S/PV.193 Security Council

Besides. the two amendments. to the Brazilian resolution which have already been circulated, a third amendment has now been presented by the representative of Australia [document S/516]. It reads as follows: Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): En plus des deux amendements a la resolution du Bresil qui ont,deja ete distribues,le representant de l'Australie vientd'en presenter un troisieme [document S/516], dont voici le texte: . "Paragraph 2: For 'Noting' read 'Considering'. "Paragraphe 2: Remplacer "Prenant acte" par "Considerant". "Paragraph 3: For 'Recommends' to read 'Invites'. "Paragraphe 3: Remplacer "Q.ecommande" par "Invite". "Sub-paragraph 3 (a): Mter 'To resume direct negotiations' add: 'Which; in so far as they affect the future of the Sudan, should include consultation \\ith the Sudanese'." "Alinea 3 a): Apres "de reprendre les negociations directes", ajouter, "qui, dans la meSUI'e ou elles affectent le Soudan, devraient comprendre une consultation avec les Soudanais." When the next meeting on this question is held, the members will have had time to consider the Australian amendment and will be prepared to speak on it as well as on the other two amendments. D'ici la prochaine seance consacree a la question, les membre:; du Conseil auront eu le temps d'etudier cet amendement, et ils seront prets aformuler leurs obseravtioils it son sujet, ainsi qu'au sujet des deuX autres amendements apportes a la resolution du Bresil. . The next meeting on this question will be held next Tuesday at 3 p.m. Laprochaine seance relative a cette question se tiendra mardi prochain it 15 heures.. 332. Continuation of the discussion on the Indonesian question. ' 332. Suite de la discussion sur la question indonesienne At the invitation of the President, Mr. Pillai, representative of India,. Mr. Sjahrir, Ambassadorat-large of the Republic of Indonesia,. Mr. van Kleffens, representative of the Netherlands, and General ~omulo, representative of the Philippines, .took thezr seats at the Council table. Sur l'tnvitation du President, M. Pillai, representant de l'Inde,. M. Sjahrir, Ambassadeur de la Republique d'Indonesie,. M. van Kleffens, repre- ' sentant des Pays-Bas, et le general Romulo, representant des Pliilippines, prennent place a la table du Conseil. . "Decides to invite the repre~entatives of East Inc' '1esia and Borneo to participate in the work of the. Security Council on the' same basis as the representatives of the Republic of Indonesia." I mentioned this morning that another'proposal of this nature, expressing exactly the same idea, was rejected by the Council at its one hundred and .eighty-fourth meeting1• I do not know whether the representative of Belgium will insist on having the matter put. to the vote again. He referred in his. speech this morning to the fact that the question of inviting a representative of t.l],e Philippines to the Council table had been reconsidered. It is true that that proposal was reconsidered after having once been rejected2, but that was done on the.basis of the fact that the representative of the Philippines brought forth new reasons to prove that the interests of his country, in the language of Article 31 of the Charter, were "specially affected"s. Those reasons had not been presented when the request was first made to the Security Council at its one hundred and seventy-eighth meeting2. There is no provision in our rules of procedure which specifiel> whether or not rejected resolutions can be put to the vote again. Generally speaking, however, according to the rules of procedure of internatior:al organs, rejected resolutions cannot be voted on again. Nevertheless, since our rules of procedure make no reference to the question, I shall put the Belgian resolution to the vote if the representative of Belgium insists upon it. . Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated from French): Doubts were expl:.essed this morning in regard to the regularity of the resolution which the Belgian delegation submitted to the iJouncil at the one hundred and eighty-fourth meeting on 14 August, proposing that the representatives of East Indonesia and Borneo should be invited to take part in the Security Council's work. That is why I have submitted a new resolution, but it is not the only reason why I ask the President to put this new resolution to the. vote. If the text of the resolution submitted by the Belgian delegation on 14 August is compared with the one I submitted this morning, it will be found that1t is different. The new text provides that after the representatives of East Indonesia and Borneo have been invited to take part in the Security Council's work, they shall be placed on the same footing as the representatives of the Indonesian Republic. In this connexion, ! should like to emphasize that East Indonesia and Borneo, by virtJ.1p. of an rgreement which has been concluded, are to become members of the future United States of Indonesia on an equal footing with the Indonesian Republic. Under those conditions, it seems to be difficult to maintain that they could not make a useful contribution to this debate, after we have admitted the Republic of Indonesia and the Philippines. «Decide d'inviter les representants de l'Indonesie orientale,et de Borneo a partidper a ses travaux dans les memes conditions queles representants de la Republique d'Indonesie." J'ai rappele, ce matin, qu'une autre proposition du meme ordre exprimant exactement la meme idee avait ete rejetee par le Conseil au cours de sa cent-quatre-vingt-quatrieme seance1; Je na sais pas si le representant de la Belgique insistera pour un nouveau vote a ce sujet. Il a invoque dans son discours le fait que la question de l'invitation d'un representant des Philippines a prendre place a la table du Conseil a ete examinee a nouveau. I1 est exact que cette proposition a ete examinee a nouveau apres avoir ete rejetee une premiere fois2, mais c'etait du fait que le representant des Philippines avait mis' en avant de nouvelles raisons pour demontrer que les interets de son pays etaient, suivant la formule de l'Article 31 de la Charte, "particulierement affectes3".Ces taisons n'avaient pas ete exposees lors de la presentation primitive de la requete au Conseil de securite, lors de la cent soixante-quinzieme seance2• . Il n'existe dans notre reglement interieur aucune disposition precisant si les resolutions qui ont ete rejetees peuvent ou non faire l'objet d'un nouveau \vote. Mais, en general,· d'apres les reglements interieurs des organismes internationaux, les resolutions qui ont ete rejetees ne peuvent pas etre mises de nouveau aux voix. Neansmoins, notre reglement interieul) ne contenant rien a ce sujet, si le representant de la Belgique insiste, je' mettrai aux voix son projet de resolution. M. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgique): Des doutes ont ete emis ce matin au sujet du caractere regulier de la resolution que la delegation belge avait soumise au Conseil au cours de sa cent-quatre-vingtquatrieme seance le 14 aout, resolution tendant a inviter les representants de l'Indonesie orientale et de Borneo aparticiper aux travaux du Conseil de securite. C'est dans ces conditions que j'ai presente une nouvelle resolution mais ce n'est pas la seule raison pour' laquelle je prie le President de bien vouloir presenter et mettre aux' voix cette nouvelle resolution. Si on compare le texte de la resolution que la delegation belge avait presentee le 14 aofit acelui que j'ai soumis ce matin, on constatera qu'il est different. Le nouveau texte precise que les representants de l'Indonesie orientale et de Borneo, invites a participer aux travaux du Conseil de securite, seront places sur le meme pied que les representants de la Republique de l'Indonesie. A ce propos, je voudrais souligner que l'Indonesie orientale et Borneo sont appeles, en vertu d'un accorli qui a ete conclu,.a devenir members des ~u; turs Etats-Unis d'Indonesie sur un pied d'egali~e avec la Republique d'Indonesie. Dans ces conditions, il me parrot difficile de soutenir qu'ils n'ont aucune contribution utile a apporter a ce debat, . apres avoir admis la Republique d'Indonesie et les Philippines a y participer. The same old proposal to invite the same representatives is now put forward in a slightly modified form. That is the first comment I want to make. My second comment is that I should like to draw the Security Council's attention once again to the fact that it is a question of inviting people who directly, openly and officially are defending the Netherlands which is carrying out military operations against the Indonesian people and against the Indonesian Republic. At the one hundred and eighty-fourth meeting I read out the official text received from the authorities which sent these representatives. The Netherlands representative calls them a Government. If we are going to call them a Government, then we are dealing with a document received from that Government. This document frankly states that they support the Netherlands' action directed against the Indonesian Republic. Tb at is the kind of people we are con- . sidering inviting. Comme seconde observation, je voudrais attirer encore une fois I'attention du Conseil de securite sur le fait qu'il est question d'inviter des persoimes qui prennent directement, ouvertement et officie1- lement la de£ense des Pays-Bas alors que ceux-ci menent des operations militaires contre le peuple indonesien, contre la Republique d'Indonesie. Au cours de la cent-quatre-vingt-quatrieme seance, j'ai lu un texte officie1 emanant des autorites qui ont envoye ces representants. Le representant des Pays-Bas donnea ees autorites le nom de Gouvernement. Si nous 2 cceptons ce terme, il s'agit alors d'un document e,nanant de ce Gouvernement. Dans ce document, il est dit clairement que ces autorites approuvent l'action entreprise par les Pays-Bas contre la Republique d'Indonesie. Te1s sont les hommes que 1'0n se propose d'inviter. Thirdly, the invitation of these people by the Security Council can in no way be justified by rule 39 of the rules of procedure as this covers invitations to members of the Secretariat or other private individuals. I do not think that in considering the I:qdonesian question the Security· Council is interested in hearing the opinion of experts or individuals. It is interested in hearing the opinion ofGovernments and of peoples, but not of individuals and private persons. I repeat, rule 39 of the rules of procedure provides for the invitation of private persons and not of representatives of Governments. Troisieme .observation: L'article 39 du reglement interieur ne peut etre invoque en aucun cas pour justifier l'invitation de ces personnes par le Conseil de securite, car, dans cet article, il est question d'inviter des membresdu Secretariat ou d'autres personnes privees. Je pense que, en ce qui concerne l'examen de la question indonesienne, le Conseil de securite n'a pas interet a entendre l'avis d'experts, 1'0pinion de particuliers. Il a interet a ecouter l'avis des Gouvernements, l'opinion des peuples et non celle de particuliers, de personnes privees. A l'artic1e 39 du reglement interieur, je le' repete, il est question d'inviter des personnes privees, et non pas les representants d'un Gouvernement. Finally, my last comment is as follows: an invitaJ:ion to these representatives would, in itself, be eqUlvalent to reducing the political significance of our decision with regard to the invitation of the representatives of the Indonesian Republic. It is no.t ~ ~atter of raising these representatives by this lDYItation to the rank in which the Security Cot;ncI1 placed the representatives of the IndoneSIan Republic when it decided to invite them, but o~ reducing our decision to invite the representatives of the Government of the Indonesian Republic to the level of an invitation to individual persons whose opinions we are asked to hear. Enfin, ma derniere observation sera la suivante: en invitant ces representants, nous diminuerons la portee poIitique de notre decision d'inviter lesrepresentants de la Republique d'Indonesie. Ce qu'on nous propose, ce n'est pas d'elever par cette invitation les representants de l'Indonesie orientale au rang ou le Conseil a place les representants de la Republique d'Indonesie en de~idant de les inviter; c'est de reduire l'invitation adressee aces derniers a la valeur d'une invitation adressee a des personnes privees dont on voudrait que nous ecoutions l'avis. . For these reasons I cannot support the proposal put forward by the Belgian representative.. .... ".........."'"- Pour toutes ces raisons, je ne puis approuvet la proposition qui nous est soumise par le. representant de la Belgique. Had the Belgian representative' worded his resolution otherwise and asked for an invitation under rule 39 of the rules of procedure, giving the full' names of those who should be invited and the capacity in which th~y could help us, I belleve there would be reason to review the matter. I really regret that the Belgian representative raised the question again.

