S/PV.197 Security Council

Wednesday, Aug. 27, 1947 — Session 2, Meeting 197 — New York — UN Document ↗ OCR ✓ 18 unattributed speechs
This meeting at a glance
18
Speeches
0
Countries
1
Resolution
Resolution: S/RES/33(1947)
Topics
General statements and positions UN Security Council discussions UN membership and Cold War UN resolutions and decisions Voting and ballot procedures Security Council deliberations

Page
First Year, Second Series, Supplement No. 4
Second Year, Special Supplement No. 3
Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securite:
Premiere Annee, Deuxieme Serie, Supplement N04
Deuxieme Annee, Supplement special No 3
The President unattributed #132894
There has been a suggestion that item 3 of the agenda should be discussed before item 2. As there is no objection, that suggestion will be followed. 1 Voir les Resolutions adoptees par l'Assemblee gene- rale pendant la seconde partie de sa premiere session,. No 40 (I). 1 ~ee Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly dunng the second part of its first session, No. 40 (I). CONSEIL DE SECURITE Tenue aLake Success, New-York, le mercredi 27 aout 1947, a15 heures. President: M. F. EL-KHOURI (Syrie). 343. Ordre du jour provisoire (document S/524) a) Rapport de M. Shushi Hsu, Rapporteur du Comite cl'experts (document 8/520)'. 344. Adoption de I'ordre du jour Mr. Hsu (Rapporteur of the Committee of Experts): On behalf of the Committee of Ex- perts, I have the honour to submit to the Presi- dent, and through him to the Security Council, the report on the rule, of procedure governing the admission of new Members, copies of which were distributed yesterday and are, I assume, in the hands of the members of the Council. This report has been prepared by the able Com- mittee secretariat. Its preparation is based upon the report of the Sub-C.,mmittee of the Committee of Experts which me~ with the General Assembly Committee, and upon the records of the Commit- tee of Experts. As far as I am aware, there is nothing substantially relevant that does not appear in it. As the members of the Council will see, the changes that have been proposed by the General Assembly Committee are not numerous, and none of these proposed changes is such that the Com- mittee of Experts would consider it unacceptable. The reason why the' Committee of Experts has been spared lengthy. deliberations is undoubtedly due to the good sense and co-operative spirit of the General Assembly Committee which readily accepted the views of the Committee of Experts as expressed by members of the Sub-Committee that met with it. It remains for me to draw the attention of the Security Council to the draft resolution on the question under d:,scussion which was submitted by the Chinese delegation,' and which is to be dis~ tributed shortly. I am instructed to say that this draft resolution is submitted with no other motive than to iacilitate the discussion in the Council. It is supposed to have summarized the recom- m~ndati<>ns of the Committee of E:xperts as given in the report I have had the honour to submit as Rapporteur. The Chinese delegation is aware that several delegations have made reservations on certain points. It would welcome any attempt to submit amendments.
The agenda was adopted as amended.
L'ordre du jour ainsi amende est adopte.
The President unattributed #132897
I have just received from"the Australian delegation amendments to the rules -of .procedure suggef;ted by the Committee of Experts, the Committee of the General Assembly, and the Committee of the Security Council. 2 I believe that. the representative of Australia wishes to give some explanation concerning these amendments. Colonel HODGSON (Australia) : When the President suggested to me privately that this item might be considered first because it could be easily and quickly decided upon, I did not share his optimism, because we have amendments to propose and because, in our opinion, the Security Council did not in any way confonn to resolution 3p (-I) of the General Assembly. M-. Hsu (Rapporteur du Comite d'experts) (traduit 'de l'anglais): Au nom clu Comite d'experts, j'ai l'honneur de soumettre au President et, par son intermediaire, au Conseil de securite, le rapport sur les articles du reglement interieur concernant l'admission de nouveaux Membres. Des exemplaires en ont ete ~istribues hier et je pense que les membres du Conseil en ont pris connaissance. Ce rapport, qui a ete soigneusement prepare par le secretariat du Comite, a ete etabli d'apres le rapport du Sous-Comite du Cumite d'experts qui s'est reuni :wec la Commission de procedure de l'Assemblee generale, et d'apres les proces-verbaux du Comite d'experts. J'estime que ce rapport contient taus les elements essentiels de la question. Ainsi que les membres du Conseil vont le constater, les modifications proposees par la Commission de l'Assemblee generale ne sont pas nombreuses et je crois que le Comite d'experts ne s'opposera a aucune d'elIes. C'est sans aucun doute grace au bon senset a l'esprit de cooperation de la .Commission de l'Assemblee generale que le Comite d'experts a pu eviter de 10nlSues deliberations. La Commission de l'Assemblee generale a accepte sans difficuIte les vues du Comite d'experts exposees par les membres du Sous-Comite avec lequel il s'est reuni. Il me reste a attirer l'attention du Conseil de securite sur le projet de resolution re1atif a cette question que la delegation cmnoise' a presente et qui doit etre distribue S0115 peu. Je suischarge de vous dite que ce projet de resolution vous est soumis uniquement pour faciIiter la discussion devant le Conseil. Ce projet vise a resumer les recommandations du Comite d'experts telIes qu'eIles apparaissent clans le rapport que j'ai eu I'honneur de lui soumettre en qualite de Rapporteur. La delegation chinoise n'ignore pas que plusieurs delegations onl: exprime des reserves sur certains points. EIIe est prete a accueiIIir tout amendement a ce sujet. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je viens de recevoir de la delegation australienne des a;mendements au reglement interieur propose par le Comite d'experts ainsi que par la Commission de l'Assemblee generale et la Commission du Conseil de securite. Je crois que le representant de l'AustraIie desire presenter quelques explications . a propos de ces amendements. Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): Le President se souvient certainement que 10rsqu'iI m'a dit officieusement qu'il s'occ~pe­ rait peut-etre en premier Heu de cette questIon! qu'iI pensait pouvoir regler rapidement, je n'al pas partage son optimisme. Nous avons en .effet des amendements a proposer et, a notre aVIS" l~ Conseil de securite ne s'est nuIlement conforme a la resolutiori 36(1) de I'Assemblee generale. 1 Pour le texte du projet de resolution de la Chine, voir page 2266. , Nous nous sommes aper~us que nous assistions a ce que nous pensions etre une seance commune, cinq membres representant' I'Assemblee et trois membres representant le Conseil de securite. Les propositions australiennes n'ont pas ete examinees en detail. Les membres representant le Conseil n'ont fait qu'ecouter ce que la Commission de I'Assemblee avait a. clli:c. De plus, nous nous sommes trouves dans cette situation surprenante ou il nous a ete donne d'entendre certail1s membres de la Commission de I'AssembIee - ou du moins !'un d'entre eux - defendre la these du Conseil de securite bien qu'il fUt la pour representer I'AssembIee. Deux autres membres ont ex· prime I'avis que la Commission de l'AllsembIee ne devait voter aucune resolution risquant de'ne pas . We fQund that we were attending what we thought was a joint meeting, five members representing .the Assembly and three representing the Security Council. The Australianprop~alswere not f.ully taken into considerfttion. The members representing the .Council merely listened to what the Assembly Committee had to say. ¥oreover, we were in the extraordinary position .of hearing some members of the Assembly Committee-or, at any rate, one member-arguing the case of the Security Council, although he was there to represent the Assembly. Two other members ~~pressedthe opinion that the Assembly Committee should not pass any resolution which the Security Council might not like. co~enirau Conseil de securite. Then there was another extraordinary thing: When the report came before the Committee of Experts, we said that we should like to put our proposals before the President of the Security· Council so that the Council would be aware of them. Mter a long debate-and despite the fact that this same Committee had accepted and considered the Belgian proposal, which was not even the subject of recommendation by the General Assembly, and had included it in its report-the Committee voted not to hear the Australian proposals at all, or rather, the vote was equal and the Chairman cast his vote against hearing the Australian proposals. Un autre fait extraordinaire s'est egalement pro· duit: lorsque le rapport a ettS presente au Comite d'experts, nous avons declare gue nous airoerions soumettre nos propositions au President du aonseil de securite de mamere que le Conseil en ait con·, naissance. Apres un long debat et en depit du fait' que ce mem~ Qomite avait accepte la proposition beIge sans qu'eIle eut T..leme fait I'objet d'lL'1e recommandation de la part de l'AssembIee generale, en depit du fait que le Comite avait discute cette proposition et I'avait incorporee dans son rapport, le Comite a decide par un vote de ne pas prendre connaissance des propositions australiennes ou plus exactement, Ies voix ont ete partagees de fa~on egale ~t le President a vote contre I'examen de ces propositions. We think that is very unfair. It was very wrong for the Committee of the Security Council to pass the resolution they did, and, inStead of conferring, Nous trouvons qu'il y a la trop de partialite. La Commission du Conseil de securite a eu grand tort de voter la resolution qu'elle a votee et au lieu de se concerter avec leg interesses, de se borner a sieger, a ecouter et a refuser ensuite d'examiner nos propositions. En consequence, il ne reste rien d'autre a ma delegation que de soumettre ces pro· positions au Conseil de securite sous forme d'amendements au rapport. ~erely to sit and listen, and then refuse to con· slder these proposals. Therefore, there is nothing else for my delegation to do but to bring its proposals now before the Security Council, in the form of amendments to the report. . ~s the Council knows, for the two years during whIch the United Nations has been in existence, Le Conseil n'est pas sans I'ignorer, depuis deux ans que I'Organisation des Nations Unies existe, mon Gouvernement a pris I'initiative de s'opposer au 'reglement interieur provisoire actuel regissant I'admission des nouveaux Membres". C'est en rai· son de cette insistance au cours de la derniere session de l'AssembIee generale que la Commission ~y Government has taken the initiative in opposmg the present provisional rules of procedure governing the adniission of new Members: It was' as a result of that opposition during the last session of the General Assembly that the Committee to - d 1 ~ee Resolutions a...dopted by the General Assembly urmg the second part of its first session, No. 36 (I). 1 Voir le~ Resolutions adoptees par l'AssembUe generale pendant la seconde partie de sa premiere, session, No 36 (1). . "Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securite, Premiere Annee, premiere serie, No 34; ibid., No 35; ibid., Premiere Annee, deuxieme serie, No 3; ibid., No 4, 55eme seance; ibid., No 5, 57eme seance; ibid., Supplement No 4, Appendice 1; ibid., Deuxieme Annee, No 38; ibid., No 42, 136eme seance; ibid., No 55, 152eme seance; ibid., No 56, 154eme seance; ibid., No 60; ibid., Supplement special No 3, page 20 et Appendice 14. ( Y 'See. Officia,l· Records of the Security Council, First Sear,lust ~enes, No. 34; ibid., No. 35; ibid., First Year, Neon SerIes, No. 3; ibid., No. 4, 55th meeting; ibid., I ~}d 5~h meeting; ibid., Supplement No. 4, Appendix u: 1 I••! econd Year, No. 38; ibid., No. 42, 136th meet- . m~; .tbld.~ !;lo. 55, 152nd meeting; ibid.,. No. 56, 154th As the Council will note, the first amendment is a new rule 114. I am not going to spend very much ti:l~e on this because the members, of the Council are all conversant with the Australian point of view: we wish to see that the application goes to the General Assembly. If the Assembly passes' it on to this Council by a large or overwhelming vote, it will, at least, have a great moral influence and effect, and probably no veto could b;:: given in the face of the democratically expressed desire of the Assembly. _ The second important amendment provides that the Security Council confine itself to the ambit of its own jurisdiction in r(>gard to the admission of new Members. We have always taken the view that the Security'Council has specific powers and no general or reserve powers, and, as far as the admission of new Members is concerned, the Sec~rity Council should confine itself to the questions: Is the applicant a peace-loving State; can it fulfil its obligations under the Charter in r~spect to the maintenance of peace and secullity? Article 4 of the Charter clearly states that it is for the Organization to decide whether a State is willing and able to fulfil all the obligations of the Charter. The Security Council, acting within its functions, can decide only whether the State is able to carry out the security pr6vis~ons. ' What did we find? During the recent discussions on the admission of new Membezos, we found questions hrought up in regard to the fact that the State had no respect for human rights, whkh matter relates to the social sections of the Charter; we found consideration of criteria, such as the absence of diplomatic relations, that were outside the provisions of the Charter; there were questions concerning the fact that we had little information about the State, or that the State did not appoint foreign representatives, as in the case of Mongolia. Whether these facts were relevant or not, I do not know. But it seems to the Australian delegation that most of the points of view, or reasons, were not the concern of the Security Council and should not have been the basis for its opinion and for the vote of the members. Therefore, we have drafted rule 59 and the first, fourth -and fifth _paragraphs of rule 60, to read as follows: Pour ce qui est du premier de ces amendements le ConseiI remarquera qu'il s'agit d'un article nou~ veau, 1'article 114. Je n'y consacrerai pas beaucoup de temps parce que les membres du Conseil connaissent tous parfaitement le point de vue austra. lien qui est de veiIIer a ce que la demande d'admission soit presentee a I'AssembIee generale. Si l'AssembI6e la transmet a ce Conseil a la suite d'un vote pris a une forte ou a une tres forte majorite, cela aura du moins une grande port~e et un grand effet au point de vue moral et il est probable qu'aucun veto ne pourra ctre applique du fait du desir de I'AssembIee ainsi exprime de fa~on democratique. Le second amendement important pi'l~voit que le Conseil de securite devra rester dans les limites de sa propre competence en ce qui concerne l'admission des nouveaux Membres. Nous avons tOUjOUfS estime que le Conseil de securite possede des pouvoirs hien determines et qu'il ne dispose d'aucuns pouvoirs generaux ou implicites; pour ce qui est de l'admission des nouveaux Membres, le Conseil de securite devrait se borner aux questions suivantes: L'Etat qui fait la demande est-il un Etat pacifique? Est-i1 en mesure de remplir ses obligations en vertu de la Charte, en ce qui con· cerne le maintien de la paix et de la securite? L'Article 4 de la Charte declare nettement que c'est a l'Organisation des Nations Unies qu'il ap· partient de determiner si un Etat est dispose a rempIir toutes les obligations de la Charte et en mesure de le faire. Le Conseil de securite agissant dans le cadre de ses attributions, ne peut decider que de la question de savoir si l'Etat est ameme de se conformer aux clauses relatives a la stcurite. O~, que s'est-il produit? Au cours des recentes discussions sur l'admission des nouveaux Membres, on a souleve diverses questions. On a fait remarquer que tel Etat ne respectait pas les droits de 1'homme, - ce ~ui re!eve des dispositions de la Charte relatives aux questions sociales, On a invoque des' criteriums tels que 1'absence de relations diplomatiques, - ce qui ne rentre pas du tout dans les dispositions de la Charte. On a fait ressortir que nOU8 ne disposions que de peu de renseignements a l'egard de tel Etat ou que tel autre Etat ne nommait pas de representants a l'etranger, COIfuile dans le cas de la Mongolie. Je 'ne sais pas si ces faits etaient ou non. pertinents, mais il semble a la delegation australienne que l~ plupart des considerations exprimees et des r~­ sons invoquees n'etaient pas du ressort du Co~sed de securite et qu'elles n'auraient pas du sel'Vll' ~ etabIir I'opinion de cet organe ni donner lieu a un vote de ses membres. Voila pourquoi nous avons propose pour l'article 59 et les paragraphes premier, quatrieI1)-e et cinquieme de 1'article 60 la redaction qui SUlt: "(a) The question whether the applicant is a peace-loving State; "(b) The ability of the applicant State to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations so far as such obligations relate to' the maintenance of international peace and security." From the legal point of view, my de-legation has given the closest consideration to these proposed amendments. They are quite within the Charter. There is nothing whatever in the Charter contrary to these proposals. If it is the Council's wish that they should be put into effect, that the democratic majority should prevail and that these deadlocks should be avoided, here is, in our opinion, a practical method of overcoming our present difficulties to a large extent. It may be said that there might be a delay, because the applications would have to go to the Assembly first. But I would remind the Cm.!!lcil iliat there is now a delay of a~year in decisions on applications going , to the Assem,bly; and even this Council usually does not start considering applicatio:r~ until about the month of August, just prior to the A.ssembly meeting, From the practical point of view, that argument does not seem sound to us. The only thing which seems clear is that, if the Ul1ited Nations wished a State to be admitted after the Assembly had passed on the application, it would be necessary for the Security Council to meet during the session of the General Assembly to pass judgment on the applications. referred to it by the Assembly. I do not wish to say anything further at this stage. I do not know whether the Council wishes to .consider or to defer these amendments, but I place them before the Council for its consideration. Je ne desire rien d4'e de plus pour le moment. J'ignore si le Conseil est pret a examiner maintenant ces amendements ou en remettre l'examen a plus tard, mais je les soumets au Conseil pour qu'il les prenne en consideration.
