S/PV.199 Security Council

Although it is late, I shall ask the representative of Colombia to present his draft resolution at this time, so that the members of the Council may have an opportunity to consider it between now and the next meeting at 3 p.m. M. LOPEZ (Colombie) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je me reserve le droit de prendre la parole eet apres-midi. Pour le moment je desire simplement presenter mon projet de resolution (document S/530) qui, je l'espere, recevra un accueil favorable de la part du Conseil. Mr. LOPEZ (Colombia): I reserve the right . to speak at the next meeting. I just want to present my draft resolution (document S/530) at this time. I hope it will be favourablJ received by the Council. Le texte de cette resolution est le suivant: "Le Conseil de securite, The resolution reads as follows: "The Security Council, CCAyant examine le differend existant entre le Royaume-Uni et l'Egypte, soumis a son attention par une lettre du Premier Ministre d'Egypte en date du 8 juillet 1947, "Having considered the dispute between the United Kingdom and Egypt, brought to its attention by the letter of the Prime Minister of Egypt, dated 8 July 1947, "Calls upon the Governments of the United Kingdom and Egypt: "Demande aux Gouvernements du Royaume- Uni et de l'Egypte: "1. To resume direct negotiations with a view: "1. De reprendre les negociations directes en vue: "a) D'achever des que possible l'evacuation de l'Egypte par toutes les forces de terre, de mer et de l'air du Royaume-Uni en prevoyant une aide mutuelle, afin de garantir en temps de guerre ou en cas de menace imminente de guerre la liberte et la securite de la navigation sur le canal de Suez; et "b) De revoquer le regime administratif commun en vigueur au Soudan, compte do.- ment tenu du principe du droit des peuples a disposer d'eux-memes et a choisir leur propre forme de gouvernement; "(a) To completing at the earliest possible date the evacuation of all United Kingdom military, naval and air forces from Egyptian territory, mutual assistance being provided in order to safeguard in time of war or imminent threat of war the liberty and security of navigation of the Suez Canal; and "( b) To terminating the joint administration of the Sudan with due regard to the principle of self-determination of peoples and their right to self-government; "2. To keep the Security Council readily informed of the progress of their negotiations." "2. De tenir le Conseil de securite au courant du progres de cea negociations."

The Council will meet at 3 p.m. to continue the discussion on the Egyptian question. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Le Conseil se reunira a. 15 heures pour poursuivre l'examen de la question egyptienne. La seance est levee a13 h. 45. The meeting rose at 1.45 p.m. CENT.QUATRE.VINGT.DIX.NEUVIEME SEANCE HUNDRED A.lm NINETY-NINTH MEETING Tenue aLake Sutcess, New-York, le jeudi 28 ao(U 1947, a15 heures. Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 28 August 1947, at 3 p.m. President: Mr. F. EL-KHOURI (Syria). President: M. F. EL-KHOURI (Syrie). Present: The representatives of the following countries: Au.~trili~, Belgium, Brazil, China, Colombia, France, Poland, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United ates of America. . Presents: Les representants des pays suivants: Australie, Belgique, Bresil, Chine, Colombie, France, Pologne, Syrie, Union des RepubliquCs socialistes sovietiques, Royaume-Uni" Etats- Unis d'Amerique. Mr. MUNIZ (Brazil): I wish to explain the position of the Brazilian delegation on the draft resolution presented by the representative of Colombia.l We are glad to state that we shall vote in favour of that resolution, and we express the hope that the majority of the Council will do likewise. In supporting the Colombian resolution, we are consistent with the stand we have taken on this question from the very start, namely, that direct negotiations between the two parties offer the best approach for the solution of this dispute. That was what our draft resolution2 intended to convey, and that is precisely the meaning of the Colombian resolution. The difference between the two resolutions lies chiefly in the fact that the resolution submitted by the Colombian representative explains the two issues on which the parties are to negotiate, namely, the withdrawal of troops and the administration of the Sudan. Since these are the only two issues in the dispute, it goes without saying that they were to be the object of the negotiations contemplated by our resolution. The other difference consists of some important details which are present in the Colombian draft and which had been omitted in" ours. In other words, where our resolution was vague, the Colombian resolution is precise. Although it is true that we should rather have the matter referred to the two parties in a more general and flexible manner, we cannot but support a resolution conceived in the same spirit as ours and aiming at the same objective. We feel it to be our duty to vote for the resolution, with the spirit of which we are in full accord, in order that the Council may make 2l just decision, whether the resolution is vague or precise. , NOKRASHY PASHA (Egypt): I must begin by expressing my thanks for the genuine sympathy and support expressed in this Council for the Egyptian point of view. However, on behalf of the Egyptian Government, I object to the resolution presented by the representative of Colombia. ' M. MUNIZ (Bresil) (traduit de l'anglais): J'aimerais exposer