With regard to' this new resolution, the Syrian delegation also does not find any reason to chan~e the attitude'it previously took with regard to a resolution of the same nature. I shall now put the Belgian resolution to the vote. A vote was taken by.ashow of hands. There were 4 vote~ in favour and 7 abstentions. The resolution was not adopted, having failed to obtain the affirmative votes of seven members. Votes for: Belgium, France, United Kingdom, United States of America. .Abstentions.: Australia, Brazil, China,' Colombia" Poland, Syria, Union of Soyiet Socialist ~epublics. Sir·,Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): I want to, say only one word. I think, unless I misunderstood" him, that the representative of the OSSRgave as one of his reasons for not adn).itting the representatives of these two territories the fact that they would be witnesses for the defence. That seems to me,a most curious reason for excluding witnesses. ltis never done in my country. I hop~ it will not be understoodthat the Council endorsed that as one,of its reasons.

I do not think there is any reason for that remark because there is no evidence that the Council has accepted this as a reason. There is no decision from the Council to that effect. It is the opinion of the representative ofthe USSR. He is free to express his opinion. Colonel' HODGSON (Australia): I had gathered that the President ruled at least ten days ago that· he had no further speakers onbis list, that the geheral debate was concluded !indche was going to discuss the Australian resolution which is contained in document S/4881• But I noticed, particularly this morning, that the general debate has started Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): I1 me semble que le President avait declare, voici au'moins dix jours, qu'il n'y avait plus d'orateur inscrit, que la discussion generale ~tait terminee et que nous allions aborder l'examen de la resolution de l'Australie contenue dans le document 8/4881• Mais j'at remarque, en particu- Before I speak of the actual amendments themselves, I must say that it was a matter of regret to me this morning that the members of this Council were personally attacked by the representative of the Netherlands. It was a personal attack to the following effect: "All the members of the Council have done plays into the hands of the extremists ... The members of the Council chose the illusion ... The members of the Council only take seriously the Jogjakarta radio; that is all they listen to ... Some members,of this Council allow themselves to 'become the dupes of such people." I think that is unfortunate language because we are here in our capacity as representatives of responsible Governments distributed over' a wide geographical area and those statements are, in effect leveIed at our respective Governments. I shall say no more on that point. .As to the original proposal, that is to say, the. Australian resolution, as we explained in our last statement at the one hundred and eighty-seventh meeting!, it had two objectives: first, to deal with the immediate or short-term problem, and secondly ,to propose a long-term solution, that is, the pacific settlement of this dispute. . ,As regards the first objective, certain amendments were proposed. The Chinese representative submitted the main one2 which, in our opinion, did not meet the urgency of the present situation. So, as the President suggested at the' one hundred and eighty-seventh meetirig, the representative of China and I held consultations, together with the representative of Poland, and the representative of China and I agreed-and if my final iinpression is correct the representative of. Poland also agreed, with one reservation in regard to the original Australian resolution-on the composition of the Security Council commissions, I refer to the commission to observe and report on the situation in Indonesia as the mstrument of this Council. The representative 3 The following is the text of the joint Australian-Chinese draft resolution: Document S/513 22 August 1947 [Original text: English] Whereas the Security Council on 1 August 1947 called Upon the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia to cease hostilities forthwith, and Whereas communications have been received from th,~ Governments of the Netherlands and of the Republic of Indonesia advising that orders have been given for the cessation of hostilities, and R;herlfas it is desirable that steps should be taken to avoId dIsputes and friction relating to the observance of the cease fire orders, and to create conditions which will facilitate agreement 1>etween the parties, 3 Voici le texte du projet de resolution commun 'de l'AustraIie et de la Chine. Document S/513 22 aoiit 1947 , [Texte original en anglais] Attendu que le Conseil de securite a invite, le 1er aoiit 1947,les Pays-Bas et la, Republique d'Indonesie a cesser immediatement les hostilites, Attendu que des communications ont ete rel;ues des Gouvemements des Pays-Bas et de la RepubIique d'Iudonesie, faisant savoir que des ordres ont ete donnes en vue de la cessation des hostiIites, Attendu qu'iI est souhaitable que des mesures soient prises pour eviter tout differend et tout desaccord a propos de l'execution des ordres de cesser le feu, et pour cre~r des conditions qui faciliteront la' conclusion d'un accord entre les Pilrties, Le .conseil de securite 1. Prend acte avec satisfaction des mesures prises par les deux parties pour se conformer a la resolution du 1er aoiit 1947; . The security Council 1. Notes with satisfaction the steps taken by the parties to comply with the resolution of 1 August 1947; Avant de parler des amendements eux-memes, je dois dire que j'ai deplore ce matin les attaques personnelles dont les membres de ce CoIisell ont ete 1'objet de la part du representant des Pays-Bas. C'est bien d'une attaque personnelle qU'il 's'agissait puisqu'elle etait dirigee de la fa~on smvante: "Tous les actes du Conseil fopt le jeu del' extremistes . " . Les membres du Conseil preferent se payer de mots ... Le Conseil ne prend au serieux que la radio de Dokjakarta; il n'ecoute qu'elle ... Certains membres du Conseil de securite se lcissent duper par ces gens.;.la." . C'e~t la, me sembJe-t-il, un langage extremement regrettable, car nous SG~es ici enqualite de rep:cesentants de Gouvernements responsables, l'epar- Os sur une large superficiedu globe, et de telles declarations sont, en fait, dirigees contre nos Gouvernements respectifs. Je n'en dirai pas plus sur ce sujet. ' Quant au texte primitif de la resolution de l'Australie ainsi que je vous le disais dans ma derniere declaration a la' cent-qu::i.tre-vingt-septieine seance!, il avait deux buts: le premier etait de ,regler le probleme immediat et a breveecheance, et le second, de proposer une resolution a plus lointaine ,echeance, c'est-a-dire le reglement pacifique ,de ce differend. En ce qui concerne le pi'emier de Ct<s objectifs, ceitains amendements ontete proposes.. Le representant de la Chine a soumis le principal de ces amendements2 lequel, a mon avis, ne'repond pas au caractere d'urgence de la situation actuelle. Aussi, conformement a. la suggestion faite par le Presidentau cours de la cent-quatre-vingt-septieme seance, le represent~nt de la Chine et moi sommes entres en consultation avec le representant de la Pologne. Le representant de la Chine et moi sommes d'accord, et, si ma c:Ierniere impression est ex.:lcte, le representant de la Pologne est egalement cl'accord, a l'exception d'une reserve qu'il formule a l'egard de la resolution originale de l'Australie, quant a la composition de la Commission du Conseil de securite3, c'est-a-dire la commission chargee d'obsez:rer et de rendre compte en tant qu'organe . 'Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securitt!, Deuxieme Annee, No. 79. "Ibid., No ,79, document S/488/Add.2. The second resolution deals with a proposal for arbitration. The represe~tativeofPo!and indicated tllis is his amendment2• We think his amendment should be considered first. The difference between his proposal and the Australian proposal is that his is a straight proposal for the appointment of three arbitrators by the Security Council. He will no doubt explain that in good time himself. 'rhe Australian proposal is a proposal for each party to the dispute to appoint an arbitrator and for the Security Council-in order that it shall retain general'control-to appoint the third. That is the Australian proposal. In addition, we have before us the United States proposal contained in document S/514 which, instead of speaking of them as arbitrators, contains an idea similar to that contained in the: Australian ,2. Notes with satisfaction the, statement issued by the Netherlands Government on 11 August, in which it affirms it& intention to organize, a sovereign, democratic United States of Indonesia in accordance with the pur· . poses of the Linggadjati Agreement; 3. Notes that the Netherlands Government intends immediately to request ,the career consuls stationed in Batavia jointly to report on the present situation in the Republic of Indonesia; 4;. Notes that the Government of the Republic of Indonesia has requested appointment by the Security Council of·a commission .of observers; 5. Requests the Governments members of the 'Council which have career consular representatives in Batavia to L1Struct them to prepare jointly for the information and gnidance of the Security Council rep'orts on the situation in the Reeublic of Indonesia following the resolution of the CouncIl on 1 August 1947, such reports to cover the observance of the cease-fire orders and the conditions prevailing in areas under military 9c£upation or from wliicharmed forces .now in occupation may be withdrawn by agreement between the parties; . 6. Requests the Governments of the Netherlands and oil the Republic o~ Indonesia to grant to the representatives referred to !n .paragraph 5, all facilities necessary for the effective fulfilrilent of their mission, 7. Resolves to consider the matter further should the situation require. 