S/PV.20 Security Council

1 should like ta il1form the representatives who have just taken their seats at the table that they are invited by the Security Couneil ta take part in its deliberatkms upon the question that is now before it, and \Vith the right ta participate in the discussion without vote. AIso, at an appropriate time mey will have the opportunity of making a proposition, if it is their wish ta do so. In thooe circumstances, they will realize that the Couneil has desired their attendance and invites them ta takc part in its discussions upon tlùs matter. Mr. RIAz (Egypt): 1 would Iike ta pomt out that it is now ten minutes to one, and it may not he a suitable time at which to hear any substantial oration by any party.

1 would like to say ta the representatives who have just taken their seats at the Couneil table that tlle first opportunity will he given t.o them ta make such oral statements as they may wish ta make to supplement the Ietters that they have already fon~arded ta the Couneil. Mter that, other members who are vitally interested in this matter will aIso be invited ta make their statements. Then the C01..m- , 'eil will proceed ta a discussion upen the question that has been brought ta its notice. Is there any objection to an adjoumment of the proceedings at this stage? As there are no objections, that suggestion is adopted. '1 would suggest that the next meeting of the Couneil might be at eIeven o'clock tomorrow morning. Are there any objections? Then that isadopted. TWENTiETH MEETING Held at Church Bouse, Wltstminster, London, on Frida')', 15 February 1946, at 11 a.m. President: Mr. N. J. O. MAKIN (AustraIia). Present: The representatives of the following countries: Australia, Brazil, China" Egypt, France, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. 76. Provisional agenda 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. Letter from the Heads of the:: Lebane.se and Syrian delegatioIli ta the Secretary-General dated 4 February 1946 (document S/5).! 1 s~ Official Record, GI the 8BCU,ily CouJacil. First Year. First Series. Supplement No. 1. Annex 9,· 77. Adoption of the agenda 78. Continuation of discussion of the le~.. ter from the Heads of the Lebanese .and Syrian delegations l

Item No. 2 of the agenda is the letter from the Heads of the Lebanese and Syrian de1egations to the Ser..retary-General dated 4 February 1946, circulated as document S/5. 1 shaIl ask the representatives of Syria and of Lebanon kindly to come to the tabie.

1 am going to'calI upon the countries in alphabetical order. 1 now ask that such oral statements as will be supplementaiy to the letters that have been rece.lved may be made by those who wish to present their case in this matter. Therefore, 1 now calI upon the representative of Lebanon to make bis oral statement in regard to this matter. 79. Supplementary sVatement of the representative of Lebanon Mr. FRANGIE (Lebanon) (translated Irom Fretlck): Of aIl the disputes brought before the Security Council, the problem of Syria and Leb-' anon is certainly the simplest as regards th~ facts. It is based on a few e1ementary facts which were briefly summed up by Mr. Vyshinsky yesterday. ln the first place, Lebanon and Syria are two independent States. They signed the Charter of the United Nations and were admitted to mem-' bership of the Organization. This in itself precludes any limitation of their sovereignty. Their international status is thereforf defined by the Charter, in particu1ar by Article 2. The second point is that there are French aad British troops on the territory of Syria and Lebanon. The presence of these troops is no longer neeessitated by a state of war. It is not justified by the existe,nce of any agreements, treaties or understanding of any sort. 1 think nobody here will deny tms. Sinee the end of hostilities with Germany and Japan, the Governments of Syria and Lebanon have repeatecUy made representatiùns to the sSee Official Reeords· of tlle Seeurity Couneil. First Year. Fir8t Series, Supplement No. 2. Annex 1. ceThe programme of evacuation will be drawn up in such a way that it will ensure the maintenance in the Levant of sufficient forces to guarantee security, until such time as the United Nations has decided on the organization of collective security in this zone. Until these arrangemrnts have been camed out, the French Government will retain forces regrouped ~n the Lebanon." , You will see that the Agreement of 13 December mentions ewcuation. It says that an evacuation will t/Ùte place, but it provides for the maintenance of foreign troops on Syrian and Leban~e territory and makes their withdrawal dependent upon conditions that are incompatible with the principles of the Charter, because they are contrary to the sovereignty of the two tountries. Subsequently, we took further steps and addressed· notes to the French Government on 26 December 1945 and 9 January 1946. No reply to these notes has been received. The dispute thus created constitutes