S/PV.200 Security Council

Yesterday, the last matter we had under consideration was the draft resolution presented by the representative of Colombia.2 Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): La demiere question que nous avons etudiee hier etai le projet de resolution soumis par le representant de la Colombie2• 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securitez Deuxieme Annee, No 59. • Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securite, Dewaeme Annee, No 86. Le projet de resolution de la Colombie a ete soumis a la 198eme seance et discute a la 19geme. In the first place, I should like to refer to the . amendment suggested by the Chinese representative! to the Brazilian resolution2 if it should come up for discussion again. The Chmese representative said he would like to move an amendment reading as follows: "Recognizing the legitimacy of the Egyptian Government's desire for the early and complete evacuation of United Kingdom troops from Egypt". I believe that is very clearly and definitely implied in the wording of my proposal, which reads: , "To resume direct negotiations with a view . _ . to completing at .he earliest possible date the evacuation of all ~.,iuted Kingdom military, naval and air forces from Egyptian territory". Should the Council' consider it advisable, however, to add such an amendment by way of reaffirming the Council's opinion regarding the evacuation,. I need not say that I have absolutely no objection. to raise. Therefore, I shall leave it to the representative of China to propose his am€l1dment, if he so wishes. Regarding sub-paragraph 1(a) of my proposa1~. several objections have been raised to the second part, which reads: "... mutual assistance being provided in order to safeguard in time of war or imminent threat of war the liberty and security of navigation of the Suez Canal". When tile resolution comes to a vote, I intend to request the Council to vote on it in separate parts. I shall ask the Council to divide sub-paragraph 1(a) into two parts, the first of which would read: "... To completing at the earliest possible date the evacuation of all United Kingp.cm military, naval and air forces from Egyptian territory . . ."; the second part would read: "... mutual assistance being provided for to safegpard in time of war or imminent threat of war the liberty and security of navigation of the Suez Canal". Consequently, if the' Security Council so desires· or finds it advisable, it can vote for the first part and against the second part, regarding which I should also like to make an explanation. The Anglo-Egyptian. Treaty of 1936,~ as it stands. today, CQuld remain in full force if the second part of sub-paragraph 1 (a) were not voted upon or if it were rejected by the Council. We have thought that, if negotiations were resumed between the Governments of the United Kingdam and.. Egypt, this might· be. an opportunil¥ for. the, Council to, give the partiflS a Quant au paragraphe 1 a) de ma proposition, plusieurs objections ont et6 formulees a propas de sa deuxieme partie Oll il est dit: ". . . ~n prevoyant une aide mutuelle afin de garantir, en · temps de guerre ou en cas de menace immintnte de guerre, la liberte et la securite de la navigation sur le canal de Suez". Lorsque la resolution sera mise aux voix, j'ai l'intention de demanderau Conseil de proceder ·a un vote separe sur chacune des parties. Je demanderai au Conseil de diviser le paragra,- phe 1 a) en deux parties, dont la premiere serait redigee comme suit: "... D'achever des que possible l'evacuation ,de l'Egyptc par toutes les forces du Royaume-Uni de terre, de mer et de l'air .. ."; et dont la deuxieme partie serait: : "... en prevoy.mt une aide mutuelle afin de ga- : rantir, en temps de guerre ou en cas de menace ; imminente de guerre, la liberte et la securite de : la navigation sur le canal de Suez". Ainsi, s~ le : Conseil de securite le desire ou le juge necessarre, : il pourra accepter la premiere partie et repouss~r la deuxieme, au sujet de laquelle je desirerros: egalement presenter quelques mots cfexplication. Le Traite anglo-egyptien de 19368, tel qu'il existe aujourd'hui, pourrait rester pleinement en · vigueur, si la deuxieme partie du paragraphe 1a) n'etait pas 'mise aux voix, ou si elIe etait repeussee par le Conseil. Nous avons pense que si les nego- .ciations .etaient reprises entre les Gouvem~ments du Roo/aume-Uni et de l'Egypte, ce seral~ une occasion· pour le Conseil d'ouvruaux parties, la 1 Voir les Proces-v,erbaux officiels du Conseil de sJ'curite Deuxieme Annee, No 86, 19geme seance~. , , -Ibid.,. No 80l Le pl'.ojet: de I1esolution du Bresl1 a.ete mis aux voix a la 198eme seance (No 86). . · a Voir le Traite d'alliance entre le RO'Y,aume.Un~ db Grande-Bretagne et d'lrlande du Nord et 1Egypt-e, Sl~ a Londres, le 26 aoilt 1936. Societe des Nations, ~eg: des Traites, Volume 173, No 4031, pages 401 a. 'I'fl ._......-.lIlI Comme je l'ai declare hier, a la 19gemeseance du Conseil, notre proposition tenait compte non seulemen:t des droits et conditions des traites en vigueur, mais egalement de 1'0pportunite d'ouvrir la voie a de nouvelles negociations. Je pourrais ajouter que cette deuxieme partie pourrait probablement ctre redigee d'une fa~on plus satisfaisante; il eJt possible que d'autres termessoient plus heureux. Je n'en proposerai pas maintenant, car j'estime qu'il n'est que juste et convenable d'entendre les observations des parties audifIerend avant de faire de nouvelles suggestions, dont la plus ·evidente serait peut-etre, ainsi que quelqu'un l'a declare hier apres-midi, de prevoir que la question d'assistance mutuelle sera discutee apres que l'evacuation des· troupes aura ete terminee. On pourrait declarer egalement que la question seradiscutee, autant que ce1a puisse satisfaire les Gouvernements du Royaume-Uni et de I'Egypte, apl'~s que 1'evacuation aura et~ terminee, ouprevoir' toute autre disposition de ce genre. Our proposal, as I stated yesterday at the 199th meeting, took into account not only existing treaty rights and c:mdiuuiiS, but also the advisability of opening a new area for the fresh negotiations. I may add that this· second part might pGssibly be drafted in a more satisfactory form; some new wording might conceivably be &lore satisfactory. I shall not propose it yet, because I believe it is only proper, right, and advisable to hear the remarks of the parties 'iL. :ested in the dispute before making any new ,suggestions, the most obvious o:ae of which might be to say, as was suggested yesterday afternoon, that this question of mutual assistance should be discussed, in so far as it may be satisfactory to the Governments of the United Kingdom and Egypt, once the evacuation has been carried out, or something to mat effect. At any rate, I wish to make it clear that, according to our understanding of the rules, we do not 'believe it is up to the Colombian delegation to sa,' whethel' or not we like any proposed amendment; it is for the Council to decide, and it is the indisputable right of any member of the Council to submit any amendments to any proposalthat is being discussed. De toutes fa~ons, jetiens apreciser que, selon l'interpretation 'que nous donnonsau reglement, il n'appartient pas a la delegation de la Colombie de dire si tel ou te! amendement lui plait ou non. C'est une decision qui appartient au COIlseil, et tous les membres du Conseil ant md.eniablement le droit de presenter des amendements aux propositions qui leur sontsoumises. Therefore, we do not believe that it is in conformity with our rules-although it may be according to our practice in the last few weeksfor the author of a proposal to say whether or not he likes the amendments suggested by other members of the Council. I believe members are entirely .free to submit amendments and I think the latter should be entirely welcome. Any draft resolution should .be simply .considered as a basis for ,discussion, and it is as such that we have presented ours. Je ne crois donc pas qU'il sC)it conforme a nos reglements, bien que ce SGit conforme a la pratique que nous avons adaptee pendant les quelques dernieres semaines, que l'auteur cl'une proposition declare ql1'il aime ou qu'il n'aime pas les amendements presentes par les autres membres du Conseil. l'estime que les membtes sont entierement libres de pr.esenter des amendements, et je pense que ces derniers doivent etre bien re~us. Tout projet de resolution doit etre simplement considere comme une base de discussion, et c'esta ce titre que nousavons pr-esente le natre. I ·:h6pe these few explanations will facilitate matters, and enable us to reach a satisfactory J'espere que les quelql1es explicationsque je viens de d.ormer faoiliteront les debats et permettl'ont d'arrivera unesolution :satisfaisante, afin que cet apres-midi nous puissions mettre aux voix soit cette resolution, soit tout autre texte. Quelle que soit la resolution acceptee, 'nous esperons qu'elle contribuera aatteindrela finque·nous nous sommes propose, c'est-a-dire non seulement de voir 'les troupes du Royaume';Uni evacuer le plus tat possible le territoire egyptien, mais egalement de maintenir les relations entrele Royaumeconclusio~an:d take a vote on this or any other resolution this afternoon. Our one desire is that no inatter what resolution is decided on, it will contribute effectively to the achievement of our p~pose,which is not only to see the early evacuatio? of United Kingdom troops from Egyptian terrItory, hut to keep relations between 'the United Kingdom :and Egypt on a satisfactory basis :of understanding :and good will, in. keeping Irraw+t·.,_

'rhe representative of Colutnbia has eJtpressed the wish that his resolution should be voted on in parts, paragraph by paragraph, anc!- that the second pari of sub-paragraph 1(a), beginning with the words (lmutual assistance", should be voted on separately. Therefore, I do not believe there will be any necessity for presenting an amendment to that effect. The; desire of the members of the Council will be expressed in their vote on this particular passage. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Yesterday afternoon I expressed the desire to study further the resolution on the Egyptian question introduced by the Colombian representative. I pointed out at the time that the resolution raised cert&in new questions which were not included in the proposals hitherto presented on this question in the Security Council. It must be noted in the first place that the Colombian resolution contains totally inacceptable proposals to the effect that the evacuation of .united Kingdom troops from the territory of Egypt and the Sudan should·be conditional on the conclusion of an appropriate treaty or agreement between the United Kingdom and Egypt regarding the· ~'libetty and' security of navigation of tlle Suez Canal". The resolution, it is true, does not refer directly to an agreement or treaty, but its meaning leaves no doubt that it envisages the conclusion of an appropriate treaty or agreement on this question. This recommendation, if adopted, would not only not.facilitate the settlement of the question raised by Egypt for the evacuation of United Kingdom troops from the territory of Egypt and the Sudan, but would, on the contrary, create new difficulties in settling the question. Egypt is indeed protesting against the fact that the evacuation of foreign troops from the territory of Egypt and the Sudan should be conditional on any agreement whatsoever. The standpoint of the Egyptian Government is completely understandable and cannot but evoke the sympathy of those who follow in deeds, and not in words only, the principles of the United Nations, whjch safeguard the independence of States. Acceptance of the Colombian proposal would be tantamount to an attempt by the Security Council to require Egypt to accept a position of inferiority in its relations with certain other States. This. is contrary to the principle of the equality of rights of peoples and States; and neither Egypt nor any other State that prizes its sovereignty could agree to such proposals and recommendations. One cannot but express surprise at the equanimity with which such a proposal is submitted to the Security Council, whose task is to main- Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Le representa!nt de la Colombie nous a demande que sa resolution fGt mise apx voix paragraphe par paragraphe. Par consequent, la deuxieme pl:\rtie du paragraphe 1 a), commen~antpar les mots "en prevoyan~ une aide mutuelle", sera mise aux voix separement, l'estime donc qu'il n'est pas necessaire de presenter un amendement a cet effet. La volonte des membres du Conseil sera exprimee par leur vote sur le passage en question. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques soda- Iistes sovietiques) (tmduit du russe) : Hier apresmidi, j'ai propqse d'examiner plus a fond la resolutton soumise par le representant de la Colombie au sujet de la question egyptienne. J'ai indique a ce moment que cette resolution posait certaines questions nouvelles qui n'avaient pas ete traitees dans les propositions dont le Conseil de securite a ete saisi jusqu'ici apropos de cette question. Tout d'abord je dois indiquer que la resolution de la Colombie contient une proposition tout a fait inacceptable qui subordonne l'evacuation de l'Egypte et du Soudan par les troupes du Royaume-Uni a la conclusion d'u11. traite ou d'un accord entre le Royaume-Uni et l'Egypte, au ,sujet de "la libertc et de la securite de navigation sur le canal de Suez". 11 est vrai que la resolution ne mentionne pas expressement un accord ou un traite mais son sens general ne laisse aucun doute sur le fait qu'elle prevoit la conclusion d'un traite. ou d'un accord sur cette question. Loin de contribuer a resQudre la question du retrait des troupes britanniques qu'a soulevee l'Egypte, cette recommandation, si elleetait adoptee, en compIiquerait le reglement. VEgypte s'oppose precisement a ce qu'on subordon,ne l'evacuation de l'Egypte et du Soudan par les troupes etrangeres ala conclusion d'accords quels qu'ils soient. L'attitude du Gouvernement egyptien est parfaitement comprehensible et ne peut manquer d'attirer la sympathie de quiconque reste fidele, non pas en paroles mais en· actes, aux principes de l'Organisation des Nations Unies qui tendent asauvegarder l'independance des Etats. Si le Conseil de securite approuvait la proposition de la Colombie, cela signifierait qu'il exige de l'Egypte d'accepter une situation d'inferiorite dans ses rapports avec d'autres Etats. Ce1a est contraire au principe de l'egalite de droits des peuples et des Etats. L'Egypte, pas plus qu'aucun autre Etat qui tient a sa souverainete, ne pourrait accepter de telles propositions et une telle recommandation. On ne peut que s'etonner de l'assurance aver" laquelle on a presente cette proposition au 20 ;1- seil de securite, alors que celui-eia pour~tac.hed'IIII Egypt approached the Security Council with a request for protection of its tightful national interests. Instead, however, the Council is being asked to impose conditions offensive to the national feelings of the Egyptian people, derogatory to Egypt's national prestige, and inC(>mpatible with its State sovereignty. Egypt approached the Security Council with a request for help to free it from those things which the Colombian resolution would impose on it. It requested help in throwing ofI the last shackles of colonial dependency and asked to be granted the possibility of assuring its existence and development as an iIld~pendent State on the basis of equality of rights with other countries. But instead of giving it such help, the Council is asked to do the exact opposite: to legalize Egypt's unequal status with the blessing of the United Nations. The members of the Council can judge for themselves how the Egyp- ~ian people are likely to react to such a recommendat,on, should the Colombian proposal become a recommendation. The United Nations Charter' and the lofty principles it embodies must not be regarded as small change to be used according to circumstances. These principles must not be abandoned, particularly in such important m.atters as the Egyptian question. The Colombian resolution shows complete disregard for the principles of the United Nations. It is fundamentally unsound. Its mention of .the evacuation of United Kingdom troops from Egyptian territory "at the earliest possible date", is obviously a polite convention and nothing more. Nevertheless, this question is relegated to the backgtound and its fundamental significance is slurred over in the resolution. In the foreground are placed the conditions for the evacuation·of foreign troops: the conclusion of an agreement or treaty for the defence of the Suez Canal. . I will go even further: the question of the evacuation of foreign troops from the territory of Egypt and the Sudan is in actual fact dropped, for. it is obVious to all that a proposal for the joint defence of the Suez Canal by the United .~gdom and Egypt is a proposal for the retention, though under certain definite conditions, of foreign troops in Egyptian and Sudanese territory. This proposal is contrary to Egyptia.n """e demands for the immediate and unconditional L'Egypte a demande au Conseil de securite de defendre sesinterets nationaux legithnes. Or, ce qu'on prbposemaintenant, c'est au conttait.e' d'imposer a ce p~ysdes. conditions qui heurtent les sentimentsdu peuple ep;yptien, qui portent atteinte a Sa dignite nationale et qui Sont incom.- patibles avec la s01.1verainete de l'Etat egyptien. Si l'Egypte s'eSI adressee au Conseil de sec~·· rite, c'est pour que cdui-ci l'aide a se liberer des conditions memes que voudntit lui impose!' l~ resolution de la Colombie. L'Egypte nous a de;; mande de·l'aider a se debarrasser des derniers· vestiges de la servitude coloniale, et de lui per-' mettre d'assurer son existence et son developpement en tant qu'Etat independant, jouissant des memes droits que les t.utres pays. Mais au lieu de lu~· accorder cette aide, on propose au Conseil de fah exactement le contraire, c'est-a-dire de sanctionner I'inegalite de droits dont soufIre l'Egypte avec, cette fois-ci, l'approbation des Nations Dnies, Il est aise de prevoir l'attitude que prcndraient le peuple egyptien a l'egard d'une telle recommandation -- si toutefois la, proposition de la Colombie etait adoptee a .titre, de recommandation. Il ne faut pas que la Charte des Nations Unies et les principes eleves qu'elle enonce soient traites comme une monnaie d'echange, dont on peut disposer seIon les circonstances. Il ne faut pas sacrifier ces principes, surtout lorsqu'il s'agit d'un probleme aussi important que la question egyptienne. La resolution deja Colombie ~emoigned'un. manque total de respect a l'egard des prmcipeS' de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Elleest~ viciee dans son essence meme. Ses auteurs indi.. quent, pour sauver les apparences, que les troupes du Royaume-Uni devraient evacuer le territoire egyptien "des que possible", mais en realite, Us reIeguent cette question a l'arriere-plan et en amoindrissent ainsi l'importance. Ils mettent· en relief la condition a laquelle l'evacuation reste, subordonnee, a savoir la conclusion d'un accord ou d'un traite au sujet de la defense du canal de Suez. . Je dirai meme qu'ils ecartent en realite la question de l'evacuation de .I'Egypte et du S01.1- dan par les troupes etrangeres, car il est parfaitement clair que la proposition qui tend a confier au Royaume-Uni et a l'Egypte la de£ense commune du canal de Suez signifie le maintien des troupes etrangeres sur le territoire egyptien et: soudanais, meme si ce maintien est soumis a certaines conditions; Cette proposition va al'encontre des desirs de l'Egypte, puisque ce pays-' , Yesterday the Colombian representative tried to give certain explanationS in reply to the Egyptian Prime Minister's statcme.'lt, and to persuade the Council that the proposals contained in his resolution might form a basis for a favourable llolution of the question raised by Egypt in the interests of both parties to the dispute. His explanation, however, merely emphasized the meaning and aim ot the Colombian resolution: to. impose on Egypt conditions which were unacc~ptable and incompatible with its national interests, and contrary to the principle of the sovereign equality of States and nations. I shall not expatiate on the proposals' contained in the Colombian resolution on the question of the Sudan. The position of the USSR has already been made clear in my statement of 20 August,l To sum up my remarks, this resolution is entirely unsatisfactory and unacceptable. The USSR delegation cannot agree to it nor to any other proposal which does not envisage the immediate and total evacuation·offoreign troops from the territory of Egypt and the Sudan, and which does not protect' the lawful rights of Egypt as a sovereign State. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): Yesterday I did not make any comment on the resolution submitted by the representative of Colombia, partly because I wished to study it and partly because I hoped to hear the views of some of my colleagues on the subject. But as soon as I saw the text, I realized the Council was in for trouble. . . 1 believe there is an inherent fault, if I may say so, in this· proposal, in that, as the representative of Brazil said yesterday afternoon, it attempts to Spell out.theactual topics of the negotiations to be undertaken. I think that is very significant. I .believe it is the will of the Council; and it certainly seems to me, that the parties should get together again to resume negotiations, as is stated in these two draft resolutions. I think both of 115 know what we are attempting to do in those negotiations. I hope we shall be able to make progress in them and arrive at an amicable result, but I do not think the Council can very well limit the scope of the negotiations at this stage. Tout cela m'amene a. conclure que la resolution de la Colombie n'est pas du tout satisfaisante et qu'elle est inacceptable. La delegation de l'URSS ne peut accepter ni cette resolution, ni aucune autre proposition qui ne prevoirait pas l'evacuation complete et immediate de I'Egypte et du Soudan par les troupes etrangeres et qui ne protegerait pas les droits legitimes de l'Egypte en tant qu'Etat s~uverain. \ Sir Alexander CAooGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'ang1ais) : J: n'ai pas commente hier la resolution. soumise par le representant de la Colombie, d'une part, parce que j'eprouvais le besoin de I'etudier et, d'autre part, parce que j'esperais entendre l'opinion de certains de mes collegues a. ce sujet. Mais aussitot que j'ai vu le texte, je me suis rendu compte que le Conseil allait au devant de certaines difficultes. J'estime que cette proposition contient un defaut fondamental, si je puis m'cxprimer ainsi. Comme le representant du Bresil le disait hier apres:-midi, ce texte tente de preciser les difi't~­ rents points des negociations a. entreprendre. Je pense que le fait est tres significatif. J'ai l'impression que le Conseil tient a. ce que les parties se reunisscnt a. nouveau et reprennent leurs negociations, ainsi que le stipulent les deux projets de resolution. Je pense que les deux parties en cause savent tres bien ce qu'elles veulent realiser par negociations. J'espere que ces negociations seront utiles et aboutiront a. un resultat amiable, mais je ne crois pas que, a ce stade, le Conseil soit fonde a. en limiter l'objet. However, I think the Council would get into the greatest difficulty if it tried to define the actual subject matter of negotiations here and now. I should have preferred something more like the Brazilian resolution, which is a simple, general invitation to resume negotiations and to keep in touch with the Security Council. In regard to one or two particular points, it has been suggested by the author of the resolution that when it comes to voting, the Coun~il should vote st,parately on the two halves of sub-paragraph 1(a). At first sight, there does not seem to be anything exceptional about that. But I should like to point out to the Council that this whole paragraph has a particular property; it has a kind of balance. One half is violently attacked by the Egyptian delegation; the other half is llOt so acceptable !:0 me. I think that balance ought to be voted upon as a whole. If the Council is going to attempt to draw up terms of reference for the negotiators, this paragraph should either be accepted in toto or rejected. En ce qui concerne un ou deux points parti~ cullers, l'auteur de la resolution a suggere que le Conseil procede a. un vote separe sur les deux; rrioities du paragraphe 1 a). A premiere vue, cette methode ne semble presenter riett d'excep- , tionnel. Mais j'aimerais faire' remarquer au Conseil que I'ensemble du paragraphe a une qualite particuliere: une sorte d'equilibre. Une moitie est violemment attaquee par la delegation de I'Egypte; l'autre est inacceptable pour moL l'estime que c'est sur l'ensemble du texte que nous devrions voter. Si le Conseil veut :enter ,~e donner un mandat aux negociateurs, ce para-:- graphe doit etre accepte ou rejete dans son ensemble. Ooniormement aux instructions que j'ai i'e~ues de mon Gouvernement, je dois avertir le Conseil que si, par hasard, la pr\:miere partie de ce paragraphe etait adoptee et la seconde repoussee, le resultat nous paraitrait absolument inacceptable. Le fait d'adopter la premiere moitie de ce paragraphe et d'en supprimer la deuxieme aurait pour effet d'accorder a l'Egypte tout ce qu'elle desire et d'opposer a. mon Gouvernement une fin de non recevoir. En efIet, le fait de supprimer ce paragraphe, apres qu'il a ete presente, equi-, vaudrait a. nous refuser formellement ce que nous considerons comme une condition essentielle al'evacuation totale et rapide avant l'expiration du Traite qui nous donne le droi~ de maintenir des troupes en Egypte. Donc,· si la: premiere nioitie de ce paragraphe etait adopt~e et la deuxieme repoussee, mon Gouvernement, cc:nme je l'ai dit, considererait