I'attitude de la delegation du Bresil a l'egard du projet de resolution sou· mis par le representant de la Colombiel • Je suis heureux de declarer que nollS voterons pour ce projet de resolution et j'exprime l'espoir que la majorite du Conseil en fera autant. En appuyant le projet de resolution presente par la Colombie, nous restons logiques avec nous memes et conservons I'attitude que nous avons adoptee des le debut al'egard de cette question. Nous estimons en effet que des negociations dim rectes entre les pal\ties interessees constituent le meilleur moyen d'aborder la solution de ce dif· ferend. Tel, etait I'objectif que cherchait a at· teindre notre projet de resolution2 et te1 est precisement le sens de la resolution soumise par le representant de la ColClmbie. La difference entre ces deu:x: textes reside dans le fait que la resolution soumise par le representant de la Colombie mentionne ey.plicitement les deux points sur lesquels doiven t porter les negociations envisagees, a savoir le retrait des troupes et I'administration du Soudan. Ces deux points etant les deux seuls e!emtnts de discorde, il va sans dire qu'ils devaient necessairement constituer I'objet des negociations qu'envisageait notre resolution. Certains details importants, qui figurent dans le projet de resolution soumiS par le representant de la Colombie, et que nous avions omis dans le notre, constituent·une autre difference. En d'autres termes, la resolution de la Coiombie precise ce qu'il y avait de vague, dans notre texte. Nous aurions prefere, certes, que la question fUt soumise aux parties de fa~on plus generale et plus souple, mais nous n ~ pouvons pas ne pas donner notre appui aune resolution con~ue dans le meme esprit que la notre et se proposant le meme but. 11 est en effet de notre devoir de voter pour un projet de resolution que nollS approuvons entierement afin que le Conseil puisse prendre une decision equitable, que la resolution soit vague ou precise. NOKRACHY Pacha (Egypte) (traduit de l'anglais): Tout d'abord, je tiens a exprimer mes remerciement~ pour la sympathie veritable et l'appui que le Conseil a bien voulu accorder a la these egyptienne. Cependant, au nom 'du Gouvernement egyptien, je m'oppose a la resolution soumise par le representant de la Colombie. S Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securite, , Deuxieme Ar.nee, No 86, 198eme seance. ~ With regard to mutual assistance in time of imminent threat of war, if the Council is referring to the 1936 Treaty,! it will find the same phrase there. Therefore, I strongly object to the dause: "mutual assistance being provided in order to safeguard jn time of war, or imminent threat of war the liberty and security of navi~ gation of the Suez Canal". I do not think that the Council is disposed to approve of this. Fourthly, we welcome the phrase "To terminating the joint administration of the Sudan ..." , We have to negotiate the termination of the present administration of the Sudan; there is no doubt about it. I have maintained on more than one occasion that we shall be glad to have the Sudanese express their views. We shall safeguard their freedom to express their views. However, I am afraid that paragraph 2 of the Colombian draft resolution conveys the idea that we shall have to discuss with the United Kingdom the future of the Sudan. We maintain that this is a domestic issue and that we shall solve it to the mutual 'satisfaction of the Sudanese and the Egyptians, with full regard to the democratic principles of the Charter. These are my objections, and I am sure this Council, after expressing its views and its sympathy for Egypt, which appears before it as a victim of foreign occupation, will not put us in this situation. I think, as the representative of 1 See Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Egypt. Signed at London 26 August 1936. League of Nations Treaty Series. Vol. 173, No. 4031, pages 401-424. 1 Voir le TraiU d'alliance entre le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord et l'Egypte, signe a Londres le 26 aout 1936. Societe des Nations, Recueil des Traites, Volume 173, No 4031, pages 401 A 424. The.PRESIDENT: Does any other member wish to express his views on this subject? Colonel HODGSON (Australia): I should like to hear the views of the representative of Colombia, since he is the author of the resolution. Mr. LOPEz (Colombia): I should like to say a few words in reply to the remarks of the representatives of Brazil and Egypt. Aside from what I say now, it seems to me that the resolution is more or less self-explanatory. In the first place, I want to thank the Brazilian representative for the support he has so generously offered to our resolution and for the way in which he expressed his support. He said the Colombian resolution was substantially in agreement with the Brazilian resolution, one of the main differences being that we had seen fit to mention the basic elements of the dispute as the object of the negotiations. We cannot follow the Egyptian Prime Minister's interpretation of paragraph 1 reglU'ding the negotiations. He understands that paragraph to mean that the negotiations should be carried out in order that the United Kingdom may complete the evacuation of troops from Egyptian territory. That could be read into the resolution, but I submit that the text of the resolution simply reads as follows: "To resume direct negotiations with a view . . . to completing at the earliest possible date the evacuation of all United Kingdom military, naval and air forces from Egyptian territory . . ." It may be that the United Kingdom and Egypt will sigr! a new treaty, but the resolution does not necessarily call for such. action, if the parties agree otherwise. They are called upon to negotiate, and, once they start negotiations, it is up to them to decide the scope of the negotiations and the definite form they should take. I think that is quite clear. The same reasoning applies to the provision: "mutual assistance being provided in order to safegUard in time of war or imminent threat of war the liberty and security of navigation of the Suez Carial". I do not believe that that passage in any way implies that there should be military occupation or that it derogates in any sense from Egyptian sovereignty. On the contrary, many treaties provide for mutual assistance in case of war or imminent threat of war without being considered, as the Egyptian Prime Minister considers the provision in question, to be a violation Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Que1. qu'un desire-t-il se prononcer sur cette question? Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (tTaduit de l'anglais): J'aimerais entendre l'opinion du re· presentant de la Coloinbie, puisque c'est lui qui a presente la resolution. M. LOPEz (Colombie) (traduit de l'ang1ais) : Je voudrais rcpo~ldre en quelques mots aux representants du Bresil et de l'Egypte. Indepen. damment de ce que je vais dire, il me semble que la resolution est suffisamment c1aire en elle-meme. En premier lieu, je tiens a remercier le repre. sentant du Bresil de l'appui qU'il s'est si gene. reusement offert a donner a notfe resolution, ainsi que de la maniere dont il a exprime son accord. n a declare que la resolution de la Co· lombie etait, quant au fond, conforme a la resolution du Bresil, l'une des differences princi· pales etant que nous avions juge necessaire de mentionner les elements fondamentaux du dif· fcrend comme but des negociations. Nous ne pouvons pas faire notre l'interpreta. tion qu'a donnee le Premier Ministre d'Egypte du paragraphe 1, relatif aux negociations. SeIon lui, ce paragraphe implique que les negociations doivent etre poursuivies afin que le Royaume- Uni puisse achever l'evacuation de ses troupes du territoire egyptien. n est libre, bien entendu, de l'interpreter de cette fa~on; quant a moi, j'affirme que le texte de la resolution dit simple. ment: "De reprendre les negociations directes en vue ... d'achever des que possible l'evaeua~ tion de l'Egypte par toutes les forces britanniques de terre, de mer et de l'air." 11 se peut que le Royaume-Uni et l'Egypte signent un nouveau traite, mais la resolution ne l'exige pas necessairement si les parties se mettent d'accord par un autre moyen. Elles sont invitees a entrer en negociations et, lorsque ces negociations seront commencees, les parties devront decider elles-memes de la portee de ces pourparlers et de la forme precise qu'ils devront revetir. Je pense que cette question est tres claire. Le meme raisonnement s'applique a la dispo· sition concernan "une aide mutuelle afin de gaiantir, en .tem s de guerre ou en cas de me· nace imminente de guerre, la liberte et la seeurite de la navig tion sur le canal de Suez". Je ne pense pas qu ce passage implique, de quelque maniere qu ce soit, une occupation militaire ou une atteinte quelconque a la souverainete egyptienne. Au contraire, de nombreux traites prevoient, en cas de guerre ou de menace imminente de guerre, une aide mutuelle sans etre consideres pour cela, ainsi que.1e Premier Paragraph 2 does not refer to the future of the Sudan but very specifically to "terminating the joint administration of the Sudan ..•" That cannot be negotiated or carried out either without "due regard to the principle of self-determination of peoples and their right to self-government" or, in the opinion of my delegation, without due regard to the treaty rights of the United Kingdom. As I think I made clear in my first statement,l we cannot accept the contention that the Treaty can be declared invalid unilaterally because it is thought to have outlived its purpose or because it is thought to be inconsistent with the Charter. My delegation therefore takes the position that respect for the treaty rights of the Government of the United Kingdom is the very reason for the negotiations which we are calling upon the parti~s to resume. Leaving aside the question of the interpreta- . tion of our proposals, I can only say that I am rather inclined to regret the action of the Egyptian Prime Minister, however sympathetic I may be to the national aspirations of Egypt. I believe we should have good reason to feel rather pessimistic about the outcome of these future negotiations, if they are to be approached in the spirit which the Egyptian Prime Minister has manifested. We have tried to find some common ground of approach to this discussion, and we very sincerely hold the view that it is the duty of the Security Council, in cases such as this, to do its utmost to act as a kind of friendly mediator. But if the Security Council is to succeed, it has to have the co-operation of the two parties to the dispute, because it goes without saying that the efforts of the Council will prove unavailing unless such co-operation is forthcoming. I earnestly hope that upon reconsideration the Egyptian Prime Minister will, as I wish, find not only that this proposal is intended to help towards a friendly adjustment of the Anglo- Egyptian dispute, but that it will also make the Security Council an active instrument of international co-operation.

As there are no further speakers, I should like to take this opportunity to state my delegation's position with regard to this resolution. In the first place, I should like to bring to the attention of the Council the fact that the maintenance of United Kingdom troops on Egyptian territory, in the vicinity of the Suez Canal, is not. an obligation on the part of the United Kingdom. It is simply an authorization by His Majesty the King of Egypt to His Bri- Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'ang1ais): Comme il n'y a plus d'orateurs inscrits, je voudrais profiter de cette occasion pour exprimer l'attitude de ma delegation a l'egard de cette resolution. Tout d'abord, je desire attirer 1'attention du Conseil sur le fait que le maintien !ie troupes du Royaume-Uni sur le territoire egyptien awe environs du canal de Suez n'est pas une obligation pour le Royaume-Uni. C'est seulement une autorisation, que Sa Majeste le roi d'Egypte a accordee aSa Majeste britannique, de maintenir In this resolution, paragraph 1 states that negotiations should be resumed for the evacuation of all United Kingdom military, naval and air forces from Egyptian territory as soon as possible or practicable. As I said before, evacuation does not require any negotiation. It may be accomplished without negotiation. ' The second part of paragraph 1 reads: " mutual assistance being provided in order to safeguard in time of war or imminent threat of war the liberty and security of navigation of the Suez Canal ..." I remind the members of the Coun.cil that the previous negotiations broke down for this reason. If we now invite the parties to the dispute, or recommend to them, to go on to new negotiations and attach such a condition, that will be one of the reasons why these negotiations will not be initiated; and if they are they will break down very soon. Mutual assistance, as the Egyptians say, is not necessary now for the protection of the Canal. The Egyptian Army is strong enough to cope with this duty which lies within its territory, and it has the ft.ill right to protect the Canal. This duty falls upon it alone. In time of necessity, the Egyptian Government could, resort to the Security Council, for this Canal is a naval highway; it is international and for the use of all the world. The Security Council, by the provisions of the Charter, is bound to take upon itself measures for collective security. This is one of them. Therefore, it is not necessary for the Se- The Security Council would not be doing the right thing if it committed itself by prejudging the negotiations in such a direction-laying down -a condition that no withdrawal will take place unless mutual assistance is provided to safeguard the navigation of the CanaL This would place the Security Council in the position of asking or imposing upon the Egyptian Government the condition that it should conclude a military alliance with the United Kingdom for the defence of the Canal; and military alliances of that sort cannot be obligatory. .They should be optional. It has been mentioned that there are now many alliances of this sort between .nations. It is true there are such alliances, but they were not concluded by order of the Security Council or in spite of one party; they were optional. Any party that wishes to conclude a treaty of alliance with another party is free to do so, ~ut .the tre~ty cannot be imposed upon the partles Imperatlvely. For this reason, I think the insertion of paragraph 1 of this draft resolution would do more harm than good to the negotiations. S~ A1exa~der CADOGAN (United Kingdom): I WISh at thIS stage to deal only with one question of fact. The President has directed the attention of the Council to the second part of' paragraph 1 of the Colombian resolution, which reads: ". . . mutual assistance being provided in order to safeguard in time of war or imminent threat of war the liberty, and security of navigation of the Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): Pour le moment je ne' vetix m'occuper que cl'une question de fait. Le President a attire l'attention du Conseil sur la deuxieme partie du paragraphe 1 de la resolution soumise par le representant de la Colombie. Ce texte se lit comme suit: "... en prevoyant une aide mutuelle afin de garantir, en temps de guerre ou en cas de menace imminente de guerre, la liberte et la securite de la navigation sur le canal de Suez". Il semble desapprouver I'insertion de cette phrase dans le texte, puisqu'il dit que c'est ce point qui a entraine la rupture des negociations en 1946. En fait, tout bien considere, je suis dans I'obligation de faire remarquer que tel n'est pas le cas. Les , negotiations de 1946 ant amene les deux Gouvernements a parapher le Protocole relatif a l'evacuation, le Traite principal qui prevoit une aide mutuelle et le Protocole re1atif au Soudan1• Ces trois documents ont ete paraphes et ce n'est que plus tard que les negociations ont ete rompues a la suite d'une controverse portant sur l'interpretation cl'une seule phrase du Protocole re1atif au Soudan. Telle est l'histoire de la rupture des negociations que je tenais a rappeler au Conseil. I','1 Voir Papers regarding the Negotiations for a Revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, Unit,d KinKdom Command Paper 7179. , ~uez Canal." He seemed to deprecate the inclu- SIon of that phrase, because he said it was on that point that the negotiations of 1946 broke d~wn. In point of fact, I am bound to point out, WIth all respect, that this is not the case. The 1946 negotiations led to the initialing by both Governments of the Evacuation Protocol the . . .' mam Treaty providing mutual assistance, and the Sudan Protocol.! All three documents were initialled, and it was only later !hat the negotiations broke down on a disputed mterpretation of a single phrase in the Sudan Protocol. That is the history of the breakdo~n of the negotiations, and' I should like to remmd the Council of that fact. 1 See Papers regarding the Negotiations for a Revision o the Anglo-Egyptian Trea.ty ()f 1936, United Kingdom Command Paper 7179. Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America): M.. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (tra- It is true that none of us has had very much duit de l'anglais): Il est vrai qu'aucun de nous time to study this new resolution or its implica- I n'a eu le temps d'etudier cette nouvelle resolutions, but the more one examines it, the more tion ou ses incidences. Toutefois plus on l'exaone is impressed with the comment made by the mine et plus on a conscience du bien-fonde des representative of Brazil that it has very little new observations formulees par le representant du material in it; it is a precision of the principles Bresil qui a dit que ce texte ne contenait que of his own resolution. peu d'eIements nouveaux; on y retrouve en efIet, quoique sous une forme plus precise, les prin. cipes qui inspiraient la resolution soumise par le representant duBresil lui-meme. Je prefere le projet de resolution du Bresil, car je pense qu'une resolution de ce genre doit etre exprimee en termes generaux. Notre but principal est de rediger un projet de resolution qui s'impose a la cooperation loyale des deux parties et au sujet de laquelle le Conseil puisse reunir une opinion majoritaire. Je dois dire que:, bien que je ne sois nullement oppose a la res'.:>lution de la Colombie, je ne vois pas de raison d'y faire figurer la seconde phrase du premierparagraphe qui commence par les mots "En prevoyant une aide mutuelle"; je ne vois pas non plus pourquoi le Conseil de securite jugerait necessaire de mettre deux Etats souverains en presence d'une stipulation aussi imperative. Je pense qu'on pourrait tres bien supprimer cette phrase. Ma delegation considererait alors la resolution comme acceptable. A moins que cela ne soit absolument necessaire, je refuse de renvoyer ademain la discussion de cette question. Je pense qu'il serait· ,presque preferable d'ajourner les debats pour di.'l:.ou quinze jours si nous ne pouvons pas les termmer cet apres-midi. I prefer the Brazilian text, because I think the resolution should be expressed in general terms. Our main object is to draft a resolution which would commend itself to the loyal co-operation of the two parties, and on which the Council could read! a majority opinion. I must say that, while I do not see arq particular objection to the Colombian resolution, I do not see any reason why the second phrase of paragraph 1, starting with the words "mutual assistance" should be included, or why the Security Council should think it necessary to put such a mandatory stipulation in recommendations to two sovereign States. It seems to me that this phrase might very well be omitted. The resol~tion would then be acceptable to my delegation. Unless it is absolutely necessary, I strenuously object to carrying over the discussion of this matter until tomorrow. I think it would be almost better to adjourn for ten days or two weeks if we cannot finish this afternoon.

I have a motion before me which has priority under rule 33 of the rules of procedure, that is, to postpone the discussion of the question either until tomorrow afternoon, or until after our vacation. I shall have to put these proposals to the vote. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I have pointed out ~hat this is a new proposal which we have not discussed. It raises some new questions which have not figured in the proposals previously introduced. I suggest adjourning the meeting till 3 p.m. tomorrow. I regard my request as a matter of ordinary courtesy. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je suis saisi d'une motion qui a la priorite conformement a l'article 33 du reglement interieur. En efIet, on nous propose de renvoyer la discussion de la question soit a clemain a~res-midi, soit a.notre rentree de vacances. Je valS mettre aux VOIX ces propositions. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques sodalistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): J'ai dit qu'il s'agit la d'une proposition nouvelle que ~OU5 n'avons pas encore etudiee. Elle souleve certames questions nouvelles qui n'etaient pas traitees dans les propositions presentees jusqu'ici. Je propose de remttre la seance a demain, 15 heures. Je fais appe1 a la courtoisie la plus eIementaire. I think we should adjourn the discussion now as a matter of common courtesy. However, I do not think it is a matter of courtesy whether we resume the discussion tomorrow, the day after tomorrow, or two weeks from now; it is for the Council to determine when it wishes to resume the debate. Mr. MUNIZ (Brazil): I merely wish to call the attention of the United States representative to the fact that the Prime Minister of Egypt is here waiting for a decision on this matteT, and a delay -of two weeks may be a very long one for him, in view of the fact that he has important business in his own country. I would therefore ask the United States representative to reconsider his proposal, in order to facilitate a decision on this question at the earliest possible date. Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America): I have not made any proposal.

Has the representative of the Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Le re- USSR made a motion to adjourn the discussion presentant de l'URSS a-t-il propose de renvoyer until tomorrow? la discussion a demain? Mr. GROMYKO: (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The President may consider it a motion.