1 The following is ;:he text of the Australian' draft resolution: Document-1l/512 22 August 1947 [Original'text: English] Whereas the'Security Council on 1 August 1947, called upon. the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia to se~tle theiJ; disputes by arbitration ocby other peae-, -1 means, :and keep .the Security Cound infouled about the progress of the settlement; and" , Whereas it is desirable that n~gotiations should com-. mence as soon as po~sible with a view to a just and lasting settlement; , The Security Council Requests. the Governments of the Netherlands and of the Republic of Indonesia.to submit all DJattersin dispute between them .to arbitration by a commission consisting of one arbitrator selected by the Government 0: the Republic of Indonesia, one by the Government of the Netherlands, and one by the Security Council. . Cette seconde res<;>lution porte sur une proposition d'arbitrage. Le representant de la Pologne I'a indique dans son amendement2• Je pense que c'est cet amendement qui doit etre examine le premier.La difference qui existeentre sa1Jroposition et la proposition de I'Australie, est qu'il suggere directement que le Conseil de securite nomme trois arbitres. I1 l'expliquera sans aucun doute luimeme en temps voulu. La proposition d!" l'Australie tend a. ce que chaque partie au 'differend nomme un arbitre et a ce que le Conseil de securite nomme le troisieme, conservant ainsi son droit de.controle general. Telle est la proposition, de l'Ausfralie. En outre, nous sommes saisis d'une proposition de la' delegation des Etats-Unis contenue dans le document S/514 et qui, au lieu de parler d'arbitres, contient une idee semblable a celle de la 2. Prend acte avec sataisfaction de la declaration du n aot'it par la<{uelle le Gouvernement des· Pays-Bas af· firme son intention d'organiser les Etats-Unis d'Indonl!sie, Etat souverainet d6nocratique, comme le prevoit l'Accord de Linggadjati; 3. Prend acte de l'intention du Gouvemement des Pays- Bas d'inviter immediatement les consuls de carnere en poste a Batavia a faire conjointement rapport sur la situation elcistant actue!lement dans la Republique d'Indonesie; 4. Prend acte du fait que le Gouvernement de la Republique d'Jndonesie a demande l'institution par le Con· seil de securite d'une commission d'observation; , 5. Invit~les Gouvernements des Etats Membres du Co!!Sei~ qui ont des representants consulaires de carriere a Batavia a, donner pour instructions a ccs representants d'elal::orer ensemble, pour infOlrmer et eclairer le Conseil de securite, des rapportssur la situation existant dam la Republique d'Indonesie, conformement a la resolution du Conseil en date dri ler aoll.t 194:7, ces rapports devant porter sur l'execution des ordres de cesser le feu et sur les conditions regnant dans 'les regions occupees militairement, ou desquelles pouITont ~tre retirees, par accord entre les parties; des, forces armees actuellement en occupation; 6. Invite 1es Gouvemements des Pays-Bas et de la Republique d'Indonesie a accorder aux representants mentionnes au paragraphe 5 toutes les facilites necessaires au bon accomplissement de leur mission, 7. Decide de poursuivre l'examen de l'affaire si la situation l'exigeait. " 1Voici le texte du projet de resolution de l'Australie: Document S/512 22 aoll.t 1947 [Texte original en angiais] Attendu que, le 1er a04t 1947, le Conseil de securite a demande aux Pays-Bas et a la Republique d'Indonesie de regIe): leur differend par voie d'arbitrage ou llutres moyens pacifiques et de temr le Conseil au courant des progres realises dans cc sens,. Attendu qU'il est souhaitab1e que des negociations commencent aussitotaue possible en vue d'un reglement juste et durable de, cc CUfferend, Le Conseil de securite Invite les Gouvernements des Pays-Bas et de la Rep~bI!que d'Indonesie a s0l!mettre a l'arbitrage d:!.!ne commISSIon composee de trOIS membres, l'un ChOlSI par le _Gouvernement de la Republique d'Indom!sie, l'autre par le GOUvernement des' Pays-Bas et le troisieme par l~ Conseil de securite, tous les motifs de differenes qlU peuvent les oppo~. I just wanted to make my position clear with regard to the actual amendments and the procedure to be adopted. We think the proposals or the amendments themselves are self-explanatory and require no further observations fmm my delegation.

Before proceeding to a vote on this resolution, we shall hear the representatives of the following countries who appeal' on the list of speakers: the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Republic of Indonesia and Poland. . Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America): The Council may recall that at the one hundred and eighty~seventh meeting, I informed the Council that I had no informatioil from my. Government to indicate that we had a definite reply from the Republic of Indonesia with respect to our offer of good offices. We had received uncertain and ambiguous replies on two occasions, ana my Government asked its representative to return again with an enquiry. As a result of this last enquiry, it is entirely clear that the Government of Indonesia has. rejected the offer of good offices from the United States. My Government and the United States delegation regret that this is so. The United States delegation is very glad to support the first of the two resolutions presented by the representative of Australia, that is to say document 8/513. . As I have had occasion to mention once before to the Council,.my Government's view is that there are two very definite and different aspects of the question before the Council. The first relates to the problems·which arise in connexion with the cessation of hostilities. My Government believes that the Security Council acted properly and in entire conformity with the Charter in calling upon the parties to cease hostilities. We consider that, so far as the Charter is concerned, paragraph (ar of the Council's resolution of 1 August 19471, is a provisional measure under Article 40. In our view that decision was properly taken and did not prejudice the contentions of -the parties with regard to . ~hether· or not the Indonesian Republic was an mdependent State under international law. In our view, the Council's jurisdiction :rested on ~e fact that large-scale hostilities were being carned on in Indonesia, the repercussions .of which ~ere sos.erious that they aIllounted to a threat to International peace and security. ----- .1 See .official . Records of the Security Council, Second Year, N~. 72, document 8/459. b Je voulais simplement exposer clairement ma position a l'egard des amendements eux-memes et en ce qui concerne la procedure a aclopter. Ma delegation estime que les propositions ou les amendements s'expliquent d'eux-memes et qu'il est inutile qu'elle presente de nouvelles observations a leur sujet. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais):" Avant de proceder a un vote sur cette resolution, il nous reste encore aentendre, inscrits sur la liste, les representants des pays suivants: Etats-Unis d'Amerique, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, Republique d'Indonesie et Pologne. M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais): Le Conseil se souviendra peut-etre que, au cours de la cent-quatre-vingt-septieme seance, j'ai informe le Conseil que je n'avais re~u de mon Gouvernementaucun renseignement me permettant de dire que nous avions obtenu une reponse definitive de la part de la Republique d'Indonesie relativement a notre offre de bons offices. Nous avons re~u, a deux reprises, des reponses vagues et ambigues, et mon Gouvernement avait charge son representant d'aller solliciter a nouveau un eclaircissement. A la suite de cette derniere demarche, il apparait tout afait clairement que le Gouvernement d'Indonesie rejette l'offre de bons offices des Etats-Unis.. Mon Gouvernettlent et la, delegation des Etats-Unis regrettent qu'il en soit ainsi. La delegation des Etats-Unis est tres heureuse d'appuyer la premiere des deux resolutions soulllises par le representant de l'Australie, c:est-a-dire .. cel1e qui figure au docm:;nent S/51:1. . Comme j'ai eu l'occasion de le declarer precedemment au Conseil, mon Gouvemement est d'avis que la question dont le Conseil est. saisi presente deux aspects bien definis et tres differents. Le pre-· mier est relatif aux problemes souleves par la cessation des hostilites. Mon Gouvernement estime que c'est a juste titre et en pleme conformite de la· Charte que le Conseil de securite a demande aux parties de mettre fin aux hostilite.~. Nousconsiderons que la mesure prevue au paragraphea} de la resolution adoptee le ler aout 19471 par le Conseil constitue, pour ce qui est de la Charte, l'une des mesures provisoires visees a l'Article 40. A notre avis, le Conseil a eu raison de prendre une telle decision sans prejudice des. pretentions des parties quant a la question de savoir si Ja Republique· d'Indonesie est un Etat independant aux termes CIu droit international. - . A notre avis, la competence du Conseil se.trouve motivee par le deroulement,. en Indonesie, d',opera~ tions de grande envergure ayant des repercussions si serieuses qu'elles en aiTivent a constituer une menace a la paix et ala securite internationales. It is hardly necessary for me to emphasize the seriousness with which my Government would view a failure by the parties to comply with the Council's cease-fire order. Of course in such event the Council would, under Article 40, have to take' such Jailure into account in considering further action. We had hoped that the provisional. measure which the Security Council took in issuing its cease-fire order on 1 August 1947 would result in action by the parties which would clearly indicate that hostilities had, in fact, ceased and that a situation had been created in which the parties could adjust their difficulties by peaceful means. There have, however, been reports from both sides that acts of violence in the area have conti~ued and which indicate'that immediate supervision of the Council's cease-fire order by an impartial agency appointed by the Council is desirable and may be essential to maint~n peace. It is the view of the United States delegation that the machinery suggested by the representative of Australia in the resolution to which I have. referred will give the Council facilities for undertaKing' this supervision immediately. It is clear that establishing effective supervision of the Council's cease-fire order will present a large and probably difficult problem. It will necessitate the fullest possible consultation with, and assistance from, both parties. There may be wide areas involved. It takes no great imagination to realize that there will be points of possible difficulty and friction at many places. These points may be widely separated from each other andsome of them will undoubtedly have poor communications. . The number of observers required to uI;ldertake such a task may be considerable. They will need communications facilities, transportation and supplies. They may need protection. It is obvious that .'considerable expense and an important organizational problem are involved. These considerations are me~tioned because they affect the.time element and the action we have a right to expect from the parties on th~ spot. Again I repeat that, in our opinion, the presence of career consuls in Batavia will furnish the nucleus for this supervision.' These men are on the spot. If the Council passes this resolution they will undoubtedly be appropriately instructed by their re!lpective Governments and wil1be able to organize this supervision immediately.' ' \ do~nera au Conseil les moyens de mettre immediatement cette mesure a