ce resultat cqmme entierement inacceptable. - In accordance with instructions from my Government, I am bound to inform the Council that if, by chance, the first half of that sub-paragraph were accepted and the second half rejected, the result would be totally unsatisfactory. To vote in favour of the first half of this sub-paragraph and to suppress the second half would be to give'the Egyptians all they want and to deny to my Government-because the actual suppression of that passage, once it is proposed, would amount to z. positive denial-what we consider to be an essential condition of early total evacuation before the expiration of the Treaty under which we have the right to maintain troops in Egypt. Therefore, if the first half of that paragraph were adopted and the second half suppressed, the result, as I say, would be totally unacceptable ~o my Government. There is one other ?oint, concerning paragraph 2, which calls for the resumption of negotiations, with a view "to-terminating the joint administration of the Sudan with due regard to t.he principle of self-determination of peoples and their right to self-government". ' Dans le paragraphe 2, il y a un autre point' demandant la reprise des negociations en vue· de "revoquer le regime administratif commun en vigueur au Soudan, compte dument tenu du principe du droit des peuples ~ disposer d'eux-, memes et a choisir leu! propre forme de gouvernement". That would naturally, I suppose, implv that the termination would not take place until 'after the Sudan had been brought to an advanced staO'e in which it would be capable of independent seH- A mon avis, ce texte implique naturellement que cette revocation ne pourrait avoir lieu avant que le Soudan ne soit suffisamlnent developpe !lour avoir un gouvernement autonome. Si ce There is one very small verbal point. In paragraph 2, my copy reads: "to keep the Security Council readily informed •.." I am not quite sure that "readily" is the right word. It reads curiously to me. I do not know if i~ means "frequently", or what its exact significance is. If I may touch on the proposal of the Chinese l'epresentative to add a phrase to the effect that the Security Council recognized the legitimacy of the Egyptian Government's desire for the early and complete evacuation of United Kingdom troops from Egypt, I have no objection whatever to the spirit of that amendment, and I should not object to the insertion of anything of the kind. I only suggest that the word "legitimacy" is not quite right, because it might be taken to imply that the Egyptians had a legal grievance, which I deny. If any other wording is acceptable, such as "recognizing the force of the Egyptian Government's desire", or "sympathiziI:lg with the Egyptian Government's desire", I do not mind. My principal point is that if the Colombian resolution were accepted as a whole, with the comments that I have made on parts of it, I should not wish to oppose it. I do, however, think that it would be much better to revert to .something mo:re along lines of the Brazilian resolution) which is wider and more general in its scope. I think that, if we persist in trying to elaborate this Colombian draft, we shall get into difficulties at every turn. I shall object to something and Nokrashy Pasha will object to something else, and I do not think we shall ever reach any agreement. I therefore suggest to the members of the Council that they might consider the possibility of reverting to the formula of the Brazilian resolution. Mr. DE LA TOURNELLE (France) (translated from French): Although the Brazilian proposal yesterday was acceptable to the French delegation, I regret that the same does not apply to the new resolution now before the Council. In the present state of affairs, the Council can do nothing other and nothing better than recommend the resumption of direct negotiations. To go any further would be to lay down rules for the negotiators, when they alone, at this f:tage, are qualified to determine their terms of reference, according to the instructions of their respective Government'.!. It is therefore not for the Council M. DE LA TOURNELLE (France): Si la proposi.tion du Bresil etait acceptable, hier, pour la delegation de la France, je regrette qu'il n'en soit pas de meme pour la nouvelle resolution qui est presentee/au Conseil. Dans l'etat actue1 des choses, le Conseil de securite n'a rien de plus et de mieux afaire que de preconiser la reprise des negociations directes. Aller plus loin serait imposer aux negociateurs un cadre de travail alors qu'eux seuls, au stade actuel, .ont competence pour determiner leur mandat, conformement aux instructions de leurs' Gouvernements respectifs. 11 n'appartient d~~~.~zd s'effor~ant de leur trouver une solution. I need not say how much tt'1e French delegation Il est inutile de dire combien la delegation de hopes for the success of the direct negotiations so Ila France souhaite le succes des negociations that Egypt may be enabled, in peace and interdirectes afin de permettre a l'Egypte de pournational order, to continue her progress along the I suivre, dans la paix et dans 1'0rdre international, magnificent road on which she has set out. son ascension sur la voie magnifique ou eIle s'est eng-.gee. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated from French): The Belgian delegation is of opinion that the Council should keep within the framework of Article 33 of the Charter, as the Brazilian representative proposed. It was in fact because the Brazilian proposal remained within the framework of that Article that the Belgian delegation voted in favour of it. The Colombian representative's proposal is conceived in quite another spirit. It expresses an opinion on the substance of the question, and that can only increase the difficulties of the problem now before the Council. "If the Security Council is to suceed", the Colombian representative said yesterday, "it has tl;) have the co-operation of the two parties to the dispute, because", he added, "it goes without saying that the efforts of the Council will prove unavailing unless such co-operation is forthcoming".l M. VAN LANGENHOVE (Be1gique): La delegation de la Belgique pense que le Conseildevrait se maintenir dans le cadre de l'Article 33 de la Charte, ainsi que le proposait le :.-epresentant du Bresil. C'est parce que cette proposition demeurait dans ce cadre que la delegation de la Belgique a vote en sa faveur. La proposition du representant de la Colombie est con~ue dans un tout autre esprit. EIle prend position sur le fond. Cela ne peut qu'augmeIlter les difficultes du probleme dont le Conseil est saisi. "Pour que le Conseil de securite", disait hier le representant de la Colombie, "reussisst':: dans sa tache, il faut qu'il puisse eompter sur la cooperation des deux parties en cause, car il va sans dire", ajoutait-il, "que sans eette cooperation les efforts du Conseil resteront vains"l. Apres les observ<J,tions. formulees hier apresmidi par le Premier Ministre d'Egypte' et, il y a un moment, par le representant du Roya1.!ffie- Uni, je crois qu'il n'y a pas d'illusions a se faire a cet egard. Mter the observations made yesterday afternoon by the Egyptian Prime Minister and, a moment ago, by the Uplted Kingdom representative, ~ think there can be no illusions in this respect. Dans ces conditions, la delegation de la Belgique regrette de ne pas pouvoir se prononeer en faveur de la proposition soumise par le repre- , sentant de la Colombie. In the circumstances, the Belgian delegation regrets that it is unable to vote in favour of the Colombian proposal. Mr. KATz-SUCHY (Poland): On 8 July 1947, the Prime Minister of Egyptbrought to the attention of the Security Council a dispute between his Government and that of the United Kingdom, a dispute the continuance of which may endanger international peace and security. His demands were the withdrawal of United Kingdom troops and the termination of the joint adrriinistration in the Sudan. M. KATZ-SUCHY (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglais): Le 8 juillet 1947, le Premier Ministre d'Egypte a attire l'attention du Conseil de seeu- . rite sm un differend qui opposait son Gouver- 'nement a celui du Royaume-Uni et dont la prolongation pouvait mettre en danger le main- •tien de la paix et de la securite internationales. n demandait le retrait des troupes du Royaume- Uni et la revocation du regime administratif : commun en vigueur au Soud;m. Il a fait ressortir plusieurs elements nouveaux qui sont intervenus dans la situation depuis la conclusion du Traite entre l'Egypte et le ',Royaume-Uni et a fait observer notamment que la presence des troupes du Royaume-Uni en ! Egypte etait contraire a la .souveramete-drr ; peuple egyptien. :n a parle de la tres, vive ran... : cune populaire suscitee par ce dernier vestige . He called attention to several new elements which had come'into the situation since the con- Glusion of the Treaty between Egypt and the United I\.ing,dom. Among such elements, he st~ted first of all that the presence of United ~gdom troops in Egypt violated the sovereign ng~ts of the Egyptian people. He cited the great national resentment against the last chains of This Council has shown great sympathy with Le Conseil a fait preuve d'une grande symthe rightful and justified demands of the Egyppathie pour les demandes justes et justifiees du tian Government. The Council, however, hesi- Gouvernement egyptien. Neanmoins, il a hesite tated to take action, and contented itself with a agir et s'est borne a des demi-mesures; peuthalf measures or even less than half measures. etre meme l'appellation de "demi-mesures" est- One of such attempts to dispose of the question dIe exageree. La resolution du Bresil constitue was the Brazilian resolution. We criticized it. The une de ces tentatives faites pour eviter de regler Polish delegation voted against it,2 because this le probleme. Nous avons crltique cette resolution. resolution did not take into account any new and La delegation de la Pologne a vote contre la essential elements of the situation, adopted comresolution du Bresil2, parce que ce texte, qui ne pletelv the situation created by the Treaty of tenait pas compte des elements nouveaux et 19%, and left further negotiations and the solu~ essentielles de la situation, se bomait a faire etat tion of the problem to the parties themselves., de la situation creee par le Traite de 1936 et In brief, the Brazilian resolution did not offer laissait aux parties elles-memes le soin de regler any solution, but merely left the Council where la question par des negociations. Bref, la resoit was on the first day on which it began to dislution du Bresil ne constituait nullement une cuss the Egyptian questioil. solution car elle laissait le Conseil la OU il en . etait le jour ou i! a commence a examiller la question de l'Egypte. We believed, when the Colombian representative intervened, that his resolution might bring a more desirable solution. However, we found that the explicitness of the Brazilian resolution had been replaced by several implications in the Colombian resolution which the Polish delegation finds contrary to the letter and spirit of the Charter. The Colombian resolution makes the evacuation of United Kingdom troops conditional on the signing of a treaty. As I said in my previous statement,3 the evacuation of the troops is recommended in the General Assemblv resolution of 14 December 1946. Therefore the. evacuation cannot be conditional, for only the continuance of the presence of United Kingdom troops could require a treaty. In general, the Colombian resolution goes much further than the original United Kingdom demands. It confirms the status quo and limits the scope of the negotiations, while imposing conditions on both parties to the dispute. I find this resolution contains very important implications which are far beyond the jurisdiction of this Council. It contains mandatory stipulations which are contrary to the sovereign rights of the States. Presupposing the result of the negotiations, it tries to impose a treaty to be drawn up between the United Kingdom and Egypt concerning the further maintenance of troops in Ep-ypt. Otherwise, we could not explain the phrase cc••• mutual assistance being provided in order to safeguard ..." To "safeguard" refers to the maintenance of peace, and therefore , See Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during the second part of its first session, No. 41 (I). Lorsque le representant de la Colombie est intervenu dans le debat, nous esperions que sa resolution nous offrirait une solution plus satisfaisante. Mais en realite, alors que la resolution du Bresi! etait explicite, celle de la Colombie implique certaines consequences que la delegation de la Pologne considere contraires a la lettre et a l'esprit de la Charte. La resolution de la Colombie subordonne I'evacuation des troupes du Royaume-Uni a la conclusion d'un traite. Comme je l'ai deja dit precedemment3, l'evacuation des troupes a ete recommandee par la resolution de l'Assemblee generale en date du 14 decembre 1946. Par consequent, cette evacuation ne saurait etre IIUbordonnee a aucune condition, et c'est au contraire le maintien des troupes'du Royaume-Uni qui exigerait un traite special. De fa/ton generale, la resolution de la Colombie va beaucoup plus loin que les demandes initiales du Royaume- Uni. Elle confirme le statu quo et limite la portee des negociations, tout en imposant des conditions aux deux parties en cause. J'estime que cette resolution comporte des incidences tres importantes qui depassent de beaucoup la competence du Consei!. Ellecontient des obligations incompatibles avec la souverainete d'un Etat. Elle essaie d'anticiper sur le resultat des negociations et d'obliger le Royaume- Uni et I'Egypte a signer un traite concernant le maintien de troupes sur le territoire egyptien.