a threat , to international peace. The presence (if foreign troops on the territory of anindependent sovereign State without the consent of that State has always, been a cause of conflict. The only fact thl:l.t can be invoked against us is that Lebanon and Syria are twe smal1 Po:.,.;l'S. But 1 do Dot think that this reason can carry any'weight from . the legal point of view or in the opinion of the Council. This i8 not the only reason for our submitting the question to the Security Council. We have many objections, and 1 will mention a few of them. The presence of these troops on our terntory is not justified, either by the need for military operati()ns or by any agreement or treaty or any kind ofunderstandingbetween the Governments of Syria. and Lebanon on the one hand, and of Great Britainand' France on the other. It is a case without precedent.in the bistory of international relations that foreign troops _._-====,slij)u1J;l_he.,s,ta.jÏoned~QIl.~the=t""rrit0!'Y,'..Qf",.·~'1d~~'.' pendent States'ri.thout·,an agreement, and 1 think itis weU to repeat tbat the presence of these troops is agcinst the. will of the Govemments .of. th~se •States. The pI:esence of . these troops constitutes, moreover,a serious violation of the sovereignty of two ',. States Members 'of the Unitli4,Nations,. and far fromcontributing to the maintenance ofsecurity, it constitutes, a perman~ntthreatanda possibility.of· intervention in the iIlternalaffairs'of Lebanonand Syria. .. ,.. Thê Syrian ~d Lebanesedelegationsdonot wish ta recall the receiltpast. Théy do not wh The Franco-British Agreement of 13 December makes the evacuation of troops from Syria and Lebanon dependent upon conditions that are incompatible with the spirit and the letter of the Charter. In the first place, the agreement implies that security cannat be maintained in Syria and Lebanon without the presence of foreign troops. In tIle set;~nd place--and 1 view the matter in the light of Article 2 of the Charter-it is a violation of the principles of the sovereignty of States Members of the United Nations and of non-intervention in affairs that fall witllin the exclusive competence of the two States in question. It is one of the fundamental rights of a sovereign State ta judge of the means required ta guarantee law and arder in its territory. A foreign Power is not entitled ta àiscuss these means, much less ta put itself in the place of the State cûncerned, whose function is to carry out this task. 'Ibis is a principle which has never been questioned by the United Nations, and 1 do not think it will be questioned now. Moreover, the expression "organization of collective security in this zone" (in the zone of the Levant, in the zone belonging ta Syria and Lebanon) is no less contrary ta the provisions of the Charter which, with the exception of territories ta be placed under trusteeship, do not envisage any.zone dependent on a •Member State of the United Nations where collective ~ecurity should be organized along the lines of a strategic zone. With regard to independent States, the Charter laysdown that cach of the Members of the Organization must make its contribution ta world security. It is the desire of Syria and Lebimon to contribute to collective security on their own behalf, directIy and under the auspices. of the organs of the United Nations. They have no desire that foreign Powers should settle matters on their behalf or should act in their stead in the accomplishment of this mission. 1 think 1 should have come to the end of my arguments were l' not obliged ta add, for the s~..{)f .. trutb"that .the ..British,...authorities,..in . .... tebanon and Syria have always made it clea.r that it was their intention to withdraw their troops as soon as we asked them to dosa. That was how things stood before the agreement of 13 December. For our part, we have always asked for the siIriultaneouswithdrawaI of British and· French troops, in accordance with a .prin.. ciple we hold dear, naniely, that of treating on .~. footing of equality all friendlyPowers and all Powers with whom wehave relations. , ]nthese conditions, the Syrian and Lebanese delegations, while taking a lively interest in the opinions expressed by the tnembers of the Secu-:- rity Cormei! in. cOI1heXion·with the variousquestions which have come before it, are confident 80. Supplementary statement of the representative of Syria Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): ln spite of the respect and high consideration in which we hold the two great. Powers ,against whom wè have brought this action before you, 1 am sorry we are obliged to do ,so. The case which we have the honour to submit to your consideration deals simply with the presence, on Syrian and Lebanese territory, of foreign armed forces, which are maintained against the will of the Syrian and Lçbanese Govemments. Whatever reasons may be put forward to you to explain their presence, those reasons are amply sufficient to hclp the Security.Coundl settle the dispute at issue by a c1ear-cut decision. 