execution. L'establissement d'une surveillance relative a l'execution de l'ordre de cesser le feu donne par le Conseil est, de toute evidence, un probleme d'envergure, d'tme solution probablement difficile. Il faudra engager avec les parties les plus larges consultations possibles et solHciter d'elles la plus totale collaboration. J Les territoire~ interesses couvrent probablement une large superficie. Comme on peut le comprendre sans grand effort d'imagination il y aura sans doute, dans bien d'autres endroits, des points presentant des difficultes, ainsi que des points' de friction. Ces points seront peut-ctre eloignes les uns des autres, et certains d'entre_ eux seront a coup sUr tres mal desservis. . Pour entreprendre une telle tache, il faudra peut-ctre prevoir un nombre considerable d'observateurs.Ces derniers devront disposer de facilites de communication, de moyens de traf1.Sport et d'approvisionnements. lIs auront peut-ctre besoin que l'on veille a leur protection. Il va desoi qu'il en resultera des depenses considerables et qu'il se posera ~n important probleme d'organisatio~. Je fais part de ces considerations, car celles-ci influent sur le facteur temps et sur les mesures que nous so~es en droit d'attendre des parties sur p~ace. A nouveau,. je repete que, selon nous, la presence de ces consuls de carriere a Batavia nous permettra: de disposer, pour'cette activite, d'un point de depart. . Ces hommes se trouvent sur place. Si le COIiseil adopte cette resolution, ils receVront sans aucun doute de leurs Gouvd'nements respectifs les instructions voulues, et ils seront a incme de proceder immediatement a leurs operations de surveillance. . . If this task is carried out properly and effectively, there is no doubt in our mind that the Council will .thereby be making a major contribution to a just and laf:ting settlement of the dispute. If the President and the Council will bear with me for a few minutes further, I must make some comments on the second resolution submitted by the representative of Australia, and also; by inference, on the amendment suggested by the representative of Poland, because my comments will affect both of them. Si le Consei1 s'acquitte de cette t~che d'une maniere appropriee et efficace, il aura, sans nul doute, a nos yeux, considerablement contribue a apporter au clifferend un reglement juste et durable. Si le President et le Consei1 veulent bien m'accorder encore quelques instants, .le presenterai quelques observations sur la seconde resolution soumise par le representant de l'Australie et aussi, par voie de consequence, sur l'amendement propose par le representant de la Pologne, car mes remarques s'appliqueront aux deux· textes. Il s'agit la, de l'avis de la delegation des Etats- Unis, du second aspect principal que presente le grave probleme dont est actuellement saisi le Conseil, cest-a-dire la solution des points d'ordre constitutionnel qui separent actuellement les parties an differend, solution qui influera directement Sll.T la solution a longue portee qui sera, esperons-le, permanente. My comments relate to the second main aspect of the serious problem before the Council, as viewed by tlle United States delegation.. I refer to the problem of reaching a solution of the constitutional issues which are in dispute between the parties; this solution has a direct bearing on the long-range, and, we hope, permanent solution. The United States believes that it is the parties themselves who ultimately bear the responsibility for determining the term of the constitutional settlement in Indonesia and the method by which it may be reached. . Les Etats-Unis estiment que c'est aux parties elles memes qu'il appartient, en dernier ressort, de resoudre la question constittrtionnelle en Indonesie, en determinant, tant les moy-ens par lesquels elles y arriveront que les termes de la solution a intervenir. The United States believes this to be true, regardless of the question of the Security Council's jurisdiction in the settlement of this affair. The United States also believes that, even assuming its jurisdiction is justified, the Council should not irQ.pose or attempt to iID.pose a particular method of pacific .. settlement upQn the parties if this can possibly be avoided. To do so would not'contribute to a just or lasting settlement and would probably not contribute to an early solution of the problem. Les Etats-Unis estiment,que tel est hien le cas, tout a fait independamment de toute question relative a I'habilite du Conseil de securite a regler le fond du differend. Les Etats-Unis estiment egalement que, meme si on lui reconnah cette habilite, le Conseil doit, autant que possible, 6viter d'irnposer ou d'essayer d'irnposer aux parties une methode particuliere de reglement pacifique. A agir dif- . feremrnent, le Conseil n'aiderait pas aresoudre le differend de mamere' juste ou durable; nimem~ probablement rapide. The question of the Council's jurisdiction in the constitutional issues of this case is a very real one. Doubts. have been expressed about it by severa:I members of the Council. It is a question which, in our view, should not be lightly brushed aside by this Council. How are we to support the rule of law in the world if we treat lightly the basic law of the Security Council itself? .' . La question de savoir si le Consei1 a la compe..; tence VOuluepour examiner, dans le cas present, le differend d'ordre constitutionnel~ se posettes reellement. Plusieurs membres du Conseil ont ex,... prime des d,outes a ce sujet. Il s'agit la d'une question dont le Conseil ne devrait pas, selonnous, msposer a la legere. Nous ne pouvons appuyer le principe de legalite sLnous ,traiton.s a lalegere la lo~ fondamentale du Conseil lUi-meme. The constitutional history of the building of the. federal structure of my own country affords ample evidence as to how seriously my Government regards proper attention to domestic jurisdiction. We have no less regard for such matters in the field of international affairs. L'histoire constitutionnelle de moil pays, qui montre la fa~on dent s'est edifiee notre structure federale, prouve abOndamment l'importance qu'at- , tache I:\lon Gouvernement a voir la competence nationale beneficier de la consideration qui lui re" vient. Notre attitpdedemeure ':Deme a l'egard de teIles questions isur le plan international. The view of the United States delegation is that. there is legitimate room for doubt as to the Counr:il's jurisdiction in so far as a settlement of the , constitutional issues of the Indonesian .question.is concerned.¥y Government would not beprepared, under the existing circumstances, to support .." , . _ }"" ,-. ·• ..=.:..H"'~, ... ~,.u D'apres la delegation des Etats-Unis, l'on peut ou l'on doitdouterde l'habilitedu Consei1a: regIeI', dans la question indonesienne"ledifferend d'ordre: constitutionnel..' Mon Gouvarnf"JIlent ne serait pas dispose, dans les· conditions actuelles, a soutenir une mesure du Conseilqui serait fondee sur la con- However, we also recognize that the very real doubts which several members of the Council have expressed regarding the Council's jurisdiction in the case before us, might very well be substantially l'esolved by an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. While the International Court was deliberating, the Council' would of course remain free to take such action in conformity with the Charter as it might deem necessary to maintain international peace. . Taking these considerations into account, the United States Government believes that the Council should not hesitate, if it judges it wise to do so, to refer the question of its jurisdiction in this case to the International Court for an opinion. The United States del~gation would be prepared to support a proposal to that effect. We are disappointed that the parties themselves have not made greater efforts, since the Council called upon them' in paragraph (b) of the resolution of 1 August to settle their disputes by arbitration or by other peaceful means, to reach at least initial agreement on the necessarily long and arduous ta~k of finding a solution of their dispute. We believe the Council should not only remind the parties of their responsibilities under this provision of the Council's resolution but should, in addition, do everything it properly can to induce the parties to take the first step in that direction. We suggest that the Council itself should tender its good offices to the parties. Due to the nature of the offer of good offices sueh a solution would not raise any question. whatsoever as to the Council's competence or jurisdiction in the matter. Since whatever services. the Council might render .to the parties would be upon the express request of the parties themselves, the question of the Council's'jurisdiction would not arise at any stage , in the exercise of such good offices. Should the parties accept the CouncWs good offices, they could request it to act as mediator or conciliator and'to suggest a method' of settlement, or ask it to perform any ,other proper service they desired. So lo~g as both parties join in making such a request, there is obviously no limit to the services which the Council can perform in facilitating aJmt and lasting settlement of this dispute. h rrught be considered preferable for the Coun- .cH to act in this respect through a small committee of the Council, composed perhaps of three mem- , bel'S. 