· C'est la seule explication que nous puissions donner a l'expression cc••• en prevoyant une aide mutuelle afiri de garantir ...". "Garantir" s'applique au maintien de la paix et signifie, par , Voir les Resolutions adoptees par l'Assemblee generale pendant la seconde partie de sa premiere session, . No 41 (I). . • Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de secunte, Deuxieme Annee, No 86, 198eme seance. . . 'Voir les Proces-verbaux 'officiels'du Con'seil de securite, Deuxieme Annee, No 84. 196eme seance. .~ ernment~ of its own free will, to conclude a treaty with the Government of the United Kingdom to that end but in no circumstances can we lay down a recommendation that such a treaty should come into being. In general, the Colombian resolution recommends not only the continuance of the present situation, but even its extension~ by means of a new treaty and new negotiations, into a much stronger form of foreign tutelage in Egypt. As to the question of the joint administration of the Sudan, it was stated here by the Polish delegation that we consider the problem of the Sudan as completely separate from the question of the withdrawal of troops, and that the Council cannot by any means allow the 'future of the Sudan to be a condition to the withdrawal of United Kingdom troops from Egypt. The presence of United Kingdom troops in Egypt has already been discussed here by several members of the Council. The mere fact that the Government of the United Kingdom has been willing to enter into negotiations concerning the termination of the 1936 Treaty, and to withdraw troops completely, subject to certain conditions, and, moreover, the fact that, although no agreement to this end was reached in the negotiations between Foreign Minister Bevin and Sidky Pasha,1 large contingents of United Kingdom troops have already been withdrawn, proves that His Majesty's Government recognizes fully that the terms of the Treaty of 1936 are untenable, that it admits freely that the conditions in which this Treaty was drawn up and signed have substantially changed, and that the aim towards which the Treaty was directed has been fully exhausted. We are surprised that the Colombian resolution tries to impose these same conditions, which, in our opinion, no longer obtain. We believe that the key to the situation, and the main basis for a satisfactory solution, is the withdrawal of troops. We believe the withdrawal of troops T m create such conditions and such an atmosphere that free negotiations will be fruitful. Nous sommes surpris que la resolution de la Colombie essaye d'imposer le retour de conditions qui, a notre avis, ont cesse d'exister. Nousestimons que la cle du probleme et l'eIement essentiel de tout reglement satisfaisant est le retrait ues troupes. Nous croyons que le retrait des troupes creera une atmosphere et des conditions propices a des negociations qui se poursuivraient en toute liberte et qui seraient fructueuses. Nous reconnaissons que les points a discuter entre le Gouvernement de l'Egypte et celui du Royaume-Uni couvrent un champ tJ'es vaste, et la bonne volonte dont le Royaume-Uni a fait preuve en engageant les negociations de 1946 nous permet d'esperer que ces negociations donneront Je bons resultats. Nous esper<;>Ds que le retrait des troupes creera les relations les plus amicales entre les deux Gouvernements. We fully support the idea that the points to be negotiated between the Governments of Egypt and th.e United Kingdom cover a wide field, and t?e w~ingness of the United Kingdom to negotiate ill 1946 gives us an assurance that these negotiations will be successful. We believe the witP?rawal of troop~ will create the most friendly relations between the two Governments. .'fl See Papers regarding the Negotiations for a.Revisio.n I 1 Voir "Papers regarding the Negotiations for a Revit the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, United Kingdom don of the Anglo-Egyptian Treat'>, of 1936, Unjt~d'Kingommand Paper 7179. dom Command Paper 7179".· ' . ' '. Colonel HQPGSON (Australia): The Council will recall that I suggested yesterday morningl ~at this draft resolution' might well have been submitted' to the Council before a vote was taken pn:the Brazilian proposal. .•''1ri the 'Brazilian proposal, the operative part was a recommendation to the Governments concerned to resume direct negotiations. Now, when 1 look at the Colombian resolution, I see the same phrase. However, the Colombian resolution then goes on to define certain objectives. Therefore, it should have been ruled that t..he resolution we are now considering was only an amendment to the original Brazilian resolution and should be treated as such. My delegation does not like the Colombian resolu,tion for the following reasons. First of all, we feel, prima facie, that it was fr:amed in such a way as to appear to be prejudicial to the requests of Egypt. In other. words, it seems to be . !oadedagainst Egypt in some respects, as compared with the original resolution. With regard to the Brazilian proposal, the Council will recall that I recommended the use of the word "Invites" instead of "Recommends",' on the ground that this Council had not found or determined, under Article 36, that the situation in Egypt did endanger international peace and security. My. second objection is that the Colombian resolution goes directly into Chapter VII. By use of the words "Calls upon", which can be used only only under Chapter VII, it implies that the Council .has verified the existence of a breach of the peace. It is only in Chapter VII of the Charter that those words appear, as far as the Security Council is concerned. The United States representative said he was impreSsed with the precision of the principle. But whenever the Security Council endeavours to be precise, it gets into difficulty because there are no limits to precision; it has to go the whole way and tries to make the proposal exclusive and Gompletely comprehensive for the sake of clarity. In this particular resolution, once the Council lays down the objects of the negotiations, it has to go the whole way. For example, those negoti- ,ations dealt with the evacuation of troops and with mutual assistance. The parties actually initialledthe instruments to that effect and said they were prepared to sign them.3 Therefore, if the- Council starts to define the objects of the 2 0 ~ Se~ (f)fficiaJ Records of the Security. Cou.ncil, Second Year, No. 36, 198th meeting. 'Ibid., No. 82, 193:!d meeting. Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de I'anglais): Les membres du Conseil voudront bien se aouvenir qu'hier matin j'ai suggere1 quo ce projet de resolution nous soit presente avant que la proposition du Bresil lie soit mise aux voix. La resolution du Bresil avait ceci de pratique qu'elle recommandait aux Gouvernements interessesde reprendre les negociations directes. En examinant la resolution. de la Colombie, je retrouve les memes termes. Cependant, 'cette resolution va plus loin et definit certains objectifs. Par consequent, il aurait du etre decide que la resolution que nous etudions maintenant constitue seulement un amendement a la resolution du Bresil, et devrait etre traitee COmme telle. Ma d~legation n'est pas en faveur de la resolution de la Colombie pour les raisons suivantes: Tout d'abord, la fa~on dont ce texte est redige me semble porter prejudice aux revendications de I'Egypte. Autrement dit, si on le compare ala resolution initiale, ce texte semble, a certains points de vue, etre systematiquement dirige, contre I'Egypte. Quant a la proposition du Bresil, les membres du Conseil voudront bien se souvenir que j'ai suggere de remplacer le mot "Recommande" par "Invite"~ car j'estime que le Conseil n'a pas constate ni conclu, conformement al'Article 36, que la situation. en Egypte menace le maintien de la paix et de la securite intemationaIes. Ma seconde objection a la resolution de la Colombie est qu'elle place la question dans le cadre du Chapitre VII. En employant les mots calls upon3 - ce qui ne peut etre fait qu'aux termes du Chapitre VII ~ cette resolution implique que le Conseil a constate,I'existence d'une menace contre la paix. En effet, pour autant qu'il s'agisse du Conseil de securite, ce mot n'apparait qu'au Chapitre VII de la Charte. Le representant des Etats-Unis a dit qu'il etait frappe par la precision du principe. Mais, toutes les foisque le Comeil de securite s'efforce d'etre precis, il se heurte a des difficuItes car la precision n'a pas de limites. Afin d'etre clair, il doit alle:r jusqu'au bout et essayer de presenter une proposition complete et suffisante en soi. Si, dans la presente resolution, le Conseil stipule les buts des negocia,tio'us, il devra aller jusqu'au bout. Par exemple, les negociations en question ont porte sur l'evacuation des troupes et sur l'assistance mutuelle. Les parties ont effectivement parafe,les instruments a cet effet et se sont declarees pretes a. les signer3• Par Gonsequent, si le Conseil commence aenoncer les. buts des nego- . i Voir le.s Proces-veT.bau~ officiels dt,t COftse.il de. s«cU1:ite, Deuxieme Annee, No 86, 198eme seance. 'Ibid., No 82, 193eme seance. aCette observation ne porte que sur le texte. anglais. : . Voir ttPape1sregarding the. Ni2gptiaticJ.ns far the ReVIsional the Anglo-EgyptianTr/laty 0#1936, Unite.d Kingdom Command Paper 7179". ".~ For those reasons, the Australian delegation does not think this Council can deal with anything but general principles, It cannot go into the details of all cases. In our opinion, this is not a case where the Council wants precision at all. Therefore, we do not like the Colombian proposal. We were very much impressed with the wisdom of the suggestion made yesterday afternoon by the Chines~ representative. The President, in his wisdom, may see how the Council can restore the original Brazilian resolution. So far, I have only heard one member of the Council, the representative of Brazil, speak unreservedly in favour of the Colombian resolution. Therefore, I suggest-or I should like the President to suggest-that the Colombian resolution be withdrawn and the Brazilian proposal restored. Nous avons ete tres frappes par la sagesse de la suggestion que nous a soumise mer apres-midi le representant de la Chine. n est possible que l'habilete du President permette au Conseil de revenir a la resolution initiale du Bresil. Jusqu'a present, je n'ai entendu qu'un seul membre du Conseil, le representant du Bresil, se prononcer sans reserve en faveur de la resolution de la Colambie. Je suggere donc - ou plutot j'aimerais voir le President. suggerer - que la resolution de la Colombie soit retiree et que celle du Bresil soit soumise a nouveau. Mr. LOPEz (Colombia): The Council will recall that when the Colombian proposal was submitted the Brazilian proposal had not· been accepted. The Council will also recall that one of the i"e2tscns advanced against the Brazilian proposal wastbat it was not acceptable to the Egyptian delegation. If my memory does not fail me, the Egyptian delegation was very emphatic about it. M. LOPEz (Colombie) (traduit de l'anglais) : Le Conseil voudra bien se souvenir que la proposition de la Colombie n'a ete soumise qu'apres le rejet de la resolution du Bresil. Le Conseil se souviendra egalement qu'une des raisons militant contre la proposition du Bl'esil est que la delegation de l'Egypte ne l'avait pas trouvee satisfaisante. Si ma memoire est fideIe la delegation de l'Egypte s'est montree categorique sur ce point. Une des objections soulevees contre la proposition de la Colombie est qu'elle ne donne satisfaction ni au representant de l'Egypte ni a celui du Royaume-Uni. Je pourrais demander a mon tour si la proposition du -Bresil satisfait maintenant ces representants. Je ne le ferai cependant pas. Le representant de l'Australie a demande au President de retirer ma proposition. Malgre tout le respect que Je dois au representant de l'Australie, j'estime qu'aucune regIe, ni aucun precedent etabli par le Conseil, ne lui donne le .droit de faire semblable suggestion. Selon les reglements, rai seul le droit de demander au Conseil l'autorisation de retirer cette proposition, si je le juge a propos. Si je me trompe sur ce point, je serais heureux