1 do not v-Jish, for the time being, te go into great detail, or to start with any refutatio!l of possible arguments; 1 would prefer·to set before the Coundl the e1ements of this case in all their simplicity and cIarity. The British troops, supported by a rclatively small number of forées of the Fighting French, marched from Palestine into Syria and Lebanon to chive from our. country the Vichy forces, which were constantly working to support the Axis in its endeavour for world domination. The march of these forces was preceded and followed by very cIear declarations that the object of tb.e campaign was· solcly to liberate those coUIitri(;~, from hostile clements; ançl it was made cIear by both parties that Free France was in no way to replace Vichy. The Allied forces were received with joy and were givenall possible support during.the campaign. While the war was pursuing ifs grim course in the west and in the east, all our resour€es, both in materiel and nI manpower, w('..re put at. the disposal of the Allies. The Syrian' Government and people contributed to the best of theirabilities to theprosecution.of this war unill conunon victory, thus fuIfilling their dutiesas Allies. Sincethe .termination of the war, we have made··constant· representationsasking for simultaneous w~thdrawal oftroops fromour territory. The maintenance.ofthese troops cannot be justified .in rime of peace, either by t~e continuation of hostilities, .which.have ended, or byany provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. That provision makes it cleaJ:: fust, that foreign armed forces shall be mailltained for an unspecified time; secondly, that the withdrawal of these forces is not dependent on pure1y technical considerations in realizing the withdrawal at a reasonable date; third1y, that withdrawal is dependent on conditions whose realization is not in the power of the parties (the United Nations should decide to organize collective security in that zon,e; otherwise these armed forces may remain); fourthly, that the consent of the Syrian and Lebanese Go'Vernments and their agreement to such provisions were ruled out of the picture; fifthly, that these forces are intended to guarantee security. The Syrian Government was bound to ask itself: whose security do the parties intend to guarantee? There should be no doubt that internal security is solely the responsibility of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. There should be no doubt, either, that external security is also the responsibility of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments -in accordance with the provisions . of the Charter. FurJ1ermore, the war ha:; ended, the nazi .and·fascist forces are ousted, and Syria and Lebanon are surrounded by States which are Members of the United Nations. What can entitle any other Govemment to assume the role of guarantor o~ security in that zone? That is something which we fail to see. Two things are, however, certain: first,collective security is not a function .which any great Power can exercise by keeping its armed forces on the territory of a· small country wmch is a Member of the United Nations, against the express wishes of that country. Secondly, inter- . national security is clearly organized by the .Charter, and aIl the States concerned in the question at issue are Members of the United Nations. Their relationships are basedon the pr.Jlciples.of the Charter, and their international conduct in the matter of security is· explicitly regulated by itsprovisions. These provisions form our agreement, and all our agreement. We seek to see that no .deviation· from them takes place. When bath parties had completed their negotiations we were notified of the agreement, for our information and ta invite us to arrange for the necessary dispositions ta implement and apply its "decisions." In using the ward "decisions", Iam quoting the terms of the agreement. This being the situation, we tried, in a vain effort, ta avoid bringing our case before you. The Syrian and Lebanese Governments have indeed declared their objections ta it in Damascus, Beirut, London and Paris, and have asked for due explanations, whichthey have failed ta obtain. We reiterated ourrequest, asking bath Powers to withdraw their armed forces as soon as that was materially possible. No satisfaction noreven an adequate answer has been received ta these representations. M. late as 19 January, when 1 had the honour ta deliver my statemenfin the plenary meeting of the General Assembly, we limited ourselves ta calling the attention of the United Nations tothe question at issue in _ the hope that something-might be done before it was brought before the Unite4 Nations in a fuller way.' - Given, first, our representations, which took place benveen the end of the warand the December Agreement; secondly, the _way in which the Agreement has been negotiaied on a question which primarily.concerns us; thirdly, its notification to