The President unattributed #132902
When I stated that item 3 of the agenda w~uld be discussed before item 2, I did not know that new amendments would be presented. Practically the same amendments were presented to the General Assembly's Committee on Procedure for the Admission of New Members, and they were considered there. Some of those amendments were incozporated in the final resolutions adopted by that Committee.' Then,. the Security Council's Committee took tliem into consideration; and the joint committee accepted the result, which was adopted by the Committee of Experts. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'ang1ais): Lorsque j'ai declare que le trolsieme point de 1'0rdre du jour serait discute avant le deuxieme point, je: ne savais ,pa~ que 1'0n aUaitpresenter de nouveaux amendements. Ce sont pratiquement les memes amendements que ceux qui ont ete pr,esentes a la Commission-de procedure de 1'.A...ssembIee generale pour l'admission des nouveaux Membres et que cette Comr.nission a examines. Certains de ces amendements ont ete incorpores dans les resolutions finales adoptees par cette Commission'. Le Comite du Conseil de securite les a ensuite examines; et la commission mixte a accepte le texte elabore qui a ete finalement adopte par le Comite d'experts. Now, the representative of Australia wishes that thest same amendments which were presented before the aforementioned Committees should be discussed again in the Security Council. I am ready to comply with his desiresaud shall put them to the vote, one hy one, if he wishes, before a vote is tak~n on the report of the Committee of Experts. Or, le representant de l'Australie desire"'lue ces . memes amendements qui ont ete presentes aux Commissions ci-dessus mentionnees soient a nouveau discutes au Conseil de securite. Je suis pret a acceder a son desir et je vais, s'il le veut bien, les mettre aux voix un par un avant qu'un vote n'intervienne sur le rapport du Comite d'experts. "a) la question de savoir si l't:tat qui fait la demance est un Etat pacifique; "b) la question de savoir si l'Etat qui fait la demande est capable de remplir les obligations de la Charte dans la mesure ou ces obligations inte-- ressent le maintien de la paix et de la securite internationales." Du point de vue juridique, ma delegation a examine de tres pres ces p1'Ojets d'amendement. Ils sont tout a fait conformes a la Charte. Il n'y a absolument rien dans la Charte qui soit contraire a ces propositions. Si le Conseil desire qu'il lui soit donn~S suite, que .ce soit la majorite demo: cratique qui irhmphe et que 1'0n evite I'impasse, noUs affirmons qu'il y a la un moyen de vail;,;re la difficulte dans une large mesure. On pourra dire que cette procedure implique un certain deIai puisque les demandes d'admission devraient etre presentees tout d'abord a l'AssembIee. Mais je rappdlerai au Conseil que, de toute maniere, il s'eccule actuellement un delai d'un an avant que les demaI;ldes soier.~ presentees a l'AssembIee; .enm core ce Conseil.ne cOmmence-toil genera!ement pas axaminer les demandes d'acImission avant le mois d'aoiit, juste avant la reunion de l'AssembIee. Du point de vue pratique, l'argument ne nom; semble donc pas valable. La seule chose qui nous apparaisse clairement, c'est que si les Nations Unies desirent qu'un Etat soit arlmis comme Membre apres examen par l'AssembIee, il serait necessaire que le Conseil de securite se reunlt pendant la session de l'Assemblee generale afin de statueI' sur les demandes d'admission que lui'trailsmet l'Assemblee. Furthermore, I do not think this is really the time or the place to take up these points. The Australian representative is bringing forward proposals which have already bee:n rejected. It is the view of my delegation that he should bring them up again, if he so chooses, in the General Assembly. This is hardly the place to enter into a lengthy discussion with a view to our making a decision on matters which have already been rejected in substance. It seems to me that that would be a waste of time on our part. I should be interested to know whether I am wrong in my idea that it is not proper procedure to amend a report submitted to the Council by a committee. The PRRSIDENT: In reply to the question raised by the representative of the United States as to whether the Security Coundl is entitled to discuss and amend a :report of a committee, I should like to say that the Council is entitled to do so in view of the two different matters dealt with in this report. One of them has to do with. recommendations to the General Assembly to modify or amend its rules of procedure. It is the Security Council which will make these recommendations, not the subordinate Committee which has submitted the report. Therefore, before making the recommendations, the Security Council may wish to amend in certain respects the proposals made by the subordinate Committee. The second subject dealt with in the report has to do with certain amendments to the rules of procedure ot the Security Council. It is up to the Council to make the final decision on the amendments proposed by the subordinate Committee. I therefore consider that the Security Council is authorized to make amendments, if it deems them advisable or necessary, and that it acts within its jurisdiction in so doing. M:,. JOHNSON (United States of America): I wish to thank the President for his explanation. I had not considered my query as anything except a point of procedure. Obviously, the Council may amend recommendations which have been submitted for its approval and which may go to the General Assembly. That was not the question I had in mind. The question I meant to raise was whether, as a matter of form, we could amend a report of a committee. That is only a technical point, but the fact is that I do not see how it can be done. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I wish to say a few words about the Australian amendments. These amendments have already been considered and rejected by most of the representatives in the appropriate Committee. To reconsider them in De plus, je ne crois pas que ce soit id ni le moment, ill le lieu qui conviennent a l'examen de ~es questions. Le representant de l'Australie pren sente des propositions. qui ont deja et£: rejetees. Ma delegation est d'avis que c'est devant l'AssembIee generale qu'ie devrait les presenter a nouveau s'il le desire. L'endroit est mal choisi pour entarp.er une 10ngue discussion dans le but de decider de questions qui ont deja ete rejetees quant au fend. Il me semble que cela ne serait qu'une perte de temps. Je serais heureux de savoir si je me trompe en pensant qu'il n'est pas de bonne procedure d'amender un rapport soumis au Conseil par un comite. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): En reponse a la question soulevee par le rep.l'esentant des Etats-Unis qui demande si le Conseil de securite a le droit de discuter et d'amender le rapport d'ull comite, je tiens a preciser que le Conseil est en droit de le faire du fait que ce rapport traite de deux questions differentes. L'une p.:Jrte sur les recommandations faites a I'AssembIee generaie de modifier ou d'amender son reglement interieur. C'est au Conseil de securite a faire ces recommandations et non pas au Comite subordonne qui a f'oumis le rapport. En consequence, avant de faire ues recommandations, il peut arriver que le Conseil de securite desire amender a certains egards les propositions faites par le Comite qui lui est subordonne. Le second sujet dont traite le rapport interesse certains amendements au re:glement interieur du C( llseil de securite. C'est au Conseil qu'il appartient de prendre la decision finale sur les amendements pro)?oses par le Comite qui lui est subordonne. J'~stime done que le Conseil de securite a le droit d'apporter des amendements s'il les jMge opportuns ou necessaires et qu'illeste dans les Hmites de sa competence en procedant de la sorte.. M. ]OHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais): Je tiens a xemercier le President des explications qu'il m'a fournies. La question que je posais n'etait a mon sens rien d'autre qu'un point de procedure. Il est evident que' le Comeil peut amender les recommandations qui ont e~e soumises a son approbation et qui sont susceptibles d'etre presentees a I'AssembIee generale. Ce n'etait pas la question que j'avais a l'esprit. La question que je desirais soulever c'etait celIe de savoir s'il est admis que nous puissions amender le rapport d'un comite. Il ne s'agit la que cl'une question technique mais je ne vois pas comment on peut la resoudre. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socia~­ tes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Je vouclraIS dire quelques mots a propos des amendements a~s­ traliens. Ces amendements ont deja fait l'obJet d'un examen, et la majorite du Comite qui s'en, est occupe ne les a pas acceptes. Un nouve! ex:... As regards the substance of the Australian. amendments (it would be difficult to discuss them in detail, even if we decided to do so, as we have received them only today), a quick glance at them shows that they are not in agreement with the ,procedure laid down by the Charter of the United Nations for considering the admission of new Members to the Organization and, in a number of essential points, they even conflict with the procedure laid down by the Charter. My comment refers to the substance of these amendments. But I repeG\t that, in my view, we should be acting correctly if We did not discuss these amendments at all, and if we approved the agreed report submitted to us by the Committee of Experts. When we discuss this report, I shall make another statement about a ~tain rule, namdy rule 116. Au moment de la discussion de ce rapport, je ferai une observation apropos d'u.n des articles, a savoir I'article 116.
The President unattributed #132905
In the circumstances, after hearing the remarks and comments that have been made, perhaps 'the Australian representative will kindly withdraw his amendments for the time being, and reserve his right to re-introduce them in the General Assembly, jf he so wishes. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'ang1ais): Dans I'etat actuel des choses, apres avoir entendu les remarques et les commentaires qui viennent d'etre faits, le representant de l'Australie youdra peutetre avoir l'obligeance de retirer ses amendem(;:nts pour le moment et de reserver son droit de les presenter a nouveau devant l'Assemblee generale s'ille desire. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): The only re- • marks I have heard indicate very clearly that the two members who have spoken do not understand the situation. These ndes have never beeD rejected by any member of the Security Council; they have not even been considered by the Security Council or any of its committees; so they have never been rejected. As I clearly told the Council, the Committee of Experts refused even 00 consider them; that is why I had to bring them here. Mr. Gromyko said that we could not examine these amendments again. These amendments have never been before the Security Council. But I will indi- Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'ang1ais): Des remarques que j'ai e:Q.tendues, il ressort tres nettement que les deux membres qui ont parle ne compl'ennent pas la situation. Ces articles du reglement n'ortt jamais ete rejetes par un membre du ConseiI de securite, et le Conseil de securite, ni aucune de ses commissions, ne les a meme jamais examines; ils n'ont jamais ete rejetes. Ainsi que, je I'ai nettement expose au Conseil, le Comite d'experts a refuse de les examiner et c'est la raison pour laquelIe j'ai du le~ soulever ici. M. Gromyko a declare quril ne nous etait pas possible d'examiner it nouveau ces amendements. Or, ces amendements n'ont jamais e16 soumis au ConseiI de securite. Mais je ''1ais indiquer un moyen qui nous permettra de sortir de cette diffi~ eulte et qui repondra ega,lement it la question soulevee par M. Johnson. Je voudrais indiquer qu'it la Commission de l'AssembIee generale, le representant de I'URSS , a repete a de multiples reprises que ces amendements etaient en contradiction avec la Charte. Maintes fois, nous I'avons mis au defi de montrer .' en quol ces amendements etaient contraires it la Charte et il ne I'a pas fait. M. Gromyko lui-mem(? a repris ces memes termes. Avant de continueI', j'aimerais savoir en quoi ces amendements sont contraires it la Charte. c~te one way in which we may get out of that dIfficulty and also meet the point raised by Mr. Johnson. I should like to say that, i~ the General Assembly .Committee, the representative of the USSR agam and again said, OIl a point of substance, that these amendments were in contradiction to the Chart~. We challenged him again and again to show m what way they contradicted the Charter and he failed to do so. Mr. Gromyko himself used the same:;'sentence; and before we pass on, I should like 'to know where the aulendments are in contradiction to the Charter. !'eataw "" En ce qui concerne la substance des amendements australiens, il serait difficile de les examiner en detail, meme si nous decidions de le faire, car ils ne nous ont ete soumis qu'aujourd'hui. Toutefois, il suffit de les parcouri;r rapidement pour se rendre compte qu'ils ne cadrent pas avec la methode que nous prescrit la Charte des Nations Unies en ce qui conceme l'examen de I'admission de nouveaux. Membres it I'Orgamsation; sur un certain nOlJlbre de points importants, ces amendements sont contraires a la procedure arretee par la Charte. La x'emarque que je viens de faire porte eu fait sur le fond des amendement~ australiens. Mais il me sembie - et je l'ai deja dit - qu'il 'l7auctrait mieux renoncer a la discussion de res amendements et appmuver le rapport sur lequel les membres du Comite cl'experts se sont rIDs d'accord. stru~ted to negotiate with the General Assembly Committee for its acceptance of the following changes submitted by the delegation of Australia." If that text is accepted, the amendments will go to the Committee of Experts. If the teAt is not accepted, we reserve our position to take up the matter in the General Assembly. Naturally, we have that right. I believe that the procedure which I have outlined is the quickest and easiest course for the Council to follow at the present time.