que l'erreur soit relevee. n sem1:>le que, sans le vouloir, j'ai provoque id une caine agitation en exer~ant, en tant que membre du Conseil de securite mon droit de vote sur la proposition du Bresil, car le hasard a voulu que ma voix ait une influence decisive sur le sort de cette proposition. Je paraisavoir ete mis dans la meme situation que les grandes Puissances lorsqu'elles disposent d'un vote. decisif. C"est la ce que certainsappeUent la "regIe d'unanimite" plus genetalement connue sous le nom de "droit de veto". Lorsque ce droit a ete exercc·une fois, n· rest ·d'habitude a· nouveau. One of the reasons put forward against the Colombian proposal is that it is not acceptable either to the Egyptian or to the United Kingdom representatives. I might as well ask again whether the Brazilian proposal now meets the condition of being acceptable to those representatives. But I am not going to do so. The Australian representative has requested the President to withdraw my proposal. With all due respect to the Australian representative, I believe he has no right to make such a suggestion under any rule or precedent set by this Council. According to the rules, it is my privilege to request the permission of the Council to withdraw the proposal, if I see fit to do so. I shall be glad to be corrected if I am in error on that point. It seems that I have unwittingly created some excitement here by the normal exercise of my vote as a member of the Security Council all the. BJ:azilian: proposal when, accidentally, that vote had a decisive influence on the fate of the Brazilian proposaL Some analogy seems to have been drawn to the situation in which the big Rowers find themselves when they have the de- <riding vote._ . Some call that the "unanimity rule," but it ~. generally called the "right to veto". Once it 18 exercised~ it is generally Fepeated. I now find ~~t" if, by chance, a representative happens to Be that as it may; I should like to make a few passing remarks on the statement I have just heard concerning' my proposal. First, the Australian representative says that I have gone into Chapter VII of the Charter, which is the only Chapter by which the Council cail "call upon the parties" to do anything. May I remind the. Australian representative . that' paragraph 2 of Article 33, under which we are dealing, reads as follows: "Th.e Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means." That is exactly what the Colombian proposal does. It has also been said by the Australian representative that the proposal is "loaded" against the Egyptian. If I may be allowed to use the same language, I should say that it is not the proposal but perhaps the situation ,itself that is loaded. How can the proposal be loaded, when, as a matter of fact, I have here a collection of documents-with which some of the members of the Council are more familiar than I and which, with the permission of the President, I should now like to read-wherein it is clearly established that we have not, by any means, tried to impose on the parties any conditions which are not at present in force under existing treaties. Article 7 of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 reads in part: "The aid of His Majesty the King of Egypt in the event of war, imminent menace of waror apprehended international emergency will consist in furnishing to ,His Majesty the King and Emperor on Egyptian territory, in accordance with the Egyptian system' of administra- ,tion and legislation, all the ,facilities and assistance in his power, including the use of his ports, aerodromes, and means of communication. It will accordingly be for the Egyptian Government to take all the administrative and legislative measures" including the establish- I ment of martial law and an effective censorship, necessary to render these facilities and assistance effective."· . That; as the members well know, is in full force. Article 8, also in for~e,'reads: "In view of the 'fact that the Suez Canal, whilst being an iritegral part of Egypt, is a universal' means of corinnunication as also an essential means of communication between the .. different parts of the' British Empire, lIis Majesty the King of Egypt, until such time' as . . the High Contracting ..Parties agree that the ~EgyptiahArmyis in a position to ensure by , its own ·resources the liberty and entire security ., of navigationol the.,Canal, authorizes His fa~on, atteinte aux droits de souverainete de l'Egypte. "ll reste entendu qu'a la fin de la periode de vingt ans specifiee a l'article 16, la question de savoir si la presence des forces britanniques n'est plus necessaire du fait que les troupes egyptiennes sont en mesure d'assurer par leurs propres moyens la liberte et l'entiere securite de na0gation du Canal, sera, en cas de desaccord entre les Rautes Parties contractantes, soumise au Conseil de la Societe des Nations pour etre reglees •.." 11 n'est done pas exact de dire que la proposition du representant de la Colombie impose aux parties des conditions qui n'existent pas dans les traites actuellement en vigueur. Therefore, it knot true to say that. the Colombian proposal imposes on the parties anything that is not established by existing treaties now in force. Je n'ai pas pris mes desirs pour des realites. Je n'ai pas discute la question sans tenir compte des traites ou des droits qui en decoulent. Tout au contraire, je pense que si nous nous bornions a proposer que les negociations se limitent a l'eva- ' cuation immediate des troupes du Royaume-Uni stationnees en territoire egyptien, ce serait non seulement contl'aire aux principes de la Charte et au protocole international, mais cela ne facUiterait pas beaucoup le succes de ces nouvelles negociations. De plus, les d~clarations que nous avons entendues ici indiquent cIairement que cette solution ne donnerait pas satisfaction au Royaume-Uni. I have not been doing any wishful thinking. I have not been discussing the matter with utter disregard for these treaties Of for the rights deriving therefrom. On the contrary, I think that if we propose simply that the negotiations should be restricted to the immediate evacuation of United Kingdom troops from Egyptian Territory, this would not only be contrary to the principles of the Charter and to international protocol but it would also not be very helpfw to the success of these negotiations; and from what we have 'heard so far, I believe we can infer that it would not be satisfactory to the United Kingdom. Ceci est un fait etabIi, car j'estime que nous devons faire confiance au representant du Royaume-Uni. C'est la la difficulte que, jusqu'a present, nous n'avons pas reussi a surmonter. That is what I call a matter of fact, because I believe we have to take the word of the representative of the United Kingdom. That is the difficulty which we have unsuccessfully tried to solve. Je ne crois pas qu'il soit sage d'affinner qu'en mentionnant les elements du differend on prejuge la question. Or, c'est tout ce que nousavons fait. Nous ne prejugeons rien en disant que I'evacuation des troupes doit etre complete et que les parties doivent negocier un pacte d'assistance mutuelle. I do not believe there is much use in saying that we are prejudging the case simply because we mention the elements of the dispute; and that is all we have done. Whep. we say that the evacuation should be completed and that the parties should negotiate for mutual assistance, we are not prejudging the case. . Loin de prejuger la position juridique des parties, nous indiquons d'une fa~on precise"le sujet du differend. J'estime qu'il faudrait beaucoup d'imagination pour soutenir, lorsqu'un litige est soumis .au Conseil, qu'il faut se garder de mentionner le sujet du differend et qu'il faut jouer a une sorte de cache-cache. Or, c'est exactement ce qui a ete propose id cet apres-midi: nous ne devrionspas mentionner - a-t-on laisse . We are not prejudging the legal position of the parties, but we are clearly stating the subject of the dispute. I believe it requires a great deal of imagination to contend that, when a dispute is brought to the Council, the subject of the dispute should not be mentioned· and that we should play hide and seek: with it. That, as I understand it, is what has actually been proposed t?is afternoon, namely, that we shoUl,d not men- 1(1on that the dispute concerns the evacuation of tx:oops from Egypt and the termination of the h joint adminiStration ID the Su4an, but just. ref~ ~ntendre - que le litige parte sur l'evacu,ation des troupes stationnees en ·Egypte et sur la cessation du regime administratif c6mmun en vigueur ~omplete the evacuation of troops, but to review this· Treaty. It was clearly an opportunity for them to do so, ifthey found it advisable. But, as I say, it was not our intention either to prejudge, "load", or impose..We have simply taken into consideration the facts and the elements of the dispute as they appeared to us. We shall not insist on our proposal. If there is any way by which the Security Council can come to an early agreement and take a vote, we shall be' very happy. For instance, if the Egyptian representative announces now that the Brazilian proposal is satisfactory to,him, I am Willing to sfate that I shall vote for it, and I shall vote for it immediately after requesting the Council's permission to withdraw my proposal. NOKRASHY Pasha (Egypt): No, the Brazilian proposal is not satisfactory. ~ 'the PRESIDENT: There is no other speaker on tlie list. However, in the name of the Syrian delegation, I should like to make some remarks on the Colombian proposal. Yesterday afternoon I referred to the second portion of paragraph 1(a) which reads as follows: ". . . mutual assistance being provided in order to safeguard in time of war or imminent threat of war the libeity and security of navigation of the Suez Canal". . The Suez Canal is a part of Egypt, just like any other territory of Egypt, and that is quite clear from article 8 of the 1936 Treaty. The safety, protection and defence of the Canal falls, in the first place, on the shoulders of Egypt. I was glad to hear the Colombian representative refer today, in his last statement, to the Treaty of 1936 and especially to article 7. I intend t<lrefer to articles 6 and 7 and other articles of that Treaty. We are now faced with an international treaty concluded between the United Kingdom and Egypt in 1936. Such a treaty, according to international law, always continues in force unless it is repudiated or abolished in some legal way. If we look at all the articles of the Treaty, ~e find that article 8 is exceptional. All the other articles have reciprocal obligations, while article 8, which is now the subject of the dispute concerning the evacuation of troops, does not contain reciprocal obligations., ' NOKRACHY Pacha (Egypte) (traduit de l'anglais): Non, la proposition du Bresil ne nollS donne pas satisfaction. ' Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): n n'y a plus d'orateurs inscrits. J'aimerais cependant presenter quelques remarques, au nom de la dele.. gation de la Syrie, au sujet de la proposition soumise par le representant de la ColOlnbie. ]'ai mentionne hier apres-midi la deuxieme partie du paragraphe 1 a) qui est redigee comme suit: ". . . en prevoyant une aide mutuelle afin de garantir, en temps de guerre ou en cas de menace imminente de guerre, la liberte et la securite de la navigation sur le· canal de Suez". Comme toute autre region de fEgypte, le canal de Suez fait partie du territoire egyptien; cela est clairement stipule a I'article 8 du Traite de 1936. La securite, la protection et la d6fense du Canal incombent donc en premier lieu a l'Egypte. J'ai cte heureux d'entendre aujourd'hui le representant de la Colombie faire allusion dans sa derniere declaration au Traite de 1936 et 'particulierement a rarticle 7. rai l'intention de pader des articles 6 et 7, ainsi que d'autres articles de ce Traite. Nous avons devant nous un traite interbational, conclu en 1936 entre le Royaume-Uni et l'Egypte. Un tel traite, conformement au droit , internftional, reste en vigueur jusqu'a ce qu'll soit revoque ou aboli par un prol:essus legal. Si nous examinons tous les, articles du Traite, nous voyonsque l'article 8 a un' caractere excep- - tionneI. Tous les autres articles contiennent des obligations reciproques, tandis que l'article 8, qui est aujourd'hui le sujet du differend reIatif a ,l'evacuation des troupes, ne contient pas d'obli-: gation reci:proque~ " Moreover, if article 8 is not implemented by the United Kingdom, that does not mean that the' other articles of the Treaty cease to obtain. Indeed, they still remain in force until some agreement can be made between the two parties concerning the future of the Treaty. Until that time, however, the Treaty remains in force. 