us to implement -its "decisions"; foutthly, our latest unsuccessful endeavoursreferred to above; and, fifthly, the fact that the Agreement itself daims to subordinate_the withdrawal of troops ta a decision of the Urnted Nations, 1 do not think that wc can rightly be taxed with extra zeal to bring this matter tq the Council; nor can anyone contest, by some Iawyer's argumentatioI1, the reality of things which show that the dispute is aIready at_a stage where it should be broughtbefore the Council. Not only Syria and Lebanon lookto you. It is. the whole world that seeks to see ci. decision taken here which gives a full and rightful solua tion of the problem. . ~See Journal of the General Âstembly. No. 10.21 Jan- 1 must add, tao, that 1 ought ta explain the ward "simultaneously", which 1 use in my statement. Had we wished to· have separate withdrawaIs; perhaps we could have obtained one from the British Government easily; but·we want the withdrawals to be simultaneous. 81. Statement of the r6\presen~lItive of' France Mr. BIDAULT (France) (translated Ira"" French): 1 thinldt was superfluous for the representative of Syria to add to the text of the letter addressed to L Security Council a particular emphasis on the discriminatory character which he wished to give to bis explanations. Despite this u~ecessary luxury, and leaving a.side for the moment whatever unfriendIy reference to my country there may be in certain allegations of the letter submitted to the Council, 1 merely wish to reply briefly and in the most objective manner. as befits what is known as a greaf PC'Ner, ta the observations that have just been made. I confess that it is not without some surprise that we noted the. demand presented' to .the Security Councilby the Syrian and Lebanese .delegations for thewithdrawal of the foreign ~roops stationed in Syria and Lebanon. It is mdeed legitimate tobe surprised, when the war period has not yet reached its. end, when peace is nowh.ere definite1y established and when ln June 1941, even before the forces of Free France and of Great Britainentered Syria and Lebanon, the Government of General de Gaulle publicly proclaimed, in the name of France, its intention to ensure the independence of these two counmes. In September and November 1941, tlùs independence was proclaimed by the - representative of France. It would have been possible, owing to the existing state of war, when so many tasks and responsibilitks lay upon the shoulders of aIl the Allied Governments, to post" pone an important political transformatio:Q. wlùch could not be brought about in time of war without T:llFÏngse..riom: and· complicated problems. Tlùs, howe'Ver, was not the attitude adopted by the Government of my country. The independence proclaimed in 1941 has become a reality despite the difficulties of the moment. ':Many foreign Governments have recognized the Stat~s of Syria and Lebanon. However, when in April 1945th~ questipn arose whether Syria and Lebanon could take part in the San Francisco Conference, the fust session of the United Nations, there still seemed to be sorne doubt and the sponsoring Powers hesitated to take a position on the question. 1 have very direct and personal reasons for remembering that it was on the initiative of France, wlùch, though not one of the inviting Powers, informed the invitingPowers of her wish that Syria and Lebanon should take part as sovereign States in the San Francisco Conference, that these two countries were invited and admitted. Thus, is it to sorne extent at.the request of Francé herself that my colleagues of Syria and Lebanon were able, just now, to express their brievances with reg.'.rd to my ~ountrJ:' If· 1 consider it necessary to recall these facts, wlùch mark the steps taken during the last five .years towardsthe realization of the independence of the two States, it is in order ta stress thQ fact that, dèspite the dimculties resulting from the state of·War and the obstacles wmch may have amen (and which have amen in other places as weIl) ,Francp. has not wavered in her .policy .of bringing the two States, entrusted to her charge by the League of Nations, to full independence. Now that the representatives of the United Nations can at last meet and determine the conditions under which collective secùrity is' ta be assured in peacetime, the French and British Governments wish to make it c1ear that they are disposed ta proceed forthwith to the withdrawal of their respective military forces stationed in Syria and Lebanon, by submitting the matter to the COUllril of the United Nations with a view to fixing the international arrangements necessary for the maintenance 'of security in that part of the world. Lebanon a' :l Syria are impatient to see the end of the burdens wmch the state of war imposes upon them. This is without doubt a gen-' eral sentiment. It is the feeling of every country in the world, not excepting my own. But 1·fail to see how matters could be otherwise in these two countries, bearing in