The President unattributed #132907
It seems that the representative of Australia has complied with the suggestion made by the representative of the United States that he submit his proposals as an amendment to the Chinese draft resolution, which will be reexamined and taken into consideration by the Sub-Committee of the Committee of Experts. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): It seems to me that there is nothing in common between the opinion which the representative of the United States expressed here, and the Australian representative's proposal. The representative of the United States expressed the opinion that these amendments should not be considered, and that the Australian delegation could, if it wished, raise this question again in the Assembly. What the Australian representative now proposes amounts to a suggestion that the Australian proposals should be recommended for adoption, in'the same way as the agreed proposals which we have received from the Committee of Experts. The Australian amendments would be placed on the. same footing. I do not think the Security Council can take such actiol'l~, that is, to recommend without discussion that the Australian amendments should be adopted or considered for adoption. If the Australian representative insists on their discussi0n, then it will be necessary to have a special debate on them in the Security Council. The best and, it seems to me, the proper decision would be not to consider them at all, as they have already been considered by the Committee of the Assemblr and have been rejected. I repeat: they have been rejected by the Committee of the Assembly. I see no sense in considering them a second time. Moreover, on their merits they are also unacceptable as, in their most important points, they conflict with the procedure laid down by the Charter.
The President unattributed #132910
The ,,~presentativeof Australia expressed the wish to submit his proposals as an amendment to the Chinese resolution. If he still adheres to that wish, I shall put to the vO,te the question as to whether or not the Council accepts this amendment as a whole. I asked the representative of Australia if he wished to have his proposal voted on point by point and he said that he did Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'ang1ais): Il semble que le representant de l'Australie se soit confonne a la suggestion du representant des Etats-Unis en soumettant ses propositions en tant qu'amende. ment au projet de resolution de la delegation chi· noise qui doit etre examine a nouveau par le sous-comite du Comite d'experts. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiqlles socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Il n'y a rien de commun, me semble-t-il, entre I'opinion expri. mee ici par le representant des Etats-Unis et la proposition du representant de l'Australie. Le re· presentant des Etats-Unis est d'avis de ne pas examiner ces amendements et de laisser ala dele· gation de I'Australie la possibilite de soulever a nouveau cette question devant l'Assemblee generale, si tel est son desir. Quant au representant de l'Australle, il nous propose de recommander l'adoption de ces propositions ainsi que de celles dont nous a saisis le Comite d'experts. Ses amendements se trouveraient ainsi places sur le meme plan que ces dernieres. A mon avis, le Conseil de securite ne peut agir de la sorte: il ne peut recommander ni I'adoption des amendements australiens, ni un examen en vue de leur adoption, sans les avoil' etudies luimeme. Si le representant de I'Australie insiste pour que ses propositions soient examinees, il faudrait que le Conseil de securite procede a une etude speciale acet dIet. Il me semble, toutefois, que la meilleure solution eonsisterait a ne pas examiner les propositions australiennes, etant donne qu'elles ont deja fait l'objet d'un examen ala Commission de l'Assemblee et qu'elles ont ete rejetees. Je repete: elle~ ont ete rejetees pal la Commission de i'Assemblee. A mQn avis, nous n'avons aucun interet 'a les examiner encore une fois. De plus, elles sont inacceptables quant au fond, car les plus importantes des dispositions qu'elles contiennent sont contraires a ~a l'I\ethode prevue par la Charte. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'ang1ais): Le representant de l'Australie exprime le desir de sou; mettre ses propositions en tant qu'amendement a la resolution de la delegation chinoise. Si tel est toujours son desir, je vais mettre aux voix la q~es· tion de savoir si le Conseil accepte ou non l'ensemble de eet amendement. J'ai demande au representant de I'Australie s'il desirait que sa p~:..! Mr. KATz-SUCHY (Poland): I should like to know how these amendments will be incorporated in the Chinese resolution, if the Council adopts them. The PRESIDENT: If the amendments should be adopted by the Council, the report of the corn-I mittee of Experts and the Chinese resolution would b~ cancelled, and a new decision w.ould be taken by the Security Council concerning a new form for the rules of procedure of the Security Council and of the General Assembly. That would be the result. Therefore, if the Council knows what the result will be, it will know how to vote. M. KATz-SUCHY (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglais): Je tiendrais a savoir comment ces amendements seront inseres dans la resolution chinoise si le Conseil les adopte. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Si les amendements sont adoptes par le Conseil, le rapport du Comite d'experts et la resolution chinoise se trouveront annuIes et une nouvelle decision du Conseil de secu..;te devra intervenir relativement aune nouvelle redaction du reglement interieur du Conseil de securite et de l'AssembIee generale~ Tel serait l'aboutissement de la procedure suivie: en consequence, si le Conseil s~it a que! resultat il aboutit, il saura comment voter.. Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): Que'le President me pardonne, mais je ne crois pas que 1'explication qu'il vient de donner soit tout afait exacte. L'adoption des amendements n'annulera ni le rapport du Coniite d'experts, ni le projet de resolution soumis par le representant .de la Chine, parce que ce rapport contient certaines de nos propositions qui ont ete acceptees. Cependant, etant donne que le rapport n'a pas apporte a la situation des modifications suffisantes, nous avons soumis ces amendements additionnels afin de renforcer le rapport. ' Colonel HODGSON (Australia) : With all respect, I do not think that is quite correct. The adoption of L1.ese amendments would not cancel either the report of the Committee of Experts or the draft resolution submitted by the Chinese representative, because the report contains some of our own proposals which have been accepted. However, because the report did not go far enough in rectifying the situation, we submitted these additional amendments to strengthen the report. Ce que nOllS suggerons simplement, c'est que le President procede point par point et qu'illes mette alL'\: voix. S'ils sont acceptes, ils seront renvoyes au Comite d'experts en vue de nouvelles discussions avec la Commission de l'Assemblee generale; mais ils n'auront pas encore force executoire. All we suggest is that the President should take up these points one by one and Plrt them to a vote. If they are accepted, they will go to the Committee of Experts for discussion with the Committee of the General Assembly; they will still not be binding. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Nous al- Ions voter sur les amendements de la delegation . australienne. Nons les mettrons aux voix l'uD apres 1'autre. Je commence par le premier.
The President unattributed #132913
We shall proceed to a vote on the Australian amendments. We shall vote on the amendments one by one. I shall put the first amendment to a vote. 11 est prdcCde au vote a main levee. 11 y a 3 voix pour,. zero contre et 8 abstentions. N~ayant pas obtenu le vote affirmatif de sept membres, l'amendement n'est pas adopte. . A vote was taken by a show of hands. There were 3 votes in favour, none against, and 8 abstentions. The amep,dment was rejec.ted, having failed to obtain the affirmatir..e votes of seven members. • Votes for: Australia, Colombia, France.- Votent pour: Australie, Colombie, Fran~e. S'abstienneni: Beigique, Bresil, Chine, Pologne, Syrie, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Ums d'Amerique. Abstentions: Belgium, Brazil, China, Poland, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America.
The President unattributed #132915
I shall now put the second amendment to a vote. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je mets aux voix le deuxieme amendement. 11 est procede au vote cl main levee. 11 y a 3 . voix pour, 1 contre et 7 abstentions. N'ayant pas obtenu le vote affirmatif de sept membres, l'amendement n'est pas adopte. A vote was taken by a show of hands. There u;ere 3 votes in favour, one against, and 7 abstentzons. The amendment was rejected, having failed to obtain the affirmative votes of seven members. Votes for: Australia, Colombia, France. Votent pour: Australie, Colombie, France. Vote against: United Kingdom. Vote contre: le Royaume-Uni. ~bstentions: Belgium, Brazil, China, Poland, Syna, Union. of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America. S'abstiennent: Belgique, Br€:sil, Chine, Pologne, Syrie, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. Abstentions: Belgium, Brazil, China, Poland, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America.
The President unattributed #132917
I shall' now put the fourth amendment to a vote. A vote was taken b'Y a show of hands. There were 3 vote~ in favour, none against, and 8 abstentions. The amendment was rejected, having failed to obtain the affirmative votes of seven members. Votes for: Australia, Colombia, France. Abstentions: Belgium, Brazil, China, Poland, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist ·Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated from Frenllh): As proposed by the Belgian representative in the Committee of Experts, that Committee is submitting for the approval of the Security Council an amendment to .rule 58 of the Council's rules of procedure. I shQuld like to give a few brief e~lanations of the scope of this ainendment. Under the present system, the date of the Assembly's decision on the admission of a State to the United Nations is not necessarily the date on which that State becomes a Member of the Organization. As it is worded at present, rule 116 of the Assembly's nl1es of procedure provides that the State concerned acquires membership only on the date on which it presents to the Secretary- General an instrument of adherence. This method is not in conformity with the provisions of the Charter. In the first place, the procedure of accession is not mentioned in Chapter XIX of the Charter, which provides only for that of signature followed by ratification. Secondly, Article 4, paragraph 2, which deals specifically with the method of admission by decision' of the Assembly, provides that the admission is effected, not by a subsequent act of the State concerned; but by a decision of the Assembly its~lf. • The present system, moreover, is liable, to give rise to serious practical difficulties. 'll'he acquisition of membership does not coincide with the Assembly's decision, since the State concerned submits its instrument of adherence after that decision. In the interval, the status of that country remains indeterminate; it is not even certain that the State will present its instrument of adherence. If the Assembly remains in this state of ignorance, it .cannot count on the participation of the State it has just admitted in establishing the budget. Furthermore, it cannot be sure that, as a result of its constitutional set-up, the Stat~ concerned will not include reservations and limitations in its instrument of adherence which might prove to be incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations. The present system is therefore contrary to the Ch,arter and lays the burden of risk on the United Nations. The report before us is intended to re-establish constitutional regularity by modifying the rules of procedure of the Security Council and of the S:a.bstien.nent.: BeIg~que, .Bresil, C~e, Pologne, Syfle, Umon des. Republiques sOClalistes sovietiques, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Unis d'Amedque. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): ]e mets le quatrieme aplendement aux voix. 1l est procede au vote a main levee. Il 'Y a 3 voix pour, zero contre et 8 abstentions. N'a'Yant pas obtenu le vote affirmatit de sept membres, l'amendement n'est pas adopte. Votent pour: Australie, Colombie, France. S'abstiennent; BeIgique, Bresil, Chine, Pologne Syrie, Union des Republiques sociaIistes sovie: tiques, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. M. VAN L~NGENHOVE (Belgique): Le Comite d'experts, sur la proposition du representant de la Belgique en ce comite, sllumet a l'approbation du Conseil de securite un amendement a I'article 58 du reglenient interieur du ConseiI. ]e voudrais donner queIques breves explications au sujet de la portee de cet amendement. SeIon la methode actuellement suivie, la date de la decision par laquelle l'Assemblee prononce l'admission d'un Etat parmi les Nations Unies n'est pas necessairement la dflte a laquelle cet Etat devient Membre de I'Organisation. Dans sa teneur actuelle, l'article 116 du reglement interieur de l'Assemblee dispose, en effet, que l'Etat Interesse n'acquiert la qualite de Membre qu'a la date a laquelle il presente au Secretaire general un instrument d'adhesion. Or, cette methode n'est pas conforme aux dis· positions de la Charte. D'une part, le procede d,e I'adhesion n'est pas mentionne au Chapitre XIX de la Charte, qui ne prevoit que celui de la signature suivie d~ ratification. D'autre part, l'alinea 2 de son Article 4, special au mode d'admission par decision de I'Assemblee, prevoit que l'admission s'effectue, non pas par un acte ulterieur de l'Etat interesse, mais par la decision de l'AssembIee ellememe. "'- Le systeme actueI peut, d'ailleurs, donner lieu ade serieux inconvenients pratiques. L'acquisition de la qualite .de Membre ne coincide pas avec la decision de l'AssembIee, puisque I'Etat interesse depose son instrument d'adhesion posterieurement a cette decision. Dans l'intervalle, le statut de cet Etat :reste en suspens; il n'est meme par; certain qu'il deposera son instrument d'adhesion. L'AssembIee ne peut, dans l'ignorance ou dIe se trouye encore, tenir compte, dans l'etablissement du budget de I'Organisation, de la participation de I'Etat qu'elle vient d'admettre. Bien plus, elle n'a pas la certitude que le jeu de ses institutions constitutionnelles ne conduira pas cet Etat a consigner, dans son instrument d'adhesion, des reserves et limitations, lesquelles peuvent se reveler incompatibles avec la Charte des Nations Unies. Le systeme actuel est donc contraire ,\ la Charte et il met le risque a la charge de l'Organisation. . , Le rapport que nous avons sous les yeux vi~e a retablir la regularite constitutionnelle en modlfiant en consequence les reglements interieurs du Under the system proposed, the Assembly would 'have before it a declaration of the applicant State's position which it could revoke afterwards. In conformity with the intentions of the Cl;iarter, the final decision would rest with the Assembly, whereas, according to the present system, as I have just said, this decision rests with the ,State concerned. Le systeme preconise placerait done l'Assemblee en presence d'une prise de position que l'Etat requerant ne pourrait plus contester ulterieurement. Comme le veut la Charte, dIe laisserait a l'AssembIee 'la decision finale, tandis que, selon la pratique actuelle, comme je l'ai dit tout a l'heure, cette decision appartient a l'Etat interesse.
The President unattributed #132920
It is quite clear that the statement made by the representative of Belgium is already approved in the rules wh~ch have been presented by the Committee of Experts. It is simply an explanation and does not require any addition to the proposal of the Chinese delegation. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Il apparalt nettement que la declaration faite par le representant de la Belgique a deja ete appro'Uvee implicitement dans le projet de reglement qui a ete presente par le Comite d'experts. Ilne s'agit que d'une simple explication et il n'y a nul besoin d'un additif a la proposition de la delegation chinoise. . Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Re- M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Le nouvel article 116 approuve par la majorite du Comite d'experts prevoit qu'au cas ou le ConseiI de securite n'aurait pas pris de decision favorable au sujet d'une demande d'admission dans l'Organisation des Nations Unies, l'AssembIee generale pourrait, apres avoir etudie le rapport officiel du Conseil de securite, lui renvoyer ce rapport aux . fins d'un nouvel examen. Je doute fort qu'il soit opportun d'inserer cet article dans le texte. En effet, en toute logique,' nous devrions alors etablir des articles du meme genre prevoyant par exemple qu'apres avoir examine le rapport du Conseil de securite, I'Assemblee generale pourrait lui renvoyer ce rapport. Apres avoir examine les autres decisions que le Conseil de securite porte a sa connaissance ou soumet a son examen, l'AssembIee generale pourrait les lui renvoyer egalement en vue d'un second examen. opublics) (translated from Russian): The new rule 116 approved by a majority in the Committee of Experts lays down that, should the Secr;,rity Council not give a favourable ruling on an application for membership in the United Nations, the General Assembly could, after discussing the Security Council's official report, send the application back to the Security Council for reconsideration. I very much doubt the wisdom of including this rule, because, if we wish to be consistent, we shall have to have a series of similar rules which will say, for example, that, after discussing the Security Council's report, the General Assembly may send the question back to the Security Council. Mter discussing other decisions of the Security Council which are communicated for information or, say, ror discussion, the General Assembly may also send these questions back to the Security Council for reconsideration. Hence, to single out one question and to say that the General Assembly may return it to the Security Council for further consideration, not to Ainsi done, il ne serait pas logique d'isoler une question et d'affirmer que l'Assemblee generale peut la renvoyer au Conseil de securite en vue d'un nouvel examen, sans mentionner en meme temps d'aut.res cas analogues qui pourraient se produire. Je ne nie· pas que l'Assemblee generale ait le droit, si elle le desire, de renvoyer au Consei1 de securite un rapport particulier, comme elle l'a fait l'annee derniere par exemple; ou plutot: qu'elle ait le droit de renvoyer non pas le rapport, mais les demandes d'admission qui avaient ete soumises par certaines delegations .c:t qui :Q.'avaient pas ete approuvees par.Ie Conseil de securite. Cela va de soi. ~ention other possibilities, is not logical or con- ~Is~ent. I ?o no~ deny the General Assembly's right, If It.conSIders It. desirable, to return, let us say, a speCIal report for the Security Council's consiperation,. as it did last year, for example; or, more pre~sel~, to return not a special report, but the applIcations submitted by certain States on which the Council did not ta.ke a favourable decision. That goes without saying. Thus, in principle, I am not against this recommendation, or against this rule; I only doubt that, for t~e reasons I have mention,ed, there is any neceSSIty for such a rule. If others think that such :rr ne m'oppose done pas, en prmClpe, a cette recommandation ou a cet article. Je doute Ilimplement de son utilite, et ce pour les raisons que je viens d'indiquer. Si les autres representants estiment qu'il y aurait lieu d'inserer cet article dans le texte, je ne m'y opposerai pas, bien que je n'en voie point l'utilite. ~ rule is needed, I am prepared to raise no objection, although it seems to me illogical.
The President unattributed #132925
The remark made by the USSR representative does not indicate or propose .that this rule should be deleted. I believe there is· no harm in keeping it, because it does not adversely affect any case. The General Assembly is always entitled to do such a thing, but in the face of possible opposition or possible objection in the Security Council on the ground that the decision of the Security Council is final, the existence of such a rule does not do any harm. For that reason, I shall put to the vote the Chinese draft'resolution (document S/528), which reads as follows: ' "1. That the Sub-Committee of the Committee of Experts be instructed to negotiate with the General Assembly Committee for its acceptance of rule 58,of the provisional rules of procedure of the Sec-urity Council as tentatively revised by the Committee of Ex;perts, and for its undertaking to effect necessary accompanying changes in rules 113 and 117 (originally rule 116) of the provisional rules of procedure of the General Assembly as suggested by the Committee of Experts; and, if the negotiation is not successful, to accept, on behalf of the Security Council, the change in rule 58 as previously proposed by the General Assembly Committee; "2. That, as regards proposals made by the General Assembly Committee concerning rule 60 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Secu- rity Council, dIe following recommendations to the Committee of Experts be accepted: "(a) That the change of the wor~ 'decide' to the word 'consider' in the first paragraph not be accepted; . "(b) That the addition of two paragraphs as paragraphs 2 and 3 be accepted; "(c) 'That the change of the word 'recom- mendations' from the plural to the singular be accepted; "3. That the Sub-Committee of the Committee -of Experts be instructed to advise the General Assembly Committee that the proposed change in rule 114 and the addition of a new rule 116 in the pJ:ovisional rules of procedure of the General Assembly are accepted."
"The Securit'y Council,
"Resolves:
A vote was taken qy show of hands. The reso- lution was adopted by 10 votes to none, with one abstention.
The President unattributed #132928
If there is no objection, the report of the Committee of Experts shall be considered approved by the Council. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Les remarques faites par le representant de I'URss n'indiquent ni ne proposent qu'il faiIle supprimer l'article vise. J'estime que nous pouvon'l> le Conserver parce qu'iI ne saurait nuire a la question. L'Assemblee generale a toujours le droit de faire une chose comme ceIle-la, mais etant don~e l'opposition ou les objections possibles au Conseil de securite du fait que cette decision est definitive, l'~xistence d'un tel article ne nuit en rien. ,- C'est pourquoi je mettrai aux voix le projet du resolution de la delegation chinoise dont void le texte (document S/528) : ':1. Que le Sous-Comite du Comite d'experts re~oive pour instructions de negocier avec la Com- mission de I'Assemblee generale que cette derniere accepte l'article 58 du reglement interieur provi- soire du Conseil de securite dans sa forme revisee proposee par le Comite d'experts et procede aux modifications qui en resuItent pour les articles 113, et 117 (anciennement 116) du reglement interieur provisoire de l'Assemblee generale proposees par le Comite d'experts et, dans le cas ou les negoda- tions n'aboutiraient pas, d'accepter au nom du Conseil de securite la modification de I'article 58 deja proposee par la Commission de I'AssembIee generale. "2. Que soient acceptees les recommandations suivantes du Comite d'experts relatives aux pro- positions de la Commission de I'Assemblee gene- rale au sujet de l'article 60 du reglement interieur provisoire du ConseiI de securite: "a) refuser de substituer le mot "examine" au root "decide'" . . , "b) accepter d'ajouter deux paragraphes nume- rotes 2 et 3; "c) mettre au singulier le mot "recommanda- tion" precedemment au plurieI. "3. Que le Sous-Comite du Comite d'experts re~oive pour instructions de faire connaitre a la Commission de l'Assemblee generale que la modi- fication proposee pour I'article 114 et l'addition cl'un article 116 nouveau au reglement interieur provisoire de l'Assemblee generale sont acceptees." Il est procBde au vote amain levee. Par 10 voix contre zero, avec 1 abstention, la resolution est d ' , a optee. I V otent pour: Belgique, BresiI, Chine, Colombie, France, Pologne, Syrie, Union des RepubIiqu~s sociaIistes sovietiques, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Ums d'Amerique. S'abstient: l'AustraIie. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'q,nglais): Sauf o~­ jection, le rapport du Comite d'experts sera Consl- dere comme adopte. Our {'~per~ence since January 1946, when the Security Council came into existence, h~s fur- nisted the L1ajority of the Council with sufficient proof of the inconvenience of the· unanimity rule of Article 27 of the Charter in its present wording. On several occasions the rule has been used against the wish of the majority of the Council and in order to frustrate a resolution accepted by the majority, on grounds inconsistent with the firm convictions of the majority of the Council. The majority felt disappointed on each of these occa- sions when its resolution was obstructed by the desire of one member. In some cases, the veto practice led to a deadlock on an important ques- tion, and put the Security Council in the awkward position of failing to cope with the requirements of the situation. '. . The General Assembly was mindful of these difficulties when, at its sixty-first plenary meeting, held on 13 December 1946, it adopted resolution 40 (I),' which was submitted to the President of the Security Council on 2 January 1947. The resolution "earnestly requests the permanen~mem- bers of the Security Council to make every effort , .. to ensure that the use of the special voting privilege . . . does not impede the Security Coun- cil in reaching decisions promptly; recommends to the Security Council the early adoption of prac- tices . . . consistent with the Charter, to assist in reducing the difficulties in the application of Article 27 and to ensure the prompt and effective exercise by the Security Council of its func- tions ..." L'Assemblee generale s'est souvenue de ces dif- ficultes en adoptant la resolution 40(1)1' lors de la soixante et unieme seance pIenU:re tenue le 13decembre 1946. Cette resolution a ete soumise au President du Conseil de securite le 2 janvier 1947. L'AssembIee generale "demande instamment aux membres permanents d).l Conseil de securite de s'efforcer ... de faire en'sorte que l'exercice du privilege du veto ... n'empeche pas le Conseil de securite de pr.endre des decisions rapides; recom· mande au Conseil de securite d'adopter sans delai des methodes . " conformes cl la Charte, qui per- mettent de faciliter l'application de I'Artic1e 27 et qui garantissent le fonctionnement rapide et ef.." ficace du Conseil ..." I I1 est a remarquer que ces recommandations de l'Assemblee generale aux membres permanents comme au Conseil de securite ont eu pour ainsi dire comme'seul resultat les abstentions opportu- nes qu'on a parfois relevees. Le Conseil de secu- rite doit maintenant discuter, au cours de cettc seance et des seances suivantes, et soumettre a l'AssembIee generale un rapport sur les' efforts qu'il a realises en execution de la resolution. It is to be noted that almost the only res4lt of these recommendations of the General Assembly to the permanent members, as well as to the Security Council, has been that there hav~ been abstentions in some cases, which proved helpful. The Security Council is now e~ected to discuss the matter in this and subsequent meetings, and to s.1.lbmit to the General Assembly a report on its efforts to comply with the resolution. !deem that it would be futile to resort to super- fiCIal measures which would not affect the clear implication of the free use of the veto hy any of the permanent members on any matrer which is not procedural, and the question whether a matter which is one of procedure or one of sub- stance is also subject to the unanimity rule. Je "Jis qu'il serait sans interet de recounr a des ml..uures superficieIles qui n'aura;ient pas pour effet de definir dairement le libre usage du veto de la part des membres permanents chaque fois qu'il ne s'agit pas d'une question de procedure. La distinction cl etablir entre ce qui est une question de fond et ce qui est une question de procedure est egalement soumise cl la regIe de I'unanimite. This being the position, the Security Council may now discuss the advisability or inadvisability ~ Le Conseil de securite peut.maintenant discuter de l'opportunite ou de l'inopportunite de recom- • 1 Voir les Resolutions adoptees par l'AssembUe gene- rale pendant la seconde partie de' sa premiere session. 1 ~ee Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly durIng the second part of its first session, Such suggestions, or others, for the amendment of Article 27, may be made by the Security Coun- cil, or amendment may be left to the consideration of the General Assembly. I mention- them now simply for the consideration of the Council and to start the deliberations. The verbatim record of this meeting will be submitted t6 the General As- sembly, with any other questions which the de- liberations may include. ~r. JOHNSON, (United States of America); Last December the General Assembly saw fit to approve a resolution regarding the voting pro- , cedure in the Security Council, which expressed the hope tJ.1at the use of the special voting privi- lege of the members of the Council would not further impede the Council's work. I feel confident that, a great majority of the Members of the United Nations share the hopes 'of my country that this desirable end may in some way be at- tained. My delegation regrets that to some extent these hopes have been dashed by the events of the last few months. As was stated by the President in his opening exposition, there is nothing which the Council can effectively do, as a body, in regard to the request of the General Assembly directed to 'the per- manent members of the Security Council in the secqnd paragraph of the Assembly's resolution. I understand that this matter has been placed on the supplementary list of the agenda of the'-forth- coming General Assembly, and it will undoubtedly be fully considered by the Assembly. The third and fourth paragraphs of the Assem- Les troisieme et quatrieme paragraphes de l~ bly's resolution were directed to the Security Coun- resolution de l'AssembIee s'adressaient au Consed cil itself. Those paragraphs recommended to the de securite lui-meme. Ces paragraphes recomman- Council the early adoption of procedures and prac- daient au Conseil d'adopter sans delai des proce- tices to assist in reducing the difficulties encoun- dures et des methodes permettant de, faciIiter tered in the application of Article 27 and to.