'With regard to the phrase in the Colombian proposal concerning mutual assistan~e for safeguarding the Canal, if we look at the Treaty, we find that, in the case of aggression against the Canal, the Egyptian Government is required to provide for its protection. Under article 7 of the Treaty, the United Kingdom is also required to help; such help and mutual assistance continue under the Inilitary alliance which exists between the two Governments under the Treaty. tu~lle continuent en application de l'alliance militaire qui existe, aux termes du Traite, entre les deux Gouvemements. Le maintien de troupes en territoire egyptien n'est pas necessaire pour assurer la cooperation qui, en temps de guerre, doit amener les· deux parties a defendre non seulement le Canal,: mais aussi toute autre partie du territoire egyptien. A cet egard, il n'existerait aucune difference entre le canal de Suez et toute autre partie du, territoire egyptien-. En fait, aux termes de l'ar~, tide 7 du Traite, le Gouvemement du Royaume~ Uni s'est engage a venir en aide a l'Egypte en cas de danger de guerre pour ce pays ou d'une agression quelconque dirigee contre quelque partie que ce soit du territoire egyptien. J'estime done que le retrait des troupes du Royaume-. Uni stationnees dans la zone du Canal n'affec., terait en rien la protection du Canal ni les prin~ cipes fondamentaux du Traite. Autrement diti rien ne changerait. L'Egypte peut maintenant placer dans la zone du Canal non pas 10.000 hommes, mais 50.000. Pendant la premiere et la deuxieme guerre mondiale, en raison des tentatives d'attaques du Canal et des menaces a la paix contre l'Egypte, ce n'est pas 10.000, mais plus de 100.000 hommes qu'il a fallu envoyer dans la re~cm. En fait, pendant la premiere guerre mondiale, plus d'un million de soldats egyptiens ont collabore avec' l'armee du Royaume-Uni ala defense du Canal. Pendant la deuxieme guerre mondiale, la situation a ete exactement la meme et la collaboration anglo-egyptienne a continue conformement au Traite. Etant donne que la presence de ces effectifs est facultative, leur retrait volontaire ne changerait rien a la question. Le Gouvemement du, The retention of troops in Egyptian territory is not necessary to ensure co-operation between the two contracting part~es in time of war, in defending not only the Canal but any other part of the Egyptian territory. In this respect there would be no distjnction between the Suez Canal and any other part of the Egyptian territory. Indeed, under article 7 of the Treaty, the Government of the United Kingdom has undertaken to come to the aid of Egypt iT that country falls under any danger of war or aggression of any nature in any part of the Egyptian territory, For this reason, I consider that the withdrawal of United Kingdom troops from the Canal zone would have no effect at all eit..heI' on the protection of the Canal or on the concept or precepts of the Treaty. In other words, everything would remain as it is. Egypt is now able to station there not merely 10,000 troops, but 50,000. During the First and the Second World Wars, when attempts at aggression or threats to the peace were made agaJnst Egypt and against the Canal, more than 10,000 or even 100,000 troops were stationed there. In fact, in the First World War, more than a million Egyptian soldiers were engaged with the United Kingdom Army in the defence of the Canal. In the Second World War, the s!tuation was exactly the same and Anglo-Egyptlan collaboration continued under the Treaty. " ~ince the presence of these forces is optional, theIr volunta..]' withdrawal will not affect the ~!~;~: The United Kingdom Government The second part of paragraph 1 (a) of the Colombian proposal should be removed; if that part is included in the resolution, I doubt whether anyone could accept it. I therefore ask the Colombian representative whether he wishes that we should proceed to vote on his proposal in the method suggested by him, and I also ask the other members of the Council if they are ready to vote. Mr. LOPEz (Colombia): On first impulse, I felt a very strong desire to withdraw my proposal, in order to meet the wishes of the Australian representative. Upon reconsideration, I find that such action would practically amount to running away with my proposal at the very moment when it appears· it may receive the necessary votes to serve as the basis for a solution. The majority of the Council has very clearly expressed its objection to the second part of paragraph 1, although the first part is acceptabl~ Since that is the objection, I am very willing to join the rest of the Council in voting against the second part of paragraph 1(a). We shall then have a solution to the Egyptian problem, or something that will look like a solution or like an acceptable proposal to the majority of the Council. By voting against the second part of paragraph 1(a) , we shall have removed the objectional p~rt of the proposal. , Let us therefore vote on the part concerning the evacuation of troops, and we shall then have lit· proposal tliat is satisfactory to the Council. The other part of the paragraph will be rejected, and so it follows that the Treaty will stand as it is. Accordingly, I request that our proposal should be voted on in separate parts, according to rule 32 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, with paragraph 1 divided into two 'parts; the first part will end at the word "territory", and the second part will COI1tain the rest of the paragraph. This will, I hope, eliminate all the objections to my proposal. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : I think it was the Chinese representative who said yesterday afternoon that it was desirableof course it is not necessary-for the Council to M. LOPEz (Colombie). (traduit de l'anglais) : Au premier abord j'ai tente de retirer ma proposition afin de donner satisfaction au desir exprime par le representant de l'Australie. Mais a la reflexion, j'estime que cela reviendrait en quelque sorte a fuir avec ma proposition au moment precis Oll elle apparait devoir recueillir le nombre de voixsuffisant pOUf servir de base a une solution. La,majorite des membres du Conseil ont eleve des objections tres nettes contre la deuxieme partie du paragraphe 1 a); quant a la premiere partie, elle leur' parait acceptable. L'objection se trouvant la, je stiis pret a me jojndre au reste du Conseil pour voter contre la deuxieme partie du paragraphe 1 a). Nous aurons done ainsi une solution au probleme egyptien, ou quelque chose q.ui ressemblera a une solution ou a une proposition acceptable a la majorite du Conseil. En repoussant la seconde partie du paragraphe 1a), nous aurons supprime la partie de la proposition a laquelle on a trouve a redire. Mettons done aux voix la partie concernant l'evacuation des troupes, et nous aurons alors une proposition qui pourra satisfaire le Conseil. L'autre partie du paragraphe sera rejetee, et le Traite actuel restera, par consequent, en vigu~ur. Je demande donc que notre proposition fasse l'objet d'un vote separe, conformement a l'article 32 du reglement intc~rieur provisoire, c'esta-dire que le paragraphe 1 a) soit divise en deux parties dont la premiere se terminerait aux mats "de l'air", alors que la seconde contiendrait lereste du paragraphe. J'espere supprimer ainsi toutes les objections a ma proposition. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais) : C~est le representant de la Chine qui a dit hier apres-mi!li, si je ne m'abuse, qu'il serait bon, mais evidemment pas indispen------- However, my Government is also a party to the same dispute.,I have already said that the first half of paragraph 1(a ) would be totally unsatisfactory without the second half. Take out both if you like; disregard paragraph 1(a). If the Council wishes anything along those lines, put in both. I think I am entitled to maintain an objection just as much as the other party. I think one or two representatives-including the President, I believe-have asked me to observe that, if the first part were retained and the second part discarded, United Kingdom troops would evacuate the area and the Treaty of 1936 would remain in force until 1956. Is that what the Council wants? It does not seem to me to be a very desirable solution. Under the terms of the Treaty itself, we were trying to revise it and to produce a settlement satisfactory to both parties. However, I wish only to point out, so that there may be no misunderstanding, that the resolution, if adopted·with the first half of paragraph 1(a), but without the second half of that paragraph, would be regarded by my Government as totally unsatisfactory. Of course, I have no vote,l and I cannot prevent its adoption. .The PRESIDENT: When I mentioned articles 7 and 8 of the Treaty, I did not mean my statement to be taken as the view of the Council. The Council has no right to deal with the Treaty how. The Colombian draft resolution is under discussion, and it has nothing to do with the Treaty. It does not determine the validity or nonvalidity of the Treaty. That subject is not before the Council now. . I referred to that point, in order to explain to t~e representative of the United Kingdom that h~ .Government had a treaty with Egypt pro- VIding inter alia for mutual assistance in the defence of the Canal. The United Kingdom may reiy upon the Treaty, which it considers to be. in force.· The representative of the United Kingdom said several times that that Treaty remained in force until it was repudiated in some Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Lorsque j'ai cite les articles 7 et 8 du Traite, je ne croyais pas que mes paroles pourraient etre considerees comme representant l'opinion du Conseil. Le Conseil, a l'heure actuelle, n'a pas le droit de s'occuper du Traite. C'est le projet de resolution de la Colombie que nous discutons, et ce projet n'a rien a' voir avec le Traite. Ce texte ne se proIionce nullemeFlt sur la validite ou l'invalidite du Traite. C'est un sujet dont le Conseil n'est pas saisi a l'heure actuelle. J'ai evoque cette question pour expliquer au representant du Royaume-Uni que son Gouvemement avait signe, avec l'Egypte, un Traite contenant notamment des clauses d'assistance mutuelle pour la de£ense du Canal. Le Royaume- Uni peut-faire fond sur le Traite qu'il considere en vigueur. Le representant du Royaume-Uni a affirrne, a plusieurs reprises, que le Traite reste en vigueur jusqu'a ce qu'il soit revoque d'une The Council is not at present studying OT dis- Le Conseil n'est pas charge en ce moment cussing the validity of the Treaty or the question d'exanu!ler la.validite du Traite ou la question' of mutual assistance for the defence of the Canal. de l'assistance mutuelle pour la defense cll} Canal. It is not going into these details. The Council Il n'a pas a entrer dans ces details. LeConseil simply wishes to make recommendations to the desire simplement faire des recommandations parties concerned, in order to facilitate the sucaux parties en cause, afin de contribuer au succes cess of their negotiations. Ide leurs negociations. , . Mr. LOPEZ (Colombia): We have come very M. LOPEZ (Colombie) (traduit de l'anglais):, cloSe now to the heart of the problem. It has NoilS approchons maintenant du creur du probeen seen very clearly that I was not trying to bleme. nest desormais evident que je n'ai pas impose anything on the parties concerned, and, tente d'inlposer quoi que ce soit aux parties inte~ as I have already stated, the majority of the ressees. Comme je l'ai deja dit, la majorite d~ Council having objected to a certain part of my Conseils'etant oppose aune partie de ma propo.. proposal; I have accepted the objection, and! sition, j'ai accepte cette objection et je m'attends expect they will vote accordingly. a ce que le Conseil vote en consequence. The representative of the United Kingdom Le representant du Royaume-Uli a dhlare said that the first part of paragraph 1(a) of the que la premiere partie du paragraphe 1 a) de Colombian proposal was not satisfactory to him, la proposition de la Colombi.e ne lui donnait and very properly called the attention of the pas satisfaction; il a de plus, ajuste raisoD, attire Council to the fact that it did not adopt the l'attention des membres du Conseil sur le fait Brazilian proposal because it was declared unque le Conseil de securite n'a pas adopte la prosatisfact0IJ: by the representative of Egypt. Now ~osition du B,r!&~, parce 9ue !e repre~entant de the Council has to decide whether it should find I Egypte ne s etalt pas declare satIsfalt de cette a proposal ~hich is acceptable to both parties, so!~tion. ,~e moment est venu pour le Conseil de or whether It should adopt a proposal which it ~ecIder s il va tenter encore de tro?ver un~ sol?- believes will give some satisfar:tory results, retIOn acceptabl,e pour les deux par~les ou.bIe~ sil gardless of the reaction of the two parties. va se homer a adopter une solutIOn qUI IUl paraitra satisfaisal1te, quel que soit l'accueil que lui reserveront les parties en cause. In view of the conflicting statements made by the representatives of the United Kingdom and Egypt, it does appear that the two parts of paragraph 1(a) of the Colomiban proposal represent more or less a conflict of opinions and of interests which the Council is trying to settle.