mind the rate at wmch these matters are progressing in the rest of the world, when the military burdens imposed by the war are being alleviated too slowly everywhere. Certainly, my Government is anxious to bring about a satisfactory solution of this problem, but it is obliged to take account of the general conditions prevailing in Syria and Lebanon, as of those sutsisting everywhere else, and it is obvious that problems of this kind cannot be solved in a ·few minutes or even in a few hours. As Mr. Bevin reminded us the other day, the representatives of the countries who are sitting in this Security Council have to 'meet many and serious obligations. The time for easy solutions has not yet returned and it is important that aIl nations, primarily the great ones, b!1t also the small, should give proof of understandi~g. . Apart from these very general considerations -and they cannat give offence to anybody--I fail to see what grounds the Syrian and Lebanese delegations have for bringingthis matter before the Security Council. As Mr. EI-Khouri, the Head of the Syrian·de!egation, ren1Înded us a few minutes ago, he said at the meeting of the Assembly Oli 19 January: Nothing has happened since then that could alter the status of the question or give it the character of a dispu~e. Without prejudice to any observations 1 may submit later, 1 will say that it is on this qualification that the Syrian and Lebanese delegations, in a passage of their lette.r, have sought to submit the question to the Security Council, moreover without stating precisely who were the parties to the possible dispute. It is, 1think, because oÏ what 1 can only regard as the weakness of 8uch an affirmation that the letter of the Syrian and Lebanese delegations does not refer to Article 35, of which the first paragraph would apply to this subject, and that it likewise disregards Article 33, whîch asks the parties concemed ta endeavour. before having recourse to the United Nations, to settle their difficulties by negotiation or any other appropriate means. The note of the Syrian and Lebanese Gov~ ernments inv.okes.:\.....rlicle 34... Thil:!.:\..rticle does not, however, refer to recèlurse by a party to the Security Council, but grants the Council the right to investigate any dispute or situation the continuance of which might endanger the maintenance of ~ternational peace and security. The fact that such an Article is invoked could in no way displease a Government that brought the matter before the San Francisco Conference itself, when the first incidents occurred last May. Why, therefore, invoke this Article nôw, if not because in fact there is no dispute, and beçause the existing situation in Syria and Lebanon cannot in good faith be considered as likely to endanger international peace and security? For five years, the presence of French and British troops has preserved the Middle East from alI the trials and harrors of war. !t Ï5 v.-ith great satisfaction that France records this fact, because it applies to countries with which France h~ maintained a tradition of friendship .for several centuries. Who could say that these troops have suddenly become a threat and that urgent measures should be taken against them to safeguard peace? That would be a distortion of the facts. The statement that sorne of these troops have been a constant menace to peace and security in this region appears to me equally curious. 1 should consider myself entitled, should the necessity arise, to show that at various times in the past the parties involved have themselves .considered that the contrary was true. The League of Nations having ceased to exist, the French Government addresses itsclf to the United Nations, and 1 fail to see in what way we are violating the spirit and the letter of the Charter when we ask the Organization whiè:h it established to assume our responsibility and ta decide whether specifie measures should be taken to continue to ensure the security of the region in question. Is this a preoccupatioll which can be .regarded as contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, when it is preciscly on this Charter that we base ourselves, and when it is to the United Nations that we appeal? It may be said, 1 agree, that these explanations are not contained in the Agreement of 13 December, or that one has failed to find them there. 1 must say that the Lebanese notes, to which the repre· ,sentative of Lebanon alluded a short while a.go, limit themselves, as 1 ~ead them, ta recording a state of affairs without raising any question a.."1d that,as far às the notes from the Syrian Government are concerned, the unsatisfë4ctory state of the relations existing between it and my Government has so far prevented me from receiving tnem. However that may be, since it appears that explanations are still needed, I shall give them and in doi'T,g so 1 shaIl 1;onclude. France, in full agreement with Great Britain, has given proo! of her good will in taking the initiative for the conclusîon of an agreement regarding withdrawal from Syria and Lebanon. The solution has not yet been formulated in the ~er~ of a pre_cis~ plan. We hope, however, that lt will take shape in the near future. The Agreement of 13 December is not interpreted by the signatOlies as implying any intention to maintain troops in the Levant indefilùtely in theab~ sence of a decision on the part of the Security Council. My Government is prepared to examine the question with the Syrian and Lebanese Governments with a view to settling with them the detaiIs of·this solution. 