· l'application de l'Article 27 et garantissant l'exer- ensure the prompt and effective exer.cise by the cice rapide et efficace des fonctions normales du Security Council of its normal functions. The reso- Conseil de securite. Cette resolution recommen- lution also recommended that, in developing- such dait egalement que, pour etablir ces methodes, le practices, the Council should take into considera- Conseil tienne compte des opinions exprimees pJ.lr tion the views expr(:~sed by various Members 'of divers Membres des Nations Unies au cours de la the United Nations during the second part of the seconde partie de la premiere session deI'Assem- first session of the General Assembly. blee generale. De telles propositions pour l'amendement de 1'Article 27 ou d'autres Articles peuventetre fai- tes par le Conseil de securit6 ou laissees a 1'~xamen de l'Assemhlee generale. Je n'en parle -id que pour inviter le Conseil a les prendre en considera- tion et a ouvrir le d6bat. Le compte rendu ste- nographique de cette seance sera soumis a l'As- semblee generale avec tous les prohlemes qui auront ete abordes au cours de la discussion. M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (tra. duit ,de l'ang1ais): En decembre dernier, l'Assem- blee generale a juge bon d'approuver une resolu-' tion concernant la procedure de vote au ConseiI de securite, qui exprimait l'espoir que l'emploi du droit de vote special des membres nu Conseil n'en- traverait plus ses travaux. Je suis sUr que la grande majorite des' Membres des NationsUnies espere, comme mon pays, que ce but si desirable PQurra etre atteint d'une fagon ou d'une autre. Ma delegation' regrette que ses esperances aient ete partieIlement degues par les evenements de ces derniers mois. Ainsi que l'a declare le 'Presil;lent dans l'expose qu'ir a fait a 1'ouverture de la discussion, le Con- seil, en tant qu'organe, ne peut prendre aucune mesure efficace en ce qui concerne la demande adressee par l'Assemblee generale, dans le deuxie- me paragraphe de sa resolution, aux membres permanents du Conseil de' securite. La question, si je suis bien informe, figure au supplement a 1'ordre du jour de la prochaine AssembIee gene- , rale, et elle sera sans aucun doute attentivement examinee par cette Assemblee. Because of the heavy pressure of other business which has come before the Council in recent months, the Council has not yet con~idered how it might further comply with the recommendations of the General Assembly. I should like respectfully to suggest to the Council that some action should be taken on these recommendations. In further- . ance of that idea, I venture to suggest that the third and fourth paragraphs of the General As- sembly resolution might be referred to 'the Com- mittee of Experts, with instructions to consider the matter and to make recommendations to the Secu- rity Council as to what action the Council might take' to comply with !pe recommendations of the General Assembly. En raison de la multiplicite des affaires qui lui lont ete soumises au cours de ces derniers mois, le Conseil n'a pas encore etudie la fa~on dont il pourrait se conformer aux reconimandations de l'Assemblee generale. Je voudrais proposer au Conseil, avec toute la deference que j'ai pour lui, de donner suite aces recommandations. A cet effet, je me permets de suggerer que les troisieme et quatrieme paragraphes dela resolution de I'As- semblee generale soient renvoyes au Comite d'ex- perts, en le chargeant d'e~aminer la question et de faire des recommandations au Conseil de secu- rite sur les mesures quece Conseil pourrait pren- dre afin de se conformer aux recommandations de I'Assemblee generale. For some tiq1e my Governme~t has been con- ridering this matter with attention, and has formu- lated certain draft proposals for additional rules of procedure of the Security Council on the sub- ject of voting: For the convenience of the mem... bers of the Council, and because the time before the convening of the Genera~ Assembly is short, the United States delegation will today circulate to the members of the Council copies of these draft proposals for amendments to the tules of pro- cedure. If the Security Council should see fit to refer this question to the Committee of E:lq)erts, the United States member of that Committee will formally put these proposals forwaI:d in that body. Depuis .quelque temps deja, mon Gouver~e­ ment etudie le probleme avec' attention et ila formu16 certains projets de proposition en VUle de completer les articles du reglement relatifs a la procedure de vote au Conseil de securite'. PmJr Ja commodite des membres du Conseil, et .etant donne le c~urt deJai qui nous reste jusqu'a la reunion de l'AssembIee generale, la delegation des Etats-Unis va faire distribueraujourd'hui aux membres du Conseil des exemplaires de cesprojets d'amendemen.t au reglement interieur. Si le Con- seil de securite jugeait bon d~ renvoyer cette ques- tion au Comite d'experts, le representant des Etats- Unis a ce Comite les lui seumettrait officiellement. The proposals are in draft form and are respect- fully offered for the consideration of the members of the Council. My delegation is aware that they can be greatly improved. We realize that the other delegations will want some time to. study this matter and perhaps to consult with their respective Governments. We therefore assume that the Com- mittee of Experts, if this task is assigned to it by the Council, will not be able to begin discussion of the matter immediately. We do not thirik that that constitutes a serious impediment, nor do we see any reason why the members of the Committee of Experts should not have the short vacation which'we hope evert0ne will have next week. In the meantime, .the various Governments could be considering these proposals and others which they may wish to present. There is no practical reason .why the Committee of Experts should not meet during the early days of the General Assembly s.ession, or shortly before it. I offer that merely as a suggestion. . Nos propositions se presentent sous forme de projet et nous avc~ns l'honneur de les soumettte a l'examen des membres du Consei!. Ma deIegation sait parfaitement qu'elles peuvent etregrandement ameliorees. Nous savonsque les autres delegations auront besoin d'un certain temps pour etudier ·la question et peut-etre pour consulter leurs Gouver- nements respectifs. Nous presumons donc que le Comite d'experts, si le ConseiI lui assigne cette tache, ne sera pas en mesure de commencer a la discuter immediatement. A notre avis, cela ne constitue pas une difficulte ~erieuse. Nous ne voyons d'autre part aucune raison pour que les 'm~mbresdu Comite d'experts ne jouissent pas des courtes vacances que tout le monde, esperons-le, pourra prendre la semaine prochaine. Dam 'l'in- tervaIle, les divers Gouvernements Rotirraient exa- miner ces propositions et teIles autres qu'ils pour- .raient desirer presenter. Il n'y a aucune raison pour que le Comite d'experts ne puisse pas se reunir durant les premiers jours de la session de l'Assemblee generale ou immediatement avant. Je ne presente cette idee qu'a titre de simple sugges- tion. . 'Voir les Documents officiels de la deuxieme session de l'Assemblee generale, Supplement No 2 (document A/366). . • Pour ~e texte des propositions presentees par les Etats- Unis, voir le document S/C.1/160. What we need, I think, is not to hover about in the clouds but to come down to earth in these talks on the "veto". Then we should be able to see more clearly exactly what the "veto" is, and how important this question is for the United Na- tions and for internatio~al oo-operation. Talk about the "veto" has recently become a kind of fashion; the "veto" is discussed by every- one who wants to talk about it without any realiza- tion of its importance. Unfortunately, the talking is done not only by those who do not realize the . importance of this problem:, but also by those. who fully realize it but h~ve their own designs. I do not want to develop a discussion on this subject. The members of the Council know that, at the last session of the General Assembly, there were hotheads who proposed to alter Article 27 of the Charter, or even to delete it aJtogether, to liquidate the "veto". But these attempts failed, just as they will undoubtedly fail in the future, if we .are anxious to preserve the United Nations and to go on organizing international co-operation within the framework of that Organization. The members of the Council know that the USSR delegation to the 1946 General Assembly did not favour this resolution because there was no need for it. As the USSR representative on the Security Council, I am also not in favour of this resolution. There is no need for this resolution. It will n~t. improve the' situation; its effect will be, I should say, the reverse. It is not just accidental that, taking advantage of this re'.,olution, the United States representa- tives have now put before us a series of proposals which, as a brief glance will show, are aimed essentially at revising important provisions of the United" Nations Charter. All attempts at such revision, especially attempts to revise so important a provision as that in Article 27 of the Charter, are certainly doomed to failure.• The authors of such proposals are obviously well aware of this. I have no doubt on this point. I repeat that I do not wish to go further into this question now; I shall confine myself to what I have just said. / Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America): I wish to say a few additional wOi-ds in regard to these proposals. From the statement made by the representative of the USSR, I am afraid he attributes an intensity of purpose and fixity of in- tention to these proposals which they do not have. The United States puts these proposals forward simply as points for discussion in regard to our rules of procedure. They can be ~discussed thor- I1 me semble que, dans IK>s discussions portant sur le veto, nous ne devrions pas planer dans les nuages, mais il faut nous placer sur le terrain de la realite. Cela nous permettrait de mieux COrn- prendre ce qu'est le veto et de nous rendre compte de .1'importan~ de ce~te question pour 1'Organi- sation des Nations Umes et pour la collaboration internationale. Les discussions sur le veto sont devenues fort a la mode ces temps derniers. Tous ceux qui le desirent prennent la parole a ce sujet, sans meme concevoir la portee de ce probleme. Malheureuse- ment, ceux qui prennent la parole a ce sujet ne sont pas tous des ignorants. I1 y en a qui, tout en se rendant parfaitement compte de la portee veri- table de ce probleme, poursuivent des buts qui leur sont partrculiers. Je n'ai pas 1'intention de m'engager dans une longue discussion sur cette question. Les membres du Conseil savent fort bien qu'au cours de la del'- niere session de l'AssembIee generale, certaines tetes bruIees ont propose de modifier l'Article 27 de la Charte, voire de le supprimer completement et· d'eliminer ainsi le "veto". Ces tentatives ont cependant echoue et il n'y a aucun doute qu'eIles devront echouer a 1'avenir, si nous voulons main. tenir 1'Organisation des Nations Unies et conti· nuer a organiser la collaboration internationale dans le cadre des Nations Unies. ' • Les membres du Conseil n'ignorent pas qu'a I'AssembIee generale en 1946, la delegation de 1'URSS s'est montree de£avorable a cette resolu- tion qu'elle considerait comme inutile. En tant que representant de l'URSS au Conseil de secu- rite, je m'y oppose egalement. Cette resolution n'est nullement necessaire. Loin d'ameliorer la situation, eIle 1'aggrave. Ce n'est pas par hasard que les representants des Etats-Unis, se cramponnant a cette resolution, ont presente un certain nombre de propositions qui, comme le revae un examen rapide, tendent essentiellement a la revision de certaines disposi- tions importantes de la Oharte des Nations Unies. . . Toutes les tentatives faites en vue de cette revi- sion, et en particulier en vue de la revision d'une disposition aussi importante ~ue l'Article 27 sont evidemment vouees a 1'echec. De toute evidence, les auteurs de ces propositions doivent le savoir egalement. Je n'ai aucun doute a ce sujet. Je le repete, je ne voudrais pas m'engagei' dans une longue discussion et je m'en tiendrai a ce que je viens de dire. M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (tra- duit de l'anglais) : Je desirerais ajouter un mot en ce qui concerIie nos propositions. La declaration du representant de l'URSS me fait craindre qu'iI n'attribue a ces propositions des intentions extre- mement precises et des fins bien definies qu'eIles n'ont nullement. Les Etats-Unis presentent ces propositions seulement comme autant de points a examiner dans un debat relatif a notre reglement I agree with the representative of the USSR that the provisions of the Charter are funda- mental law. But the Charter is a statement of basic principles, and the~e is no reason why members of the Council and its Committee of Experts should not discuss possible ways of inte11preting the Char- ter, of making it a living organism instead of a static piece of granite. All law should grow, and we hope that our C!-.arter can be' the basis for growth. I should bate to have the door closed to any consideratioT. of these matters. The United States is not f->utting up a flag to advocate the changing of t.he Charter or abrogation of the rule of veto, but merely to find, if possible, within the Charter, ways by which our work can be made a little more effective and a little more consonant with .the purposes of the framers of the Charter at San Francisco--including the, representatives of the USSR at that Conference-than has been apparent at some of our meetings during the past year. I cannot forget the fact that at' San Fran- cisco the permanent members of the Council agreed that the veto would not be used lightly or for frivolous purposes. Je suis d'accord avec le representant de 1'URSS pour dire que les dispositions de la Charte consti- tuent une loi fondamentale, mais la Charte est un expose des principes essentiels, et il n'y a aucune raison pour que les membres du Conseil et le Comite d'experts ne discutent pas des diver- ses manieres possibles de l'interpreter, et d'en faire un organisme vivant, au lieu d'un bloc de granit immobile. Tout droit doit evoluer, et nous esperons que not1'e Charte pourra servir de point de depart a une evolution. Je ne voudrais pour rien au monde voir fennel' la porte a tout examen des questions qui s'y rapportent. Les Etats-Unis ne partent pas en guerre pour preconiser la modi- fication de la Charte ou l'abrogation ·du droit de veto, mais simpleinent pour trouver, si possible dans le cadre de hi Charte, des moyens susceptibles de rendre nos travaux un peu plus efficaces et un peu plus confOImes qu'il n'est apparu au cours de certaines seances de 1'annee passee aux intentions des peuples qui 1'ont elaboree a San-Francisco -. parmi lesquek se trouvait d'ailleurs les represen- tants de 1'URSS. Je ne puis oublier qu'a San- Francisco, les membres permanents du Conseil ont convenu de ne pas utiliser le veto a la legere, ni clans des cas futiles. Colonel HOnGSON (Australia): I do not know whether the words of the representative of the USSR were correctly interpreted by the expres- sion "hotheads" who rushed in at the Assembly. I think that impeachment :referred to the Aus- tralian delegation, because that resolution was adopted largely because of the insistence of the . Australian del~gation. Le colonel HOnGSON (Alfstralie) (traduit de l'anglais)_: Je ne sais pas si les paroles du repre- sentant de 1'URSS ont ete rendues de fa~on cor- recte par la traduction "les tetes brUlees" qui auraient voulu brusquer l'Assemblee. Je pense que cette accusation faisait allusion a la delegation australienne, pa,rce que cette resolution a ete adop- tee en grande partie a cause de l'insistance.de la delegation australienne. I call to the attention of the Council the phraseology of the original resolution: J'attire l'atteJ;ltion du Conseil sur la. redaction de la resolution originale: «Mindful of the purposes and principles of tl;te .Charter of the United Nations and having taken notice of the manner in which the power of veto conferred by Article 27, paragraph 3 of the Char- ter has been employed in the proceedings of the Security Council in relation to matters outside Chap,ter VII of the Charter, "Respectueuse des buts et principes de la Charte des Nations Unies et ayant pris connaissance de la fa~on dont le droit de veto confere par l'Arti- cle 27, paragraphe 3, de la Charte a ete employe au cours des debat~. au Consell de secUrite au sujet de questions que ne prevoit pas le Chapi- tre VII de la Charte, ~YConsiders that in some instances the use and the threatened use of such power of veto have not been in keeping either with the general purposes and principles of the Charter or with the under- standing of the United Nations Conference on In- ternational Organization held at San Francisco, and "Estime que dans quelques cas I'usag(! et la menace de faire usage de ce droit de veto n'ont pas· ete conformes aux buts et principes generaux de la Charte ni a l'accord auquel est parvenue la Conference des Nations Unies pour l'Organisa- tion internationale qui s'est tenue a San-Francisco; «Earnestly requests that the permanent mem- bers of the Security Council shall refrain .from exercising this power of veto except in cases under Chapter VII of the Charter.'" "Demande instamment que les membres perma- nents du Conseil de securite s'abstiennent d'exer- cer ce droit de veto sauf dans les cas prevus par le Chapitre VII de la qparte 1." ~epresentativesof my Government made it clea; prIor.to, during, and subsequent to, the San Fran- Les representants de mon Gouvemement ont clairement indique avant, pendant et apres la 1 Voir les Documents officiels de la seconde partie de la premiere session de l'Assemblee generale. Premiere -Commission, Annexe 7. General Assembly resolution 40(1), which we are now considering, did not go as far as we had hoped, despite the fact that there was an over- whelming sentiment in the Assembfy to the effect that the veto had been abused. It is not necessary to review the circumstances whicl: gave rise to that sentiment or that belief, based on the evi- dence concerning the use of the veto which was placed before the Assembly. Therefore it is suffi- cient to state that the request that the permanent members of the Security Council should refrain from exercising the power of the veto except in cases under Chapter VII was not accepted. This resolution makes three requests. First, it is addressed to the permanent members of the Secu- rity Council and asks them "to make every effort, in consultation with one another and with fellow- members of the Security Council, to ensure that the use of the special voting privilege of its per- manent members does not impede the Security Council in reaching decisions promptly". A question naturally comes to mind: Has there been any consultation concerning the use of the veto since resolution 40(1) was passed? That was the request of the Assembly. Was there any con- sultation, for example, after the weeks and weeks spent in debate concerning the United States resolution on the Greek question?' We received a veto then only at the final stage, when the vote was taken on the resolution as a whole. If effect is to be given to that request, it seems to us that an attempt-a real attempt-should be made along the lines suggested, in the form of a self-denying ordinance. If the· permanent members of the Council do not like any alteration in the Charter or in the' rules of procedure, some agreement should be reached amongst them as to when and how the veto shall be exercised. The other two points, recommending the adop- tiQ.n of practices and procedures consistent with the Charter, are addressed to the Council itself. The second of these points urges that "in develop- ing such practices. and procedures, the Security Council take into consideration the views ex- pressed by Members of the United Nations during the second part of the first session of the General Assembly". In reference to these Jast two recommenda- tions, we note that, during the course of the Assembly 'proceedings, various proposals were La resolution 40(1) de l'Assemb16e generale, que nous examinons actuelIement, n'est pas alIee aussi loin que nous l'esperion·s, en depit du develop- pement, au sein de l'Assemblee, d'une impression de plus en plus forte qu'on avait ~buse du veto. 11 n'est pas necessaire de passer en revue les condi- tions qui ont donne naissance a cette impression ou a cette conviction. Elle repose sur les preuves qui ont ete fournies a l'Assemblee elIe-meme au sujet de l'utiIisation du veto. Par consequent, il suffit de declarer que la demande seIon laquelIe les membre.s permanents du Conseil de securite devraient eviter de se servir du droit de veto, sauf dans les cas relevant du Chapitre VII, n'a pas ete acceptee. ~ La presente resolution porte sur trois points. Tout d'abord, eIle s'adresse aux membres perma- nents du Conseil de securite et leur demande de "s'efforcer, par des consultations entre eux et avec les autres membres du Conseil de securite, de faire en sorte que l'exercice du privilege du veto qJ.ri appartient en propre aux membres permanents n'empeche pas·le Conseil de prendre des decisions rapides". Vne question se pose tout naturellement a 1'es- prit: Ya-t-il eu, depuis le vote de la resolution 40(1), des consultations portant sur l'usage du droit de veto? C'etait UI. ce que demandait 1'As.' semblee. S'est-on consulte, par exemple, apres toutes les semaines passees a discuter la resolution americaine relative a la question grecque'? En cette affairele veto n'est intervenu qu'a ia fin du debat, alors qu'on procedait au .vote sur l'ensem- . ble de la resolution. Si 1'on veut acceder a la demande de l'Assemblee, il nous semble qu'il faudra faire un effort - un effort veritable - pour consentir des sacrifices de l'ordre de ceux qui ont ete· suggeres. Si les membres permanents du Conseil repugnent a modifier la. CharFeou le reglement interieur, il faudra qu'ils parviennent entre eux aun accord sur le point de savoir quand et comment s'exercera le droit de veto. Les deux alltres recommandations relatives a l'adoption de methodes et de procedures confor- mes a la Charte, sont adressees au ConseiI lui- meme. La seconde de ces recommandations faites au Conseil demande de "tenir compte, pour et~~ blir ces methodes et procedures, des vues exprI- mees par les Membres des Nations Vnies a la seconde partie de la premiere session de l'Assem- blee generale". En ce qui concerne les deux dernieres recom- mandations, nous remarquons qu'au cours des tra; vaux del I'A~sembIee" diverses propositions ont ete The second practice or procedure advanced was that a committee should be established to reconcile differences. If the Council remembers correctly, it was the French delegation which ad- .vanced this particular proposaL Some' representa- tives expressed doubt as to how it would work out in practice, if strict theory were followed. The President will recall this question of trying to reach a compromise through a committee-and it is a compromise to resort to a committee in order to try to resolve fundamental differences of opinion, with a view to reaching agreement when there is the ~ear of the veto of resolutions. It seems that fear of the veto has a greater effect, at times, than the actual veto itself. As the Council may recall, we tried this procedure in the Greek case when,. with a view to reconciling the various resolutions before us, we appointed'a Sub-Committee: which failed hopelessly and reached a deadlock. That was the second practice or procedure which was sug- gested. The third practice was that the case should he presented in writing: that is, that before a case should come before the Security Council, it should be properly presented in writing and documented, so that this Council would avoid the long tangle, the procedural arguments, and questions as to whether or not it was to go on the agenda. The fourth practice was that a resolution 'should be voted on in parts: that is, it should not be voted on as a whole.' At' times that is sound; at, times, it is very unsound. For example, the Coun- cil will recall that during the discussion on the Greek question, the Polish delegation submitted a resolution" which was quite acceptable, part by part, and could have received the affirmative vote of the Council. But the view of the majority of the Council was that the contents were not sufficient. It was not what it contained, but what it omitted, which was the important thing in that case; and therefore, the resolut,ion was rejected as a whole. La quatrieme methode consistait a mettre aux voix les resolutions, paragraphe par paragraphe, sans qu'on vote sur l'ensemble. C'est parfois un~ bonne methode, c'en est parfois une tres mauvaise. Le Conseil se rappellera par exemple qu'au cours de la discussion sur la question grecque, la delega- tion polonaise a soumis une resolution" qui etait tout a fait acceptable, paragraphe par paragraphe, et qui aurait recueilli un vote affirmatif de la part du Conseil. Mais l'avis de la majorite du Conseil fut que son contenu etait incomplet. Ce n'etait pas ce qu'elle contenait, mais ce qu'elle omettait, qui etait important en I'occurrence.: et c'est pourquoi l'ensemble de la resolution se trouva rejete. Il est tres difficile d'adopter une procedure ou une pratique en suivant les voies que je viens de mentionner. Tout revient a ceci: Toutes les pra- tiques et toutes les procedures qui ont ete propo- sees par l'Assemblee et qui ont ete mises en avant a differentes epoques, ne vont pas au fond meme du probleme; elles se bornent - ce qui est tres facile - a renvoyer la baIle au Conseil de securlte et a lui dire: "Eh bien, faites donc quelque chose." A notre avis, le fond du probleme, ce serait une entente veritable entre les membres per- . It is very difficult to adopt a procedure or prac- tIce along the particular line I have indicated. It all comes down to this: All these practices and procedures, which were suggested by the Assembly and have been advanced at different times, really do not go to the root of the problem. It is all very well to throw it bac~ to us and say: "Well, now you do something." As we see it, the root of th'e problem is a genuine understanding among the permanent members that the veto should be used ~nly in such a way as to further the real interests La seconde pratique ou procedure proposee con- sistait en l'etablissement d'un comite charge de concilier les divergences de vues. Si le Conseil veut bien se le rappeler, c'est la delegation fran- ~aise qui a presente cette proposition. Certains representants ont exprime des doutes sur la ma- niere dont cette methode fonctionnerait en pra- .tique si 1'0n voulait suivre la stricte theorie. Le President se souviendi'a sans doute de cette tenta- tive pour parvenir a un compromis par l'interme-. diake d'un comite, car c'est un compromis que de recourir a un comite pour essayer de resoudre des difficultes essentielles d'opinion en vue d'aboutir a un accord, lorsque 1'0n craint que le veto ne s'applique a ces resolutions. Il semble que la crainte du veto ait a certains moments plus d'ef- fet que le veto lw-meme. Si le Conseil veut bien se le rappeler, nous avons essaye cette methode dans la question grecque, en vue de concilier les diverses resolutions' qui nous etaient presentees, nous avons nomme un Sous-Comite 1 qui a echouc completement et qui a abouti a une impasse. Telle etait la seconde methode ou procedure proposee. La troisieme methode impliquait la presentation dF.. l'affaire par ecrit: en d'autres termes, avant qu~une affaire passat c.evant le Conseil de secu- rite, il eut fallu qu'elle fUt presentee par ecrit et instruite dans les formes, de fa~on a eviter au Conseil le long maquis de la procedure, le dedale des arguments et les questions qui surgissent pour savoir si la question doit etre portee a I'ordre du jour. In the meantime, we regret that we had to con- sider this question today. We did not get a day's notice. A lot of water has gone under the bridge since this resolution was passed. We did not even have an opportunity to consult with our Govern- ments and, as the Council knows, this question will come before the Asse~b~y in a few weeks. It will be fully debated there. I do not think that we can go very far at the present time, because the con- sideration of one aspect of this problem is one of the items on the agenda of the forthcoming As- sembly. However, we welcome the proposals advanced by the United States. We shall certainly consider them and submit them to our Government. We note that, if the Committee of Experts is going to examine those practices and procedures, the United States list is not exhaustive. If we are going to instruct a committee, we think that it should have more than this before it. For exampl~, my mind goes back to 18 November 1946, when, during the Council of Foreign Ministers in New York, very valuable proposals were advanced- by Mr. Bevin, for example; we think they were very constructive,'even far'more constructive than these proposals. Surely they should be considered. The USSR representative also made some pro- posals, and there were various others suggested. I indicated a few myself, during the course of the Assembly discussion. The second point I wish to make about this matter is that, in our opinion, the United States proposals do not go nearly far enough. They say nothing about the veto's being confined to Chapter VII. They do not say the veto shall not be used' as regards Chapter VI and the pacific settlement of disputes. We welcome these proposals as far as they go, hut they are not complete enough; they are not exhaustive enough. I do not think that at this stage, with the limited time available, the Committee of Experts, with such scant infor- mation as this, could bring back anything worth- while to thi~ Council for it to submit to the Gen- eral Assembly. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland): It was not the in- tention of my delegation to participate in this dis- cussion. We believe that the action of this Council on resolution 40(1) of the General Assembly, as presented to us today, cannot be other than simply to take note of it, because the Council is unable in any way to act upon this resolution. However, the President has opened the general debate. Therefore, the Polish delegation finds itc~lf justi- fied in taking part in the debate. I agree with the representative of the United States that our rules of procedure are not perfect and that there is plenty of room for imrr.ove- ment. The Polish delegation will w~lcome every proposal which le"ds to the improvement of the present rules of prvo:edure, and we believe, in the' En attendant, nous eprouvons un certain regret d'avoir ete amenes a examiner cette question au- jourd'hui. On ne nous a pas donne une journee de preavis. Il est passe beaucoup d'eau sous les ponts depuis que cette resolution a ete votee. Nous n'avons meme pas eu l'occasion de consulter nos Gouvernements, et, ainsi que le .Conseil le sait, cette question sera soumise a l'AssembIee dans quelques semaines. EIle y sera discutee en detail. Nous ne pensons pas pouvoir aller tres loin ae- tueIlement, parce q)le l'un des points de l'ordre du jour de la prochaine Assemblee concerne l'exa- men de l'un des aspects du meme probleme. Neanmoins nous accueillons. avec satisfaction les propositions presentees par les Etats-Unis. Nous les examinerons certainement et nous les soumettrons a nocre Gouvernement~ Nous faisons remarquer que si le Comite d'experts doit etudier ces pra- tiques et ces procedures, la presente liste n'est pas limitative. Nous estimons que si nous devons char- ger un Comite d'examiner la C!,uestion. il devrait avoir devant lui d'autres documents. Je ...le repotic par exemple au 18 novembre 194,6, date alaqueIle, au cours du Conseil d.es Ministres des Affaires etrangeres a New-York, des propositions d'un tres grandinteret ont ete presentees, entre autres par M. Bevin; nous estimons qu'eIles etaient construe- tives, bien plus constructives meme que les propo- sitions actueIles. Assurement dIes meritent examen. Le representant 'de l'URSS a egalement emis eer- taines propositions, et diverses autres ont ete sug· gerees au cours du debat de l'Assembl6e. J'en ~ suggere qudques-unes pour ma part. La derniere remarque que je presenterai aprn• pos de cette question, c'est qu'a notre avis les propositions des Etats-Unis ne vont pas assez loin. Elles ne disent pas que les vetos sont limites au Chapitre VII. EIle ne ·disent pas que les vetos ne doivent pas s'appliquer au Chapitre VI et au regie- ment pacifique des differends. Nous sommes satis- faits de ces propositions pour eIles-memes, mais dIes ne sont pas suffisamment completes, elles n'epuisent pas la question; et je ne crois pas qu'a l'heure actuelle, avec le temps limite dont nous disposons, le Comite cl'experts, avec aussi peu d'in- formations, soit en mesure d'adresser au Conseil un rapport qui vaille la peine d'etre soumis a l'Assemblee generale. M. KATZ-SUCHY' (Pologne) (traduit de l'an- glais): Ma delegation n'avait pas I'intention de participer a ce debat. Nous estimons que tout. ce que le Conseil peut faire quant a la resoluoon 40(1) de I'AssembIee generale qui nous a ete presentee aujourd'hui, c'est simplement d'en pren- dre note, parce que le Conseil n'est pas it meme de prendre une mesure queIle qu'eIle soit en l'oe- currence. Neanmoins, le President a ouvert la discussion generale, et, en consequence, la dele- g,ation polonaise se croit autorisee a y prendre part. Je suis d'accqrd avec le representant des Etats- Unis pour dire que notre reglement interieur n'~st pas parfait, et qu'il y aurait tout lieu de l'amelio- rer. La delegation polonaise accueillera fayorable- ment toute proposition ten9ant a amehore~ le reglement interieur actuel, et nous estimons, a la I am very glad that the United. States repre- sentative, in submitting the proposals, disasso- ciated himself from the group of people inside and outside the United Nations who try to create a special atmosphere around the principle of unanimity and, to use his words, "raise the flag of the fight" against the veto. I am very glad that . he did so, and that he left all the cheers from the ladies' knitting circles and the old boys' clubs to those members whose actions are not taken very seriously. In particular, the Council must con- sider that the main fight against the rule of unaniplity is made by a country which has shown contempt for the United Nations, not only by not adhering to a unanimous resolution of the General Assembly, but by taking steps completely, opposite to the recommendations contained in this resalu- tion. I am speaking of the resolution on Spairi. 1 The principle of unanimity has very often been the subject of criticism and propaganda which gives this very principle as the reason for the mis- take of the Security Council and for its failure to solve any particular question. The propaganda states that the rule of unanimity is incompatible with the democratic equality of nations. In the opinion of the Polish delegation and in the light of our experience during the Second World War, we consider that peace and security can re guar- anteed and maintained only by the common efforts of all the nations, whether they are large or small. At the ·same time, however, e~erience h'as taught us that not all nations possess the same possibili- ties of ensuring the maintenance of peace, regard- less of whether or not they enjoy sovereign equality. We believe that the real interests of the small nations lie not in a voting procedure, but in the success of the United Nations, which sur~eS5 alone can maintain intemational peace and secur- ity, and give effective protection to any nation, great or small. The Charter of the United Nations gives a special position to the five great Powers. This posi- tIOn is manifested in their permanent seats in the Security Council, in the necessity for a unanimous v~te, in the' existence of the Military Staff Com- mIttee, and in the rules laid down for the revision of the Charter. The rule of unanimity has been established by the Charter as a fundamental part of our Organization. The aim of the Security Council is the maintenance of peace and security. In the opinion of the Polish delegation, that aim cannot be achieved without the closest collabora- tion and co-operation of the five permanent mem- b.ers of the Security Council. Effective organiza- tion .for the purpose of maintaining peace and securIty requires the unanimous action of the five great Powers because they alone have the means of guaranteeing the peace. , . cl ~ee Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, un.ng the second part of its first session, No. 39 (I). The voting procedure-and the necessity for a unammous vote-has still _another important function. It acts in cases when unanimity is in dan- ger, and it aims to prevent the formation of coalitions of one or more great Powers directed against one or more of the other great Powers. At the same time, it prevents important resolutions from. being passed on the basis of a simple ma- jority which, as we know from past experience, is very often not 'based on the merits of the resolu- tion but on the influence, both economic and political, of the State or Power submitting it. This principle guarantees that no great Power will be able to deviate from the principles con- tained in the Charter. The authors of the Charter foresaw this. At the same time, by stating that a majority of seven is required, the authors of the Charter gave to the. non-permanent members of the Council an important weapon by which even they can, in case of a unanimous vote, veto any decision of the five permanent members. It was the aim 'of the authors' of the Charter, and it is in the spirit of the Charter, to force "- unanimous vote, to force the great Powers to con- sult with one another for the high purpose of maintaining peace and security. As we all know, the Charter was drawn up immediately after the war. The results of the unity shown in the decla- rations of Yalta and Potsdam were known to everyone, and it was well known that it was this unity which had led to the victory of the Allied Powers and had made possible the creation of this Organization and this Council. My delegation is quite prepared to consider any proposals leading to the improvement of our rules of procedure. Those proposals can be dealt with at future meetings. However, my delegation will oppose any attempt .at the present stage to revise the Charter. We believe that such action, whether or not it is serious, whether or not it is taken only for reasons of propaganda, will not serve the aims laid down .in the Charter and will not improve the work of our Organization. Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America): Unless I misint~rpreted the remarks of the repre- sentative of Australia, I think he entirely mis- understood the nature of my suggestion to the Council. This paper which I have· distributed is not a proposal before the Council at all. It is merely a memorandum for the information of the La procedure de vote - la necessite d'un vote unanime - remplit encore une autre fonction im- portante. Elle joue dans les cas ou l'unanimite se trouve en danger, et elle vise a empi:kher la for- mation de coalitions d'une ou de plusieurs grandes Puissances contre une ou plusieurs des autres gran- des Puissances. Elle empeche en meme temps le vote a la majorite simple de resolutions importan- tes qui, (comme l'experience a permis de le cons- tater) sont adoptees souvent, non pas en raison de leurs merites, mais bien de l'influence a la fois economique et politique de l'Etat ou de la Puis- sance qui les a proposees. Ce principe donne done l'assurance qu'aucune grande Puissance ne pourra s'ecarter des principes contenus dans la Charte. Les auteurs de la Charte I'ont prevu. En declarant en meme temps qu'une majorite de sept membres est requise, les auteurs de la Charte ont donne aux membres non-perma- nents du Conseil une arme importante grace a laqueIIe eux aussi, dans le cas d'un vote unanime, peuvent s'opposer par veto a toute decision des cinq membres permanents. Tel etait le dessein des auteurs de la Charte, et iI est conforme a l'esprit de la Charte d'obliger a un vote unanime, d'obIiger les grandes Puissan- ces a se concerter les unes avec les autres pour parvenir a cette noble fin: maintenir la paix et la securite. Comme nous le savons tous, la Charte a ete redigee immediatement apres la guerre. Les resuItats de l'unite qui s'etait exprimee par les Declarations de Yalta et de Potsdam, etaient evi- dents et on savait que c'etait cette unite qui avait amene la victoire des Puissances alliees et rendu possible la creation de cette Organisation et de ce Conseil. Ma delegation est tout a fait prete a examiner toute proposition tendant a l'ameIioration de notre reglement interieur. Cesel>propositions pourro~t etre etudiees lors de prochaines seances. ToUtef01~, m~ delegation s'opposera a toute tentative fade .a I'heure actueIle pour reviser la Charte. Nous estl- mons qu'une telle mesure, queUe que soit so~ importance, qu'elle soit faite ou non pour des ~al­ sons de propagande, n-e facilitera pas la r~ahsa­ tion des fins definies par la Charte et n'amehorera pas les travaux de notre Organisation. M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (tl'a- duit de l'anglais): A mains de me meprendr~ en- tierement sur le sens des remarques du represen- tant de l'Australie, je crois qu'il a mal interprete . la nature de la suggestion que j'ai presentee au Conseil. Le document que j'ai Jait circu!er ne constitue pas utle__ proposition formeUe faIte~ 'I.'he PRESIDENT: I have a few expl;matory re- marks to make in regard to the statement which 1 made at the opening of this meeting. The l'epl'e- sentative of the USSR says that 1 went further than the resolution of the General Assembly. It is t.rue that I went a little further, because 1 thought that rectification of the rules of procedure could have no concrete benefit. The only way to reduce the difficulties mentioned in the resolution of the General AS5embly is therefore to seek to amend, in some way, the unanimity rule of Article 27 of the Charter. 1 could justify that statement by referring to the fourth paragraph of General Assembly resolution 40(1) which recommends that "the Security Council take into consideration the views expressed by Members of the United Na- tions during the second part of the first session of the General Assembly". When we consider these views of the Members of the General Assem- bly, we find that many Member~ discussed the matter of the veto and the amendment of Article 27. So if we take that into consideration, we may make suggestions or formulate opinions within that limit. However, I did not say that we should make any proposal to that effect. I am simply indicating how we can remedy this matter. The United States representative has made a statement suggesting that the question should be referred to the Committee of Experts. It was merely a suggestion. It is not a proposal which I would put to a vote, unless the representative of the United States should stress that point and ask for a vote upon it. He has distributed to the Coun- cil, for our information, drafts of rules of pro- cedure which he says we are not to take up seriously at this time. But I should like to express my view with respect to this document. I should have preferred to see such specifications made in the reverse way; that is, instead of spe~ifying the matters of procedure which are subject to the rule of seven affirmative votes of the Security Council, to have included or speci- fi~d all the matters which are subject to the veto. Smce the veto is an extraordinary practice, it w?uld be more normal and more in conformity Wl~ the universally adopted ruling in this case to decl?e that the extraordinary practice should be specified rather than the ordinary practice. . I think it would be worse to make specifications like. these than to apply the second paragraph of ArtICle 27, because in so doing we might omit Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): J'aimerais fournir queIques explications sur la declaration que j'ai faite au debut de cette seance. Le repre- sentant de I'URSS ciit que je 8uis alle plus loin que la resolution de l'Assemblee generale. II ~st exact que j'ai ete un peu plus loin, parce que j'ai estime que les rectifications a notre. reglement in- terieur ne pouvaient pas etre eflicaces. La seule mani(~re de reduire les diflicultes dont parle la resolution de l'Ass~mblee generale, c'est par con- sequent de cherCher a amender, d'une m.aniere ou d'une autre, la regIe de l'unanimite definie dans l'Article 27 de la Charte. Je peux justifier cette declaration en m'appuyant sur le quatrieme para- graphe de la resolution 40(1) de l'Assemblee gene- ra.le qui recommande au Conseil de securite "de de tenir compte . . . des vues exprimees par les Membres des Nations Unies a la seconde partie de la premiere session de I'Assemblee generale". Lorsque 1'0n examine les vues des Membres de I'AssembIee generale, on s'aper~oit que beaucoup de Membres ont pris part aux debats sur la ques- tion du veto et de l'amendement de l'Article 27. Aussi, si nous en tenons compte, iI nous sera pos- sible de faire des suggestions ou de formuler des opinions qui ne sortent pas du cadre des delioera- tions: Neanmoins, je n'ai pas dit que nous devrions emettre une proposition a cet e:ffet. J'indique siro- plement la maniere dont nous pourrions porter remede a l'etat de choses actuel. Le representant des Etats-Unis a fait une decla- ration proposant que la question soit renvoyee' au Comite d'experts. II ne s'agissait que d'une simple suggestion. II ne s'agit pas d'une proposition que je mettrai aux voix, a moins que le representant des Etats-Unis n'insiste sur ce point et ne demande .qu'un vote intervienne a ce sujet. Il a fait circu- ler, pour notre information, des projets de regle- . ment interieur que, dit-iI, nous ne devons pas discuter a fond actuellement. Je desirerais cepen- dant donner mon avis sur le document qui nous occupe. J'aurais prefere que des precisions aient ete apportees en sens contraire: c'est-a-dire qu'au lieu de preciser les questions de procedure qui se trou- vent soumises a la regIe des sept voix aflirmatives du Conseil de securite, elles aient vise et enumere toutes les questions qui sont soumises au veto. Etant donne que le veto constitue une pratique exceptionnelle, il serait nature! et plus conforme a la regIe universellement adoptee en pareil cas de decider que c'est la pratique exceptionnelle qui doit· ctre precisee et non la pratique ordinaire. J'estime qu'il est pire de donner de semblables precisions que d'appliquer le deuxieme par~graphe de l'Article 27, parce que, en procedant de la The problem is that there is no complete or true understanding among the five great Powers. Had they been dealing with matters in a spirit of true understanding, the difficulty would not have arisen, and the rule of voting in accordance with Article 27 would be very useful and could be easily applied. However, they c::annot.agree on many points and they cannot come to a unanimous decision. Certainly the other members of the Security Council would welcome such unanimity. As I have stated, if the representative of the United States asks "that his proposal to refer the whole question to thf1 Committee of E~erts should be put to the vote, that will be done. Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America): No one has expressed any opposition to this procedure. I venture to suggest that if the President cared to, he could simply say that the question would be referred to the Committee unless there were some objection. / Now, to.be precise, I merely suggested that the two last paragraphs of the General Assembly's res<;llution should be referred to the Committee of Experts, with instructions to consider the matter and to make recommendations to the Security Council as to action which, in its opinion, the Council might take in order to comply with the resolution. The Committee might make a report which :would serve as the basis for a report to the' Assembly. Then, if the Council should decide to do that, the United States 'Would submit these proposals in the Committee. We should. also be greatly interested in proposals such as those which the President suggested should be included. This is merely a ball tossed into the ring. We hope other people will submit some ideas so that we can at least assure the General Assembly that the Council considered its resolution with some seriousness and thought enough of it to take some action and to make a report to the General Assembly. Mr. GONZALEZ FERNANDEZ (Colombia): I re- gret very much to have to raise an objection to the proposal of the United States delegation. My delegation believes that oIfe of the requisites for any recommendation.or any decision by the Coun- Le probleme, c'est qu'il n'y a pas d'entente complete et veritable entre les cinq grandes Puis- sances. Si elles avaient traite les differentes ques- tions dans un esprit de veritable comprehension la difficulte ne se serait pas produite et la procedure de vote prevue par l'Article 27 serait fort utile et pourrait etre facilement applicable. Neanmoins, ils ne parviennent pas a se mettre d'accord sur de nombreux points et ils ne parviennent pas a prendre de decisions a l'unanimite. Il est certain que les autres membres du Conseil de securite seraient heureux de les voir aboutir a une telIe unanimite. Ainsi que je I'ai declare, si le representant des Etats-Unis demandait que sa proposition tendant a renvoyer l'ensemble de la question au Comite d'experts soit mise aux voix, elle le serait. M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (tra- duit de l'anglais): Personne n'a manifeste d'op- position a cette fagon de proceder. Je me permets de suggerer que si le President le vent bien, il pourrait dire tout simplement que cette question sera renvoyee au Comite a moins qu'il n'y ait quelque objection. Pour etre precis, j'ai simplement suggere que les deux derniers paragraphes de la resolution de l'Assemblee generale soient renvoyes au Comite d'experts, avec pour instructions d'examiner la question et de presenter les recommandations au Conseil de securite relativement aux mesures que, ason avis, le Conseil devrait prendre pour se con- former a la resolution. Le· Comite pourrait faire un rapport qui servirait de base a un rapportJ.t l'Assemblee. Si, ensuite, le Conseil decidait d'agir . ainsi, les Etats-Unis soumettraient ses propositions au Comite. Nous trouverions egalement grand in· teret a ce que l'on soumit une serie de proposi- tions du genre de celles que le President a sug- gerees. Il ne s'agit ici que de mettre la balle en jeu. Nous esperons que d'autres membres soumettront leurs propres suggestions de telle maniere que nouS puissions au moins donner a l'Assemblee generale le sentiment que le Conseil a serieusement examine sa resolution et l'a suffisamment prise eJ;l conside- ration pour s'efforcer d'agir et pour soumettre un rapport a cet egard a l'Assemblee generale. M. GONZALEZ FERNANDEZ (Colombie) (tra- duit de l'anglais): Je regrette vivement d'avoir ,3- soulever une objection a la proposition de la dele- gation des Etats-Unis. Ma delegation estime que les conditions requises pour toute recommandatlon The belated consideration of this reso~ution of the Assembly, after seven months' delay, should not justify our taking a perfunctory decision ana sending it to a Committee in which all members of the Council are represented, but which does not have the same authority as the Council itself and which is composed of the chiefs of the dele- gations. I do not think it would serve any useful purpose to dispose of this resolution in this way. Fortunately, in the Assembly's resolution, no time- limit is fixed, so that we do not have to be con- cerned with meeting a deadline such as is usually fixed, and with which it is difficult to comply when it is a question of solving very complicated politi- cal problems. This is one of the most difficult problems with which the Organization is faced. I think the first thing to do is to try to arrange consultations among the permanent members, but not now. We have waited seven months without having the consultations, and we can probably wait until the Assembly meets and considers the points on the agenda relating to precisely the same question. I do not believe that the Committee of Experts can do anything useful toward solving this problem, which should be taken up by the Govern- ments of the five permanent members. I repeat, I am very sorry to raise an objection, but I do not think it will be of any use to send this question to the Committee.
"Le Conseil de securite
"Decide:
«The General Assembly,
"L'Assemblee generale,
«Therefore ,
"En consequence,
The President unattributed #132933
The Council may well be asked, in that case, why it kept this resolution for eight months and at the last minute wished to refer it to the Committee of Experts. Why did it not consider this in the beginning-say, in January-so as to reach a decision? However, it was taken up for consideration later, and we have no remedy for it. The Council now has to submit something to the General Assembly. Either we are going to tell the General Assembly that we have not done anything and are not going to do anything in regard to this matter, or tell them that the matter is at least under discussion in the Committee of Experts, and that when there are results we shall submit them. This is simply a way out of the difficult position in which we find ourselves. I do not see any other way' out. . The representative of Colombia raised an objectIon. Hi's reJ.l1ark~ were very good, but he did not propose any .other way out. He said it was up to the permanent members to consult with each other and find a solution. They can always meet without ~ resolution from us. They are free to do so, and If. they find something on which they all agree, WIthout a veto, we shall be happy to receive it and work on it. As I raised an objection, I trust that the proposal will be put to a vote. Sir· Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): I am prepared to support the suggestion to refer this matter to the Committee of Experts. Mter all, the Assembly resolution must be considered as a whole. It is quite true, as the representative of Colombia points out, that one paragraph concerns the question of the permanent members' doing something about the veto. However, there are two other paragraphs which make recommendations to the Security Council. I recall to the Council that all the permanent members of the Council are represented in the Committee of Experts. Upon various occasions in the past, the five permanent members have been asked to get together and settls some question amongst themselves with not extremely happy results, if any at all. It may be-though it does not always happen -that they may reach an agreement with six of their collea.gues. Therefore, I think that we might provide a means of achieving all the ends of this Assembly resolution if we sent the matter, .as suggested, to the Committee of Experts. Of course, the Committee will not have much time to show concrete results to this session ~f the Assembly, but we can, at least, say that the work has been begun. . Mr. DE LA TOURNELLE (France) (translated from French): The French delegation also wishes this resolution to be referred to the Committee of Experts. I think it is necessary to refer this question, out of respect for the decision of the General Assembly. Of course, it is very late to do so, but, as the proverb says, "better late than never". . Moreover, since the permanent members of the Council serve on the Committee of Experts, and this Committee also includes all the other members of the Council, as the Umted Kingdom representative pointed out, the work and discussions on the matter in the Committee of Experts may constitute a good working basis which will facilitate the application of the first paragraph of the General Assembly's resolution.
The President unattributed #132938
I shall put to a vote the question of referring this matter to the Committee of Experts. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): I should like to ask one question. I understood from the. remarks of the representative of the United States that he wished only two questions to be referred to the Committee. Subsequently, I gathered from the re- Etant donne que j'ai souleve une objection, je suppose que ma proposition sera mise aux voix. Sir Alexander CADOGAN. (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): Je suis tout pret El. appuyer la suggestion demandant que cette affaire soit ren· voyee au Comite d'experts·. En effet, la resolution de l'AssembIee generale doit etre examinee dans son ensemble. Il est parfaitement exact, ainsi que le representant de la Colombie l'a fait remarquer, que l'un d~ paragraphes demande aux memhres permanents de prendre des dispositions relativement au veto. Il y a neanmoins deux autres para· graphes qui contiennent des recommandations au Conseil de securite. Je rappellerai au Conseil que tous Ies membres permanents du Conseil sont representes au Comite d'experts. A diverses reprises dans le passe, on a demande aux cinq membres permanents de se reunir et de regler Ies questions entre eux sans qu'il en soit sorti des resultats tres heureux, a supposer meme qu'il y ait eu des resultats. Il se pourrait (hien que ce n'ait pas toujours ete le cas) qu'ils par· viennent El. un accord avec six de leurs collegues. J'estime 'en consequence que nous aurions une chance d'atteindre tous Ies buts de la resolution de l'Assemblee,' sinous renvoyions la question, ainsi qu'on l'a suggere, au Comite d'experts. Bien entendu, ce Comite n'aura guere le temps de pre. senter des resultats concrets lors de la prochaine session de l'Assemblee, mais du moins pourronsnous dire que ces travaux sont en cours. M. DE LA TOURNELLE (France): La delegation fran~aise souhaite egalement le renvoi de cette resolution au Comite d'experts. C'est en dIet par soud du respect de la decision de l'AssembIee generale que ce renvoi me parait necessaire. Il est sans doute fort tard pour le faire, mais selon le proverbe frCl.n~ais, "mieux vaut tard que jamais". D'autrepart, Ies membres permanents du Conseil faisant partie duo Comite d'experts, et ce Comite d'experts comprenant egalement taus les autres membres du Conseil, ainsi que l'a declare le representant du Royaume-Uni, il est possi?le que les travaux et les deliberations qui auront lieu au Comite d'experts constituent une base de travail utile qui faciliteraensuite l'application du paragraphe premier de la resolution de l'AssembIee generale. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je vais mettreaux voix la question du renvoi de cette affaire au Comite d'experts. Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (tradu~t de l'anglais): J'aimerais poser unequestion. J'at. cru comprendre, d'apres les remarques presentees.PB;!' le representant des Etats-Unis, qu'il ne desll'alt renvoyer au Comite que deux questions seulement.
The President unattributed #132940
All the members of the Security Council are represented in the Committee of Experts. If we send on}y two paragraphs o~ this resolution to the Comilllttee, what are we gomg to do with the third paragraph? It would be necessary to have i;lnother resolution: We shall send the entire resolutIOn to the CommIttee. There can be no argument about that. We shall take a vote on referring the subject as a whole to the Committee of Experts. A vote was taken by a show of hands. The resolution was adopted by 7 votes to none, with 4 abstentions. 'Votes for: Belgium, Brazil, China, France, Syria, United Kingdom, United States of America. Abstentions: Australia, Colombia, Poland, "Q:nion of Soviet Socialist Republics.
The President unattributed #132943
The matter is finished, Tomorrow morning at 10.30, we shall have a meeting on the Egyptian question. If we dispose of it in the morning, we shall not have to have an afternoon meeting. We must finish all the questions before us, so as to be able to refer the decision on the vacation to the next President of the Security Council, the representative of the USSR. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated from French): I suppose the Security Council does not expect to receive the report of the Com- • mittee of Experts before the Assembly meets.
The President unattributed #132945
I said that we shall send the verbatim record of this meeting to the Committee. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated from French): The Committee of Experts will therefore have sufficient time. It will not be obliged to produce its report before the session of the General Assembly, which would be impossible.
The President unattributed #132948
We do not expect the Committee of Experts to dispose of this matter and give us its final report before the session of the General Assembly. But that do~ not prevent the Committee of Experts from holding meetings while the G~neral Assembly is in session. They will s!art their meetings after the vacation and contmue until they reach a decision on the matter to be presented to the Security Council. The meeting rose at 6.55 p.m. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Tous les membres du Conseil de securite se trouvent representes au Comite d'experts. Si nous ne renvoyons que deux paragraphes de cette resolution au Comite, qu'allons-nous faire du troisieme paragraphe? Il serait necessaire deJormuler une nouvelle resolution. Nous enverrons 1'ensernble de la resolution au Comite. Cela ne saurait soulever aucune difficulte. Nous allons voter sur le renvoi de l'ensemble de la question au Comite d'experts. It est proced~ au vote amain levee. Par 7 voix contre zero, avec 4 abstentions, la resolution est adoptee. Votent pour: Belgique, Bresil, Chine, France, Syrie, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. S'abstiennent: Australie, Colombie, Pologne, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de ranglais): Cette question est donc liquidee. Demain matin a 10 heures 30, nous tiendrons seance sur la question de 1'Egypte. Si nous en avons fini. dans la matinee, nous n'aurons pas besoin de sieger l'apresmidi. Il nous faut en finir de toutes les questions dont nous sommes saisis, afin de laisser au prochain President du Conseil de securite - en 1'occurrence au representant de 1'DRSS - le soin de regler la question des vacances. M. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgique): Le Conseil de securite ne s'attend pas, je pense, a recevoir le rapport des experts avant l'Assemblee? Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): I'ai deja dit que nous enverrions au Comite un proces-verbal de la seance d'aujourd'hui. M. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgique): Donc, les experts disposent du temps necessaire. Ils ne seront pas obliges de produire leur rapport avant la session de l'Assemblee generale, ce qui serait d'ailleurs une impossibilite. ,Le PRESIDENT (traduit de I'anglais): Nous ne nous attendons pas a ce que le Cornite d'experts termine l'examen de la question et nous soumette son rapport definitif avant la session de l'Assemblee generale. Mais cela n'empeche pas le Comite d'experts de se reunir pendant que siegera 1'Assemblee generale. 11 commencera ses seances apres les vacances et les poursuivra jusqu'a ce qu'il ait atteint une decision sur la question a presenter au Conseil de securite. La seance est levee a18 h. 55. AUSTRALlA~ AUSTRALlE H. A. Goddard Pty. Ltd. 255a George Street SYDNEY. N. S. W. BELGIUM-BELGIQUE Agence et Messageries de la Presre, S. 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UN Project. “S/PV.197.” UN Project, https://un-project.org/meeting/S-PV-197/. Accessed .