In spite of the symptoms I have noticed in the statements whkh have been made ag2~t the Colombian draft resolution, I shall have to put it to a vote in accordance with our rules of procedure. In compliance with the , request of the representative of Colombia, the Council will vote on the resolution in separate parts and then as a whole. The preamble and first operative clause reads: ccHaving considered the dispute between t' e United Kingdom and Egypt brought to its ac- tention by the letter of the Prime Minister of Egypt, dated 8 July 1947, CCCalls upon the Governments of the United Kingdom and Egypt: En raison des declarations opposees faites par les representants du Royaume~Uniet de l'Egypte1 il paralt clair que les deux parties du paragra- phe 1 a) de la proposition de la Colombie repre- sentent, en quelque sorte, un conflit d'opinions et d'interets que le Conseil tente de resoudre. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): En de- pit des declarations qui ont ete faites contre le projet de resolution de la Colombie, je dois met- tre ce projet aux voix, conformement a notre reglement interieur. Suivant la demande du re- presentant de la Colombie, le Conseil votera d'abord sur les parties separees de la resolution, et ensuite sur son ensemble. Voici le texte du preambule et de la premiere recommandation concrete: ccAyant examine le differend existant entre le Royaume-Uni et l'Egypte, soumis ason attention par une lettre du Premier Ministre d'Egypte en date du 8 juillet 1947,' "Dernande aux Gouvernements du Royaume- Uni et de l'Egypte: Abstentions: Australia, Belgium, France, Po- land, Union of Soviet Socialist RepubEcs. The United Kingdom representative did not take part in the voting, in accordance with Ar- ticle 27 of the Charter.

The next part reads: "(a) To completing at the earliest possible date the evacuation of all United Kingdom military, naval and air forces from Egyptian territory ... " . Il est procede au vote .a main levee. 11 y a 5 voix pour, zero contre et 5 abstentions. N'ayant pas obtenu le vote affirmatif de sept membres, la deuxieme partie n'est pas adoptee. A vote was taken by show of hands. There were 5 votes in favour and 5 abstentions. The second part was not adopted, having failed to obtain the affirmative votes of seven members. Votes for: Brazil, China, Colombia, Syria, United States of America. Abstentions: Australia, Belgium, France, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The United Kingdom representative did not take part in the voting, in accordance with Article 27 of the Charter.

The next part reads: "... mutual assistance being provided in order to safeguard in time of war or imminent threat of war the liberty and security of the navigation of the Suez Canal". A vote was taken by show of hands. There; were no 7Jotes in favour, none against, and 10 abstentions. The third part was not adopted. Abstentions: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, Colombia, France, Poland, Syria, Union. of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America. The United Kingdom representative did not take part in the voting, in accordance with Artic.le 27 of the Charter.. .

The next paragrapJ:i reads: (b) To terminating the joint administration of the Sudah with due regard to the prillciple of self-determination of peoples and their right to self-governI!1ent". A vote was taken by show of hands. There were 4 votes in favour, none against and 6 ab- ~tentions. The paragraph was not adopted, havzng failed to obtain the affirmative votes of seven members. ..... C01l.formement al'Article 27 de la Charte, le represintcnt du Royaume-Uni ne prend pas part au vote. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Voici le texte de la p~rtie suivante: "a) D'achever des que possible Fevacuation de l'Egypte par toutes les forces du Royaume- Uni de terre, de mer et de l'air ..." V otent pour: Bresil, Chine, Colombie, Syrie, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. S'abstiennent: Australie, Belgiq.'J.e, France, Pologne, Union des Republiques socialistes SOn vietiques. Conformement al'Article 27 de la Charte. l~ representant du Royaume-Uni ne prend pas part au vote. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Void le texte de la partie suivante: ". . . en prevoyant une aide mutuelle afin de garantir, en temps de guerre ou en cas de menace imminente de guerre, la liberte et la securite de la navigation sur le canal de Suez". Il est procede au vote a main levee. 11 n'y a aucune voix pour, aucune contre et 10 abstentions. La troisieme partie n'est pas adoptee. S'abstiennent: Australie, Belgique,' Bresil, Chine, Colombie, France, Pologne, Syrie, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, Etats- Unis d'Amerique. Conformement al'Article 27 de la Charte, le representant du Royaume-Uni ne prend pas part au vote. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Void le texte du paragraphe suivant: "b) De revoquer le regime administratif commun en vigueur au Soudan, compte dfunent tenu du principe du droit des peuples a disposer d'eux-memes et a choisir leur propre forme de gouverneIl?-ent". Il est procede au vote a main levee. Il y a 4 voix pour, zero contre et 6 abstentions. N'a'yant pas obtenu le vote affirmatif de sept membres, le paragraphe n'est pas adoptee The United Kingdom representative did not take part in the voting, in accordance with Article 27 afthe Charter.

We shall now vote on the last paragraph, which reads: "2. To keep the Security Council readily informed of the progress of their negotiations." A vote was taken by show of hands. There were 5 votes in favour, none against, and 4 abstentions. The last paragraph was not adopted, having failed to obtain the affirmative votes of seven members. Votes for: Brazil, China, Colombia, Syria, United States of America. Abstentions: Belgium, France, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The United Kingdom representative did not take part in the voting, in accordance with Article 27 of the Charter. The representative of Australia did not vote. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): I did not vote on the last paragraph because it was foolish to do. so, when none of the previous paragraphs had been accepted.

The Colombian resolution is not adopted. I have no other proposals before me. I should like to hear what action the members of the Council wish to take. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Australian representative is correct in a certain sense if he has in mind paragraph 2, which says: "To keep the Security Council readily informed of the progress of their negotiations." In view of the fact that the preceding paragraphs were not adopted, this last paragraph is meaningless. That is why I did not vote in favour of it. I cer'" tainly think this question should be considered as remaining on the Council's agenda and it seems to me that the majority of the other repre- Sentatives on the Council are of the same opinion. If there are any contrary opinions on this matter, we shall have to take a decision. If we are all agreed, perhaps it would be sufficient for the President -to make a statement to this effect.