If the members of the Council agree to meet tomorrow at 3 o'clock, I have no objection at all. I am ready, but I understand that some representatives may have to consult their Governments, and I am afraid it may not, be possible to do anything tomorrow afternoon and that it will again be necessary to postpone the discussion until some other time. However, I shall ask the members of the Council whether or not they wish to meet to- ~orrow afternoon; if not, I shall not fix any tun.::, because my authority does not extend beyond tomorrow. Aiter tomorrow, ·1 shall leave M. MUNIZ (Bresil) (traduit de l'anglais): Je voudrais seulement attirer l'attention du representant des Etats-Unis sur le fait que le Premier Ministre d'Egypte attend id une decision et qu'un delai de deux semaines peut etre tI'es long pour lui, etant donne qu'il a, dans son pays, d'importantes affaires a regler. Je demande donc au representant des Etats- Unies de revenir sur sa proposition, afin que le Conseil puisse prendre aussitot que possible une decision au sujet du probleme dont il est saisl. M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais): Je n'ai fait aucune .proposition. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe) : Vous pouvez considerer ma proposition comme ·une motion. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de I'anglais): Si les membres du Conseil acceptent de se reunir demain a 15 heures, je n'y vois pas d'inconvenient. Je suis pret, mais je crois comprendre que certains I'epresentants aimeraient avoir la possibilite de consulter leurs Gouvernements. Je crains done qu'il ne soit· impossible de faire quoi que ce soit demain apres-midi et qu'il ne soit·a nouveau necessaire de renvoyer la discussiua a que!- que date ulterieure. Cependant, je demande aux :membres du Conseil s'ils desirent se reunir demain; dans ~a negative, je ne fixerai aucune date, car mes pouvoirs de President expirent demain. Passe ce jour, je laisserai a mon successeur, le representant de l'URSS, le soin de fixer la prochaine seance a la date qu'il lui plaira. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): I am not Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de quite clear as to whether the motion for adjournl'anglais): Je ne vois pas tres bien si la motion ment is to enable the representatives to consider demandant l'ajournement doit permettre aux this resolution further or to give them dme to representants de proceder a un examen plus consult their respective Governments. If it is the approfondi de la resolution ou de lenr donner latter, I do not know how the USSR representale temps de consulter leurs Gouvernements. tive's communications are with Moscow. I sup- Dans cette seconde hypothese, je ne sais rien des pose he is going to send his telegrams off and get moyens de communication du representant de his Government to consider them and reply to l'URSS avec Moscou. Je suppose qu'il enverra them, so we can proceed to a vote tomorrow des telegrammes et qu'il priera son Gouvemeafternoon. However, I am not sure whether the ment de les etudier et d'y repondre, afin que le motion for adjournment is to enable Mr. Gro- Conseil puisse proceder a un vote demain apresmyko to consider the resolution, or to permit his midi. Cependant, je ne comprends pas nettement Government to do so. I think it is important to si la motion d'ajournement doit permettre a know what precisely is the intention, because, as M. ~rom~ko ou a son .Gouv,~rneme?t d?examiner far as my delegation is concerned, we prefer to la r~solutIOn. Je C~olS q~ il est unport~nt de proceed this afternoon. savorr exactement a quO! tend la motIOn en question, etant donne que la delegation de l'Australie pr~fererait pour sa part poursuivre ces debats cet apres-midi. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I confirm my suggestion to postpone the discussion of this question until 3 p.m. tomorrow: Mr. TSIANG (China): I should ,also welcome a certain amount of time to consider the proposal of the Colombian representative. The resolution does ,contain new elementl;. There are consequences which I do not qt,{ite: understand. I hope, however, that the representative of the USSR will not insist upon an immediate adjournment. I do not think we should come to a decision on the Colombian resolution until some time later. But it may be that we could very profitably use our time to consider other suggestions and other approaches to the problem. If th~ Council is not adjourned immediately, I myseif should welcome an opportunity to ask it to consider the problem from another angle. .Mr. GRIJMYK<l (Union of Soviet Socialist M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques soda- Republics) (translated from Russian): I very listes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Je suis much appreciate the Australian representative's tres reconnaissant au representant de l'Australie cC!ncem about my means of communication with de s'etre preoccupe de mes moyens de communi- Moscow. I have no objection to deciding this cations avec Moscou. Je n'ai pas d'objection a matter tomorrow, if the Security Council is ready ce que nollS prenions demain une decision sur to do so; but, as I have already pointed out, cette question, si le Conseil est en mesure de le this new resolution demands a certain amount faire. Mais, comme je l'ai deja indique, il y a of fresh study. Twenty hours would probably be lieu d'examiner cette nouvelle proposition plus sufficient for the USSR delegation to study tbis a fond. Un delai de vingt heures environ suffira new resolution. I think, therefore, we might well ala delegation de I'URSS pour etudier cette nouclose the discussion now, simply .because we shall. velle proposition. Donc, si j'estime qu'il serait M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques sodalistes sovietiques) (tTaduit du russe): Je repete que je propose d'ajourner l'examen de ceUe question a demain, 15 heures. M. TSIANG (Chine) (tTaduit de l'anglais): Je serais moi aussi heureux de disposer d'un certain laps de temps pour examiner la proposition du representant de la Colombie. Cette resolution contient effectivement des elements nouveaux. RUe comporte des incidences que je ne suis pas sur de bien saisir. J'espere cependant que le representant de I'URSS n'insistera pas pour obtenir l'ajournement immedi:it de la discussion. Je ne pense pas que nous devions prendre immediatement une decision relative a la resolution de la Colombie. Mais il est possible que nous utilisions avec profit le temps dont nOllS disposons pour examiner d'autres suggestions et d'autres fa~ons d'aborder le probleme. Si le Conseil ne decide pas de s'ajourner immediatement, j'aimerais, en ce qui me concerne, avo;r la possibilite de lui demander d'examiner la question sous un aspect different. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je dois mettre aux voix la motion demandant l'ajournement du Conseil jusqu'a demain 15 heures. Si elle n'est pas adoptee, nous continuerons la discussion pendant quelque temps et nous ajournerons plus tard.