1 therefore ask the representatives of the United .Nations, in view of the efforts which have been made to bring about the independence of Syria and Lebanon, Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): If you will allow me, 1 will make at this stage a statement regarding the position of my Government.in this matter. His Majesty)s Government in the United Kingdom is in sympathy with the Syrian and Lebanese Governments in their desire to see British troops withdrawn from their two countries. British troops are not in the two Levant States, as they are in some other countries in the Middle East, by virtue of any treaty provision, but as a heritage of the needs of war. When the Vichyauthorities, in 1941, allowed our enemies the use of aerodromes in the territory of the French mandate, the British and Free French armies moved into the Levant States and overcame the opposition of the adheJ;ents of the Vichy ret.tllle. Although the two Levant States were formally promised their independence at that time, it was necessary, in order to safeguard Allied communications with the Far East ariâ te ensure· mat the.t"'e shûuld ·be no danger of a recurrence of German intrigue in the Middle East, to maintain armies of occupation in the Levant. The Governments of the Levant States acquiesced in tbis necessity. Before the end of h<:'lstilities with Japan and, therefore, before it could reasonably be expected that British troops would withdraw, a dispute arose between the French troops and the Syrian population which threatened to .assume grave proportions and te ~ndaD.ger th~ security of the whole of the Middle East lying across the vital lines of communication of the British forces in the Far East. PartIy for this reason, and aIso at the invitatJon of the Syrian authorities, British troops intervened to restore order during the last days of May 1945. In vi~~ cf the repeated rçquests of the Governments of the Levant States for assistance in resolving à difficult s.ituation, His Majesty's Government approached the French Government with a suggestion that these. two Governments might discuss the possibilities of the early withdrawal of .their troops. from Syria and Lebanon. On ·13 December, an Anglo-French Agreement was signed, providing for the withdrawal of·British and French forces from the Levant States. rhe terms of. t ).<'.~ Agreement have . been criticized in the Middle·East and in thia country)c and1 donot pretend thatit is one hun- • dred pet .cent· satisfactoryfrom .anyone's point of view. But it. representedan âttempt to bre~k. At the time of the negotiations, we could not immediately and simply withdraw and leave a vacuum. It must he recognized that there was, as has been admitted, a troubls:d situation, and feeling ran high. AIso, at the time of negotiation we felt entitled to expect that the United Nations would, as soon as possible, find sorne means of covering the responsibility in the m.atter which had fallen upon us as a. result of the war. At that tinie the United Nations had not come into existence; but we felt entitled ta believe that it would be able to take decisions which would define clearly the future responsibility for maintaining peace and security in this strategically ÎiÜpmtant pax4: üf the' würld,and would thereby relieve us' of our responsibility. That wàs what was in our minds when we drafted that clause. However that.may bl1, the Council has now heard the declaration by the representative of, France to the .effect that the Agreement' of 13 'December is not interpreted by the signatories as implying any intention on their part to maintain, without limitation of time, effective.~ in the Leva.t1t, in the absence of a decision by the Securi.ty Council. My delegation' associates itself wholeheartecUy with that declaration. And 1 repeat, our desire is to withdraw at the earliest possible moment and be free of responsibility to which, by our presence in the Levant, we are exposed.

1 suggest that tlrls might he a convenient moment to suspend the,sitting. 1 would suggest that we resume our proceedings at 4p.m. If there is no disagreement with 'that, tllen it is adopted. . The meeting rose al 1.JO p.m. TWISNTY-FIRST MEETING HeM at Churck House, Westminster: L01~don, on Friday, 15 February 1946, al4p.m. President:Mr. N.J. O. MAKIN (Australia). Present: The repl'esentative:s of the following countries: Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt,