Minister for Information and Foreign Affairs, said that Indonesia was behind the break-up of the coalition. He may be better informed than I, but I do not regret him since he has an informer’s mentality. It is very difficult to find out the truth when dealing with adventurers of the type of Mr. Hot-ta. UDT has nothing to hide from the rest of the world, because it has a clean record and is very proud of this. 14. At first, Mario Carrascalao, who was chief of the Timor Agricultural and Forestry Services as well as Vice-President of ANP, was chosen to preside over the Organizing Committee of the Party, whose fundamental aim was to prepare a provisional statute to form the basis for the election of the leaders of the Party. Francisco Lopez da Cruz was elected President of the Central Committee and Domingos Oliveira Secretary-General of the Party. 20. What was the reason for the UDT coup? On 9 August 1975 UDT received information from highly reliable sources, confirming other earlier information that FRETILIN was planning to carry out an armed coup on about 15 August. FRETILIN intended by that coup to eliminate not only the opposition party but also whoever opposed its power, in order to make sure of complete control of the Territory. The Government and the collaborators were repeatedly advised and informed of what was going to happen, but the Governor never took any preventive measures. It was evident that he had no intention of taking such measures against the coup planned by FRETILIN. 15. In those days the main goal of UDT was to make Portugal responsible for leading Timor gradually towards independence until a minimum of socioeconomic development had been achieved that would allow the people freely and consciously to exercise its inalienable right to self-determination. Later on, in view of the impracticability of this solution on the part of Portugal, UDT opted for independence in the long term, envisaging a privileged relationship with Portugal. In other words, it can be said that this Party was against immediate total independence, since it understood that conditions did not yet exist for its achievement. 21. Unlike FRETILIN, UDT decided to take part in the meeting at Macau on 27 June 1975. After the UDT coup and the FRETILIN counter-coup, bloody fighting began. UDT jointly with KOTA [Klihrrr Oun Thor Aswtrin] and the Labour Party signed at Batugade, on 7 September 1975, a petition for the integration of Timor into the Indonesian Republic. When FRETILIN 22. UDT, as the most powerful party in Timor, supported by over 50 per cent of the population, had no difficulty in regrouping its members,’ and then, together with the forces of the other parties, it attacked the FRETILIN forces until Dili, the capital of the Territory, was taken on 7 December 1975. 23. When on 11 August 1975 UDT took the headquarters of the police and the army, it did not fire a single shot.,Throughout the whole operation, whether at Dili or in the interior, only one person died, at the airport. Even after the attack launched by FRETILIN against Dili, UDT, before leaving the city, freed all the FRETILIN prisoners it had taken. It could have killed them, but for humanitarian reasons it did not do so. Hot-ta deliberately omitted to tell the Council this. Why did he not tell the truth? Everybody at Dili can confirm the truth of my ‘story. 24. It was FRETILIN that killed innocent people after gaining power with the help of the colonial army, which had joined it. The army of UDT left Dili. We were attacked with grenades by the colonial troops helping FRETILIN. We had a difficult task saving more than 5.000 women, children and old people. Some of them died, but the majority survived. The massacre of innocent people, women and children, the old and the young, the houses and properties burned, the plundering and the terror launched by FRETILIN opened our eyes and forced us to ask ourselves what would become of Timor with FRETILIN in power. 2 25. The leaders of UDT held an emergency ‘meeting in order to discuss the political situation in Timor, and reached the following conclusion. The Government of Portugal had left Dili and settled in Atauro, leaving their weapons in the hands of FRETILIN. The .party concluded that in those circumstances its proposal of independence with certain ties with Portugal could not be carried out. It was a pipe-dream. After seeing the cruelty with which FRETILIN treated its own people, we realized that independence was impossible, particularly bearing in .mind the socioeconomic conditions in Timor. ~ .; 26. After a long discussion we finally arrived at the conclusion that it was in the interest of the people of Timor togain its independence through integration with the Indonesian Republic. As we understand it, an undeveloped Timor with 93 per cent of its people illiterate, could not survive, and if it became ,independent it would start to go from one country to another begging alms, and would simply become a new kind of colony. 28. There is another thing that I should like to clarify before the Council. The decision that my party took was the decision of the leaders of the party-nine leaders, not three as Mr. Hot-ta stated yesterday. An opportunity must be granted to all the people of Timor to decide on their political future and the future of their land, and when I say “all the people” I am naturally including FRETILIN. As soon as better conditions for peace and order are achieved, the people shall be granted their right to self-detertnination with the assistance and under the supervision of the United Nations. 29. Finally, I .want to say that if perchance Indone: sian troops’ are forced to leave the territory of East Timor, then the situation will certainly become much more chaotic. UDT will not be responsible for the consequences of such a decision. It is;, however, my desire, as well as the desire of 300.000 poor and illiterate Timorese, that the Council should take a decision to spare us the traumatic repetition of what we have already lived through. Let the sun shine again in the eyes of our people.

I thank Mr. Carrascalso, on behalf of the Council, for the statement he has made. In accordance with the Council’s usual procedure, I now ask him to withdraw from the Council table and resume-the place reserved for him at the side.of the Council chamber. The next speaker on my’ list is Mr. Guilhermo Maria Concalves, member of the Presidium at APODETI [A.wo&~do Poprrltrr Denlocrdtiw Tintowrue], whom 1 now invite to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement. ’ 31.: Mr. GONCALVES*: The party I represent; APODETI, was founded on 27 May 1974; and Mr. Arnaldo dos Reis de Araujo was chosen as President of the Presidium. He was a former highschool teacher who for 29 years was isolated by the Portuguese colonial authorities. Mr. Jose Fernando Osorio Soares, an employee of the Service of Social Assistance, who had previousiy held the-functions of Chief Administrator, was appointed Secretary-General of the Party by the,Presidium. 32. The reason l APODETl always refused to give advice to its militants concerning any type of political ideal that would lead Timor to maintain its union ,* Mr. G&&es spoke in Portu&ese. The English version’of his statement was supplied by him. 33. The alternative-independence-was in reality full of difficulties and doubts,.owing to the absence of adequate structures to help a young nation lacking in everything. APODETI did not want to take, the risks a fertile imagination might suggest, but only to be a sincere and practical party. Without the necessary structure or the means of creating it, to think about independence for Timor was like trying to place a ship upon the highest mountain. 38. APODETI, feeling that the natural inclination of the majority of the people of Timor would be to integrate with Indonesia, endeavoured to ensure that the Indonesian language was taught in schools wherever possible: It is interesting to note that a certain number of APODETI members at every level are men who played an active part in the 1959 revolt in Vikeke against the Portuguese colonial regime. In the suppression of the heroic resistance fighters of Timor, the Portuguese oppressors killed about 500 patriots. Because of that revolt APODETI ,can claim that it has within its ranks the true fighters for liberty and freedom of East Timor. 34. As a consequence, aware of the insuperable difficulties involved in the achievement of independence, that is in not being dependent upon another country, APODETI opted for integration based on ethnic, moral and historical grounds; besides, such a move would extend to Timor all the general structures of the Indonesian State, with all the consequent advantages for a people that has nothing. 39. APODETI, following the example of the other parties-UDT, KOTA and Trabalhista-planned to attend a conference of the parties with Portugal after the meeting at Rome. However, typical lack of interest on the part of the Portuguese Government led to its failure. Jointly, with the other three parties, APODETl proclaimed the integration of East Timor into the Indonesian State on 30 November 1975. APODETI invited the Government and the -people of Indonesia to protect .the lives and properties of al! those who consider themselves to be Indonesian in order to achieve a historical and moral goal. Also, in proclaiming that integration, al! the militant members of APODETI agreed to be protected by their new State. 35. The action carried out by UDT on 11 August was understood to be a highly justifiable measure. However, APODETI did not participate in any type of preparations for the coup, nor did it take part in it because.it understood that it had to respect the fundamental principles agreed upon by APODETI at the conference of Macau. 36. Therefore, it is not strange that APODETI should have maintained absolute ‘neutrality during the rise of movement. But later on, in view of the evolution of events and the responsibility of FRETILIN, APODETI decided to associate itself with the parties UDT, KOTA and Trabalhista in its struggle against elements of FRETILIN. Thus the Joint Political- Military Front that would eventually recover Dili and Baukau was born. ‘After FRETILIN launched its counter-coup on 20 August 1975, sympathizers within APODETI started to be persecuted pitilessly. Then there came the attacks against villages and populations that supported APODETI, and massacres were committed. The militant members of APODETI, unable to remain indifferent to this, proceeded to form groups, in distant and inaccessible places, so as to be able to take part in the self-defence groups that were being formed. 40. Many people, including the very militant members of FRETILIN, are not fully aware of the atrocities and abuses of every kind which have been committed by that association of ETI LIN leaders 3 which so miserably betrayed our peo e. In view of the genera! explanation which will be read later on, there is little that can be said except that only the people of Timor know how cruelly they have suffered. However, APODETI has no hatred or ill feeling against those who participated in the evil designs of the FRETILIN leaders. APODETI wants peace and social order to be t-e-established as soon as possible so that the people of Timor may have the time to reflect and make their own free choice. / 37. It is necessary now to recall certain other aspects of APODETI. While in Timor nothing was disturbing the peace, APODETI, calmly and most democratically, obtained the support of 94 sukrrs-the equivalent of 20 per cent of the local population. Although it only 41. APODETI is confident that the United Nations, through its representative organs,- will make an important contribution to enabling the people of Timor to express themselves freely.