I have to put to the vote the motion for adjournment until tomorrow afternoon at 3 p.m. If it is not adopted, we shall continue our discussion for a short time, and adjourn later. Mr. GROMYKO: (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I have already said that if the other representatives think we can continue the discussion today, and then adjourn the discussion and the adoption of the decision until tomorrow, I shall raise no objection; that course would be acceptable to me. I think that it would be advisable to close the discussion in order to have more time for study. If there are any representatives who would like to speak today on condition that we continue the discussion tomorrow, I have no objection. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): J'ai deja dit. que, si les autres delegues estiment possible de continuer la discussion aujourd'hui et de remettrea deniain la suite des debats ainsi que la decision a prendre, je n'y verrais pas d'inconvenients; je suis pret a l'accepter. J'estime qu'il serait preferable de clore la discussion afin de pouvoir etudier la propos~tion a loisir. Toutefois, si certains deIegues desirent prendre la parole des aujourd'hui, je ne m'y opposerai pas, pourvu que nous reportions la suit~ des debats a demain. - The PRESIDENT: I understand that the representative of the USSR prefers to postpone his motion for adjournment until after we have heard any others who wish to speak on the subject this afternoon. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'an!;lais): Je crois comprendre que le representant de l'URSS prefere retirer sa motion d'ajournement jusqu'au moment ou nous aurons entendu tous ceux qui desirent prendre la parole cet apres-midi. Mr. DE LA TOURNELLE (France) (translated from French): I, too, should like an adjournment, but for more than twenty-four hours. In deciding the length of the adjournment, the Council should, of course, take into consideration the convenience of the Head of the Egyptian Government. M. DE LA TOURNELLE (France): Jesouhaite egalement un ajournement, mais un ajournement de plus de vingt-quatre heure~, Pour la fixation d'un delai, le Conseil devrait evidemment tenir compte des convenances du chef du Gouvernement egyptien. Mr. TSIANG (China): I think it is our agreed aim to get a resolution which can be passed by this Council. In the second place, we hope we can get a resolution which (the two parties, while not completely satisfied, will try to carry out with loyalty and hearty co-operation. M. TSIANG (Chine) (traduit de l'anglais): Je crois que notre dessein a tous est de preparer une resolution que le Conseil puisse adopter. _J'espere, d'autre part, que nous aboutirons a une resolution que les deux parties, sans etre parfaitement satisfa.ites, s'efforceront de respecter loyalement et dans un esprit de cooperation cordiale. Etant donne la declaration qu'a faite le Premier Ministre d'Egypte apres la presentation de. la resolution de la Colombie, je suis oblige d'admettre que nousdevrions probablement en revenir a la methode preconisee par le representant du Bresil. Au cours de la discussion relative a la resolution du Bresil, nous avons constate que cette resolution contenait implicitement une idee tres importante qui ralliait les suffrages d'un grand In view of the statement which the Prime 'Minister of Egypt made after 'the introduction of the Colombian resolution, I am compelled to think we should probably revert to the line of approach proposed by the Brazilian representative. During the course of our debate on the Brazilian resolution, there was a very important point implicit in the resolution most desired by ~=c~f the. members of the Council, bU~. it was In reflecting upon these-matters, I am inclined to believe that the course of action adopted by the United· Kingdom Government also indicates that it recognizes that the desire of the Egyptian Government is both legitimate and natural. The United Kingdom Government agreed to negotiate with Egypt on that question, and both Governments came to an agreement. For some reason not connected with evacuation itself, that agreement failed to reach completion. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom proceeded to withdraw part er its troops from Egypt. That course of action indicates to me that the United Kingdom Government itself recognizes the legitimacy and naturalness of the Egyptian Government's desire for early and complete evacuation of its troops from Egypt. My amendment to insert an additional clause1 in the Brazilian resolution also implied that Egypt's desire was legitimate. Therefore, I have come to the conclusion that, on the one hand, many members would like to give public recognition to the legitimacy of the Egyptian Government's desire for the early evacuation of United .Kingdom troops from its territory, 'and that, on the other hand, the resolution introduced by the representative of Brazil implied that this was a legitimate desire. I wonder whether, if we make that fact explicit in the resolution, we could not get it passed by this Council and also loyally accepted by both parties to the dispute. If my analysis is correct, I would suggest-I am not ready to make a formal motion at this time-that we should return to the Brazilian resolution and add a further paragraph to it, which would read as follows: "Recognizing the legitimacy of the Egyptian Government's desire for the early and complete evacuation of United Kingdom troops from Egypt". I have put this amendment as a suggestion in order to get a resolution which will be passed by this Council and loyally agreed to by the two parties in the dispute.