'The Council, for example, might consider it appropriatefor each of the parties to select one of the members of the Council, a third I}lember to be 'designated by the two so selected. ~ I put this suggestion to the Council for its consideration, and' also for .the consideration" of the partles to the dispute. I have just circulated a Toutefois, nous admettons, ~galement que, pour mettre fin a l'incertitude tres reelle exprimee par plusieurs membres du Conseil quant a l'habilite du Conseil a examiner le differend sur les faits de la came, on pourraitfort bien solliciter, sur le fond, l'avis consultatif de la Cour internationale de Jus.' tice. Pendant que d6libererait la Cour internationale, le Conseil conserverait, bien entendu, la liberte de prendre toute mesure, conforme a la Charte, qu'il estimerait necessaire au maintien de la paix internationale. Tenant compte de ces observations, le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis estime que le Conseil ne devrait pas hesiter, s'il le jugeait bon, a soumettre, pour avis, ,a la Cour internationale de Justice, la question de savoir s'il dispose de la competence voulue pour connaltre de cette affaire. La deletion des Etats-Unis serait disposee a appuyer une proposition dans ce sens. Nous regrettons que' les parties elIes-memes n'aient pas fait· de plus grands efforts, apres que le Conseil les eut invitees; au paragraphe b) de la resolution du 1er aOtit; a regler leur differend par voie d'arbitrage ou par d'autres moyens pacifiques, afin de parvenir au moins a marquer d'un premier accord la route necessairement longue et ardue qu'i1 leur faudra parcourir ~vant de regl~r leur differend. Nous estimons que le Conseil ne devrait pas se borner a souligner aux parties les obligations qUi leur incombent en vertu de cette disposition de la resolution du Conseil, mais qu'il ,devrait en outre fairetout son possible pour amener les parties aaccomplir un premier pas dans ce sens. Nous ·proposons que le Conseil lui-nieme offre ses bons offices aux parties. Pareille solution, en raisonJde sa nature ,meme, ne souleverait aucune e$pece de question quant a la competence ou a l'habilite du Conseil''en la matiere. Etant donne que tout service que le Conscil pourrait rendre aux ' parties le serait a la requete expresse des parties elles-memes, la question de la competence du Conseil n'aura jamais lieu de'se poser aaucun stade de l'exercice desdits bons offices. Siles parties "acceptaient les bons officesdu Conseil, e1les pourraient lui. demander de faire ceuvre de mediateur ou de conciIiateur et de leur prop9ser en cette qualite une methode pour regler leur differend, ou encore solliciter de lui tout autre servicequ'elIes desireraient obtenir. Pour autant que les deux parties presentent encommuri une telIe, demande, il n'y a manifestement pas "de limite a~ services que le Conseil'peut rendreen )vue de faciliter un reglement juste et durable de ce differend~' " . Le Conseil pourrait estimerpreferable d'agir, a ce propos, par l'intermediare d'un Comite du Conseil lui-meme dontla composition restreinte pourrait selimiter a trois membres. Le ConseR pourrait par exemple juger utile de demander aux parties de choisir chacune un des membres du Conseil, et de faire designer' le troisieme par lesdeux membres ainsi nommes. , . Jesoumets cette proposition au Coriseil pour qu'il l'ex.amine et egalement pour que l'e.x... a.mine:411 les parties au differend. Je viens de faire distri· As to the substance of the question, the Security Council should have complied with the Indopesian . request and set up two commissions: one to ensure compliance with the Council's cease-fire decision of 1,August and the other to deal with arbitration; or else the Council should have set up one commission with the du~l function of simultaneously supervising the implementation of the Council's deyision of 1 August and dealing with arbitration~ , , Unfortunately, discussion of these requests from La discussion de ces requetes du Gouvernement the Government of the Indonesian Republic has de la Republique d'Indonesie a malheureusement .shown that the Security Council is not of one mind montre qu'iln'y avait pas unaJJimite au Con,seil on this question. Furthermore, discussion of this sur cette question. Bien plus, les debats du Conseil question in, the Cuuncil has shown that therepreont montre que lesrepresentants 'cl'un certain sentatives of certain countries are more inclined to nombre de pays, au .lieu d'etre favorables au Gouagree not with the Government of the Indonesian vernemeIit de la Republiqued'Indonesie, c'est-a- R;e~ublic, that is to say, the country which is the dire, au pays qui a ete victimed'une agression VICtim of armed attack, but to agree-I would ' armee, ~ennent plutot a satisfaire -je dirai pr~s­ say almost entirelx-with the Netherlands Govque entieremellt - le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, , ernment, that is to say, tl1e Government of the c'est-a-dire le Gouvernement,du pays qui a decIa;re, country which declared wa.r on the Indonesian laguerrea la Republiqued'Indonesie <;:t quia deja Rep?blic and which has accomplished, at least,. a ' .mene., a ,bien, en, grande partie du moins, les ope.. conSIderable part of the military operations which rations projetees par le ~ommandementneerlan­ were contemplated by the Netherlands High Comdais en Indonesie. mand in Indonesia. If we consider the respective. proposals now before the Security Council: the Australian pro- A examiner les differentes propositiqns dont est saisi le Conseil de securite, c'est-a-dire la proposi- , :LThe following is the text of the United States draft resolution: ,- Document S/514 . 22 August 1947 [Original text: English] The Security Council :LVoici ie texte du projet de resolution des Etats-Unis: DocumentS/51422 aol1t 1947 [Texte original en anglais] Le Conseil de securite Decide d'offrir ses bons offices aux partieS interessees pour contribuer au reglemmt pacifique de leur differend conformelllent aux dispositions du paragraphe b de la resolution du ConseP en date du ler aol1tl947. Si les ?arties interessees en fent la demande, le Conseil .est dispose a eontribuer au reglement' de ce differend au moyen d'une commission du Comeil composee ,de trois membres, dontdeux seront choisis respectivement par chacune d~ partielS interessees et le troiSieme parIes deux prelDlers. ' Re,s?lv~s to tender its good offices to the parties in order to aSSIst In .the pacific settlement of their dispute, in accord~ce WIth paragraph (b) of the resolution of the Coun~tl of 1 4ugust 1947. The C;:ouncil expresses its readinthress, If the parti~s so request, to assist in the settlement ougha commIttee of the Council consisting of three mhemb«;rsof the Council, each party selecting one, and t e thIrd to be designated by the two so selected. ' If we examine the modified Australian resolution, which is now presented as an Australian-Chinese resolution, we see that there is almost nothing left of the first Australian resolution. Everything of value in the first resolutipn submitted by the Australian representative is absent in the joint Austral,: ian-Chinese resolution. It' contains no proposal to create a commission of the Secunty Council. There is a proposal whic..1t was put. forward at the one hundred and eighty-fifth meetingl by the Netherlands representative and \Yhich for some reason was very warmly received" by the Security Council, to the effect that the task qf supervising the implenientation of the Security Council's decision should be entrusted to consuls, which' in the opinion of ,the USSR delegation, is unacceptable. First of ail, let us see whose consuls, are in :':ndonesia. In Indonesia there is a United States, a French, a United Kingdom, a Ohine~e, and Australian and I think a Swiss consul {Switzerland is ' not a Member of the United Nations). Among the five eligible so-called "career" consuls'therefore there' are United Kingdom, French and United States consuls. We all know-I think that we can speak frankly in discus~ing this and all other question8-'-th~ attitude adopted by the United Kingdom in the Indonesian question. There is no secret about the position of the French....Covernment in this matter. Something is also known. about the position of the United States. Thus, out of the five corisuls in Indonesia we find three whose op[nions and actions, in the view of the ,USSR delegation, cannot be relied upon or con- . sidered to reflect in any way the Security Council's opinion or that of the countries represented on the Security'Council. They will reflect the opinion of ..three countries, namely, the United States, .the United Kingdom and France and :qot the opinion of the countries represented on the Security Coun-:- cll. \, , One fails to understand on what grounds the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United Voyons tout d'abord queIs sont les c~>nsuls qui, se trouvent en Indonesie. Ce sont les consuls des, Etats-Unis, de ,la France, du Royaume-Uni, de la Chine, de l'Australie,. et, je crois, de la Suisse (la Suissen'est· pas membre de 1'0rganisation des Nations Unies). Il y a donc, parmi les dnq consuls admissibles dits "de carrlere", les consuls du Royaume-Uni, de la France et des Etats-Unis. Nous savonstous - je crois que nous pouvons parler franchement dans la discussion de c<;:tte question comme d'ailleurs de toute autre question -quelle est la position adoptee par le Royaume- ( Uni dans' la question indonesienne. La position adoptee par'le Gouvernement fran~ais n'est pas un secret non plus. Nous avonsegalement une idee de la position du Gouvernement des Etats· Unis. Nous avons done trois consuls, sur les cinq qui se trouvent en Iridonesie, dont l'opinion ou l'action ne meritent pas, a notre avis, la confiance du ConseiI, et qui ne peuvent pas etre consideres comme exprimant, de quelque fa~on que ce soit, 'l'opiniondu ConseiI de securite ou celle des pays representes au Conseil. Ces consuls exprimeront I'opinion de trois' pays, celles des Etats-Unis, du Royaume-Uni et de la France, et non pas I'opinion des pays representes auConseil de securite. Je ne vois pas pour. queUe raison les represen. tants du Royaume-Uni, des Etats-Unis et de la ~ les Proces-verbaux olficiels du Conseil de st!curite, I will deal with the question of arbitration later. We know that the Governments of the United Kingdom and of France are favourable to the Netherlands; we also know.that the attitude of the Government of the United States is on the whole favourable to the Netherlands. If w~ are to judge this attitude by individual remarks, apparently intended to have an effect on public opinion, or by the content of the statements which have been made by the representative of the United States, on this subject, then the USSR delegation and the Government of the USSR cannot consider that the career consuls of the five Powers can act for the Security Council. There is apparently no justification for thinking that they can do this. As far as the USSR delegation is concernea these consuls do not exist. They are the .consuls of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Australia and China. They are not representatives of the Security Council, they are not a commission of the Council. The resolution submitted jointly by the representatives of Australia and China,contains in substance a proposal which in practice means by.passing the United Nations. -That 'proposal can only be construed in this way. In its present form, . it seems to indicate that the Security Council is taking some kind of action, but in substance and in content, it means that the Security Council voluntarily stands aside and' accepts the proposal dictated by Mr. van Kleffens, the representative of the Netherlands Government, the representative of the guilty party in this conflict, which, as I have already stated, met With sii<:h a warm and, in my opinion, unmerited reception in the Security Council.' . ' La resolution qui a ete presentee conjointement par les representants de <}'Australie et de la Chine contient, en fait, une proposition qui signifie pratiquement que l'on elude I'Organisation des Nations Unies. Telle est la seule signification qu'on puisse atttribuer a cette proposition. Sous'la forme qu'on lui a donnee cette proposition _semble dire que le Conseil de securite prend certaines mesures, mais, en realite, lecontenu en signifie que le Conseil