On behalf of the Security Council I thank Mr. Gonqalves for the statement hk has made to the .Council. In accordance with the Council’s usual procedure, I now ask him to withdraw from the Council table and resume the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber. In accordance with the decision the Council took at its meeting yesterday, I now invite Mr. Jo& Martins, President of KOTA, to take a place at the Council table and to address the Council. 44. Mr. MARTINS: I should like to thank you, Mr. President, and the other members of the Security Council for giving me the opportunity to acquaint you with the current situation in Timor. The members of my party, Mr. Mario Carrascal and Mr. Guilhermo Gongalves, and I. and all the people of the Territory entertain profound respect for the United Nations. We are confident that in considering our case the Council will rely upon the principles of justice and the ideals of the Organization enshrined in the Charter, which we firmly support. 45. 1 refer now to the problem of East Timor. Portuguese Timor is located in the heart of the Indonesian archipelago. It is one of the thousands of islands which constitute the archipelago. Portuguese Timor is part of the island of Timor; the other, or western, part is Indonesian territory. The population of Portuguese Timor, a little more than 600.000, is of the same ethnic origin as the population of 800.000 in the Indonesian part. About 25 per cent of the poptilation are Catholics. The majority, or about 65 per cent, of the population are Animists. There are also Moslems, Hindus and Buddhists, but exact figures cannot be given. 46. The Timorese people at-e at the stage of a traditional society. The sr&s and the lirrrcri~ still hold a dominant place in society. Mr. Joseph Lelyveld wrote in Tltc iVl~rl* York Times in October 1974 that “the nearly five centuries of Portuguese rule have left Timor not underdeveloped but undeveloped in an almost absolute’sense”. This observation is an accurate description of the fact that the people of Timor have been left to their own way of life more. or less as it was on the day the Portuguese navigators landed in Timor in 1514. 47. A SIII?II can be considered as a group of families belonging to the same clan and living in a certain area of the kingdom. The territory of a sulirr is the small village in which the members live and the land on which they grow their paddy or corn. It should be mentioned that each srrkrr has its own territory and 48. The liurcli, or traditional chief or ruler of a tribe, has a certain number of srrkrrs under his control. The influence of the lirrrcri depends on how many srrkrrs he represents. The lirmi is left very much on his own as to how to administer his SII~XS, but he is responsible for all taxes being collected on time and delivered to the district chief, who is an official of the Govemment. The lirrrcri is in effect the native ruler of his own tribe as far as customs and traditions are concerned. 49. Of the 472 s&r/s of East Timor, 236, or about 50 per cent, are under the influence of the UDT Party and about 95 S&IS, or 20 per cent, are under the influence of APODETI. Thus 331 of the 472 S&I/S have pledged their allegiance to those two parties, which account for 70 per cent of the population. Together with KOTA and the Trabalhista Party they claim at least 75 per cent of the population. The effort of FRETILIN to depose the traditional chiefs of the s~~krrs and the lirrrtris and to replace them with village councils is one of the main reasons why FRETILIN cannot gain a foothold in the kingdom. 50. The Territory is divided into 13 counties or c*onc*&os. A c*onc~li~o is headed by an trtb~tirristrcrtbr cltr c*orrcellro, who is directly responsible to the Govemment. Each county is divided into postos. A po.sto is headed by an trtlrninistivr~~~r ckr posto who is directly responsible to the c~m*ell~o. The cri~lllinistrcrtl~~r drr posto co-ordinates the work of the lirrrtris on behalf of the trLlillilristrcrilr,r clrr cwtrcx4ho. 51. The liwtri has a dual function, so to speak. On the one hand he gets his instructions from the crdrninistrcrtior tltr pwto regarding government affairs, such as taxes and so an, while on the other hand he has some autonomous authoir authority as a native ruler within the s~rkrrs serving under him. The c/t& (ke s&r, chief of the srrkr~, is a native authority, most of the time acting on behalf of the liulvri who looks after community problems. According to tradition, the <*/I& &J srrkrr is not elected but, according to native laws and customs,, he inherits the power froin his father. The clrefi &ltr powtrgtio, chief of the village, is directly responsible to the &$J (IL> s&r. That is the lowest ranking chief in society, but he is still a powerful person as regards the maintenance of peace within his village. However, one thing should be very clear about this colonial system: whatever the circumstances, the word of the crri~nhi.strtrri(,r tlrr c.orr&/ro is final in almost a!! cases. 52. It is relevant tq. recall for a moment the experience of the last Governor in the Administration at Dili. Mr. William D. Hartley wrote in The Wtrll Strut Jorrrmrl of 10 February 1975 as follows: “The people have always done what the Portuguese told them to do and making a decision is There is a basic truth in what Governor Pires has experienced. The people in the village ask the chef<> de s&r what to do and in normal circumstances it is the chc$ de srrkrr or the litrrcri who makes the decisions for the people. It may sound strange to Western ears, but up to now these conditions were facts of life in East Timor and in every community at the same stage of development as our people in Timor. 57. Those are the credentials of FRETILIN, which claims to represent the majority of the people of East Timor. What it represents is no more and no less than the colonial troops alone, which inherited al! the weapons from the Portuguese Government. 53. The APODETI Party, .former!y the Association for Integration of Timor with, Indonesia (AITI), was founded on 27 May 1974. Its first Chairman was Amaldo dos Reis de Araujo, an exiteacher who for 29 years had been isolated by the colonial regime. The Secretary-Genera! of this party is Jose Fernando Osorio Soares an offtcia! of the Portuguese Timor Social Service who once held the post of district head. The representatives of UDT and APODETI have already spoken and there is no need for me to give information about those parties. 58. The KOTA Party, founded on IO November 1974, defends the existence and continuation of the liurcris as the traditional leaders of the people, elected by the assemblies of -people according to tradition. The KOTA Party has about 28.000 members, located in Baukau, Lolotoe, Vikeke, Kelikae, Manatuto, Laklubar, Laleia, Funar, Maubara, Maliana, Ermera and Hato-Lia. 54. I should like now to touch on FRETILIN. ASDT which later became FRETILIN, is headed by Francisco Xavier do Amara!, a regular clerk in the Tax and Customs Section and an informer of the colonial secret police. Jose Manuel Ramos Horta, who now claims to be Foreign Minister of the so-called Democratic Republic of East Timor, is a free-lance writer on the newspaper A Vw de Timor and an informer of the colonial secret police. He became Secretary-Genera! of FRETILIN. Many Portuguese Timorese were thrown into prison because of him. In those days, he was in fact a too! of the colonial regime. 