The representative of France has proposed that the next meeting of the Se- En reflechissant aces questions, je suis porte a croire que l'attitude adoptee' par le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni indique egalement qu'il reconnait a la fois comme legitime et nature! le desir du Gouvernement egyptien. Le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni a accepte d'entreprendre des negociations avec l'Egypte et ces deux Gouvemements ont abouti a un accord. Pour une raison qui n'est pas en relation directe avec la question de l'evacuation elle-meme, cet accord n'a finalement pas ete realise. Neanmoins, le Royaume-Uni a commence a retirer d'Egypte une partie de ses troupes. Ces mesures me' semblent indiquer que le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni lui-meme reconnait comme legitirne et naturel le desir du Gouvernement egyptien d'assister bientot a une evacuation, complete de l'Egypte par les troupes britanniques. L'amendement que j'ai propose en vue d'inserer une clause suppIementaire1 dans la resolution du Bresil implique egalement que le desk de l'Egypte est legitime. En consequence, j'en suis venu a la conclusion que, d'une part, de nombreux membres seraient disposes a reconnaitre publiquement la legitimite de ce desir d'evacuation rapide de l'Egypte et que, d'autre part, la resolution soumise par le representant du Bresil implique qu'il s'agit d'un desir legitime. Je me demande si, en rendant la resolution explicite sur ce point, nous ne pourrions pas la faire adopter par le Conseil et accepter loyalement par les deux parties au differend. Si mon interpretation des faits est exacte, je proposerais - bien que je. ne sois pas pret en ce moment a deposer une proposition formelle - que nous revenions a la resolution du Bresil et que nous y ajoutions un paragraphe ainsi con~u: "Reconnaissant la legitimite du desir du Gouvernement egyptien de voir une evacuation rapide et complete des troupes britanniques du territoire egyptien." Je presente cet amendement comme une sim: pIe suggestion afin d'aboutir aune resolution qUI soit adoptee par le Conseil et loyalement acceptee par les deux parties. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'ang1ais): Le representant de la France a propose que la pro- La seance est levee a16 h. 50 FIANCE Editions A. Pedone 13, rue Suuftlot PARIS, ye GREECE-GRECE "Eleftheroudakis" Librairie intemationale Place de la Constitution ATHENES GUATEMALA Jose Goubaud Gouhaud & Cia. Ltda. Sucesor 5a Av. Sur No. 6 y 9a C. P. GUATEMALA HAITI Mu Bouchereau Librairie "A la Caravelle" Boite postale 111-B PORT-AU-PRINCE ICELAND-ISLANDE Bokaverzlun Sigfuear Eymundsonnar Austurstreti 18 REYKJAVIK INDIA-INDE Oxford Book & Stationery Company Scindia House NEWDELm IRAN Bongahe Piaderow 731 Shah Avenue TEHERAN IRAQ-IRAK Mackenzie & Mackenzie The Bookshop BAGHDAD LEBANON-L1BAN Librairie universelle BEYROUTH LUXEMBOURG Librairie J. Schummer Place Guillaume LUXEMBOURG NETHERLAND5-PAVS·BAS N. Y. Martinus Nijhoff Lange Yoorhout 9 'S·GRAVENHAGE DENMARK--DAN~RK Einar Munksgaard NJilrregade6 K~BENHAVN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC- REPUBLlQUE DOMINICAINE Lihreria Dominicana Calle Mercedes No. 49 Apartado 656 ClUDAD TRUJILLO ECUADOR-EQUATEUR Muiioz Hermanos y Cia. Nueve de Octubre 703 Casilla 10·24 GUAYAQUIL EGYPT-EGYPTE Lihrairie "La Renaissance d'Egypte" 9 Sh. Adly Pasha CAmo ETHIOPIA-ETHIOPIE Agence ethiopienne de publicite P. O. Box 8 ADDIS·ABEBA NEW ZEALAND- NOUVELLE·ZELANDE Gordon & Gotch, Ltd. Waring Taylor Street WELLINGTON United Nations Association of New Zealand P. O. 1011, G.P.O. WELLINGTON NICARAGUA Ramiro Ramirez V. Agencia de Puhlicacione6 MANAGUA, D. N. NORWAY-NORVEGE Johan Grundt Tanum Foriag Kr.Augustgt. 7A OSLO PHILIPPINES D. P. Perez Co. 132 Riverside SAN JUAN, RIZA!. POLAND-POLOGNE Spotdziema Wydawnicza "Czytelnik" 38 Poznanska . WARSZAWA SWEDEN-SUEDE A.-B. C. E. Fritzes Kung!. Hofbokhandel Fredsgatan 2 STOCKHOLM SWITZERLAND-SUISSE Lihrairie Payot S. A. LAUSANN~ GENEVE, YEVE~ MONTRElJX" NEUCHATEL, BERN~ BASEL Hans Raunhardt KirchgaS'!e 17 ZURICH I SYRIA-SYRIE Lihrairie universelle DAMAS TURKEY-TURQUIE Lihrairie Hachette 469 Istiklal Caddesi BEYOGLU-IsTANBUL UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA- UNION SUD·AFRICAINE Central News Agency Commissioner & Rissik Sts. JOHANNESBURG and at CAPETOWIi and DURBAN UNITED KINGDOM- ROYAUME·UNI H. M. Stationery Office P. O. Box 569 LONDON, S.E. 1 and at H.M.S.O. Shops in LONDON, EDINBURGH, MANCHE5TI CARDIFF, BELFAST, Bmr.:.:rwGHAM and BRISTOL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA""; eTATS·UNIS D'AMERIQUE International Documents Service Columbia University Press 2960 Broadway NEW YORK 27, N. Y. URUGUAY Oficina de Representaci6n de Editoriales Av. 18 de Julio 1333 Esc. 1 MONTEVIDEO VENEZUELA Escritoria Perez Machado Conde a Pinango 11 CARACAS i YUGOSLAVIA-YOUGOSLAVIE! Drzavno Preduzece Jugoslovenska Knjiga Moskovska U1. 36 BEOGRAD ~