The last paragraph of the Colombian resolution, which reads: "To keep the Security CoUncil readily informed of the progress 'of their negotiations", certainly would have been adopted if the whole resolution had been passed. As all the other paragraphs were rejected, this last one was also rejected. That does not mean, however, that the matter is taken Conformement al'Article 2'7 de la Charte, le representantdtt Royaume-Uni ne prend pas part au' vote. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je mets aux voix le dernier paragraphe: "2. De tenir le Conseil de securite au courant du prc;>gres de ces negociations". Il est procide au vote a main levee. Il y a 5 voix pour, zero contre et 4 abstentions. N'ayant , pas obienu le vote affirmatif de sept membres, le dernier paragraphe n'est pas adopte. V otent pour: Bresil, Chine, Colombie, Syrie, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. . S'abstiennent: Belgique, France, Pologne, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques. Conformement al'Article 27 de la Charte, le representant du Royaume-Uni ne prend pas part au vote. Le representant de l'Australie s'abslient egalement de voter. Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): Je n'ai pas vote sur le dernier paragraphe parce que la situation est ridicule, du fait qu'aucun des paragraphes precedents n'a ete adopte. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : La resolution de la Colombie n'est pas adoptee. Aucune autre proposition ne m'est soumise. Je serais heureux d'entendre ce que les membres du Conseil pensententreprehdre a ce sujet. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Il se pourrait que le representant de l'Australie ait raison, s'il a en vue le paragraphe 2, aux termes duquel il y aurait lieu "de tenir le Conseil de securite au courant du progres de ces negociations". Etant donne que les paragraphes precedents n'ont pas ete adoptes, ,.:e dernier paragraphe est depourvu de sens. C'est precisement puur ce1a que je me suis abstenu; Mais il va sap.s dire que je voudrais voir cette question maintenue aI'ordre du jour du Conseil, et il me semble que la majorite des representants sont du meme avis. Si tout le monde n~ partage pas cet avis, nous devrions prendre une decision. Mais si nous somme~ tous d'accord, il suftuait peut-etre qu:; le President fasse une declaration a ce~ sujet. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Le de:- nier paragraphe de la resolution de la Colomble aux termes dJlque1 les parties en cause devraient ". . . tenir le Conseil de securite au courant du progres de ces negociations", aur~it certainement ete adopte si I'ensemble de la resolution I'avait ete. Comme taus les autres paragraphes ont ete repousses, ce dernier l'a ete egalement. Toute- Mr. TSIANG (China): Since two attempts have been made to provide the Council with. a resolution, and since in both instances they have failed, I now suggest that we should attack the problem. from a slightly different angle. As I listen to the discussion, I feel the key to the problem is the evacuation of United Kingdom troops. The other problems inyolved are of course serious, but, if negotiations on the evacuation of troops could be initiated and if they seemed likely to lead to agreement, the other problems involved could be dealt with in a better atmosphere. Therefore I suggest-I am not making a motion-that the two parties and the members of this Cauncil might consider an approach of this kind: "The Council recognizes the reasonableness of the Egyptian Government's desire fo~ an early and complete withdrawal of United Kingdom troops from Egypt." We could take note of the fact that the Government of the United Kingdom had already partially withdrawn its troops from Egypt and was ready to negotiate on the completion of the evacuation. We could recommend to the two Governments' that they should proceed with their negotiations. We would leave out all the other paragraphs that we have previously considered, and just concentrate on this one problem. If that suggestion is generally acceptable to the Council, I shall then undertake·to put it in resolution form. Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America): Unless the representatives of Egypt and the United Kingdom should indicate such opposition to a resolution along the lines of the one suggested by the representative of China, that it would be obvious that it could not be implemented, my delegation would gladly support such a resolution. Without formally proposing it, I should also like to ask the representative of China whether he would consider including before his resohition a paragraph to this effect: "The Security Council, having considered . . . having confidence that the renewal'of negotiations between the parties will result in the early evacuation of United Kingdom troops from ;Egyptian territory NOilS ne pouvons pas ecarter la question tant qu'une decision n'a pas ete prise par le Conseil de securite. Le Conseil de securite ne peut. pas abandonner un cas,. a moins d'avoir pris une decision approuvee par la majorite de ses membres. M. TSIANG (Chine) (traduit de fanglais)': Etant donne qu'on a essaye par deux fois de soumettre une resolution au Conseil et que dans les deux cas ces esssais ont echoue, je voudrais suggerer que nous abordions cc probU:me sous un angle un peu different. Apres avoir ecoute attentivement la discussion, j'estime que la cle du prob!eme est l'evacuation des troupes britanniques. Les autres problemes qui s'y rattachent sont evidemment graves, mais si les negociations concernant l'cvacuation des troupes pouvaient s'engager et si elles promettaient une possibilite d'accord, tous ces problemes pourraient etre regles dans une atmosphere plus favorable. Je propose done - a titre purement officieux - que. les deux parties, ainsi que les membres du Conseil, veuillent bien. prendre en consideration la fac,;on suivante d'aborder la question: "Le Conseil reconnait le caractere raisonnable du dl~sir du Gouvernement egyptien de voir les forces armees du Royaume-Uni evacuer rapidement et completeinent le territoire egyptien." Nous pourrions prendre acte que le Gouverne.. ment du Royaume-Uni a deja proecede' a un retrait partiel des troupes stationnees en Egypte et est pret a en negocier le retrait complete Nous pourrions recommander aux deux Gouvernements de continuer leurs negociations. Nous pourrions abandonner tous les autre! paragraphes que nous avions examines precedemment et concentrer nos efforts sur ce seul probleme. Si cette suggestion recueille l'approbation du Conseil, je la presenterai sous forme de resolution. M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais) : A moins que les representants de l'Egypte et du Royaume-Uni ne manifestent leur opposition a une resolution du genre de celle proposee par le representant de la Chine, ce qui evidemment empC'cherait qu'on y donne suite, ma deh~gation appuiera volontiers cette resolution. Sans presenter de proposition formelle, je voudrais aussi pour ma part demander au representant de la Chine s'il accepterait de placer, en tete de sa resolution, un paragraphe ainsi redige: "Le Conseil de securite, ayant considere . . . convaincu que la reprise des negociations entre les parties interessees aurait pour resultat d'amener l'evacuation rapide du territoire egyptien par

I do not believe such sug- . ge<.;tions can be discussed or brought to a decision at this late hour. As long as the question is kept on the agenda, a subsequent meeting ought to be called for that purpose. The President of the Security Council for the month of September,l the representative of the USSR, will call the next meeting, unless he wishes to fix the date now. Otherwise, I shall adjourn the meeting and leave it to him to call a meeting 'at such time as he thinks proper. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : I only wished to appeal to the President or, if not to him, to the representative of the USSR to give us some idea of when we should meet on this question again. It is rather inconvenient not to know the date. The material inconvenience is $at I have staff here from London; they have already been here several weeks, and they naturally want to return. I wish to iI}form them accordingly.

The next President of the 'Security Council agrees to call the next meeting for Tuesday, 9 September, at 3 p.m. . .,. 1 Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Coun- I 1 Voir le Reglement interieur proviso:re cil, rule 18. ' de securite, article 18. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : J'estime qu'il est bien tard pour discuter ces propositions et prendre une decision a leur sujet. D'ailleurs, etant donne que la question reste inscrite a l'or- dre du jour, nous devrons y consacrer une seance ulterieure. Le representant de l'URSS, qui doit assumer la presidence du Conseil de securite au mois de septembrel, fixera la date de ,la pro- chaine seance, a moins qu'il ne desire le faire maintenant. Sinon, je vais ajourner la seance en lui laissant le soin de convoquer une reunion lorsqu'il le jugera apropos. Sir Alexander CADoGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): Je voudrais demander au President, ou au representant de l'URSS, de vouloir bien nous donner une idee approximative de la date a laquelle le Conseil reprendra l'exa- men de cette question. Il est assez genant de ne pas connaltre la date. L'inconvenient, c'est que j'ai id, depuis plusieurs semaines, du personnel venu de Londres et qui, naturellement, desire repartir. l'aimerais etre a meme de leur fournir des renseignements a ce sujet.' Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Le pro- chain President du Conseil de securite accepte de fixer la prochaine seance au mardi 9 septembre a15 lieures. , I d".::J FRANCE Editions A. Pedone 13, rue SoufHot PARIS, Ve AUSTRALlA-AUSTRAL~E H. A. Goddard Pty. Ltd. 255a George Street SYDNEY, N. S. W. BELGIUM-BELGIQUE Agence et Messageries de la Presse, S. A. 14-22 rue du Persil BRUXELLES BOLlVI,A.-BOLlVIE Lihreria Cientifica y Literaria Avenida 16 de Julio, 216 Casilla 972 LA. PAZ CANADA The Ryerson Press 299 Queen Street West TORONTO CHILE-CHill Edmundo PizarIo Merced 846 SANTIAGO CHINA-CHINE The Commercial Press Ltd. 211 Honan Road SHANGHAI COLOMBIA-COLOUlBIE Lihreria Latina Ltda, Apartado Aereo 4011 BOGOTA. COSTA RICA-eOSTA·RICA Trejos Hermanos Apartado 1313 SAN JOSE CUBA La Casa Belga GREECE-GRECE "Eleftheroudakis" Lihrairie intematiouale Place de la Constitution ATHENES GUATEMALA Jose Goubaud Goubaud & Cia. Ltda. Sucesor 5a Av. Sur No. 6 y 9a C. P. GUATEMALA HAITi Max Bouchereau Lihrairie "A la Caravelle" Boite postale 111·B PO!'T-AU·PRINCE ICELAND-ISLANDE Bokaverzlun Sigfusar Eymundsonnar Austurstreti 18 REYKJAVIK INDIA-INDE Oxford Book & Stationery Company Scindia House NEW DEL'!!I IRAN Bongahe Piade:l'ow 731 Shah Ave..lle TEHERAN IRAQ-IRAK Mackenzie & Mackenzie The Bookshop BAGHDAD Renl~ de Smedt O'Reilly 455 LA HABANA CZECHOSLOVAKIA- TCHECOSLOVAQUIE F. Topic . Narodni Trida 9 PRAHA 1 DENMARK-DANEMARK Einar Munksgaard Nj1Irregade6 LEBANON-LlBAN Lihrairie universelle BEYROUTH LUXEMBOURG Lihrairie J. Schummer Place Guillaume LUXEMBOURG NETHERLANDS-PAYS·BAS N. V. Martinus Nijhoff Lange Voorhout 9 'S·GRAVENHAGE. K.~BENHAVN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC- REPUBUQUE DOMINICAINE Libreria Dominicana Calle Mercedes No. 49 Apartado 656 ClUDAD TRUJILLO ECUADOR-EQUATEUR Mufioz Hermanos y Cia. Nueve de Octubre 703 . Casilla 10·24 GUAYAQillL EGYPT-EGYPTE Librairie "La Renaissance d'Egypte" 9 Sh. Adly Pasha CAffiO ETHIOPIA-ETHIOPIE Agence ethiopienne de publicite P. O. Box 8 ADDIS·ABEBA NEW ZEALAND- NOUVELLE·ZELANDE Gordon & Gotch, Ltd. Waring Taylor Street WELLINGTON United Nations Association of New Zealand P. O. 1011, G.P.O. WELLINGTON NICARAGUA Ramiro Ramirez V. Agencia de Publicaciones MANAGUA, D. N. NORWAY-NORVEGE Johan Grundt Tanum Forlag Kf. Augustgt. 7A OSLO PHILIPPINES D. P. Perez Co. 132 Riverside SAN JUAN, RIZAL POLAND-POLOGNE Spotdzielna Wydawnicza "Czytelnik" 38 Poznanska WARSZAWA SWEDEN-SUEDE A.·B. C. E. Fritzes Kungl. Hofbokhandel Fredsgatan 2 STOCKHOLM SWITZERLAND-SUISSE Lihrairie Payot S. A. LA.USANNE, GENEVE, VEVEY, MONTREU~ NEUCHATEL, BERNE, BASEL Hans Raunhardt Kirchgasse 17 ZURICH I SYRIA-SYRIE Lihrairie universelle DAMAS TURKEY-TURQUIE Librairie Hachette' 469 Istiklal Caddesi BEYOGLU·lsTANBUL UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA- UNION SUD.AFRICAINE Central News Agency Commissioner & Rissik Sts. JOHANNESBURG and at CAPETOW and DURBAN UNITED KINGDOM- ROYAUME·UNI H. M. Stationery Office P. O. Box 569 LONDON, S.E. 1 and at H.M.S.O. Shops in LONDON, EDINBURGH, MANCHES' CARDIFF, BELFAST, BIRMINGHAlIl and BRISTOL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ETATS·UNIS D'AMERIQUE International Documents Servic Columbia University Press 2960 Broadway NEW YORK 27, N. Y. URUGUAY Oficina de Representaci6n de Editoriales Av. 18 de Julio 1333 Esc. 1 MONTEVIDEO -VENEZUELA Escritoria Perez Machado Conde a Pifiango 11 CARACAS YUGOSLAVIA-YOUGOSLAVI Drzavno Preduzece Jugoslovenska Knjiga Moskovska Ul. 36 BEOGRAD