59. This party is led by Jose Martins, whose father, former lirrrcri of Ermera, was forced to abandon Timor because of his non-acceptance of the colonial regime. He has also been arrested by PIDE in 1964 in relation to a liberation movement for the independence of Timor. The KOTA party is also one of the signatories of the petition for integration with Indonesia and for the joint proclamation of 30 November 1975. 60. The Trabalhista, or Labour Party, was founded in October 1974. Its main programme is the independence of East Timor, under a system somewhat similar to the Commonwealth system, and is closely related to the UDT Party. The leader of this party is Mr. Abrago, who is represented in the Council by the UDT leader, Mr. Mario Carrascalao. Although it has a small following, that party was active during the fighting against FRETILIN. 55. The FRETILIN Party called for immediate independence. The Fur Eastern Economic Re~~icw of 17 October 1975 stated: “The Revolutionary Front for Independent East Timor has a!! the appearances of a hastiiy assembled identikit mode! of a .third-world in-dependence movement. Up to six weeks ago, it would have been hard to take too seriously a self-important party of Dili intellectuals. that was formed only after G.enera! Spinola’s coup in Lisbon on 25 April 1974 and busily acquired a FRELIMO-type image through a vague co!!ectiv/st ideology, a flag and an anthem. Although it still retains an amateurish air reminiscent of a student council, FRETILIN is now the tie jircto Government of East Timor, however long it will last. It has a lot of blood on its hands getting there. FRETILINwon because it had the guns and the soldiers.” 61. With respect to socio-economic conditions in genera!, and education in particular, it would be more objective to quote the information supplied by the Governor of Timor to William D. Hartley of Tha Wrd Street Joornd, and which appeared in the 10 February 1975 issue, as follows: “We stayed here sleeping”, says Governor Pires, “It has only been in the last five or six years that Lisbon spent any real money”. It has been only in the past four years that primary schools were built outside Dili. There is still only one high schoo!, and although there are about 75 university students’from Timor in Portugal, half of them are in their first year. There are only one or 62. With regard tohealth, there are two hospitals in Dili: one for the military, and one for the public. Although there are about 30 clinics in all in East Timor, there are no doctors and no equipment, ,and the medicine supply is poor. 63. With respect to agriculture, coffee is the main source of the foreign exchange earnings of the Territory, accounting for an average of 80 per cent of the value of its exports. Thirty per cent of its production is owned by the State enterprises; 10 per cent belongs to white farmers and medium-scale farmers, and 60 per cent belongs to small farmers. The annual output of rice production is about 25.000 tons. To feed the population 70.000 tons of rice a yearare needed; thus there is a shortage of approximately 45.000 tons. Annual imports amount to about 4.000 to 5.QoO tons a year.; well below subsistence levels. 64. The production of corn is about 14.000 tons a year. ,To, feed the population 40.000 tons are needed; thus there is a shortage of 26.000 tons a year, which is never imported. It is no -secret that the local production has been unable to meet the .growing needs for domestic consumption. 65.’ I turn now to the economy and trade. The economy is purely agricultural; there is no industry and no mineral prospecting. The economy is based on a single crop: coffee. There is no energy infrastructure, and transport is inadequate. According to the Portuguese Government, Timor has had a continuous and growing foreign trade deficit. This cannot be accepted with 7.900 troops on the island, plus the civil service and the more than 10.000 scgrrt~t~ lithr or second line defence.people whom the Government has to feed. 66. The general picture with relation to the socioeconomic conditions on the island, as I have mentioned, i.s of course, generally true in every colony of Portugal. I have no intention to dwell much longer on this subject; I just want to give the Council some background, so as to assist members .in the exercise of their responsibilities, and to do justice .to’ the people of, East Timor. 67. I shah now start on the Timor problem. As to the exercise of democratic liberties, the .plan for the decolonization of Portuguese Timor as formulated by the-Portuguese Armed Forces Movement recognizes the right of the people of East Timor to opt either for independence or for integration with ,Indonesia. The plan further provides the people of East Timor with the opportunity to set up political parties. However, certain developments in Portugal had their repercussions on East Timor,. The.great hopes that the people in East Timor would soon be able freely to express their right to self-determination were soon shattered by the actions of the local Portuguese authorities. ‘68. One political party; KOTA, which has established 38 committees and has a membership of noless than 28.000 people, was refused recognition. That party stands strongly for the preservation of the traditional societies and refuses to admit to membership those. who had once served. the colonial Government. It .has thus become increasingly apparent that the principles of the free exercise of’ the right of selfdetermination as professed by the Armed ‘Forces of Portugal on 25 April 1974 are greatly contradicted by’ their practice in East Timor, to such an extent that they have made a mockery of the exercise of democratic liberties. 