desecurite se dessaisit lui-meme de l'affaire et qu'il adopte la proposition qui a ete dictee par M. van Kleffeps, le representant du Gouvernement' des Pays-Bas; proposition qui, comme' je l'ai deja dit, a re~u un accueil si. chaleureux et, a mon avis, si peu merite, de la partdu ConseiI' de securite, et qui a ete dictee par le representant de la partie . coupable dans ce confit. . ' I need hardly say that this resolution and the Chinese amendments' submitted at the one hundred and eight:y-seventh meeting of the'Security Council contain a series of further unacceptable suggestions. For, instance, it is stated in paragraph 2 that the Security Council notes with satisfaction the statement issued by th~ Netherlands Government on 11 August;.in that statement the Security Council is slandered and abused for having undert.aken the consideration ofthe Indonesian question, but in reply the Council notes the statement with sati.sfaction. The same applies to paragraph 3, which states that the Security Council notes that the Netherlands Government intends to request the career consuls stationed in Batavia to report on the situation in Indonesia,. The proposal of the Netherlands Government however was made in ?rde~ to by-pass the 'Security Council and the UnIted Nations. The proposal emanating from the Ne!herlands delegation is 'logical from the standpomt of the Netherlands Government. From the. very beginning "that Government adopted the Je n'insisterai pas sur le fait que cette resolution, de meme que les amendements de la Chine pxesentes a la cent-quatre-vingt-septieme seance du . Conseil de securite, contient un~ serie d'autres dispositions inacceptables - par exemple le para~ graphe 2, OU ilest dit que le ConseiI de securite prend acte avec satisfaction de la declaration du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, en date du 11 aout.- Dans cette declaration, le ConseiI de securite etait denigre et traite de haut pour avoir entrepris l'examen'de la question indonesienne; et voila que le Conseil de securitey repond en prenant acte avec satisfaction de cettedeclaration. II en est de meme du paragraphe 3, ou il -est dit que le ConseiI de securite prend acte de l'intention duGouvernement des Pays-Bas de .s'adz:esser aux consuls de carriere qui se trouvent a Batavia pour 'que ceux-ci fassent rapport sur la situation en Indonesie. Or, la proposition du Gouverne.mentdes Pays-Bas a justementete faite pour mettre aI'ecart le ConseiI de securite et pour eluder l'Organisation des Nations Unies. La proposition faite par la delegation des Pays-Bas est logique du point de vue du Gouvernement neerIandais. Des le co,mmencement,ce Gau- Je parlerai de l'arbitrage plus loin. Nous savons que les Gouvernments du Royaume- Uni et de la Frane sont favorables aux Pays-Bas, nous savons egalement que, dans l'ensemble, l'attitude du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis leur 'est egalement favorable. A juger de cette attitude d'ap;res certaines remarques qui ont ete faites, sans doute, en vued'in£luencer l'opL'lion publique, OJ! a en juger d'apres les declarations faites a ce sujet par le representant des Etats-Unis, la delegation de l'URSS et le Gouvernement de I'URSS ne peuvent considerer que les consuls de carriere des cinq Puissances puissent agir au no~ du Conseil de securite. Rien ne nous autorise a croire.qu'il soient en mesure de le faire. Pour la delegation de I'URSS, ces consuls n'existent pas. Ces consuls 'sont les consuls des Etat.s-Unis, de la France, du Royaume- Uni, de I'Australieet de la Chine. .Ge ne sont pas des representants du Conseil desecurite, et ils.ne constituent pas une commission du ConseiI. \, Thus we have let in by the window what, we had driven out by the door. At first we tried not to agree with the representative of the Netherlands G9vernment that the Security Council could not consider the Indonesian question. In 'the course of considering it, however, we accept the Netherlands Government's proposal, which means that the, Security Council voluntarily stands aside and refrains from considering this questio!!. The first ~ustralian' resolution, was acceptable to the USSR delegation, subject to the deletion of paragraph 2 in which it was stated that the Security Council noted the offer by the Governments of the United States and Australia of their "good offices". That question, however, is now ancient history and the Australian representative does not include that paragraph in the subsequent,drafts, since the fate of these "good offices" is well-known. If'the Australian resolution dealt with both questions: namely, the question of supervising the implementation of the, Council's decision of 1 August and the question of arbitration, I could have agreed that the resolution should do so, subject to the acceptance' of the amendments on arbitration suggested' by the Polish representative. Ifthis r.esolution were confined to one question we should have to adopt another resolution in regard to arbitration. ,, . , . ,In the opinion of the USSR delegation, if the Security Council really wishes to' deal seriously with this matter, as I have already stated it should create either, two .commissions: one on arbitration and the other on supervision of the implementation ol the decision of 1 August; or one commission with dual functions. In either case, whether one commission with dual functions or two commissions with different functions are created, the commission should be composed of representatives of the States represented on the Security Council., The question of the number of States on the commission or commissions could, be discussed separately. We could decide on a variant which would include all eleven States represented on the Council; We could alsowscuss another variant: a smaller memberihipof the commission or' commissions. Membership of such commissions, however,should c~:>nsist of States represented on the Security Council. The USSR delegation considers that this is a question 6f'principle. '" The question is: Is the Council going to deal with supervising the implementation of the decision of 1 August and with arbitration, will the Council be by-passed, or will the Security Council voluntarily stand aside? That ~5 the question. In view of the fact that the modffied~Australian (Australian-Chi."lese) resolution means in ,effect that the Securiity Council stands aside in this matter and tha1t both questions-arbitration and supervision of the implementation of the, Council's De cette fa~on, nous avons admis de nouveau ce que nous avions ecarte tout d'abord. Nous avons d'abord essaye de ne pas accepter la these du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas selon laquelle le Cons,eil de securite ne pouvait pas examiner la question indonesienne. Et maintenant, au cours de l'examen de cette question, nous adoptons une proposition du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui signifie que le Conseil de securite se dessaisit lui-meme de la ql;lfrstion. La premiere resolution de l'Australie etait acceptable pour la delegation de l'URSS a condition de supprimer le paragraphe 2, OU il est dit que le Con,seil de securite prend acte de l'offre de "bons offices" faite par le Gouvernements des Etats- Unis e,t de l'Australie. Mais cette question est maintenant de .l'historie ancienne, le representant de l'Australie a omis ce paragraphe dans ses projets de resolution'posterieurs, par suite de l'accueil qui a ete reserve aces "bons offices". Si la resolution de I'Australie traitait a la fois des deux questions: le controle de l'application de la decision du Conseil en date du ler aout et le probleme de l'arbitrage, je pourrais accepter que ces deux questions fassent I'objet d'une seule resolution, a condition que soit admis l'amendement propose par le representant de la Pologne au sujet de l'arbitrage. Si cette resolution ne traitait que de la premiere question, il faudrait que nous prenions , une seconde decision quant a l'arbitrage. De l'avis de la delegation de l'URSS, le Conseil de securite doit, s'il veut vraiment p~endre cette question au serieux, creer, comme je l'ai deja dit, soit .de\lX commissions, l'une chargee de I'ltrbitrage et l'autre chargee de surveiller l'application de la decision du ler ~out, soit une seule commission ayan~ a la fois ces deux fonctions. Dans les deux cas, soit que 1'0n cree une seule commission ayant cette double fonction, soit que I'on cree de 'x commissions ayant une mission distiIlcte, ces ( Jmmissions devraient etre composees de representants d'Etats membres du Conseil de securite. La question du nombre des Etats representes dans ces commissions ou dans cette commission pourrait etre discutee separement. Nous pourrions nous arreter a la solution d'une Commission comprenant les onze Etats representes au Conseil. Nous pourrions examiner egalement. une . au~re solution, comportant une commission ou des commissions a corn. position restreinte. Mais ces commissions devraient etre composees d'Etats representes au Conseil de .J securite. La delegation del'URSS estime que c'est la une question de principe. La question est done la suivante: le Conseil surveillera-t-il lui-meme l'application de la decision en date dl,l 1er aout et s'occupera-t-il lui· meme de l'arbitrage? ou bien le Conseil sera-toil tenu a l'ecart? ou bien encore, le Conseil se desistera-t-il tout simplement? C'est ainsi que se pose, la question. . , Etant donne que la proposition de l'Australie modifee (la proposition commune de l'Australie et c1.e la Chine) signifie qu'en fait le Conseilde securite se dessaisit de l'affaire et que les' deux questions - l'arbitrage aussi bien que le controle I will conclude by saying that, in the opinion of the USSR delegation, neither the Australian- Chinese resolution, nor the Australian and United States resolutions on arbitration are acceptable for the reasons which I have already indicated. The delegation of the USSR cannot agree that on such an important question as that of Indonesia the United Nations and the Security Council, which has already begun to deal with the subject, should be by-passed and that further decisions on these questions should be left in the hands of one, two or three countries. . Mr. KATz-SUCHY (Poland): On 1 August, after a discussion on the dispute between the Indonesian Republic and the Government of the Netherlands, the Security Council adopted a resolution in which it Called upon the parties to cease hostilities and to settle their differences by arbitration or by other means. Since that time three weeks have passed and I believe it would be wen to review what has happened in the light of the facts which we have before us. With regard to the first point of the resolution Nous nous trouvons maintenant en presence, 'en of 1 August, we are now faced with an accusation ce qui concerne le premier point de la resolution which has been made here that the terms of the du 1er aout, d'une accusation selon laqueUe il cease-fire order and the recommendation to cease n'a pas He donne suite a.l'ordre de cesser le feu hostilities have not been implemented. The Govet a la recommandatior. de mettre fin aux hostiliernment of the Neth~r1ands charges that the forces tes. Le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas accuse les of the Indonesian Republic have continued hostilforces de la Republique d'Indonesie d'avoir pourities. On the other hand, an accusation has been suivi les hostilites. De son cote, la Republique d'Inbrought forward by the Republic of Indonesia to donesie accuse les forces des Pays-Bas de continuer the effect that the Netherlands forces are conleurs operations. A ce propos, nous avons entre les tinuing their hostilities. In this respect, we have mains plusieurs depeches de journalistes qui se several press reports from reporters who are on trouvent sur les lieux. Ces depeches nous inforthe spot, stating that the Netherlands troops are ment que les troupes des Pays-Bas continuent leurs continuing their operations and that the capital operations et que la capitale de la Republique se of the Republic is seriously threatened. From the trouve serieusement menacee. De meme source same sources we hear of descents of paratroopers nous parvient la nouveUe de descentes de paraa~~ C?f new l~ndings of N~therlands troops in that chutistes neerlandais et de nouveaux debarquements VIClllity and In other portions of the islands apart de troupes neerlandaises dans ce secteur ainsi que (. from those which have already been occupied. dans d'autres parties des lIes que celles qui oht "--_ deja ete occupees. I believe that these facts justify our statement Je crois que ces faits nous autorisent a declarer that the result of the resolution of l' August has que la resolution du 1er aout n'a pas donne des not been very good. We all hoped that it would resultats que l'on pourrait qualifier de satisfaibe sufficient if we adopted a cease-fire order or a sants. Nous avions tous espere qu'il nous suffirait recommendation for a cease-fire order and left it d'adopter un ordre de cesser le feu, ou une recomto the discretion of both parties to the dispute to mandation i~witant les parties au differendcl cesser settle the question. Events of the past have proved le feu et les laissant libres de regler la question that the case is much more serious than some of entre elles. Les evenements ont revele que cette ~e members of this Council have tried to represent affaire est beaucoup plus grave que certains mem- It. The case requires very careful consideration bres du Conseil n'ont tente de la presenter. Elle and it is of immediate interest and concern to the demande cl etre examinee tres attentivement et Council. rcntre dans le genre des questions qui interessent et touchent le Conseil de tres pres. At the moment we are dealing with the case in its primary form. Hostilities are being continued. There is no sign of a settlement yet'and every attempt to hasten the activity of the Security Council is being blocked by prolonged discussions, new resolutions and new problems with regard to the right of jurisdiction. We have before us a case which possesses every element .of urgency and immediacy. Yet three weeks have passed in the course of which we have had several days of discussion here, hut we must admit that we have not moved very far from the position we were in on 1 August. As I reflect upon our action in this case, I cannot help going back into the past to a case which arose .not so many years ago. It was when the Kingdom. of Ethiopia was invaded by Italy. I do not intend to draw an analogy between the action of the Government of the· Netherlands and the Governme!1t of Fascist Italy. There is a very grave difference between them, besides the historical difference in the periods. At that time, however, the Council of the League of Nations, instead of taking prompt action which would have saved the world a lot of the suffering it had to experience later, entered into prolonged discussion in which many arguments were put forward, similar to those we have heard here, with regard to the advance of the white race, to white supremacy, to illiteracy and to the danger to the white rae<e which might exist. These arguments were effective and no action was taken. I am afraid that in this case we are repeating one of the mistakes of the past which we thought, after the results of the Second World War, would never be repeated. I am very glad that the representative of Australia has drawn the attention of the President to the language and to the form which has been used in the statement of the representative of the Netherlands. I admit that I, myself, felt a little bit as if we were in the dock and were listening to a speech/by the public prosecutor accusing us of the various charges which have been set forth by the representative of the. Netherlands in language which was very popular among the colonizers of the eighteenth century. I admit that, as the representative of the Netherlands stated, there is a conflict between illusion and reality. It definitely exists. We had the illusion that by some mild action, by showing some concern, we could settle the case and that no strong words or action needed to be used. I believe many of the members of the Council have the same illusion at the present time. The result of that mild action Actuellement, l'affaire se presente a nous telle qu'elle etait a son debut: les hostilites se poursuivent; aueun signe de reglement n'apparalt encore, et toute tentative faite en vue d'accelerer l'activite du Conseil de securite se trouve arretee par des discussions prolongees, par des resolutions nouvelles et par de nouveaux problemes concernant la competence du Conseil. Nous avons devant nous un cas d'un caractere eminemment instant et pressant; et cependant, trois semaines se sont ecoulees pendant lesquelles, malgre plusieurs journees de discmsions, nous n'avons, il nou::; faut le reconnaltre, guere fait de progres depuis le ler aoilt. Lorsque je considere les mesures que nous avons prises dans la presente affaire, je ne puis m'empecher d'evoquer un cas qui. s'est presente il ya quelques annees seulement. Je veux parler de l'invasion ·du Royaume d'Ethiopie par l'Italie. Je n'ai pas l'intention d'etablir un parallele entre la maniere d'agir du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et celle du Gouvernement de l'Italie fasciste. Il ya entre elles une tres grand~ difference, independamment de la difference historique qui existe entre deux epoques. Quoi qu'il en soit, a l'epoque en question, le Conseil de la Societe des Nations, au lieu d'agir rapidement, ce qui aurait epargne au monde beaucoup des souffrLl.nces qu'il a ail endurer par la suite, commen~a des debats prolonges, au cours desquels de nombreux arguments f:lrent avances, analogues a ceux que nous avons entendus id, sur I'evolution de la race blanche et sa suprematie, le manque d'instruction et le danger a l'egard des blancs. On a entendu tous ces arguments, et on n'a pris aucune mesure. Je crains que nous ne soyons en train de commettre encore, dans l'affaire qui nous occupe, une des fautes commises dans le passe et que nous pensions devoir ne pas se reproduire apres l'enseignement tire de la deuxieme guerre mondiale. Je suis tres heureux que le representant de l'Australie ait attire I'attention du Pres.\dent sur le Iangage et la forme de la declaration du representant des Pays-Bas. Je dois avouer que, tandis que celui-ci parlait, j'avais un peu l'impression de me trouver au banc des accuses, ecoutant le procureur articuler contre nous Ies diverses accustaions enumerees par le representant des Pays-Bas dans un langage tres goilte des colonisateurs du XVIIIeme siecle. Je reconnais que, comme l'a declare le representant des Pays-Bas, ce que nous croyions ne s'accorde pas avec la realite. Le desaccord est patent. Nous avions 'I'illusion que, grace a des mes~ moderees, en manifestant quelque preoccupation, nous pourrions resoudre le probleme sans avoir besoin '\:le faj"'''·T '~des termes et a des mesures energiqm grand nombre des membres du :lcore cette illusion au-' However, in view of the urgency of the case, I was prepared to ovel'1ook all these faults except for one point: namely the composition of the commission to observe the cease-fire order. I believe the Security Council must determine the composition of the commission from among the members of the Council and not leave the matter to career or non-career consuls. Of course, each State will be free to decide whether it wants to appoint its career consul as a member of the commission. In the opinion of the Polish delegation, this commission should be entirely within the framework of the Security Council and· of the United Nations. We believe that the case belongs to the Council and to the Council alone. We know the opinions which most of the representatives of the countries which have consuls in Batavia have expressed here with regard to the dispute between the Indonesian Republic and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. We can already easily foresee what majority wiU be formed .in this commission. In the opinion::>f the Polish delegation, the commission should be.composed of members of the Security Council and three, five, six--or as many members of this Council as the Council shall decide-can be appointed to act as observers of the execution of the cease-fire order. We can appoint either the six non-permanent members of the Council or the five permanent members; all eleven members of the Council could even be appointed. I believe that such action would be much more effective. If any recommendation is made by this . Council with regard to the situation there, it will carry much more weight than an opinion from the consuls who are accredited at Batavia at the present moment. As to the other resolution, which is contained in document S/512, the Polish delegation has proposed an amendment suggesting the formation, again within the framework of the Security Council, of an organ of the Council which would have as its duty and task the mediation and arbitration of the dispute between the Republic of'Indonesia and the Government of the Netherlands. This amendment is contained in document S/488/ Add.P. . We cannot agree with the United States proposal. The United States proposal is practically a .Nous ne pOll"OnS nous rallier a la proposition des Etats-Unis. Ceti.e proposition reproduit, pour ainsi dire, i'article XVII, point D, de I'Accord de Linggadjati2• Je vais donner lecture de ce point: ~ep.etition of article XVII, point D of the Linggad- Jati Agreement2. I shall read it: - IDocument 8/488/Add.l was origi-,u,l>'; proposed as an amendment to the first Australian dll1.f. resolution wntained in document 5/488. • S~e The Political Events in the Republic of Indonesia, pUblIShed by the Netherlands Infcf1l.Tiation Bureau, New Ylir~._ lLe document 8/488/Add.l a ete propose a l'origine comme amendement au premier projet de IP.liolution dt: l'Australie paru au document 8/488. • Voir The Political Events in the Republic of Indonesia. publication du Bureau d'information des Pays-Bas, New- York. I believe that if the Government of the Netherlands had wanted to act in accordance with article XVII, there was time to act before the hostilities started. By their a::tlun, they proved that article does not satisfy them; therefore, we cannot consider that any action,by which the parties would appoint their representatives and the representatives would appoint a chairman or a third member, will bring about a satisfactory solution. In any case I do not see any reason why the parties should appoint a· third State: They do not need liaison officers. If we establish an arbitration commission, both parties will automatically be represented on it and there will be no need for them to have an advocate. I believe that l")'lth the Government of the Netherlands and th· .·epresentative of the Republic of Indonesia are qUite able to defend their cases before the commission of arbitration in the same mannerin which any State appointed by them would defend them. I do not believe that'such a measure would be helpful to the case, especially in view of the statement made this morning by the representative of the Netherlands as to the com;' position, character and form of the Indonesian Republic. The representative of the Netherlands describes the members of the Government of the Republic as a group of vicious men with no influence. If such is the situation, within a very few days there will be a new Indonesian Government with which, probably, the Netherlands Government will negotiate with plelisure. I believe that the delay which we are showing here is encouraging a complete occupation of the 'i:erritory of the Indonesian Republic by the Netherlands .forces, their aim being to achieve. their primary military objectives apd then to enter into negotiations. In our comments on the first Australian resolution, we stated that si-ace the Netherlands forces occupied nearly half of the territory of the Indonesian Republic no arbitration, 'no negotiation could be free. If we.do not ask 'both the Government of the Netherlands ano the Government of the Republic of Indonesia to withdraw their forces and civil administrations to the lines which they held before hostilities started, we must at least have a commission which will have behind it the authority of the Security Council and of the United Nations and which will be able to bring about a just solution. I believe that we mU.:t at:t swiftly; that we must I .h \ l'Oi,. ':1'~'j1 nous faut at.r 'rapidement; qu'il try to bring into existence in the shortest possible fant il(JUS efforcer d;instituer, dans le plus court time two bodies or one body having the functions dclai possible, deux organismes ou un organisme both of observers and of arbitrators. investi a la fois des fonctions d'observateur et d'arbitre. Je crois que, si le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas avait voulu conformer ses actes a l'article XVII, il en aurait eu le loisir avant le commencement des hosnlites. En agissant comme il l'a fait., i1 a montre que cet article ne le satisfait pas. Nous ne saurions done considerer que la methode suivant laquelle les parties designeiaient des representants qui a leur tour choisiraient un Presideilt ou Un troisieme membre, puisse etre susceptible de donner des resultats satisfaisants. De toute maniere, je ne vois pas pourquoi les parties devraient designer un troisieme Etat. Ces parties n'ont pas besoin d'officiers de liaison. Si nous creons une commission d'arbitrage, les deux parties se trouveront representees ipso facto et n'auront nul besoin d'avocat. Je suis persuade que le Gouvernement des Pay~­ Bas et le representant de la Republique d'Indonesie sont tout aussi capables de defendre leur cause devant la commission d'l:lrbitrage que ne le ferait n'importe quel Etat qu'elles pourraient designer. Je ne crois pas qu'une telle mesure serait de que!" que utilit€: dans le cas ell question, surtout si j'en juge par ce qu'a dit le representant des Pays-BliS de la composition, du caractere et de la forme de la Republique d'Indonesie. Le representant des Pays-Bas a represente les membres du Gouvernement de la Republique comme un groupe d'hommes corrompus e1- sans influence. Si tel est le cas, il ne se passera gUere de jours avant qu'il n'y ait un nouy-eau Gouvernement indonesien avec lequel le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas aura vlaisemblablement plmsir a negocier. Je crois que le retard que nous apportons ici a prendre une decision favonse l'occupation totale du territoire de la Republique d'Indonesie par les forces neerlandaises, dont le but est de s'assurer, avant d'entrer ep. negociations, de leurs objectifs militaires essentiels. Dans les commentaires que nous avons faits au sujet de la premiere resolution de l'Australie, nous avons declare que, du fait de l'occupation de pres de la moitie du territoire de la Republique d'Indonesie· par les forces neerlandaises, aucun arbi· trage, aucune negcv·jation, ne pouvaient etre libres. Si nous nedemandons pas au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et au Gouvernement de la Republique d'Indo:;"tesie de ramener l'un et 1'autre leurs forces et leurs administration civiles sur les lignes ou elles se trouvaient avant le c.ommcncement des hostilit.es, .).. du moins devons-nous instituer une commission qui, forte de 1'autorite du Conseil de securite et de _ l'Oxga:lisation des Nations Unies, sera en mesufe-- df pdv:"ur aune solution equitable. The Indonesian case does exist. Daily reports from that region state that hostilities are going on and that a settlement is desired. The Australian representative has pointed out that his country is already suffering because of the hostilities in Indonesia. Probably many neighboring 'countries feel the effects of the war there. The case belongs to the Security Council, and the Security Council alone can bring about a change in the situation in Indonesia. Or, elle existe. D'Indonesie nous parviennent tous les jours des depeches qui nous informent que les hostilites se poursuivent et qu'on espere un reglement. Le representant de l'Australie a signaIe que son pays souffre deja ju fait des hostilites en Indonesie. 11 est p!'obable que beaucoup de pays voisins en ressentent aussi les effets. Cette affaire est du ressort du Conseil de securite, et sew le Conseil de securite peut amener un changement dans la situation en Indonesie.

The last speaker on my list is the representative of Indonesia; he wiJl speak at the next meeting of the Council on this question. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Le dernier orateur inscrit sur ma liste est le representant de 1'lndonesie. 11 prendra la parole lors de la prochaine seance du Conseil sur cette question. Certains membres se sont plaints du retard, mais le reglement interieur de ce ConseiI, ainsi que l'usage re~u, veulent que les. orateurs parlent aussi longtemps qu'ils le desirent. 11 n'existe aucun moyen de clore la discussion et de mettre le projet de resolution aux voix avant d'avoir entendu tous ceux qui desirent parler. Pour cette raison, je crois qu'il n'est rien de p1us que nous puissions faire actuellement. Nous devrons nous efforcer d'activer nos travaux autant qu'il sera possible. Some of the members have been complaining about the delay but the rules of procedure and the tradition of this Council are that spF.akers shall continue to speak as long as they desire to do so. There is no way to stop the discussion and to put a draft resolution to the vote before we have heard all those who desire to speak. For tlii~ reason, I do not believe we can do anything more at this time. We shall have to try to expedite the work as much as possible. Nous allons maintenant lever la seance, et nolls reprendrons la question indonesienne lundi a 15 heures. This meeting will now adjourn and we shall take up the Indonesian question on Monday, at 3 p.m. La seance est levee a18 h. 45. The meeting rose at 6.45 p.m. . FRANCE Editions A- Pedone 13, rue SoufHot PARIS, Ve GREECE-GRECE "Eleftheroudakis" Lihrairie intemationale Place de la Constitution ATHENES GUATEMALA J0ge Gauhaud Gaubaud & Cia. Ltda. Sucesor .5a Av. Sur No. 6 y 9a C. P. GUATEMALA HAITI Max Bouchereau Librairie "A la Caravelle" Boite postale ll1-B PORT-AU-PRINCE ICELAND-ISLANDE Bokaverzlun Sigfusar Eymundsonnar Austurstreti 18 REYKJAVIK INDIA-INDE Oxford Book & Stationery Company Scindia House . NEW DELHI IRAN Bongahe Piaderow 731 Shah Avenue TEHERAN IRAQ-IRAK Mackenzie & Mackenzie The Bookshop BAGHDAD lEBANON-LlBAN Librairie universelle BEYROUTH LUXEMBOURG Librairie J. Schummer Place Guillaume LUXEMBOURG NETHERLANDS-PAYS-BAS N. V. Martinus Nijhoff Lange Voorhout 9 'S-GRAVENHAGE N~rregade6 KJi$BENHAVN DOMINICAN Rf:PUBLle- REPUBLlQUE I)OMINICAINE Libreria Dominicana Calle Mercedes No. 49 Apartado 656 ClUDAD TRUJILLO ECUADOR-EQUATEUR Muiioz Hermanos y Cia. Nueve de Octubl'e 703 Casilla 10-24 GUAYAQUIL EGYP'i-EGYPTE Librairie "La Renaissance d'Egypte" 9 Sh. Adly Pasha CAmo ETHIOPIA-nHIOPIE Agence ethitlpienne de puhlicite P. O. Bax8 AnDIS·ABEBA Printed in the U.S.A. NEW ZEALAND- NOUVELLE-ZELANDE Gardon & Gotch, Ltd. Waring Taylor Street WELLINGTON United Nations Association of New Zealand P. O. 1011, G.P.O. WELLINGTON NICARAGUA Ramiro Ramirez V. Agenda de Publicaciones NUNAGUA, D. N. NC.itWAY·-NORVEGE Johan Grundt TailUIn Forlag Kr. Au~us~gt. 7A Os:tc'"l Puc,: in. Lt')"'" U.5oA.: 45 cent~ PHILlPPlNaiS D. P. Perez Co. 132 Riverside SAN JUAN, RIZAL POLAND-POLOGNE Spotdzielna Wydawnicza "Czytelnik" 38 Pomanska WARSZAWA SWEDEN-SUEDE A.-B. C. E. Fritzes Kungl. Hofbokhandel Fredsgatan 2 STOCKHOLM SWiTZERLAND-SUISSE Librairie Payot S. A. LAUSANNE, GENEVE, VEVEY, MONTREUX, NEUCHATEL, BERNE, BASEL Hans Raunhudt Kirchgasse 17 ZURICH! SYRIA-SYRIE Librairie universelle DAMAS TURKEY-TURQUIE Librairie Hachette 469 Istiklal Caddesi BEYOGLU-IsTANBUL UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA- UNION SUD-AFRICARNE Central News Agency Commissioner & Rissik Sts. JOHANNESBURG and at C.\PETOWN and DURBAN UNITED KINGDOM- 'POYAUME-UNI H. M. Stationery Office D. O. Box 569 LONDON, S.E. 1 and at H.M.S.O. Shops in LONDON. EDINBURGH, MANCHESTER, CARDIFF, BELFAST, BIRMINGHAM and BRISTOL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA-- ETATS-YNIS D'AMER!QUE International Documents Service Columbia University Press 2960 Broadway NEW YORK 27, N. "'1. URUGUAY Oficina de Representacion de Editoriales Av. 18 de Julio 1333 Esc. 1 MONTEVIDEO VENEZUELA Escritorfa Perez Machado Conde a Pifiango 11 CARACAS YUGOSLAVIA-YOUGOSLAVIE Drzavno Preduzece Jugoslovenska Knjiga Moskovska Ul. 36 BEOGRAD ~9~f April 1949-l},OOO