69. I shall now speak of the events leading up to the revolutionary movement of 11 August. After the Macau meeting; certaingrave developments which occurred in Timor led to the formation of the Revolutionary Movement of 11 August. That Movement was subsequently joined by KOTA and Trabalhista. In the early part of July 1975 FRETILIN began a systematic campaign of terror and intimidation of the population. For instance, in the village of Aileu, a key-point controlling access to much of the southern part of the island, FRETILIN stationed groups of armed men who could thus regulate the’ traffic of people through ,the village, either on their waylto Dili or to the south. Those armed members of FRETILIN would authorize the passage only of those who could prove FRETILIN membership by displaying the party’s identity card; all those who were affiliated with other parties were forced to destroy their parties’ cards and ‘made to accept a new card attesting to membership in FRETILIN. Consequently, only those who agreed to accept the FRETILIN card were allowed to proceed to Diii, the capital of East Timor. Those who refused to accept FRETILIN membership were forced to return to theirvillages, taking with them the goods they had intended to sell in the market at Dili. 70. It also frequently happened that they were physically punished for their refusal. The purpose of those actions was to force the members of other parties to become members of FRETILIN against their will. These actions also resulted in a sharp reduction of the food supplies in the Dili market. The situation quickly became disastrous, for the supply,of essential products quickly became acutely short, and the prices of those still available skyrocketed. Food prices rose so high that most of the peopie of Dili were simply unable to pay them. 7 1. The local Government was fully aware of all these events but took no measures to improve the situation. 75. On 8 August UDT received information from a reliable source indicating that FRETILIN intended to follow up these activities by launching -an. armed coup some time around 15 August. It was clear that FRETILIN intended to seize power in the whole Territory of East Timor through this coup, which was the logical culmination of its earlier armed efforts. It was reported that FRETILIN intended to murder its chief opponents as part of the coup, and the leaders of opposing political parties, the Chinese and the people of mixed blood who were not supporters of FRETILIN. This would effectively eliminate all opposition in their attempt to secure total control of the territory. For the success of its coup FRETILIN was counting heavily on the help of its own members; who had been given extensive military training at Aileu by Major Costa Jonatas, the highest-ranking member of the Portuguese Army to give aid and guidance to FRETILIN. The involvement of Major Jonatas was *of great importance to FRETILIN, since it provided them with training not available to the members of the other parties and which they could not have received in any other way. 72. During the first days of August 1975 a number of FRETILIN supporters, led by Hamis Bassarewa, attacked the administrative post of Remexio, from which they stole arms and ammunition, including six Mauser rifles. They also detained the passengers of a truck there for 24 hours. These passengers included women and children, as well as some members of UDT. When the Governor learned of the attack, he dispatched a military force, to Remexio, which ‘released the prisoners. According to the commander of this force, however, it proved .impossible to apprehend the FRETILIN outlaws involved, who fled before the arrival of the police. 76. The Major maintained close contact with the leadership of FRETILIN, meeting frequently with them in his home in Dili from midnight until 4 or so in the morning. These contacts were supposed to be kept secret, but were detected and watched by members of UDT. As news of this intervention by members of the Pdrtuguese Army spread, the supporters of UDT, KOTA and Trabalhista, as well as some citizens not affiliated to any political party, demonstrated before the Government Palace on 8 August 1975, demanding the immediate expulsion of the two officers responsible, namely, Majors Costa Jonatas and Francisco Mota, from Timor. This demonstration lasted from the afternoon of 8 August until 1 o’clock the following morning, but did not produce any positive results. Since the Government had failed to respond to the demonstration, .on the following day, 9 August, the public services staff began a general strike which continued until 11 August. Their demand was the same: the immediate expulsion of the two majors from the Territory. 73. Between 1 and 8 August the leader of FRETILIN, Xavier do Amaral, announced at a series of assemblies held at Same, Maubissi and Hatu-Builiko that from then onwards he was himself assuming the authority of the Governor, and the Military Commander of Timor. At the same time he called for all FRETILIN supporters to muster at Turiscai. On 8 August Amarai was joined in Turiscai by about 5.000 men armed with metal weapons and bows and arrows. Despite the fact that the !ocal civil and military authorities had full first-hand evidence of what was going on, they made no move to stop Amaral and his followers from carrying out their plans to seize power by force, but left. them free to act as they liked. They quickly seized the opportunity open to them. On 9 August 1975 members of FRETILIN launched a hit-and-run attack on the administrative post of Laieia, and withdrew after stealing 6 more Mauser rifles. The villagers naturally suffered a good deal of fear from then on, since it was clear that the authorities either could not or would not protect them from FRETILIN.. 77. On the same day, since it was evident that the Government was either unable or unwilling to take the actions necessary to prevent an armed take-over by FRETILIN, UDT decided that it was imperative to take action in order’ to neutralize the predicted FRETILIN coup, then expected within the next three .74. In the period between 1 and 9August, FRETILIN had already gained control, during the hours of dark- 78. Owing to the fact that the Mohwnto of I I August made up of UDT, KOTA and .Trabalhista exercised control over the greater part of the Territory, the Governor of Timor, Colonel Lemos Pires, offered to transfer his powers to the leaders of the Mmvinento. These leaders declined the offer, as their reason for establishing the Movimento was not to obtain power but to enable the people of East Timor to exercise freely their inalienable right to self-determination. The main proposal. of the MmJrnento was also to prevent the recurrence of the evils brought about by both FRETILIN and the local Portuguese authorities. 79. Later developments clearly demonstrated that local military authorities had given their support to FRETILIN. These authorities threatened to fire all military personnel who dared to support the Modmenro. The commander of the military units of Atabai and Bobonaro even ,went so far as to threaten to take harsh measures against military personnel as well as the civilian population if they gave their support to the Mo~*im~nto. The Mouhwnto, which meanwhile was in full control of the city of Dili, handed over responsibility for the city to the Government on the condition that the local armed forces would remain neutral. The total negligence of the Portuguese forces, however, enabled some members of the local army who sided with FRETILIN to seize large quantities ‘of heavy armaments and ammunition, including 160 G-3 machine guns. The superiority of weapons obtained by FRETILIN through the negligence of the Portuguese forces finally enabled FRETILIN to take control of the Dili military headquarters and other military installations which contained approximately 20.000 rifles and 80 per cent of the heavy ammunition in the Territory, without meeting with any meaningful resistance. 80. The actions of FRETILIN led to the outbreak of general hostilities all over the city of Dili, which subsequently spread to other parts of the Territory. The Governor made some efforts to act as mediator between the warring parties, but without any success. The Indonesian Consul at Dili, however, managed to arrange, with the help of the commander of an lndonesian vessel, a temporary truce for the purpose of unloading food supplies for the population and of rescuing Timorese and non-Timorese civilians who wanted to flee the horrors of war. Countless atrocities were’committed by FRETILIN in this civil war. Let me just recount some of them. About 200 people, including.women and children, ‘were assassinated by FRETILIN at the s&r of Mau Lau in Maubisse. 81. The Portuguese Government withdrew to Atauro, an island near Dili, after having handed over to FRETILIN forces the control of the strategic points, which it had received from the Movinwnro, as related earlier. An exodus of thousands of people to Indonesian territory followed, owing to the total incapacity of the Government to guarantee their safety. The Govemment invited all the white staff to proceed to Atauro, in disregard of the sufferings of their Timorese staff. At Railaku and Likisa hundreds of people were murdered by FRETILIN. ‘About 40.000 refugees, Timorese-born and some Chinese, are living now in Indonesian territory with the financial support of the Indonesian Government. According to the monitoring system of the Mnvinwnto, in a communication from radio station BRAVO-Portuguese Government in Atauro-to radio station PERA-FRETILIN headquarters-the former recommended that FRETlLlN should unilaterally proclaim independence. 82. The atrocities committed by FRETILIN against the people of East Timor greatly strengthened the conviction of the Parties of UDT and Trabalhista that integration was the only available means of putting an end to the immeasurable suffering of the people, a course that would guarantee peace and social welfare for the people.,1 apologize for taking so much of the time of the Security Council, but to put the record straight I have to explain events which Mr. Horta tried to twist before the Council. 83. The desire for integration with Indonesia was not caused solely by FRETILIN ‘atrocities. The deep awareness of ethnic and cultural affinity existing between the people of East Timor and their Indonesian kinsmen has always evoked a deep desire on the part of the people of East Timor to reunite with their kin across the border. Almost five centuries of separation caused by Dutch and Portuguese colonialism has not been able to obliterate this deep desire. Ithas made it even more deeply feit and profound. 84. Four centuries of Portuguese colonialism has, furthermore, left East Timor not only underdeveloped 85. As a result of the Rome meeting on 1 November 1975 between the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Mr. Adam Malik, and the Foreign Minister of Portugal, Mr. Melo Antunes, a memorandum of understanding was issued reiterating their views with regard to the future political status of Portuguese Timor: In the memorandum Indonesia emphasized its respect for the right to self-determination of the people of Portuguese Timor, and reaffirmed the role of Portugal as administering Power in this respect. 86. However, Portugal stated ambiguously that it promised to carry out its responsibility and would organize a meeting which was to be attended by Portugal and all the political parties concerned. While Portugal had announced that such meeting was to be held at Darwin, Australia, it failed to explain clearly the date, circumstances and objectives of the meeting. For our part, we could not but regard Portugal’s commitments as merely a bluff aimed at obtaining concessions from the four political parties, which had previously relied on Portugal’s good intentions, to their regret. However, notwithstanding the fact that the problems and difficulties faced by APODETI, UDT, KOTA and Trabalhista resulted from political oppression and military brutalities committed by FRETILIN, we decided to respond with the best will. We, therefore, informed the Portuguese Government that we were ready to attend such a meeting at .Bali, Indonesia, instead of Darwin. The Portuguese Government has never stated its position in response to that proposal. 87. Suddenly, on 28 November, FRETILIN, in its characteristic way, proclaimed the unilateral independence of East Timor. Such an attitude on the part of FRETILIN can only be interpreted as complete disrespect for the inalienable right of the people of Portuguese Timor to self-determination. 88. With great reluctance and as a direct reaction to this flagrant action by FRETILIN, APODETI. UDT, KOTA and Trabalhista decided, on 30 November 1975, to proclaim the integration of Portuguese Timor with Indonesia. At the same time, we demanded that the Indonesian Government protect the lives and property of the people of Portuguese II 89. As we have stated previously, the Government of Portugal is responsible for the worsening developments in Portuguese Timor. Portuguese negligence and failure to prevent the oppressive acts of FRETILIN before 11 August and its moral and military support for that party cast further doubts on the sincerity of Portugal% commitment to promote a fair and even-handed process of decolonization. Had the Portuguese Government been more conscious of its responsibility towards the people of East Timor, and had it carried them out more faithfully, there can be no doubt that it would not have been necessary to bring this matter before the Security Council. 90. We do not believe that the people of Portugal would ever have sanctioned the undemocratic and improper procedures carried out by their officers against the fundamental rights of the people of Timor. At the present time, owing to our superhuman efforts on the battlefield, our parties effectively control all the territory of East Timor. We do not wish, however, to imitate FRETILIN and attempt to impose our ideas on the people by armed force despite our strong position. What we insist on is that the people of our country be able to exercise fully its right to self-determination. This is what we have fought for. We ,therefore wish to demand of the Security Council that the right of the people of East Timor to express its choice between independence and integration in a free manner be respected and implemented. 91. A referendum should be carried out and guarantees must be given by all the parties of East Timor that they will accept without any reservations or equivocations the results of the people’s choice thus freely expressed. We also fervently hope that the results of that vote and the right of .our people to decide its own destiny will .be strictly respected by all the nations of the world. The people ‘of Timor urgently need peace and time for the wounds inflicted by this tragic nightmare, into which, through no fault of our own, we have been plunged, to heal. I pray that God will help our people to attain these goals, and that .after so much suffering and sacrifice by the men, women and children of Timor we shall be able to smile once again. 92. The developments in Portuguese Timor, particularly those since August of this year, make it crystalclear that the Portuguese administration bears the full responsibility for the deterioration of conditions in the Territory. Its failure to stop the mounting toll of FRETILIN atrocities, a few of which I have detailed for the Council, and above all its inability to take action to thwart the planned FRETILIN coup, for which their advance evidence was overwhelming, constituted a total abdication of its responsibilities and rights as the administering Power-rights 93. Far from adhering to the neutral role demanded by its statutes as administering Power by devoting itself impartially to promoting the process of decolonization in the Territory, the Portuguese administration permitted some of its members, notably the Special Assistant of the Governor, Major Mota, to aid and encourage FRETILIN in its undemocratic efforts to impose its will on the majority of the people of Timor by armed force. Those Portuguese in positions of authority who did not actively assist FRETILIN took no effective action to prevent it from improperly gaining dominance. In the afermath of the fighting, the Portuguese Government completely abandoned the Territory. The Governor is now at Lisbon and the Acting Governor has left us for Australia. No attempt, however feeble, has been made to restore order to the Territory, so that the people can exercise its sacred right to self-determination in a meaningful way. 94. The Portuguese Government indeed has much to answer for at the bar of history concerning its conduct at the close of its role in Timor. Those of us who were left behind have had to pick up the pieces in an attempt to exercise our right to self-determination and to rebuild our shattered lives. The four combined political parties, which together represent the majority of the people of Timor, unquestionably have the right to seek aid from Indonesia, or from any other source, in order to restore peace and order to our land. Having done this, although we practically control the whole of the Territory and represent most of its .people, we have no wish to impede the process of decolonization. On the contrary, we strongly desire that the process be implemented and that all of the people of East Timor, including those who are members of FRETILIN, be able to,exercise freely their right to determine their own political future in the presence of representatives of the United Nations.

On behalf of the Security Council, I thank Mr. Martins for the statement he has made to the Council. In accordance with the Council’s usual procedure, I now ask him to withdraw from the Council table and resume the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber. I now invite the representative of Australia to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement. 96. ,Mr. HARRY (Australia): My delegation is grateful for the opportunity to make a short statement to the Council on the question of Portuguese Timor. We appreciate very much the courteous and skilful manner in which you, ‘Sir, are conducting the Council’s proceedings and we extend to you our full co-operation and best wishes in ‘your efforts to find a satisfactory solution to this problem. 97. The Australian Government and people have for several decades been concerned that, in the evolution 98. The history of East Timor in the period since the change of regime in Portugal has been recounted in varying detail by the representatives of Portugal, Indonesia and Malaysia, and by the representatives of the political parties. The Australian attitude to these events, including our view on the use of, force, has been stated by our. delegation in the Fourth Committee2 and in the plenary meeting of the General Assembly.-’ 99. We hope that the Security Council; instead of seeking to apportion blame for the situation which has arisen, will propose practical measures and actions with a view to enabling the -people of Portuguese Timor to exercise their right to self-determination and decide their own road to an independent future. The immediate requirement as we see it, is for a cease-fire, to spare the people of Timor further bloodshed and to create a climate in which a constructive programme of decolonization can be resumed. 100. Clearly, however, some time and organization will be needed before’ the actual process of selfdetermination can begin. Meanwhile it seems to us that we must avoid the creation of a vacuum or a retrogression into chaos in the Territory. There must be some effective civil authority to restore economic activity, to ensure the food supply, to arrange medical attention for the victims of the fighting and also to make the initial preparations for a subsequent act of self-determination. 101. Portugal has, of course, the continuing legal responsibility but since the Portuguese Government does not seem to be in a position to restore the framework of civil government even after fighting has ceased, or to make the administrative arrangements under which the people could freely exercise their choice, we must make the best of existing possibilities. Some United Nations presence is also clearly required to assist with arrangements for self-determination, and we are glad to note that this is desired by all the parties concerned, including Indoneha. The practical question which faces the Council is what type of United Nations presence would be appropriate, and how soon conditipns on the spot will have returned sufficiently to normal for a United Nations mission to begin work. iO2. The Australian delegation takes it for granted that the Council will require a cessation of hostilities and that a cease-fire will be observed. We are also confident that the Indonesian elements will withdraw as soon as fighting between the political parties has ceased. 103. It is regrettable that the various political parties, whose representatives are now appearing before the 109.. I shall not remind the Council again of the efforts made by the Government of Portugal to carry out the process of decolonization of Timor s’uccessfully, in accordance with the principles of the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, in particular the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). But I wish to emphasize that my Government, bearing in mind the specific circumstances of this case, has always been in close contact with the Jakarta authorities-in vain, as everyone.can note. Indonesia has chosen to exercise a negative influence on the parties closest to it and that in order to justify, if need be, the use of force in the Territory. I 104. I have said that some form of United Nations presence is clearly required, but it is difficult, in view of the sometimes conflicting ‘information as to the precise situation in Timor, to determine what would be the appropriate form and dimension of United Nations involvement, and the right timing. The Australian delegation feels that the best course might be, as a first step, for the Secretary-General to be asked to appoint a special representative who could consult with the parties principally concerned, both in New York and on the spot, and who could recommend further action. Such action might be by the Council, which will, we assume, remain seized of the question; or if, as we hope, hostilities quickly cease and security is restored, it might be possible for responsibility to be assumed by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples under its mandate from the General Assembly. 1 IO. As.‘he did before in the General Assembly, here once again the representative of. Indonesia invoked the “criminal negligence” of the Portuguese authorities in regard to the events which have taken place on the Territory of Timor. My delegation is sincerely astonished. at the speed with which the delegation of Indonesia changes its mind on, the action of Portugal and as regards Timor. In the opinion of the Government of Jakarta, “the positive attitude of the administering Power”-according to the draft resolution of which Indonesia was a sponsor on 3 Decembeti-has now become “criminal negligence” simply in order to justify the Indonesian, invasion of Timor. 105. The representative of Malaysia suggested yesteri day [/8641/r r~eetin~] that the countries of the region may have a special responsibility in assisting the administering Power. The Australian delegation endorses the principle of this approach but would like to see what sort of action the Council may have in mind to give effect. to such a principle. Meanwhile the Australian Government, as it has already informed the administering Government and Indonesia, stands ready to resume its humanitarian aid and the facilitation of appropriate international aid to the distressed people in Timor, while continuing, of course, its assistance to the many hundreds of people who have sought in Australia refuge from the fighting. 111. The representative of Indonesia has affirmed that UDT, APODETI and the other groups in favour of the integration of Portuguese Timor with Indonesia represent the majority of the population of the Territory. In so far as no plebiscite of any kind has taken place, we may observe that Indonesia has a very curious conception of the self-determination of a people, since it believes that the reply can be known before the question is even put. Such an attitude, which clearly reveals the partiality of Indonesia as to the political future of Timor, proves how dangerous and harmful it would have been for Portugal to appeal -to Indonesia for the restoration of “peace and order”4. I 112. ‘I believe, in fact, that there is no doubt in anyone’s mind, least of all after the events of these last days, that any intervention by Indonesia in Portuguese Timor would have been aimed essentially at the achievement of ,its own designs over that Territory. It, is therefore difficult to challenge the fact that if Portugal refrained from appealing to Indonesia to intervene to settle problems pertaining to order and the preservation of calm in Timor-problems the existence of which is not in doubt and which we 106. In conclusion, I would once. again emphasize; as indeed the General Assembly did in its resolution 3485 (XXX), that the purpose and aim of the United Nations, underlying any action which the Council may decide, is to enable the people of the .Territory freely to exercise their right to self-determination. The main question now is to establish conditions in which the people of Timor can make its own free, choice.

The representative of ,Portugal has asked to speak in exercise of his right of reply and accordingly I now call on him. 108. Mr. GALVAO TELES (Portugal) (inturpretqtionfiw99 French): I have listened most attentively to 113. We have furthermore observed with pleasure, after the statement today of the representative of UDT, that the people of .Timor has not decided in favour of the integration of that Territory with Indonesia and that, for this reason, that Party is prepared to accept a plebiscite for the free exercise of the right to self-determination and independence. 114. It is therefore the hope of Portugal that the policy of decolonization which we have proposed may yet be applied, with the agreement of all the parties concerned, the more so since it is obvious, after the statements made this morning before the Council, that the positions of those parties are, after all, rather different from one another, since only one of those representatives took up a defence of the position of Indonesia. The acts of that country have been and are, unfortunately, of a different kind. 115. The recent evolution of events in Timor, moreover, enables us better to understand the various steps taken by Indonesia so as to prepare the intervention which was carried out a few days ago. It leads us to conclude-to use the imagery employed by the representative of Indonesia-that Indonesia has not only set fire to everything in Timor (and the image of a famous pyromaniac firefighter inevitably comes to mind), that it has not only done everything in its power so that things would come to such a point in order that the selfless mission of a voluntary firefighter that it claims to be carrying out would appear to be justified, but that it has even constantly acted so as to prevent others from being able to extinguish the fire. Litho in UnitcdNationr, New York 00300 82-6 1202-December 1983- 2,200 117. Can we really believe that Indonesia intervened impartiahy and objectively in the internal affairs of Timor? Certainly not. And if any doubt should still subsist, the latest news concerning the official annexation of the enclave of Ocussi-Ambenu would dispel that doubt completely.

I call on the representative of Indonesia. 119. Mr. ANWAR SANI: I should only like to reserve the right of my delegation to reply to these latest remarks made by the representative of PortugaL In fact, I would have referred to my own statement once again and to the statements which have been made by the representatives of the parties this morning, but I thought it would be good to reply to the representative of Portugal in the way his statement merits. So I should like to reserve my right to reply to the Portuguese remarks at the next meeting of the Council. The meeting rose rrt I .I0 p.m. I See General Assembly resolution 3485 (XXX). z See Ojj%ial Rrcords ofthe Gmrrul Asstmhly, Thirtieth Srssicm. Forrrfh Committcv, 2178th. 2185th and 2188th meetings. 3 ibid., 77Grtkth &r&m. Pl~nn~y Matings, 2439th meeting. 4 Ibid.. 7hirtirth Session, Anrw.ws. agenda item 88, document A/10426, para. 8.